Exhibit 089

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 7 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which he rendered to writing as close to the exact words used by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) during the discussion.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the scope of the investigation, methodology for capturing the statement, and the opportunity to review the memorandum for record after.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. How long have you been in 2/1 Marines?

(2) Answer. I arrived to the unit in July 2020. I've been in the Marines 2 ½ years, and attended the Infantry School prior to arriving. I was commissioned through of OSC and got my degree from Northwest Missouri State.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. When did you deploy to CENTCOM?

(2) Answer. My platoon, 1st platoon, arrived with all of G Co to (b)(1)1.4a in early April.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What did you do in (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. The company did a lot of infantry combat training. We executed a progressive training plan, starting with individual tasks and progressed to squad tasks. Squad training included patrolling techniques, culminating with a 10 KM contract patrol.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

We knew the deployment was ultimately a crisis response support effort, but we were able to do a lot of infantry training. The British element we trained with came out in mid-July. This was 2 Paramarines, who were later at Abbey Gate with us at HKIA. In July we conducted force on force and an LFX with them.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When were you aware NEO in Afghanistan might become a possibility?

(2) Answer. The situation in Afghanistan was on the news and social media, so you could feel it coming. We officially got a warning order from the BN in early August. On 10-12 August, we were officially notified some of the Golf Platoons would go to HKIA.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Any chance to prepare or train before departing for Afghanistan?

(2) Answer. Very little. We were able to rehearse basic crowd control and we had some discussions on ROE.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What was the mission and when did you learn what tasks you would be performing?

(2) Answer. We were told to be prepared to come off the aircraft, get accountability, and be tasked immediately. We saw the news with the civilians falling off the C-17s and the civilians overrunning the airfield. We arrived a couple of days after that, night of the 18th, about 0100.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. What was the situation on ground when you get off the plane?

(2) Answer. We consolidated at PAX terminal and then to the gym, which served as our staging area. The Platoon Commander and Company Commander huddled to discuss the next morning tasks. The company was tasked to go out to Abbey Gate in the morning of the 18th. We secured a couple of vehicles for transportation; they were abandoned. My platoon was the first to go out to Abbey gate and we arrived at approximately 0800.

i. Question and Answer 8.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question. What units within Golf arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer. 1st, 3rd, 4th Platoons, and the Company HQ were all at HKIA. 2nd platoon was in (b)(1)1.4a but never arrived because the flow of forces was stopped.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When you arrived at Abbey gate, what do you see?

(2) Answer. We travelled down to the gate area by vehicle and patrolled through Abbey Gate proper, down to the middle gate. We found Air Force Pararescue Jumpers and (b)(1)1.4a at the gate. The crowd was pushed up against the outer gate. The actual physical gates for Abbey Gate, both proper and outer, were larger solid metal gate. I used one squad to open the gate and try to push the crowd back, but I quickly realized I needed the whole platoon. It was a rough experience. Marines were getting choked, punched, and pushed; but we had to hold the line. We held for 45 minutes, but had to close the gate to prevent the crowd from breaching the inner gate. Someone hooked up a tow strap to pull the gate shut, and my platoon had to slip back in, as it closed. A (b)(1)1.4a Soldier released a C&S canister, which he took off a US Marine in my platoon, and created a small riot to clear the crowd. Some Marines got trampled. At this point, the crowd is pushed back, the gate was closed, and 50 evacuees were inside the gate with us. The evacuees inside the gate were not problem. Opening and closing the gate took about an hour total. Another platoon came up and moved the evacuees into the inner gate area and searched them. The CS had the platoon vomiting and out of the fight. We returned to the line and guarded the gate.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. How does the Gate get to the steady-state in place from 19-25 August?

(2) Answer. On August 19th, at 0100, we reopened gates, and cleared crowds with one platoon left and one right, on line. We slowly pushed the civilians back to the Barron Hotel inlet road. We stayed on line, two platoons abreast, concrete barrier in between. The Brits need to get vehicles up to the Barron Hotel, which was our reason for reopening the gates. During the push, the Taliban had one guy in the crowd, and he was violent and they complied with whatever he wanted. The engineers brought up the chevron containers after we pushed the crowds far enough down. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was coordinating with the Taliban through some SOF and interpreter, and then later individually. After the containers were in place, the Taliban took over the south entrance area and we pivoted behind the containers and road to the Barron Hotel. The Brits were positioned on the canal at this point. This becomes the steady state until 26 AUG. There was a platoon with the Brits on the canal, a platoon on the chevron behind the Taliban, and platoon on inner gate (holding area, search area, escorts).



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Where were you on the 26th of August?.

(2) Answer. My platoon was on the canal on the 26th, pushed up against the jersey barrier beneath the tower. We RIP'd with 4th platoon at about 1600. The Gate was going to close that afternoon; we were told 1700. But that got pushed back until 1800. We were good with 1800, because it allowed us to keep pushing the evacuees through the gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Did you ever take a different force posture because of threat?

(2) Answer. A few days before 26 August we stopped the flow at the Gate, took a knee behind the T-walls, and reduced our profiles to the extent possible. We held the position for over 3 hours, from 0200-0500. We were not there when they executed a similar pause on 26 August.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What was the typical PPE worn at the gate?

(2) Answer. Everyone wore a vest with SAPI back and front, eye pro, gloves, and helmets. We could drop gear in inner gate or during rest in North HKIA. On the line, it was full PPE. Marines would occasionally remove their helmet to engage with a civilian, especially to calm them down.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. What threat were you aware of on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I was tracking a potential SVIED or VBIED against the gate. I did not hear any details beyond the threat as an SVEST. Threats were constant throughout gate operations.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Where are you in relation to the canal and where is your platoon on 26 August?

(2) Answer. I was less than 25 meters from the tower. I had one squad at the jersey barriers at the tower, one at the canal edge, immediately next, and the last squad on line with the second. The crowd of people was rowdy and the biggest we had seen



Approved for Release

so far. People at the jersey barrier were getting crushed to death and the crowd was going to come over the barrier, compromising the gate. The Brits were still out at the Barron Hotel so we had to keep the Gate open.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. How many KIA in your PLT?

(2) Answer. There were Nine KIA, all of Golf Companies KIA. The FETs were at the wall with us, mixed in with 2nd and 1st squads, helping with the crowds, especially the rejects.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. What were you doing at the time of the attack?

(2) Answer. When the blast went off, I was escorting a family back and holding a child. I got knocked down but was still conscious and able to check myself for injuries. There were people on top me and after I cleared them off, I saw the blood on my arm. The first thing I see are casualties, but the Marine next to me has a CS gas canister going off. It must have been struck by shrapnel. I was able to move and a Marine came up to me, put on a tourniquet, and sent me to the CCP. On my way to the CCP, I see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) crawling in that direction, so I pick him up, and we both get to CCP. When I get to the CCP, its clear the tourniquet is not on correctly, and need to be reestablished. I was losing a lot of blood. Someone helped me reapply the tourniquet. I went back to the outer gate, I saw Marines everywhere, but I knew I would be little help with one arm. So instead I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get accountability. After that, I blacked out. I woke up on the "baggage cart" and was going to the Hospital. A lot of my Marines were with me, so I was talking with those who being evac'd. I ended up on a British truck to go to Role 2 on North HKIA. The Role 2 had no room because of all the casualties, so I was put in a Toyota Hilux, and taken to another Field Hospital. I was stable, so not a high priority. They got me X-rays and then moved me back to the main hospital after about an hour. I was put into a room with my platoon's wounded, which when I started to hear about our KIA. They told us the plane was scheduled to leave 0100-0200. We had some time, so I left hospital for the gym we put our gear in, grabbed the wounded's phones and wallets, and returned to the hospital. The sun was coming up when the flight finally left, and went to Germany. We went to Walter Reed, after surgeries in Germany. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

s. Question and Answer 18.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question. Did you hear or experience any small arms fire?

(2) Answer. I did not hear anything. People said there was, but I don't remember any firing. I was focused on helping casualties.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. What would you say caused these injuries, based on what you saw?

(2) Answer. It was a lot of shrapnel and ball bearings, because of the round holes a lot of the wounded had for injuries. There was one gun-shot wound, which was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at least according to him. However, my arm was originally determined to be a gun-shot wound. One Marine might have been burned by the blast, but more likely it was from the heat of the shrapnel that struck him. I'm not aware of any blast trauma issues among the wounded.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Were there any platoon members who were injured, taken to Role 2, but not evacuated?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) my platoon sergeant, could give you a better list of who didn't get evacuated. He was with 3rd Squad on the jersey barriers, but had no injuries.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Is there anything you would like to add?

(2) Answer. (b)(1)1.4d They would pull people from the crowd, put them in holding area, or worst against the fence immediately behind the canal position, while we were not taking anyone. The crowd would get really upset seeing this happen. This got worked out later, but it was a big problem for some time. It smoothed its self out by 25th and 26th of August.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) G Co, 2/1 Marines, 7 October 2021

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 090

ACTS-SCK-DO 8 October 2021

MEMOANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 8 October 2021

1. On 8 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answers individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: How long have you been in 2/1?

(2) Answer: Since March of 2020.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Were you with 2/1 for pre-deployment training? Were you able to visit some of the training?

(2) Answer: Yes and yes. It was an interesting time dealing with COVID mitigations during the train-up. We didn't want to risk insufficient training due to COVID but had to include risk mitigation. For example, we trained often by company and not as a whole battalion.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Did this pay off to have the companies used to working independently and still report to the battalion?

(2) Answer: Yes. It helped the companies exercise command and control internally and with the battalion.

Approved for Release

For the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX), the battalion performed phenomenally. We heard great feedback from the outside units that worked with us and they said they loved working with our Marines. This was very motivating to our Marines. We culminated our train-up with the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX), a peer-adversary type of training

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Were you confident with the battalion's readiness after the train-up?

(2) Answer: Absolutely. I think we were very prepared. It was very rough when we were at the end of our ITX and to hear that the deployment was canceled around the end of October. The Marines were still training but didn't know what we would be doing. November, December, and January we felt like we were in limbo. We kept the mindset that we may still be going. I think it was late January when we got the call again that we were deploying.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Talk me through the flow of the battalion to theater.

(2) Answer: ADVON left in March. We were spread throughout different locations. G Co went to (b)(1)1.4a and did a lot of training with the British Military (Brits) and ended up working with them again at HKIA. This was beneficial in the long run.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When did you receive the order for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan?

(2) Answer: We knew that it was probably going to happen but we didn't know when. We did a lot of simulation training with role-players at this time in preparation. We rehearsed the landing of planes and tried to keep training as realistic as possible. We practiced loading and un-loading the aircraft, actions on the objective, interaction with different people, etc. I was walking the lines and observing training during this time. The Marines were very engaged in training.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Is it safe to say that, based upon all of the training to this point, the Marines have received a lot of practice adapting to situations?

(2) Answer: Yes. You can never predict what is going to happen but the Marines had a lot of exposure to different types of scenarios. We did a lot of mass casualty (MASCAL) training, integrating the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP), and had a lot of

Approved for Release

practice for MASCALs. We had a lot of practice exercising crisis response. We asked the Air Force during our second large training to provide personnel to simulate large crowds. We performed a lot of repetitions practicing with the crowds.

The companies and platoon also did a lot of individual training internally.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When does 2/1 arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: We arrived 15-17 of August. The CO left one day ahead of me. I think he was there during the crazy time when people were hanging from aircraft. I left (b)(1)1.4a on a Tuesday. We got stuck in (b)(1)1.4a for quite some time.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Around 19 August, G Co begins manning Abbey Gate. Correct?

(2) Answer: Yes. I actually was there receiving G Co when they arrived. I was trying to help them as much as possible. I was at the flight line when they landed and did typical SgtMaj duties. They were coming in from (b)(1)1.4a and were tired.

G Co is the one that cleared the area. They did it in such a professional way that the two-star CSM from the Airborne unit approached me and said that they were the best Marines he had ever seen. After he saw E Co and the other companies, he said that the whole battalion was on point.

So G Co went and cleared the crowd. They were very professional and never fired any warning shots. We emphasized that the people were in the crowd were trying to find a better life and to stay empathetic. They convinced the crowd to move back without using force. They were able to connect with them. They moved them back toward the Barron Hotel and allowed the British and other foreign nations to have a clear corridor for them to move from the Barron Hotel to HKIA.

2/1 initially helped secure a perimeter on the airfield when we first arrive, we were tasked with the gates, and then the US Army took over security duties.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What were your general observations of the Marines working on the gates? How did the Marines deal with the crowd's desperation over the course of the days?

(2) Answer: I went with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) everywhere that he went. There were so many people. The flow of people never stopped and kept increasing. The Marines were

Approved for Release

on their feet for over 20 hours at a time sometimes. They were so passionate about the mission and some would volunteer to not rest because they wanted to keep helping people. I saw a lot of joy in their help despite the tough circumstances.

The Department of State (DoS) would come, help, and then leave. They didn't always provide clear instruction and this led to the Marines getting very creative with their processes. The Marines became very good at finding ways to save time with processing people. They came up with color codes to separate processing people. They had green for those that were good to go to the terminal, yellow that needed the DoS to check documents, and red meant that they had to leave and wouldn't be processed. This helped limit the reactions of people getting turned away.

The crowd would freak out when (b)(1)1.4d would pull other people out of the crowd. The Marines had to explain that they were going to different countries and not the US. They used the interpreters a lot to communicate this.

The heat was a large concern for the CO and I. We would find camo nets and tents to set up for the Marines to give shade to the crowds.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Is there anything else leading up to 25 August that you would like to emphasize?

(2) Answer: No, the only thing I noticed was that people were reading the news and becoming desperate. They knew that this could be their last day at a chance to leave. The crowds were very desperate, especially the night of 25 August. People were trying to throw themselves over the wall. I caught about eight of them. We had to take them back to the gate. We tried to have the interpreters explain they couldn't do this.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: On 26 August, what was the threat reporting?

(2) Answer: I saw on the news that they were telling AMCITs to avoid the gates due to possible threats.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: The DoS was still taking people at the gate, despite this?

(2) Answer: Yes.

o. Question and Answer 14.

Approved for Release

(1) Question: I'm aware 2/1 took some additional FORCEPRO measures to mitigate this risk. Can you talk about this?

(2) Answer: Yes. We moved some Marines closer and set up overwatch.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Were you by the gate at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer: I went down there with the CO and moved away from him about five minutes before the blast. The Marines were smoking and I don't like to be around smoke so I moved away from them. They finished smoking and I was on my way walking toward them when all of a sudden I felt a pit in my stomach that something was wrong. I stopped and two 1stSgts came up to me and we were chatting. All of a sudden the blast went off and I saw bodies and debris fly.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Did you feel the blast?

(2) Answer: Yes, I felt some headache afterward.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: What happened after the blast?

(2) Answer: Everything felt like slow motion right after the blast. I immediately moved to my right and went to a LCpl next to me and thought that there may be a secondary blast. I told the LCpl not to move. Another Marine ran past me a few seconds later yelling that there were Marine casualties. I took off running toward the site of the blast and went through the hole in the fence and started assisting carrying the casualties out. I was one of the first ones on-site.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did you hear any gunfire at this time?

(2) Answer: Yes. I heard gunfire. I remember I heard automatic fire as I was running toward the blast sight. It sounded like it was being fired near the chevron. I didn't hear incoming rounds landing. People were saying that the Taliban were shooting in the air.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Do you know if any Marines fired shots?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer: I do not know. I only heard shots fired near the chevron.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: So you assisting with casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) of the Marines?

(2) Answer: Yes, I pulled out three of them and brought them to the casualty collection point (CCP). When I went back the fourth time, all casualties had been evacuated. It was a very quick effort. We CASEVAC everyone within minutes. I feel really bad about the wounded and dead civilians. There were bodies everywhere.

Once everyone was in we closed the gate and then started retrograding back and getting accountability.

Once we were retrograded back, we had to start identifying the casualties and KIA. I had to open body bags. It was hard to identify some Marines because they had a lot of facial injuries.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: From your perspective, is there anything else that you can add or anyone else that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer: No.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 091

ACTS-SCK-DO

8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 91, G Co Marines KIA Sketch and Discussion

1. On 7 October 2021, Marines from across G Co were gathered for an interview with Col CJ Douglas concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. At the conclusion of the interview, I gathered Marines from 1st Platoon and Marines closest to the attack-blast area to diagram the location of Marines at the time of the attack and who were KIA.

2. Using a whiteboard, Exhibit 91 was collaboratively sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Each participant was instructed to only rely on their direct memory and not what they heard from others. They were also instructed to categorize the certainty of their memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the Marines who were KIA.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

# ABBEY GATE KIA LOCATIONS
## G Co, 2/1 Marines Sketch
## 7 OCT 21

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~




1. HM3 Soviak, Maxton
2. LCpl McCollum, Rylee
3. LCpl Nikoui, Kareem
4. LCpl Espinoza, David
5. Cpl Sanchez, Humberto
6. Cpl Page, Daegan
7. LCpl Schmitz, Jared
8. Cpl Lopez, Hunter
9. LCpl Merola, Dylan
10. Sgt Rosario Pichardo, Johanny
11. Sgt Gee, Nicole
12. SSgt Hoover, Darin

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Exhibit 092

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 92, G Co Platoon Sergeant KIA and WIA Sketch and Discussion

1. On 8 October 2021, I met with Marine (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st platoon to diagram the location of Marines at the time of the attack and who were KIA and WIA. The vast majority of both KIA and WIA were from 1st Platoon, G Co.

2. Using a whiteboard, Exhibit 92 was sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was instructed to only rely on direct memory, and not what they heard from others. He was also instructed to categorize the certainty of his memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the Marines who were KIA and WIA.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

# ABBEY GATE KIA LOCATIONS

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sketch 8 OCT 21

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~




1. HM3 Soviak, Maxton
2. LCpl McCollum, Rylee
3. LCpl Nikoui, Kareem
4. LCpl Espinoza, David
5. Cpl Sanchez, Humberto
6. Cpl Page, Daegan
7. LCpl Schmitz, Jared
8. Cpl Lopez, Hunter
9. LCpl Merola, Dylan
10. Sgt Rosario Pichardo, Johanny
11. Sgt Gee, Nicole
12. SSgt Hoover, Darin
13. SSG Knauss, Ryan

X— (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (not KIA)

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

# ABBEY GATE WIA LOCATIONS

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 8 OCT 21

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c




(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(not WIA)

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Exhibit 093

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 93, Echo Company Abbey Gate 26 August Sketch and Discussion

1. Throughout 1 October 2021, Platoon Commanders, Platoon Sergeants and Squad Leaders from Echo Company, 2/1 Marines were gathered for an interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. During the interview, I drew a sketch of Abbey Gate at the time of the attack, based on their description of events and locations. All participants provided feedback as part of their interview to refine the sketch.

2. The sketch was done on a whiteboard and Exhibit 93 was collaboratively refined by all participants throughout 1 October 2021.

3. The interviews related to this sketch are Exhibit 59-61.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

# ABBEY GATE 26 AUG 21
## E Co Leaders Sketch 1 OCT 21

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~




1. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2. SSgt Hoover (KIA)
3.
4. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
5.
6.

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Exhibit 094

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 8 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 94, 2/1 Marines Sniper Abbey Gate 26 August Sketch and Discussion

1. On 1 October 2021, Snipers from 2/1 Marines were gathered for an interview with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. Throughout the interview, I drew a sketch of Abbey Gate at the time of the attack, based on their description of events and locations. The Snipers provided feedback as part of their interview to refine the sketch.

2. The sketch was done on a whiteboard, Exhibit 94 was collaboratively refined by (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. The interview related to this sketch is Exhibit 62.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Encl (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

# ABBEY GATE 26 AUG 21
## E Co Sniper Sketch 1 OCT 21

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~




1. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
2. SSgt Hoover (KIA)
3.
4.
5. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
6.
7.
8.

~~SECRET// REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Page 107 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 095 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 108 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 109 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 110 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 111 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 112 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 113 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 114 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 115 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 116 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 117 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 118 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 119 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 120 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 121 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 122 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

Page 123 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6), 1.7(e)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 096

ACTS-SCK-DO

22 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USFOR-A, 22 October 2021

1. On 22 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel over Secure Video Teleconference from the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command Headquarters, Fort Bragg NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which CSM Banfield answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Did you visit the gates?

(2) Answer: I hit every gate, every day starting on the 16th. All three of the main gates and the peripheral gates. That was my daily battle field circulation, I'd Hit North Gate, East Gate, then Abbey Gate. I'd do that in the morning and at night, then I would do the perimeter where we had Marines and Soldiers.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Can you speak to the atmosphere of the crowds and actions of Marines by Gate?

(2) Answer: North Gate was the most violent of the gates. The crowd up there was violent since the first time I went on the 15th or 16th. There were Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) up there, and my opinion is they started two rungs higher on the ladder of escalation than the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) did at the East and Abbey Gates. From the beginning, it appeared to me that they were at a higher state in the way they dealt with the crowd. It



Approved for Release

was a bit heavier handed with yelling and screaming than it was at Abbey Gate. Full disclosure, this was my first Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) or large crowd control event. I did crowd control training 20 years ago with riot gear, but that gear and non-lethals were not widely available during this operation. Abbey Gate just had a strikingly different atmosphere. The Marines there were very stoic, they had a much different atmosphere. Perhaps the British being there had an effect on that. In the first few days, before the chevron was set up, there were large crowds pushed inside the Abbey Gate. We brought translators in to get control of the situation and clear the road there. Sometime between the 18th and the 20th, the Marines there pushed the crowd back. It was a deliberate operation. I observed some of it from on top of a guard shack nearby, and it was very deliberate. It almost reminded me of trench warfare with Marines and British pushing the crowd back. It was not violent, just a large scale crowd control measure.

While Abbey Gate later became the largest gate as more Afghans tried to use it to get on to HKIA, I don't know if they had different training, but the Marines from the SPMAGTF and Golf Company with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had a different perspective on what was going on. It was clear down to the lowest level that this was a humanitarian effort. At North Gate, the mindset was more just about keep people back. I did not see any specific violent actions at Abbey Gate, at North Gate I had to control some Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) that were a bit heavy handed. I had to explain to them that yelling wasn't helping, these were desperate people trying to escape from their country. Many of them had spent years fighting for us in our war. The potential for violence was just higher at North Gate, if I was an Afghan I would not have gone through there because it would have been a scary experience.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Could you speak more about (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) His vision down from the Company Commander level to his Marines?

(2) Answer: I have never been a huge fan of Marines, my son-in-law is a Marine. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his Marines have changed my opinion of Marines. His demeanor, professionalism, and his Marines ability to make snap decisions were incredibly impressive. I was floored, it made me proud to be an American.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Were you there the day of the attack?

(2) Answer: Yes, two to three hours prior. Time and space was jumbled, I only know that because I called my wife that day, prior to the attack. When we got initial



Approved for Release

reports of the bombing, it was incomprehensible because there was never a point where I saw Marines clustering there. They were as tactically sound as they could be, it was a high risk situation obviously, having the crowds within blast radius of Marines. We are lucky that it was only 13 Marines and there wasn't a second blast, it was high risk situation.

The first time I went to North gate on the 16th, they were running a turnstile type system, which I felt like was a suicide bomber's dream because there were so many people going into a narrow passage. The next morning they switched to a gate system which was more logistically sound, but obviously that was still high risk as Marines were so close to the crowds.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: We have heard Abbey referred to as the international gate?

(2) Answer: The first week North Gate was really the international gate while the Brits were getting set up at Abbey Gate. The Europeans were using North Gate, and having them there actually toned things down a bit. It was 19 year old Marines working up there at the gate, it was hard to change their more combative mindset on the spot. That is something that they would have had to think about before they got there. But the European countries came in deliberately and used North Gate until they hit a culmination point. After that, they moved to Abbey Gate in smaller numbers. Abbey Gate became the primary gate for everybody. There were British, French, Italians, etc down there and you could differentiate all the nations because they had flags set up to signal their civilians.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Anything else you want to highlight?

(2) Answer: When I did see specific instances that needed to be corrected, I would bring it up with leadership on the ground. Leadership always took appropriate actions, and BGen Sullivan and the entire JTF-CR did an excellent job with a difficult situation.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: In regards to the retrograde, there was clear guidance on how to execute the demilitarization (demil), could you speak to how Golf Company and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, executed that versus other companies?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: After we pushed the task to conduct a demil, the intent got lost somewhere in the chain of command. The purpose wasn't to destroy everything, it was just to conduct a demil. Golf Company did exactly as they were supposed to, but some of the Marines on the North East side of HKIA cleared anything in their path to include vehicles, shops, and windows. It looked like vandals had gone through there, penises were spray painted all over the place. When that got up to me, I talked to (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was already tracking and working on fixing it. He told me to wait a couple hours because he was going to try to fix it. We consolidated the vehicles that had been destroyed, and we tried to package it as best as we could to look like there was American discipline.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Golf Company set the standard on demil. I saw them one morning on North HKIA, and I knew already, but I asked him if it was his guys that did it. And he reassured me that his guys wouldn't do that, which I expected.

The destruction was wild, Marines were flipping cars. I don't know where the mindset came from, maybe from the early hot wiring of cars. Leadership, myself included, had spoken about how it was in American interest to leave a functional airport. There was a culture of not respecting equipment on ground, everywhere you went was destruction. It takes engaged leaders to stop that and explain that it is not in our best interest to just destroy things.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Any lessons learned?

(2) Answer: The difference that Abbey Gate had, tactically, is that they had a pressure release valve from the crowd. They could take in and screen people, and push them out as necessary, not back in to the same crowd. At North or East Gates, the rejected personnel were pushed back in to the same crowd they were pulled from. If I could go back to day zero, I would have built in a bleed off area, which I think is a good technique. There is definitely some tactics and strategy involved with running a NEO.

The other thing I want to address is the heat. I never imagined it before I got out there. It changed the dynamic of the crowd, they got angry and ornery and it also caused health problems. We couldn't have changed it, but the temperatures leading up to that event were milder. Marines could only throw a bottle of water so far in to the crowd, so the heat was a constant concern for us.

Mental Health checks for these guys that were face to face with the crowd will be important. These guys were making tough calls, they were telling males they had to pick which wife to bring in. That's going to have an effect on these guys, they were making







Approved for Release

tough decisions that will stick with them for the rest of their lives. I think Golf Company will be extremely resilient even though they had the highest losses. I know they had a deliberate, day by day, group after action session during their redeployment so that everyone could talk about their experiences. I think there is a lot of guilt out there as a whole, because a lot of people were turned away. We were never going to get everyone out. We got 124,000 people out which is incredible, and the work they did was incredible.

This wasn't combat, but it had the fear and the close feeling of danger. Some of those guys were out there for 12 hours a day, and we need to remember that.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Can we have your contact information

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assistant investigating officer, at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Exhibit 097

# UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Current as of: 1830Z 26 AUGUST 21

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

## MEDICAL FORCE LAYDOWN (w/TSHs)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4c

## HKIA MEDICAL CAPABILITIES (w/Tentative Retrograde Plan)

August

| Pax | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | ~~T-72~~ | ~~T-60~~ | ~~T-48~~ | ~~T-36~~ | ~~T-24~~ | ~~T-12~~ | ~~T~~ |

(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

## MEDICAL FORCES CURRENTLY IN HKIA (BOG)

US Surgical Teams (R2): 4

US SPEC OPS Joint Medical Augmentation Unit (JMAU)

UK Surgical Team R2: 16 PAX

(b)(6)

SPMAGTF STP R1E: 50 PAX (until 27th)

- 44 HMS (24Line/2Xray/2PMT/ 1 Pharm)

(b)(6)

~~24th MEU R1: 64 PAX (until 28)~~

(b)(6)

- CLASS VIII: 30 DOS
- Blood: 0
- Walking Blood Bank kits: 50

1/82nd R1E: 72 PAX

(b)(6)

- Blood: 47 units

3/10 MTN R1: 4 PAX

(b)(6)

## CCSG Update

- HKIA / Flow:
  - $N_2O$ published to place medics on flights from HKIA (MARCENT / ARCENT)
  - Daily AE flights planned to preserve max available bed capacity at HKIA
- TSHs:
  - ~120K antigen tests at AUAB/CAS
  - LTSH CAS has received an FST, MCAS, and PM Tm; conducting integration
  - Population of pregnant women and children continues to increase; PEDs / OB CL VIII package arrived
  - VOCO from Kuwait Foreign Minister to use 2 HN MTFs
  - USAF R3 for LTSH CAS personnel arrive ~26 Aug
  - Unaccompanied minors handed off to UNICEF at AUAB
  - 500 vaccines administered at CAS / AFG physician present to assist

02/02/22

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

# UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Current as of: 1830Z 27 AUGUST 21

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)




## MEDICAL FORCE LAYDOWN (w/TSHs)




## HKIA MEDICAL CAPABILITIES (w/Tentative Retrograde Plan)

| | Pax | August 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 Z-72 | 28 Z-60 | 29 Z-48 | 29 Z-36 | 30 Z-24 | 30 Z-12 | 31 Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| German | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| UK | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | | | | | |
| 274th FRSD | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | | | | | | | |
| TF Med | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 59 | 3 | | | |
| 936th FRSD | 18 | 18 | 18 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | | | |
| SOST | 14 | | | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| SRT | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Total Pax | | 119 | 119 | 122 | 116 | 116 | 110 | 110 | 100 | 100 | 90 | 34 | 22 | 22 | 22 |
| Capability: Surg TM | | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Capability: OR | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Capability: ICU | | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Capability: Ward | | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| CCATT Qatar | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| CCATT Kuwait | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

## MEDICAL FORCES CURRENTLY IN HKIA (BOG)

**US Surgical Teams (R2): 4**
- FRSD 1
- AD HOC (USAF)
- 2x SOS-T
- Blood: 182 units (US+NOR)

**US SPEC OPS Joint Medical Augmentation Unit (JMAU)**
**Surgical Team R2: 12 PAX**
- 2 X PA, 2X SURG, 2x ER
- 2X CRNA
- 4 X 18D/SUPPORT
- 2 SURGICAL PACKAGES

**UK Surgical Team R2: 16 PAX**
- Surgical Team: 1
- Medics
- Providers:
- Nurse
- CRNA
- AELO
- Blood: 86 Units
  - 40 PRC
  - 40 FFP
  - 6 CRYO

**SPMAGTF STP R1E: 50 PAX (until 27th)**
- 44 HMS (24Line/2Xray/2PMT/ 1 Pharm)
- 2 ER DOC
- 2 ER RN
- 1 PA
- 1 IDC

**24th MEU R1: 64 PAX (until 28)**
- 58 HMS, 1xPA, 1xEMPA, 1xER DOC
- 2 RN, 1 MED PLANNER
- CLASS VIII: 30 DOS
- Blood: 0
- Walking Blood Bank kits: 50

**1/82nd R1E: 72 PAX**
HQ: 1 FM
Red Devils (1/504):1Ped, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 19 Medics
White Devils (2/504): 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 14 Medics
Gun Devils (Field Arti): 1 PA, 12 Medics
1/194: 1 ER doc, 1 PA, 1 MEDO, 3 Medics
307th BSB Black Devils (Charlie Med):
1 ER, 1 GMO, 1 ERPA, 2 RN, 1 CRNA, 2 MEDO, 6 Medics; FRST (2 Surg Team)
- Blood: 47 units

**3/10 MTN R1: 4 PAX**
- 1 PA
- 1 ER Doc
- 4 Medics (A Co)

- **HKIA / Flow:**
  - N,O, published to place medics on flights from HKIA (MARCENT / ARCENT)
  - Daily AE flights planned to preserve max available bed capacity at HKIA
  - UK extended 24hrs (New EDD 28 Aug 21)
  - 3 AE missions following MASCAL; CL VIII supplies, blood and surgical supply sets distributed
- **TSHs:**
  - ~120K antigen tests at AUAB/CAS
  - LTSH CAS has received an FST, MCAS, and PM Tm; conducting integration
  - Population of pregnant women (85) and children continues to increase; PEDs / OB CL VIII package arrived
  - VOCO from Kuwait Foreign Minister to use 2 HN MTFs 02/02/22
  - USAF R3 for LTSH CAS personnel arrived
  - 581st MCAS arrived (working movement plan to Camp Buehring)
  - 25x pax USN Medical AUG Tm for Camp Buehring (departs CONUS ~28AUG)

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 098

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 07 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

1. On 7 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, California, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology. BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, and the Corpsmen answered them to the best of their ability. For brevity, the Corpsmen will be differentiated as follows. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

BG Curtis will be designated as C1 and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included fact finding concerning the actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum. They would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (b)(6) Can you speak to any training that Golf Company executed that was outside of the standard pre-deployment work up, or any training that you think prepared the company best for Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) and the mass casualty event on the 26th?

(2) Answer (b)(6) 3rd platoon was tasked with the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) mission in (b)(1)1.4a When we were in (b)(1)1.4a working with the Air Force PJs and the 3/1 Marines, they were helping setup a medical (b)(6) which was a more organized way to keep gear like sleds, litters, and oxygen tanks. We were doing all of this on the 5-7 and 5-6 med birds that we were utilizing. We were running through different scenarios that we might come



Approved for Release

across. We were getting multiple reps of that in every night and day. We also got repetitions in with our inflight corpsmen. We practiced what we would do to care for a patient on board and how to provide care by priority. We would rep that and hold classes like we did in combat trauma management (CTM). We did that almost every day. We also set up trauma lanes with our guys, went through lanes and the algorithm of P-MARCH-P which is patient/provider safety, massive hemorrhage, airways, respiration, circulation, head wound and hypothermia, then pause. They had it memorized by the end and could go through it quickly. Pause refers to the time to administer antibiotics, pain meds, splints, or care for minor wounds. We were able to cover intravenous (IV) training as well, and most Marines were able to implement one in under 3 minutes. We had 3 Marines in 3rd platoon qualified for Valkyrie, the walking blood bank program. I was trained in that as well. It was very unique, the TRAP platoon Marines weren't straight up grunts. It was a medical mission, and our Platoon Commander (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) knew recovering personnel may have medical demands associated with it. Formal classes were at least every Tuesday and Thursday. Once guys were comfortable with the algorithm and initial steps to take, we moved into the science of why they took those steps.

(3) Answer (b)(6) We did training on securing an embassy before deploying. During that exercise, the local populace didn't speak same language. We gained a feeling for how stressful that can be, how hard it is to have to use physical and hand signs to communicate. We were taught what to look for in that scenario, I think that was a big help. We did that right down the road at the infantry immersion trainer which all the platoons cycled through. In (b)(1)1.4a, we did tactical combat casualty care (TCCC) for the guys and we did Valkyrie for ourselves and the junior corpsmen. We practiced that for multiple days, and I think those reps and refreshers made it much more second nature for everyone.

(4) Answer (b)(6) We had 3 new corpsmen that we needed to train - (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They hadn't been certified in CTM, and you can't even cover a live range unless you have been through CTM. It's basically training on TCCC and P-MARCH-P and ensuring the corpsmen are the masters of their profession. We used the independent duty corpsman from the battalion in (b)(1)1.4a to help train those new guys. They needed to do trauma lanes and assessments. They had only joined the unit in February or March and we couldn't really get them trained due to pre-deployment leave and COVID precautions. It was a priority as soon as we got to (b)(1)1.4a so we trained them for the 1st month before integrating them with their platoons. Then they started doing ranges. Our CO did a good job of getting platoons through squad attack lanes, and it let the corpsman get familiar with their guys. By around July, we started training on Valkyrie and whole blood. Once we got word we would deploy, we focused even more on training. I was always comfortable with those new guys even if they weren't CTM certified, all of our corpsmen were well trained and ready.

c. Question and Answer 2.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question (b)(6) When you get the word you'll be supporting a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Afghanistan, what did you do specifically and how did you change how you do things?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We heard in early August and I started packing an AMAL (Authorized Medical Allowance List), a medical supply box that would cover any injuries that might arise, right away. Some of the guys made fun of me at the time for how fast I started, but I was just prepping the gear and meds in case we couldn't bring everything. We ran the guys through full trauma assessment and whole blood and auto transfusions. We started checking individual first aid kits (IFAKs) and combat life saver (CLS) bags to ensure the supplies were up to date and cross loaded our equipment to maximize what we brought.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you run any drills for the Marines to find things in their IFAK or CLS bag?

(2) Answer (b)(6) For 3rd platoon we bought an extra med bag that we built. We would assign one person to carry it, and throughout the day we would approach them, tell them patient down, and see what they could do to find the stuff in their bag to treat the casualty. We worked to ensure that the IFAK was more accessible, Marines often put it in the back of their kit where they couldn't get to it

(3) Answer (b)(6) In the rear, a lot of the time it is frowned upon to open your IFAK since it will use up the materials in it. The current USMC issued IFAKs aren't great, the older ones are better, the zipper on the new one is hard to use. The Army pull out version is much better. Ours are difficult to close in moments of high stress. In terms of training, our CLS qualified individuals were being trained on using their bags. We didn't want to use all the equipment in their IFAKs. Before deployment we sent our Marines to supply to ensure that their IFAKs were filled.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (b)(6) When did you all get to HKIA? What do you focus on when you get there?

(2) Answer (All). We arrived the night of the 18th.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Once we arrived, I went on a leader's recon with the CO and Gunny after we dropped our stuff in the bivouac area in the gym. I went to conduct the recon with the big 4 (CO, XO, 1stSgt, Co GySgt). I noticed that one of the combined anti-armor team (CAAT) platoons was at the gate, and 2 of their female corpsmen were running a female searching area, and would run to the crowd if someone called corpsmen up for a heat case or an injury. Fox Company corpsmen were by the gate as well, not doing too much at the time. I was looking for what areas could serve as

Approved for Release

casualty collection points (CCPs) depending on our missions. There were heat cases that I could see in the crowd. The shock trauma platoon (STP) didn't get setup until the 2nd day, so if we needed a higher echelon of care we would have to go to the Role 2. I was trying to establish the medical rules of engagement and casevac procedures.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (b)(6) Were you given a casevac plan in the event of a mass casualty?

(2) Answer (b)(6) No. We were just told where the Role 2 was and to go to the STP first, but we didn't know where they were at initially. We didn't have casevac vehicles set aside. We had big blue (a large van), Casper (a baggage truck), and a gator, which were the three vehicles we had acquired. We heard that the STP had an ambulance, but comms were in and out and they might be difficult to call.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question (b)(6) That first day were there any Marine patients? Did you talk about ROE or were you ever given an ROE?

(2) Answer (b)(6) All our patients were Afghans at first. When 1st platoon pushed from the sniper tower toward the barriers on that first night we had a couple routine injuries from guys that got trampled in the crowd, the worst one was an ankle injury. Other than that, we just had a lot of heat cases from the Afghans. We sent about 70% of those heat cases back in to the crowd after treating, about 30% needed a higher echelon. We had no MEDROE from higher or from the company. We took it as it was and the Company trusted our decision on what to do. At one point the CO briefed us and explained that there were some people we couldn't take in because we wouldn't be able to treat everyone. Battalion didn't bring the actual Battalion Aid Station (BAS), so I didn't get much from the medical higher ups in regards to guidance.

(3) Answer (b)(6) On our second day on the gate, I remember a Gunny, maybe from 1/8, told us that the STP was at East Gate about a 5 minute drive down the road. I was set up at the inner gate, so I had the most direct line to them.

(4) Answer (b)(6) During the night we pushed to the Barron Hotel we set up a CCP behind the line of Marines as they advanced. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ordered corpsmen not to participate in the line push. We set up a CCP at the front of the gate, patients would be brought back to us or we would move forward to retrieve them. Our CCP moved up with the line as they pushed.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (C1). Did Afghans maim children to get them through?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer (b)(6) I didn't see any of that. We had some children with burns, but I don't know if they were caused intentionally. Some of the heat cases would be dramatic, and over the top in an attempt to get their family through. A woman would faint, and then their 15 person family would stand up and try to follow them in through the gate. I remember a girl that we were treating, she was trying to get out through the (b)(1)1.4d but she didn't have the right credentials. She kept on fainting, but the (b)(1)1.4d wouldn't touch her because of her lack of credentials even when we asked them to assist because she had the (b)(1)1.4d Embassy on the phone and (b)(1)1.4d documents. In those cases, we would funnel those personnel to the STP. The STP was very good to us, and they would figure out where to send the patients from there.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (b)(6) Did you ever go to the STP's location to establish a relationship with them?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes. I had worked with the STP when working the TRAP mission. They told us they had supplies and an ambulance. After we brought that first girl there, I let everyone know that the STP was right down the road and ready to assist. They were very helpful.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (b)(6) As the company established their position on the gate, did you ever speak to the company or adjacent units about actions to be taken in the event of a mass casualty (MASCAL)?

(2) Answer (b)(6) No. The plan we had in place was basically rolling CCPs. Everything was so spread out. It was mostly us, Fox, and Weapons Company those first 4 days. We had CCPs set up along the way, but there was no formal talk about what to do for a MASCAL. There was always a corpsman by the search area, one from the STA team at the sniper tower, and one of the line corpsman was with the CCP as well. We had our litters staged right inside the outer gate. There was a vehicle before the chevron (blocking obstacle) that normally had a corpsman near it. The Brits were the forward CCP, because they had an actual doctor and some staff at the Barron. Once we found out about that it was a huge relief. It was nice to not have to bring someone all the way back to the gate. The STP was the rear release valve, and the Brits had the higher echelon forward release valve. They would take them off our hands if we asked, and kick them out as necessary.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I found out the Brits had that capability after an individual came through the chevron bloody. That's when I found out the Brits had a doc. That was huge, prior to that we were being overwhelmed by heat cases. Once we found out that they could help with anything serious, we could breathe a little easier. We also had the STP from the MEU inside the terminal by the Role 2. They were there since day 1, but

Approved for Release

no one really communicated that they were there. It was a poor location considering that the Role 2 was right next to them. I think they could have been in a much better location.

(4) Answer (G). I think that location was okay. That terminal had a large volume of people, it was probably good to utilize as a CCP near the Role 2.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(6) Alright, so starting on the 19th you're at Abbey Gate for 4 days, can you describe the atmosphere during that time?

(2) Answer (b)(6) During the first two to three days, we had a lot of heat cases due to lack of water. Water was coming in sporadically, and we were we told to conserve water as much as possible. There were tons of people in the holding areas that were waiting for the Department of State (DoS0, and there was only one of them usually and they would go home at night. We had to take care of and feed and give water to anyone inside the gate, but we didn't have enough to distribute. We had issues getting enough supplies during those first few days. The guys started high energy, but by the end they were just on autopilot. Starting around the 21st or 22nd the food and water came more consistently.

(3) Answer (b)(6) The MEU started to bring in more pallets of water and MREs. They brought enough that we were able to pass it out to the crowds. We would give water and food to women and children and they would share it with their families. Once we ran out of a pallet of water or food, another would be delivered. The Afghans were hoarding what they could get, they would put the water in their bag and the MREs weren't halal so they didn't always eat them.

(4) Answer (b)(6) In my opinion, we never had enough water. We always had people begging for it. During high noon there was no shade to be found, and people would start dropping. We would pass out water to those most at risk, but some folks would highly exaggerate their symptoms in order to get water. We would douse them with water and give them a bottle, but then everyone around would start to beg for water.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (b)(6) When did you receive medical supplies?

(2) Answer (b)(6) That box I packed supported the whole battalion in terms of meds and fluids. One AMAL, about a 3x2x2 foot box. It resupplied us and it came in handy right off the bat. Most of our patients were just heat cases though.

(3) Answer (b)(6) We ended up breaking in to the Turkish dog kennel near the inner gate that had A/C. We made that into our Battalion Aid Station (BAS). We brought the



Approved for Release

AMAL can there and brought any major heat cases in there because it was cooler and they would be out of sight of the crowds when we gave them water. We could send them to the STP if necessary. If not, we would keep them there until they were okay. This was located directly behind the inner gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (b)(6) So there was a CCP by the outer gate, the BAS at the inner gate, and corpsmen floating in between?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, platoon corpsmen were usually with their guys. I would rove between and see if anyone needed help.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Eventually, we saw people were trying to use heat cases to get water for the crowd. They would cause a disruption, then when they called corpsman up, the crowd would start begging for water. I started to have heat cases searched then brought to the BAS for treatment away from the crowd.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (b)(6) When you go back to the gate on the 25th, what is different?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) It was more destroyed. There was more fecal matter, more trash. The people were mostly contained now, but the canal was bunched up.

(3) Answer (G). The DoS finally pushed up to the searching station by the outer gate. It seemed calmer, more organized. We only had to focus on that area along the fence, outside of the outer gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (b)(6) What were you hearing in terms of threat reporting?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) I remember on the night of the 25th at 2200, we received an IED threat. I wasn't there for that. I was with one of my Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) I got back around 1600 on the 26th.

(3) Answer (b)(6) We started getting a higher amount of IED threats and that's when we start talking with our XO about a possible MASCAL. We set up litters inside the outer gate. We staged our 3 vehicles for casevac with corpsmen there. The plan was to assign triage and push any casualties to the STP or Role 2 from there. We had our plan, equipment, and casevacs prepared.

Approved for Release

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question, (b)(6) So on the 26th, you were almost always located at the CCP?

(2) Answer, (b)(6) On the 25th into the 26th our corpsmen and the sniper team corpsman were usually in the vicinity of the CCP. As the platoons rotated, sometimes there would be a call for corpsman up, and we would go check on our guys, but the guidance from the CO and XO was to consolidate near the CCP.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (b)(6) On the 26th, were you hearing any increased threat reporting?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I remember being told that an IED would go off in 2 minutes, so we hunkered down but that didn't happen. The focus at the time was on the 82nd coming to relieve us. Everyone was giddy at the thought of getting relieved from the gate. We were anticipating an imminent attack, but the relief was giving people some energy.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I remember speaking with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) when we set up the first CCP about setting up an additional CCP, CCP2, by the sniper tower for the routine casualties and the urgent casualties would go to CCP1 by the vehicles. I wasn't at the gate until 1400 or 1500 on the 26th. Early on the 26th we brought some kids back to the orphanage and rested at the gym until about 1400 or 1500 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) grabbed us and we rode back to the gate in big blue. Once we got there, I set up by the white van at CCP1.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (b)(6) On the afternoon of the 26th, had you established who would be sent to the STP versus the Role 2 in the event of a MASCAL?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We were as ready as we could be. We were prepared mentally and doctrinally to use our CCP. The day prior, the ambulance with a triage team and en route care team moved from the STP had moved up to the inner gate due to the threat reporting. That was only about a 1 minute drive away. The STP was still at East Gate. They let us know they were there when we coordinated with their ambulance.

(3) Answer (b)(6) There were 4 people on the team the STP sent to the inner gate, a nurse and 3 corpsmen.

(4) Answer (b)(6) That was a relief for us, once they arrived we could bring all of our corpsmen up closer to the outer gate.

Approved for Release

(5) Answer (b)(6) At this time, we also had a lot more turn over because the battalion had a better rest cycle. That made a lot more of us present when the event happened.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question (b)(6) For the blast, the Doctor at the STP said that the report of an explosion came over green gear at 1738. Where are you when that happens?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I am at the main CCP, with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Doc Soviak were out checking on the line. There were probably 2-3 Echo corpsman at the search area, and one corpsman by the sniper tower. When the blast went off, I told our guys to standby, I knew that the casualties would come to us. About 20 second later, the first routine casualty was dragged to us. Within the first minute, we had about 6 get to us. One urgent came to us, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was bleeding from his jugular. I communicated to our driver that he was urgent and I packed his wound, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) accompanied him and 2 other wounded got into big blue as well to push to Role 2. That all happened within 3 minutes. We had about 12-13 people with us at that time.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (b)(6) In the time immediately after the blast, what else were you seeing?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The first injury was a frag wound right to his (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was fine, he wasn't bleeding elsewhere. I passed him (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) for treatment, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in next and we threw him on a litter. (b)(6) guy. I take off his kit and see that he is spurting blood from where he was hit by a fragment in (b)(6) I start packing that wound and treating him. While doing that I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and a couple of Afghans come in. I was focused on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was urgent and we had to get him out of there. That initial group of our wounded was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had shrapnel in his legs, but he was okay. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I did a pressure bandage on his leg after we got (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on a casevac. An Echo corpsman showed up, I told him to give (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) pain meds, some ketamine, since they were walking wounded.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (b)(6) You had wounded Afghans coming in already?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, I remember that I treated an Afghan girl. We prioritized US military like we discussed, but there was a one year old girl that a Marine was yelling at me to treat. She had an abrasion on her head. I wrapped her head and her family took her away. I didn't see any other patients at that moment and I wanted to diffuse the situation with the Marine. One thing I wish I did better was keep track of my guys and

Approved for Release

prioritizing who was pushing out, but there were so many casualties. Corpsmen were loading casualties and just going. I had to be a corpsman first, so I couldn't really stop that. After the Afghan baby I find Nikoui and he had no pulse. He was KIA. I moved onto the next guy Hunter Lopez, he was my friend. His head was swollen due to intracranial pressure and he also had no pulse. I spent 30 seconds on him, but he was already expectant. Next, I went to Cpl Humberto Sanchez, there were a group of Marines around him looking at his chest. I checked him and I thought I felt a pulse. I went to clear his airway and saw that his teeth were blown out. I did a crike on him and another corpsman came to assist and ventilate. We moved him on to a van and got him out of there. I was on him for about 3-4 minutes. I looked up and saw Army medics and the Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman (SARC) I knew from (b)(1)1.4a I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) working on SSgt Hoover. At this point I linked up with 1stSgt. He gave me the casualty list so far, it was larger than I thought it would be. I kept looking for patients, the last 2 patients I could see were (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and an Afghan woman. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had the tightest tourniquet I'd ever seen on, he kept yelling to take the boys first. He was the last to leave in one of the vans. After that I focused on consolidating gear, flaks, and medbags. I told the guys to resupply after that and moved into a holding position in case there was another attack.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (b)(6) Who was still around when you sent (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) back?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I was back. It took 3-5 minutes to get (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the STP and back. The goal was to get him there quickly since he was bleeding so much. Eventually, we were able to stop that bleeding. The injury went through his mouth and ripped through his tongue. I didn't want to put gauze in his mouth and obstruct his airway. Once I got back, I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He tells me to find out casualties by type. I walked around and found 5 or 6. About half were priority, and half were urgent. After that, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got with 1stSgt. I saw Soviak and a couple other wounded guys. I hopped on Soviak, I didn't even recognize him at first. I checked his carotid and radial pulse. I didn't feel a pulse, but I was going to try refractory shock. I had a double needle d in my hand, but then (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) showed up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I told him to try refractory shock and gave him the needles. I think he tried, but I think Soviak was expectant at that point. 3 people got on that casevac. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the last one out, it was no more than 8-10 minutes before everyone was moving to STP or Role 2.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Yea all of Weapons' corpsmen, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came up and were acting as en route care

(4) Answer (b)(6) When the blast went off, I remember a moment of silence. I started to run forward, but I had to turn back for my med bag and Kevlar. Once I turned back around, I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and ran him in through the gate with me. I helped cut off his flak and weapon sling. After that I left and went to help next person I heard yelling for a corpsman. There was a Marine with a 7 year old kid that had shrapnel, I treated him, picked him up and took him to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I'm not sure if I gave him to a corpsman.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

This all happened from minutes 1-4. Then I hopped up, and treated a service member that had the back of their head smashed. I got gauze and made a donut to put around their head. After that an Echo and sniper corpsman came and asked how they could help. I realized there were too many of us in one spot. I let them finish and echelon that patient out.

Next, I treated (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was close to the blast. He had shrapnel through his (b)(6) and had a tourniquet on his upper arm. I cut his sleeve back and saw there were no other wounds. I gave him to a Marine to walk back to the casevac. After that, I crossed back to the other side of the CCP. An older local female was the next patient, she had the same head wound as the guy that I treated before. Then I moved to Ssgt Hoover, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was treating a wound on his leg and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started helping with mass bleeding. I was treating his airway, he was gasping for air. I put an NPA in, but it did nothing. I put an i-gel (supraglottic airway) down his throat and waited a second or two before I felt that he had an airway. I heard other calls asking for corpsmen. I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) if he could handle Hoover, and he said yes. I left and told him to watch the breathing. I don't remember the next patient. Then I saw Soviak. I got his head, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got the side, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got the feet, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got on (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with him and they drove off.

I looked over and saw one of the female Marines get a tarp laid over her. Then I saw another patient and ran back across the street. When I came by again I saw the tarp was off and 2 or 3 Brits were doing CPR on her, I told them it was not the time and place for that because she was expectant. I checked on some children but they were fine. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) speaking with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I don't remember any shots being fired. I saw tons of med supplies were being used up, my med bag was low, and I yelled out to consolidate medical supplies by the van.

(5) Answer (b)(6) There were 3 or 4 Brit medics with the doctor, trying to do CPR and treat that female. I told them to get her on a casevac, but they were trying to stabilize her there. Capt (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had spoken with the Brits and that's where I think that response came from.

(6) Answer (b)(6) Around that time, I brought another med bag from the STP that I had asked them for since we were using up so many supplies.

(7) Answer (b)(6) Then I grabbed two of my Marines to go get the green box with all the medical supplies. The last person I saw was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with two tourniquets. I asked him what else hurt and he said his foot. I cut his boot off and there was a small hole in his foot that wasn't bleeding. I remember we got him on a litter and put him on a casevac to get him out of there. Once he was gone we just held our posture and echeloned out.

w. Question and Answer 22.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

(1) Question (b)(6) Did any of you treat (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) expressed that sending him to the STP saved his life because they were able to stabilize him before the Role 2.

(2) Answer (b)(6) It might have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that did that, as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was his Marine. I had the same thought process when I took (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) there. That Role 2 was too far sometimes.

(3) Answer (b)(6) The STP at East Gate was only a 5 minute drive, it was about a mile and a half away. On the night of the push we didn't have a vehicle and we had to run a child with a pelvic fracture there.

(4) Answer (b)(6) Yeah we didn't have a vehicle yet. A few of us ran there, passing her back and forth. We ran her most of the way there before getting picked up by a British guy on the last leg.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question (C1). Did any wounds penetrate Kevlar or SAPI plates?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I remember for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he had a lot of blood inside his Kevlar. I didn't take his Kevlar off, so I couldn't say for sure if it was penetrated. I do know that a lot of Marines' Kevlars stopped shrapnel. I think the personal protective equipment (PPE) and plates did their job. I didn't see any that went through armor.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Most injuries were in the non-PPE areas. The neck or the area above the side SAPI plates was usually where we saw serious wounds.

(4) Answer (b)(6) The guys that passed away were mostly those too close to the blast. They were probably within 10 meters, and some were as close as 5, to the blast. We never heard gunshots after the blast, I was focused on treatment. I heard the canal was a mass of casualties. I'm glad the Marines did their job and pulled security so that only the right casualties got to us so we didn't get overwhelmed.

(5) Answer (b)(6) Our mind-frame at the time was to focus on treating US Military. The assets and the training we had enabled everyone to get treatment quickly.

(6) Answer (b)(6) Also, there were a lot of vehicles just showing up and evacuating anyone that needed help. There was some sort of ambulance exchange point (AXP) established inside the middle gate, I heard. I hope that's true because it would direct care to the right place. We had a lot of assets being flexed at that time. We had Fox Corpsmen and a bunch of guys in the rear that were ready to support, there were the 4 medical Brits, there were 3 or 4 Army medics helping take care of walking wounded, and the SARC.

Approved for Release

(7) Answer (b)(6) After we pushed all of the casualties out, the Marines lined up and established a security posture. We fell back to the inner gate where the Weapons corpsmen were. I could see them directing where to send patients. We consolidated all of our meds with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from Weapons Company there at inner gate. He was drawing up the proper dosage for corpsmen to administer and assess patients at the inner gate. I took (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and gave him ketamine before sending him to Role 2 care.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(6) About how long was it from the blast until (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) left?

(2) Answer (b)(6) About 15-20 minutes probably, it was absolutely within 30 minutes.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (C1). The concussive waves are serious and have long term effects, what are you doing now to double back and check on those Marines affected? Are you checking for that?

(2) Answer (b)(6). When we got back to Kuwait we did a TBI screening on those who may have been affected. We made all of 1st platoon get checked. Now that we are back in Pendleton, the whole company will be doing our post deployment ANAM (Automated Neuro-psychological Assessment Metrics). We are identifying some guys who might need individual attention.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question (C1). I heard about a Marine that had two feet blown off and kept trying to drag people?

(2) Answer (b)(6) That may have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I heard that he was dragging (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after the blast, and she said she remembers seeing him bleeding while dragging her. They reunited later on, once they were both back receiving care State-side. It also may have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and kept dragging people off the X.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question (b)(6) Who was directing traffic at the inner gate?

(2) Answer (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the Weapons Company Senior Line Corpsman. He started the walking blood bank for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and pulled ten units of blood from the field. He started leave today. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the other STA team may also have been there.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 7 October 2021

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question, (C1). Can we get your contact info?

(2) Answer (All). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) email.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (C1). Could you see, hear, or feel the blast?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I didn't see it, but I heard it. It definitely wasn't a flashbang. Things were pretty dusty, after that my adrenaline kicked in and I just started acting.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assistant investigating officer, at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
LANCE G. CURTIS
Brigadier General, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Exhibit 099

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 08 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Company Intelligence Cell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 8 October 2021

1. On 08 October, 2021 BG Lance Curtis, USA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Pendleton, CA to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology. BG Curtis (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered in a conversational manner. (b)(6) will designate that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking, a (C1) will indicate that BG Curtis is speaking, and an (b)(6) designate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is speaking.

3. Discussion.

a. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) provided overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have any information on threat streams right before the blast?

(2) Answer (b)(6) If I could get on the (b)(1)1.4c I could confirm. I saw that there was a timer from what I was reading, it was on the Hamad Karzia International Airport (HKIA) coordination thread. I couldn't say the exact source or if it was a specific gate. I remember a 30 minute, and then a 5 minute, and a 2 minute warning. I couldn't remember if it was specific to the blast, I would have to go back and read.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (b)(6) I don't think there is any doubt about there being counters that day, there was high confidence that an attack was imminent. That resulted in Marines taking a knee and waiting for impact, we were tracking it as being a couple of hours prior. Do you think what you remember is the false alarm or the actual blast?



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Company Intelligence Cell, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 08 October 2021

(2) Answer (b)(6) I just remember that there was a countdown. I know it was in the afternoon, I couldn't say if the countdown happened for the actual blast.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have access to those reports?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I'm locked out of my token right now, our (b)(6) could probably get to it.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 100

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 12 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis (C1) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: C1: Can you talk me through your pre-deployment training and validation?

(2) Answer: I've been the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (b)(6) since December of 2017. This is personally my second deployment with the MEU. I previously deployed with the SPMAGTF to Africa for Crisis Response.

The MEU went through a six-month pre-deployment training here at Camp Lejeune, NC. There are 13 Mission Essential Tasks (METs) that we trained on, including Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). Normally, NEO is included during our urban training, but we actually did a NEO training package separate from what we normally go through. We added this as an extra exercise because we had extra time in January 2021. This NEO training was sponsored by our Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG) We had personnel from the Department of State (DoS) and civilians train with us. We also had Professional Military Education (PME) provided by the former MEO XO that participated in the last (b)(1)1.4d NEO.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

Our training consisted of sending in a Forward Command Element (FCE) and then a security element that practiced screening and searching operations. We went through practical exercises and conducted personnel searches. Looking back, this training was not to scale of HKIA, however, it provided us with a broad overview of Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations. It was less realistic than what I would have liked because we had Marines as role-players. Marines are much more compliant than civilians in real life. This NEO exercise was four to six days long.

The next NEO training we completed was during deployment. Initially, we were focused on the European Command (EUCOM) Area of Operations (AOR). We received SDOB for Central Command (CENTCOM) specifically for the NEO. June 1st 2021 was our first time dealing with CENTCOM. Initially, the orders were signed only for 30 days. (b)(1)1.4d to practice NEO. We sent out our command and control element and security element into the embassy to practice how we would se up and process people through in order to practice repetitions of NEO.

On 28 June, we began heading back toward EUCOM. We made it to the Suez Canal, received a new SDOB, and made a U-turn back to CENTCOM. This next SDOB was for an additional 30 days.

Next, GEN Mackenzie postured us near the shore. We put our Marines (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a and staged our forces here for HKIA. Some Marines arrived to (b)(1)1.4a in July, coming off of the USS Iwo Jima. I arrived to (b)(1)1.4a on July 23rd. The rest of the Marines arrived a week after me after stopping in Oman for ship maintenance. Once everyone was in (b)(1)1.4a we began running daily rehearsals. We focused on running organized operations and keeping stand-off at gates. We had some of our Marines practice with the security forces on the airfield at (b)(1)1.4a so that they could learn airfield security operations. We practiced all aspects of NEO. We were running rehearsals up until the day that we went to HKIA. We ran at least four or five full rehearsals in preparation. On 13 August, we received the call from (b)(6) that we were going to HKIA.

We first started hearing initial discussions about NEO around May. I don't remember the dates of the first Secure VTC with GEN Mackenzie. We had been talking with BG Sullivan since May or June about NEO. Our initial discussion and plan was to arrive to HKIA, augment with the Turks, set up the ECC, and process people. In July, we sent a leader's recon to check out HKIA; we left (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with the JTF at HKIA to help us continue our planning efforts.

We knew we would be operating out of Building 300 on HKIA as our headquarters and Tactical Operations Center (TOC). This area was already set up with a computer network. We also set up single-channel, plain text communications. We combined efforts with the JTF and created a Joint Operations Center (JOC). This helped create one central point of information. Again, our initial plan was to have our



Approved for Release

security element integrate with Turks, man gates, have QRF capability, and then have our ECC begin processing personnel. Our planned force flow was to have our ECC and security elements arrive first and the command and control elements arrive second.

We didn't conduct any training rehearsals with 2/1. As a MEU, I have a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 1/8, consisting of three Rifle Companies, a Weapons Company, an Artillery Battery, a Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company 'minus', an Engineer Platoon, and a Reconnaissance Company 'minus'. I also have an Aviation Combat Element (ACE). I didn't take any aircraft forward, but brought some ACE, like air traffic controllers, to help run airfield operations. They ran air traffic with the Special Operations Forces until the Air Force arrived, and then continued to work into their organization. The Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) has a similar organization. The final piece of the MEU is the command element, consisting of the headquarters and staff.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: C1: Let's discuss Task Organization (TASKORG). Who did you work for directly? Was this clear?

(2) Answer: I worked for BG Sullivan from the Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR). Yes, it was very clear, but sometimes it was hard to tell who he worked for.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: C1: Who did 2/1 work for?

(2) Answer: They were TACON to the MEU and OPCON to the JTF. I was giving them their tasks. 2/1 still had a direct line to BG Sullivan and sat in a lot of the same meetings due to the OPCON relationship.

The initial plan did not have 2/1 TACON to the MEU. We originally were going to bring their SPMAGTF in. As the plan evolved, it didn't make sense to bring in another O-6 headquarters and they were busy with other things. BG Sullivan asked if I could handle another battalion to command, and I said yes. It was helpful to have another unit.

The 2/1 Commander understood that he was TACON to me and he never tried to work around that. It was sometimes challenging with the other units already at HKIA. For example, TF Polar Bear (2-10th MTN), initially worked directly for United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for the embassy. MG Donahue and TF Wild Boar (10th MTN Rifle Company 'minus', a very small element) arrived between 17-20 August. They were supposed to relieve TF Polar Bear but they ended up keeping both on HKIA. TF Wild Boar was pulled from our TASKORG and were put underneath one of the brigade commanders from 10th MTN that was working



Approved for Release

as the Deputy Commanding Officer for USFOR-A, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was the garrison commander of this unit. They formed a unit called the multi nation coordination cell. They coordinated the movement of people from all directions. We were receiving calls from retired generals, senators, and reporters, and they were tasked with coordinating these calls and movements. This command relationship was pretty unclear.

I was unclear of the two Army units' TASKORG to the JTF, the MEU and USFOR-A. It became especially confusing when the 82nd Airborne arrived. The TASKORG constantly changed with the force flow.

As the MEU (b)(6) my command and control were clear. The 2/1 Commander arrived right after the MEU and was immediately TACON to me. He stayed like this for the duration of the NEO. The command and control relationships above the JTF sometimes changed, but didn't really affect me because I worked directly for BG Sullivan.

Our force flow was slowed due to the 82nd Airborne (1-82) using some of the crews that were supposed to fly our C-17s in. They started arriving on the 15th or 16th of August. I told BG Sullivan that this was affecting our combat power because we didn't have many people on ground. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the 1-82 Commander, arrived and he was adjacent to me. The initial security that we were going to push out were delayed because the follow-on forces were delayed and we needed to integrate their personnel on the line to assist with security.

My initial security guys were manning some of the towers with the Turks and doing QRF drills. We hadn't started manning the gates to start pulling people through because we were limited on personnel. Once I put one of the companies in the towers, I really only had one company to serve as QRF. I sent one rifle company out during the first civilian uprising onto the airfield. They were trying to keep people from crossing the runway. We eventually brought some concertina wire out to assist with this. At the same time, the 82nd started to arrive to Camp Alvarado. The JTF tasked them to support us in the south by sending a unit to us to link up with 1/8. They were sent to assist 1/8 with pulling security to reinforce the line. This coordination was difficult because we hadn't met or talked to each other yet as units. This became a problem because we didn't have communications with them and had to go through their headquarters element to communicate.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: C1: What did the 82nd have for TASKORG when they arrived?

(2) Answer: I think they had about one battalion.

f. Question and Answer 5.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: What's the largest size for TASKORG that you received?

(2) Answer: All of 1/8, to include three Line Companies, one Weapons Company, two Provisional Companies, one Engineer Platoon and one Reconnaissance Platoon. We also had additional mortar personnel, most likely helping with searching personnel.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When do you achieve full strength of 1/8 at HKIA?

(2) Answer: It was around the 19th or 20th of August. It was well before the event on Abbey Gate. Our UAVs were flying around the 15th and 16th to provide video feeds.

2/1 was a lot smaller than 1/8. They were an Infantry Battalion 'minus'. Two of their platoons from F Co remained at the (b)(1)1.4a in Iraq. They brought forward G Co, E Co, two platoons from F Co, and a Weapons Company to HKIA. Initially, they were linked up us to help pull security on the line. 1/8 pulled one sector, 2/1 pulled a sector, and the 82nd pulled a sector.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: C1: When was the first time that you saw a large change to your mission set in regards to the 82nd arriving?

(2) Answer: The 82nd arrived around the 15th or 16th of August. A few days later, around the 19th, we decided that their mission would be to provide airfield security. The MEU would keep security on Abbey Gate, East Gate, and North Gate. I met with all of the battalion commanders and described who would pull security and where. Each gate had two rifle companies pulling security. BLT 2/1 was responsible for Abbey Gate.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Can you provide a timeline of the gates opening and how operations at the gate changed up until the 25th of August?

(2) Answer: The first gate we opened was North Gate. It was open from 17-23 August. It was the only gate open for the first few days because we didn't have enough people to open more. This was not the gate that we first planned to open, but we had delayed planning with the Turks. We had to wait for some supplies, equipment, and personnel before opening Abbey Gate. We were planning to set up a holding area with tents on the eastern side of the airfield to keep from having to bring personnel up to the PAX terminal right away. This would help to limit the back log of personnel waiting for



Approved for Release

aircraft at the PAX terminal. We requested tents and other supplies in order to do this. There were pre-existing structures at North Gate and it was close to the airfield.

The North Gate allowed us to process people through and bring them immediately to the PAX terminal. There was a holding area that we called CATO where the overflow of people at the PAX terminal could wait.

The North Gate has an inner and outer gate but they were closer together than the other gates. The construction material was similar to that used at Abbey Gate; flimsy. The avenue of approach to North Gate was never shut down, even though we asked the Taliban to at least shut it down to one lane. That never happened. We received intelligence reports that mopeds or motorcycles were transporting Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). One time, a tanker truck came through that was a high threat. There was a lot of traffic in this area and it caused the personnel to be very cramped closer to the gate. This area required us to use a lot of measures to control the area allowed by our Ruled of Engagement (ROE).

The North Gate was the hardest gate to control.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What were your ROE?

(2) Answer: It was the same for all US Forces on HKIA. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

We had the National Strike Unit (NSU) trying to help us with crowd control. It was difficult to work with them because they had some overly-aggressive tendencies. They used a lot of warning shots. By the third day, warning shots weren't effective with the crowd because everyone was so used to them. You constantly heard warning shots at HKIA. Our guys didn't use warning shots very often because we didn't find it to be effective. The Taliban and NSU fired warning shots all of the time.

We used a vehicle to help reinforce the gate when we would close it. There was a natural alley/corridor that was made by some hesco and jersey barriers that helped us create lines for initially-screened evacuees to stand in as they waited to be searched and escorted to the PAX terminal. Once the PAX terminal was overflowing, we brought personnel to other designated holding areas. The Germans set up a separate NATO line at North Gate

We had to open and close the North Gate often. There was also a pedestrian gate with a turnstile that we originally wanted to use. However, this quickly became



Approved for Release

mobbed with people and was unusable. We eventually used this pedestrian gate to return people that didn't pass screening back out to the crowd.

North Gate was closed on the 23rd because it was too hard to control the flow of people and vehicles had a lot of access to it. We moved the mass screenings to Abbey Gate. North Gate remained closed after this, except for special intakes.

East Gate was open from the 20th to the 24th. It was the easiest gate to control because it had one access point and fewer people trying to enter. There were towers with strong overwatch at East Gate. The first day that we opened the gate was easy to man because people were not expecting it to be open. There is only one gate and a vehicle barrier at East Gate, so we accepted a lot of risk by using it. We had to push people outside away from the gate to create stand-off to try to control the crowd from storming in. We also emplaced a wire obstacle to help create stand-off. The crowds were very unyielding and the NSU eventually took over pulling security at East Gate and used aggressive crowd-control measures.

There were a lot of pre-existing structures behind East Gate that we could use to control the flow, searching, and movement of personnel for processing and movement to the PAX terminal. The walls were high and there weren't many people trying to climb over. There were still warning shots and non-lethal munitions used here.

Other elements, like the Taliban, did not like to help us pull security at the gates and this created some banter. Around 23 August, we saw the Taliban setting up mortars outside of East Gate. We understood that the Taliban help us until the 31st of August, but after that, they wouldn't hesitate to attack us. This caused for a ROE discussion because we agreed not to attack them. They ended up not doing anything with the mortars, but it was still surreal.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: Did you receive phone calls to help find people and bring them through?

(2) Answer: Yes. I created a special task force that dealt with this.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: As a (b)(6) which gate did you most prefer to use?

(2) Answer: At first, I preferred East Gate. Abbey Gate ended up being a better gate because it was easier to access evacuees and pull them through. The chevron was helpful with the crowd. The canal created a challenge as it filled up because it was hard to control who was moving to the front. The Brits also used it, operating out of the



Approved for Release

Barron Hotel. Once the Brits had enough people processed at the Barron Hotel, they would convoy them in during the night. By the 26th, all multinational forces were using Abbey Gate.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Why did East and North Gates close?

(2) Answer: We would close gates periodically if there was a backlog of personnel or if the crowds get too aggressive. The commander on the ground had the authority to open or close gates as they saw necessary.

We were directed to close North Gate by the JTF Commander because there was too high of a risk for VBIEDs and we were receiving constant threat streams for vehicles in that area. The VBIED threat was huge to me because there was a lot of room to get large vehicles by North Gate.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Why don't you think there was an incident with VBIEDs here?

(2) Answer: Someone was talking with the Taliban about watching and keeping people away. We had snipers on overwatch and they took out the Corolla and moped with disabling shots when those threat streams were published.

I'm not sure why a VBIED never actually went off.

North Gate was ultimately closed because the risk to force was too high.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Why did we close East Gate?

(2) Answer: We initially closed it on the 23rd because we had about 6,000 people now on HKIA with no flights coming in or out. The holding areas were overflowing and we needed to process people and get them on planes before we could intake more. All gates were closed at this time. We re-opened Abbey Gate once the flow of evacuees started moving again.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Why didn't you re-open East or North Gates?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: Abbey Gate was working the best. The multinational forces were all using Abbey Gate. Every nation represented at HKIA had groups they were escorting through the Abbey Gate Corridor all day, every day.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Why was Abbey Gate used by the multinational forces the most?

(2) Answer: I think it was due to the ability to corral people through the canal. There were barriers to hold people back and it was wide enough to conduct searches. The multinational forces weren't assisting with security. Only the US Forces and British Forces were conducting security here. The other nations saw this and used the opportunity to pull their people through here without having to provide security.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Do you think it is possible that this caused additional inducement for the coalition forces to send all of their people to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: Yes. They had much smaller forces. It was easier for them to go to Abbey Gate to pull their people out and bring them through without having to provide security.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did you receive any phone calls to open up East and North Gates again?

(2) Answer: I did not. I only had people in the US call me asking me why we had gates closed.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Are you aware of other selective operations occurring at other gates?

(2) Answer: Yes, but we were only focused on East Gate, North Gate, and eventually only Abbey Gate.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: Did you receive any threat streams at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: By the 25th, we heard threat streams focused on Abbey Gate.



Approved for Release

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Is this because it was the only gate left open?

(2) Answer: Yes. The intelligence brief we received on the night of the 25th was that there was a threat of something happening on the 26th. We discussed how to operate at Abbey Gate with this threat. The Brits were planning to stop operations and leave on the 26th, and we were also planning to stop the night of the 26th. Our plan was to close the gate around 1600, clear the area to the Barron Hotel, and then pull security while the Brits drove from the Barron Hotel through Abbey Gate around 1800.

We wanted to keep operating and pulling people for as long as we could on the 26th. All of the Marines on ground were aware of the threat and what to look for; a man dressed in black with a shaved head. The canal access was of huge concern at this time.

At this time, the 2/1 Commander, the 1-82 Commander, and the British Battalion Commander were going to have a KLE with the Taliban to discuss the turnover of the gate. The plan was to close Abbey Gate, have the Brits retrograde from the Barron Hotel, and then have 1-82 take over for us in preparation for the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE) on 30 August. The KLE occured at 1700 on 26 August.

We were aware of the threat streams on the 26th. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g The Commander moved the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) closer to the gate and the Marines at the gate were on high alert. Around 1430, we received intelligence from the Brits that someone with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) could be at the gate now and that it could detonate within the next five to ten minutes. I was between the inner and outer gate at this time. As I approached outer gate, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stopped me and told me about the threat and asked me to take cover. I asked him about the information that they received and he told me the this isn't the first time today that the received threats like this.

Earlier in the day, someone attempted to throw a backpack over the wall. The bag didn't explode and nothing happened. The Marines pushed the bag back over the wall safely. Bags were often thrown over the wall containing food and similar items.

After the threat timeline passed, the Marines continued their mission.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Do you know where the Brits received intelligence of this threat?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: I don't know their source. (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c I saw an email after returning saying that the Brits passed this info to us.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: What actions were taken during this threat?

(2) Answer: Marines were pulled back from the canal. They kept a low profile and took cover if they could. Snipers were scanning and PSYOP was on their loud speakers giving messaging to the crowd to push back.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Did you ever get information about Afghans in the crowd being a threat?

(2) Answer: No. Just the threat information shared by the Brits.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: What time do you think the blast at Abbey Gate occurred?

(2) Answer: According to reporting, it occurred between 1730-1740 on 26 August.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: Where were you when the blast occurs?

(2) Answer: I was heading back to the JOC after a latrine break. I could not hear the blast. It was always pretty loud with smalls arms fire.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Did you hear small arms fire at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer: I heard small arms fire (warning shots) every time I left the JOC.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: When and what was the initial reporting to you of the blast at Abbey Gate?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: There was a blast at Abbey Gate. It initially looks like 20-30 personnel being treated and they couldn't tell if they were Marines or civilians. There were approximately 15 urgent and one routine casualties. Marines could hear small arms fire and they requested more ambulances. The BN OPSO was hit but still communicating with us. Initially, he couldn't locate the battalion commander but then found him. We closed the gate after all casualties were pulled in.

By the time we had airborne assets en route, all casualties were already transported.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: What time did was Abbey Gate closed?

(2) Answer: I don't know.

The day after the blast, I brought a lot of people in and did a recap of the events.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: Do you have any products from this?

(2) Answer: Yes, my (b)(6) was the scribe.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: What was the conclusion?

(2) Answer: One blast occurred. Some people thought it was two blasts because both the US and the Brits reported it. The Battalion Commander said there wasn't small arms fire but the (b)(6) said that our Marines were engaged in small arms fire. We heard there was fire coming at us from the chevron, but were unsure if it was our guys being fired at, us returning fire, or there just warning shots being fired. It's a possibility that we could have been firing at the Taliban.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Are you aware of the 82nd having any designated marksman or snipers?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure about that.

ii. Question and Answer 33.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

(1) Question: When is the decision made to close Abbey Gate blast and what time?

(2) Answer: We were planning to close Abbey Gate on the 26th to bring the Brits through. Originally, the Brits were going to come through and we were going to close on the 25th, but the Brits ended up needing more time to process their personnel. The next plan was to stop processing people at 1600, clear the area, and have the Brits come through and close Abbey Gate NLT 2000 on 26 August. This was information from a JTF meeting. I think this was discussed in the KLE as well. The gate would close, the 82nd would take over, and we would peel off and prepare to exfil.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Who made the decision to close the gate after the blast?

(2) Answer: I don't know who made the actual decision. It could have been me or it could have been BG Sullivan. The gate was closed but we knew we still had to bring the Brits through.

We talked with the Brits to coordinate bringing the rest of the people at the Barron Hotel through. Originally, before the blast, we were going to have them convoy through while we had Marines holding the area secure.

This was at the same time that we had the threat at North Gate with the tank truck. We still had people at the North Gate even though the gate was closed.

I met with BG Sullivan, post-blast, to discuss getting the Brits in from the Barron Hotel. I recommended that we still follow our plan to have the Marines and Brits push out to hold the canal, have the Brits convoy through, and then closed the gate. This is what ultimately occurred. We then had the engineers emplace obstacles between the inner and outer gates. The 82nd replace us at Abbey Gate around the morning of the 27th.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: Were people flooding to Abbey Gate again after the blast?

(2) Answer: I don't know.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: What time did the Brits finished coming in Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: Sometime between 2000 and midnight on 26 August.



Approved for Release

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Do you know what obstacles were placed at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: I'm not sure. There were vehicles up against both the outer and inner gates to reinforce them being closed.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: Do you have the numbers of wounded and killed Afghans?

(2) Answer: The most I've heard is 160-170 Afghans killed. 12 US Servicemembers were KIA and an additional Servicemember passed away during surgery. There were 18 wounded Servicemembers evacuated the morning of the 27th.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Did you see (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shortly after the blast?

(2) Answer: Yes, he came back into the JOC and was clearly concussed. He was speaking very loudly because I think he was having a hard time hearing. He was clearly shaken.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer: My flight out of HKIA was around 1000 on 30 August.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: Is there anything that you think we need to know that we didn't discuss?

(2) Answer: No, but you didn't ask about the State Department's involvement during HKIA. The DoS started surging more assets around the 25th or 26th after we requested more personnel from them repeatedly. They didn't seem prepared to support the amount of people at HKIA. A lot of us were shocked when the embassy shut down around 15 August and was immediately evacuated. It took a while for them to provide DoS personnel to process people. The DoS kept changing who we could and could not bring through the gate. This confusion directly caused us to have the surge of 6,000 personnel on the airfield. Not only were we confused, but the DoS was confused and didn't keep standards between themselves. We would often pull people through the



Approved for Release

gate that passed initial screening, but when we brought them to the PAX terminal, DoS would change the requirements and they wouldn't be able to be processed and get on a flight.

At the end of the day, I think everyone wanted to get as many people as we rightfully could through the gate and to refuge. It was just really hard to get people through the gate and then get turned away at the PAX terminal.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: Was BG Sullivan hesitant to help get the Brits through from the Barron Hotel after the blast?

(2) Answer: No. We discussed it and decided it was the time to do it.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: Did you see the crowds surging around the timeframe that the Brits came through the Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer: No, I don't think so.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: What time do you think that Abbey Gate was completely closed after the Brits pushed through?

(2) Answer: Sometime between midnight and 0600 on 27 August. By the time we got all of the Brits through and had the obstacles in place it was probably around 0600.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that we didn't talk about that you think is important?

(2) Answer: No, I think we got all of it.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: Is there anyone else that you think we need to talk to?

(2) Answer: No.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 12 October 2021

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assistant investigating officer, at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Exhibit 101

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO

12 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, (b)(6) Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II MEF Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What training did you conduct prior to the deployment to prepare for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer. As part of our Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) in June 2020, we conducted some NEO training. We completed the MCCRE before we had our change of operational control (CHOP) to the MEU. We also conducted a few NEO exercises before that. One of our mission essential tasks (METs) is evacuation control center (ECC) operations. We went down to (b)(1)1.4a where we set up an ECC and set up the NEO tracking system (NTS) just to get repetitions. In January 2021, as part of our pre-deployment training program (PTP) we conducted a four day NEO training package through the Expeditionary Operations Training Troup (EOTG). As part of the package, 1/8 sent a company to do an embassy reinforcement, the 24 MEU sent in a forward command element, and we conducted ECC operations.

Approved for Release

Throughout the NEO in Afghanistan, we processed a total of about 80,000 records in the NTS, while about 40,000 others were processed through other government agencies (OGAs). We sent over tablets to help assist them in their processing of individuals. The OGAs processed the Afghan National Strike Unit (NSU) personnel. They also didn't process everyone. Some were just sent on to the plane.

In January 2021, we came to the agreement that we would focus on our other METs while we were at sea. We started our Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) in February.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Do you think what you did for NEO training adequately trained you for what you saw at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. No, you would have to simulate all the human factors and issues we faced there. You would have to do a continuous flow of people. It was 24 hours a day processing people. It would take a lot of resources to provide that level of realistic training. I'm not sure if it is in the capability of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to provide that training. I don't think you can really train for that. You could possibly do 24 hour operations for a few days processing people.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you deploy?

(2) Answer. I deployed 21 March, after we conducted COMPTUEX, the MEU certification exercise, in February.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Was there anything you guys were doing while underway that prepped you for NEO?

(2) Answer. Until May we were training in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), and finished up training in (b)(1)1.4a before we completed our CHOP to the CENTCOM AOR on 1 June. Before we completed our CHOP, we knew that Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR) was preparing for a NEO. During the month of June, we conducted a Theater Amphibious Combat Rehearsal (TACR) in (b)(1)1.4a Arabia. Throughout the TACR, we focused primarily on providing combat service support to the infantry units conducting training in vicinity of (b)(1)1.4a Throughout the month of June, we thought there was a 50/50 chance we would be staying in CENTCOM, and then on 29 June the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) made it official. When we knew we were going to be in CENTCOM, we shifted our focus and



Approved for Release

got out our NTS kits to make sure they were fully functional, and got some repetitions on the systems and ECC operations. July is when the planning started to ramp up.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Who did you deploy with? How many are with the ECC, is it a platoon?

(2) Answer. We had 296 marine and 2 civilians as our battalion total. The total we deployed with to HKIA for ECC operations was about 225. Our battalion has a Landing Support Company, Motor Transport Company, and an Engineer Company, but I task organized them into three Combat Logistics Detachments (CLDs) spread across the three ships. The Marines we took to HKIA to run the ECC pulled from all the CLDs. We built our ECC to be a unit that could execute 24 hour operations. We were told to expect up to 300,000 people. We wouldn't be able to take that capacity.

We had a heavy and light package that we were going to send, but I had to keep some people on the ship because we thought we were going to be at HKIA a while, and once the ships returned to the US, I would need people to manage the equipment offload as well. We went ashore in (b)(1)1.4a stage the third week of July, and that was absolutely the right call. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) my (b)(6) was already there to receive us. I knew that I needed to have at least a captain to stay back to help coordinate with the MEU while we were forward at HKIA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made the most sense, so that's why she ended up staying in (b)(1)1.4a

Before offloading in (b)(1)1.4a we did a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) with BGen Sullivan in HKIA around 10-13 July. The purpose was to get a lay of the land, survey the gates, and meet with the units. This was kept quiet because we couldn't tell the Turkish military personnel at HKIA that we were planning a NEO. We offloaded the CARTER HALL into (b)(1)1.4a and before we left (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c got approval from BGen Sullivan to offload people. 15 July was when the quartering party left for HKIA. I sent (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in with the quartering party to run the ECC. I also had four other Marines with NTS kits.

Based on imagery analysis, we had planned to set up the ECC at Abbey Gate. When we went to HKIA for the PDSS, we validated what we had planned off the imagery. We had everything on graphics, and set an ECC up, to scale, at (b)(1)1.4a We ran through three mission profiles, each one getting more complicated as we progressed. The second run through we processed about 250 people, and on the third we ran through IEDs, and other threats.

There are various stations of an ECC, including the search area, bracelet issue, scanning area, and other various stations. The last stage before getting on an aircraft was going to be the comfort area. We planned for about 5,000 people per day, but theater logistics was not in place at all. We had submitted our plan up through the MEU,



Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4c and I assume it went up through CENTCOM logistics, and we identified all the tents and everything else that was supposed to be staged at HKIA prior to our arrival. We identified all our requirements, but when we arrived at HKIA for the NEO there was nothing there. Logistical requirements were identified no later than the second week of July. We identified a certain number of tents, generators, etc. that we'd need to conduct ECC operations. Logistical support was a major source of contention for the Marines.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(b)(1)1.4a

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Were you anticipating a NEO around 17 July when you offloaded into (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer. It was a two-fold effort in (b)(1)1.4a Part one was the staging phase, and part two was getting the equipment washed down in prep for redeployment. At this time the SPMAGTF was going to be the main effort, but it later switched to the MEU. BGen Sullivan knew it was one of our core METs. The IWO JIMA was not in the Arabian Gulf yet, she had to do the Straits of Hormuz transit, but once it entered the Gulf and the MEU was whole, we were tasked to lead the NEO.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Did you conduct any other preparation?

(2) Answer. We started seeing all the districts falling, and the map go from blue to red, but that didn't change what we had to do. The rest of the BLT was prepping to man the gates at HKIA. We didn't know until August that 2/1 would be responsible for all of Abbey Gate. The initial plan was that they were doing part of the ECC with the Turks assisting. We had 1/8, the 82nd, and 2/1 coming to also help support the airfield.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. When did you get the order to deploy to HKIA?

(2) Answer. It was just as everything started to collapse around 13 or 14 August. There were additional forces we sent in such as a representative from our Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) and (b)(6) We were able to add these teams because JTF gave us more spots on the initial wave into HKIA. The majority of the force was still in (b)(1)1.4a



Approved for Release

We had about 10 total in country by the time the NEO started. The entire footprint of the MEU was about 30.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Talk to me about deploying in to HKIA? What do you see when you arrive?

(2) Answer. They wanted a small security element and most of the ECC prioritized for the initial flights. Elements of the MEU Command Element (CE) went on the first flight. The second group of flights was the ECC. I got there about 0400 on 15 August. This was the day Kabul collapsed. I flew into HKIA. Everything was peaceful when I got there. They already had the ECC established at the PAX terminal, and they had already started processing people.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Why was the ECC set up at the PAX terminal initially and not Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We didn't have any of our equipment there yet. If we sent the ECC to Abbey Gate, it would require all our tents and generators. Everything at Abbey Gate would have been my organic equipment, but we just set up at the PAX terminal because none our equipment arrived on time. The first people through our first day were multinational embassy workers. As the helicopters brought people in we would process them through our ECC and put them directly on to the aircraft. We had processed several hundred Spanish, Danish, and other nations as well.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What happened during the night of 15-16 August?

(2) Answer. We were the first to see the masses of people coming across the airfield. Some of my team were sent out to help stop the people flooding the air field. 1/8, JOC personnel, our team, and anyone that was available helped to stop the flow of people. Now in regards to filling the aircraft, I remember seeing all the people that had boarded a C-17 without being processed. I was on the ramp, trying to get the people off the plane, but no one was budging. Then the engines fired up, and I ran along the outside of the plane to talk to the pilots and let them know the plane was full, and they said that they knew, and they were just going to take them. We filled most planes with 450 people, but that one had at least 600 on board.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. How do your operations continue from there?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer. There were a couple of instances that aircraft were trying to land but couldn't because of the massive amounts of people. It took about a couple of days to secure the airfield so we could restart our ECC operations.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. You had about 225 Marines in HKIA. How many were working the ECC?

(2) Answer. We were doing about eight hour shifts, with three shifts. I had people manning the tablets, assisting screening at the gates, and the Shock Trauma Platoon. We had about 70 Marines for each shift. This was only their day job. When they got off they would provide combat service support to the other units. I had Marines finding dump trucks and forklift to move MREs, pallets, pick up trash, and transport items around the airfield. Prior to the NEO, we hadn't planned to deal for the massive amounts of trash and human waste, as we thought contractors would handle that.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Was the CLB expecting to provide as much combat service support as it was required to, or were you expecting to focus primarily on ECC operations?

(2) Answer. We thought there would be contractor support, so that the overall NEO process would be relatively easy. The contactors started to evacuate four to five days in to the operation. I had my guys focus primarily on the ECC. They were very proficient on the NTS. I asked the SPMAGTF's CLD to focus on the combat service support stuff.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Do you know 2/1's (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)? Did she coordinate any logistical support through you?

(2) Answer. I never met her. I spent a lot of time at the ECC and at the gates with the female search teams, and never crossed paths with her.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. How did you get tasked with the female search team mission, and how were they organized and tasked?

(2) Answer. I had responsibility for the female search teams because I had the preponderance of the females at HKIA. We supplemented the search teams with female corpsmen from 1/8. The training they received wasn't like traditional Female



Approved for Release

Engagement Teams (FETs) would get going through 29 Palms. They were a team of female Marines and corpsmen task organized to search women and children at the ECC, but then were tasked to serve at the gates in direct support of the companies out there. There were about 35 female search team members, who worked eight hour shifts at the North, East, and Abbey Gates. Sgt Gee, who was my Marine that was killed, was at the ECC processing people earlier that day. I had talked to her that day. Towards the end, when we were processing a lot of people, none of the female search team members were at the ECC, they were solely focused on searching people at the gates. Sgt Gee was an electronic maintenance technician. She wanted to laterally move to EOD, and had been meritoriously promoted to Sergeant in July. She was one of the top 5 sergeants in the battalion.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Can you talk to me about the State Department's role at the ECC and how it helped or hindered you in the execution of your mission?

(2) Answer. I had Marines outside the PAX terminal who would bring people into the ECC. The people were staged outside the PAX terminal. There were either two or three State Department personnel at the entrance of the PAX terminal checking documentation. The issue with them was that they wouldn't do 24 hour shifts. When it was time to shift change they would just leave, not rotate in place, but just leave to change out elsewhere. They would be gone for a few hours. When the volume of people lowered they would just leave. This would happen all the time. The fix for this was for the Marines to just check documents even though they weren't qualified to do so. In the mean time I had people outside the PAX terminal wanting to get through the process. My main concern was throughput. There was a time that the civilians rioted and we had to restrain them. My fear would be that we would get behind and not be able to fill the aircraft quickly. When the State Department representatives were not there it would slow down the process. It was a big issue.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Would it be fair to say that you were mainly focused on the ECC throughout the NEO?

(2) Answer. I was tasked to lead the ECC. I would go around and check on my Marines, and I interacted with the JOC, but spent most of my time was at the ECC.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. You mentioned earlier that based on imagery analysis, you had selected Abbey Gate as the location for the ECC, then confirmed that during the PDSS in July, but it ended up being set up at the PAX terminal. Why did that happen?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. The bottom line was that when we did rehearsals we thought it was going to be an organized, orderly NEO process, but it wasn't. North Gate was the first gate that was opened and we quickly learned that it wasn't going to happen how we imagined and practiced it. Based on the geography, based on how it would need to be set up, and based on how we were bringing in Afghans, it made more sense to do initial screening at the gates then bring them through to the ECC at the PAX terminal.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Based on the situation at the various gates, do you think it would have been possible to separate those with proper documentation from those who did not have documents at the gates, so that the ECC could have been set up at Abbey Gate as planned?

(2) Answer. No, the people were too desperate and pushing too much down at the gates. Once they got to the ECC, we'd tell them that they were going to get on a flight, but they still tried rushing the aircraft to get on flights. The process was first in and first out. The SPMAGTF and MEU Marines did a good job of keeping them in sticks and in the order they arrived to the ECC prior to getting them on flights. When Afghans saw the planes come in they would start to rush the aircraft. It was every man for themselves. The men would rush through without their wife and kids. We had all kinds of women that were at the ECCs that would come up and talk to us about it. When you see the news reporting about how we could just go out to the gates and grab AMCITs, they were completely wrong. It was rough.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What engineer assets, including personnel and equipment, did you have at your disposal?

(2) Answer. Most of my engineers were doing ECC operations. I had about 35 Marines in the Engineer Platoon, comprised of combat engineers, heavy equipment operators and mechanics, and utilities Marines.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Was it a fairly even split?

(2) Answer. It was about a third of each. We had planned on bringing a bunch of equipment but because of logistical delays it didn't arrive. The only equipment we set up at the PAX terminal was communication equipment.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Did you have any engineer officers working for you?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer. A 1302 lieutenant. The BLT had a combat engineer platoon. That is the standard with the MEU. The JTF-CR may have had an engineer on staff.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. What force protection improvements for the gate were requested of you, if any?

(2) Answer. 2/1 was given the Abbey Gate and maintained full control there. 1/8 had North and East Gates. If the units wanted support they would send a support request through the MEU, and the BLT Engineer Platoon was in direct support. It wasn't a CLB mission, but we would assist them when we could. My Marines would operate dump trucks, and forklifts as needed, but I don't ever recall seeing a crane for moving barriers.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. Was CLB tasked to provide sustainment for 2/1 at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. We assisted in moving food and water out there. If the BLT or 2/1 had a truck to pick up MREs and water, then they would just come get it. Food and water deliveries were mainly ad hoc based on how many people were coming through, as the Marines had to take care of the Afghans once they were inside the gates. I wasn't receiving the logistics support requests, but I know our team would move things as required. Whenever I went out to the gates, I saw plenty of pallets of water. We were never short Class I that I was aware of.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. How did the female search teams being pushed out to the gates come about?

(2) Answer. When we were doing the rehearsal in (b)(1)1.4a we already had the teams put in place. Other units didn't have search teams. CLB provided the female search teams, and there were BLT corpsmen embedded in as well. I had teams at the North, East, and Abbey Gates. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the senior female search team lead. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the (b)(6) Since the BLT and SPMAGTF were in charge of the gates, the female search teams were in direct support to those units at the gates. They were directly engaged with the people at the gate. They enjoyed their job, because they felt like they were doing important work.

cc. Question and Answer 28.



Approved for Release

(1) Question. At any given time how many female search Sailors and Marines were at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. On average there were probably about six to eight.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. How many total Sailors and Marines were part of the search teams?

(2) Answer. We had 35 females trained in (b)(1)1.4a who went through the full mission profile training, but others were added to the team when we got to HKIA.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. Did you have a role in the decision making process regarding when the gates were opened or closed?

(2) Answer. It was mainly a BGen Sullivan decision, but when flights weren't coming in, and there were a ton of people at ECC and comfort area, I would call the JOC and recommend that they close the gates. This was primarily because of the throughput issue. It wasn't on our end, it was mainly because the birds weren't coming in and the temporary safe havens couldn't take any more evacuees.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Were you aware of any flights that went out empty, or partially full? There were reports in the news of flights leaving empty, although the photos I saw looked like they were commercial aircraft. Were the people you were processing flying out on commercial flights?

(2) Answer. It was primarily C-17s, there were only about two commercial aircraft that we sent. We started out planning to send 300 out per flight, but we got up to about 450 per flight. However, there were times we'd be told to manifest 450 passengers for a flight, but when the aircraft would arrive the crew chief would say they could only handle 412 passengers, or something similar. I would then have to take a bunch of people off the manifest, which caused problems. I would have three sticks of 450 passengers staged and ready to get on aircraft at any given time.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. Were you at Abbey Gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer. No, I was there on the 25th. We walked all the way down to the chevron and down the canal. I was literally standing where the blast was 24 hours prior to it happening. It was right about 1400. I remember going through a hole in the chain



Approved for Release

link fence, and seeing people in the canal holding up paperwork. It wasn't a mass of people at this time. I believe that this was when the people were pushed back up passed the bridge.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Did you notice a difference in the level of desperation at the gate versus what you'd see at the ECC?

(2) Answer. Yes, people were a little more desperate at the gate. They would yell and hold up various documents, and were mainly trying to get our attention.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Do you remember hearing about any threat reporting throughout your time at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I remember that there was a threat in the vicinity, but not sure if it was Abbey Gate itself.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. Do you remember if the threat level was increasing leading up to the 26th?

(2) Answer. I don't recall. I remember around that time there was an ISIS-K threat being talked about. I don't remember it being with any specificity. We had nightly meetings at the ECC with the leadership. I talked about the threats of suicide vests and ISIS-K.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. At the ECC, did the threat streams change how you operated?

(2) Answer. Yes, once the attack happened we made the civilians consolidate their personal belongings into a clear plastic bag. We would put their stuff through the scanner, while it was working. After the blast they had to dump all their stuff and reconsolidate it into the clear bags.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. After the attack occurs, and there's notification of a MASCAL event, what do you do?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. I got a call from the JOC sometime in the afternoon. The Shock Trauma Platoon that had been working near the PAX terminal was deployed down to the gate. They had NTVs that were modified into ambulances. They started bringing people back. The more severe cases went to the Role 2 and the lower priority cases went back to the PAX terminal for lower level triage. I knew that there were Marines that were killed. I found out later that one of them belonged to us. It was Sgt Gee. She was evacuated to the Role 2. I remember having the conversation that at the gate she had a pulse but wasn't breathing. By the time she made it to the Role 2 she had passed away. That night we went over there, around 1830, we went over to the morgue to identify the bodies. She was in the back right corner. I'm not sure what her immediate status was when the blast initially happened. I don't know what the ultimate cause of death was, but I was told she had some fragmentation.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Did you have any other Marines wounded?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in between the inner and outer gate area when the blast went off. He may have had a concussion. I don't think he was diagnosed with a grade three, but I know he had some effects. I think he was down there to check on the search team Marines. He was inside the gate, not outside where the females were. He worked at the ECC, often times at the front. He may have been down there for that or just to check on the Marines. He is one of the Staff NCOs that always wanted to be engaged. Nothing changed operational wise. A couple of my Marines on my team were in tears. I addressed the unit and shared the facts of the tragedy. I told them we must continue what we are doing in order to get people out. There will be a time to grieve. I told them to check on Marines that may be taking it exceptionally hard.

We processed people until 0800 on the 30th of August. This was about two hours before we left. We had a small team of about 10 with me. This was just enough to process people before we left. We took IDF on the morning of the 30th. They almost put rockets through aircraft before we left. We flew into (b)(1)1.4a then redeployed on the 24th of September. All of our flights went through Romania or Ireland.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. Do you have any story boards that may be helpful to us?

(2) Answer. I know the MEU did an AAR that may be helpful.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question. Is there anything that you want us to know or have any questions that we should have asked?

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, (b)(6), Combat Logistics Battalion - 24, 12 October 2021

(2) Answer. The theater logistics support wasn't very good. We conducted our PDSS and submitted our requirements in plenty of time, but still didn't get the support we needed. We felt like we were alone out there.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 102

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 12 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below. For brevity, C1 will indicate BG Curtis, (b)(6) will indicate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will indicate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will indicate (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question (C1). When did you first start training to be certified as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and when did you think you would deploy forward?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Training for the MEU is started in July of 2020. Before we even formed as a MEU, we started classroom training with our amphibious squadron. Then we went up to Little Creek, Virginia to do integration training with them with a focus on amphibious assaults. One of the staff planning exercises that we executed in a classroom environment at the end of July 202 was a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). We went through the planning process of inserting the command element and preparing for a follow on evacuation. It is part of the standard progression up to evaluation by the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). NEO wasn't the focus of the course, but it was covered.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

Then on about 09 August of 2020 we formed the command element of the MEU. In steady state the command element of the MEU is about 70-80 people, but it picked up a lot of people to deploy. The command picked up communications, human intelligence, and Military Police (MP) to bring that number up to about 250. The entire MEU was formed in early September when we gained our Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB), our aviation squadron (consisting of heavy lift, attack helicopters, the UAV detachment, and the harrier detachment), and the battalion landing team (BLT) (an engineer platoon, a light armor reconnaissance (LAR) company, and the base infantry battalion). Throughout the fall we were doing individual courses. There was NEO involved in that, about a week long. The primary attendees are the evacuation control center (ECC) folks, the CLB, and some folks from the battalion landing team that would pull security. Generally the executive officer (XO) would go forward with that command element, so that XO could coordinate with the embassy they arrived at. Obviously, that was unnecessary during this operation as so many higher headquarters arrived before us.

The fall is just those individuals' courses. Then we had an exercise to establish an ECC, train their guys on NEO tracking systems (NTS). It was mostly the CLB and BLT involved in that. Our first at sea period, was PHIBRON-MEU Integration Training, and that's really just figuring out where you live on the ship and how to get on and off. That happened in mid-October, then we went to sea again in early December. That was our first evaluated exercise. We are evaluated by EOTG and the carrier strike group forward, a one star admiral. We executed raids, and one decision I would like to note from II MEF by LtGen Beaudreault, his perspective was if you can do the higher level stuff you can do a NEO. His decision was not to use the at sea days for the NEO, and use it for the higher priority exercises.

There ended up being a delay of the deployment in front of us. That 1 star admiral has to evaluate everyone, so that delay pushed us back as a result. Our final exercise was February into March. That was a COMPTUEX and go. Normally you would take leave and do final maintenance prior to departure. We still had to go to Norfolk first, but we deployed straight from there. Between the 2 exercises we did a NEO exercise, with an embassy and a couple of remote sites where we could do evacuations. It was integrated in with the operational scenario known as the Treasure Coast Scenario. It was in line with all of our exercises, the first one we had done was an urban training situation with the same political situation of a deteriorating country. So we planned on a NEO, deployed our forward element, security, and the CLB. Then we deployed the NEO element to execute and pick up evacuees to a nearby landing area. We answered requests for information (RFIs) on how we would bring them back to the ship. That was done in January.

(3) Question (C1). You had harriers?

(4) Answer (b)(6) Yes, they flew off the USS Iwo Jima. They had about a 6-8 hour flight time and they did a total of 8 sorties while we were in HKIA from the 19th to the 22nd.

Approved for Release

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question (C1). Alright, jump forward to the EOTG and tell me what training you did, I'm told you have 13 Mission Essential Tasks (MET)? What did you do to conduct a NEO at EOTG?

(2) Answer (b)(6) It's down to 11 METs, 3 were combined into 1. Conduct a NEO is one of the MET tasks. We did individual courses that were NEO focused and some of those courses were interagency focused. There is a bleed over with foreign humanitarian assistance, so we sent a lot of NEO folks to that course. The NEO course is taught by EOTG. We sent our artillery battery and a rifle company platoon to a nonlethal weapons train the trainer course which is important for ECC crowd control. We also have a small MPs detachment of 4 on the staff.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question (C1). How were you certified by EOTG?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We are actually certified by II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and validated by EOTG. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the MEF, a peer headquarters, did the recommendation to LtGen Beaudreault as we executed. During the course of our 3 at sea exercises, 2 of which were evaluated, and the 2 we did on shore (the urban training and the NEO in January) we executed all 11 METs as necessary. EOTG has a general rubric of how many times they need to see each event in order to be validated. NEO is a long execution, so EOTG only wants to see it executed once. Some of the shorter ones that only take half a day, you may have to execute 4 times.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question (C1). When are you validated and certified? You are validated then certified?

(2) Answer (b)(6) At the end of our COMPTUEX exercise in mid-March. Yes sir, they are close together but that is final step.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question (C1). When did you deploy?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We know we are going to EUCOM. In late February there was a Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) change that gave us to CENTCOM for 30 days in June because we were the backfill for a big deck carrier. We deployed at the end of March 2021, around the 28th. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a We know we were going to CENTCOM so we started planning exercises and crisis response with (b)(1)1.4c



Approved for Release

Afghanistan came up a little bit, but at that point anyone thought that a withdrawal would be more like a draw down with a long term presence.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question (C1). When do you hear that you may be supporting Afghanistan? When are you sure?

(2) Answer (b)(6) About mid-June. We knew that (b)(1)1.4 was standing up as an on call Joint Task Force for Crisis Response (JTF-CR) as a part of that withdrawal plan. I believe the President's announcement was in April. CENTCOM did some of its withdrawal plan in May and there was a NEO annex in that plan (b)(1)1.4 got that commanders estimate in June.

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer (b)(6) I remember that, you all flew to Afghanistan in mid-July and conducted that site visit. A few days after that, we all moved ashore to (b)(1)1.4a.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question (C1). What did that visit look like?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We talked with all the U.S. personnel, but not that much with the Turks due to the concern of spooking the herd The Brits arrived when BGen Sullivan



Approved for Release

did, they were the only foreign partner that we really got to coordinate with. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to visit the embassy at the same time that Gen McKenzie and RADM Vasely visited. While they did that, the planners and crisis response element that we had present wanted to pick out where we would set up for NEO and where would we call in Joint Mission Essential Equipment Listing. By the time they returned from the embassy we had a plan on ground and we decided that Abbey Gate would be our primary gate. It would provide the best security as it had more standoff than the North, and more space to spread people out than East Gate. At the time we weren't too aware of the Barron's role for the UK or the potential role of Camp Sullivan. We also looked at the Afghan Border Police check points that approached Abbey Gate. It was the only gate that had depth, and therefore space for processing. That would have let us hold evacuees at the cargo area at the far eastern end of the airfield, and then bus folks to ramp 8 to load at the PAX terminal.

After the PDSS, we went back to the ships. We weren't sure if we could go ashore. (b)(1)1.4c was seeing who would let us stay near an airfield, and Al Jabar became the best option. (b)(1)1.4a had just left to consolidate in (b)(1)1.4a so there was space. It was within reach of (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a We probably could have flown our C-17s out of (b)(1)1.4a instead of going to (b)(1)1.4a We continued to plan with SPMAGTF-CR, they were better postured to get in from (b)(1)1.4a than we were in (b)(1)1.4a They were the main effort until the 1st of August. Everyone's preference was get the MEU in, since we had trained on NEO and EEC operations as a MET. It was not a core MET for the MAGTF, even if they had trained for it. It may be an additional MET for them. We had less competing missions as well, they still had to control the (b)(1)1.4a embassy and maintain some training presence in (b)(1)1.4a We brought almost double the number of companies that they brought. But we needed everyone we could get, we ran out of people quickly.

In the second half of July we were moving our ships in. Iwo had to do an exercise with 2 other ships. Our CLB headquarter was ashore and ready to go as an ECC and control element. As soon as we were in range we flew in to (b)(1)1.4a We were officially capable. This was around 20 July, and Iwo continued to steam around before offloading the rest of the battalion a few days later to get everyone ashore. That's when we became the lead element and SPMAGTF had to provide support.

(b)(1)1.4g

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question (C1). When do you know for sure that you are going?

(2) Answer (b)(6) It became clear on the 13th but we still didn't really know when we were going. Around the 9th Kandahar fell, and there was an announcement that the



Approved for Release

embassy would do a deliberate draw down. Between 9th and 10th our tether pushed from 48 hours to 24 hours. The night of the 12th it was a 12 hour tether. The other concern that night was a quick collapse of security on the airfield, so we bumped some security up from force package 3 to force package 1. That caused some friction, we didn't understand why at the time, but it was because they were trying to prioritize space to bring in the 82nd. I'm not quite clear on the 12th, but I think only 3 of the 6 C-17s in theater were functional, so the 82nd with C-17s may have been better positioned than us.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question (C1). When are you boots on ground and what does that look like?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Initially we had 2 companies and a headquarters elements on ground. We left on the night of the 13th and got in around 0200 on the 14th. By that evening 2 and a half companies and some of battalion headquarters element (sniper, scout, engineers, and a 25 man jump HQ for the MEU) were in Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). We had a few folks, about 10-15 get in early with the JTFCR. (b)(1)1.4a

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question (C1). What was the force flow?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Onn the 14th we had our initial force with 2 companies. Maybe we got some more bodies on the 15th and 16th. Then as the zombie apocalypse started on the 16th into the 17th we weren't getting much in. We leaned heavily on TF Polar Bear. The next day the crowd rushed the airfield, and there was some gunfire. 1/82 showed up at this point, and we tried to put them on line to pull security to the south but they had to go secure ramps 2 and 7 in the west, near Alvarado. There were times when BGen Sullivan wanted to employ arrivals in a certain location, so we would go grab a stick as they landed and position them in a security location.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question (C1). When do the first 82nd elements arrive?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The first night that the crowd broke out of the civilian terminal. The 17th or the 18th. They flew in over the course of the next days, and they were pretty short on manning. The white and red devils were both there, but one of the battalions was basically just a company for the first few days.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question (C1). I think you shut north gate between 22-23 August, with the exception of special targeting, and you shut east gate on the 24th. Why?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer (b)(6) We never liked North Gate. We started there because that's where the crowd was and the Taliban had some control there. It was along the road, which was a high speed avenue of approach. It was also en route to Kabul from the prison to the north. A lot of the threat picture from previous attack on the airfield had come from the northern direction.

We didn't like North Gate, the walls are up against the road and it felt breachable and climbable. As we execute at North Gate, it was a challenge of crowd control. They were using riot control elements and flashbangs. The Afghans are firing rounds in the air, at people's feet, or at people to crowd control. Every few hours we would have to take in a gunshot wound for treatment until RADM Vasely ordered to stop treating noncompliant military aged males.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Additionally, a lot of international forces coordinated to use that gate. That worked for a few days until word got out and that gate was getting crushed by people. That wore out the Marines manning that gate. Steady state manpower for that gate was 2 rifle companies for 12 hours. They'd pull over watch, security, and close and open the gate as necessary. That was our initial threat focus.

(4) Answer (b)(6) Threat reporting was generally at North, East, and Abbey Gates from the beginning. The Taliban owned South Gate and you didn't hear about it. To the North there are elements of key terrain with the possibility of plunging fire and there had been some historical machine gun fire from that northern area toward the airfield at some point. It felt like a risk, and our going in assumption was not to use the North Gate. The crowds changed that, they were always present at North, East, and Abbey gate. There was no time when there weren't 2000-3000 people at a gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question (C1). How about East Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) You still have crushing at East Gate. There is a lot of density. It doesn't have same opportunity of plunging fire, but it just a single gate. Mostly a vehicle gate. It is very simple. It's about 12 feet tall.

(2) Answer (b)(6) The first couple of nights it worked out for our foreign partners to bring in a few convoys at night. It was a nice balance for international operations for a day or 2, but once word got out it was crushed as well.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question (C1). Why and when did you close East Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) It took a company and a half to man that gate. It ate up two more units of combat power, and had some of the same problems of people crushing against



Approved for Release

that gate. It was actually easier at North Gate to pick out certain individuals like someone with an orange flag and telling the Taliban to bring that person. It was too hard to open the East gate, and the Taliban commander at East gate was ornery and didn't like being there. The Taliban commander basically told the company commander to shut the gate down around the 24th because he wasn't going to cooperate. We observed them bringing in mortars around us there as well. But mostly once the crowd collapsed there, you couldn't get anyone in that gate. I think we closed it on the 24th. The 24th and 25th were only Abbey Gate. A couple people came through North Gate during that period, but none through East Gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question (C1). Could they have operated a mortar there?

(2) Answer (b)(6) They observed them moving the mortar by there, in transit, not actually setting it up.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Our legal team thought that there was enough legal standing for the Marines at the date to have shot at the Taliban, but I think it was the right call not to.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question (C1). Why did you like Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer (b)(6). It gave us more standoff, and as we learned that the Brits were going to use Barron we knew that we would have to keep that gate open anyway. We were manning that south eastern area anyway as a buffer in case the crowds tried to jump the fences and get to the commercial terminals. That never happened, the Taliban and the 1/82 locked that area down pretty well. There was probably some bias as well since our initial plan was Abbey Gate, but we liked the depth and that there were a series of gates to close. In our initial assessment we did not give enough appreciation to the canal, we only assumed the road would be used.

(3) Answer (b)(6) Not to say we set conditions, but we were using that drainage ditch. The Taliban were stopping high risk Afghans, so we recommended that some families come along that footbridge until we saw them and would pull them through the hole in the fence. You would typically see Afghans on the village side, but at first not in the canal or on the fence side. But once we did that for a few days, you see a large mob in the canal. That mob was manageable on the 24th and the 25th, but it was huge on the 26th. The word just got out.

(4) Answer (b)(6) The embassy was also deliberately messaging to use Abbey Gate in addition to the National Strike Unit (NSU) Gate.

s. Question and Answer 18.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Those other gates were very targeted, weren't they?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes. The walk up gates are Abbey, North, and East. The NSU and South Gates were generally targeted. Around the 19th or 20th we lost a gate on the Northern side (AAF compound) and people poured in, it wasn't as viable.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question (C1). How did the situation on the ground at Abbey Gate change from the 25th to the 26th?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't think there was a major change on those 2 dates. I think there was a surge of personnel across that canal because the word got out about it, and because the Taliban hadn't quite figured out to screen that area yet. The Taliban had checkpoints elsewhere, but the canal could avoid them. We were pulling those high risk folks in through the hole in the fence, there is a much lower presence of Taliban around here and they wouldn't be stopped, so we have them go around. We were successful at that for about 3 days, but that word was fully out by the 26th and the crowd was huge. On the 24th and 25th it would be busy after 1100 in the canal, so we would try to pull people out in the morning. By the 26th, that wadi is filled on both sides, and the Brits are no longer along the fence line as they had been for 3 days prior. The Brits were focused on the Barron, they didn't have the manpower to manage the fence line and the Barron. They can't secure the gate/fence and the Barron with the crowd there, there was only a company or two of 2nd Para. The Battalion Commander was the tactical commander of the 2nd and 3rd Para companies that were there.

(3) Answer (b)(6) It was a task force. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question (C1). When do you want to close Abbey? To lay it out, I see that the crowd has grown. The Brits have made it clear that they need us to keep it going. I think that the end time for the Brits kept changing because they couldn't keep up, is that accurate?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The afternoon of the 26th. I think it is somewhat accurate, I think they were trying to get everyone out, but the crowd was too thick for them to convoy through the crowd.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question (C1). Are we concerned that if we closed Abbey Gate the risk to force and mission on HKIA increase? Would it have taken 48 hours to reestablish operations which was unacceptable due to the tight timeline?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer (b)(6) Part of the atmospherics was that the quality of intakes had decreased.

(3) Answer (b)(6) To back up, when we had that breach on the 17th we had control back by the 19th. At that point, I understand that there was a push from the executive branch to get the flow started. Doing the right processing was too slow, so the quality of intake dropped because we were barely checking paperwork. At one point we had 18,000 people on HKIA. That's just evacuees total, and some NSU folks. 3,000 people were at the ECC site alone, and the holding areas were full.

(4) Answer (b)(6) Those holding areas weren't even constructed as we had planned.

(5) Answer (b)(6) We were dealing with people getting in, but we had nowhere to put them because the air craft weren't getting in which exacerbated the problem and pushed us to 18,000 people.

(6) Answer (b)(6) At the same time we had to turn the gates off from the 20-22nd to deal with that backlog.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question (b)(6) So even though we paused, other nations are still getting people out?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes. Some birds are coming in, but they are foreign planes and they are only getting out their people. That frustrated the crowds that we were trying to control, and they would get extremely distressed when they saw those planes coming and going.

(3) Answer (b)(6) It didn't help that we were also rejecting people from inside HKIA.

(4) Answer (b)(6) That started happening later, because they would get to (b)(1)1.4a and then be rejected. Then we had to go back and be stricter with our acceptance criteria, and we had the logistical nightmare of trying to kick people out that we had previously let in but we knew would be rejected further down the road. We had to fill busses of people that got rejected and push them out. I think that when it comes to opening and closing gates, there were also the company commanders making decisions to temporary close the gates in order to push people off in order to reestablish control. That was acceptable, and if it went on for a bit too long the command desk would ask what the situation was and the commander would explain that they or the NSU were pushing the crowds back to reopen the gate.

x. Question and Answer 23.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). When does the blast occur? I've heard 1730-1745.

(2) Answer (b)(6) I think it happens at about 1300Z. I think that time frame you have is about right. (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (C1). What do you do when the blast happens?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question (C1). Who has a picture and information on the guy in the ball cap who stood near the bomber and looked suspicious? Allegedly the recon guys fired at him.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) I don't know if they fired shots at him, I think they wanted to. I think I have a picture of him.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). I was told that the recon guys fired at him right after the blast because he was standing around. Warning shots finally scared him off but he still looked unconcerned. What do you think was going on there?

(2) Answer (b)(6) Yes, I have a picture of him that I can get to you. I can DOTs it over to you on SIPR or send it via Signal. I don't know if anything can be done about him, that's speculation at this point. We could maybe (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me about him initially, but I don't know the answer to that.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question (C1). Do you have post blast photos?

(2) Answer (b)(6). Yes, the Brits and the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) did a post blast analysis that have some photos. We may have included that in our initial brief, and I can provide that to you.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question (C1). I've been told at any time there are as many as 60 threat streams?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't know about 60, but the threat reporting was definitely consistent. I would say there were 4-6 separate threat streams at any given time.

ff. Question and Answer 31.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question (C1). What kind of screening are you doing on women? Are you using Female Engagement Teams (FETs)?

(2) Answer (b)(6) We don't have FETs, we just had females searching females.

(2) Answer (b)(6) It was basically a pat down search.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question (C1). Did we ever find anything?

(2) Answer (b)(6) They maybe found some knives or some handguns, no devices. I think this may be a better question for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) He may have better fidelity about what was found, I think that anything that was found went straight to EOD.

(3) Answer (b)(6). Most things that were confiscated were found, like abandoned bags.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Do you have any reporting that the bomber flashed American identification to get closer?

(2) Answer (b)(6) No, that would be a first heard for me.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question (C1). Any reason to key in on this guy before he blew himself up?

(2) Answer (b)(6). No, we are having a hard time even identifying him at this point. It's possible we saw him, but we don't have a solid description of who he was. It's all speculation. If you were looking at that crowd, you were looking at a hundred people. Even if there was a go pro that were recovered I don't think we could pick him out. With that, I know there was some reporting of small arms fire thereafter.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question (C1). Do you think there was a complex attack?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't. I believe there was shooting, but I don't believe they were being engaged by an adversarial force.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I agree, the Taliban was probably shooting to back up the crowd, I don't know if they shot at them.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question (C1). I believe that the Marines returned fire after the blast at some Taliban individuals that they saw on top of the crack house. The Marines probably viewed that as hostile intent, and fired on them. I think that is a possibility.

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't know that I have seen a single report of any Taliban being shot during this event, but we couldn't know for sure. It could be possible, but the Taliban would have informed us that we shot some of their guys.

(3) Answer (b)(6) You are going to hear tomorrow from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that they think our doctors treated people with gunshot wounds.

(4) Answer (b)(6) There are Taliban on the connex boxes, and there are Marines stretched all along that corridor. We had the non-green tipped rounds, the Taliban usually have 5 or 7 millimeter weapons, but there is no telling what kind of rounds there are in theater. There is probably green tip all over the place. The MEU showed up with an open tipped, non-colored, copper jacketed barrier blind round that I was not familiar with and the SPMAGTF showed up with green tip (M855). It is conceivable that some people may have got caught in that crossfire given the layout of the area. I did see some open source reporting of rounds being pulled out of Afghans, but we can't know

Approved for Release

for sure. There are 20 years of rounds being in the theater and the ANDSF armories have been abandoned and opened for weeks. There is no way to know, but there is enough uncertainty that I am not convinced that there is anyone shooting at the Marines.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question (C1). Any reports of the sniper tower taking fire? The snipers say they took 3 rounds, but that has been unconfirmed.

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't recall, I would have to go back and check.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I heard that reporting, but it was never fully actioned by the time it got to us.

(4) Answer (b)(6) When you look at the ball bearings, they are small. It is conceivable that it would look like gun shots. I don't know if anyone has a ball bearing, but you can see the scale in the EOD report. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(5) Answer (b)(6) We got sporadic reporting of shooting throughout the night as well, around when we got circular reporting of the IED in the market.

(6) Answer (b)(6). We did get more reporting of a secondary IED at the back of the Barron, but that was the same threat.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question (C1). You don't believe it was a complex? Do you think we fired at the Taliban on the crackhouse?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I do not think it was. I was unfamiliar with a Taliban position on the crack house, so I could not say.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I don't believe it's impossible, but I have no reason to believe it was. My speculation is that all the compounds in the area had local management that hired their own security forces. Some of those were contractor facilities. Camp Sullivan had probably a platoon of its own contracted security.

pp. Question and Answer 41.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(1) Question (C1). Did you get any RFIs saying that Taliban were killed? I was told there was an issue up north?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I have no indication that Taliban were shot by U.S. forces. If they were shot up there that was probably the National Strike Unit (NSU).

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question (C1). Do you think any Taliban were killed in the blast?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't think so. Taliban usually have a weapon and some load bearing equipment and are distinguishable from the rest of the population. I do not recall a report a saying there was a Taliban in that location. I remember reports of suspicious individuals in the wadi, but no reports of individuals with weapons that would indicate that they are Taliban.

(3) Answer (b)(6) I think the Taliban weren't there, we wouldn't have needed the PSYOPs to come help with crowd control if they were helping with the crowd.

ss. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question (C1). Any reports of the Taliban laughing after the explosion?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I am not aware of any reports like that.

tt. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question (C1). Are there EOD guys that were present at the gate? Anyone present here at Lejeune?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I think we should defer that question to our EOD officer. We can coordinate that for tomorrow.

uu. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question (b)(6) How did the gate change over time?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer (b)(6) We initially used the wadi to get people around the Taliban check point. There were always Afghans on the building side. They were not in the wadi or the fence side initially. The recon company commander would know better than me, again, he was there every day. His gunny and his guys could give fidelity on that concentration.

vv. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question (C1). Would the Taliban have told you if any of them were killed?

(2) Answer (b)(6) The Taliban were good about reaching out when their needs weren't met. If the Taliban were wronged they would have reached out and said something.

ww. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question (C1). What do you think Dover will have?

(2) Answer (b)(6) They will do autopsies and pull any projectiles from the bodies.

(b)(1)1.4a

xx. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question (C1). Could we please have your contact information?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

yy. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question (C1). Anything you think we missed?

(2) Answer (b)(6) In terms of calculus for keeping the gate open, Camp Sullivan never went away as a possibility for ways to get Americans out. Like I said, the quality of our intake had gone down so there was speculation that if we stayed longer we might go to Camp Sullivan for a collection area. It had pros, like having an existing infrastructure to support about 3,000 people. It used to be a SOF training camp.

Approved for Release

(3) Answer (b)(6) When we were having the Camp Sullivan discussion, I recommended that we not use it. I saw the sheer volume of people at the gates, and I knew that this space would be difficult to control since it was outside of the wire at a time when we had very high threat streams. I recommended considering other options and not going that far south.

(4) Answer (b)(6) But part of keeping Abbey Gate open, was keeping that Sullivan option open if we stayed longer. By the 26th we had gone final on our withdrawal plan, but I don't know if anyone believed it until the blast. People were trying to keep options open, and Abbey Gate would have been our answer. We planned on closing the gate as soon as the Brits left. The White Devils would come take the gate right afterward. In the back of our mind we felt like we weren't done yet and we would go to Sullivan.

(5) Answer (b)(6) I'm confident that if we stayed past the 31st we would have had a huge fight on our hands. I don't think the Taliban had any deal making left in them.

zz. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question (C1). How fragmented was Taliban leadership? I have heard that they were not cohesive.

(2) Answer (b)(6). That is accurate sir, there were different levels of how much these guys talked to each other. The senior leadership would talk, but the battalion and company level had pretty fractured understandings of the situation so you would get different cooperation at the lower level. There was some reporting of lower level Taliban moving over to ISIS-K when the Taliban started working with the Americans. It presented an ideological issue for them. I think the brigade level Taliban had fair control, but at the lower level execution I think you had some problems.

(3) Answer (b)(6) The other side is that the Taliban would follow instructions to the letter. If the dad had documentation they might let the dad through, but not the family.

(4) Answer (b)(6) That's true they would either follow it exactly or maybe not at all. That presented issues and we had occasions where a bus would be stopped and families separated at the south gate. It got to the point that we had to provide a detailed list to the Taliban of who would be on a bus or they wouldn't let it through.

aaa. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question (C1). Which flag officers spoke to Taliban?

(2) Answer (b)(6) I don't have great awareness on that. I know that MG Donahue and RADM Vaseley did, and I dont know that BGen Sullivan didn't. Company Commanders at the gate would also speak to the local Taliban commanders at their respective gates.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

bbb. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question (b)(6). 2-1 didn't have a gunner but you did. Any reason to talk to him?

(2) Answer (b)(6), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were always together, they did the PDSS at Sullivan together and were there for about 30 days before we got there. I think that would tell you the same thing, so you could speak to either of them.

(3) Answer (b)(6) To close us out, we were told to stay in CENTCOM in July and we came ashore late July in (b)(1)1.4a In early August the provincial centers are falling. After that you had about a week and half until the Taliban entered Kabul. As soon as that decision to take provincial center occurred, the writing was on the wall. The country and its government were actively collapsing. In my professional opinion, that is when the NEO should have been called. We should not have waited until every provincial capital had fallen except for Kabul.

And that brings up the sensitive topic of when to talk to the President of Afghanistan about what our plans would be, in order to shape the governmental decision. It just feels like on our end, when the capitals were falling and the news was saying 90 days, we knew that was false.

(4) Answer (b)(6) Even the day before Kabul fell, RADM Vasely was telling the leaders in (b)(1)1.4 not to approach Kabul or they would be bombed but that was eventually overcome by events.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 103

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 12 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 12 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), US Army, recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your background and what was your duty position with the MEU?

(2) Answer. I was the (b)(6). I'm currently with 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB) and this was my first deployment. The platoon I had on the MEU was my Platoon whom I trained with for almost 2 years. I was dual hat being the Engineer Platoon Commander and worked in the (b)(6) assisting the Operation Officer and Assistant Operation Officers.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Describe your element and force structure?

(2) Answer. We deployed with a total force of 43 to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). We left behind the Motor Transport (MT) Operator, a MT Mechanic, a

Approved for Release

Heavy Equipment (HE) operator, HE mechanic, a Electrician, a Food Service Marine and a couple Combat Engineers who'd gotten into trouble, so I had most of my Marines out there. The Engineer breakdown of the platoon was myself and 2x 1371 staff NCOs. 35x 1371 / 2x 1345 / 1x 1141 / 1x RTO / 1x Corpsman. We had no females in the Platoon which meant no one to get pulled into the female search teams at HKIA.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Describe the training and operations your element participated in during the deployment, prior to HKIA?

(2) Answer. We were very focused on survivability, mobility, and counter-mobility training. We knew we could potentially be tasked to execute a noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), but our tasks would be engineer related. Since we aggregated as a platoon we trained to execute missions based on survivability, mobility and counter-mobility operations and had a lot of range time focused directly on those tasks. While deployed the whole platoon got a chance to do some training in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a We got to do some force protection and demolition training. We secured a few gates around the Logistics Support Area and created guard shacks with a knife rest. We also emplaced wired obstacles around the Command Operation Center and the Ammunition Handling Area. During our Bi-Lateral training with the Saudi Arabian Royal Army we demonstrated the construction of various wire obstacles.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at HKIA and what was the atmosphere upon arrival?

(2) Answer. We were split up. My Platoon Sergeant; (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), went out first on advance party. He was in HKIA on 9 August and was with the initial MEU elements. He assessed what we had for HE and Class IV Materials and made sure we knew what we were walking into. Then I had a squad flown in on the 16th that linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). The insane influx of people on the runway happened the next day. The remainder of the platoon including myself arrived on the 17th or 18th.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What were your first tasks and priorities at HKIA?

(2) Answer. I showed up in the middle of the night. My Platoon Sergeant greeted me and talked to me about setting up some type of obstacles across the southern portion of the commercial passenger terminal to get control of that portion of the airfield. There was Infantry Company and a Light Armored Recon Company setting up defensive positions across the southern side. We ran wire as much as possible across the grassy area south of the flight line. We ended up having to move and use about 20 connex boxes to create a little bit of a canalizing feature. We used a flatbed tow truck to

Approved for Release

move the containers and save a lot of time. We used the Rough Terrain Container Handler (RTCH) to load containers on the back of the flatbed tow truck, and then we would drive it around and move the container as necessary using the tow truck. That took us through the first day. We were really still getting the equipment and identifying what we could use. Class IV on hand included: Engineer pickets, concertina wire (c-wire), barbed wire, razor wire, HESCO 7 footers, and 6x6, and 4x4s, and some plywood. Initially they had stocks of wire on hand, but as much as we used we started running out. I put in requests for resupply, but by the time the requests made it up, they never got a chance to get more back. We never got resupplied with Class IV while I was there. Equipment wise, we had contract equipment. We had a crane, front loaders, dozers, fork lifts, backhoe, dump trucks, semi-trucks, a tow truck and excavators. We used the crane once and broke the cable on it. We had knocked down a bunch of guard towers and they were outside the wall and because some Afghan civilians were using them to observe the airfield or to climb into the airfield, we had to knock them down from the inside. We used the excavator to knock them down in order not to go outside. We ended up using the crane to try to knock down the last tower. The tower came down but it broke the crane. We had stocks of barriers, but they were already inside the gates and we basically moved them around to the best situation we could make at each location. We couldn't really get the crane into the Abbey Gate area. We didn't have any certified crane operators, so my guy who'd been on it before was just operating it to make it happen. We used the RTCH to move T-walls. With the RTCH we were limited to about 8 feet of height clearance. There was no way to move taller walls over other walls using the equipment we had on hand. We made some tetrahedrons using some rebar and welding equipment in a mechanics shop we had. They let us make some obstacles and improvised obstacle pieces in order to cover areas and create barriers. We double stacked a lot of ISO containers. We did that a lot because it was something we had a ton of and it was effective.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did you have any clear tasks upon arrival or did anyone ever specifically task or prioritize tasks to you?

(2) Answer. We were working at each gate. East Gate was our #1 priority and we would work wherever 1/8 needed us and had companies at the line. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at the BLT was the Ops O and directed that effort. I'd bounce from East and North Gates to Abbey. I worked with the British Royal Marines. We put the chevron in place for 2/1. I worked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on that effort and it was somewhat sketchy even when we did get out to the outside gate area due to the amount of people there. He directed a little effort out there and then we didn't really have anything else to do for them after the chevron. We installed that on the morning of the 20th but it took all night. Throughout most nights we were shoring up holes in the wall. There was an area west of North Gate that used to be a gate and the Afghan civilians were hopping the fence in that area. There was another Army unit out there, TF Polar Bear, and we happened to be right there with them when the 50+ CIVs hopped the gate. We would work with these units and we would constantly have to plug holes in the fence. The guard tower take down

Approved for Release

took a night in itself. We were originally supposed to destroy the concrete towers outside the perimeter, but that got canceled because we couldn't do so without impacting all the civilians nearby. We did get tasked to come back down to Abbey Gate. This was coming from the BLT so it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sending me. On the morning of the 25th the 2/1 Marines said we weren't going to talk about the gate improvements because they were shifting focus to the draw back and gate closure. The role had switched from operating the gate to then looking at the echelon back movement once we closed the gates and that wasn't really just at Abbey Gate. We were looking at emplacing disruption obstacles following the pull back. Getting back out there on the 26th we weren't asked to help with anything outside the gate at all.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Is it fair to say East and North Gates were your priority, considering you are the BLT Engineer, and those gates were manned by BLT Marines?

(2) Answer. Yes. It was clearly and specifically briefed that way.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. What assessments did you do at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. My first assessment was passed back to me by 2/1 saying, "I'm not worried about the gates because we're turning them over." We got called back out there to improve it again on the morning of the 26th, but it was inaccessible other than the outer gate area and even that was crazy with the amount of people processing still. We basically couldn't input anything else at the gate, and the inner corridor was extremely dangerous to operate equipment in because of the crowds.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did you ever receive any requests for support to gain standoff, create obstacles, or increase or decrease traffic flow?

(2) Answer. Not after the first tasking to put in the chevron. Everything after that was to go down and talk with the infantry companies to see what they needed and could use to improve the area. They had pushed civilians back, but they were right on the road and we had no room to operate. When we were placing the chevron obstacle, I was with the HE operator and we were ground guiding the vehicle which was super dangerous on the 20th let alone later on. We had the RTCH and an up armored vehicle with a plan to fall back if the crowds got crazy. I was on the ground and there was a second ground guide basically keeping people from grabbing and touching the containers while they were in the air. I was on the ground helping them. I was working with the British Royal Marine who was also an engineer and he had been out there for a while.

Approved for Release

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What assessments did you do as the BLT Engineer? Did you have time to do any assessment or was it always responding to the crisis of the moment?

(2) Answer. I had time to look and assess but getting the units to understand what we would need in order to move things all over the place was the hard part. We had the evenings sometimes, but the crowds restricted us from being out there even then. We provided as much assessment as we could to help them improve their areas and force protection. The gates would change by who was working it also so the gate changes were different every time I came back. It was the same at the other gates too, so this wasn't just Abbey Gate. We had the gate set up and they briefed what they would do but they were doing a lot of searching and crowd stuff at the gate that wasn't happening at other gates.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. When you got out there on the 25th, what'd you see?

(2) Answer. The 25th was crazy. The people were lined all over the place and the entire area was flooded with human traffic. The Marines were trying to keep it organized but people were packed in. I couldn't even get out past the break in the fence when I tried to look at the area. The company leadership even told me it wouldn't have been worth it to try to get out there to assess potential force protection improvements because there was so much traffic of humans there and we couldn't make any changes among the crowd. I couldn't even see past the break in the fence to look at the problem set they had. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) loved our help, and he was super complimentary of our work, but when I came back on the 26th, he couldn't give us space or time to be able to make any changes to what existed. The crowd was going nuts. It was crazy at Abbey Gate on the 26th. Compared to the other gates it was worse on that day.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. What was the situation like at the other gates?

(2) Answer. North Gate was crazy in their own way. 1/8 ended up going outside the gate after the gate got pushed in. We were stacking wire everywhere to help them gain space. We had to push the people back so that they were not right up on the gate. It was effective until we abandoned the gate later on. It was crazy at all the gates. The ANA was kind of helping but shooting a lot of warning shots so that was confusing. The Taliban were out there and traffic was right next to the highway and they were also shooting warning shoots. East Gate wasn't that bad. I only went out there once and it wasn't that bad. I knew things were crazy at all the gates, but East Gate never had too much craziness after we stacked the vehicles up against the fence. And none of this was the focus after the first improvements. I was really concentrated on the plan to pull

Approved for Release

back and so was everyone else. We were constantly trying to just figure it out based on what we had and what we were being asked to do.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Leading up to the 26th, were you aware of the increasing threat stream?

(2) Answer. Never. I never got an official brief about changing force pro conditions. It was at best a conversation in passing. Nothing like intelligence about a specific threat. I was never briefed any of that. We worked all day and worked all night. We would hear it was an IED, but nothing specific about the threat to Abbey Gate or size or type of bomb. I had heard about the possibility but nothing specific at any time or place, and as far as I was tracking there was never any effect on force posture other than taking shelter at the very localized level at the gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Describe the scene on the 26th.

(2) Answer. Busy, chaotic. They were still pulling people in and processing. I had a whole flatbed truck full of wire and I came out there to try to help them. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was focused on finishing at the gate and they couldn't gain any space to install anything anyway, so he was focused on changing over with 82nd. They were also focused on lane closure in the fall back. They couldn't get me any space in order to work outside so we couldn't really drop anything outside the gate by the sniper tower. At the time the IED went off we were fixing a breach that had just happened at tower 8. We saw 11 Afghan civilians come through a break in the fence. We were addressing that right when the IED went off.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Did you have any role in the CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. No sir, we finished the gate breach fix and I had guys setting up trip flairs in order to address the other problems and perimeter breaches all over the place because of dead space and sight lines. We were busy at all times. Working to fix holes, working to shore up breaks, working to solve strange problems.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. So the attack happens, what role did you have in shutting the gate?

(2) Answer. Nothing. We had about 24 hours after the IED before (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g indicated a follow on requirement at Abbey Gate. On the 28th I went back out there and linked up with the CPT from 82nd Airborne. They asked us to put a barrier



Approved for Release

at the gate in order to stop anyone from coming in. Because the fences were pretty solid, we basically moved cars in to position to create a serpentine and filled the rest with wire. It was a disrupting obstacle, not a blocking obstacle. There was too much space and not enough time to make a block. We got that set up between the morning to mid-day on the 28th.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. After that?

(2) Answer. We went back to our compound and we departed on the 30th. Between then we were cleaning up the passenger terminal area and still kind of plugging holes in the perimeter. We were filling holes, pushing trash, and really just making sure things were ready to roll out.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Anything else you think we should know?

(2) Answer. We played a role but we were really focused on the BLT. We had no engineers with 2/1. We didn't have any of the Marines tasked directly with them. The Marine from CLB-24 were pretty much working with the evacuation control center (ECC). I spoke with the Engineers from MWSS briefly but really didn't have any exposure to them directly. We had the biggest engineer force and because of that we got the bulk of the engineer work.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Any thought about contracting heavy equipment support?

(2) Answer. When my Platoon Sergeant was out there on the initial push to HKIA we knew we would have shortages of manpower and licensed personnel to run the equipment we had. The RTCH was our main mover for the most part for lifting. Contracted support wasn't really discussed.

Contact info: (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 104

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6), 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis (C1) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: (b)(6): How long have you been the (b)(6) of 1/8?

(2) Answer: Since February of 2020.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: (b)(6): When did you lock on with the MEU? Can you discuss your pre-deployment training in preparation for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer: We locked on in September of 2020. Prior to that, we did our pre-deployment training under our Division. We completed three pre-deployment training blocks, including the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) in the first half of July This was when our Division certified us and confirmed that we were ready to lock on with the MEU. The attachments that joined us include the Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Company, an Engineer Platoon, an Artillery Battery, and a few months later, the Reconnaissance Platoon. At the Change of Operational Control



Approved for Release

(CHOP) in September, we conducted three amphibious trainings, including getting on and off ships and practicing raids. We were evaluated on this training. We also conducted many field operations, to include Realistic Urban Training.

We conducted a Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise (MEUX) specifically in preparation for NEO in late January. The MEUX is where we really focused on NEO operations and were evaluated. We practiced embassy reinforcement during this training. This is an assigned Mission Essential Task (MET) for us.

We got on our ship in February to deploy. Between February and March, we conducted our Composite Training Exercise (Comp 2X), which is our certification exercise with Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). We officially deployed in March.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: (b)(6): Did you conduct any other NEO, or any elements of NEO, training between your time of departure and time of arrival at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: Yes. June was when we first started to hear about a possible NEO. We were in (b)(1)1.4a for three and a half weeks conducting our amphibious training when we first heard about NEO. We completed the training in June and got back on the ship in July. We kept hearing about Afghanistan and geared our training toward a possible NEO. We conducted publication and internal Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) reviews while on the ship. We were only on the ship for a week or so and got off in (b)(1)1.4a to stage for HKIA. Once in (b)(1)1.4a, we conducted NEO training every day. We focused on all types of security. We leveraged the Air Force Security Forces to help conduct training.

I conducted a site survey of HKIA for three days in July and got a strong situational awareness on what HKIA looked like. This helped shape and adapt our training in mid-July and August. We really learned how to secure a base, use the mechanical arms available, train on anti-terrorism measures, practice Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations. We received a lot of role-players from the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) that helped create realistic scenarios. We would inject a lot of different scenarios.

Communication between leaders at this time was very strong. (b)(1)1.4c were already on the ground and helped a lot.

In June, we were focused on high-risk levels of sustainment training. In July and August, we focused solely on NEO training, to include drivers training, security operations, and other NEO-related training.



Approved for Release

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: (b)(6): When did 1/8 arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: The lead element, consisting of approximately 130 personnel, arrived on 13 August. This included of my staff primaries, the command element, all of Alpha Company, and some portions of Bravo Company and Charlie Company. I had my Gunner with me and my Assistant Operations Officer on deck to help us integrate with the MEU staff. I sent my gunner and three corpsmen to HKIA from (b)(1)1.4a in July to help set up our processes and systems.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Can you describe the rest of the force flow?

(2) Answer: It was very simple; full companies would come in on flights. The lead element received tasks right away. We established the towers, had a QRF element, and started pulling security on the gates to begin processing people. The arrival of the rest of my elements were delayed for about four days due to the 82nd bumping our flights. All of 1/8 was on ground in a period of darkness on the 18th of August.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Talk me through the breach of security on the airfield.

(2) Answer: The breach occurred on the civilian side of the airfield. The Gunner and I were circling the entire airfield but never went to the civilian airport. We never anticipated the abrupt departure of Afghan security forces on the airfield once the government fell.

We took rounds on the 16th when the breach occurred. We were bolstering our positions. No one really knew that it was coming. I came into the JOC and everyone was staring at the screens. All you could see were thousands of people running on to the airfield. I picked up my gear and ran out. I grabbed the one company that I had, without chow or water, and we ran out to the airfield. We didn't know the threat level or the capabilities of any threats. We ran out to Apron 8 and saw thousands of people everywhere. I looked west and saw one C-17 being overrun. The pilots were in the cockpit. I looked south and saw that the only option we had was to push everyone back off of the airstrip. I knew we didn't need to use lethal force.

We got on line immediately, riot control-style, and marched forward. More forces began to arrive and help. An Army platoon was behind us, mounted, and helped. Some staff members came out of the JOC to help. A few others from 1/8 came out. We had



Approved for Release

about 300 personnel in total. It took us until about 0200 to push everyone back. I was calling back for engineer support because I needed something to block these people. Eventually we got concertina wire out there and started setting it up. We had everyone contained now. There was a lot of shooting going on near the south side, from the Taliban. They were pushing North to South and we were pushing South to North, causing the crowd to get condensed in between. A lot of people in the crowd were military members, trying to get their families out.

I thought we had it pretty well under control, but around 0400, people found another way in on the southeast side. I didn't know it at the time, but this area was very porous. Thousands of people broke through on this side now. We had a few thousand people that we already pushed back and now thousands more were coming in.

I took some of our people off the line to take control of this breach. We ran the concertina wire further and got everything contained.

The C-17 was now behind us and eventually took off.

I was supposed to receive 82nd personnel during this time to help reinforce our security but I never received them. I don't know what happened, but I didn't receive any help. I kept getting told more reinforcements and engineer equipment was on the way. Eventually, a company from 2/1 came to help. I think it was Echo Co. I also received a company from 10th MTN. They arrived around 0700 or 0800 in the morning. We eventually received some water and chow.

Now that the airfield was clear, C-17s started coming in to land. This caused excitement in the crowd. I pulled the mounted Army platoon up to the line to help. They were almost out of ammo. The crowd was relentless when the C-17s would land because they saw it as their only way out. The Taliban were becoming very aggressive at this time and we killed about six of them. They were armed and pushing the people in the crowd and were shooting at us. We had the crowd kneel down and we returned fire on the Taliban and killed them. I don't actually know if they were Taliban, but they were hostile and armed. This showed the crowd we were there to help, but the C-17s kept landing and the crowd was hard to control.

We had about 8,000 to 10,000 in the crowd now and only 300 of our forces holding them back. People in the crowd began stepping on the concertina wire and broke through our line. They ran across the airstrip and we tried to run them back. This happened a few times throughout the day. I wasn't receiving forces, and in fact, I kept losing people. Many people augmenting us were leaving.

The crowd swarmed the parked C-17 again and the pilot signaled to me that we needed to move because he needed to take off. He taxied on the airstrip and took off.



Approved for Release

This is the moment where you saw three guys that were clinging to the aircraft fall off in the air. This moment deflated the crowd and they became easier to push back.

We finally got the crowd across the airstrip to the civilian terminal. We kept them there for a few hours but then they overtook us again. I noticed that the crowd was finding other places to breach. They were very clever at finding ways to get in. We were never lethal with them because we knew they were just trying to get in. We played this back-and-forth game all day.

Later in the afternoon, toward dusk, the National Strike Unit (NSU) arrived to augment us. I was at the Northwest Gate to link up with the commander. The air operations were shut down all day. We let the NSU mostly take over after they arrived and we pulled the Marines back to Apron 8. The NSU was very violent and clearly had different Rules of Engagement (ROE) than us. They pushed everyone back off of the airstrip and we never had a problem with being overrun again.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Is this around the same time that the Taliban began helping the US?

(2) Answer: I went back out to check on the NSU on the 17th. I knew the JOC was looking for sites to begin processing people. This was the first tip that I got that the Taliban were helping us because I saw their first checkpoint they had set up. I looked for a few different sites to set up the ECCs and went back to brief the General and Col to pitch the ideas I had about where to set up ECCs.

My forces began to flow in by this time and we had everyone on deck.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Did you have any other elements, Task Organization (TASKORG) wise?

(2) Answer: We had the Headquarter and Services (H/S) element and Weapons Company. I left a small element in (b)(1)1.4a and about 200 personnel remaining on the ships. We had 996 Marines on ground.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: (b)(6) At this point, there is relative security of the airfield between the Marines, Army, NSU, Turks, and somewhat the Taliban. Aircraft are flowing in and you're starting to find ECC sites. Talk me through the initial gate operations and TASKORG.



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: We focused on North Gate, East Gate, and Abbey Gate. When 2/1 arrived, they took over Abbey Gate from us. I had two companies at North Gate and East Gate. I rotated them off the gate every 12 hours as part of the rest plan. We were still receiving warning shots and sniper rounds and it was exhausting. We also had security at the passenger (PAX) terminal where we were helping with the ECC. We had to reinforce this area a few times because we would get an overflow of people and no aircraft to send them on.

On day one, we had a frontage of Marines on the gates trying to help people as much as they can and pull people in. It became unsustainable to keep this slow process. We eventually created a lane to bring people in to conduct initial screening and this made the process faster. However, we weren't bringing in the right people and we had two many people on the airfield. BGen Sullivan recognized that this created a security threat and we began to find ways to remove people that weren't eligible.

Our focus on this time was security, both internally and externally. Once aircraft started to arrive the flow was better. The issue now was that there were changing requirements for processing. The Department of State (DoS) constantly changed the requirements needed to get on a flight. Another issue was with the coalition forces. There were many people that looked like us and spoke perfect English, but they held Spanish or other passports. We would try to pull them in and help them when we could. Also, coalition partners would constantly come to the gate and start pulling their random people out, even when we had the gate closed. This created a lot of anger with the crowd. We had to push them back a lot when this happened.

Eventually, we had created a comfort area within the gates containing about 5,000 people that still required screening. We wanted to finish screening these people before bringing more people in, but we needed more consulars present to screen. About 15% of these 5,000 people actually had the correct documents and we had to escort the remaining 85% out. This was soul-crushing for the people being escorted, and the Marines, because these families had just fought for their lives for days to get inside the gate and now they had to leave.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: (b)(6): Going back to the initial clearing of the airstrip, you mention that there was an engagement with the Taliban in which the Marines killed six members of the Taliban. Was this verified?

(2) Answer: Yes, I was there when it occurred. It happened near a gate close to Aprons 4 and 5 on the southside of the airfield near the international terminal. The crowd in this area kept telling us that they couldn't move back because the Taliban were killing people in the rear. I don't know for sure if it was the Taliban, but the crowd was



Approved for Release

saying it was the Taliban and they looked like the Taliban. We were getting shot at all through the night on the 15th. These men caused the crowd to run away from them. They would swing sticks at the crowd and beat them. Around this time, I had pulled the mounted Army platoon back off of the line to refuel and get more ammo, causing the crowd to push forward

I saw six of the guys that the crowd alluded to coming through the gate. The crowd cleared away from them and that was our chance to eliminate them. They had displayed hostile actions and hostile intent. They had been firing at us before they came through the gate. Once they came through the gate, we had a clear line of site and we killed them. I saw three of the men go down personally. Shortly after the engagement, the crowd overran the airfield again.

The civilians in the crowd had received fire from the Taliban throughout this time period and we rendered aid to them. Sometimes the crowd would take them away to render their own aid or bring them to a hospital. If someone was very injured or died while out in the crowd, people in the crowd would just take them away.

I didn't know that we were working with the Taliban at this time. I heard about RADM Vasely talking with the Taliban the next day and that was the first time that I heard that we were working with them.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: (b)(6) What happened to the six men that were killed?

(2) Answer: We never went to check them like we normally would do. We were quickly overran by the crowd when a C-17 landed and weren't able to go to the location. When we were able to return to the area, the bodies and weapons were gone.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: C1: How long after the engagement with the Taliban did the C-17 land?

(2) Answer: I'd say it was an hour or two after the engagement. It landed, taxied over to the apron, and then the civilians overran us onto the air strip.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did you say that the aircraft were receiving fire?

(2) Answer: Yes. It was around the morning or early afternoon of the15th when there was fire coming from the Taliban towers onto the airfield. I saw all of the Afghan



Approved for Release

Security Forces leave their security towers when this happened. There was a C-130 staged on the airstrip that received fire. I think the firing was coming from one or two nefarious actors that were the ones firing. We recovered one round from them and my gunner and EOD conducted analysis on it. They said that it was an armor-piercing round and that it was pretty large. The rounds only came in when aircraft were parked there.

We were posting security at this time. TF Polar Bear was patrolling the area, mounted, at this time. I linked up with their Platoon Commander and spread their screen line wider. Once TF Polar Bear had their two M240s pointed in their direction, the fire stopped.

I eventually had some guys take these towers down with high explosives because people from the crowd were using them to jump over the fence.

After this, I went in to the JOC. This is when I watched the video feed of the thousands of people pouring on to the airfield.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of these rounds?

(2) Answer: Yes, I have photos and EOD conducted an analysis.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: (b)(6): What were the ROE when you arrived and what did it transition to? Was it CENTCOM ROE?

(2) Answer: Yes. It was CENTCOME ROE. We were never unclear on the ROE. Our SJA did a great job briefing us. We conducted training on this and also handed out cards to each fire time. The only ROE change I was ever told was on the evening of the 15th. (b)(1)1.4a

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: C1: Can you provide one of the ROE cards to us?

(2) Answer: Yes

r. Question and Answer 17.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

(b)(1)1.4a

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: C1: How are things changing between 18-25 August in terms of force structure? What are you seeing in the dynamics of the Afghans in the crowd?

(2) Answer: I finally had all of my people. They started flowing in the evening of the 18th. We went from approximately 150 people on ground to 996 people. We were a battalion minus, but reinforced. I had eight maneuver elements. Alpha Co, Bravo Co, Charlie Co, Weapons Co, H/S, the LAR Co, the Artillery Battery, the Recon Platoon attached to the MEU, and the Engineer Platoon. The Engineer Platoon was tasked by me but they used by all as general support.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: C1: Who was your boss and was the chain of command clear?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was very clear. He arrived to HKIA with me on 13 August.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What was your mission set once your entire battalion is on ground?

(2) Answer: Simply put, security. We had security of the north and east gate. We had security for North HKIA and the towers/perimeter security here. We had QRF and snipers.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did you have security of Abbey Gate with the Brits?

(2) Answer: When we had security of Abbey Gate, we were there with the Azerbaijani. The Brits were in the Barron Hotel.

w. Question and Answer 22.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: C1: Where was the best overwatch that you had on the perimeter?

(2) Answer: There were towers available and we leveraged the camera system available at the gates.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: C1: Who had the sniper tower at Abbey Gate? Were any of your forces pulling security at Abbey Gate on the 18th?

(2) Answer: 2/1 eventually took that gate. I don't think we had anyone there on the 18th.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question (b)(6): Who did you change out with at Abbey Gate and when? What did the changeout look like?

(2) Answer: We changed out with Echo Co, 2/1 on or before the 18th of August. I'm not sure how many people they had. I wasn't there during the change out. Every gate was open at this point.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: C1: Were you at Abbey Gate on the 25th or 26th?

(2) Answer: I was there on the 26th but was at East Gate at the time of the blast. I heard the blast perfectly. I was out with my guys at the time and knew exactly what the sound was. It didn't sound very big; I thought it was a suicide vest or small Improvised Explosive Device (IED). I couldn't see it. As soon as the blast occurred I grabbed my SgtMaj to go check it out. I wanted to see what my other guys were doing.

We were walking that way and saw many vehicles speeding by with casualties. I saw blood on the vehicles. We saw three or four casualties that had already received care.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: C1: Was East Gate closed at this point?

(2) Answer: Yes. Abbey Gate was supposed to closed at 1800 on the 26th. We were receiving threat streams all day about an IED at one of the gates. We were taking measures to spread our people out.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: C1: Even though East Gate and North Gate are closed, were specific people still being pulled out at the gates at this time?

(2) Answer: Yes, at North Gate. We pulled a group of New York Times reporters and a large women's organization out at North Gate. These extractions were very targeted. We continued pulling special groups out here up until the 26th. The threat stream was too high to keep doing this. Thousands of people were still outside East Gate even though it was closed.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: C1: Did you see the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP)?

(2) Answer: Yes, they were at East Gate. They weren't receiving a lot of patients because no one knew where they were located. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me they had received some casualties from the blast but I wasn't in that area to verify.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: C1: Is there any way for people to cross from Abbey Gate (34 on the map), across the apron to Tower 3, to get across the airfield? *Uses map as reference*.

(2) Answer: Yes, there was. There was an offshoot with a fence that brings you out to Apron 2. We had this blocked by vehicles, so they would have had to move the vehicles to get through. The unimpeded route was the route that the casualties took.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: C1: From Abbey Inner Gate the distance to the hospital is about 3 kilometers. Can you clearly see Tower 3 from across the airfield? Could you see the hospital?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: It was about 3 kilometers. You can see the tower but can't see the hospital.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: C1: About how long does it take to drive the route that the casualties took to get to the hospital?

(2) Answer: It would take about ten minutes. There are a lot of turns and people in this area causing you to have to go slowly.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: C1: Generally, how long do you realistically think it would take to move a casualty from Abbey Gate to the hospital? Did you see anyone deviate from this route and take a different way?

(2) Answer: I think it would take about 15 minutes. I didn't see anyone else use a different route.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Were aircraft flying in and taking off at this time period?

(2) Answer: Yes. I don't specifically remember any movement during the time of the blast. But airfield operations were open.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: What time do you think the blast occurred?

(2) Answer: It was in the later half of the afternoon. I didn't think to look at my watch.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: How much time was there between the blast at Abbey Gate and the direct fire? Could you see anyone shooting?

(2) Answer: Maybe about ten minutes. I saw our Marines on top of the barriers and in the tower, all aiming toward the direction of the fire. I did not hear us return fire.

mm. Question and Answer 37.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did 1/8 have suppressed weapons? Did you hear suppressed or un-suppressed weapons?

(2) Answer: I heard un-suppressed fire. It sounded like it was coming from an AK. The Marines had round impacting around them.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: C1: What did the fire sound like?

(2) Answer: It was sporadic to sustained fire for about five to ten minutes. It was ineffective in the fact that no one was hit, but it did cause heads to go down for protection.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: C1: Did some of your Marines hear the rounds coming in?

(2) Answer: They could hear and see impact.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did the fire sound louder as you got closer?

(2) Answer: I guess, yes.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: C1: Did you talk to your guys after this?

(2) Answer: Yes. I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) afterward and he was pretty rattled. Everyone was concerned with the blast and casualties. We had one of our Marines serving on the Female Search Team, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) get injured during the blast.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Many things led to the decision to close the gates. Can you talk about this?

(2) Answer: North Gate needed to be shut down. It was very hot and people were passing out often. It was untenable and there were a lot of Taliban nearby. There was also a huge Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threat at North Gate.



Approved for Release

We did the same thing and shut down East Gate before the 26th. The threat streams coming in were very high. We were taking active measures at both of these gates to spread them out and reduce man power.

I would say the blast occurred around 1500. I walked toward that area and saw that 2/1 had the situation under as much control as they could. I had my guy come help pull security for 2/1 so they could worry about the gate and evacuating their casualties.

Many other units showed up to try to help and were bringing in a ton of large vehicles. (b)(6) kept these units away and off the road to ensure that 2/1 was able to evacuate casualties as easily as they could.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: (b)(6) As the blast happens, do you see an increase in civilian activity at the gates? Or was it more of a dispersal?

(2) Answer: I think they felt unsafe and many made the decision to leave. They had been out there for three, four, five days and did feel like it was safe enough to stay.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of North Gate or East Gate to show what you were dealing with as far as the crowd and the surrounding area?

(2) Answer: Yes. I have photos I can share.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: C1: At one point, East Gate was used for deliveries to HKIA. I'm tracking it only had only one gate instead of the double gates. Is this true?

(2) Answer: Yes. I also have photos from the PDSS that would show the area well.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did there appear to be a change in the atmospherics of the people as you got closer to the 31st?

(2) Answer: At first, when we were being breached on the 15th and 16th, the crowd thought that it was a free for all to leave. Once we began controlled gate operations, people were just trying to push and shove and get through the lines. After



Approved for Release

about six or seven days, the crowd realized it was a process and took a lot of waiting to get through the gates and on to a flight. As it got closer to the 30th, people gave up and were leaving. The crowd was almost cleared when I turned our operations over to the Army on the 29th.

It wasn't immediately after the blast that people left, but as we got closer to the 30th, the crowd dwindled down.

Around the 27th, the Taliban started telling us to get off the wall and they began pointing RPGs at us and telling us to leave.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: C1: Our main Taliban point of contact was located at the South Gate. I think that we felt that if we told this guy something, he would push it out to everyone. Instead, I believe that the Taliban did not have a unity of command like this and information was not spread throughout their command structure. Is this true? Did the Taliban commanders at the gates work separately? Who was the hardest to work with?

(2) Answer: Absolutely. The Taliban commander at the North Gate was the hardest to work with. The Taliban at the North Gate made things difficult and wouldn't talk to us. The Taliban at the southern side would talk with us and work with us.

The Taliban at the North Gate were still firing pop shots. I believe they were firing at the NSU. They hate each other. Guys from my Bravo Co saw an NSU man get shot in the chest and die from a Taliban firer.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question: C1: Did you ever talk to anyone from the Taliban? Do you know who was the Taliban Commander at the East Gate?

(2) Answer: I don't know who he is. I can remember some of the ones that I talked with.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: C1: Do you have any photos of the Taliban?

(2) Answer: Yes.

zz. Question and Answer 50.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did you see the Taliban setting up any mortars around East Gate on the 23rd?

(2) Answer: The Taliban were moving rounds and tubes around the buildings in that area. According to the ROE, the Marines could have engaged that Taliban at this time but they didn't. I went to the JOC to discuss this. I was concerned with the Taliban's intent. It seems like they were setting the conditions for their actions after August 31st.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question: C1: Did you see any other weapons that the Taliban set up?

(2) Answer: No, just heir typical RPGs and the mortars. Nothing else.

bbb. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question: (b)(6) Did you interact with the Department of State? What was your interaction with them?

(2) Answer: Yes. There were usually only one or two consulars at the Gates. They were initially very intermittent and hard to find. We kept requesting constant consular support and finally received it. We created relationships with some of the consulars and could get them to flex to certain areas as needed, such as the comfort area when it was overflowing.

*BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) refer to the map of HKIA and draw out locations of the comfort area, Taliban areas and checkpoints, gate locations, and their set-up.*

ccc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question: C1: Is there anything that we haven't asked you that you think that we need to know?

(2) Answer: I will forever wonder how the 82nd arrived before my guys. The rest of my battalion was stuck in (b)(1)1.4a and their flights kept getting bumped by the 82nd.

ddd. Question and Answer 54.

(1) Question: C1: It doesn't sound like the Taliban reacted very heavily when the Marines killed six of their men. Is that correct?

(2) Answer: Yes. I never heard anything else about it.



Approved for Release

eee. Question and Answer 55.

(1) Question: (b)(6) What kind of external pressure, as a (b)(6) at the tactical level, did you experience while you were on ground? How much of your time did this take?

(2) Answer: Quite a bit. With my name, picture, email, and phone on our unit website, I received a lot of traffic. I had former Congressman hitting me up on Signal and emailing and calling my phone. I had Marine veterans that I knew reaching out to me. I received requests every day.

I kept the mission of the security of the airstrip and Marine security as my highest priorities. I would have the people reaching out to me conduct all of the coordination to get their requested people out. I would tell them which gate to go to and I would meet them at like 0300 or 0400 in the morning. I would act on maybe one or two of these a day but would receive about 15 requests a day. I told my subordinate commanders to push requests that they received to me. I let (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) know about everything. I pushed some of the extracts to my recon element because it was part of their mission set to do these special tasks.

fff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)
LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Exhibit 105

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What was your duty position with the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)?

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. When were you actually assigned from the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to support the MEU?

(2) Answer. June or July of 2020. I did the full work up with them, to include the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) MEU Staff Planners Course (AMSPC) where you do top level planning that is blue side coordination. We did Realistic Urban Training (RUT) that we did on the ground here in North Carolina, which is just the green side MEU executing against targets from the Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG). Then we did Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) MEU Integration Training (PMINT). That was the last time that I was on the ships, since they knew that I would be the LNO. I was left on shore for ARG MEU Exercise and the Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPUTEX). (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The MEU was doing COMPUTEX and go due to COVID, so I went out to Italy with enough time so that I could quarantine and be ready to work before they changed of operations (CHOP) in to theater. 6th fleet used LNOs like they should, so I reported to the director of fleet operations and the fleet admiral the way that I should, and they understood that I represented (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I worked with my friend (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at 6th fleet. At 6th Fleet the PHIBRON and the MEU are treated as their own task force commanders.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Alright so you are in 1.4a, (b)(1)from March through July, then where do you go?

(2) Answer. I transferred to 1.4a (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already there and we linked in with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), I went with my PSOYP Marine, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We had two PSYOP Marines in the MEU, one was with me and one was afloat. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the (b)(6) also came with us. We three get told to get with the Joint Task Force (JTF) and focus on the NEO planning and execution from the time we get there. We left (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to run the steady state stuff. I also did a little IO stuff, like (b)1.4c while I was there.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Alright, you get there on 08 July, when do you get to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer. I did not get on the pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) (b)1.4c does not use their LNOs appropriately, they use us as extra staff officers. I ended up helping



Approved for Release

with planning, and I only had 2 conversations with their Commanding General. Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) planners were brought in, so that ramped up planning really fast, and things would spin down a bit once a plan was developed. Then the situation would change, and planning would ramp back up. Things were changing rapidly. I'm sure you have ascertained that State thought they would have a diplomatic presence and keep processing visas regardless of the situation in country. I'm not suggesting the military was more correct, but the two perspectives were not in line.

The JTF deployed the Early Entry Assistance Team (EEAT) to help speed the visa processing up, but really it had a lot of Marines for the Evacuation Control Center (ECC), gate protection, and air traffic control. At the time our (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), caught some shit for sending (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in to HKIA. He was there for 51 days, and they needed him for planning. BGen Sullivan was trying to get in as many people as he could, so he was willing to lie bit for the purpose. They used (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) as the LNO even though that wasn't really his job.

Meanwhile, the MEU was figuring out what we needed. We knew there would be a huge IO need, so we pushed (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to (b)1.4a to work with the CLB and Battalion Landing Team (BLT) on messaging and signage. We also pushed cyber to (b)1.4a before they went to HKIA, they had (b)1.4c

f. Question and Answer 5.

(b)1.4a, (b)1.4c, (b)1.4g

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Around when are you tasked to deploy? What's your team and equipment set?

(2) Answer. I got there during the period of darkness (POD) from the 18th-19th of August. In the JTF scramble to get there, they realized they were missing a SOCCENT IO planner and an Information Warfare Task Force-Afghanistan (IWTF-A) IO representative. The MEU figured they could fix that problem by sending me, and sending (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He is a 0510 additional MOS, an intermediate level information operations planner. He was given to the MEU before RUT, and he is a great coordinator. He was an additional IO planner, and he is sent to (b)1.4a to coordinate with the IWTF-A in (b)1.4a



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 13 October 2021

(AUAB). We are filling all billets as best as possible. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already in Afghanistan and so are my 2 cyber guys, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Those 3 are in country. (b)1.4c (b)1.4c (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g, (b)6 (b)1.4c (b)1.4c but they are Military Information Support Operations (MISO) equipment that we use to broadcast messages across different frequencies. (b)1.4c (b)1.4c

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Between you and your team, you can operate and employ all of these systems?

(2) Answer. Correct. (b)1.4c, (b)6 (b)1.4c, (b)6

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Marines didn't get out to Abbey Gate until the 19th, I understand?

(2) Answer. True, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had already been out there a good amount. Our focus of effort when there is on the ground messaging. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was technically my boss for IO, but we did everything together. We worked on force closure, employment of equipment, and closure of gates. Messaging crowds to stop throwing rocks at Marines for instance. We were getting messages translated and approved through IWTF-A. They would send us the recordings, and scripts back in English, Dari, and Pashto. We would load that on an MP3 and loop that. We might put a translator on a mic to do ad hoc messaging as necessary. That doesn't need approval from PSYOP authorities, because that is solely force protection at the discretion of the ground commander.

(b)1.4c (b)1.4c I had 3 micro fractures in my fibula. The British held that tower for

Approved for Release

a long time, and the Yorkshire Regiment, the blue patch boys would message from there. They were pretty loose with their messaging, but it was helpful to them. I went to get it back from them since it was out of batteries, and I fell down the ladder there.

On the 20th, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from IWTF-A arrived. Also, I forgot that I brought some (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g, (b)6 So (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arrived on the 20th. Previously we had an (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g Everything we had was in play. Some Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles with speakers were in play and the German PSYOPs guys were messaging at North Gate. All capabilities available were being used.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the first Army PSYOP Soldier on the ground at that time?

(2) Answer. Yes, he is from 9th PSYOPs and is filling the billet at IWTF-A. The rest of my guys, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SSG Ryan Knauss, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in on the 21st. So I have 6 guys, which I break in to 2 teams of 3.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Who decided you would be in charge of the PSYOP guys?

(2) Answer. The MEU and the BLT started to take over the gates, and we knew the PSYOP Soldiers would be in support of the gates. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided that the guys would be TACON to me as they supported the gates. The only one that worked for me permanently was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The cyber guys end up being re-tasked because their systems weren't approved. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) became a watch officer at some point, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) became an NCO who did what needed to be done.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Alright, so there are 6 PSYOPers and yourself?

(2) Answer. Yes, and also (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) sometimes. I broke them into 2 teams of 3. I split up (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to spread the knowledge of the Marines out between the teams. The day team was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Ryan, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They would work 9am to 9pm. The night team was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) On and off was a misnomer, the off team was focusing on gear maintenance, vehicle procurement, or getting random extraction phone calls. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)



Approved for Release

recovered the family of a cultural advisor that carried some political attention. Off time was really was special projects time, sometimes they would provide other gates support at that time. They might go deliver cigarettes to Marines that hadn't slept, they would trade non-lethals between the gates, and they would provide tactical advice to commanders on ground. They were Special Operations Forces (SOF) who had deployed previously, so they had tactical, mundane, messaging knowledge that was helpful, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) helped them communicate that to the Marines.

A lot of time we were dealing with Afghans who had already been screened through the gates, so that was a different change for these guys who were tense coming in country. There is a picture of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that went viral of him in his soft cap speaking to a local leader inside the wire trying to keep things calm.

My guys are probably sleeping 2-3 hours a night. I would run 48 hours on, 6 hours off. That was untenable, so we eventually tried to rest more. The timeline had collapsed so rapidly that we did not have enough time. Abbey was supposed to be the ECC with a linear set of features from security, to medical, to COVID screening. It just couldn't be done with the time and crowd we had.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Alright, you are in direct support of the companies manning the gates, providing knowledge and equipment, and in your free time they are floaters who are providing assistance and guidance?

(2) Answer. Cross training the Marines on the PSYOP gear was critical. We would leave a system at a gate anytime we left, and we had to make sure there was a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) that knew how to use them so that the Marines could pull an interpreter and push messages to the crowd as necessary. We would have to do more cross training later as the Marines grew too comfortable and started using them too carelessly. That was at North Gate, East Gate, Abbey Gate, and the comfort area that the guys would rotate through. When the guys would come in they would check with the (b)(6) and they would go to any hotspots he identified as a 3 man team. They would take out officers like the (b)(6) (b)(6), and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would push out with them as well. I spent 50% of my time working translations, approvals, and CONOPs and the other IO work I was doing. I would try to go out with my day and night team each once a day and keep a feel for the commanders.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. How did your priorities change based on the threat or Department of State messaging?

(2) Answer. Our messaging had to be in line with State messaging. When I would get new translations, I would run them through State. There were only a couple times



Approved for Release

where they vetoed our message. The difficulty was that they didn't want things to seem final. When we closed North Gate on the 23rd or 24th, we were not permitted to say the gate was closed, we had to say this gate is temporarily closed, please go away. That wouldn't convince this massive crowd to go away. They were willing to wait it out. That was something we had to deal with. In regard to the threats, because we were in the Joint Operations Center (JOC), we had the freshest information. We would pass that greater information around to the gates in higher detail.

We told them about the gold convertible Corolla that our snipers shot the tire out of at North Gate. Threat streams didn't change our operation, but it would change the posture of the guys at the gates. We would adjust our message based off that, and tell the crowd to disperse due to threat etc.

We had a message playing stating the only three documents that were acceptable to get in. There was an (b)(1)1.4c report that we reduced the crowd by 70% at one point, but there was a backfill that if that crowd left the people further back who had been waiting would rush in and fill the gaps.

The PSYOP guys that showed up were authorized to use tactical questioning (TQ). They were able to do that to wall jumpers to find out why they did that and if anyone directed them to do so.

Our priorities did not change with the tactical threat stream. The priority was to support the ground commander, the message affected their posture. Gate closures were confusing. Marine Lance Corporals are not qualified to say if identification is valid, but there was one day that State said anyone with a photo ID was good to come in. At one point that led to 50k to 60k in the wire. That lasted for one day. Then we had to kick people out, so priorities shifted to internal support of riot control, riot prevention, and crowd subduing as the crowds inside were also large and frustrated.

The comfort area had a 6 hour long, rock throwing riot. Our (b)(6) was leading a counter charge against a riot at the terminal. He was punched in the face at one point. The people had been waiting for days and were frustrated. We had to message to try to combat that issue. I estimated that my guys prevented 6 riots and helped to put down 2 more. It was an important job.

Tempers flared for a while, even with Marines so we had to talk to the Marines to calm them down. Same with the Brits, we had to use the British LNO in the JOC. Their dudes would get hot too and get a little rough with the crowds.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Okay, so on the evening of the 25th into the morning of the 26th Echo had pushed all the way passed the bridge. When Golf gets on deck, they collapse that back down to the jersey barrier due to the threat stream and the manning, correct?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. Yep, and admittedly the Taliban weren't our enemy but there was a house down that foot bridge, the crack house, that had about 15 Taliban and they would come out and point rifles at Marines anytime the crowd got rowdy. That was just not something you wanted to deal with, especially that far way. And again, if a bomb had gone off, that was very far away to egress.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. When were you out there?

(2) Answer. I was there by midmorning of the 26th. I had planned to go out with the gate team, but they left without me. I went with the Antiterrorism and Force Protection (ATFP) team to Abbey Gate. The (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g was messaging that the gate was temporarily closed and that only people with the 3 valid forms of identification, the passports, green cards, or U.S. Visas, were the only acceptable ID.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Were you tracking the threat stream? Had you heard that Abbey Gate was the highest threat?

(2) Answer. Yes. I put myself there since I thought it would be the highest point of friction and I wanted to disperse that crowd. I worked the positioning of the (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g and tried to observe the crowd on both sides of the wadi to see if there were any suspicious individuals. My day team probably got there at about noon, and my team joined me up on the HESCO to observe the crowd. Ryan was the best at it, he would spot the suspicious guys right away and call it up to 2-1 and the snipers on the radio. He could find them instantly and give a great description.

The rest of my guys are pushing messaging and trying to disperse the crowd due to the threat stream. We told them the threat was high and we tried to reject people due to poor documents and tell the crowd what documents we were rejecting. We would get people to leave, but they were always backfilled by the crowd further back.

After about 4 hours we were going to leave, I went to tell (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that because I wasn't having an effect. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told me they were having a massive issue at the jersey barrier where people were being crushed to death. We had dealt with that previously by putting the vehicle up against the fence line with the (b)1.4a, (b)1.4g messaging that, "you are hurting women and children, please stop," loud enough to hurt their ears and try to back them off.

We put the truck by the gate, half in and half out of the lane in case the British came through. We started playing some messaging, but we needed an interpreter. I went and grabbed a guy who had already been pulled into the area between the outer and inner gates with his family. He was nervous to leave his family, but I told him I'd have him back in 10 minutes. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the driver seat of the vehicle, Ryan was scanning the



Approved for Release

crowd, and the interpreter and I are standing right next to the vehicle on the passenger side as he pushes the messaging. The interpreter was getting into it, he's pleading with the crowd to stop because he sees what is going on. I had told him that I would get him back to his family in ten minutes, but at the end of that he is crying because he could not get the crowd to stop. I start walking him back to his family like I promised, and that is when the bomb goes off at about 1730ish.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Where was everyone at the time?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the driver's seat. Ryan and (b)(3)130b, were both behind the vehicle, talking. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was standing outside and speaking to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the interpreter are at the vehicles 11 o'clock moving back toward the gate. The bomb goes off. I didn't see the interpreter again after that, I don't know what happened to him. I think I was in between him and the blast, I fly front left and break the grip on my rifle. I checked myself and didn't find any wounds. I was fine.

My first thought was about where my guys are. I couldn't find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), but I saw Ryan laying on the ground on the driver's side. We are behind the vehicles, and I hear gunfire from the chevron direction. I can't tell where the rounds were from or where they were going. I was trying to decide to either treat Ryan there or drag him back, since I didn't know where the threat was. I dragged Ryan in behind the gate wall and screamed for a corpsman until one showed up. I stripped his plates off, I swept him, and I didn't find anything. He was in and out of consciousness, and he was still breathing but it was labored. His tongue was swelling up, the corpsman and I try to fish it out. A truck came screeching up. At this point 2/1 was flooding the zone, and casualties are being dragged back to the casualty collection point (CCP). We lifted Ryan on to the back of the truck and I got in the truck with him. I hopped out to make room for another casualty and to look for my guys. As soon as I got out I saw (b)(3)130b, helping some Marines, so I knew he was fine. I went to the truck to look for (b)(3)130b, and at that point (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran in to look for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came in, screaming and looking for Sgt Gee. I realized that the truck was in the way of the British, so I put the truck in neutral and some of us Marines pushed the truck back into a wall.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. You didn't try to turn the truck on?

(2) Answer. I didn't even try. It was a white SUV and I didn't have the right screwdriver to turn it on. The (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, and the seats had been ripped out to make room for more equipment.

The vehicle actually was essential in the EOD report, they knew exactly where the vehicle was at the time of the blast and they could tell by the angle of fragmentation in the vehicle where the blast came from.

Approved for Release

After I moved the vehicle out of the way, I told a fire team to orient at a nearby tower, and I realize that I am not being helpful. I went to keep looking for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) someone passed off a female teenager to me that I walked back to the CCP. 2/1 had a full security posture, and the gunfire stopped a while ago.

I know where Ryan and his weapon were since I put them on a truck, and I had seen (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). I went back to look for (b)(3)130b, again, and that's when I saw Sgt Gee. She was already dead, she had a ball bearing right through her forehead. She was one of the few casualties that I could recognize. I knew her from an investigation I did on her unit before we left, and then from our PSYOPs guys interacting with her some times.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did your teams work with the Female Search Teams (FSTs) a good amount?

(2) Answer. Yes, we would pull them if we needed them specifically for handling.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Was she outside of the fence line?

(2) Answer. I saw her outside the fence before the blast went off, then I saw her again on a stretcher coming through the hole in the fence on a litter. She was clearly gone.

After I got that female back, I told the corpsman the female with me was shell shocked and had no injuries. I felt useless at this point, I still couldn't find my dudes. Then I heard my name. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are in an 82nd Airborne ambulance, they got yanked by them since they were also Soldiers. (b)(3)130b, had a tourniquet on his arm, and a bandage on his hip. (b)(3)130b, was sitting across from him, he had holes in his cheek and blood was pouring down his face. The driver saw me and asked if they should grab more guys, I told them to roll. En route we heard that the Role II was packed and since both of our guys were stable we went to the 82nd's Role 1 at Camp Alvarado for treatment.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) couldn't see out of his right eye, and they were watching (b)(3)130b, because his arm was initially arterial bleeding. We get to the Role 1 and they started treating. I was waiting outside, and I wanted to find out what happened to Ryan and I knew that I should get back to North HKIA because our leadership knew I was at the gate. I bum a ride from some Captains, and gave my report back in the JOC. I briefed that my guys are accounted for. I may have been the first eye witness back in the JOC.

It was either me or (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is the type of guy you can't pull from a problem, he had been there for hours trying to help people while I was trying to find my guys. The Colonel pulled me aside and asked what happened. To me it sound like a complex



Approved for Release

improvised explosive device (IED) initiated ambush, but I don't know who was shooting at who. I saw Marines from 2/1 firing, but I didn't see anyone to fire at. They were firing toward the chevron and the Barron, down that avenue of approach. My hearing was messed with, but it was generally that direction.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. How long do you think those guys were shooting?

(2) Answer. When I saw Gee on the stretcher, is when I noticed that the gunfire had stopped. It may have been before then, but that is when I realized.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. What did you do when you went back to the JOC?

(2) Answer. I made my report then I went back to the 3/5. I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to grab the night team. She ran out the door to get them, but she couldn't find them initially. They were out doing something. I tried to go to the Role II, but officers kept stopping me from going over there.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Why?

(2) Answer. Part of it was they wanted to talk to me, part of it was that I wasn't in a great state, and part of it was they knew Ryan was being worked on. Eventually the night team showed up, and we tried to go to the Role II. They didn't let us in. At this time, the Colonel tells me that we had to go to the ECC to get checked for a concussion. I was cleared, and we went back to the office.

We got permission to put (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the Role II with Ryan. We were able to get in touch with the 82nd, and got (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) transferred over to our Role II to get our guys in one spot. We started to get the casualty reports, and the rules of engagement (ROE) changed all over HKIA. Lethal force was authorized on HKIA for anyone who jumped the fence with a backpack or bag. We prepped those messages, I don't know if they were pushed from on high. The (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g had been set up by Ryan, and he was the only one who knew how to use it. We had jerry rigged that one to work with SIM cards from Afghans who were getting on planes. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stuff was over with the 82nd now. We had our cellphones in the JOC, I popped out and sent my mom and wife a text message saying that I was fine. I had my guys do the same.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back from the Role II in a hospital shirt and his boxers. He was loopy on meds and told them he was leaving. He wanted to get back to work. We told him to sit down and let us find him some pants. (b)(6)

(b)(6)



Approved for Release

(b)(6) His vision is fine now. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) arm was treated, (b)(6) (b)(6) so he got sent on a flight to Germany that night.

My night team went to go recover their stuff that night, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) fournd Ryan's plate carrier and some of his kit. They saw the vehicle against the wall, and they were able to turn it on. The (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a absorbed most of the fragmentation and protected the radiator. They drove it back to the JOC, that pissed EOD off but it was fine because they could still see the tracks from where it was.

After that (b)(3)130b, came in at 2300. He had updated us at 2130 that Ryan was in surgery. At 2300 (b)(3)130b, told us Ryan had passed. He told me and (b)(3)130b, so we went and told the guys in the parking lot. After that, (b)(3)130b, flight out was at 0300 on the 27th.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. Alright so at 1200 on the 27th, there was the dignified transfer, did you attend?

(2) Answer. Yes I was one of the pall bearers. Our whole team acted as pall bearers for him, and (b)(3)130b, went with him on the flight.

After that, it was getting our shit together. Later on that morning, (b)(3)130b, caught Army and (b)(1)1.4d soldiers stealing (b)(1)1.4a from their rooms which made us late to the dignified transfer. After, we provided a list of stolen equipment to the British and the 23rd Military Police. After that, we just focused on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4a and handing off our gear to the 82nd to use. They wanted the gear, but not any of our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g and packed them out. We consolidated the critical components of that from 11 pelican cases to one. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g We continued using the speakers at the gates to push the message that the gates were temporarily closed, even though it was permanent. The 82nd wanted the speaker sets (b)(1)1.4a We showed them how to use them.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went to (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3)130b, went with me and the MEU to (b)(1)1.4a We got the final report that an IWTF-A (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) completed the final destruction of gear in country, because the 82nd didn't do it.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. When did you fly out?

(2) Answer. On the 28th or the 29th. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) are in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3)130b, and I are in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3)130b, was on the Honor flight and (b)(3)130b, is getting treated in Landstuhl. Our aircraft, which had about 250 people on board, landed at the wrong airfield. We texted (b)(3)130b, and he told us he was on an (b)(1)1.4a We thought it was



Approved for Release

elsewhere, but then we found out that we needed to line a route for the dignified transfer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) hopped out and we get to see him and Ryan again, and say goodbye. After that we went to (b)(1)1.4a and decompressed there.

To be clear, I want to go back to the closure of the gates. On the 26th, Abbey Gate was technically closed. We had access to the canal, and we were pulling from there to a limited extent. We were only at that gate in order to avoid ceding that territory to the crowds in order to let the British through. The final closure of the gate wasn't until the British came through some time that night.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. In your mind, we are only outside of the outer gate in order to let the Brits through?

(2) Answer. Yes, my understanding is we were just waiting for the British convoy that was supposed to come through at 1600 and then the outer gate would be permanently closed. After that, there would be no way to pull anyone out. It would have been like North Gate, where I could see some people that I wanted to pull, but I couldn't because opening the gate would have caused a riot. To answer the question, our role in the final closure of the gate was just our (b)(1)1.4a telling the crowds to stay away.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Anything you want us to know?

(2) Answer. Tactically, I think I would be in a worse position mentally if I had made a tactical error. Those SOF guys were under me, I didn't order them because they knew how to execute. They were there because of me. The Tactic, Technique, and Procedure (TTP) that my guys ran when they left a gate was to check in with the ground commander there. (b)(3)130b, told me later that if I hadn't checked in with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) before we left, he would have done it and the result would have been the same.

In the 4 hours that we were at the gate, Ryan probably spotted and communicated 7-13 bombers to the sniper tower who kept an eye on them. Everyone had bags because they were trying to leave. Was that area the best defensive position? No, but it wasn't bad. There was some cover and there was security. I think we had the vehicle in the right place, and my guys were using the jersey barriers and the vehicle as cover. We had all of our protective equipment on, and every one of my guys and the guys on the line were scanning the crowd, which was hard to see through. If I had made a tactical error, I would be in a worse mental place than I am, but I think we weren't over extended and we had the right gear on.

cc. Question and Answer 28.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 13 October 2021

(1) Question. Can we get your contact information and are there other people we need to speak to?

(2) Answer. My cell is (b)(6) and my email is (b)(6) Talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) is over there as well, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) weren't there for this but they are a bit older than (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may also be good to speak to.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 106

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis (US Army) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (US Army) recorded the interview for transcription below. For the purpose of annotation of who is speaking, the following queues will indicate the speaker:

Brigadier General Curtis – BG

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. (b)(6) – What's your background

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I've been with Recon for a long time. I'm at 15 years in and have been with 31st MEU twice, did 13th MEU twice. I've been with 2nd Recon since 2017. I've been the (b)(6) since Jan 2019.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MEU Recon Marine Interview, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 12 October 2021

(b)(6) – I've been with Recon since 2019. I was a 1371 in 7th ESB originally. I deployed in 2017. I was on the 15th MEU.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was your duty Position in the MEU?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We went in as a platoon plus. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were also with us. We had 20 Marines and we ended up on 3rd line defense originally when we were put there by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took us from the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and Tactical Control (TACON)'d us to the MEU. We were running special recovery missions all over the base.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What was your force structure?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I ran it in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and my team leaders were out on the line and running missions. The platoon was roughly 22 personnel. There were three teams of 6 plus some comms and medical personnel. The attached trailer element is a security element in addition which we had with us, essentially doubling our numbers.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What was your mission and effort?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Special Operations Forces (SOF) was running their own stuff and we were picking up their leftovers and we would every once in a while catch some other high profile stuff. We were assigned to a lot of different missions and we would end up pulling individuals out as well. We were working to identify targets and known people from within the crowd and we would specifically identify them and go get them in personnel recovery. We were consistently active. So we were never activated. We were getting tasked from the (b)(6) the MEU, phone calls, the white house, people everywhere. We were the right people at the right time.

(b)(6) – Also we dealt with a woman in Kabul while outside the gate, and she had a US Senator on the phone. I asked her to Facetime us and it was in fact a US Senator from their office. I don't remember who it was specifically.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. (b)(6) - Did your team feel the comms and coordination struggles?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – None of the JOCs were linked and there were at least 5-6 operations centers which were not linked. Army, Marines, Department of State (DoS),

Approved for Release

Navy, Air Force, comms, none of it. No unity of command, nobody had the ball at all times and we didn't know who was in charge from minute to minute and the tasking was constantly prioritized and re-prioritized. Rank gets things done usually but when the civilians get involved and all the non-uniformed military and all the people calling and getting involved, things got crazy even among the military.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you arrive at HKIA and atmospherics?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– I left on the ADVON but he made it in before me.

(b)(6)– 15 August we left (b)(1)1.4a We saw all the craziness going on at the airfield through watching it on CNN in (b)(1)1.4a In flight we had no idea what to expect. 5 min out we were prepared to fight our way in. When we landed and realized it was coordinated and organized we just started working on getting set up. We met up with another Marine on ground and they got us set up with living space in the basketball court.

(b)(6)– I left the day prior and we flew and got routed throug (b)(1)1.4a The C17 that had the bodies on it from the 15th was parked next to ours. I ended up sitting on an airfield in (b)(1)1.4a I was with 16 trailers then. We arrived in the morning and next Period of Darkness (PoD) we took off and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had already left. The other element became our Advanced Party (ADVON). We were on ground quickly and we had a space. It wasn't ideal because it was without cover. Once (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) moved us off the 3rd line of defense we ended up being his special recovery team. We moved to elevated positions and could see the civilian air terminal. We manned it 24 hours per day and we did that 16-18 August. We got a sniper mounted and set up to be able to observe the terminal and provide overwatch to the entire apron area. Started moving our guys back and off the Apron. We officially started recovery operations on the 19th.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. BG - When did we get in the business of targeted extraction?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– We got taken from BLT 1/8 on the 19th. Our initial requirement was to get them from the terminal to the (we started working with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Simultaneously we were working Platoon Security Detachment (PSD) ops for MGen Sullivan. The SOF lead was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We worked with him a lot too. We were really getting tied in indirectly before we became part of the direct effort. From working with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) our name and numbers started getting passed out and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would pass directly to me in order to get us out to get guys. We were checking papers and then pass off for the coordination to our team leads. We would get them from specific locations out in Kabul and we would basically exploit other business and use those to leverage access.

i. Question and Answer 8.

Approved for Release

(1) Question. BG – Where was most of the activity by gate? Which gate?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We would get names and then we would coordinate a location and work with them to get to a point where we could grab them. After working with the liaison teams. Normally we would try to avoid North gate because there were so many people originally. One of the things we did with the SOF Liaison. We went out and got them originally but that would make the crowd mad because they'd see us grabbing people. We identified the rat maze we could work to try to get people in other ways. The "Black Gate", I think it was the Army or Aussies who controlled it, we had some great success there. We used this method for a minute but it drew attention. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran his operation there.

(b)(6) Brits owned the gate but Army operated it. This would have been the 18th or 19th. NSW shut us down a lot because they didn't have coordination with our folks.

(b)(6) I had connections with them and SEAL Team Six, but they didn't like us using their access point. One of the guys with DoS that we worked with at Santa Cruz gate didn't talk to the other DoS guys at other gates and even though we tried to work with them it didn't work out to get people in that way. The north west gate, that was the National Security Unit (NSU) gate, that gate denied access to people unless an American came up there and pointed out specific people to them, at that time and we weren't allowed to go out past the Blue ring (points on map). Our authorities only extended us to the immediate protection of the walls of HKIA. With the Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) we could get out there. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was one I worked with for over 9 days to get him inside. To answer your question, we bounced around a lot. There was a spot at the East gate we could pluck people but that caused problems too. The Canal was flooded by the 26th. The French, Germans, and everyone else started using the canal as an access point at Abbey because it was a means to get out there and interface.

(b)(6) – We didn't want to burn our locations and access. We moved around to keep from burning out our contacts and access so we would spread as much as possible to keep from utilizing any one point or location. It caused problems a lot so we had to be careful about leveraging one location.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. What did you do on the 25th?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We had planned ops at the black gate. We had 2 interpreters and support people that would work with us. They people outside the gate were listening and they would behave and it was going great. Our operations were halted, as (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) put it, "your op is on pause". His op was taking over that location, and he had not coordinated the gate or times. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ended up taking that location and he ended up taking some of our guys and our females for his search team.



Approved for Release

(b)(6) – The first night – once word got out the gate would get swarmed and it became a focal point because every time they would work it other people would identify that and redirect their people there. For that evening it was the first 'Be on the look out' (Bolo) we got. It was a tan Hilux. Because that was so bland and broad we would have to get out there and get out of the traffic as soon as possible.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Talk about the 26th before the blast.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – After the night of the 25th we got shut down at Black gate and we had to re-route people to Abbey. We had lists of 500-1000 people at any given time. The most I ever got was one group with 29 people and it was him and his wife and their kids and their kids. I personally pulled them through on the 26th that day by direction of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He was SIV approved and there was a green card in the group. Coming from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) he said they were approved. It was between 1400 -1600 on the 26th. Also, it took a while to get him because he was in the crowd and his family was back off the crowd so they had to work forward to get to us.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Photos – Do you have them?

(2) Answer. Both - Yes

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. In the photos you have, did you capture the guy with the ball cap?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I've got it. I saw the man in the hat in the crowd. I walked down there and the guy with the hat was down to the South of the bombing site. I looked at him and he looked at me. After the explosion one of the Marines from 2/1 said he saw the guy on the water tower filming. Some of the guys were using their phones as challenge and pass codes. We set up all kinds of pro words and similar challenge and pass stuff. Initially he started at the site that would later be the blast site. I told my guys about it. I saw him further down towards the chevron. After the blast I saw him at the bridge.

(b)(6) – He was across the canal, he was standing and observing. He was across the wadi. He was back by the bridge and watching back towards the tower. He was standing up over the wall and we could see from his shoulders and above. He had on a blue t-shirt. Almost European dressed. We shot above his head after and he ducked and ran, but he was almost not at all effected by the blast and it was odd how calm he was even in the aftermath of the blast.

Approved for Release

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Blast occurs, what actions did you take?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– I was on the wall outside the gate facing South. We were trying to pull out a guy. He was about 5 feet back from the entrance to the tower on the opposite wall. I was out about 18 meters off the blast when it went off. The closest person to me would've been one of the 2/1 Marines. Maybe 6-7 meters from me off to my left. I saw it with my left eye and felt the pressure and initially thought it was a flash bang. I watched it turn to chaos. I lost hearing momentarily. It turned into me yelling at my guys. Time was 1606. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were all out there with me. The Blast went off and everyone was yelling and screaming and a ton of CS gas was flooding the area. I knew what it was immediately. We could see the CS cloud billowing up and we heard gunshots and they sounded like they were from my right (chevron direction). My guys bounded up to me. I could feel snaps when I was running up to the concrete barriers. I didn't see any impacts but it was hip to head high and it felt like it was coming from the chevron area. By the time we made it back to the gap in the fence I couldn't see where it was coming from.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Did you remember gun fire immediately following the blast?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)– I could not see an impact but I am certain about the rounds and hearing gunfire. I was oriented towards the threat, and I am certain of that. Due to the CS gas I couldn't really focus super well, but I know I heard and felt the snaps and cracks of rounds all around me. The wounds from the individuals was cauterized because of the blast. It was the civilians and the Marines who had blood pooled in a way that it looked like the puncture was different. The wounds I saw which looked like gunshots were also protected from the blast area. The people who sustained wounds below the wall would have been protected by the wall. The parking lot would fill up and be full at night. We had been told earlier in the day about guys with S-vests. Because of that we were making sure anyone with bags wasn't getting through up to the gate.

(b)(6)– So unless the blast occurred from an elevated position such as a held up backpack the blast couldn't have caused lower extremity injures. In terms of the guys on the crack house area, though, I saw the guys peeking through the fence. I could see through the screen at the fence and the gaps in the screen and it was often we'd see guys come up to the wall and fence and peek until we would look. I could hear the snaps and cracks inside the corridor as I made my way to the exterior gate entrance. We saw the ball cap guy in the vicinity of the bridge. We saw the guy and he was overlooking the blast area. We shot directly next to him. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shot two unsuppressed hammered pairs right next to him and then the guy bounced out. My gut says he was watching our response. It felt like we were being surveyed in our reactions. We never went back to find out.

Approved for Release

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. Back to the fire which you heard, not the ones you fired.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) 4-5 round bursts in multiple bursts. Maybe 15 seconds of shooting with the associated cracks and pops around us which is what queued me into the rounds being incoming fire.

(b)(6) – Sounded like an AK to me and it was distinctive. It sounded very clear to me that it was maybe 30 seconds total of sporadic fire. After we shot at the guy with the hat on a couple of the 2/1 guys threw CS grenades over the wall too. We did observe the Brits in the tower, but they weren't shooting and their weapons were oriented down outside the exterior gate.

(b)(6) – once the smoke cleared all the gunshots were already finished. The wind was blowing to the west that day so it also would've been worse from the CS down by the gap in the fence.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. What else haven't we talked about that you think is important?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – When we showed up out there that day on the 26th we knew that the North gate was the last gate open prior to Abbey being the final. The PSYOP folks were telling the crowds at the gate that there was a imminent threat and that their paperwork should look like this or that. They were saying the message in multiple languages. Also because of the position of the walls there's no way that the injuries to the lower extremities.

(b)(6) – The blast was on the same side of the canal as we were. It occurred directly in front of the sniper tower I ran up to the wall and the plume appeared to be right up against the tower. The bodies were splayed out from the blast sight right up against the wall and the sniper tower. It looked to me like the preponderance of bodies were right up against the wall near the sniper tower side. The orientation of the bodies were not against the wall. There were bodies in the wadi that appeared to have died from overpressure related injuries, not from frag or projectiles.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. BC – Did you hear other Marines return fire?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I didn't see any Marines return fire during that time, there didn't appear to be clear areas or targets to engage. From the smoke, debris and CS gas, it was not easy to identify any viable targets. I saw and heard Marines fire warning shots. 2/1 kept telling us the Brits were constantly firing warning shots which was detrimental to crowd control. My initial actions following the blast were to run to my guys who I knew



Approved for Release

were in the blast area. Once I had them accounted for, we looked for targets to prosecute. When there appeared to be no one to engage, we ran back in and try to work casualty assistance and work on the movement of Marines.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) phone number – (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 107

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered together. It is annotated accordingly when they answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your MOS?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) 3531 Motor Transport Operator

(b)(6) 0621 Radio Operator

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Is CLB 24 your first unit?

(2) Answer: Yes

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: I understand that the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) had built the female search team by pulling female members from various units to function similarly



Approved for Release

to the Female Engagement Teams (FET) of the past. At which point do you get pulled in for this?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We began training for this while on the ship. They kept calling us FET, but we never trained as an engagement team, just as a search team.

(b)(6) We began training on actual searches once we arrived to Kuwait, the third week of July.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When did they consolidate all of the females for this function?

(2) Answer: While we were in (b)(1)1.4a Once we were pulled together we split in to different teams. One team was Landing Support (LS). They handled most of the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) tracking systems (NTS). We all trained on the NTS.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Did you anticipate that you would be in the Evacuation Control Center (ECC) at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: We were told that all of the CLB would be in one location. We didn't know anything about the gates. We practiced setting things up a different way than what actually occurred. The plan seemed to change when we landed.

(b)(6) I was told that I would still be doing some communications operations.

Once in (b)(1)1.4a we were told that all females would be on the female search team. There were about ten to twelve females in each team. There were three teams. Each team would pull eight-hour shifts.

We trained with the Air Force Security Forces to learn about basic searching and how to use batons and metal-detectors. We also completed realistic night training and pulled our shifts and practiced searching the Air Force personnel. We did this three or four times during our training events.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Did this training seem sufficient in (b)(1)1.4a

(2) Answer: HKIA was chaotic and it seems like our training wasn't actual training compared to what we saw.



Approved for Release

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you find out that you were going to Afghanistan for NEO.

(2) Answer: At first, we were put on a 36-hour stand-by. Then it changed to 24 hours, and then we were told that we were going. It was around the first week of August when we knew we were going for sure.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: When did you land at HKIA?

(2) Answer: It's hard to remember the actual dates because they all meshed together. We flew in with the CLB. We flew in before the commander. We were the first team to arrive and we set up the NTS kits. The rest of the CLB was supposed to fly in the next day, but then the airfield was rushed by civilians and their flights kept getting pushed back.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: The airfield security breach was on the 15th and 16th of August, so you arrived before that?

(2) Answer: We arrived to HKIA the night before that, so the 14th. We unloaded all of our gear and equipment, went to get some sleep, but then got woken up right away because we had to go help with the rush of people.

After this was handled on the airfield, we moved in to the building and moved our kits upstairs.

The other team arrived three or four days later.

Around two days later, we were working on the NTS kits at the passenger (PAX) terminal. We got pulled every once and awhile to search females. They were all from the embassies and were wearing Flak vests. They were orderly. They opened the North Gate shortly after, around the 17th, and we all went out there to conduct searches. We didn't sleep for the first three days.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: How many of you went out to the North Gate? What did you do?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: We had teams of two. One would be up toward the front to do a quick search of the personnel and then they would go through the gate to the next team member to do a thorough search.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: How long were you out at North Gate?

(2) Answer: The shifts were about 8-12 hours.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Were you strictly out there to search and interact with females and children?

(2) Answer: Yes. We only searched women and children under 13 years old.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Were the women cooperative?

(2) Answer: For the most part they were. They were scared. They didn't speak English and we didn't have an interpreter.

There were interpreters at the East Gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Were you ever given an actual mission at the gates?

(2) Answer: We didn't know what we would be doing at the gates when we first got there. We didn't even know the gates were open at this point. We learned we would be conducting searches from the other females on our teams that we relieved when we got to the gates.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: As your unit and other units arrive, how long did it take to build out the female search teams? Did you get additional team members from (b)(1)1.4c

(2) Answer: (b)(1)1.4c had their own teams out at the gates. We didn't know anything about what they were doing. It wasn't a combined or joint team.

q. Question and Answer 16.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: I was under the impression that Sgt Rosario was pulled in to be a part of your team. This isn't true?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No. The first time that I saw her was after the blast when she was a casualty. I saw them cutting pants off of female legs and that was the first time that I saw her.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: When did your team get built up to about 35 personnel?

(2) Answer: The teams sort of split up. When we first arrived, the CLB barracks were in one location but we quickly ran out of room and people had sleeping areas other places. We ended up having the teams consist of the people that lived together. We only interacted with the other teams when we relieved them.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: In your time at HKIA, how often were you at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: We were only out there for the last week and a half. We were mostly at East and North Gate. The Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) people were the ones at Abbey Gate. They requested more females and shifts to support searching. We relieved the SPMAGTF team on the 26th.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Prior to the 26th, describe the atmosphere at Abbey Gate and the job that you conducted there.

(2) Answer: We were asked to search females at Abbey Gate. The female search team location was located behind the outer gate, across from the sniper tower. We had cammie netting set up where we would conduct the searches. We took turns in groups of two to be by the canal to check peoples' documentation and escort females to the search area.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: How many people did you have on your team at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: We had four on our team and three or four from the SPMAGTF. This was how it was the first few times we were out there.



Approved for Release

We were often requested to go outside the gate to search a baby or woman. We would go out there in buddy teams every time. Eventually, we were requested to have permanent shifts out there.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Were you responsible for identifying people in the crowd?

(2) Answer: Yes. We were told to look for special colored flags or people that would say a special phrase to us.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Was it your job to escort women and children that needed to be searched to the search area?

(2) Answer: No, any Marine could escort them to the search area. However, males couldn't touch them, so when we had to escort them out due to improper credentials, we would get called over to help.

A lot of women would fake fainting or actually faint and we would have to drape their arm around us and/or carry their children.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: Describe the area by the canal.

(2) Answer: It was very smelly. We called it 'Schitt's Creek.' Our gloves would turn yellow because they would pee on themselves. It was very unsanitary. People would spit on us and call us names. Some people that didn't have the proper paperwork would call us names and yell at us.

We would direct people from other countries to where their coalition forces were located for them to go to for processing. They would call us bad names as if we weren't trying to help them, but we weren't able to process their paperwork.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Was it mostly men or women doing this?

(2) Answer: It was mostly men. However, some women got very upset with us when we were trying to help them with their children. Some women left their children behind.



Approved for Release

(b)(6) One woman I was helping wouldn't let me help with her baby and she instead dropped it in the canal. No one helped to get it out and it stayed there and died.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Did you feel a lot of pressure to get as many people out as possible, either from your chain of command or personally because you had to look these people in the eye while they were asking for help?

(2) Answer: We didn't feel pressure from the units or chain of command. We wanted to help as many people as we could. Our chain of command would always tell us to take a breath and take breaks as we needed.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: How often did the required documents needed to get through the gate change?

(2) Answer: All of the time. When we were on an 8-hour break, we would hear the changes in the paperwork more often than while we were at the gate. When you're working at the gate, we would find people with the documents that we were told were required, bring them in, conduct the searches, and then bring them to the Department of State (DoS) and they would get turned away. Sometimes at East Gate, when this would happen, we would just have the personnel wait to the side until the document requirement changed again and the DoS would accept them. They changed the requirements so often and it was hard to escort people back out.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Do you think this slowed down the process?

(2) Answer: By the time we opened Abbey Gate and began looking for Special Interest Visas (SIVs), a lot of the people didn't have recent paperwork. The people that had recent paperwork or had American family members made it to North Gate before we closed because they had constant contact with people telling them where to go. North Gate mostly saw American Citizens (AMCITs), students, and people that had been in contact and knew where to go to get processed.

East Gate mostly saw interpreter families that had contacts at East Gate that were helping them get out.

Abbey Gate was where people went when they thought they maybe could get through as a last-ditch effort. The threat level felt very high at Abbey Gate. There was less security here and we were out there with the people.



Approved for Release

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Were you receiving threat streams leading up to the 26th? What information did you receive?

(2) Answer: We heard Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) threats every time we went to begin a shift. We were given some non-lethal measures, like batons and spray, during this time. The 26th was the only day that we were told that we wouldn't be going up to the gate due to the threat.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: What threats did you receive on the 26th? What was different?

(2) Answer: We relieved a team at Abbey Gate at about 1200 on the 26th and they told us that there were three IED threats. We didn't pay too much attention to it because we always had these threats. This was the last shift being pulled by the SPMAGTF.

(b)(6) Me, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee were the females on the team on duty. We were told by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that we wouldn't be at the front by the canal anymore. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was only out there with us for a few minutes because she was puking and sick and went back to rest. She made it clear that we wouldn't be out by the jersey barrier by the canal. About an hour or two after she left, we had a SgtMaj and Lt request us up by the canal. We told them we couldn't go up there. They discussed it and eventually had two of us go up to their location. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee were the females that went up there. They were there for about an hour and then came back to the search area. We got called up again and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I went out. We were there at about 1500 or 1600.

The crowd seemed more hectic. There weren't any more coalition forces out there anymore, just the Marines and Army. The canal seemed emptier because they were pushing people back.

We were only out there for about and hour but were told we weren't taking people in anymore. We went back to the search area. We were just sitting out there waiting and then we got called out again. Gee and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) went out this time. About five minutes after they went out there the blast went off. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were sitting right inside the outer gate when it went off.

ff. Question and Answer 30.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

(1) Question: What happened after the blast?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) I was sitting, sort of facing away from the blast. There was an explosion and I saw smoke and papers flying. It was very hectic and people were running around. I looked at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and saw she was ok. I was waiting on Gee and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to come through the gate and never saw them. They weren't coming out so I knew I had to go out there and find them. I lost (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and was running around looking for Gee and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was yelling for them. I went through the fence and found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) next to the canal near the jersey barrier. She told me not to look down at the body near her. I looked anyway and saw Sgt Gee on the ground. People were running around everywhere. I was trying to pick Sgt Gee up. With everything I had on, and my rifle, I was struggling.

I thought about (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sgt Gee was already dead when we found her. We left her to go find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I saw people cutting into the fence to get someone through. I couldn't see who it was. I kept looking and looking. There were corpsmen everywhere. I went back inside the gate near the Casualty Collection Point (CCP). I saw female legs and ran over. They were cutting up Sgt Rosario's pants. I didn't recognize her. I turned around and saw some corpsmen carrying a body and recognized a black belt that I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) wore. I went up to her and she asked me what the fuck just happened. I (b)(6) (b)(6) Someone said something about Gee. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I would be right back and went to check it out. I was told to check Gee's pulse even though I knew she had passed. I kept looking for a pulse anyway. When I left to go back to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) she had been taken away. I think the Reconnaissance (Recon) guys were the ones that carried her away.

Someone put a blanket over Gee. I found (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we posted security, moved, and pulled security again. A GySgt found us and asked who we were reporting to. I told them (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The GySgt then told us to get in a vehicle to go back to the Joint Operations Center (JOC).

(b)(6) I was sitting when it went off. I jumped up. I didn't know if it was an IED or a flash-bang. It wasn't much louder than a flash-bang. It sounded like someone dropped one close by. We were getting pushed back by the gate. I kept yelling at the SPMAGTF to let us go get our girls back. I ran up to the truck and talked to some Sgt and asked to go in. I lost (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and decided to go through the gate by myself. I went in and saw a lot of Marines shooting by the jersey barrier. There was a lot of smoke. I couldn't see where they were firing. They grabbed me and I started firing my weapon as well. I don't know what I was firing at. Some other Marines started grabbing casualties. I was looking for the woodland cammies that we were wearing in order to find (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) or Gee.

Approved for Release

I saw a boot that looked like Gee's and I ran over and found that it was her. I took off her flak and started checking her. At first, I thought she was just knocked out or had burst her lung. Another corpsman came up to Sgt Gee. I was looking for her pulse and couldn't find one. (b)(6) (b)(6) I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and tried to block her view of Gee. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started trying to pull Sgt Gee up and then realized that she had passed.

I knew that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may still be alive so I went to start looking for her. I was screaming (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) name and was running around looking for her. I asked some of the Marines that were pulling security if they had seen anyone in the same cammies as me. They said no. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I kept running around looking for her. I saw a male corpsman that had a leg injury and he was yelling and screaming. I grabbed someone else's tourniquet and brought it to the guy giving him care.

After this, I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The corpsmen that carried Gee out said she still had a pulse. I was checking, she didn't. I went back to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I started providing care to wounded Afghan women and children after (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was evacuated. I went and pulled security with another Marine. I ran and left with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and went to the JOC.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Did you see any other casualties?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) They were dragging a lot of bodies. I couldn't recognize anyone. I was told that Sgt Gee died because of the ball bearings.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Do you know how many rounds you fired?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) No, but I didn't have to reload my magazine, so not that many.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: What happened once you got to the JOC?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) We talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) He brought us outside and let us calm down a little bit. We were waiting outside for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to come outside of the JOC and knocked for her to come out. I explained to her what happened and that Gee passed and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the hospital. We went in to the JOC and the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) told us that they were working on Sgt Gee and that she would be ok. I was mad that he was lying to me.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, Female Search Team, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, 13 October 2021

They told us to go to the CLB room in the JOC to calm down. We were sitting there and a ground attack alarm went off. We asked if we could go back to our sleeping area and then walked back when they approved.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Did anyone task you to go out to the gate after the blast?

(2) Answer: No. We only worked at the PAX terminal after that. We missed our first two shifts because they were confused on how to work us in to the schedule without (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and Gee. Having this downtime made everything worse.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer: We left around 0200 on the 30th and went to (b)(1)1.4a. We were there for about two and a half weeks before re-deploying back to the States.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Is there anything important that you think we should know?

(2) Answer: No.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

Exhibit 108

ACTS-SCK-DO

13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis (US Army) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Camp Lejeune, NC, II MEF Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions to (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (US Army) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. How did you enter into HKIA and what was your Task Org and Reporting?

(2) Answer. I had a Company minus consisting of one Reconnaissance platoon, our Infantry trailer platoon, and a small company headquarters. Our reporting requirements and command relationships changed during the operation. In short, we began the operation as part of the Battalion Landing Team but spent the majority of the operation as part of the Command Element. There is some history behind this. We originally were assigned to the 24 MEU as part of the Command Element, however during the workup we were attached to the Battalion Landing Team (BLT). We were part of the BLT for most of the 24 MEU deployment. When we arrived in HKIA, we were part of the BLT and were reporting to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). This changed shortly after we arrived. On 18 August, a group of reporters and sources associated with the New York Times were recovered through the south/domestic terminal of the airport. The terminal was not an established gate or official way onto the base and involved coordination with

Approved for Release

the Taliban and the Americans who were in defensive positions near the terminal. The recovery was successful, but it was hastily organized and a group of 24 MEU staff members had to personally conduct the recovery operation. Because of this, the MEU Commander determined a force was required to coordinate and facilitate recovery of individuals/groups that wouldn't come through the normal gates. The Maritime Raid Force was assigned this mission and designated as TACON to the MEU CE. We remained TACON to the CE for the rest of our time at HKIA reporting directly to (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was your mission?

(2) Answer. We facilitated recovery for individuals or groups who were unable to enter via the normal gates, required special assistance, or were designated as high priority by elements within the DoD or USG. Our focus was on the actual recovery, not designating who should be recovered/prioritized. If the MEU said "here's the people we want," we would go get them. We created solutions and developed methods for getting people onto the airfield. Although we didn't belong to them, this effort was tied to the international coordination cell. When we began doing these operations on 19 August, many people from across the staff reached out to us in an attempt to help Afghans they knew or were getting contacted about. All sorts of Americans were reaching out to people they knew were in HKIA trying to help Afghans. There seemed to be a general sense that "if we can just get ahold of someone on the airfield it will be easy to get this group of people onto the airfield." Requests like this flooded in and were impossible to keep up with. We limited our recoveries to only those authorized by the (b)(6) the (b)(6) or the reps of their team. However, we would conduct multiple recoveries for a point of contact once they were authorized by the (b)(6) For example, after a successful recovery, a group of American officers who worked with a special mission air wing (provides mission list details) requested several additional recoveries from us, which we succeeded in. If we were contacted directly by or passed info from clearly important groups, we would backbrief the MEU and begin helping the group. This happened with US Institute of Peace and Reuters News Agency among others. We ended up recovering at least 2,245 people who were identified as high priority by high ranking members of the DoD or USG and were unable to enter the normal gates for whatever reason.

e. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. We've heard about so many people who've been making contact. Did you have direct contact with Senators or President?

(2) Answer. No, however we were passed people via staffs from at least the Senator level. Most of our tasking came via intermediaries or had funneled through the MEU or J3 before it got to us. We did have some unexpected contact with high levels of the USG. For example, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had an Afghan claim



Approved for Release

he was sponsored by a US Congressman. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked for proof and the Afghan Facetime called the Congressman and handed the phone to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We allowed that onto HKIA. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was frequently the senior Marine on-site at recoveries and he in particular has a lot of unbelievable stories and spoke with all types of people.

f. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. 26th in the morning

(2) Answer. I was working in the Joint Operations Center. I was the day shift while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on nights. We had fallen into a rhythm at that time and I would spend the morning discussing our activities with my recovery teams. I briefed them on what tactics we were seeing have success for the day and giving them their assigned groups for recovery. They would back brief me on the results of their individual operations. Many of the methods to recovery people had been used up at this point, and the sewage canal was the best chance of success that day and we were planning to use it to get some folks out. (THIS IS MY MAP!!) We had several methodologies to bring people in. One method was to coordinate with Afghans on site. For this method we used NSU gate or South gate. We would coordinate with the Afghan NSU allies, Taliban, or 82nd, or who ever we needed to in order to get the targets in. We also had established ratlines consisting of holes, service gates, or ladders. We built a lot of connective tissue with adjacent units, afghan interpreters, and SOF elements to keep us plugged in to multiple means to get access to and control certain areas. However, at this point we had burned a lot of the backdoors we knew about, and the crowds would know where our ladder points or fence gaps were. So by the 26th the sewage canal method at the Abbey Gate was becoming the best and possibly only way to bring people in. We had worked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a lot to make sure we did things without disturbing his operations or overall security at Abbey gate. I briefed my guys that Abbey was the only game left in town and tasked out my guys with different groups to recover. I recognized that this might be one of the last days we could recover people, so I assigned the bulk of my force to work that entry way, two Recon teams and an Infantry Platoon. Personally, I was also absorbed on that day with helping the US Institute of Peace and Asian Women's University get a bus convoy onto HKIA. They both had a lot of complex issues getting access to the installation and had frustrations.

g. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Where are you physically when it happens?

(2) Answer. I was in the JOC. I believe the attack occurred between 15-1600.

h. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. What do you remember about the moment it happened?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer. Blast was announced and it was reported that small arms were also associated with the attack. I heard continued small arms fire reports longer than I expected. I heard that there was a large number of casualties and a lot of reporting about the movement of personnel between the gate and the role II.

i. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Any reason you preferred Abbey gate?

(2) Answer. We preferred to use Abbey Gate because of the sewage canal. The canal was unique because it presented a secure area where we could pull people from a crowd without chance of the gate being overrun. The canal wall was high enough people couldn't climb up but low enough you could reach down to grab someone. We could grab a lot of people efficiently there.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Contact Phone number (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), assistant investigating officer, at (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 94 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 109 - (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 95 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

# SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

Exhibit 110

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

| 1. LOCATION | 2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)* | 3. TIME | 4. FILE NUMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Camp Lejeune | 20210910 | 1300 | |

| 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME | 6. SSN | 7. GRADE/STATUS |
|---|---|---|
| (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | | (b)(6) |

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
24 Marine Expeditionary Unit

9. I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The Force Protection Team consisting of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I stood at the Abby Gate drainage canal everyday pulling people into our lines once all other gates shut down. We would be tasked to find and save a specific person or groups of people and we would have them meet us at Abby Gate, cross the drainage canal, and pull them into our lines to be evacuated.

That morning, the crowd was trampling each other in front of the barrier that 2/1 held at Abby Gate. The 2/1 marines were hand to hand fighting the crowd to push them off the barrier and stop civilians from getting trampled. My team and I were searching for one Blue Passport holder, (b)(6) whose wife was at the PAX terminal. I stood on the right-hand side of the canal on top of the wall looking for the individual, but we ultimately did not see him. In the chaotic crowd, I picked out a 1-2-year-old girl in a red dress with blue eyes and her mother desperate to escape being trampled or crushed. I had a conversation with two HN personnel, a man and woman, sitting next to the barrier who never made it into the lines. Both helped me keep track of the girl and mother. Multiple times the little girl and mother disappeared into the crowd. I got off the wall and stood behind the 2/1 Marines fighting, trying to see if I could get the girl and mother out. I took my OC spray out of my flak and gave it to a 2/1 Marine to give to their Captain, who was fighting in the crowd. A Marine pulled the pin and detonated a flash-bang right in front of me on accident, blowing off pieces of his hand. I looked down to check to see if I was okay and if I could still hear. The 2/1 Marines carried the injured Marine on their back to safety. I couldn't leave the little girl in the red dress and the mother, so I went back to the barrier to see if they were still there. They were still in the crowd and were able to make their way to the 2/1 jersey barrier. The Marines pulled the mother and girl over and handed the girl to me, who I carried in my arms. The mother followed behind (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) panicking. The mother was desperately trying to go back into the crowd to get her husband "in a pink shirt." The mother and girl left the area due to the trampling crowd and we transported them to the PAX terminal in our vehicle with three other individuals.

| 10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | |
|---|---|---|
| HKIA ATTACK 20210826 | (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | Page 1 of 4 |

*ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____*

*THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.*



Approved for Public Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Lejeune DATED 20210910

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Once we arrived at the PAX terminal, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was granted permission by his command to go with the Force Protection team to help us. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got a white truck to drive while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I continued to drive our unarmored black SUV. We briefly stopped by the JOC to brief the CE and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the situation at Abby Gate. After that, both vehicles headed towards West Gate to pick up our next tasked individuals, (b)(6) (b)(6) and family of 8. When we contacted her, she was located on the south side of the airfield at a gate controlled by the Taliban. She and her family could not get through. I devised a plan to have her go back to her vehicle and drive her and her family to the Northwest side of HKIA to Panjsher Pump Station. She told me she was wearing a blue coat and had a purple umbrella so I could easily identify her in the crowd. The gate was controlled by NDS and a myriad of men dressed in plain clothes. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed with the vehicles while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I went forward to the West Gate entry point once we arrived.

I spotted the purple umbrella in the crowd from a tower. I had (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stay back from the open entry point as I walked forward. I called (b)(6) and told her to bring her and her family as far forward as she could. I was met by a bearded man in a black T-shirt who told me there was an IED/SVEST threat currently. I told him I knew, and we had to get these people out. I pointed to them in the crowd and showed him the purple umbrella. He directed me to go forward with NDS and told me to stay on the right-hand side with as much cover as I could find. We walked forward and I identified (b)(6) (b)(6) in the crowd to NDS. NDS crossed the street and grabbed (b)(6) and her family for me. After searching the personnel and their bags, we loaded the family into our two vehicles. We drove back to the PAX terminal and dropped them off.

We loaded the vehicles again and pushed south to Abby Gate looking for the same blue passport holder from that morning and another former Afghan interpreter with a bright yellow shirt. We made it past tower 11 and towards tower 8 when we saw 14 individuals who breached the walls being held in place by British forces. We stopped to provide support and to ensure they didn't need transportation for the apprehended to North Gate by the International Military Police. The C-Wire was open on top of the wall and there was a gap in the wall where the apprehended broke in. I made the decision to send (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) forward to Abby Gate to begin searching for the blue passport holder and interpreter while (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I reported the apprehended to the JOC staff. I also reported it to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Once we finished reporting the apprehended, we headed toward Abby Gate.

As we drove up to Abby Gate, I could see civilians starting to run towards our vehicle and 2/1 Marines were up and preparing to run towards the gunfire/explosion site. After brief moments trying to move our vehicle, we placed it as far forward at Abby Gate as we could with another vehicle behind us. Both were placed next to the hardened (b)(1)1.4a screening area. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to stay with the vehicle and not leave that position. As a squad of 2/1 Marines were getting ready to run forward, I saw another Marine in Woodlands who appeared to be MRF and asked him if he was going out there. He said he wasn't "not going" and we both ran forward with 2/1. I knew (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who I had sent earlier, were out there when the suicide vest went off. We ran up the right side behind the jersey barriers. 2/1 Marines were facing and securing to the south and southeast. I looked around for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but could not find her initially. I crossed over a C-Wire gap where we parked our vehicle everyday next to the triage point. I spoke wit(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) who told me Sgt Gee got hit and he had not seen (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There were bodies of both civilians and Marines on the ground. I ran towards the outer perimeter past the British gate to the hole in the fence where we had pulled many families through before. I briefly saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and we exchanged words as we passed each other after his team had taken shrapnel from the blast. I ran into a Marine with a wounded girl coming through the hole in the fence. I put her on my back in the fireman's carry. I ran her from the hole in the fence back through the British gate to the triage point. I set her down behind cover of a vehicle. A mother and her two daughters were in shock standing next to where I sat down the girl. I ran up to them and turned them around, directing them towards the inner Abby Gate controlled by 2/1. I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) at this point. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got in the white truck and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was helping triage wounded Marines at the triage point.



Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Lejeune DATED 20210910

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I backed the white truck up to where Marines and civilians were laying on the ground. We all looked up at the tower directly to the southern perimeter and saw a man in the tower. We oriented our weapons towards the tower and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I directed a couple 2/1 Marines to orient on the tower as we started to load the wounded. We did not see the man in the tower again.

We loaded one Marine (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who was covered in blood, in the bed of the truck with tourniquets on his legs and arms. We loaded another HN girl with a wounded arm into the bed of the truck as well. We loaded a small HN female child in the back seat of the truck. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) rode in the back seat with the little girl, sternum rubbing her the entire way to keep her awake as she was slipping in and out of consciousness. I rode in the bed of the truck with the wounded Marine and girl. We drove as fast as possible screaming for Marines and individuals to get out of the way so we could make it to Role 2 as fast as possible. All three were in severe pain and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I did what we could to comfort/talk to them the entire way and keep them awake. We made it to the hospital and unloaded the little girl in the backseat first, then the girl in the bed of the truck, then the Marine. I briefed the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that more were coming to Role 2. We then drove back to Abby Gate as quickly as possible, stopping next to east gate briefly since there was a roadblock by a British vehicle/MAXPROs.

We went around it on the opposite side of the road and immediately back out to the triage point. At this point, all the Marines had been loaded and the British Gate was shut. We turned the vehicle around and entered the inner Abby Gate perimeter. I disembarked the white truck and spoke to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and told him Abby Gate was secured by 2/1 and we needed to get any 24 MEU CE/JTF-CR Marines out and gain accountability and push them back to the JOC. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took the white truck and began loading another Marine (potentially Espinoza) (b)(6) and multiple other civilians, driving them to Role 2 to drop off.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was at the interior triage point inside the perimeter of Abby Gate with our SUV. She was helping keep everyone calm and was determining which civilians/military needed to be transported to Role 2 immediately. She was directing what needed to be done to the civilians around her. I approached (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and she directed that a mother, little boy, and a man with badges on his face who had been hit in the head and face needed to be transported. We moved them to our still parked vehicle and loaded them in. We drove directly to Role 2 and unloaded them all.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) vehicle was breaking down at this point and they pushed back to the JOC after unloading all the wounded they had.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) then went to medical to receive medical attention for their injuries during the attack.

I firmly believe that if it wasn't for the actions of (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the day of the suicide bombing at HKIA, more individuals would have passed away due to the wounds they received from the attack. Their quick thinking and actions that day saved multiple lives.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Lejeune DATED 20210910

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

*(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at Camp Lejeune .

*(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

*(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

*(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

Approved for Release

# SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

Exhibit 111

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

| 1. LOCATION | 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) | 3. TIME | 4. FILE NUMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hamid Karzai Int. Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan | 20210727 | 1200 | |

| 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME | 6. SSN | 7. GRADE/STATUS |
|---|---|---|
| (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | | (b)(6) Active |

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

9. I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the afternoon of 26 AUG 2021, with my PsyOps Day Team already out supporting the various gates, I finished the work I had to do in the JOC and caught a ride out to Abbey Gate. I knew that we had a speaker system emplaced there, I knew that was the most worrisome area for the day in terms of crowd size, and I knew the day team would come back through eventually after they finished up at other gates. I got to Abbey gate, ascertained that our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g the last gate before the final stretch of abbey gate between HKIA and Barron Hotel. I got up on the Hesco with several Marines of 2/1 and kept the speaker playing the message describing what paperwork you had to have to get in and to otherwise go home. The message was having no visible effect on the crowd, which was getting rowdier as the day got hotter. I had been there a little over an hour when my day team showed up, having been providing assistance at other gates.

My day team was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) SSG Ryan Knauss, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Together we began engaging directly with the crowd, still attempting to both mollify them and reduce overall numbers in the Abbey Gate crowd. Again, we achieved little effect as everyone we managed to convince to go away was replaced by someone else. We also passed suspicious people, especially with bags, up the 2/1 chain as we spotted them in the crowd, because we knew about the SVest or PBIED threat. In three hours we had spotted over ten possibles, AKA military age males doing more than the norm to hide their features, with bags or super bulky clothing, moving and acting suspiciously, often with the crowd giving them a wide berth as though they knew or suspected something; essentially possible attackers. However, even with the best spotting, once someone got into the main press of the crowd (closer to the final wadi bridge, the close packed barricade on our side of the wadi, or the end of the wadi itself, from which Marines were pulling out folks with appropriate paperwork) there was simply no way to keep track of them. The crowd was too dense, too rowdy, and all clambering to get in.

With the 2/1 Marines already well versed in operating the NGLS if they needed it, we prepared to depart Abbey Gate and think about other ways to reduce crowd size. Before we left however, I went to check in with the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (spelling?) of 2/1. While talking to him his (b)(6) came over (a Major whose name I cannot recall) and asked if we could provide direct, powerful, loudspeaker support at the barrier on our side of the wadi, the barrier just below the tower. The crowd there was crushing women and children up against the barricade, crushing them against it hard enough to hurt at a minimum and possibly kill people. He wanted us to employ our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g mounted to the front of the vehicle, to implore them to stop as well as potentially be so loud as to be painful enough to make them stop that way. So I went back to the team, told them we had work to do, and we

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

Continued on next page.

| 10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | Page 1 of 4 |
|---|---|---|
| | (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) | |

*ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____*

*THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.*



Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Hamid Karzai Int. Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan DATED 20210727

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I returned with a local man, whose family had just been let in, I don't know what documentation they possessed for that, but he did speak English, Dari, and Pashto. He was reluctant to leave his family as they progressed down the length of Abbey Gate into HKIA, but I told him "Just give me ten minutes, just help me for ten minutes and I'll bring you back to your family." He agreed and I brought him back to the TPT vehicle we had prepositioned. He started with the basics "Stop pushing" and "Please calm down and give some space" but moved on to "You are hurting women and children!" trying to implore the crowd to stop pushing right there. I had set a timer for ten minutes, and when it dinged, I thanked the man for his assistance. He was actually sad, because he could see what was happening. He said "I tried my best" and I assured him that he had, and that it was okay, and that I would then take him to rejoin his family. I turned to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and instructed him to ask the SPMAGTF BLT to provide a contracted interpreter, so his started talking to the (b)(6) to his left. I had the helpful civilian in front of me as we walked in front of the TPT vic, and I got about another two steps in towards the gate, with him still in front me of me, when the IED went off behind me and to my right (about 5 o'clock). I never saw that dude, who was just trying to help, again. I have no idea what happened to him, if he is okay, if he made it back to his family. Since I don't know his name I have no way of finding out either.

When the IED went off, I was thrown forward and to my left. I hit the ground hard, and quickly checked myself to see if I was hit. I got off the ground after that, stunned, and moved towards the gate, which was in front of me. I couldn't hear anything. I realized I didn't know where my team was, so I turned around to go back to the vic, and that's when the gunfire started from the front of the gate, really by the Connex boxes by the entrance to the Barron hotel. I saw SSG Knauss, on the ground, but on my side of the TPT vehicle (not where he had been before the blast) and grabbed him and dragged him back past the gate and off to the side, trying to get him out any gunfire that might come straight down the gate from the Barron Hotel front. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the MRF, ran up, he saw me and yelled "Have you seen Gee? Where is Gee?" but I hadn't seen her for a bit so I said I hadn't seen her. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) ran by me, towards the hole in the fence where Sgt Gee had been working. SSG Knauss was unconscious, but breathing. I stripped his plate carrier off and checked him for obvious external injuries but found none. His tongue was swelling. He started to choke on his tongue, so I instructed another Marine who was helping to fish his tongue out, which he did. SSG Knauss was still not conscious. I was yelling for a Corpsman, who did show up, and looked again for obvious external injuries and again found none, but we still couldn't get SSG Knauss to wake up. Meanwhile a pickup truck had pulled up, and we decided to get SSG Knauss onto the opickup truck to get him to triage and the role 2 as fast as we could. We got him on the truck. I cleared his weapon and tucked it beside him. I fished his tongue out. They loaded a second non-ambulatory, an SPMAGTF Marine, on a stretcher, onto the bed of the same truck, which I helped with. I fished Ryan's tongue again. I realized I didn't fit on the truck bed with them both and hopped off.

While I was standing on the truck I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) come around the corner supporting another Marine, whom he laid down at the temporary CCP just inside the gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was bleeding from his face. He saw me in the truck with Ryan, and hopped into the passenger side. I hopped out, without exchanging any words with him, and went to go look for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The truck left, with SSG Knauss in the bed and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in the passenger seat. I went back to the TPT vehicle to look for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and couldn't find him there, but realized the truck would be in the way if the British did manage to get their convoy out the Barron gate and towards Abbey Gate and HKIA, so I hopped into the driver seat, put it in neutral, and disengaged the E brake. I yelled for some Marines to help me, and together we pushed it back against the wall of the gate area, out of the potential path of the British convoy. I threw the e-brake to stop it from rolling. At this point I saw (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and spoke with him for a second. He was looking for Command Element Marines, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in particular. He picked up a little civilian girl who was wounded, put her on his back, and ran back towards the STP with her. He came back to continue looking for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) after that. SPMAGTF 2/1 Marines took up defensive positions behind the truck facing forward. I moved past the truck and noticed nobody was looking at a tower, external to HKIA, with clear lines of sigh into the killzone and our actions. I got a fireteam, one of many facing forward, to reorient to watch that tower from behind jersey barriers. I watched a civilian try to run into HKIA, carrying a backpack, and nearly get shot I the face. Several Marines were yelling at his to drop his bag, a red backpack. After he dropped it they let him run by and in. He wasn't a threat, he just didn't know what to do. I saw other Marines pulling the wounded through the hole in the fence, including Sgt Gee on a stretcher. The gunfire had stopped.

It was at this point that I realized that 2/1 had the security situation under control, they had flooded forward, towards the gunfire, after the IED and while the SAF exchange was in progress. I was no adding anything to their posture, and would likely get in their way if they had to maneuver. So I turned around, went back to the fenceline, and helped another Marine, partially ambulatory, through to the CCP.

Continued on next page.



Approved for Public Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Hamid Karzai Int. Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan DATED 20210727

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I came back to the front, looking for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) still, and helped a shell-shocked civilian lady get back to the STP that had set up back behind the further back gate. On my way back towards the TPT vic from dropping her off, I heard (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) call out to me, he and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were in the back of an ambulance style HMMWV, and since I had been looking for them, I hopped in too. I told the driver to go, unless there were any other ambulatory patients to pickup, because with two Corpsmen (Army medics I think actually) treating them, we didn't have any more room. There weren't any other ambulatory wounded around, so we began to leave. The ambulance driver heard on the radio that the role 2 was full, so she said she'd be taking them to the 1/82nd role 1 on Camp Alvarado, especially since they were Army. I explained they work for the JTF-CR, not 82nd airborne, but that'd be fine so long as they got seen and to step on it. We drove directly across the airfield and went offroading to get to the Camp Alvarado Role 1, where they were seen immediately. I tried to tell them I needed to see SSG Knauss in the Role 2 but they made me sit for a while until a Captain had some other reason to go over to North HKIA, and he drove me back.

Arriving at Building 300, I entered the JOC and reported to various folks inside. I may have been the first Marine who was in the explosion to make it back and report, because I had to explain that there was only one explosion at Abbey Gate, but that it had been a complex IED initiated attack because of the SAF exchange at the front which may have been ISIS-K shooting Taliban and then trying to get inside. I drew up an initial diagram for the blast, and reported the location of my three soldiers (SSG Knauss in the role 2 and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the Camp Alvarado Role 1). I sat down for a while. My night team came in, heard the news, and went to check on everybody. Eventually (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were moved from the Role 1 to the Role 2, so everyone was at North HKIA. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was discharged and camp back in a hospital shirt and boxers, but no pants on. I got seen by a corpsman who said I didn't have a concussion. We heard (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was stable and would be fine. We heard Ryan was Urgent, then Urgent and intubated, then later Urgent Surgical. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed with him in the Role 2. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) came back at around 2300 to tell us that Ryan had passed away during the surgery.

End of Statement.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TAKEN AT Hamid Karzai Int. Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan DATED 20210727

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

*(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at Hamid Karzai Int. Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan .

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

*(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

*(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

*(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

Approved for Release

Page 104 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 112 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 105 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 106 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 107 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 108 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 109 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 110 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 111 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 113 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 112 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 113 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 114 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 114 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 115 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 116 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 117 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 118 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 119 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 120 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 121 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 122 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 123 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 124 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 125 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 126 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 127 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 128 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 129 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 130 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 131 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 132 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 133 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Exhibit 115 - (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 134 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 135 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 136 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 137 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 138 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 139 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 140 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 141 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 142 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 143 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 144 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 145 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 146 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 147 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 148 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 149 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 150 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 151 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 152 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 153 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 154 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 155 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 156 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 157 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 158 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 159 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 160 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 161 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 162 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 163 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 164 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 165 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 166 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 167 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 168 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 169 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 170 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 171 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 172 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 173 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 174 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 175 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 176 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 177 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 178 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 179 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 180 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 181 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 182 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 183 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 184 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 185 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 186 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 187 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 188 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 189 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 190 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 191 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 192 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 193 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 194 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 195 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 196 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 197 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 198 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 199 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 200 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 201 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 202 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 203 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 204 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 205 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 206 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 207 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 208 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 209 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 210 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 211 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 212 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 213 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 214 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 215 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 216 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 217 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 218 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 219 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 116 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 220 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 221 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 222 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 223 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 224 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 225 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 226 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 227 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 228 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 229 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 230 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 231 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 232 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 233 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 234 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 235 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 236 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 237 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 238 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 117 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 239 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 240 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 241 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 242 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 243 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 244 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 245 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 246 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 247 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 248 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 249 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 250 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 251 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 252 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 253 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 254 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 255 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 256 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 257 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 258 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 259 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 260 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 261 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 262 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 263 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 264 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 265 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 266 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 267 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 268 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 269 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 270 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 271 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 118 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 272 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 273 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 274 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 275 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 276 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 277 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 278 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 279 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 118 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 280 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 281 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 282 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 283 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 284 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 285 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 286 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 287 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 119 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 288 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 289 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 290 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 291 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 292 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 293 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 294 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 295 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 296 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 297 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 298 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 299 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 300 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 301 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 302 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 303 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 304 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 305 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 306 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 307 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 308 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 309 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 310 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 311 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 312 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 313 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 314 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 315 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 316 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 317 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 318 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 319 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 320 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 321 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 322 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 323 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 324 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 325 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 326 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 327 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 328 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 329 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 330 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 331 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 332 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 333 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 334 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 335 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 336 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 337 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 338 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 339 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 340 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 341 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 342 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 343 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 344 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 345 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 346 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 347 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 348 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 349 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 350 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 351 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 352 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 353 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 354 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 355 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 356 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 357 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 358 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 359 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 360 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 361 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 362 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 363 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 364 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 365 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 366 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 367 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 368 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 369 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 370 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 371 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 372 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 373 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 374 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 375 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 376 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 377 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 378 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 379 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 380 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 381 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 382 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 383 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 384 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 385 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 386 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 387 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 388 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 389 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 390 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 391 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 392 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 393 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 394 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 395 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 396 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 397 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 398 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 399 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 400 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 401 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 402 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 403 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 404 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 405 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 406 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 407 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 408 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 409 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 410 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 411 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 412 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 413 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 414 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 415 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 416 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 417 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 418 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 419 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 420 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 421 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 422 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 423 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 424 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 425 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 426 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 427 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 120 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 428 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 429 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 430 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 431 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 432 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 433 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 434 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 435 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 436 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 437 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 438 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 439 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 440 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 441 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 442 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 443 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 444 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 445 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 446 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 447 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 448 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 449 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 450 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 451 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Exhibit 121

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 15 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st BDE, 82nd Airborne Division Brigade (b)(6) 15 October 2021

1. On 15 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, US Army and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 3ESC Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered often answered collaboratively. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) US Army recorded the interview for transcription below. For the purpose of recording who was speaking, the following shortened terms will be used to identify the speaker:

BG Curtis – BG

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. BG - When did you get assigned to the Brigade?

(b)(6)

(b)(6) – 12 August 2021 I was assigned as the BDE (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st BDE, 82nd Airborne Division Brigade (b)(6) 15 October 2021

(1) Question. BG - Can you talk about any important events in your pre-deployment and train up to your movement to HKIA?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – IRF Prep started in March which was our Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Rotation 21-05. We did not rehearse non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) but we did rehearse civic engagement. Mock interagency visits and role players. Did not rehearse crowd control. Geronimo is the size of an airhead line and we ran Entry Control Point (ECP) ops at the scale available at the location. Unlike the one at National Training Center (NTC) where there's always a NEO inject we did not get that. Following that we did marksmanship training in preparation for IRF 1 July. We did one LPD involving tactical decision games. One was a NEO. We practiced a NEO leaving Hamad Karzai International Airport (HKIA) with a penetration. I would not have considered us to have achieved the status and training the Marines do in their prep for a float.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. BG - When did you officially get alerted?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We started studying the problem knowing it was highly likely and developed a pointed playbook. We talked to MG Donahue and we were told to focus on Bagram. We worked up Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) concepts and thought things through for how to split forces between multiple airheads if necessary. We started getting serious about NEO discussion and then got the official notification on 12 August. The CG (MG Donahue) gave me the first indicator the day before that it was definitely going to happen.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. BG - What did the departure look like? Prioritization of outload?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – We were 100% focused on outload. IRF PVL and echeloned equipment sets. We began to work on Soldier load issues because it was clear that the division would be manipulating the force flow. We deployed and made decisions based on probably going to an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) like (b)(1)1.4a and then when called forward we planned to be security for whatever location it might have been.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. BG - Talk about force flow and build-up.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - My first unit on the ground is 2/504. We had one aircraft land on the 15th. It was a Sunday and we landed 2100 local. We linked up with Diplomatic security.



Approved for Release

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. BG - Talk me through your first impression of the tactical scenario.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We were immediate put on the Camp Alvarado perimeter and then when the sun came up we were told to put our Soldiers down against that crowd who was out all over the airport facility and fields. I was in the Cab CP. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his staff were watching the crowds with the raid camera and the crowd initially looked like the Taliban attacking. We had security of Alvarado and we sent a unit out to establish a screen line. We had 300 personnel on the ground (one battalion minus). We had 2/504 with their artillery battery on the ground. Red Devils landed on the 16th at 0440 local. We got a lot of artillery personnel on early in anticipation of opposition. They were basically with the IRV 1. By the time the zombie apocalypse happens we were at about 750-800 personnel. But the end of that night we had 1k on the ground. We established the screen lines south of the air strip once we had the personnel.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. BG - Talk about COMREL. Who did you work for?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I worked for BGen Sullivan (USMC, JTF-CR Commander). I asked this question right away and that was one of the things we established very early on. Although it later changed, I worked for BGen Sullivan.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. BG - How did you get tied in with Marines on the ground to create a security perimeter?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We tied in visually. We never established radio comms in the darkness. I recall that the Marines at the time only had 200-250 personnel themselves so we were both pretty thin. It would have been 1/8 or 2/1 but they were under (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) There was an understanding that the Marines had the East side of the airfield and we had the West.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. BG - Talk about how the day of the 15th ends for you.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Our third aircraft came in and the night ends with the crowd never being disbursed. That's off of apron 8A-C. There were two distinct waves according to outside reports, but we just saw it as a mass mob because we were too close to it all. It looked to us like a constant wave of influx. We could differentiate between the Taliban based on their dress and while some of them were armed, there



Approved for Release

was never a direct threat to our Soldiers demonstrated in any intent. We had to be very careful about crowd control because the crowd was in the thousands and even small movements or disturbances could have a much larger effect. Those who were directly associated with the Taliban had clothing that was distinctive. Later that night as we pushed the crowd and the Taliban out. You could tell the difference and they even lamented to the National Security Unit (NSU). I witnessed awkward, but civil interactions between the Taliban and NSU. The night of the 16th was the first time we had any interactions with the Taliban. We were clued in then that the partnership and balance of relationships would be okay.

(b)(6) – When I got there and we established a more secure perimeter the interactions were civil between the NSU and Taliban. This is a different time and space because I came in a little after the CDR.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. BG – What Rules of Engagement (ROE) were you aware of and practicing?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - The ROE was the right to self-defense - I was going off the self-defense ROE and it was the hostile act and hostile intent standard expectation. They never maneuvered or demonstrated intent and our paratroopers exercised amazing restraint even in a lot of difficult scenarios.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. BG - Can you talk at all about messaging to the crowds?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We used a vehicle with some guys who showed up and spoke a few of the local languages and they would speak and tell the crowd that nothing would happen until they get off the airfield. They understood that they needed to move back. There were a lot of injuries that night between locals claiming getting hurt and the shoving of the masses. I've heard a lot of figures. We haven't really established the numbers but we think there were 2000-3000 civilians on the airfield that night.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. BG - What was your posture when dealing with the crowd?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We were inoculated from day one because of our close proximity to the Afghan Civilians (AFGCIVs). We were immersed in the crowd and the people at the forward line of troops (FLOT) since the moment we touched down. We got used to their presence and proximity and so as we continued from our arrival we became normalized in accepting the risk and proximity of their crowds. We were in no way dismissive of the danger and potential issues, but at the same time we did not

Approved for Release

have a choice in how we engaged them and our timetable was known to be compressed to a point of stressing making things work.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. BG - So we're at the 17th now. Talk about your posture, force flow, and tasking understanding as of the 17th.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - 17th was the first day of normalcy in terms of operations without surprises. Our CP was at Alvarado and we had 5 companies, one delta company, and two batteries. We had a strong point at the (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c We had an agreement with the Marines that they had the East and we had the West prior to the 17th. The narrative was that we were securing the airhead line. That started on the 17th. On the 18th that changed to us being responsible for perimeter security with the Marines on local security for their gates in which they were operating. It looked like the following by date in a very general sense:

15th, arrive and secure locally
16th, clear AFGCIVs and secure locally
17th, secure the western line and establish perimeter understanding
18th, build combat power and secure the perimeter
19th, we have the entire perimeter line minus the localized Marine gate security
20th, secure the entire airhead line
21st, same as above
22nd, start supporting the NEO through south gate, and this was a big change because this was the first day we started receiving AMCITs at west gate. This is the day that we got wishy washy because we were doing the boutique exfils along with the planning of the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE). This grew and grew and grew over time. Gate 1 and 3 were our gates we ran. This was also in coordination with (b)(6) in the International coordination cell. (b)(6) didn't start producing clarity and unity of effort until then. There was a moment in time where it was clear that he wasn't doing much chief of staff'ing and he was really running the international coordination cell. The MCC was really working to create clarity to be able to provide clarity.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. BG - Mission Orders are distributed how?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Joint Task Force 82 is formed on the 18th and All American 6 (MG Donahue) and the Division tactical command post (DTAC) arrived mid-day. He had his first huddle that night around 1900. The task org changed the next day. I was working for Gen Sullivan before and then got TACON to 82nd on the 19th. We were still coordinating directly with the Marines but at this point what was established between myself and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was that we agreed to assume the entire airhead line and that he (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was on the gates. The security of the gates had a bubble around them



Approved for Release

which they efficiently established on the ground and they owned the security in those spaces. It was largely (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who established those connections.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. BG - So now we're on the 22nd. Talk me through the issues and observations you had around this time.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - These are the days where the Marines are extracting personnel from the gates and the reporting in the news is picking up. The NSU is firing a huge amount of warning shots. The Threat stream is picking up. We had multiple threat streams with levels of specificity that varied. We started hearing about the 'gold corolla' I think on the 2nd day but it's not populated on the Intel row until the 20th. I have physical evidence of the threat on the 20th and we knew they were cooking something up early. We knew they were imminent on the 22nd. This is important because the issue became apparent when we would try to do anything at the gates. The issue of standoff and crowds complicated any transitions. The Taliban were very difficult to deal with at the North Gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. BG - What was your interaction with the Taliban and their leadership?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We established a sense of the Taliban control structure after Abbey Gate opened. We established individuals who controlled specific areas and then overall commanders who reported various levels of effectiveness. (b)(6) he controlled a specific area. (b)(6) was the senior guy at south gate. (b)(6) was the city commander and he'd enter through the South gate and he'd have meetings. (b)(6) may have been a bigger deal that some of the others because he got the pomp and circumstance that the others didn't get when they came around. They had a fairly clear command structure based on control and presence. 1/504 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) interfaced with (b)(6) was at Abbey Gate. (b)(6) was the overall area leader, but we never established contact with him.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. BG - Talk about gate and transition planning.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I had been to Abbey Gate on the 23rd to get a sense of the gate ops and structure. There was always a discussion about this and we would agree to things but then our guys on the ground would start actioning stuff, and agreeing to the relief in place (RIP) schedule. Timelines started slipping almost immediately. We established the 27th early on that we would have leadership interface and start to



Approved for Release

transition. This was the 23rd when we initially agreed to this. BGen Sullivan and MG Donahue were very much of the mindset to say you guys figure this out down to my level with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We established on the 24th that we would start pushing out info ops that the gates would close. We understood we would never operate the gates to process the evacuees. The economy of force was never capable of having us operate gates and secure the airhead line. We established that as the known factor. The earliest date they asked for was the 24th. This was the compelling factor because this was based on their exfil timeline understanding. They (the Marines) thought that was the amount of time it would take to draw back and then get off the lines and exfil. The Brits had asked for the gate to remain until the period of darkness (PoD) 25/26. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(6) – You could just see that the Marines were tapped out. They were almost culminating with their ability to operate the gates and we felt like their ability to operate was approaching end. They were exhausted, but they kept doing it.

(b)(6) – We agreed to the timeline: RIP on the 28th/29th, but the moment we walked out of the room with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and then MG Donahue and I walk the ground to assess the gate ops and I'm wondering if we can keep the Baron hotel rat line open. We called those rat lines because they were known ingress points used by lots of folks for different reasons. The Baron complex is large. We planned to close the larger gate and only operate the very niche boutique extracts. I convinced MG Donahue we could operate the rat line to Barron. MG Donahue was convinced there was no way we would keep the gate open based on the operations we already had planned. He said that based on the fact that this was an accident waiting to happen. We talked about the timeline for the 28th and 29th and it almost went from the agreement to an understanding that it likely wouldn't work the same way as the initial discussion with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We established that we planned to close those gates and have zero operations, to a degree that we discussed the specific control. We established the expectation that the Marines would close the gates with an obstacle plan and their engineer effort would make sure the gate traffic could not continue.

I kept hearing the Marines at the lower level kept pushing the expectation of establishing the timeline that did not match our agreements and they kept pushing for earlier. On the 26th (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was already walking around because of this expectation to start taking the gates earlier despite the understanding of the 28th/29th timeline. He was down there doing an assessment.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. BG - So the day of the 26th?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – The day started at 0400 in the morning with some craziness. (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) He was not



Approved for Release

in charge of anything. His purpose in the group was to use his clout. Anyway, I get info from (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) that there was an issue at the Black Gate. On the heels of the "small extraction" (6 busses) at Black gate. There was no coordination done prior and it created big problems and it was really sketchy. (b)(6) owned that part of the perimeter. We show up and the info was mixed. The person who was more apparently in charge than anyone. He never said anything about Americans on the busses, and in fact pointed out that they didn't know who half the people were. He said half of these people jumped on these busses out of nowhere. We were surrounded by (b)(1)1.4c and a bunch of paramilitary. There was a logical connection but nothing official. I called the consular affairs people because this all felt bad. It just reeked of unofficial and off the books. I explained who was at the gate and was moving them around. I end up taking the JSOC guy to the JOC in order to coordinate entry. The longer I work with the (b)(6), the more I learned. He was working with the (b)(1)1.4a and using their air force. They were bringing the evacuees to the gate 9 ramp. But the longer we worked with them, the SoA people led by (b)(6) who was the front-man for SoA, the more I realized the divide between the SoA people and the actual JSOC crews. It was an understanding but nothing real. This was at 0504 I sent a text to (b)(6) was DoS's (b)(6) The threat stream was growing in this timeline, so this was a real potential problem connected to me wanting to get the convoy of random Afghans off the base. It was surreal.

(b)(6) – I went out there. I told the boss "this needs your attention".

(b)(6) – This went on and continued to get more and more sketchy in some ways. Insane and absolutely uncoordinated.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. BG - Timeline for the blast.

(2) Answer. I took a note and wrote down 1734 as the SIGACT. They were (the Marines) miraculously poised to react and provide medical care. The other gates were shut down. North and East gates were shut down.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. BG - Do we know why the Abbey gate was operating still?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - When you go down there you'll see the international forces. It was almost sectioned off. The crowd would go nuts when that happened. But it offered a lot of options to see and grab select personnel. It was the whole reason the North gate shut down at one point after the NSU/Taliban/Marine incident.

v. Question and Answer 21.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st BDE, 82nd Airborne Division Brigade (b)(6) 15 October 2021

(1) Question. BG - You referenced the incident between Marines and NSU at the North gate. Can you talk about that?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – Kind of. The Marines killed 2 NSU guys at the North gate. There was some sort of confusion. The Marines thought they were getting shot at. The Marines returned fire and killed an NSU guy. There were a lot of contributing factors to that incident, but more specifically to the feeling of keeping the gates operating. I feel like the problem was that they had no control of who was coming in. We were actually talking to one of the Marine LtCols. It was an (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). He called it out as being very frustrating with the amount of people were being let in specifically for people whom we did not have control of or valid information on. The DoS operated in a way that made this difficult. I believe there wasn't a company commander out there that didn't feel that pressure and know that it was tied directly to the bigger picture at the White House level. BGen Sullivan and MG Donahue had meetings all the time with the White House and they knew it. Not that it was permeating down necessarily, but we were all aware of where a lot of this was driven from. We believed that it was something epic and awesome and we were just out there assuming risk in order to keep the lines open and do good things for people.

w. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. BG - The 26th threat stream reporting?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I recall clearly the threat streams of a motorcycle or bag IED and ISIS media reportedly in position. It was awful at Abbey gate on the 26th. We were actually there at 1430 on that day. The Marines didn't seem to be taking a lower profile than any other day. The other countries were there doing the same. Still operating like normal.

(b)(6) – That's what I observed. I was down there several times in that time period and we had a lot of visualization over time and I didn't observe any change.

x. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. BG - What about uptic in threat stream reporting?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I did not observe any special threat reporting that day or any threat stream that specifically told me to change posture. Whether it was an incident or group of incidents, there were constant reports of 'bomb in 10 minutes'.

y. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. BG - Did you observe any specific gate being used for targeted extraction?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - So we controlled and ran West Gate with 2-504, and South gate with 2-501, then later 1-501. The ANA gate was controlled using TACON National Guard, but NSU mostly decided who entered. The Black gate was never even supposed to be a portal. Each gate had its own hustle. There was a (b)(1)1.4d compound just outside of it. I got a message from (b)(6) and remember telling him "KAK needs to work within the discipline of the gate security requirements". We called West gate "West Gate". Most people called it liberty gate but WSJ called it "Glory gate" other people called it NSU gate. Santa Cruz gate also known as the ANA gate was pretty much small extractions through (b)(1)1.4c We used (b)(6) to control that gate, but we normally never would have done that. The crowd would be right up against the berm and the fence. The 28th was the day they controlled the outer gate.

z. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. BG - Back to Abbey gate – on the 26th – The Marines say there were snipers or designated marksmen in a tower there. Do you know if they fired?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - (b)(6) had a bunch of guys out there. I've asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) this question and I don't understand his answer. He was always kind of tied in with multiple international folks and different security posture. But the area isn't as open as it appears on the map. We were trying to determine whether or not anyone fired from us. It ended up that the small arms fire following the blast was US and Taliban forces firing warning shots. All the small arms fire would have been warning shots and trying to get AFGCIVs back. The medical personnel kept describing the penetrating wounds and it would have been ball bearings and fishing weights they were pulling out of guys. They would have known if it was bullets they were pulling out of wounded. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would know who to speak to about that specifically. The initial reports indicated that hundreds of shots were fired but eventually someone said that it was everyone shooting into the air. It would have been US personnel and the Taliban most likely. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) will know who was in the tower that day and whether or not anyone fired from that position. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may know what it even sounded like because he was down there.

(b)(6) – As it pertains to the Role II minus. As far as the timeline from the blast. I was on site as of 10 minutes from the blast. I was initially there because of traffic control and we needed to make sure the entrance was clear. I made it down to the first gate. We did not hear anything in our time there so it would have had to happen in the initial 2-3 minutes (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) may also have been directly in the gate area when the blast happened.

aa. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. BG - On the scene, how long are you there and what do you see?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I initially got control of the inner gate. We brought in evacuation vehicle after evacuation vehicle. We were treating US servicemen and AFGCIVs. It was mostly Army FLAs that moved everyone out of the Abbey Gate area. I don't think the Marines recognized that. We maintained the route and kept moving Marines out of there. Aircraft was still flowing, meaning I don't think the airfield ever shut down so we had to be real careful of not effecting the runway operation even while evacuating. Rules didn't change for crossing the taxiway. 90% of our crossings were done on the West side of the taxiway. We could gain access to the North side of the runway through West side. The CH47 came in hot at about blast plus 45. The PJs came off the bird where it landed at the gate area and they just screamed past me and past the control measures and entered the gate. All the casualties were already gone out of the gate. I didn't have much visibility after I went in about what was happening inside the gate. The Western corridor was used and I know that from the drivers. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) can speak to the casualties that would've gone in to Alvarado Role 1. They would've been US Service members and local nationals.

(b)(6) – at 1901 on the 26th I took a note that said 5 Marines and 4 Afghans. MG Donahue was trying to gain visibility of the location. I later wrote down 4 more urgent cases. Those may have been pushed to us later.

bb. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. BG - What were your medical capabilities at Alvarado?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We considered it Role II Minus. Only thing we didn't have there was CT or Xray.

(b)(6) – We had everything else there though. So the senior ranking provider/surgeon would have been (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) but the senior medic from 82nd would have been (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The building was 40 yards from my command post.

cc. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. BG - What did I not ask that you think is important?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – Only thing I would add would be that it was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who had walked from the inner gate through to the outer area on the 26th moments before the blast and was doing a recon and he would have been down by the chevron when the blast occurred – he would have a very specific and clear perspective on the fire he would've heard and seen.

dd. Question and Answer 72.

(1) Question. BG - Exfil, What does that look like for you? Brits?



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 1st BDE, 82nd Airborne Division Brigade (b)(6) 15 October 2021

(2) Answer. (b)(6) – I know we agreed to speed up the timeline and we saw zero activity at the gate after the bombing. The gate would have been operating through the Barron evacuation. The next time I was at Abbey I saw zero crowd. On the 27th JTF-CR transitioned control of the gate to Task Force 82nd. From the 26th on, the North, East, and Abbey gates were actually the quietest. We had a lot of jumpers, but never at the gates themselves. We were active at South and West gate. On the morning of the exfil we saw rockets and we were down to the last few sticks, but it was eerily quiet and stable on the last day. We had 100% manning and we began to collapse slowly. From the time we collapsed to the time we were out was 2 hours. The reason the ISIS threat stream dropped to indirect fire was because they knew we were not taking gate traffic. On the fence our manning looked the same. As we started to collapse in, we knew we wouldn't have time to eject people, so we started making sure people couldn't get at the aircraft by isolating or controlling them off the airfield in non-lethal controls like locking them in busses off the flightline.

Contacts provided to add statements or interview are found below:

(b)(6) – POC for statement with 1/82 IBCT

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 244th FWD surgical detachment. (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
LANCE CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Exhibit 122

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 13 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

1. On 13 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Camp Lejeune, NC, to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of the scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What's your Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)?

(2) Answer. 5803, a Military Police Officer.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What is your official billet?

(b)(6)

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. When did you get assigned to that billet?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. A year and a half ago, during the summer of 2020.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Leading up to the deployment Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), what where you doing in terms of training?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Were you conducting vulnerabilities assessments in these countries?

(2) Answer. I went to all three locations in (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a and the embassy. Assessments had already been conducted at the embassy and (b)(1)1.4a In (b)(1)1.4a we were going to be doing a vulnerability assessment, but we ended up not doing it because the training was canceled. I did do vulnerability assessments for (b)(1)1.4a

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. When did you first make it to HKIA?

(2) Answer. I was part of the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), originally in (b)(1)1.4a I requested to go to Afghanistan, so I talked to the MEU Operations Officer to put me on the team. 11 July was when we inserted, and I stayed through the duration. The original plan was to stay a few days, but we were able to get extended and the MEU (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) advocated for me staying there. I worked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who were the (b)(1)1.4c Marines operating out of HKIA.

h. Question and Answer 7.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

(1) Question. Talk me through what you are seeing as an (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from July 11th through the collapse of Kabul on 15 August.

(2) Answer. I took the first week or so during the PDSS to really establish the layout and security aspects of the perimeter at HKIA. I linked up with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) joined the team around the end of July, which formed our security team. This is also about the same time when the Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) Major flew in with eight other Marines to execute Evacuation Control Center (ECC) operations. The main goal was to figure out security. I worked for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in my security role and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) in my operations role, both of them were with Joint Task Force-Crisis Response (JTF-CR). Situation Reports would be sent to the MEU Commander. I worked hand in hand with the Turks. We went with their Commander to look at every single gate and tower. We developed a security plan between us. I looked at the gates and security posts for the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) for fighting positions and overall security posture. I sent my findings back to the MEU Commander. We did this all around HKIA, between 13 different compounds. We did the security assessments at Camp Sullivan as well. The other thing I was doing was working with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We would bring in all the Afghan leadership once a week on Saturdays, to go over the all-around security posture. We mainly talked about what we would do if HKIA was attacked. We focused on the attack aspect rather than a horde of people.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. What is your assessment of the overall survivability and viability as the one location that we would conduct the noncombatant evacuation (NEO) from?

(2) Answer. I provided all the assessments in detail and documented them on the high side. Specifically, we were talking about North HKIA where we identified four main security vulnerabilities. One was the North Gate and the others were the eastern perimeter towers, the southern area that was leading up onto the airfield, and the West Gate. We provided our recommendations to the commanders.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Did you conduct any assessments at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, however I can't give you the results because it was on a different domain. I sent the report to the MEU and JTF-CR, mostly every staff member should have had it.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Does anything stand out in your mind that could be problematic?

(2) Answer. Firstly, we had to get the General's permission to go outside HKIA to originally look at the enemy perspective. Everything we did on Abbey Gate was from

Approved for Release

inside the compound looking out or from about 200 meters outside looking back in. This was coordinated with the Turks who would provide security for us while we were conducting our analysis. From the original plan, to what actually happened, was completely the opposite of what we expected. Inside the internal gate was a shack that we needed to harden, but besides that I don't recall anything else.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. During the time you were on the deck between the PDSS and when the NEO was starting off, how much time did you have with the RSO?

(2) Answer. Not much, I had anticipated working with the Embassy quite a bit, but everything was focused on the set up and security analysis at HKIA.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. How was HKIA as the primary location to conduct NEO?

(2) Answer. From a security perspective, not very good. If we had more Marines it may have been feasible, but not with the Turks providing security. I was comfortable with the actual physical security. All the fence lines, tower structures, and the perimeter notification system was good enough to prevent people from entering the perimeter. I pointed out that the towers were outside the perimeter wall. If someone got into the tower they would be able to shoot or throw an IED on to the compound.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. Were you mostly concerned with protecting the force and less concerned with keeping people off the runway?

(2) Answer. We were planning on keeping people off the airfield as well. We specifically talked about the holes in the fence line that would keep people from entering the airfield. I didn't anticipate that all the Afghan security forces would leave their weapons and let people flow through.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Prior to the NEO starting, was anything done to mitigate the threats you identified or any other security short falls?

(2) Answer. No, everything we determined as a risk was pushed up. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

p. Question and Answer 15.

Approved for Release

(1) Question. If we declared a NEO sooner, could we have fixed the security short falls?

(2) Answer. Yes, most likely. This goes along with making sure the ECCs are set up correctly. This could have been done if we pre-coordinated with the Turks.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. As you do you assessments to determine the viability of whether or not HKIA is valid from a security perspective, how do you envision the NEO occurring?

(2) Answer. We thought it would be an orderly process just like the way we were practicing it in (b)(1)1.4a It just didn't play out that way. The in-depth planning was conducted to set everything up with a secure perimeter, but on the 15th it just didn't go that way.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Did you ever readdress the major vulnerabilities?

(2) Answer. Yes, we briefed the JTF-CR staff about the vulnerabilities when they got on ground. We did that for about the first week. Once things started it didn't really matter because the situation had changed.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. What did you assess as the risk to mission and risk to force?

(2) Answer. Risk to force would probably be the quick advance of the Taliban and their ability to attack HKIA prior to the NEO kicking off and before the Marines would get on ground. This was also dependent on the Turks' ability to provide security. This would affect our overall ability to properly secure the airfield.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. What was your biggest concern to risk to mission and force?

(2) Answer. An insider attack and suicide vests were the main concern because of the ability for them to get close to the gates. There was a possibility a threat could be pulled in from the drainage ditch or through one of the other gates. A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) wasn't a main concern due to the amount of people, as the crowds provided some standoff from the gates.

u. Question and Answer 20.

Approved for Release

(1) Question. Are you talking to the other units about that concern and ways to prevent that threat from manifesting?

(2) Answer. When 2/1 arrived I talked to their security officer and the BLT Marines about what I saw on the ground. My role as the protection cell changed because I was at the gates all day. The three of us would go to every gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the intelligence analyst, I was filling my role as the (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the (b)(6) Marine whose main job was to help with the biometrics. We linked up with the female search teams (FST) in order to help them whenever possible. I also spent much of my time going to find people at the gates and bring them in.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question. Was it primarily North and East Gate?

(2) Answer. Abbey Gate, North, and East. We also helped at West gate as people started coming in. There were families at the airport that were Americans. Some of the family members were stuck outside the gate. Our job was to go get them. There were important people from the embassy that we were tasked to go get as well.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question. Did you have success finding those people?

(2) Answer. Yes, I was provided a phone number and name to contact them. I was familiar with the area since I had been on ground so long. I spent about 90 percent of my time identifying people at the gates and getting them out. The other 10 percent was spent briefing and working with engineers to fix security issues around HKIA. We worked to get riot control gear around the compound. While going out to the gates to find people, I was able to identify security concerns and make recommendations to the commanders on the ground and the engineers to mitigate those concerns.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question. Were there other engineers making improvements at the gates besides the BLT Engineer Platoon?

(2) Answer. No, it was mainly just the BLT.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question. What concerns did you have from the time when we get Marines out to Abbey Gate to the end of the 26th?

Approved for Release

(2) Answer. My original concern, before the Marines were at the gates and while I was picking up locals at the gates, was the massive amounts of people. The Turks had shut the inner gate due to the amount of people. We had to work with them to open the gate when we needed to get people through. When we get the gate open the people tried to break in. This made me realize the security concern with how many people were located at the gates.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question. Once Marines establish security at the gate, pushed the people all the way out passed the Barron Hotel, and emplaced chevron on the 20th, what was your main concern?

(2) Answer. We were working with intelligence to find the people who would jump over the wall in order to get on the compound. We were trying to apprehend them to get them off the airfield. As I would go from location to location, I would consistently find people jumping over the wall who needed to be escorted off the compound. I think there was about 60 in total. There was a tree located near Abbey Gate that people were climbing and jumping over the wall in order to get past the perimeter. It was later cut down.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question. What at Abbey Gate was a concern to you?

(2) Answer. It was just the massive amounts of people at the gates. All of the foreign countries were using that gate to get their people out as well. They would grab them from the ditch and process them through.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question. Did you talk to the (b)(6) (b)(6) about ways to mitigate risk?

(2) Answer. I don't remember talking with them about that specifically. You also had the British out there controlling the gate as well.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question. Were you out there on the 25th at all? What did it look like versus 26th?

(2) Answer. Yes, the night of the 25th we were pulling people in. The British had pushed everyone down to the bridge. They had the riot shields down there controlling the crowds. The next morning the crowd had made it back up to the gate.

Approved for Release

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question. What are your thoughts on the crowd being up near the gate during the 26th? Did it make more sense for the company to collapse security or keep them further out?

(2) Answer. Based on the amount of people, and from my perspective, it's my opinion that it would provide more standoff, for the people to be by the bridge, in the case of an attack.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question. If the Marines had kept security pushed out passed the bridge, how do you think it would have gone if there was an attack?

(2) Answer. Triage would have taken a lot longer, because casualties would have had to been carried a further distance. Depending on the situation there may have been more loss of life.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question. Do you think there could have been anything done that would help with the standoff?

(2) Answer. I think that the Marines on the ground made the decision to the best of their ability per the threat that was identified and the numbers of people on the ground. You may have been able to put obstacles on the ground, but was there enough time? Potentially. From what I saw on the morning of the 26th, you would have needed a lot more Marines to push the crowd back. This would expose more Marines to the threat just to get more standoff.

gg. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question. On the 26th where are you when the blast occurs?

(2) Answer. The morning of the 26th we woke up and went over to the PAX terminal, where there was one person that was identified as a blue passport holder who was meeting us at Abbey Gate. There were two individuals at the gate that I stood next to. We couldn't actually locate the person. I saw the Marines fight the crowds and watched the crowd trample each other. As for threat awareness, I was tracking a potential S-Vest during that day. I didn't know at which location. Inside the crowd was a one to two year old girl with her mother that was getting trampled and killed. The mother was asking us to get them out. At the same time a Marine blew up his hand with a flashbang and was getting evacuated. I gave the Marines my mace to help control the crowd. We eventually got the mother and her child out and took them to the PAX terminal to send them off.

Approved for Release

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question. Were they passport holders?

(2) Answer. I'm not sure, we would talk to the Department of State workers about certain people and explain the situation to try to get them out.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question. Did you go back out to the gate?

(2) Answer. Yes, I went upstairs to ask to take (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) with me. He wanted to get outside and help. JTF-CR tasked us to get a lady and her family out that we were trying to get for multiple days. I located her on the southern area of the airfield. I told her to meet us at the gas station outside the West Gate and wait for us. She had a purple umbrella, which we used to identify her. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took a white truck and we took a different vehicle. We drove out North Gate toward the West Gate. We were greeted by an American guy that told us about the S-vest threat. I told them we were still going to get these people out. I looked out from one of the towers for the signal. I went outside the HKIA gate with National Directorate of Security (NDS) personnel. They went across the street to get the family and pull them through the gate. I checked their documents and brought them into HKIA. We searched the personnel and brought them back to the two trucks. We put the females in the up-armored vehicle, and we put the males in the white truck. We took both vehicles back to Abbey Gate to look for another person we were trying to find.

At this point there were several people that jumped the wall. The British personnel got them and were holding these people. They had it under control. There seemed to be another hole in the wall that needed to be closed. We drove over to the JOC and told them about the situation because our radios weren't working. At this point we get to the inner gate where we saw people running. Our vehicle was in the way so we moved it. We ran with the 2/1 Marines out past the barriers through the outer gate to find my Marine. I was looking for (b)(6), but couldn't find her. I found out she was hit and made my way to the hole in the fence. I put a little girl on my shoulder and evacuated her to the casualty collection point (CCP). From there I ran into (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who were helping to triage people. We saw someone looking out of the tower, so we had Marines look that way. We loaded (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) a host nation female, and a little girl into the truck. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was in the back helping (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was driving, and in the back as well. We drove to the Role 2. We dropped them off and went back out to the gate. Once we got back out again there wasn't really anyone to get so we went back toward the inner gate. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) loaded up a few more Marines and civilians to transport them back to Role 2. We meet up with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to load up a mother, her child, and a male in our black vehicle and drove them to the Role 2. We then reported to the JOC.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6), 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question. What is your focus after the attack?

(2) Answer. I reported in what happened and what I saw. They brought in (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to give a statement about what happened. After that we stayed in the JOC for a while. They told us to stay off the gates. At this point we went into the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question. When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer. The 28th of August.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question. What else do you think we should know or should have asked about?

(2) Answer. I think you hit all the major points.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question. Was it formalized that you would work for JTF-CR or have two bosses?

(2) Answer. I was the only (b)(6) on the deck so it just happened over time.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question. What's your phone number?

(2) Answer. (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 13 October 2021

Approved for Release

Exhibit 123

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO

15 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

1. On 15 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at 3RD Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

| |
|---|
| (b)(6) |

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Can you provide a brief overview of the training completed in preparation for your Immediate Response Force (IRF) mission?

(2) Answer: Collectively, our main training was completed at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, LA in March of 2021. We followed a full training glide path up to this point. This was a brigade-level training event. When we came back in April, we conducted recovery and then began preparations for assuming IRF I. This included Deployment Readiness Exercises (DREs) and inspections to verify our readiness. We conducted two DREs to practice deploying out of Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina (JBC).



Approved for Release

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Did any of your training include securing an airfield?

(2) Answer: Yes, during a brigade exercise called Devil Storm, we seized and defended Sicily DZ at Fort Bragg, NC. We also secured an airfield while at JRTC. It's kind of our bread and butter to seize an airfield, but Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) was bigger than any airfield we had previously trained on.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: As part of your preparation, did you do any training to prepare for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer: Not really, but we made ourselves familiar with the NEO doctrine through Leader Professional Development (LPD) sessions at the brigade and battalion levels. We never trained specifically for a NEO. Our portion of the HKIA NEO was primarily security, rather than evacuation.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: When did you receive notice of your deployment to HKIA?

(2) Answer: Our brigade received the alert message on 12 August. We received a WARNO earlier that day to expect an alert. At first, it was unclear on which battalion would be going where. I was IRB III so I expected to be in (b)(1)1.4a instead of HKIA, but MG Donahue told me on 14 August around 2200 that my whole battalion would be going straight to HKIA.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: We departed JBC during a period of darkness between the 15th and 16th. Our pilots thought we were going to (b)(1)1.4a but I told them we needed to go to HKIA. We refueled in (b)(1)1.4a before arriving in Kabul during the period of darkness between the 16th and 17th.

We arrived to HKIA shortly after the chaos of the crowd running onto the airfield. The airfield was mostly secure when we arrived. We filled the security gap on the south side.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: What was your initial mission upon arrival to HKIA?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: Our initial mission was to tie in with 1-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division to help secure the south side of HKIA. We initially secured from the Abbey Gate to the domestic terminal. 1-504th was on the international terminal and to the west.

After the Marines left, we pulled security from the domestic terminal to the northeast corner of the airfield.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(b)(6)

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What was your Command Relationship (COMREL)?

(2) Answer: I reported directly to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Once MG Donahue arrived, he visited my sector and provided guidance often. Adjacent to me were the Marines and Brits. There were a lot of other nations and other services present throughout the NEO.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: Did your mission change or evolve from airfield security while you were at HKIA?

(2) Answer: Initially, we were tasked with making sure that no one came on to the airfield. The mission eventually evolved to providing security on the south side of HKIA. This became difficult because many convoys came through the south side to the domestic terminal. We would process the convoys and support their movement to planes. We did this for four or five days and then I handed this over to 1-504th when we replaced the Marines at Abbey Gate and East Gate on the 27th. The gates were closed at this time, so we were not processing anyone at the Abbey gate or East Gate. We secured the southeast portion of HKIA until the exfil on POD 30/31.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: What was the COMREL above you? Did you understand the adjusted Task Organization (TASKORG) pushed by Gen Mackenzie?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: When I first arrived, a day or so before MG Donahue arrived, I understood that RADM Vasely was the CENTCOM representative in AFG. I thought (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was working for BGen Sullivan, who was working for RADM Vasely. At first, it seemed like BGen Sullivan ran the NEO and MG Donahue ran security. But eventually, it just seemed like MG Donahue ran everything at HKIA.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: What were your immediate priorities when you arrived to HKIA? How did they change over time and what drove your decisions?

(2) Answer: At first, my urgent priority was to understand where our perimeter was and to make sure we held it to ensure airflow in an out of HKIA. I was also concerned with trying to finding a place for my battalion to conduct sustainment and command post operations. We were the third battalion from 1/82 to arrive and we didn't have any logical place to live. We ended up establishing a CP in a hangar on the south side of HKIA. We didn't have any running water or latrines, but we had shade and set up our command post and living area in the hangar. My first priority was security. My second priority was to take care of the troops and establish a battle rhythm. Eventually, I had to focus on the security of the convoys, because I had to do a lot of negotiating with the Taliban to get the convoys through. I placed a lot of trust in (b)(6) and staff to keep security operations running along the perimeter, while I focused on the convoy missions at South Gate.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Did this take a lot of your time?

(2) Answer: Yes, I didn't sleep much during this time at South Gate. There was a high demand for the convoys to be coming in. I was the middle-man for many other countries and the Taliban.

It was important to work with the Taliban to ensure convoys could pass through the South Gate (which the Taliban controlled). The Taliban wanted information about each convoy, which we originally were uncomfortable with. We agreed to provided the number of buses, the drivers' names, and the number of passengers on each bus, so that the Taliban could be sure they were letting the right convoys in. The Taliban eventually wanted a full manifest before letting the buses in, but we were hesitant to provide names of evacuees.

I finally got a break from this mission at the South Gate as the Brits and Marines prepared to leave around the 26th. 1-504 PIR replaced us at the South Gate, and I began planning with the Marines for our transition. The Brits were leaving first, and then the Marines, and then we would be responsible for securing the East and Abbey Gates. There was a lot of discussion on if we would still be processing evacuees or not after we



Approved for Release

took over. I conducted a leader's recon on the 26th to discuss all of his with the Marines.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: How often did you have the Department of State (DoS) working with you? Was it episodic or static? Did you understand which documents were required for processing?

(2) Answer: I never really understood what the standard was for evacuation and I was rarely the decision-maker on who would be allowed to come in to be evacuated. I knew that passport holders and green card holders should be able to come through. It seemed like there were not many American Citizens (AMCITs) waiting in line at the gates to come in. The Special Operations guys were plucking AMCITs out of the crowd and many AMCITs had contacts guiding them through easier ways to get in. I didn't have anyone from the DoS with me to help with any of this. A lot of Afghans that were trying to get in had random paperwork, but not passports or VISAs so we couldn't really help them. We weren't really running a processing center so we only helped obviously qualified evacuees.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: What were the Rules of Engagement (ROE) when you arrived? Did it evolve over time?

(2) Answer: We were still trying to figure specific ROE when we arrived. We didn't receive a lot of information about ROE before deploying. Clarification to the ROE was my largest information requirement when we landed. I told my battalion that they should defend themselves when faced with hostile acts or hostile intent. Our Brigade Judge Advocate gave us a very good briefing when we arrived at HKIA explaining ROE, escalation of force, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) I felt like it was pretty clear. The most confusing thing was how to interact with the Taliban.

We had one incident when a small group of either the Taliban or ISIS maneuvered toward one of our battle positions and pointed weapons at our guys. My guys fired at them. I immediately talked to my Taliban contacts and explained what happened. They didn't seem to know of care about it, so the group of armed males may not have been Taliban.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Was there any confirmation that you hit anyone during this?

(2) Answer: No.



Approved for Release

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Were you receiving threat streams during your time at HKIA?

(2) Answer: We received intelligence reports all day, every day. I mostly received them through our brigade command channels, but MG Donahue would also tell me directly what to be watching out for. He would call, text, or tell me in person. There were constantly threats and reports being passed. We received the threat reports a potential attack at Abbey Gate, but it didn't seem more urgent than the many other threat reports we received.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: You conducted your leader's recon and initially coordinated replacing the Marines at the gates. What did this look like?

(2) Answer: We knew all along that we would eventually take over security at the gates. We didn't know if we would be taking over the work of pulling people in the gate to process them, or if we would be solely pulling security. As the date for the handoff approached, we didn't think we would have anything to do with the evacuations. We were focused on security.

I focused Bravo Co on Abbey Gate and Charlie Co on East Gate. Starting on the 25th, these companies were in the vicinity of their gates to begin the transition. Each company was replacing a Marine battalion. I went down to the gates a handful of times on the 25th and 26th to check on my guys and the transition.

We had one joint meeting with Brits and Marines and Taliban. We were supposed to meet at 1500 on the 26th at the Barron Hotel. I was down at Abbey Gate the morning of the 26th, around 1000, and saw and talked with BGen Sullivan about the situation. I saw the huge crowds of desperate Afghans. It seemed like the Marines had created a more orderly process compared to when I had been down there before.

Around 1500 I walked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to the Barron Hotel, leaving (b)(6) and the (b)(6) at Abbey Gate. We met with the (b)(6) who was tied up in a VTC with his command. We waited for almost an hour and ended up starting the meeting around 1600. I think I missed some of the incoming intelligence reports about the Abbey Gate because of the meeting. I didn't feel any security concern on my walk through the Abbey gate, to and from the Barron Hotel. It didn't seem like there was going to be an imminent attack. The Marines were conducting business as usual. I think the meeting lasted form 1600-1700. I left the Barron Hotel with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the (b)(6) stayed at the Barron Hotel. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) stayed at Abbey Gate with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to continue their transition.



Approved for Release

The attack happened after I returned to my TOC. My battalion responded immediately by assisting with CASEVAC and crowd control.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Can you discuss the Taliban leaders and who was in charge at which gates?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) seemed to be MG Donahue's Taliban counterpart. It seemed like he was the overall Kabul Taliban Commander. (b)(6) was located mostly near the South Gate at the domestic terminal. This seemed to be their headquarters. This made it tough for me during convoy coordination because we had to stop convoys for KLEs between US and Taliban leaders.

I know (b)(6) and MG Donahue talked a lot. I also coordinated with (b)(6) a few times. When I moved over to Abbey Gate and East Gate, I was trying to figure out who the Taliban leaders were in these areas but it was initially unclear.

I eventually figured out that (b)(6) was the Taliban leader at Abbey Gate on the day that I went to do my leader's recon at the gates with the Marines. The Brits gave me a burner cell phone that they used to contact (b)(6). I talked to (b)(6) a lot when there were surges of people near the gates, after we took over, when we needed help to control the crowds.

The Taliban commander near the East gate was (b)(6) He was very helpful assisting us with ground control. He would send guys with swords and hoses to quickly disperse crowds. They were unbelievably helpful. I don't know how we would have been able to clear crowds from the gates without their assistance.

At first, we had the National Strike Unit (NSU) as a partner force, and they were helpful with crowd control. After they left, we relied on the Taliban for crowd control, because the Afghans did not respond to our escalation of force methods.

I never met face-to-face with (b)(6); we only spoke through phone conversations. I met face-to-face with (b)(6) often. I had very good rapport with (b)(6) I trusted based on our mutual interests. I never thought that they enabled the blast at Abbey Gate.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What was discussed in the meeting? Did you discuss the timeline for the Brits and Marines to retrograde?

(2) Answer: We discussed that the Brits would pull out from the Barron Hotel that night. After they exfil'ed, the Marines would close the gate. Over the course of the 27th,



Approved for Release

the Marines would begin their exfil, as we replaced them for security. We discussed all of this with the Taliban and worked out the logistics of communication with them. The only thing that seemed a little sticky was when our transition with the Marines would be. I think this was worked out between (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on the 26th before the attack. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) made it clear to me that we wouldn't take over the gates until the 28th. We ended up taking over the Abbey Gate sooner, due to the attack. We took over the Abbey Gate on the morning of the 27th.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Do you recall the Brits discussing any delays with their exfiltration timeline?

(2) Answer: No, I was pretty oblivious to anything they were doing. I didn't get the sense that anything was off.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: What happened after the attack?

(2) Answer: After the attack, I brought all of (b)(6) to the Abbey Gate. We showed up about five minutes after the blast. We had one Afghan Field Litter Ambulance (FLA) that we had found on HKIA, and also called our brigade to send any FLAs that were available. We provided Role I medical assistance, and moved casualties to Role II. Four FLAs came down and we evacuated all of the remaining US casualties. I think it's safe to say that we evacuated all of the US casualties.

I'm not sure who evacuated the majority of the Afghan casualties. We pulled some of them through to Role II after we evacuated the US casualties.

We didn't really have to assist the Marines too much with security after the attack. I had (b)(6) on standby to augment with them as needed.

Once we had all US casualties evacuated, a chinook landed with SOF medics. We had already evacuated all of the casualties, so they were not needed so I waved them off. I acted sort of like a "beach master" throughout the CASEVAC process, directing the ground traffic for first responders.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: What time did you take over Abbey Gate and East Gate?

(2) Answer: We took over Abbey Gate around 1200 on the 27th. We took over East Gate a little later because a different Marine unit was at this gate. The gate at



Approved for Release

Abbey Gate was sealed at this point. We could open the gate to talk to the Taliban, but it was closed to potential evacuees. Some Afghans civilians continued to mass at the gate in hopes of being evacuated.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: When did you start collapsing security at the gates and begin the force flow out of HKIA?

(2) Answer: (b)(6) held security at Abbey Gate until the last night (POD 30/31). I had been phasing my battalion out until the exfil. (b)(6) completed a three-phased withdrawal in less than two hours. They stayed up in towers around the gate until they had to move to the exfil plane.

The Taliban kept asking us for our exfil timeline but we didn't share any specific information with them. They knew we would be out by the 31st, but wanted to know exactly when so that they could rapidly move to control HKIA.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think we should know? Is there anyone that you think we should talk to?

(2) Answer: The main thing we failed at, is that I didn't feel like we ever a found good way to communicate with our adjacent units. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g We relied on face to face communication, and sent runners to their locations to pass information. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

I was also confused about when we would stop operating the gates and the timeline for our troops to pull back.

The Taliban were getting very frustrated that people were getting into HKIA that shouldn't have. (b)(6) wanted us to tell the Afghans exactly where they need to go and what to do. He said we needed to clearly message which gates were open and what the required documents were to get through. Many Afghans would go to Taliban checkpoints and tell them that Americans had told them to come to the gate. So the Taliban were frustrated because a lot of people that shouldn't be at the gates unnecessarily which became a security concern for the Taliban.

For every legitimate evacuee, there were thousands of illegitimate people trying to get into HKIA. We had such pressure to get as many people in as we possible. There was a lot of outside messaging to the Afghans that almost anyone would be able to be evacuated. This made perimeter security tough.



Approved for Release

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: Back to the blast at Abbey Gate. Where were you located at the time of the blast and did you hear it? Did you hear any gunfire in the area?

(2) Answer: I was in the vicinity of Abbey Gate. I was in my TOC in a hangar a couple hundred of meters away. I could hear it but it wasn't extremely loud at my location. It was around 1730 when the blast occurred. I put my gear on and drove to the site to coordinate our response which I assumed would entail security and CASEVAC.

I got to the site around five minutes after the blast. There was sporadic gunfire, but it seemed to be coming from Taliban positions which as not unusual. I heard a few explosions south of the gate shortly after the attack, but assumed they were Brits or Taliban to control the crowd. I don't believe there was a complex attack after the initial explosion.

I had (b)(6) attached to my unit. They were in the tower west of the Abbey Gate at this time and they could provide more information about possible small arms fire. No one has told me that there was any incoming small arms fire during or after the blast.

I had communication with the 82nd units at the time of the blast, but not with the Marines or Brits.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 124

ACTS-SCK-DO

15 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

1. On 15 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at 3RD Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered together. It is annotated accordingly when they answered questions individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What's your background and how long have you been in Bravo Co, 2-501st?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Did you conduct any training before assuming the Immediate Response Force (IRF) mission that helped prepare your unit for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)?

(2) Answer: We didn't conduct any specific NEO training but we did train on securing airfields.

d. Question and Answer 3.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abrahamson, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

(1) Question: When did you find out you would be going to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: We were alerted on 13 August.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When did you depart for HKIA?

(2) Answer: We departed Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina (JBC) on the night of 16 August.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: What was your task and purpose when you arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer: Our mission was to provide airfield security.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Were you aware of the crowds that were storming the airfield before you departed?

(2) Answer: Yes, we saw the CNN coverage while we were at JBC.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you arrive to HKIA?

(2) Answer: Our initial out load was sent six hours ahead of the main body, at 2200 on 16 August. Despite leaving earlier, they arrived after the main body. The two groups arrived within three hours of each other around 0200 on 19 August with 120 personnel.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: What was the organization of your company?

(2) Answer: We were organized organically with 20 additional fire support specialists.

j. Question and Answer 9.



USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)
1380
02/02/22

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abrahamson, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

(1) Question: What was the atmosphere like when you arrived at HKIA?

(2) Answer: It seemed rather tame when we arrived. We had to first establish an inner cordon around the airstrip. We were trying to secure some dig assets to set up an operations network on our line. We set up from the southern portion of East Gate. We had local communication with the Marines at East Gate, but everything else was just internal communication within our battalion. Our battalion was located by the domestic terminal in an abandoned hangar.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: Did you feel comfortable with the mission at this point?

(2) Answer: Yes, everything was pretty tame. We occupied this area for five to seven days and only 25-30 people managed to breach our security. We would detain, hold, and clear these people and (b)(6) escorted them out.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Was anyone else out by East Gate?

(2) Answer: There was a Marine unit and our inner cordon.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Did you receive any notification from personnel monitoring cameras in the JOC about people getting over the walls?

(2) Answer: No.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Did your entire battalion deploy? Where were they located?

(2) Answer: Yes, all organic elements did. (b)(6) was northwest of Abbey Gate and were staged as a QRF element. (b)(6) were near the terminals.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: How did you understand the COMREL?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: R: I worked for the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) who worked for (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: What can you tell me about TF Wild Boar and TF Polar Bear?

(2) Answer: Absolutely nothing. I've never heard of them.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Did you do any work with the 10th MTN?

(2) Answer: A: I did a lot. They had MRAPs and helped flex assets when people would get over the wall.

R: I understand that 10th MTN were mounted and acted as the base QRF.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Did you guys acquire any vehicles?

(2) Answer: Yes, a bus and some National Directorate of Security (NDS) trucks.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: How did your priorities change from the 19th to the 26th?

(2) Answer: Our techniques to maintain security changed over time, but our mission didn't change.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Over the initial five or six days, did you have any interaction with the Taliban or the Department of State?

(2) Answer: R: During the period of darkness from the 20th to 21st, there was a pretty significant security concern near the domestic terminal. We were asked to provide any additional manpower to help secure area defense. We interacted with the Taliban there, at South Gate. There was a group of civilians that were causing issues. We were told to close South Gate. The Taliban were guarding it and told us that we couldn't close the gate. The Taliban had broken the gate. We had to establish a secure perimeter here to keep 500-600 civilians from storming in. There were about 30-50 Taliban in the area.



Approved for Release

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: Did you have to use crowd-control measures here?

(2) Answer: Yes, we created wire obstacles around 2000 the night of the 20th. We were helping at this location until around 0200 on the 21st before the screening process could begin again.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: How many of the 500-600 people were processed?

(2) Answer: Maybe 120-200 people were able to get in to the terminal for processing.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: What happened with the rest of the people?

(2) Answer: MG Donahue was in the area during this time and conducted a KLE with the Taliban commander near the gate. After the KLE, we were able to start processing people.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: Were you ever briefed on the ROE? Non-lethal measures?

(2) Answer: We were aware of the theater ROE. We knew we had the right to self-defense when shown hostile acts or intent.

(b)(1)1.4a

R: I received this brief from the BJA the day I arrived around 0500-0600.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Leading up to the 26th, were you tracking the departure timeline? Were you a part of the planning?

(2) Answer: We weren't a part of the planning but were tracking the exfil date was the 31st.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abrahamson, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Did you visit the gates before the 26th?

(2) Answer: R: I went to South Gate the night of the 20th. I went to Abbey Gate periodically because we had an adjacent unit there and were told we would be taking over that area. I went there to conduct reconnaissance. I went to East Gate to try to establish radio communication with the Marines there.

A: I was with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) most of the time and went with him. We did a lot of reconnaissance.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: How many times did you go to Abbey Gate before the 26th?

(2) Answer: R: The first time we went out there was the 23rd. Between the 23rd and 26th, we went to Abbey Gate all the time to survey the area in preparation for when we would take over security. I went all over the area.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: What did the atmosphere at Abbey Gate seem like on the 23rd?

(2) Answer: It was very chaotic. The entire area was full. The area between the inner and outer gates was full. The canal was full. From the chevron to Barron Gate, it was either completely full or empty. Always one or the other.

There were Taliban on top of the chevron and they also had a small tower nearby.

I went to the Barron Hotel to meet with the Brits and saw the resting area that the Taliban used.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Did you interact with any Marines at the gates?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often about our change out.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I talked with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and also a gunny out there.

ee. Question and Answer 29.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: What did you talk to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) about? What was your impression?

(2) Answer: We talked to them about their operations and our changeover process. For the situation they had out there, they were doing well. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) did a great job.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: How was the population at Abbey Gate at this time?

(2) Answer: Military-aged males were very aggressive. Most other people in the crowd were rather tame.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: From the 19th to the 25th, what threat reporting did you receive?

(2) Answer: We had a daily BUB every day at 0600. The intelligence we received was not specific. It was generic and vague.

We received reporting that ISIS-K was moving in to the area. This caused more credible threats over time as they moved in.

There was threat reporting every day. Some seemed more credible than others but it was very normal.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Did the high number of threats cause any sort of change in operations?

(2) Answer: F: I don't think so. We reported all of the threats that we could.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: Was there any change in threat reporting as the 26th came?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) would say threats seemed more credible now because they were getting called over the net.

jj. Question and Answer 34.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abrahamson, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

(1) Question: Did you ever receive any threat reporting over the net that caused any changes in posture?

(2) Answer: Not really. There were multiple reports of an imminent threat but nothing occurred and the mission continued.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: Where were you during the blast on the 26th?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was in the hangar.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I was at the end of the fence near the latrine. I had been back and forth all day talking with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We were supposed to take over the gate security the night before but the timeline shifted. I got to the gate around 1720. I had linked up with the Brits to get a burner phone in order to maintain communication with the Taliban when we took over. I was walking back to my truck to drive back to the BUB at 1800.

The blast went off as I was walking back. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was with me. I saw the explosion and knew it wasn't a flash-bang. I told everyone to get down. I could feel the blast. I called it over the net to say there was an explosion, most likely a suicide vest (SVEST). I said there was a minimum of 30 KIA.

There was a lot of smoke in the area. I was counting my guys and started bounding back toward Barron Gate. I saw that the Brits had opened their small personnel gate and I pushed my guys through there.

The Brits were pulling security in the area. I made sure I had accountability of my guys. I kept pushing the information that I knew over the radio. I recommended that our QRF not go to the gate because the Afghans in the area did not disperse.

I talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and he told us his plan to retrograde. It was a quick conversation and I understood what they were trying to do. I heard a call for medics and my guys and I went over to assist. There were some Brits that went with us. We moved toward Outer Gate. There were still hundreds of people in the area. We went to go get the truck that we had to use as a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) vehicle. Once we had used our full capability, I told the QRF to stand down. There wasn't enough space. I ran back to help marshal the vehicle traffic in the area. I was doing this for five to ten minutes. I had one of my platoon sergeants take over and went to meet with the [redacted] to give him a SITREP.

A: (b)(6) away from the gate. We were assisting with the CASEVAC.



Approved for Release

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Do you remember seeing any specific casualties?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I remember seeing a large, white male being treated in front of where my vehicle was parked. We were trying to assist with getting him in the vehicle.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Did you or your Soldiers treat anyone?

(2) Answer: We didn't treat anyone, just assisted with moving people. Everyone was already being treated or had already expired.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: What did you see at the casualty collection point (CCP) at inner gate when you arrived?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Everyone was being treated but it didn't seem like a typical CCP. I remember seeing a Marine with injuries to his face. I remember seeing a dead baby on the ground.

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Was there anyone in charge of the CCP?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I couldn't tell you who was in charge, but there were a lot of people coordinating the CCP. It was controlled chaos. We were trying to get everyone out of the area as fast as possible.

pp. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: Were a lot of vehicles being used?

(2) Answer: We had a line of 20-30 vehicles ready to CASEVAC.

qq. Question and Answer 41.

(1) Question: Have either of you been a part of CASEVAC before?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Yes.



Approved for Release

A: I have, but had air and surgical assets available.

rr. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: Is there anything that could've gone better for the CCP?

(2) Answer: The STP was pretty far away. The corpsmen at the gate did a really good job.

ss. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: Do you or any of your Soldiers hear small arms fire at the time of the blast? Where?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At the close side of the canal, I saw British firing about 45 degrees up in the air, spraying the area to the northeast. They were about 10 meters away from me. I called up for Charlie Co when I saw this to tell them to take some cover, as the Brits were firing in their general direction. I didn't see any Taliban in the area.

tt. Question and Answer 44.

(1) Question: Did the Soldiers in the tower observe anything?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They could hear fire, I don't know if they saw it, but they did not return fire.

uu. Question and Answer 45.

(1) Question: How many Brits did you see fire?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) At least two.

vv. Question and Answer 46.

(1) Question: Was your whole company at the inner gate?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) No, They were either out on their positions or at the hangar.

ww. Question and Answer 47.

(1) Question: What happened after the casualties had been evacuated?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We left our guys pulling security out on their positions and the rest of the company went to the hangar.

xx. Question and Answer 48.

(1) Question: When did (b)(6) take over the security of Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Around 0200-0300 on the 27th, I took my leaders out to Abbey Gate to conduct a final recon. I met up with some Platoon Commander from (b)(6) near the inner gate and went over the timeline with them quickly. It was a different unit on the gate than (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The Brits had not completed their retrograde yet. I brought (b)(6) (b)(6) out around 0530 and took over the security of Abbey Gate.

By this point, the Brits still had people retrograding between the inner and outer gate and the corridor near East Gate. We had security elements placed from the outer gate to the inner gate and the outer gate was closed. By 0700, the Brits were north of the inner gate.

yy. Question and Answer 49.

(1) Question: How long were you pulling security at the gate?

(2) Answer: We pulled security up until our flight to leave HKIA.

zz. Question and Answer 50.

(1) Question: When did you leave HKIA?

(2) Answer: We left at 2358 on 30 August.

aaa. Question and Answer 51.

(1) Question: Do you know why the Brits' timeline kept changing?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think there was just confusion. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From my initial coordination with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I made my timeline based off of his. I briefed this plan to BN and was told to wait to action. A while later, both (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and I were told that we had to shift our timeline to the right.

bbb. Question and Answer 52.

(1) Question: Did your entire battalion leave at the same time?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: No, about half of the battalion, to include Alpha Co, Delta Co, and HHC left the day before us on the 29th. At this point, we had two companies pulling security of a large area.

ccc. Question and Answer 53.

(1) Question: Were the crowds dispersed now?

(2) Answer: No. There were 50-100 people during the day waiting near the gates. At night, 300-400 people would come. We had an interpreter come out to tell them that we weren't processing people anymore and that they needed to go to a different gate.

ddd. Question and Answer 54.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

eee. Question and Answer 55.

(b)(1)1.4a

fff. Question and Answer 56.

(1) Question: From your position, did this seem like a coordinated attack?

(2) Answer: No.

ggg. Question and Answer 57.

(1) Question: Did you see any impacts from small arms fire or hear rounds snapping overhead during/immediately after the attack?

(2) Answer: No.

hhh. Question and Answer 58.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Abrahamson, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think we need to know?

(2) Answer: No

iii. Question and Answer 59.

(1) Question: We had a report that the sniper tower manned by the 82nd received a few rounds during the time of the blast. Did they report any of this to you?

(2) Answer: No. They never said anything.

jjj. Question and Answer 60.

(1) Question: Did you notice a difference in the crowd from the 23rd to the 26th?

(2) Answer: The crowd in the canal was extremely packed by the 26th.

kkk. Question and Answer 61.

(1) Question: Can you please provide your contact information?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 125

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

15 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

1. On 15 October 2021, BG Lance Curtis, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis (C1), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which MG Donahue (D2), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered either collaboratively or individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with BG Curtis and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question, C1: Is this COMREL accurate?

(2) Answer, D2: RADM Vasely chose to retain Joint Task Force – Crisis Reponse (JTF-CR) specifically. He wanted BGen Sullivan to keep working for him, we all coordinatedth well. As the mission changed, it was the right call. We all worked very collaboratively and it worked out.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That's all codified in the U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) order, both the 82nd and JTF-CR would be tactical control (TACON) to USFOR-A.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question, C1: Please describe the readiness, preparation, and medical operations prior to the deployment.

(2) Answer, D2: To speak to the medical aspect, Sergeant Major would have to be present. He was unbelievable and highly involved with the process.



Approved for Release

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question, C1: Was it a complex attack?

(2) Answer, D2: Ask James Martin, the Brit who was in command. He watched it happen. That's why I know it's not a complex attack. The bomb went off, and so everyone shoots in the air. The reason that we started to think it was a complex attack was because fish weights were used in the suicide vest which look more like a bullet wound on impact. We ran the hospital, so immediately after the blast, Gen McKenzie called me to get updates, since he was on the line with the President. I told him in our first report that there was a suicide vest and maybe some gun fire. Gen McKenzie was a phenomenal leader with clear guidance. I fully understood his intent.

To follow up from that initial report, the next day I sent him an email. I told him that we were 99% sure, based off videos from ISIS-K and speaking with our medical providers, that it was not a complex attack. The medical providers initially told us it was a lot of lower extremity gun shots, but we came back and we corrected that. James Martin confirmed, BG James Martin the 16th Assault Commander at Abbey Gate, he told us that there was 1 bomber and no shooters. He was standing by the chevron, and he witnessed the attack from his perspective.

I saw the video that ISIS-K released. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be able to get that for you. From the angle of that video you can see that the ISIS-K member is in a building near the explosion. Anyways, James Martin reports that he saw the explosion from his location. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was over by the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) vehicle. He described it to me the same way.

I will be transparent, and have said this to everyone, I am shocked we only got hit with one suicide vest. The Marines did a movement to contact at North, East, and Abbey Gates. That is phenomenal, and the Marines did phenomenally. I am shocked that we had so few people hurt, we need to realize that people get hurt.

You know why we didn't get hit with more suicide vests? The Taliban did a great job screening people. The Taliban screened people and pushed them back twice that day. We watched it on our raid cameras. They were clearing stuff all the time. They were trying everything in their power to get us out. They wanted us to leave on the 31st of August.

e. Question and Answer 4.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

(1) Question, C1: How and when did you find out you were going to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)? When you were on the ground on the 18th, what did you do?

(2) Answer, D2: I found out on the day that LTG Kurilla told us, the 16th of August. I showed up with a small team the (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) The flow in was haphazard, as you know. I immediately came in and I met with RADM Vasely. He and I are friends. I told him he was in charge and that I was in direct support of him. He just needed to let me know what he needed me to do. He told me we were good, so I went out to assess the perimeter. We went to North Gate, then East Gate, then we drove the entire perimeter.

In fact, here is my map. This map had no markings and is unclassified so that I could use it with the Taliban. We used this map to drive around and also to speak with the Taliban. The perimeter stopped right here, and jutted down by the (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c There are Taliban over here driving Toyota ZPUs back and forth. Our guys, 1st Brigade, are right here. (b)(6) is down by the (b)(1)1.4 initially. I bumped in to him while I was with one of my rifle companies. Some of the guys had been there maybe 24 hours by then.

I asked (b)(6) what was going on, because it all was very unacceptable to me. I went cruising around the perimeter and I was jacking people up as we go around. We continued down to the terminal because there was a command post there. Inside the terminal there were about 9 Taliban pulling guard. I was pretty agitated by this point, so I told my guys to give me some rifle squads. I told my guys to take the two ZPUs that were pointed towards Abbey and East Gates. I ordered my guys to get them out. I came back into the terminal, and the Taliban were sweeping the floor. There were two Taliban snipers on the roof of the international terminal, and the Taliban were also watching us on closed circuit television (CCTV). I had my guys push them out. When we got back I saw RADM Vasely, and I told him that we didn't have a perimeter and we needed to meet with the Taliban.

Later that night, around 0200, we met with the Taliban. We told them which areas we would be in charge of and which areas they would need to control. We told them that we would control the gates and they would push people out. We expressed that they will comply, because if they fight us on this we would we be able to kill more of them than they could ever hope to kill of us.

After that their tone changed, and they generally did what we needed them to do. After that they moved out, and RADM Vasely had me establish the perimeter. I told him, and RADM Vasely and BGen Sullivan agreed, that North and East Gates weren't sustainable. I told them that we will open other gates, South and West Gates. We also



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

worked with (b)(1)1.4c up by at the Northwestern Gate, also referred to as the National Strike Unit (NSU) Gate. Then I saw that we needed to get organized. I told RADM Vasely that (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) because he is phenomenal. He crushed it out there by the way.

After that I outlined what we would do. Our priorities were to defend the area, keep the runway open since I was concerned about indirect fires, plan the exfiltration of the force, and conduct the initial Joint Tactical Exfiltration (JTE). Then we added in all the gates, and after that we added in go on the offensive. We had all of this going on while still executing day in and day out operations. We didn't have enough people to do the processing that Sullivan's guys were doing. I don't think we ever could have got to that point. RADM Vasely understood that.

It took 26 hours to get the rest of the division TAC in there. So that night I focused on meeting with everybody. We put markers down. The plan was for all international forces to be out on the 28th. By the way, all of this is still being done on the 18th, within the first 6 hours of being on ground. JTF-CR was consumed with running those three gates, and the international parties were only adding to that burden. That is why we took over the perimeter and the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (A/DACG) stuff. We would move equipment out. (b)(6) are pushing equipment, while BGen Sullivan and his guys are processing people.

So we met with everybody that night and told them that we are focusing on the withdrawal and then the JTE. The withdrawal is to get everyone out, then the JTE is to get the last people and equipment out. Those are two distinct plans. The battle rhythm that emerged from that was doing a standup in the morning with everyone that was there. After that, my guys would go into working groups and I would go into battlefield circulation for the afternoon. Then we had evening meetings. RADM Vasely and I had a meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Then I would do circulation at night and sleep when I could. The first 3 days we did not really sleep. As soon as I went out and came back, I told our surgeon that he needed to prepare for a mass casualty event. We were responsible for the hospital since we had the highest ranking surgeon on the ground. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was very good and he was formerly 160th, a Special Operations Forces (SOF) guy.

After that, we started doing mass casualty stuff. We got all of the vehicles out of the road which was essential since the roads were clogged. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) started preparing for the mass casualty. Our headquarter reinforced the NATO Role II and 1st Brigade set up a second one. I also want to point out how great the international surgeons did, specifically the Norwegians who extended to the 30th for us. We did rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills, table top exercises, etc while we did other stuff.



Approved for Release

About 40-50 people jumped the fence every night. We also had to have quick reaction forces (QRFs) out every night to push to breaks in the fence. (b)(6) had to manage that, and as we got more forces, we arrayed those better to properly defend the airfield. We were figuring this out in the first 8 hours while we were there, so we were doing this as well as the mass casualty planning.

(b)(6) hop in if you want. Things were happening so fast, the insanity was off the chart.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) In addition to our international partners, we would coordinate with them to open gates to allow foreign Afghans in. This would cause a flood to that newly opened gate from one that was already open. That would cause a crowd and burn that gate's usability for a while.

(4) Answer, D2: To jump ahead, I knew Ambassador Bass really well. I told RADM Vasely that we needed to coordinate with State. We met with Ambassador Bass and Ambassador Wilson, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(6) and BGen Sullivan. We made (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) the coordinating cell lead. We gave the Taliban lists of groups from the Department of State like Afghan Women or New York Times Afghan reporters. (b)(6) would coordinate to get them in. At the West Gate you have (b)(6) and eventually (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) took over East Gate to South Gate as we started to thin the ranks.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question, C1: Was it difficult to do perimeter security and gate operations at the same time?

(2) Answer, D2: Absolutely, it became a maneuver defense. Everyday North Gate would have to close. East Gate was too high risk, and we all knew it, so BGen Sullivan shut it down. It was overwhelming over there. BGen Sullivan and everyone else was stuck at Abbey Gate. The chevron was in place there, the Taliban were screening constantly, and it was also the "International Gate". We were getting people through that gate.

The Marines were bringing people through Abbey Gate, as was the United Kingdom. The International SOF was also pulling in people through the canal. The Marines pulled security for all of those forces as well. The U.S. provided the platform to get everyone out, and the Brits helped defend the perimeter as well. We had large numbers of Afghans that, once through, would just sit inside the gate and RADM Vasely had to work on overseeing their processing. It wasn't until we started to thin the ranks, on the 25th, that we went to the gate since we were going to take over the next day.







Approved for Release

James Martin commanded 2 Para Battalions over there. He told me that they were going to try to keep pulling people out, and he wanted to know if I thought that we could keep the gate open. I told him that we would conduct a site survey since we were going to take over that gate. And we were interested to know if we could keep Abbey open, since North Gate was obviously dangerous at that time.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We estimated 13,000 People at North Gate in our first 48 hours there.

(4) Answer, D2: We wanted to close it. I told (b)(6) that we will get our people out, and they needed to cooperate with us. (b)(6) was a team player. Once we got some more gates open, West and South and NSU, we could close those other gates.

So we did that for North and East Gates, but Abbey was our main producer. On top of that, we were still getting pressure to pull people out. I told James that we had 2 rifle companies replacing 2 Marine Battalions, 2 Para Battalions, and the SOF community. I told James that we were going to plan on closing the gate, because we weren't going to be able to keep it open with our manning.

Those Para Battalions were at least battalion minuses. They needed our forces there to help them. The Paras were not two full battalions, but at a minimum they were two battalion minuses. Do I know that for certain? No, but James Martin would.

The (b)(1)1.4c State, and other International Nations were all provided for, including air lift, by the United States. BGen Sullivan could talk better on that, but that's why I called it the international gate.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question, C1: When were you going to close to the gate on the 26th?

(2) Answer, D2: Initially at 0900, on the 27th of August. That time moved left after the explosion.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question, C1: So as the timeline for the JTE closed, Abbey Gate was the only gate open?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer, D2: That's not true. West gate was open. One time the Taliban were complaining about the two guys who got shot. RADM Vasely told them that we lost 13 people. It was interesting, one of the Taliban guys responded to that by saying "12 of my Taliban fighters were killed in that blast as well." I don't know if that's true, but that's what he said. I don't believe what they say, but that's what they told us. All that we actually know is that there were hundreds of Afghans killed and wounded. Some came into our aid stations, our corpsmen and U.S./Coalition medics worked on Afghans. That was something our providers had a hard time dealing with. They treated high numbers of women and children that were hurt, and then they had to turn them over to the local hospitals.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question, C1: When was that meeting with the Taliban?

(2) Answer, D2: About 3-4 days after the blast.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question, C1: Did you hear the blast? I believe the most accurate time I have heard is 1734.

(2) Answer: I did not, I was not there for that. But that sounds right because that is when I am normally in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) preparing for our evening meetings. That's why I didn't hear the blast, but it sounds right. The person that I think would know best is BGen Sullivan.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Sir, the USAFOR-A J2 chatlog I have shows 1738. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the Marine Expeditionary Unit, put that out in the chatlog. However, that is probably a few minutes after the blast.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question, C1: What do you do after you hear about the blast?

(2) Answer, D2: We got the report, and we sent a runner to the hospital to tell them to prepare for a possible mass casualty event. BGen Sullivan called me, and he told me that an attack may be occurring at Abbey Gate. We were getting threat reporting throughout the day. We were mentally preparing for an event like that.

l. Question and Answer 11.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

(1) Question, C1: I'm tracking 50-60 threat streams, suicide vests, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and countdowns to the blast from the Brits that happened around 1400 and caused the Marines to lower profile until about 1430 before they realized it was a false alarm.

(2) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That was from a twitter handle at 1433, according to the chatlogs that I have.

(3) Answer, D2: I was not aware of that. But to put this in perspective, I got into the JOC about 5 minutes before the blast happened. At the time we were very worried about the gates. The road up here to the north, if a large truck VBIED happened a breach would occur.

(4) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But not just at the perimeter sir. This was right near the headquarters. This would have taken out JTF-CR headquarters at the least.

(5) Answer, D2: If an 18 wheeler went off over here, I don't think it would take out our headquarters but it would have knocked out our comms and destroyed other headquarters. Once the blast occurred the Taliban shut off that road and stopped anything from moving.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question, C1: How far is this road from your headquarters?

(2) Answer, D2: It's got to be about 200 meters. By the way, we moved cranes and t-walls all around so that we were ready to fill in any gaps caused by VBIEDs. We were very prepared mentally for a VBIED. We went around looking for people who could drive a crane so that we would be prepared to move t-walls and trying to find out how long it would take. The Brigade Engineer Battalion Command Sergeant Major was working with us. We dug a 13 foot deep trench, and we lined up filled connexes along the fences. We stacked cars up. We were conducting a defense in depth.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) From the South to the airhead line (AHL) was where civilians massed on the airhead before/while Immediate Response Force (IRF) 1 arrived. 1BCT placed obstacles on that route to disrupt civilians ability to mass on the AHL again. Due to the sheer volume of civilians, we wouldn't be able to block or fix them but we could disrupt and slow their movement should they breach the perimeter again.

(4) Answer, D2: Then we put (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g ) in to disrupt them as they got closer.



Approved for Release

(5) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) That was good the LRADS were strong enough to make the Afghans sick if they got too close.

(6) Answer, D2: Secretary of Defense Austin was asking about our obstacles and disrupting. Also, don't forget about our demilitarization (demil) plan. That took up a lot of time. We were told to demil any helicopters out there, but also anything that State left. It was thousands of rounds, and thousands of M4s laying around. Whenever guys came in through NSU gate, they would drop all their stuff. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(7) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Meanwhile, you have (b)(1)1.4a

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question, C1: I need more information on threat streams you have directed towards Abbey Gate. I was told that you only really have general threat information at this point, but to the point, I have been told there were 1-4 individuals that didtheir media interview, and there may have been a briefcase with arrows on it. Was there anything specific on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) I think on the 26th we knew it would be North or Abbey Gate. We were not surprised. I do not think it was a generic threat, we knew that it would be a suicide vest and it would be at North or Abbey Gate.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Have you received any information on a man with a ball cap near the bomber?

(2) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question, C1: Any images on the actual bomber?







Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

(2) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We received about 3 images of possible suspects, but nothing that I think would indicate the bomber specifically at Abbey Gate.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question, C1: I hadn't heard about the lead fish weights in the suicide vest before this.

(2) Answer, D2: I got that from the surgeons. That is confirmed. Before I spoke to Gen McKenzie, I spoke to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and James Martin. When I spoke to Doc, he was emotional because he just performed surgery to save an Afghan child and initially reported that it was a gunshot wound to the head. I asked him about that being a gunshot wound, because all of the threat reporting focused on a suicide attack. There were several casualties who had lower extremity wounds and our medical teams initially thought those were gunshot wounds too.

Later on the medical team came back to me, and they told me it wasn't gunshot wounds, they were fish weights and they showed them to me.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question, C1: There is still a bit of a gray area for us. There is a t-wall by the canal, and maybe the Marines are standing on it, but normally there are the low walls in front of them. You can see the pattern of the blast on the wall below them, so we wondered why they have lower body wounds. Do you have any other insights on that? It is a leading theory of the complex attack.

(2) Answer, D2: James Martin is the guy who will tell you about that, and you need to speak with the doctors. My guy, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) you need to speak with him. He is an emergency room doctor and (b)(6) He was running the main Role II, not the other aid station that received only 9 guys.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question, C1: After RADM Vasely left were you the main conduit for discussions with Taliban?

(2) Answer, D2: Yes, but our general breakdown was that if it was tactical, I would deal with the Taliban. If it was above that, RADM Vasely would deal with it. If we met with them together, same thing. I would also try to set conditions for getting American citizens and others out after we left. I made it clear that we would leave the terminal



Approved for Release

ready to go, with the (b)(1)1.4a to run it, so that we would leave them an international terminal to get citizens out of the country after we departed.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question, C1: What role did state play?

(2) Answer: Ambassador Bass and his two deputies' task organized the screening. One Deputy worked with us, and one worked with the Marines. We talked to foreign nations at my level, but big go/ no-go decisions were for RADM Vasely. He was the up and out guy. Once he made a decision it would fall down to me or BGen Sullivan. If it was withdrawal it was me, if it was at the gate it was BGen Sullivan.

We started planning the JTE right away. We took 82nd, Joint Special Operations Command capabilities, and flew in the Air Force mission commander and their planner. We did a ROC drill with them. The JTE went very well. All of that planning went very well. We have a book with all of that planning in it that we gave to Army Central Command (ARCENT), my (b)(6) can provide it.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question, C1: Were you in anyway associated with decisions to move from using the North and East Gates, to focusing on Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer, D2: BGen Sullivan made those decisions. We talked about all of these decisions together, RADM Vasely and I weighed in, but BGen Sullivan was making all of the right calls. At one point, on the 25th, Gen McKenzie told me to make an assessment of the gates. Gen McKenzie asked me if the North, East, NSU, or Abbey Gate was the highest risk. I explained that was Abbey Gate and why. The reasoning made sense. When we showed up North and East were the only gates open, but the British pressured the Abbey Gate to open. And it was a great decision to open, it got thousands of people through.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question, C1: What was the force flow out of HKIA?

(2) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It was very easy. We thinned US and international capability. We gave everyone slot times to fill to get them out for the exfiltration.

(3) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) It wasn't clean. There were so many impacts on the planning to get people and equipment out. It was an hourly, daily change. At one point we had to



Approved for Release

transition to a more aggressive number of people, but we still had tons of equipment to retrograde. We had pause where we didn't bring any equipment or people out because we were planning on bringing people in to hold the air field.

(4) Answer, D2: We took over the A/DACG and set the priorities through (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) prioritizing evacuees as necessary. To James' point, (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question, C1: Who was in charge when RADM Vasely leaves?

(2) Answer, D2: I was. There is a formal FRAGO saying that I was in charge when RADM Vasely left and that I was to report to Gen McKenzie directly. I want to say again, that he always had crystal clear guidance for RADM Vasely, BGen Sullivan, and myself. He would always end a conversation by asking if we had any questions, and emphasizing that he was available 24/7 to answer questions. My respect and admiration for him are immense, and they only grew during the operation. He did awesome.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question, C1: When are you out of HKIA? How did that go, what did you tell the Taliban? We heard that there may have been some deception involved with what you told the Taliban the plan was.

(2) Answer, D2: Early morning on the 31st. I told the SECDEF and everyone else that this was our plan during the back brief. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g We had 8 or 9 chalks planned, 5 programmed to land, 2 flying spares, 1 that had surgical capabilities, and 1 that had a heavy maintenance team. That all went in to timing. It's an evolution, it's like a sync matrix or a machine once it starts. We needed to leave enough time to land and fix an aircraft if necessary. We had to plan on how to take off with a damaged plane. All while people were tracking us. That photo of me was the 5th aircraft. We got a report saying that I lied, I wasn't the last one out because additional aircraft took off after mine did. We had to beat that back to make it clear that those were spares falling in to formation.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

At our last meeting on the 30th, we told the Taliban that we were leaving on the 31st. At 2000 we told them we would give them all the details the next morning. They were asking if we would take photos of the handover, etc. I almost felt bad, but the other side of me knew they were Taliban. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) You mentioned the pressure from the British. What was the driving factor to keep Abbey Gate open, was it that pressure?

(2) Answer: We had pressure from everyone, not just the British. The U.S., other countries, and foreign interest groups were all exerting pressure. I had a company commander getting called directly by his congressman for not letting groups through. The pressure was real.

When I did the Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), I came back and told people that when I took over that gate I was going to close it. I think the pressure to keep it open, kept it open. That and the pressure to get people through. The threat was up, down, and sideways, so I think there was just immense pressure to keep that gate open. If you look at the steps that BGen Sullivan took to balance that risk, they were more than prudent to mitigate the threats the received with the resources they had. RADM Vasely and BGen Sullivan are both great leaders. Gen McKenzie is a great leader. When you get placed into a position where you don't control all the conditions, and you can't change those conditions sometimes there is a hard outcome.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question, C1: Anything else to bring up?

(2) Answer: Ghost Company is the reason that Abbey Gate was as successful as it was. Of the three companies that were there, that company is the reason for their success.

When we put out the demil plan everyone was responsible for an area, there was a MEU element and one of the rifle battalion elements that were wantonly destroying things. We had to stop that twice, state department reported it as well. Ghost company had the most reason to be pissed off, but they executed their demil plan exactly as it was briefed. Their sector was excellent. I cannot say enough about that company. You could tell just walking around, the difference there was between the companies.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

Have you interviewed RADM Vasely's Command Sergeant Major? You need to interview him if you want to hear more about Ghost Company. When I got back from looking at the gates, his Command Sergeant Major asked me which company was the best, and I told him Ghost Company was the standard. He absolutely he agreed, he was out correcting other companies.

You need to remember which area Ghost Company occupied. Until the day prior at that gate, international guys controlled that gate. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

My point is, down at Abbey Gate, Ghost had to deal with that. The international SOF forces were out of control. Ask (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) how they acted.

(3) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They were out of control. They had no regard for anyone else. They did not coordinate. They would hang off the side of the vehicles as they were driving around, they were reckless.

(4) Answer, D2: I told RADM Vasely that I was frustrated, these guys lost their mind and didn't know how to act. They were always asking if they had to leave on the 28th as well.

(5) Answer, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d

(3) Answer, D2: Many countries tried to do that, but the Brits were able to talk it back to the 29th.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question, C1: Was State difficult to work with as well?

(2) Answer, D2: The State Department element forward had to reach back to Main to synchronize messaging efforts. My Paratroopers had to deal with the confusion that their messaging caused. They would send the wrong messaging, the wrong threat streams. Then you would have to go and renegotiate with the Taliban for an hour to smooth over whatever state put out. At one point they accused us of brain draining them, we were taking all of their educated women, etc. We had to negotiate through that, and another time we had to negotiate them letting the National Strike Unit (NSU) through. We were able to get all of the NSU out, because we told them if the Taliban



Approved for Release

didn't let them through we would just tell them the NSU to go fight out of Panjshir. After that the Taliban would cooperate there. This stuff about the Taliban not letting people through isn't true, they'd let people through it just took some time.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question, C1: What were the rules of engagement (ROE)?

(2) Answer, D2: We had tons of discussions, a whole conversation on ROE just for the exfil and JTE. I remember discussing that with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) But we didn't need an ROE. This is the purpose of the 82nd, to go into a situation like this. If we had asked for an ROE, it would not have been dynamic enough to keep up with this event. We told our guys that if someone jumped the fence, assume that they have a suicide vest. And still none of my guys shot. They knew their ethical left and right limits.

(3) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Absolutely. It was incredible restraint by the Paratroopers and Marines.

(3) Answer, D2: There were occasions where paratroopers shot warning shots, the situations could have escalated from there, but they didn't. It is on Commanders to plan and use the information available to make the decisions on the ground. If we had sought guidance we would have got late and wrong answers about what to do on the ground. We had a whole meeting with the Commanders about ROE, once in the ROC drill and once about just using the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d We talked about when to use lethal force. From an exfiltration perspective, when the MPs got in we went over what was expected to for them. I would talk to the Paratroopers during battle field circulation and ask them about ROE, and I would spot check them and their Commanders. It was something we were able to develop on the ground. (b)(6) was with me for all of this.

cc. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question, C1: (b)(6) was with you for all of this?

(2) Answer, D2: (b)(6) He would pull all kinds of people through on his own. He would go on his own and save people left and right. He did remarkably. He had previously been held captive be the Taliban in Kabul for two months. (b)(6) (b)(6) He hates the Taliban.

He was angry that the Afghan Security Forces didn't fight the way they said they would. He was mad they didn't go to Panjshir. He had a lot of raw emotion.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with MG Donahue, USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 82nd Airborne Division, 15 October 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) assistant investigating officer, at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, USA
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Exhibit 126

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 18 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 3/10th Mountain Division, HKIA, 18 October 2021

1. On 18 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel via Secret Video Teleconference (SVTC) from Ft. Bragg, NC 3ESC Headquarters to (b)(1)1.4a to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (US Army) recorded the interview for transcription below.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(b)(3) 130b; (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What was your mission in CENTCOM?

(2) Answer. We deployed forward and established the security assistance force (SAF) for USFOR-A for continuity. That consisted of a rifle company and part of a Forward Support Company (FSC) and we reinforced US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) with part of the staff. (b)(6) This was the

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 3/10th Mountain Division, HKIA, 18 October 2021

Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar (CRAM) team. SAF was filled out with a bunch of enablers and an Infantry Battalion (-) in (b)(1)1.4a We were planning for security of the Embassy and as required at HKIA. We also had a second Battalion at JTF-CR to reinforce the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) if required when the Turkish forces pulled out.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. So Polar Bear and Wild Boar are already in Afghanistan as of July or August timeframe?

(2) Answer. It wasn't until mid-June that things started getting clarified, but it still was not captured in orders. We were fleshing out that structure into pushing into USFOR-A Forward. The lead element left Fort Polk around 4 July to push into (b)(1)1.4a We did the over the horizon (OTH) CT platform in order to get an intelligence read. We had the brigade role 1 and some of our security force. The rest of the element was set to come forward a little bit later in order to spread transitions and build continuity into the force flow. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had been there for 6 months. They are out of 4-31 in Drum so not organic to 3rd brigade. 4-31 and 2-30 Relief in place and transfer of authority (RIPTOA) was meant to happen 2 August. Since we had both units on the ground I went to RADM Vasely and requested to freeze the RIP. I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to stay in place and I pulled some staff forward. But as of mid-August the boots on ground (BOG) ceiling was still the same and in order to stay under it we kept having to adjust our planning.

It was apparent that we would need more combat power. When I came in, it became really obvious early on that the bulk of my effort needed to be in the (b)(6) role. When I looked at the employment of forces, at authorities, and for the aviation specifically, it was all at RADM Vasely level. Our priority was with planning for the employment of forces and preparation. I came in with the aviation unit and dug into the maintenance. I came away from (b)(1)1.4a with an understanding that 31 August was a real date and BOG was a real thing. The policy was that we would be out by 31 August and that would not move. For context I had been in the (b)(1)1.4a in 2019/20, so I understood the NEO and evacuation framework in mind. I understood the evacuation was coming based on my experience. That drove me to really focus on the aviation maintenance problem in order to think ahead of the problem. Those aircraft had been ridden really hard and they were going to be challenged if needed. If we were going to have to swap out aircraft we needed to get ahead of the problem in order to make sure we could keep pace.

For the infantry company on the ground, I had personal relationships with them going into it. Having been a quick reaction force (QRF) company commander before, I understood their planning and capabilities and likewise quickly dug into the equipment to identify if we were showing green on slides or showing reality? (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) quickly responded to that energy and started getting after it. Both the aviation unit and Polar Bear were able to rehearse and set priorities of planning early and that set them up for success. For my (b)(6) with energy from BG Day (Brit), we had this realization that

Approved for Release

we had a lot more to retrograde than we originally planned. I had (b)(6) (b)(6) with me so I set them on that problem. They dug into the retrograde and made it their responsibility to plan and dispose of properly. They continued to work the retrograde as much as possible and we got a ton of equipment and material out all the way into late July. I also helped build their staff. The staff was comprised of Resolute Support (RS) holdovers and we had a lot of pieces to bring together. Dropping that down from a 4 star headquarters into a 2 Star headquarters was always going to be a challenge.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Safe to say your staff was rounding that out?

(2) Answer. Yes

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. What was TF Polar Bear?

(2) Answer. It was approximately 130 people. The way (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had aligned it, it went to 4 platoons. They weren't doctrinal Modified Table of Organizational Equipment (MTOE). He had a platoon leader with a reinforced squad as the Platoon Security Detachment (PSD) and then had some Battalion staff officers to make a very small Battalion tactical TAC. The next problem I gave (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was to really get a handle on the security at Hamad Karzai International Airport (HKIA). It didn't take a lot of walking around to realize that they had a different attitude on that than we did. We had a lot of struggle to keep them in the game and trying to be a force for good in improving the Force Pro standards at HKIA.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. You got into HKIA when?

(2) Answer. I arrived 18 July and immediately went to the US Embassy Complex (USEC).

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. What role did your subordinates play in the embassy evacuation?

(2) Answer. It would have been 14th through the 16th. Period of Darkness 15th-16th. We made the decision on the 12th to swap units. We were in the middle of RIPTOA and made the decision to go organic with Polar Bear. That gave us unity of command and put a Battalion commander at each location. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had TF Polar Bear because he had more time on the ground at HKIA and understood that problem better. The USEC, I thought the Infantry Battalion commander would be the



Approved for Release

right fit there so that's where (b)(3)130b, went. I really felt that with me there the existing Department of State could handle the requirement. The rifle company with a sniper section and a Battalion commander was TF Wild Boar under (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. When did you get your mission change?

(2) Answer. During the RIPTOA, we saw the way this was going. Pretty obvious that we would have things change. We knew we needed at least 2 companies available. We needed two distinct teams and set the personnel up at the different locations. RADM Vasely had given a discussion to the ambassadors on the night of the 13th. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) had changed out 4 days prior. The previous RSO got it and understood, but he was frustrated with the rest of the embassy team for keeping their heads in the sand. It became problematic to a degree that RADM Vasely is meeting with the ambassador and his messaging was something to the effect of "this is going to be bad and it'll be bad faster than you think". There was a general disbelief and lack of agreeance on behalf of the embassy team towards that point. We kept putting together talking points and eventually the Ambassador agrees that we need to evacuate, but the timeline kept becoming the issue. As late as 13 August the embassy staff was still planning to be evacuated around 31 August. I sat in the EAC and had to be very clear about the fact that we were looking at hours, not weeks. I think what eventually got traction was the decent possibility that there would be a gunfight at the embassy. Part of what resonated with the ambassador was the larger picture of what that fight would look like and how the Taliban would get the choice of how that went down. I literally had to talk to him about planning for firing (b)(6) into the streets of Kabul.

So early morning on the 14th we quickly moved 1400 people off the embassy compound and frankly not much leadership came from within the DoS personnel at all, especially the senior ones. A lot of very junior RSO's would push, but they couldn't provide a head count or names for us to work movement tables. From RADM Vasely, it was the plan to be off the embassy footprint by the morning of the 15th. We didn't want to fly in daylight, but it became obvious that we would have to. It took direct push and leadership on our part to almost force our will on them to move. We went in and had that conversation with the ambassador mid-morning on the 15th. That led him to do the flag ceremony later that afternoon and planned for the collapse back into the embassy as well as the HLZ location. The plan all along was that the last element out would be a security element. There were (b)(1)1.4a and that was the last element out. We ended up going room to room and pulling out individuals to make the deadlines. DoS people were intoxicated and cowering in rooms. People were still operating like it was day to day operations with absolutely no sense of urgency or recognition of the situation. The junior leadership were dialed in, but the more senior leadership did not understand the gravity of the situation or didn't think it was real.

Approved for Release

Likewise the equipment destruction plans were not realistic. We just had to explain to them the challenges associated with the timeline and all the stuff that still needed to happen. The RSO was planning for some compactor operation for vehicles. We had to be frank about the fact that the green zone was gone. But they just had trouble conceptualizing the idea of what the attack from a regular force would look like. We (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g. We ended up having direct fire engagements with the Taliban during this time where they were shooting sporadically at anything they thought they could hit. As the evening went on it started sinking in that the gravity of the situation was very different than their previous expectations. We didn't know how much control the Taliban had over their fighters and we saw their capability. We had reservations about their ability to hold their individuals back from full on coming at the embassy.

Towards the end we were running out of time and aircraft availability and we're tossing bags off the ramps and manifesting people. Equipment kept coming out of the woodworks. They brought out hundreds of weapons. There were diplomatic pouches with sensitive equipment and communications. The embassy team was not postured for an evacuation whatsoever, not planned, not resourced, not rehearsed - it was beyond them. The maintenance for the chinooks actually kept us up and running. We collapsed the perimeter and got the Gurkha guards down and started the transition as soon as possible in order to get set up for the actual final pull. We didn't want to leave it late with contracted security. The ERT element gave us some more guns, but then it was the late evacuation and planning for destruction of equipment that really pushed us to problems.

First thing that went sideways was the chinook generator fire and emergency landing at HKIA. We had conditions checks, and we blew through some of that right away. The penetration of the perimeter at HKIA put that all that other stuff on pause. That was the zombie apocalypse and that event changed timelines. We had to push security back out and reset the security to protect the LZ. That's where we had some direct fire engagements. We didn't know if we would be able to continue to evacuate by air, or would we would we have to go by ground? We ended up getting (b)(1)1.4c up and the aircraft/HLZ wasn't over run. Lead elements of 82nd were on ground. Polar Bear is working to control the south side perimeter. At that point they were answering to (b)(1)1.4a Every aircraft was maxed out at that point. 55-60 people in every CH47. I was one of the last guys off other than the operator team leader. We cleared the compound as much as possible. We had guys going as slim as possible in order to be able to bring off JTAC-TS equipment. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Sometime between 0230 and 0330 we reorganized and got back on the line.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Were you dealing with airfield perimeter security at all?

(2) Answer. We saw and understood the implications of having people on the airstrip. The evacuation was literally impossible with the airfield controlled.



Approved for Release

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What was your initial role upon arrival and reconstitution at HKIA?

(2) Answer. So, in daylight I went out and had to get a handle on our forces on the ground including (b)(1)1.4a who isn't even organic to me. I was bouncing between checking on them and trying to help get USFOR-A sorted and perform the command post transition. Then it was complicated by 82nd getting on the ground and getting their HQ integrated. That first morning was really just going out to see what it looked like. We did a link up with the guys from 82nd just to get a sense of things. We drove out to Alvarado where they were set up. (b)(6) Getting HKIA secure was obviously our 1st priority. At this point you have Marine elements and Army elements on the ground but nobody is complete. The posture and command and C2 and visualization was still in the grey a little. We were grappling to gain and maintain understanding of what we were dealing with. After talking with RADM Vasely, he didn't understand the JTF-CR plan was to secure HKIA. I spent some time with the (b)(6) and two of the problems I saw were the Graphic control measures and the array of forces.

The graphic used to develop that was off. The terminal road was kind of split and that's where the line was drawn to divide the runway. I felt like that was a seam instead of a unified front. I knew how (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) conceptualized it. We knew the airfield seizure concept. I thought that was a challenge out of the gate and the other issue was the JTF-CR staff, and their lack of scenario planning leading up to this point. They had a completely different lead up planning cycle. It was huge, it was incomplete force structure for almost every unit. It was taking a little bit for them to get that. The first part of this for me was to make sure that HKIA remained open and operating. If HKIA became untenable it was a problem. We ended up having that conversation with JTF-CR, and (b)(1)1.4a and MG Donahue identified that the NSU was the 'clear' force and that 82nd would 'hold'.

The South side of the apron was a whole different problem. There was so much gunfire. Taliban and NSU shooting over peoples' heads. Pretty much continuous machine gun fire across the South side of the airfield. It was the most chaotic situation I've seen in my time in the Army. We almost planned for having an accident on the runway. The control of the airfield and the visualization of where everyone was on the airfield at all times was almost impossible at that point seemingly. At one point we established a meeting with pretty much everyone other that BGen Sulivan and RADM Vasely and laid down the real plan to establish the security perimeter. It was that night where the realignment happened. From that moment on 82nd owned the perimeter. The 82nd focused down. North HKIA west all the way around was tactical control of the gates was JTFCR. Polar Bear was the mounted reserve. Their Soldiers, leaders, and everyone had done the rehearsals, and we knew that mission. Polar Bear and 3-21 had their footprint in the JTF-CR footprint. At that point, once things were in that place, I really leaned into the (b)(6) I was able to do another command post

Approved for Release

transition to where 82nd had the JOC floor in order to give them down and in and us being up and out. The other thing that needed to be done was the interagency and international burden had to be taken off the senior leadership. We stood up the multinational coordination cell by direction of RADM Vasely. We ended up moving down into JTF-CR footprint and there was a cell we could occupy. The upstairs was us, downstairs was the internationals. Ambassador Bass came in about that time and he was the NEO. He needed from me the planning abilities from the mil side. He needed us to sync with coalition partners. He needed us to sync the team and triage requests and inputs. We helped him to plan and visualize the embassy staff evacuation while helping to maintain relationships. We had to separate the spaces in a way that we could maintain the NOFORN space but not off-put the partners, so we used the upstairs for that. RADM Vasely was communications up and out and we had to maintain synchro with JTF-CR. Some folks augmented the 82nd, and some folks stayed on with me but the effort was divided pretty hard.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. What did the Turks have a role in, and how did that transition over time?

(2) Answer. The COMREL with the Turks was interesting. When the JTF-CR thing ends it was interesting. They didn't work for RADM Vasely. They were business as usual, and their operations were very normalized at low operating concept. They identified early on that they would not fight the Taliban, and that while they would 'secure HKIA' but they specifically would not fight the Taliban. The identification of North HKIA as their area of control. I saw the problem set as a two Battalion problem set at minimum to secure HKIA. In fairness to (b)(6) he probably didn't know what their countries policy was. Their Force Pro officer went on leave like 10 days before everything kicked off. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) were working hard to establish the perimeter and the control measures and gate and radio traffic. We got that and some measure of command and control (C2) established, and then there was supposed to be some element of LNO with the Turkish. Wild Boar had really provided them the support, but then when 3/10 got the notification of the requirement right before the embassy evacuation to feed that problem. (b)(6) (b)(6) and he would be able to go in there and get it done. The second part was frankly to understand what the hell they were doing. The third part was the contracts. The machine ran on contracts. We had to keep that on life support as much as possible. The Turks and NATO were the ones keeping a lot of the lights on and the chow moving. It got a lot of attention from JTF-CR and USFOR-A. Keeping that going was key to the operation and that stayed on even after we knew they (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d They went in their shell, and it was interesting because they ended up going to ground until the last few days. They started wanting things in those last few days.

m. Question and Answer 12.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) 3/10th Mountain Division, HKIA, 18 October 2021

(1) Question. Looking at the 17th, Gen McKenzie established the COMREL product. Talk about your understanding of that update?

(2) Answer. I was in the room with RADM Vasely with Sullivan and MG Donahue. Maybe even before Gen McKenzie said it. The most difficult dynamic would be USFOR-A forward and 82nd. There was tons of respect and ego would not be part of this. That was abundantly clear by personal example and clear within their staffs. They talked out what Gen McKenzie ended up framing as the COMREL. USFOR-A up and out. 82nd focus down and in. I really was impressed with the way they did it and their whole organizations bought into it. The 82nd came into it with that downward focus in order to bring order to chaos. Everything fell under JTF-CR, but in terms of authorities, I knew this was not at my level. Clear communication with BGen Sullivan and RADM Vasely and to me. I would oversee the evacuation. JTF-CR would operate at HKIA and we would go work for them upon arrival back at HKIA. It became obvious that we were really operating under 82nd. For physical terrain we were operating out of North HKIA and 82nd owned the airhead line and 1st BDE 82nd had South, North, and West.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. So how does that evolve?

(2) Answer. JTF worked for RADM Vasely as far as the NEO. As far as the security component, it wouldn't surprise me if it was complex and changed a lot, but it was 82nd. It really became clear with 82nd.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. So from your perspective (b)(6) (b)(6) can you talk a bit about your interactions with outside organizations?

(2) Answer. Two times daily we held an international reps meeting. I was usually the senior military guy there and usually Ambassador Bass would be there. This was the formal sync with the coalition partners non-military folks. This was continuous engagements with DoS, and each of the two main DoS guys got one of my Infantry Captains. I gave them the CPT in order to keep the products and information synced to be usable for us. The sync with MG Donahue and reps from RAMD Vasely and (b)(1)1.4a was multiple times per day. We were working continuous, around the clock and we maintained touch points. We were constantly triaging the needs of their partner nations and managing relationships with them and their needs and making it equitable. The focus was on not marginalizing the smaller nations and making sure the JTF-CR folks were really operating with options for everyone. The bulk of the international personnel coming in was from South perspective. The riskiest gate was at South gate. The most likely gate for VBIED was South. 82nd was having to manage that gate closely. We did a lot of direct engagement with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) We had to keep plugged in to that gate

Approved for Release

because it freed us up to do things in other places. We met the requirement there with our international partners.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question. You reference those pick ups at the gates. Can you discuss that a little?

(2) Answer. I was primarily coordinating bulk entry. This was primarily passport holders or folks who had passport and visa. This was not partner, worked with, or unclear folks. This was coordinated for large groups and clear documentation. We built movement tables and figured out the movement windows in order to allocate them for our partners. We knew what was coming and what the need was. This was key for the search teams. They had their own responsibility for their searches and this required coordination but it was their own responsibility to keep people from going rogue and stepping on each other and to keep 82nd out of the business of doing it for them. The manifest issues were worked through the International Coordination cell. The Taliban would validate the manifests at their gates. Much has been made about those lists, but I want to be clear that the busses weren't being screened out using people on the lists. It was people who weren't on lists and shouldn't have been on the busses who were screened out.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question. Marines were running North, East, and Abbey Gate. Did you visit those locations at all and can you discuss what you saw?

(2) Answer. I ended up going to all gates at some point and just based on what I was doing, I went to South gate most. You could tell North gate was a bad deal. We would watch them on the feeds as well. North gate was not awesome. One of the hard parts for the dismounted gates was really the Marines had to establish those gates in contact. They were mobbed from the moment they arrived. It was not feasible to gain standoff. Noticeable difference between North Gate, East gate, and Abbey gate. I talked to a lot of folks about it but I really felt like North gate got dialed up a little too much. NSU added a dynamic to it. They were shooting over people's heads. I think it was NSU on NSU and then Marines ended up getting tied into it. It was chaotic enough. It was not an 'if', but a when. Frankly the NSU was very aggressive towards Afghans. It was untenable. East Gate was a bit different. I went there with RADM Vasely to get an American family at East gate. It was chill. It wasn't chaotic and Marines were looking after the area. It was chill. This was around the 19th. Big group of female searchers there. Felt very in control. A lot of depth to that gate area. We met up with the NSU commander on the ground and more of the same machine gun fire. The gas station across the street felt like a drug deal gone bad. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a There was some kind of altercation and the little bubble we were in was chill, but we saw them kill some dude like 100 meters away. We roll up and while that's happening, we are dealing with the Taliban



Approved for Release

and they took the photo and go and get the guy and we all walk back into the chill. I was trying to get my head wrapped around what all this looked like. It was very clear that the control and the division of the labor was happening. The Taliban and the NSU would be shooting over people, but when we walked up, the Taliban guns and the NSU guns would go down. The SPMAGTF folks was just a real challenge, not on their shoulders. I was so very impressed at how empathetic the 18-19 year old Marine was in dealing with these people. It was clear that they had really trained to deal with this problem. I did not see, particularly with the SPMAGTF, that it was a problem. I specifically talked to those guys about how their moms and dads would be proud of what they were doing. Obviously at Abbey gate was the issue of the multinational. It was the Barron hotel and the other nations using the canal to get people in. The initial idea of Camp Sullivan, and how the Brits ended up using the Barron hotel, it didn't obviously work out that was and the Abbey gate operations weren't ideal. South Gate was order and I really felt like North and Abbey were chaos. We really tried to preserve the order and usefulness of South gate so we measured entry there and tried to keep it to these bulk deliveries.

Another item I think is relevant was that I don't think we had enough non-lethal capability. I think the folks at the DoS went through theirs in the first night. For future NEO, we need lots of capability pushed forward. I made my folks bring masks.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question. Talk about threat streams.

(2) Answer. The high profile attack 1.2 km away from Ministry of Defense house a few days before the embassy evacuation. That was a 4-5 hour gunfight. We were absolutely aware of the present nature and concept threat. The support throughout July and Aug meant that we were supporting ANDSF meant we were supporting them instead of ourselves. The limited number of (b)(1)1.4c went to ANDSF. The efficacy waned obviously, and then it started to make us have to identify pressure points and prioritize the future look and how this would roll out. We knew ISIS-K was trying to play the spoiler in this thing. Everyone saw there would be rockets and we expected an SVEST or VBIED attempt. Because there was an expectation and it became clear that the Taliban were interested in seeing us out of there, we were not oblivious to the ISIS-K threat. The risk to people due to concentration and lack of stand-off. We closed every gate at some point. We were trying to get security and react appropriately to the threats as the streams came in. We were in a lot of ways sharing our information with the Taliban. Taliban were not interested in an ISIS-K effecting us. The ISIS-K folks were likely more effective than the Afghan National Defense Security Force (ANDSF). My recollection of it was that Abbey gate, the transition was from Marines to Brits and the gate was supposed to be closed. There was a known presence of passport holders and it was supposed to have transitioned or closed earlier that day but that timeline slipped. If it had been ordered closed, it would have closed. There was a lot of external pressure to get people out. I got phone calls from the white house. I got calls from congress. I got calls from 4 stars retired and current. Chiefs of staff of all those entities. There was a real pressure to want to get people out, but there was a real sense of mission and

Approved for Release

responsibility to get people out. We all felt a tremendous responsibility to get every single American citizen, every Afghan who had served with the US, and everyone we could who we'd worked with out. I believe that was felt all the way to the lowest level.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question. Force Flow out?

(2) Answer. 82nd has the JTE. We wanted to make it as easy for them as possible. We started pushing out non-mission essential on the 25th. We start pushing out and collapsing down. We flowed 4-31 out on 26th-27th. They were first in order of movement out from us. We were closing a lot of gates and starting the process of getting out. We flowed 2-30th out and collapsed down to skeleton crew of the multinational coordination cell. It was basically me, a skeleton of staff, and my surgeon and bare bones crew with them. I think it was the 30th, I went to MG Donahue and the last of South gate and some weird mass of NYT reporters came in. I completed my requirements and went to MG Donahue and manifested on the 30th between 1000-1100.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question. Did you visit the gate on the 26th? Present for the blast?

(2) Answer. I did visit the gate but I was not present. I was in a meeting and I didn't hear a blast or anything. I checked in with the JOC and we knew something was going on. Wild Boar was QRF. Initial report was 3 wounded US. I got started looking at it all and kind of saw things come back and realized it was massive. Wild Boar never got called. People were clearing the roads to make sure evacuation was clear. They had done a MASCAL rehearsal like 48 hours from when it actually happened. Our role II had relationships with a lot of the other medical folks who had already been out there. These guys were great. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) ran the triage. The amount of medical capability was insane. Unfortunate, but the reality was that it is likely that those who could've been saved were saved. I didn't spend enough time at Abbey to be able to speak to the tactical array of the gate. There was no way to run any of those gates in order to be done with zero risk. Given all the requirements of operating the gates, it was a requirement to take risks in order to make things happen. Bags were offloaded. We made it a principle to not allow bags just because that was one factor we could control.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question. Anything we haven't discussed?

(2) Answer. In the spirit of learning and taking away lessons. I think it was hard for the entire enterprise, and for people not on the ground, to be able to rectify the picture of what Afghanistan was in July and August of 2021. It felt like people just didn't understand that the de-evolution of the situation was known. It felt like the Taliban built

Approved for Release

in the airstrike losses into their calculus. They knew they could keep charging and be effective. The overconfidence in the ANDSF was due to the investment over 20 years, but I'm not sure we were as honest with ourselves as we needed to be. As a guy who would've been in charge of about 650 people at the embassy even if things went well. I think we really overestimated our requirement to support our operations with outside agencies. I really just felt the overestimation at my end. Not your problem, but DoS has to do a real wargame of the math and science of this stuff. The rigor wargame on DoD end is also incumbent upon us. We were able to do napkin math for so long, but the tyranny of distance with Afghanistan caught us short. I think the fixation on BOG absolutely hurt us. I didn't feel comfortable getting on a plane with a BOG between 650-1k. No organic fires. I didn't want to get caught out, and nobody did, so the bottom line to us was planning on getting put in a position of having to fight. Organic units are a thing and you cannot outsource your security to other people. The force flow and the triggers for force flow were probably a bit calculated off. You can go without food and a lot of other things, but the unity of effort has to push security as the primacy. Lot of O5/O6 on the ground commanding 1-2 companies. Things that were positive: we sent the most ready units in the Army to do this. We just came off CTC rotations. We had Soldier discipline and movement down. That was painful and was very much a preparation for what we saw and dealt with out there. I think that saved lives. I think as I look at the SPMAGTF, they had clearly trained and prepped for that mission very well. Finally, I was really proud of the young people and their empathy, discipline and courage. Last one I would add is that I watched a lot of people stepping up. The PR Recovery team. Across the entire team, people played ego-free ball. Especially the senior leaders, and it was reflected in their actions and attitudes. They set the tone and they operated in a way to make sure everyone was clear as possible given the shifting sands and moment to moment picture changes.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at email: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 75 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 127 (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 76 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 77 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 78 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 79 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 80 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 81 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 82 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 83 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 84 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 85 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 86 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 87 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 128

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

18 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USAF, (b)(6) USFOR-A, 18 October 2021

1. On 18 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel telephonically from the 3RD Expeditionary Sustainment Command Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which MAJ How answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Could you state your name and your billet?

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Were there any other USAF medical officers present?

(2) Answer: Yes, 2 other (b)(6) Actually, it was 3 others.

d. Question and Answer 3.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USAF, (b)(6)
USFOR-A, 18 October 2021

(1) Question: When did you deploy to Afghanistan?

(2) Answer: I got to Afghanistan on April 23rd, and I was working out of Bagram Air Base. When that closed, I went to HKIA on June 20th and I was there until August 30th.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: When the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) kicked off, and Kabul collapsed, what were the medical capabilities at the Role II?

(2) Answer: We had several surgical teams. We had (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, 2 Surgical Response/Resuscitative Teams (SRT), we had a British light surgical team, half an Army Forward Resuscitative Surgical Team (FRST), and a (b)(1)1.4a. All of those were located at the Role II. Later there was a 274th FRST. That was about half a mile or so away in Camp Alvarado. That was supposed to be considered a Role II, but they were missing some supplies so they were more a Role I and a half. They could do surgery but not as much as a Role II.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Could you describe your medical capabilities at the Role II?

(2) Answer: We had 2 physical operating rooms (OR), we would practice having 2 patients in one OR so we could flex up to 4 patients in the OR. We had 7 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds, but we could flex up to 10. We had 14 regular medical surgery beds, but that could flex to 30. That was our surgery/ medical capability at the time.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Did you have any specialized equipment?

(2) Answer: We had one computerized tomography (CT) scanner in a connex, we only had one portable x-ray because the other one was broken, and we had one C-Arm, a medical imaging device, that was for use during surgeries.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: Was there anything you felt you were lacking?

(2) Answer: In terms of some of our laboratory equipment, we were running out of the ability to run the basic metabolic panel. We were short some dressings for a while,



Approved for Release

but we were eventually resupplied. The Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team (AELT) had flights to and from (b)(1)1.4a almost daily, and they were able to get us more supplies. This was prior to the mass casualty (MASCAL) on the 26th. We were short basic bed coverings and linens as well, so we used a disposable sheet on some of our beds. We were not short anything that was medically critical.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Have you ever seen anything like that Role II in terms of capability?

(2) Answer: No, not even at Bagram did we have that many surgical teams.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: Did you have a relationship with other countries' medical facilities?

(2) Answer: For the Norwegians, we were fully integrated. We shared shifts, we were in the same location, and we shared educational materials. When the British came they initially set up a Role I right outside our facility. After August 15th we fully integrated them into our trauma system as well.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: Were you aware of any British medical capability out of the Barron Hotel?

(2) Answer: No, I was not aware of that.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Did the hospital do any coordination with either the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) shock trauma units?

(2) Answer: We received and discharged patients from and to them. They often brought us patients for higher care, so we interacted with them to that extent. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) worked that coordination directly, I was not a part of that. They would often bring us patients for higher level care prior to the 26th.

m. Question and Answer 12.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: Was there any rehearsal prior to the MASCAL that incorporated either the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) or the 274th Role I at Alvarado?

(2) Answer: No, there was not. We saw a lot of patients even prior to the MASCAL. We were busy, so we did not incorporate them into the planning. Any MASCAL exercise prior to the 15th would have needed approval from the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d and I think that we could not have even gotten approval for that if they tried, there was a lot of confusion.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: Was there a MASCAL plan that covered all of HKIA?

(2) Answer: Yes, there was a plan and it was worked on by myself and the Norwegian team that handled the entire base. We were planning casualty collection points (CCPs) and trying to streamline the plan while working with the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d. It was difficult to ensure that patients would receive the necessary pre-hospital care in the event of a MASCAL. There was already an initial plan in place, but we were trying to improve it and make it comprehensive as the situation on ground changed.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Is it fair to say that when the NEO kicked off, the full MASCAL plan had not been finalized?

(2) Answer: That is correct, we were going off the initial MASCAL plan. I am most certain that whatever MASCAL plan there was, it was not being implemented. The units at the gates likely did not know the full details of the MASCAL plan.

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Did you ever work with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from the STP by East Gate?

(2) Answer: No, sir.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Prior to the 26th, what type of patients were you seeing?

(2) Answer: Mainly refugees that were being evacuated. A lot of dehydration, hunger, heat stroke, and lack of nutrition. We also had some trauma patients. For our







Approved for Release

trauma patients we saw multiple penetrative injuries that ranged from children to elderly men and women. Some of these may have been from warning shots that went up and fell down from the air. There were also some flash bang injuries that occurred. I remember one Afghan with a serious chest wound from a flash bang. Around August 15th to the 16th there were some civilians that were being hostile, so warning shots would ricochet off the ground and hit them in their limbs. There were 1 or 2 active duty service members that had some penetrative injuries from stray bullets.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Any Afghans with flashbang injuries to the head?

(2) Answer: Yes, there was one with a head and eye injury from a flashbang. That individual lived and went to Landstuhl for medical treatment after we stabilized him. We would evaluate, stabilize, provide necessary surgeries, and then medevac patients to the next echelon as soon as possible in order to keep beds open.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Do you remember which gate that occurred at?

(2) Answer: Maybe North Gate. That is where most of our patients were from. The flashbang injury to the chest was definitely from North Gate.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: Prior to the 26th, was the Role II's capacity stressed at any point?

(2) Answer: It was not. The max number of people we had in the ICU at that point was just 4 patients. We never reached full capacity, and that is due to the excellent work by the AELT that was there. We were able to (b)(1)1.4a or to Germany. From a capacity standpoint we were not stressed, for a brief time we were pressed on supplies, but the AELT helped us with that as well.

Initially when we first had our patients, and when we had Afghans brought in the whole government was already collapsed. We used to be able to send treated Afghans to a local hospital, but once the government collapsed we had to either hold them or discharge them to continue evacuation with their family. That was not ideal, they may have had to hobble onto a crowded plane with a wounded leg. Eventually, the leadership was able to work out evacuating casualties to (b)(1)1.4a or Germany.



Approved for Release

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What were you doing when the blast occurred?

(2) Answer: I was in the emergency department. I did not hear the explosion, the door was closed. I immediately got a text from someone saying that there was an explosion and to prepare for a MASCAL. We got notified almost immediately, the explosion happened at 1740 and we were preparing by 1741 or 1742. I don't think we ever officially announced a MASCAL because we knew that a bunch of patients were coming, so we activated our MASCAL. All trauma teams had to report to their respective departments. Everyone reported to their respective bays/beds, and nurses reported to their areas. The way it worked in HKIA was to have different triage levels. T1 was the worst, they needed immediate surgical help. T2 was the delayed category, T3 was the walking wounded, T4 was expectant, and T5 was the dead. Healthcare personnel assigned patients a triage level, and they report to those areas. A triage officer at the door evaluates patients at the door to direct where the patient would be treated. The (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) documented patient injuries and their identity before they headed over to the trauma bays. We were basically living in the hospital at that time, so everyone was there within 3 or 5 minutes of the blast. We received our first patient 12 minutes after the attack.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: Do you remember the trauma officers that were assigning triage levels?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from 3-10 Mountain, and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USAF, a (b)(6) that went with the Bagram team to HKIA.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Talking to everyone at the gate, it sounds like patients were evacuated rapidly from the gate. We know of 2 that went to the Shock Trauma Platoon (STP) location before going straight to Role II, which saved their life before the longer drive. Do you know of anyone that died but would have survived if they went there first?

(2) Answer: No, most of the patients that died had wounds that were pretty catastrophic so they were either dead or expectant by the time they arrived. Patients got there within 10 or 15 minutes, which is pretty fast. Some had truncal hemorrhaging and I don't know if going to STP would have helped them. I think patients went to the appropriate locations for care.







Approved for Release

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: How many patients did you receive after the blast?

(2) Answer: Close to 30. For the Afghans it was also about 30 or 31.

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: For the 13 that ended up dying, from your assessment was there anything that could have been done, or equipment, or treatment that could have saved those service members?

(2) Answer: Sadly, no. Most had very catastrophic injuries. I wasn't helping with triage outside, but those were pretty catastrophic injuries. We only saw about 3 or 4 patients that may have made it but died from exsanguination. Perhaps receiving blood en route may have helped keep them alive, but that was almost impossible given the situation. To establish an IV, get the blood out and in a pressure bag, administer the blood, and carry them to us while treating other patients would have been almost impossible. For one patient that would take all of our attention, but to have multiple patients like that in a MASCAL was unachievable.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: For the 13 that were killed, do you remember trends in causes of death?

(2) Answer: I don't know all of them, most were expectant. The 3 that I was aware of mostly had catastrophic injuries to the head, next, or chest injuries and exsanguinated or could not clear their airways from there. One individual bled to death from pelvic trauma.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: From the 13 that were killed, 9 were T4 or T5 when they arrived? And the other 4 were T1, but passed from blood loss or airway?

(2) Answer: That is correct. Yes, and they passed rapidly. We had to crack their chest and provide a cardiac massage on 3 while administering blood. One made it to the ICU, but had a significant penetrating cardiac injury. He essentially had a massive whole in his heart, the injury to his heart was too significant without bypass capabilities and a cardiothoracic surgeon to repair the hole in his heart. That equipment is not



Approved for Release

normally available in a Role II or III. Even then, it was tough to say if he would have survived.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: You mentioned cracking chests, did you do that any patients that survived?

(2) Answer: Yes, that was a different team. My role was to oversee and assign patients to different trauma teams. I was able to move around to patients as they were receiving care. We overflowed in the T1 area since there were only 8 beds there, so we overflowed to the T2 area. This patient was there, lost pulse, the surgeon cracked his chest and did a cardiac massage and was able to bring the patient back. He had bleeding, a penetrative injury to his chest and also had some lung injuries that were able to be repaired. They took him to the operating room and stopped the bleeding and air leak in his lungs. That was a very good save.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: You mentioned a number of patients with penetrative injuries. Were any gunshot wounds (GSW)?

(2) Answer: It was hard to tell honestly. Most were shrapnel or ball bearings. I don't recall one that was a clear GSW. Most were penetrative injuries and may have been labeled a GSW, but they were shrapnel or ball bearings as I can recall. No bullets were extracted from patients. We didn't extract items, we saw them on imaging or CT scans or from Germany, it looked more like a piece of metal or shrapnel than bullets.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: So (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decided where they went in the hospital?

(2) Answer: Yes, T1 was the emergency with trauma beds. Walking wounded went to T3. This was all in the Role II to decide where they would go.

ff. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: How long did it take for all patients to arrive?

(2) Answer: It was until midnight due to the high number, the more minor injuries were coming in that long.



Approved for Release

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Of the patients who were T1, T2, T4, T5 how long did it take to get all of them in there?

(2) Answer: The initial wave was about 30 minutes to an hour. The other location at Camp Alvarado also received patients and operated on them there. Our second wave was to receive some of those patients from Alvarado, which is why patients came in until midnight.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: Why would patients go to Alvarado, was it because (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) directed them there?

(2) Answer: No sir, that was still unclear to me. That was not (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) decision or anyone's about why patients would go there instead of our Role II.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: I was in an interview where we heard some patients were told that Role II was full and to go to Alvarado instead, would that have happened?

(2) Answer: No sir, we did not do that. We did not have a set capacity, we were able to take as many patients as they were able to give us. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was the only one who would have had the authority to direct patients there, and he was also confused. He was pushing that all patients could and should come to our Role II.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Did you treat any other countries other than US or Afghans from the blast?

(2) Answer: No, just US and Afghan.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: In terms of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) that was conducted at the blast site, then at the STP and en route, can you speak to what you saw from that? How well or poorly were the patients cared for?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: From my perspective, and the enormity of the situation, the TCCC that occurred was appropriate and adequate. Most patients that needed a tourniquet had tourniquets. The most basic care was applied, I did not see anything that was insufficient. All limbs that needed tourniquets got tourniquets. It would have been nice to have them give blood, but I don't know if they had time or resources. Pre Role II care was pretty good. Normally we have one triage officer, but we flexed to 3 triage officers due to a little bottle neck at the entrance, so having medics outside the Role II that were still providing care, tourniquets, and dressing wounds saved a lot of lives as well.

ll. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: Did you hear about any patients that arrived and survived due to anything outside of the norm having been done prior to arrival?

(2) Answer: Not that I can recall.

mm. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Can you speak to the Norwegians' role?

(2) Answer: The hospital was really under the Norwegian hospital commander. They were very helpful from the 15th onwards, they were very helpful in being able to discharge patients. During the MASCAL they medically evacuated some of the Afghan casualties to Norway for care by making them Norwegian citizens. ICU nurses were about half US and half Norwegian and worked very well together. The x-ray tech was Norwegian and very helpful. It was basically one team, and they contributed to caring for those MASCAL patients as much as we did.

nn. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: You departed on the 30th, is that correct?

(2) Answer: It was on a Monday, it might have been the 29th (30 August was a Monday).

oo. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Is there anything else you want us to know?

(2) Answer: I don't believe so.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USAF, (b)(6)
USFOR-A, 18 October 2021

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 129

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 19 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) 19 October 2021

1. On 18 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at Fort Bragg, NC 3ESC Headquarters to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), US Army, recorded the interview for transcription below. For the purpose of note taking at speed during the interview, the following representations will be used to denote who is speaking:

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. What is your background and how long have you been with your current unit?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) can be broken down a couple different ways. Bottom line we didn't have a whole team on the ground. We were requested at the gate by JTF-CR. Traditionally we have a PSYOP CPT with a Detachment Sergeant MSG. We tend to fill that with an E7 currently. The ops Sergeant tends to be an E6. The Ops cell would be a combat illustrator, an intel cell. Under that are the teams. Typically this is 4. The Tactical



Approved for Release

PSYOP teams are a three man team. The Detachment would be about 12-16. The PSYOP team refers to the small 3 man teams. The detachment can be pulled and made right sized for the mission. There are also vetting processes to make sure that the team meets the needs of the mission. The traditional team structure is doctrinal but not normal. I've worked with SEALs, Rangers, and other Special Mission Units. We both have deployments with special mission units such as those listed.

(b)(6) - The request we received was from JTF-CR for a 4 man detachment. I think (b)(6) has a good breakdown of why.

(b)(6) - Based on the request we knew it was odd. We tried to understand why they would ask for 4 when considered against our traditional structure. I think they didn't know what they were asking for. Information Warfare Task Force Afghanistan (IWTFA) helped with the request and I think they knew who was already postured forward. By the time the request made it to Bragg, it was already stale. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(6) - And there was a lot of push back from our team. We identified that this should have been a detachment.

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6) - For us to have a good footprint for what you're asking us to do, we would need at least 8-9 individuals. There was a large gap in capability based on what was asked.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. So is it possible that there was a misunderstanding of capability or employment techniques?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - I genuinely believe that JTF-CR doesn't know or understand our composition and capability, so they requested what they through they wanted, and someone, somewhere, turned that into the request that actually came down.

(b)(6) - That is common actually and we see that a lot based on being PSYOP'ers. We had a Marine plus five of us. So we ended up having two teams of three.

(b)(6) - So even after all that, and after they put the 4 under a microscope, it was strange that we ended up with 6. It ended up being something positive, and it helped us do the actual work needed.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. How'd you come to HKIA in August 2021

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We had a problem set presented to us in June and we presented the concept to the team. The request and our response waited almost a



Approved for Release

month and a half. We ended up getting picked up on the 18th. I had discussed this with our Battalion Commander for the 4 days prior to getting pulled in. It happened about 5 days prior to us getting on the plane that we got confirmation. So August 10, 11, or 12 we knew what was happening. We ended up sleeping in the team room for almost 5 days. We were initially told to hitch a ride with 82nd. We ended up driving down to Charleston and got manifested and front loaded within an hour.

(b)(6)- We did show up as a priority push from (b)(1)1.4a so that was quick.

(b)(6)- We ended up getting to (b)(1)1.4a and that we were getting bumped off the aircraft. They ended up bumping us off the aircraft and we unloaded our stuff off the aircraft. That was right around the timeline of the airfield rush, so I do understand the potential change in priorities on the ground. We were kicked off the bird and told to take further instruction from our command. We ended up getting on a bird on the 18th of August during Period of Darkness. Morning of the 19th. We touched down that night late.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. You land PoD 19th. General Atmospherics

(2) Answer. (b)(6)- Not to make a joke, but lord of the flies. The JTF-CR was running well, but it felt like no one was in charge of HKIA when we got there. It felt like sourcing equipment or personnel was completely off the cuff.

(b)(6)- We link up with the Marines and basically started getting the rundown of what was happening on the ground. We knew right away that we were getting over extended right away. We sourced a vehicle and basically committed to starting rotations through friction points. So main points were North Gate, Abbey, and black gate. We were lucky enough to get a running vehicle and we broke up our team into two sections of three for 12 hour shift coverage. Call it luck, but we had the right amount of people and the right combination of people on the ground. It worked really well. Bottom line we had the right specialties. We broke down the priority of task organization.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. Talk Task org and where those tasks are coming from

(2) Answer. (b)(6)- JTF-CR asked us for Crowd control and mitigation. We ended up falling into more jobs while we were there. We fell into making sure speakers were running and responding to rioting. We jumped in with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and the Force Protection folks. We were going after Fence Jumpers. We would also work with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and his Recon Marines for targeted pull for individuals.

(b)(6)- We tried to identify the biggest friction points. He ran nights, I ran days. Our priorities were to identify the friction points in order to better understand the evolving threat issues. We were constantly working on loops of information and keeping our gear



Approved for Release

up. We worked very hard getting the information from the JTF-CR folks out to the crowds, be it AMCIT or AFGCIV with CIV. The 'comfort zone' was anything but that. It went from 100 people to as much as 4000 people. The area was an internal holding area which was just inside the Inner Abbey area.

(b)(6) - The first day we were on ground, while sourcing our vehicle, we saw the 'comfort zone'. We saw Afghans holding 2x4's trying to hit Marines. We intervened and helped talk them down.

(b)(6) - We worked diligently to be accessible and workable in order to keep touchpoints at each location. We staged other equipment at gates in order to access when we would come back around.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. Did you have any other directed messages?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - The DoS made a lot of last second changes. This changed over time and it made things way harder. The DoS would make changes and it effected the mood of the crowd.

(b)(6) - The people already knew the gates were going to close. When this messaging would keep changing the people would hear it and become conditioned to understand the environment would change. The one noticeable change we saw was on the day of the change. That day in particular was different because all the international partners pulled off the gate.

(b)(6) - If we were putting out our end date, the others were doing the same

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question. Equipment?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We brought three different loud speakers, the portable manpacs. We ended up getting a Marine larger loud speaker we mounted. That ended up being one of our best assets. That microphone is loud. Like real loud.

(b)(6) - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g The IWTFA helped us bring in capability. The messaging was sent to us and we were able to put out the required information.

(b)(6) - The messaging on some of the pamphlets was a little broken too. We had one piece that we decided not to disseminate which told family members to approach service members if they had concerns about missing family members. We already had problems with child theft and there was no shortage of people asking to be prioritized because of family members, so we decided it was better not to use that messaging.

Approved for Release

(b)(6) – (b)(1)1.4a We had a lot of equipment, but what works best for us was interface with the individual.

(b)(6) - We'd been out there for a few days, and we ended up interacting with the Marines. The elderly Afghan males ended up giving us a list. They had ordered their party into an order of march, and they asked that we pull them out in that order and that they would remain calm as long as that was something we honored. They did honor that.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. Talk about your adaptation

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - The GFC is the primary owner of that battlespace. The DoS was bad about trying to push information. The GFC is always the primary concern. It was kind of groundhog day in a way because we were working off the security posture and changing tactical situation, so we couldn't project information out more than 24 hours. We always have to make sure to tie in to the GFC for that reason.

(b)(6) - We also got tasked by the JOCs. WE would end up responding a lot.

(b)(6) - The North gate was probably the most physically secure in my mind. I don't know why the gates were so much different from one another. Once you arrived at North gate, you could tell the North gate was under control. Despite that visual, the North gate crowds were probably the most aggressive though. I showed you pictures of the comfort zone, and for whatever reason, the Marines established the 'comfort zone' in a rocky unshaded area. It was just inside East gate. They incorporated tents later on.

(b)(6) - That was an issue too because there were several areas where you could jump the fence, so we had jumpers all day and night in that area.

(b)(6) - The 'comfort zone' was located over there and because there was a fluctuation of personnel there, we ended up dealing with them face to face a lot as much as possible. The changes at East gate were mostly physical and in anticipation of the hordes of people. But Abbey gate was by far and away the hardest gate to deal with. The depth of the inner corridor was a problem. The different partner nations created a lot of problems by doing their own security checks and pat downs. That was already a red flag, and they also caused traffic issues by staging their pulled AFGCIV pax in areas that backed up personnel and vehicles in the gate corridor. Anyone could have jumped in those vehicles. The C-Wire changed too. They added more concertina wire. The Marines had excellent control of their pulled personnel, but the partner nations were very bad and disorganized about where they stashed their pulled personnel. Night time was relatively organized because the Marines would be the only ones operating, but the International operating hours would complicate their processing during the day.

Approved for Release

(b)(6) - The crowd could get unruly at times. The Brits decided they would enter the crowd and use shields at one point. It created multiple problems for a lot of reasons and one of the biggest ones was the fact that the expectation would change. The Taliban on the chevron were bad enough, so that got more and more complex.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Change in priorities?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - We were just more adaptive. We were passing as much uniform messaging as possible, but we had to adapt as time and energy shifted at the locations.

(b)(6) - The timelines shift a lot too. We were doing a handover with 82nd, and even then we couldn't really tell when we were going in or coming out. Determining when we would be pulling out would have been very helpful. The exfil plan may have existed for others, but we were not part of that planning outwardly. Bottom line though was that we were planning to leave with JTF-CR

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. Night of the 25th leading into the day of the SVEST.

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - It was more or less business as usual. We heard threat streams about every 6 hours at this point. This warning came straight from CENTCOM. It was Bald with well-kept beard wearing tan man-jams carrying some type of bag. The crowd was more unruly than usual that morning. I think that word had circulated through the crowd that something would be happening. They crowd went into full blown riot mode. There were crowd divers, there were tons of problems that day with people throwing kids. We were handling the craziness while also working on looking for the BOLO. We also were looking for the calmness in the crowd. That was the end of our shift and we ended up switching at about noon.

(b)(6) - We ended up getting there at 3-4 in the afternoon. I showed up at the gate at 1500 and the behavior at the gate was chaotic. There was no international community. The Marines were now holding the outer line by the canal. We got there and we took up a position inside the gate behind the sniper tower. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and our team were working on talking to the crowd about the gate status and what documents we were looking for. We were aware of the threat and so we were also on the lookout for the BOLO. When we got down off the gate initially the vehicle was parked inside the gate. At that point in time, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had talked to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) They wanted our vehicle up at the outer gate. The driver was having a hard time parking the vehicle, so I hopped in and moved the vehicle back to the position where it sat when the bomb went off. We got an interpreter and he spoke in the loudspeaker for a few minutes. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was right next to me. The explosion went off. When the bomb went off, I knew it was bad. My first reaction was to check myself. I moved to the rear of the vehicle and stood there for a



Approved for Release

miute figuring out what happened. I chose to wait because I wanted to make sure to be careful of any follow on direct fire. I told (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) to get accountability. We couldn't find SGT Knauss. We went down to the inner gate. And eventually made our way back to the outer gate and we found a corpsman working on Ryan Knauss. I didn't receive any direct fire behind the vehicle. I heard shooting. It wasn't direct fire at me. I know the Marines were firing. I went to the rear of the vehicle specifically because of the firing. I know I heard small arms fire and because of everything else I've seen, I expected it to be a complex attack. Adrenaline kicked in and I realized I was wounded. Once of our other team members was wounded and he got checked out by a corpsman with a tourniquet. I assisted getting Ryan loaded into the vehicle. I got checked right after the second vehicle pulled up. Ryan got taken to the role 2. I got taken to role 1. Overall, that entire time lapse was about 30 minutes (speculating, based on fuzzy memory).

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Who was around you

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was directly on my left when it went off. SSG Ryan Knauss was off the side of the vehicle. (Depicts on photo location of individuals known at the time of the blast).

(b)(6) - I was not there because we had rotated off the gate for the day coming off night shift. We tried to get clearance to get back out to the gate that night.

(b)(6) - After that the priorities of work changed a lot. I did not get rotated out. (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) got manifested and rotated out to Germany and then to Walter Reed. SSG Knauss was stable in medical treatment facility for some time, but while he was in the treatment facility he ended up having issues with wounds in his chest and he later passed.

(b)(6) - We had one of our team members stay with Ryan. The doctor told us the piece of shrapnel in his chest cavity was working its way to his heart and there was no recovery from that. I know they did everything they could have and that nothing was going to save the ones that ended up passing.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question. Role in final closure

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Because we had no flight out, we stuck by Ryan's side and equipment accountability. There was a ton of looting in the final hours. Our team room ended up getting raided.

(b)(6) - We were told later that there was some marking system that didn't make its way to us.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) 19 October 2021

(b)(6) - We walked Ryan onto the plane, then we walked back to our team area and we found MP's going through our stuff, like our personal stuff. Anyway, so we worked out the plan for destruction and leaving equipment. We torched the rest of the equipment we were supposed to and worked into the plan for retrograde.

(b)(6) - At this point in time, we started working back into the 82nd for our messaging and retrograde. It was maybe 24 hours after.
(b)(6) - It would have been the 28th.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question. What else haven't I asked?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) - Sir in 10 days, it was very hard to understand the requirements that were generated. We didn't understand authorities, team travel issues, and all the associated issues with all the friction from request to fulfillment. I just don't understand how the whole thing felt so desynched to us.

(b)(6) - It felt like no one was in charge. It was contentious with the different units even within the holding areas.

(b)(6) - It was to the point where the International folks would leave people at the gate, and there was no coordination with the gates for how to shut down. The 'why' of a lot of this is still very very unclear to me.

(b)(6) - We ended up getting stuck in (b)(1)1.4a for like 5 days too on the way out. It was all just so unclear.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question. Would you be willing to provide us contact information for you?

(2) Answer. (b)(6) SIPR email:

(b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 130

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

18 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Role II Hospital, 307th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 18 October 2021

1. On 18 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at the 3RD Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your role?

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: When did you deploy to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: I was notified on 12 August and flew out on the 14th. We arrived the morning of the 16th.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: What were the medical capabilities when you first arrived?



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Role II Hospital, 307th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 18 October 2021

(2) Answer: There was a NATO Role II at North HKIA (NHKIA). I wasn't aware of the other medical assets until I was on ground for a few days.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: What was the unit composition that you deployed with?

(2) Answer: I brought twelve personnel (b)(6) to make a Role I. About five members from the Forward Resuscitative and Surgical Detachment (FRSD) arrived with me, and additional fifteen arrived later.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: What can a FRSD provide? What is their composition?

(2) Answer: They provide limited damage control surgery and resuscitation. The FRSD consists of two teams of ten with four surgeons, three Registered Nurses, two Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists, one detachment sergeant, three Licensed Practical Nurses, three surgical technicians, and three medics.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Who were the FRSD organic to?

(2) Answer: They were from the 44th Medical Brigade here at Fort Bragg. They are a normal part of our IRF package.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: What equipment did you deploy with?

(2) Answer: We only had aid bags. Our organic equipment did not arrive in our containers. Luckily, we fell in on an abandoned aid station. We typically require some type of lift capability to bring all of our equipment. We only brought the supplies in our aid bags. We had to get surgical supplies from the Role II at NHKIA. We were not able to order supplies. We picked up blood from a blood detachment (b)(1)1.4a on our way to HKIA.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Were you assigned to Camp Alvarado or did you acquire that area?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: The (b)(6) Headquarters was already located over there and we joined them. Elements of the medical platoons from (b)(6) were already set up to include (b)(6) medical assets.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: When was your Role II fully established at HKIA?

(2) Answer: We were fully capable as US Role II the first day. It took a few days to get the FSRD in to establish surgical capabilities.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: What was your Task Organization (TASKORG) with 1-82nd?

(2) Answer: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: Did you understand the Medical Rules of Engagement (MEDROE) when you arrived to HKIA?

(2) Answer: No, I did not. We first started to set up our aid station the way that we wanted it. I went to go meet with the NATO Role II to discuss the MEDROE. They kept saying that the MEDROE didn't change. This was on the 16th. We followed the CENTCOM MEDROE. We were told to change it so that if people were injured within the gate, we would treat them and evacuate them through our chain. We treated two at my facilities on the first day. One was treated and returned. The other was shot in the face and we kept him in our facility for a while before evacuating him to the NATO Role II.

m. Question and Answer 12.

(1) Question: Do you know how these two injuries occurred?

(2) Answer: We think that the guy shot in the head was hit by a warning shot. We never got the full story.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: What type of patients were you seeing up until the 26th?







Approved for Release

(2) Answer: We were seeing sick-call type patients. We saw almost exclusively US personnel. We saw some Afghans only when the 82nd was controlling gates.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: Was your facility ever at maximum capacity before the 26th?

(2) Answer: No

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Were you tracking a mass casualty (MASCAL) plan?

(2) Answer: HKIA was so massive and there wasn't a plan delineating a flow for a MASCAL. We mostly understood that we would flex to the NATO Role II.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Did you hear any threat streams leading up to the 26th?

(2) Answer: We began hearing a non-specific threat of a suicide vest (SVEST) or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). We were made aware of an imminent threat on the morning of the 26th. We rehearsed our internal MASCAL plan in preparation.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Did the threat reporting on the 26th change your medical posture? Was there any centralized medical messaging about being prepared for a MASCAL?

(2) Answer: We had a meeting around 1700 on the 26th that mentioned the threat but there wasn't any messaging about posture.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Did you do any pre-staging of medical assets in response to the threats?

(2) Answer: No. We didn't hear anything about specific gates being targeted.

t. Question and Answer 19.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Role II Hospital, 307th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 18 October 2021

(1) Question: Do you remember what time the blast occurred?

(2) Answer: It was around 1800. I came back from the meeting and found out as I walked into our Role II facility. We began to prepare our three Field Litter Ambulances (FLAs) and crews to assist with medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: What was in the FLAs?

(2) Answer: We sent at least two medics in the back of each FLA. We also sent one emergency room doctor and an additional doctor from my team drove over separately from a different location. There were four crews in total.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: What did they do upon arrival to Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was located with the (b)(6) at the time of the blast and arrived to the gate almost immediately after the blast. He loaded as many casualties as he could in his FLA and drove to the NATO Role II. My other three teams did that as well.

The NATO Role II called us after they were overwhelmed with casualties and began shifting casualties to us. We received nine casualties.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Were these casualties already seen at the NATO Role II?

(2) Answer: I believe they were triaged at the door but the ER was full. We took them in for surgery.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: Did your four crews return to Abbey Gate after dropping casualties at the NATO Role II?

(2) Answer: Yes, but by the time they returned to the area, it was too congested. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) had them pull to the side and remain staged until he knew for sure whether or not they were needed.



Approved for Release

z. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Did they ever evacuate more casualties?

(2) Answer: I don't think so.

aa. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Were there any other 82nd FLAs that could have been at the gate to bring casualties to the NATO Role II?

(2) Answer: We had the only ones that I was aware of.

bb. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: How many patients did you see from the blast?

(2) Answer: The nine that were brought to us, plus one additional patient that bumped their head in an unrelated incident.

cc. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: What injuries did the nine patients have?

(2) Answer: There were a few injuries to the chest from shrapnel from the blast and a few broken limbs. There was also a 12 year old Afghan boy and his 7 year old sister that had injuries.

dd. Question and Answer 28.

(1) Question: Were there any gunshot wounds?

(2) Answer: There were what appeared to be gunshot wounds.

ee. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: Could these injuries have been caused by ball bearings?

(2) Answer: Yes, they could have been from ball bearings.

ff. Question and Answer 30.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: How many of the nine were US casualties and how many were local national casualties?

(2) Answer: Two Soldiers, the PSYOP guys, were our first patients. Then, we saw three Marines and four Afghans. They all had blast-related injuries.

gg. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Out of the nine, how many required surgery?

(2) Answer: Three required surgery to include one Marine, one Afghan child, and one Afghan adult.

hh. Question and Answer 32.

(1) Question: After surgery, did you keep the patients at your facility or send them to the NATO Role II?

(2) Answer: Once they were stable, we began calling the NATO Role II to coordinate transferring them. We were empty by 2300 on the 26th.

ii. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: Were the civilians that you treated evacuated to the Role II?

(2) Answer: Yes. I am unsure if they were evacuated further to the Role III, but I do know that all of the US casualties that we sent there were.

jj. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think we should know?

(2) Answer: No. My guys that went to the site of the blast said they thought there was small arms fire after the blast but they don't know who was firing.

kk. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: Did the patients you receive seem like they had proper Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and triage?



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Role II Hospital, 307th Brigade Support Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, 18 October 2021

(2) Answer: Yes. Everything seemed to happen appropriately. Once the NATO Role II became overwhelmed we received some patients that we wouldn't normally see.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 131

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO 19 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TF MED, 19 October 2021

1. On 19 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel telephonically from 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: For the record, could you please describe your name and duty position.

(b)(6)

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: When you moved to HKIA and the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) kicked off, you were the senior medical officer?

(2) Answer: Correct.

d. Question and Answer 3.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TF MED, 19 October 2021

(1) Question: What is the medical structure of HKIA in mid-June?

(2) Answer: We were a combined force with a Norwegian team of about 36 or 38 medical personnel. We brought about 95 medics from Bagram. I was (b)(6) (b)(6) I answered to GEN Miller and then RADM Vasely, the Norwegians ran the Military Treatment Facility (MTF). We kept that COMREL since the Norwegians had run the hospital for over a year, and we didn't want to interrupt that. The senior Norwegian Surgeon on ground was the HKIA MTF commander for the Role 2.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: What medical capabilities were present from the 15th through the 30th of August? What medical teams were present and what capabilities were there in terms of bed space?

(2) Answer: We had 2 physical Operating Rooms (ORs), but enough teams to run 4 cases at one time. We had space and staff to take care of 7 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) patients and 14 ward patients. In addition to that we had a computerized tomography (CT) scanner and a radiologist and radiologist tech. We had a COVID management cell, primarily staffed by the Norwegians, but with some of our medics as well. We had a public health officer on the base. We had a lab and pharmacy in our emergency room that ran 24 hours a day.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Please talk through the different teams present on the ground.

(2) Answer: We had a constant shifting number of medics and teams while we were there. Not long after we got to HKIA, we moved the ground surgical team (GST), the Air Force 6 person surgical team, to the Role I at the embassy compound. They had limited surgical capabilities if necessary at the embassy, we could have pulled them back as necessary. In the beginning, one Norwegian surgical team, 2 Army Forward Resuscitative Surgical (FRST) (20 people total), and 5 other Americans that made up another surgical team. Those 4 teams were the steady state from early June until mid-August. We were trying to reduce our footprint at that time, so the Norwegian surgical team left in early August. That left us with 3 US surgical teams at HKIA, and then we moved the GST out to (b)(1)1.4a when the embassy collapsed. We postured them to return as necessary. A couple of days after that the 274th FRST, a 10 person team arrived. (b)(1)1.4a showed up. Then we had some US Special SOSTs show up as well. That was all between the 20th and the 23rd. On the day of the mass casualty (MASCAL) event. we had 8 or 9 surgical teams present on the ground. Some of that capability was organic, and some were flown in for the Joint Tactical Exfiltration (JTE).



Approved for Release

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: Those all operated out of the Role II except for the 274th FRST, correct?

(2) Answer: That is correct. Initially the SOSTs were also going to operate out of Camp Alvarado, but they decided that folding in to our facility was better due to location. We worked with them formerly for a week before the MASCAL. We were counting them towards our surgical capabilities at the time because we knew they were around.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: What interactions, if any, did you have with the Shock Trauma Platoons (STP) from the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF)? Or the other Role I facilities, US or partner?

(2) Answer: There was a German surgical team that did not work within the HKIA MTF. They were on the ground, in a building about half mile away from the MTF. The 9th team was a United Kingdom (UK) surgical team that initially worked in a tent outside the MTF, but they eventually folded into our MTF as well.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: You called it the MTF not the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) facility, why is that?

(2) Answer: We tried to tamp down calling it the NATO facility, because there was a rumor that the Norwegians ran this one and that there was a separate NATO building. We referred to it as the MTF so everyone knew that this was the one facility for treatment, we wanted to avoid confusion.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question: What interactions did you have with the other medical units on the ground?

(2) Answer: Every evening we had representatives from the medical teams on the ground. We would talk through supplies, personnel, and patient flow so that we could support them from the hospital as well as we could. That being said, leading up to the MASCAL the Role I facilities did a good job taking care of the less serious injuries to



Approved for Release

avoid us being overwhelmed. During the MASCAL they did an awesome job on triage and also providing us assistance at the Role II during the MASCAL.

k. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question: During the NEO, were you ever short any supplies or assets?

(2) Answer: Yes, and it wasn't MASCAL related, it was humanitarian related. We needed more supplies for babies and kids, oral rehydration solutions, and diapers. Those things that were not an allowance standard for a treatment facility, and the Role I facilities were not prepared for that. We spent time solving that issue. In terms of true surgical supplies, the only time we were short was when we were trying to supply the 274th team at Alvarado since they landed without many supplies. We pushed them what we could reasonably spare

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question: What were the medical rules of engagement (ROE) for the NEO? Was it disseminated to the units and the Role I facilities?

(2) Answer: Prior to the NEO, GEN Miller and then RADM Vasely, protected us from doing more local national care than we needed to do. Persons of special designated status (PSDS) had to appeal to RADM Vasely or (b)(6) to get approval to receive care from our medical team. As the NEO started to take shape, I had conversations with RADM Vasely's staff about if those rules would remain in place, and if we had to get approval to treat anyone that needed help. From a medical/ethical standpoint that gave me a lot of heartburn, that is not what we practice in terms of providing care. What gave me more heartburn, was what it would do to our Role I facilities and knowing that they might care for an individual that they needed to escalate to our facility, and we would have to turn them away.

That only came up a few times. When Kabul fell, on that Sunday we had a dozen patients come in and we treated them without RADM Vasely's approval because he was busy. I told his (b)(6) a few days later, that if we had to ask for permission for every patient, they wouldn't be doing anything other than spending time processing those requests. Later on I gave reports about who we were treating and how much bed space we were using, and none of the flag officers pushed back. I later told Role I facilities not to make decisions based on nationalities. I made it clear that if we treated someone, we owned their care so we would take them at the Role II and I would own any blowback. That was probably around the 18th or 19th, maybe a little earlier.

m. Question and Answer 12.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: When you passed that information, did you say that we were responsible for anyone that became wounded or ill while they were within HKIA??

(2) Answer: Yes, that was the guidance and we did that based off our geographical area. It was too gray to determine if refugees were wounded by U.S., Taliban, or Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. I told our medical personnel that if they were inside our gates, we owned their care. We would not push people out once we gave them treatment.

n. Question and Answer 13.

(1) Question: So you treated anyone that needed treatment on HKIA?

(2) Answer: That is correct. For a while there was an Icarus clinic that treated contractors, but when that folded we became the lone treatment facility on base. That folded prior to NEO. So we treated contractors as well, but that was not overwhelming.

o. Question and Answer 14.

(1) Question: So when NEO kicks off the MTF is the only show in town for medical treatment, aside from any Role I facilities?

(2) Answer: Correct

p. Question and Answer 15.

(1) Question: Prior to the 26th, what type of patients were you seeing at the Role II?

(2) Answer: A number of Afghan civilian patients. They had generally minor injuries, some tied to gunshot wounds. Some flashbang injuries. Some folks who had been assaulted outside the gate or by the Taliban en route. I don't know where all of the assaults came from. We were not seeing a lot of active duty folks, we would see an occasional MEU or SPMAGTF member who had low acuity stuff like sore throat, bumps, or bruises, etc.

q. Question and Answer 16.

(1) Question: Any surgery or ICU stays prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer: For sure, I remember one local national lost an eye from a flashbang detonation. We took him to the OR and treated, but there was not much we could offer



Approved for Release

from an ophthalmology stand point. Generally from 3pm to 3 am we saw the greatest uptick in patients.

r. Question and Answer 17.

(1) Question: Upon treatment were Afghans sent to Europe or released back in to town?

(2) Answer: We would try to keep them either united with their families or evacuated out. Usually that meant that they would travel intra-theater to (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a but sometimes to Germany which was harder to get clearance for.

s. Question and Answer 18.

(1) Question: Was the Role II's capacity ever stressed prior to the 26th?

(2) Answer: No, the only times that the Role II got stressed prior to the 26th was in the Emergency Room (ER) getting the initial flow of patients. There were a few days where a lot of patients came in, but that really just kept the ER teams busy and interrupted their work/rest cycles.

t. Question and Answer 19.

(1) Question: What, if any, medical capabilities were pushed out to the various gates? For instance, on the evening of the 25th the STP pushed an ambulance down to Abbey Gate with an en route care team.

(2) Answer: Nothing was pushed that I had coordinated. The MEU and the MAGTF were doing this posturing at their level based on the flow as they saw it on the ground.

u. Question and Answer 20.

(1) Question: Did you ever go to the gates while you were at HKIA?

(2) Answer: I did not.

v. Question and Answer 21.

(1) Question: From the 15th on, was there a comprehensive MASCAL plan?

(2) Answer: Yes there was, our team had worked on it since mid-June. It was integrated with the Norwegian team, and we were considering anything more than 4



Approved for Release

patients at one time a MASCAL. We worked on that, and we also prepared for movement of casualties from the embassy, to the flight line, to the clinic for care.

w. Question and Answer 22.

(1) Question: Did the MASCAL plan include flow of wounded from the gates to Role I to Role II?

(2) Answer: No, our MASCAL plan started when the patients actually arrived to the ER bay.

x. Question and Answer 23.

(1) Question: Is it fair to say that the plan at north HKIA was to get the patients to you and they would be handled from there?

(2) Answer: True, we did not have vehicle assets so we decided that vehicles of opportunity were the way to go. This was not entirely a concern for me, I wanted to keep our medical assets closer to the hospital so that we weren't sending medics into a firefight. We had some discussions about placing a surgical team closer to the Brits in south HKIA. My concern with that was that it would have been a reduced capability facility and that if we created that facility, patients that needed higher level care may have been brought there instead of coming straight to the Role II. I also wanted to keep my medical capabilities centralized.

y. Question and Answer 24.

(1) Question: Threat reporting seemed more imminent on the 26th, how much of that were you tracking?

(2) Answer: I think I read the daily report on the 25th and the 26th and there was some specific reporting about suicide bomber threats at the gate. At 1310, I got a call from RADM Vasely's (b)(6) saying that the threat streams had become a lot more credible and that a MASCAL was coming, possibly within the hour. We called all of our medical teams into the MTF for accountability at that time. We went through the afternoon and there were no developments, so we let folks go back to their dorm rooms nearby around 1700. As you know, about an hour after that things went sideways.

z. Question and Answer 25.

(1) Question: Outside of you keeping anyone on a short tether on the 26th, any other changes? You kept everyone consolidated?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: Correct, the only team not with us was 274th at Camp Alvarado.

aa. Question and Answer 26.

(1) Question: At about 1738 the bomb goes off, can you talk us through what happens at the Role II?

(2) Answer: I was in the tactical operations center (TOC) at that time. I heard the reports of the explosion, and the team was wondering about calling the MASCAL. I told them to hold until we got a report of what to expect. Within a few minutes we got a call from the Role I saying that there were going to be a lot of patients. At that time, we called a MASCAL and got teams staged in the ER and outside of the ER as the first flatbed with patients arrived. Some were already dead on arrival, a few came in with no vital signs. The first 6 or 7 patients were part of the 13 that passed away. We set up a morgue outside, a few of those first few personnel came in for treatment but a few went straight to the morgue. We had time before casualties showed up to stage trauma teams. We had 6 beds in the ER running, and we set up additional treatment areas in the hallway as overflow. I don't know how many we saw in the first wave, but it was very steady for the next several hours. As I looked at the board and talked with the teams, the thing that impressed me most was the triage that was done prior to the Role II. We were definitely seeing the sickest, most serious injuries first, which is a testament to the efforts of the field medics on ground to prioritize care. Normally the folks that arrive first are the walking wounded who can get themselves on a vehicle, but that was not the case here.

bb. Question and Answer 27.

(1) Question: What does triage look like upon arrival?

(2) Answer: We had a covered ambulance bay, and we had an area on the ground for about 6-10 litters right outside. We had a triage officer, an Australian and some medics that were assessing the patients to find out which patients were immediate, urgent, expectant, or deceased. Then patients would be brought into the hospital and then the trauma czar would control the flow of patients into the trauma bays or the ward areas as needed. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was controlling flow from the bays to the OR, to see how soon teams needed the OR from the treatment area. Two teams went to the OR fairly rapidly, and I asked (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) shortly after if we needed more OR space. He told me he had 2 more teams that needed to go in there. We went to find out if we could expand the OR to 4 beds, but we had to wait a minute since they were using that full capacity. Shortly after, we were able to flex up to 4 patients in the OR at a time.

cc. Question and Answer 28.



Approved for Release

(1) Question: Do you feel that the MASCAL stressed the capacity at the Role II?

(2) Answer: Without a doubt. 12 hours after the MASCAL, I felt like we were about at capacity. By daylight on the morning of the 27th, we didn't have any more patients, but the hours before that we were beyond capacity.

dd. Question and Answer 29.

(1) Question: Do you know the numbers of US service members and Afghans that you treated?

(2) Answer: Not exactly. There were over 70 patients total. It was probably 30 service members and 40 Afghans. I don't know exactly, but I pushed that up to CENTCOM.

ee. Question and Answer 30.

(1) Question: At the OR, which providers were operating the OR? Was that a joint effort between the U.S., Norwegians, and UK?

(2) Answer: It was all of the above, the UK team went in early with one of the more complicated patients and worked on that patient throughout the ordeal. General surgeons would generally stay with their patient throughout, and the orthopedic surgeon would jump around as needed. Some teams had simpler patients and went to the OR 2 or 3 times, and some teams had longer cases so they went to the OR fewer times. The more complicated cases were shrapnel injuries to the abdomen, there was a vena cava injury, we had one patient that was complicated and started at Alvarado before coming to us, we had kidney and bowel injuries, we had one with a spinal injury. Those were the cases that were a bit more involved. Then there were those with a lot of puncture wounds to extremities that had to be cleared out and dressed, which was fairly time consuming.

ff. Question and Answer 31.

(1) Question: Were there gunshot wounds (GSW)? Or was it all ball bearings and shrapnel?

(2) Answer: It's really hard to say. I think there may have been GSWs sprinkled in, but that's inconclusive and wasn't medically worth trying to figure out. They would be treated the same. I can't offer a whole lot on that, I don't know if anyone recovered a slug from a body.

gg. Question and Answer 32.







Approved for Release

(1) Question: From your opinion, do you think that all patients that arrived had received the appropriate treatment at the tactical level?

(2) Answer: Absolutely. I think the temptation in this situation is to pull apart how one or two patients were treated, but you have to look at the number of complex injuries, the continued threat, and the resource constraint. It is impossible to look at these patients one by one, so I have no doubts that the team on ground did some heroic things before they got there that night.

hh. Question and Answer 33.

(1) Question: I think (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) said that 9/13 of those that died were expectant by the time they arrived at the Role II. Are there any of those other 4 that you think could have been saved with more equipment or personnel?

(2) Answer: I'd have to defer to (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) on that, but none come to mind based on the serious nature of their injuries. Some of these injuries were just not survivable.

ii. Question and Answer 34.

(1) Question: You mentioned that some of the fallen didn't even make it the ER, they went straight to the morgue. We are tracking that there was space for 8 in the morgue, what was the solution there?

(2) Answer: We had 8 spaces in the morgue. For expediency, we placed those that were killed in action (KIA) and the expectant in a tent outside the morgue itself. When we had the time to gather ourselves, we had arrangements to use a refrigerated connex on HKIA to store bodies. Before the MASCAL we had some local nationals that were killed that we were trying to figure out how to move and we worried we would get more. We had 4 at the time, and the UK also had 4, so we coordinated to use the refrigerated connex as necessary for the NEO if we needed more morgue space.

jj. Question and Answer 35.

(1) Question: When were the bodies transferred from HKIA?

(2) Answer: We did a hero ceremony on the afternoon of the 27th.

kk. Question and Answer 36.

(1) Question: In terms of the wounded, what timeframe were they all evacuated? How many were evacuated?



Approved for Release

(2) Answer: We evacuated 35 total personnel across 3 flights, Americans and Afghans. The first flight was heavily U.S. personnel going to Germany, the second flight was a mix and dropped some folks in (b)(1)1.4a and then went to Germany, and the third flight was mostly refugees and that went to (b)(1)1.4a That was more for immigration reasons than it was for medical.

ll. Question and Answer 37.

(1) Question: Did the severity of injuries on those flights vary?

(2) Answer: Yes, greatly.

mm. Question and Answer 38.

(1) Question: Any personnel that stayed in the Role II for a period of time?

(2) Answer: On the morning of the 27th we had no patients left, they had either been evacuated or returned to duty if their injury was minor.

nn. Question and Answer 39.

(1) Question: Do you have a point of contact that could provide a list of those that were evacuated?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) was specific with me, he said any releases need to come from him at CENTCOM.

oo. Question and Answer 40.

(1) Question: Can you speak to why it took so longer to identify the bodies?

(2) Answer: Yes, some of the bodies were fairly mangled which makes identification hard. There was one instance that had an individual in the OR that had the identification of one of the deceased individuals with his belongings. The two looked similar and they were confused for each other, which was difficult to sort out. That took some time, and as we circled back to the unit, we found out that it was a different guy. The gatherings of belongings at the scene and them being mixed up en route to us created some difficulty for identification.

pp. Question and Answer 41.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) TF MED, 19 October 2021

(1) Question: You mentioned that 40 Afghans were treated, and that some were medically evacuated. What happened to those that weren't?

(2) Answer: Individuals with more minor injuries were released back to their families to continue their evacuation. We made no attempts to push individuals to local hospitals.

qq. Question and Answer 42.

(1) Question: Anything else that you want to mention?

(2) Answer: One thing that came up, was concerns about adequate Class VIII. I want to quash any rumors about that, our supply folks and our (b)(6) were extremely receptive. I mentioned earlier the baby supplies. U.S. and Norwegian efforts to make sure we had everything we needed on the ground were top notch and we were able to fill all of our shortages.

We got into some interesting discussions with the USFOR-A staff about our medical footprint, and we were able to work with the staff so they could understand the value of having an overload of medics on the ground. We are fortunate that the Norwegians stayed, and that the surgical teams that came in with the NEO gave us the robust number of medical personnel we needed to make that MASCAL response a success.

rr. Question and Answer 43.

(1) Question: What is your SIPR email?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 127 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 132 (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 128 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 129 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 130 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 131 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 133 (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 132 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 133 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 134 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)(A)

Approved for Release

Page 134 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)(A)

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

**(U) Title: CENTCOM JICCENT OSINT Open Source Intelligence Report (OSIR), OSINT Tipper Roll-up for 25 August 2021 (1800-2400).**

**(U) Subject: This report provides a roll-up of OSINT Tippers provided 25 Aug 2021 (1800-2400).**

**(U) Serial Number:** JIC OSINT R202108200096

**(U) Date Generated:** 25 AUG 2021

**(U) Date of Access:** 25 AUG 2021

**(U) Requirement:** RFI

**(U) Local Tracking Code:** N/A

**(U) Coordinates:** N/A

**(U) Priority:** N/A

**(U) Disclaimer:** Warning: May Contain Graphic Content and Images

**(U) Summary:** Information has been derived from internet sources and reflects recent discoveries/postings from traditional and social media sources. The accuracy of the information, sources, and locations presented cannot be verified.

**(U) Content:** See Below

**(U) Organization:** USCENTCOM CCJ2 JICCENT

**(U) Comment:** N/A

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

**(U) File Location:** (b)(6)
(CENTCOM OSINT)

**(U) File Caption:** N/A

**(U) Source Statements:** N/A

**(U) Source Information:** N/A

**(U) Country/Target Code/BE#:** Afghanistan

**(U) Notice:**

*(U) This product may contain U.S. person information that has been deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act on the information provided. It should be handled in accordance with the recipient's intelligence oversight and/or information handling procedures.*

*(U) This document has been compiled using materials, including copyrighted materials, in accordance to a license, express authorization, or under the "fair use" doctrine as codified in Title 17, Section 107 of the United States Code (The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended). Further reproduction or redistribution of this document is subject to original copyright restrictions.*

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

# CENTCOM JICCENT OSINT Open Source Intelligence Report (OSIR), OSINT Tipper Roll-up for 25 August 2021 (1800-2400).

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

The following information derived from internet sources reflects recent discoveries/postings from traditional and social media sources. The accuracy of the information presented cannot be verified. Sources and their locations of social media posts cannot be verified.

**CAUTION: MAY CONTAIN GRAPHIC IMAGES**

## Summary

- Avoid Kabul airport due to terror threat, Foreign Office warns (Source: BBC)
- US State Department advises US nationals waiting at Abbey, East, and North Gates at Hamid Karzai Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan to "leave immediately" (Source: Twitter)
- Increasing number of Afghan-Americans still in AFG are “telling us that they won’t leave unless they can take large families with them" (Source: Twitter)
- Reports circulating that Abdul Rashid Dostum is going to or in Panjshir to meet with Northern Alliance 2.0 leadership (Soure: Twitter)
- Former GIROA governor says the Taliban has searched his residence for eighth time, took his private vehicle, and threatened his children (Source: Twitter)
-

## Observations

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

# (U) OSINT TIPPER – NEO Afghanistan: Afghanistan: Avoid Kabul airport due to terror threat, Foreign Office warns

**(U) Serial Number: N20210825418**

**(U) Production Description: Tippers provide raw data extracted from publically available information sources without editorial intervention.**
**(U) Publication Date: 25 Aug 2021**

***(UNCLASSIFIED) Afghanistan*: Avoid Kabul airport due to terror threat, Foreign Office warns**

**Afghanistan: Avoid Kabul airport due to terror threat, Foreign Office warns**

BBC

25 Aug 2021

People in Afghanistan should stay away from Kabul airport due to a "high threat of a terrorist attack", the UK Foreign Office has warned.

In new advice, the FCDO told anyone in the area to "move away to a safe location and await further advice".

US President Joe Biden has warned of a group linked to Islamic State that is seeking to target the airport.

It comes amid a race to evacuate thousands from Kabul ahead of the 31 August deadline when troops will leave.

In the update issued on Wednesday evening, the FCDO warned Britons there was "an ongoing and high threat of terrorist attack", and that travelling by road was "extremely dangerous", with people alleged to have been "mistreated" on their way to the airport.

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

The government has said the UK's aim to complete the operation ahead of 31 August is moving at "significant pace", with more than 11,000 people evacuated with the help of UK troops, according to the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

On Tuesday, President Biden rejected calls from Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other allies to delay the withdrawal date for remaining American soldiers beyond the end of the month.

Kabul airport is currently being defended by 5,800 US and 1,000 British troops.

Meanwhile, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has told MPs that Afghans wanting to flee to Britain may be better off trying to reach one of Afghanistan's borders instead.

Concern over suicide attacks

The Foreign Office has previously warned against all travel to Afghanistan, and cited the possibility of terrorist attacks.

But the new advice is very specific. Do not travel to Kabul airport. If you're in the area, move away to a safe location and wait for further advice.

Officials won't elaborate on the nature of the threat, but this change comes just 24 hours after President Biden warned of the danger posed by extremists linked to the group calling itself Islamic State.

Commanders dealing with vast crowds around the airport are increasingly concerned about the possibility of suicide attacks.

What the new advice means for the British evacuation operation is not clear.

The MoD said that since 13 August, when the evacuation mission started, a total of 11,474 people had left Afghanistan. That includes almost 7,000 Afghan nationals and their families.

The total also includes British embassy staff, British nationals, those eligible under the UK government's relocation programme - Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP) - and some evacuees from allied countries.

About 2,000 people eligible for ARAP remain in Afghanistan, but the plan is to evacuate more in the coming days, the BBC was told earlier ahead of the new FCDO advice.

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

Since the Taliban takeover, more than 82,000 people have been airlifted out of Kabul airport, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said. About 10,000 are waiting to be evacuated by the US.

Mr Blinken said the Taliban have promised to allow foreigners and Afghans to leave beyond the end of August, adding that the US and its allies had "a responsibility to hold [the Taliban] to that commitment".

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*




(U) Source Reference Citation and Descriptor: (U) USCENTCOM OSINT; N20210825418 (U) Source Publication; Source Description: BBC; UK Media; Neutral

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

UNCLASSIFIED



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

# (U) OSINT TIPPER – NEO Afghanistan: US State Department advises US nationals waiting at Abbey, East, and North Gates at Hamid Karzai Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan to "leave immediately" (Reporter via Twitter)

**(U) Serial Number: N20210825419**

**(U) Production Description: Tippers provide raw data extracted from publically available information sources without editorial intervention.**
**(U) Publication Date: 25 Aug 2021**

***(UNCLASSIFIED) Afghanistan*: US State Department advises US nationals waiting at Abbey, East, and North Gates at Hamid Karzai Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan to "leave immediately"**

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Jerry Dunleavy
@JerryDunleavy

U.S. Embassy Kabul: "Because of security threats outside the gates of Kabul airport, we're advising U.S. citizens to avoid traveling to the airport & to avoid airport gates at this time...U.S. citizens who are at Abbey Gate, East Gate, or North Gate now should leave immediately."

**Event:** Because of security threats outside the gates of Kabul airport, we are advising U.S. citizens to avoid traveling to the airport and to avoid airport gates at this time unless you receive individual instructions from a U.S. government representative to do so.

**U.S. citizens who are at the Abbey Gate, East Gate, or North Gate now should leave immediately.**

**Actions to take:**

- Be aware of your surroundings at all times, especially in large crowds.
- Follow the instructions of local authorities including movement restrictions related to curfews.
- Have a contingency plan for emergencies and review the Traveler's Checklist.
- Monitor local media for breaking events and adjust your plans based on new information.
- Enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program(STEP) to receive Alerts and make it easier to locate you in an emergency.
- Follow the Department of State on Facebook and Twitter.

7:08 PM · Aug 25, 2021 · Twitter for iPhone

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open ere has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

(U) Source Reference Citation and Descriptor: (U) USCENTCOM OSINT: N20210825419 (U) Source Publication; Source Description: Twitter; Jerry Dunleavy (@JerryDunleavy); Journalist, Washington Examiner

# (U) OSINT TIPPER – NEO Afghanistan: In leaked recording of a call, Deputy Assistant Secretary in US Consular Affairs King says "increasing number" of Afghan-Americans still in AFG are "telling us that they won't leave unless they can take large families with them" (Reporter via Twitter)

(U) Serial Number: N20210825419

(U) Production Description: Tippers provide raw data extracted from publically available information sources without editorial intervention.
(U) Publication Date: 25 Aug 2021

*(UNCLASSIFIED) Afghanistan*: Increasing number of Afghan-Americans still in AFG are "telling us that they won't leave unless they can take large families with them"

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe

Got a leaked recording of a call today between congressional staffers and administration officials about Afghanistan.

A couple of takeaways:

7:41 PM · Aug 25, 2021 · Twitter Web App

**24** Retweets **3** Quote Tweets **53** Likes

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 14m
Replying to @DanLamothe
Some American citizens have told the State Department that they do not plan to evacuate from Afghanistan unless they can bring Afghan family members with them, administration officials said. That's a group with an uncertain future.

2 19 51

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 14m
"The embassy has told that us that an increasing number is telling us that they won't leave unless they can take large families with them," said Karin King, a senior State Department official. "So, part of the number you have been given are people who are self-selecting to stay."

2 11 26

Approved for Release

*editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 12m

A different official (unidentified in audio) acknowledged the situation is complicated by reports that some families have been stopped on the way to the airport with a mix of Afghan-Americans and Afghans seeking refuge. State Department seeking "ground truth" on those cases.

2 7 13

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 10m

When will the military shift to "retrograde" operations rather than evacuation operations?

Rebecca Zimmerman, a senior Pentagon official, declined to say in an unclassified setting. But she added that DOD is "multi-tasking," and will try to do evacuation ops as long as possible.

1 4 11

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 8m

Karin King from the State Department said the chaotic conditions outside the airport has prompted the U.S. government to reach out to American citizens and green card holders to go to specific rally points and then bringing them to the airport from there.

2 12 21

**Dan Lamothe** @DanLamothe · 8m

"My best advice to all those folks is to get themselves registered and get away from the gates because the gates are simply not a way to gain access at this point," Karin King added.

2 11 18

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

(U) Source Reference Citation and Descriptor: (U) USCENTCOM OSINT; N20210825419 (U) Source Publication; Source Description: Twitter; Dan Lamothe, (@DanLamothe); Washington Post reporter

# (U) OSINT TIPPER – NEO
# Afghanistan: Reports circulating that Abdul Rashid Dostum is going to or in Panjshir to meet with Northern Alliance 2.0 leadership (Reporter via Twitter)

(U) Serial Number: N20210825421

(U) Production Description: Tippers provide raw data extracted from publically available information sources without editorial intervention.
(U) Publication Date: 25 Aug 2021

***(UNCLASSIFIED) Afghanistan*: Reports circulating that Abdul Rashid Dostum is going to or in Panjshir to meet with Northern Alliance 2.0 leadership**

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

(U) Source Reference Citation and Descriptor: (U) USCENTCOM OSINT; N20210825421 (U) Source Publication; Source Description: Twitter; Panjshir Update, (@PanjshirUpdate); Twitter feed dedicated to tracking events in Panjshir

# (U) OSINT TIPPER – NEO Afghanistan: Former GIROA governor says the Taliban has searched his residence for eighth time, took his private vehicle, and threatened his children (Government via Twitter)

**(U) Serial Number: N20210825422**

**(U) Production Description: Tippers provide raw data extracted from publically available information sources without editorial intervention.**
**(U) Publication Date: 25 Aug 2021**

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*



Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

***(UNCLASSIFIED) Afghanistan*: Former GIROA governor says the Taliban has searched his residence for eighth time, took his private vehicle, and threatened his children**

(U) Source Reference Citation and Descriptor: (U) USCENTCOM OSINT; N20210825422 (U) Source Publication; Source Description: Twitter; Halim Fidai, (@GovFidai); Former Governor in 4 provinces of Afghanistan; Wardak, Logar, Khost & Paktia provinces. (2007-2021)

**** Please fill out CCJ22 T-OSINT RFI Feedback Form: USCENTCOM - Home (ic.gov) ****

Approved for Release

*(U) This is an Open Source Information Report, NOT finally evaluated intelligence. There has been neither editorial intervention nor analysis of the content. This report does not represent USCENTCOM opinion(s) or assessment(s), and is disseminated for informational purposes ONLY. The recipient may retain this report and bears sole responsibility for assessing relevance to individual mission(s) and further dissemination.*

Page 151 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 136 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 152 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 153 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 154 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 155 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 156 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 157 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 158 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 137 (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 159 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 160 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 161 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 162 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 163 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 164 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 165 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 166 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 167 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 168 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 169 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 170 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 171 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 138 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 172 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 173 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 174 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 175 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 176 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 177 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 178 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 179 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 180 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 181 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 182 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 183 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 184 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 185 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 186 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 187 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 188 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 189 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 190 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 191 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 192 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 193 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 194 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 195 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 196 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 197 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 198 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 199 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 200 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 201 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 202 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 203 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 204 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 205 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 206 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 207 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 208 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 209 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 210 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 211 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 212 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 213 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 214 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 215 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 216 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 217 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 218 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 219 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 220 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 221 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 222 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 223 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 224 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 139 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 225 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 226 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 227 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 228 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 229 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 230 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 231 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 232 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, 1.7e, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 233 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) USC 130b, (b)(6)

Page 234 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 140 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 141 - (b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 8 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 10 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 12 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 14 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 15 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 17 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 18 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 21 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 23 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 24 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 25 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 26 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 27 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b1)(1)1.4a, (b1)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 28 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 142 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 29 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 30 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 31 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 32 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 33 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 34 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 35 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 36 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 37 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 38 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 39 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 40 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 41 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 42 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 43 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 44 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 45 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 46 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 47 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 48 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 49 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 50 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 51 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 53 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 54 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 55 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 56 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 57 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 58 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 59 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 60 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 61 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 62 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 63 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 64 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 65 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 67 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 68 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 69 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 70 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 71 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 72 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 73 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 74 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 75 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 76 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 77 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 78 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 79 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 80 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 81 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 82 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 83 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 84 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 85 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 86 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 87 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 88 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 89 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 90 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 91 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 92 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 93 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 94 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 95 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 96 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 97 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 98 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 99 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 100 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 101 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 102 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 103 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 104 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 105 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 106 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 107 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 108 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 109 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 110 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 111 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 112 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 113 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 114 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 143 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 115 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 116 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 117 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 144

ACTS-SCK-DO

15 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

1. On 15 October 2021, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), conducted an interview of the above personnel at 3RD Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began wit (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: Where were you at the time of the blast at Abbey Gate?

(2) Answer: I was about 75 meters north of the Marine sniper tower, inside our tower.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: Can you describe the blast and what you saw?

(2) Answer: I got to the tower about fifteen minutes before the blast went off. It was already occupied by three guys from 2-504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. I was emplacing them for proper security to create 270 degree coverage. I was adjusting one of the guys when the explosion occurred. I moved to the side of the tower looking out to the canal. The blast was in the dead space that I couldn't see.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) USA, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

There was a cloud of dark smoke. Before the blast went off, there were about 300-400 Afghans in the area. The Marines were manning the gate at the time. 2-Para (British forces) also had a small gate they were operating.

Marines immediately started evacuating casualties from the blast site. The Marines were emplaced on the HESCO barriers and were pulling security.

One of the Marines called up and asked me what I could see. There were about 100-200 people Afghans still in the area. There was a large group huddled away from the blast, near the Barron Hotel. There were injured individuals littered around the area. The Brits had gone back to the Hotel for cover and the Taliban maintained their positions.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: Did you hear any small arms fire at the time of the blast?

(2) Answer: Yes. I heard shots coming from the direction of the Barron Hotel. It wasn't the Taliban firing. They were just sitting in lawn chairs on the containers at the chevron. I did hear that the Brits were firing at this time but I don't know if that is true or not.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Did you see any Marines fire?

(2) Answer: No. There was quite a bit of blast residue in the area but I could still see well enough. There was a guy walking around in a two-story building that I kept eyes on. I was hyper-focused on an attempt for follow-on attacks but didn't see anything to allude that this may occur.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: Did you feel any effects of the blast in the tower?

(2) Answer: I was hit with the typical concussive force but I didn't hear or see anything else. The force was strong enough to feel in my chest.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(6)



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), USA, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 15 October 2021

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 121 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 145 - (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 122 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 123 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 124 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 146 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 125 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 126 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 127 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 128 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 129 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 130 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 131 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 132 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 133 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

Exhibit 147

ACTS-SCK-DO

19 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6) USA, Command Sergeant Major, 82nd Airborne Division, 19 October 2021

1. On 19 October 2021, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USMC, conducted an interview of the above personnel at the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview which CSM Pitt answered individually.

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) describing the purpose of the interview, the scope of the investigation, and the manner in which the conversation would be captured and rendered to writing. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) was present to record and transcribe the statement.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question: What is your full name, what is a good email to send this transcript to? How long have you been the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) for?

(2) Answer: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) and please cc (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) I have been the CSM for 15 months now, since July of 2020.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question: When did you get in to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA)?

(2) Answer: I got on ground approximately 24-36 hours after MG Donahue.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question: When you hit the ground, what was the general atmosphere?

(2) Answer: When I got there, the rush on the airfield had dissipated. North Gate was still crazy, flashbangs were going over the wall, and we were still trying to push people back. Abbey Gate and all the other gates were overwhelmed. The Taliban had



Approved for Release

not set up an outer cordon, they and the National Strike Unit (NSU), wouldn't for another couple days. They were pushing up on the Gates and the walls, there was no standoff.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question: Leading up to the blast on the 26th, what was your assessment?

(2) Answer: We were at Abbey Gate on the 25th, and we were doing a walkthrough because we were going to take over that gate on the 27th. By the time the 26th happened, the NSU and the Taliban had pushed everyone back off the wall and the gates. By that time, they had everybody back and there was space between the crowds and the gates. The situation was more depressurized. The one thing I would say, if I could rename Abbey Gate, it would be the international gate. Marines did an outstanding job at Abbey Gate. North Gate was just Marines, West was just Army, and the terminal was just the 82nd.

(b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d The North Gate was very organized, but the amount of countries at Abbey Gate made it impossible to coordinate. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d There were so many entities there. The gate process wasn't a funnel, there was the gate, there was the canal, and there were (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d When you went to any other gate that was only U.S. run it was very scripted. When MG Donahue and I went to Abbey Gate, we were like "what the heck". When we were there other countries were just walking through with evacuees, and we didn't know who they were.

I don't fault the Marines for that. The Marines at North Gate were very scripted. They had a serpentine, minimized area that would have reduced exposure to an attack. Abbey Gate just had a large parking lot of people, there were people sitting inside the check point under cover that had been there for days waiting. There was no methodical checking system like there was at North or West Gate. To me, that is the failure. I don't want to say the attack was inevitable, but that was where the risk was. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d Marines at other gates may have been at risk one at a time, but not 30 people at a time the way they were at Abbey Gate. The Marines were just trying to make order out of chaos, they had to rely on the other host nations to check their people.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6) USA, Command Sergeant Major, 82nd Airborne Division, 19 October 2021

I wasn't there at the explosion, but I was there the day prior, and we did not know what the heck was going on. You couldn't identify friend from foe, there were people sleeping on cardboard inside the holding area, just waiting. At that point, faces and bags become familiar so you lose situational awareness. Everything started to look normal after 3 or 4 days, because that is the situation they were in at that gate. (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d Nobody stopped it.

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question: You weren't there on the day of the blast, but can you talk through your understanding of the actions during and after the blast, specifically tied to the 82nd?

(2) Answer: Prior to the explosion, my boss had told me to go over the mass casualty (MASCAL) plan. Doing that I looked at the route to the Role I, so I cleared the dead-lined vehicles from that route. I was there when they started bringing people in. It was organized chaos, everyone that wasn't occupied came down to help. I was very pleased with the effort from the Paratroopers and Marines. At Alvarado they took some as well, everyone was ready for the event, and their actions after the MASCAL showed it.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question: From your perspective, what was the characterization of Abbey Gate security?

(2) Answer: It wasn't the same as any other gate. The Marines may have been responsible for security, and you can say that they were responsible for security, but that's not really true if you have armed Polish, German, etc. forces present. At that point everyone is responsible for security. North, West, and South gate didn't have that problem, and it was evident. From the Mine-Resistant Armor Protected (MRAP) vehicle back the Marines were locked down and it was pretty tight, back behind that area it was very organized and you couldn't tell that there was chaos. Forward of that MRAP, about 50 meters in front of it, the area was out of control, there were too many countries. That 50 meters might actually have been 20, I'm not sure. Regardless, that gate was out of control because there were families so close to security.

h. Question and Answer 7.

(1) Question: When did you depart?

(2) Answer: I left with MG Donahue. I was the second to last guy on the plane.



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3) 130b, (b)(6) USA, Command Sergeant Major, 82nd Airborne Division, 19 October 2021

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question: Is there anything else that you think we need to capture?

(2) Answer: I think everyone needs to understand that Golf Company was doing an outstanding job. What they were being asked to do, was not in accordance with what anyone should have been asked. With that many countries operating in front of them, something wasn't bound to happen, but the risk was so high. Nobody was synchronized, but you still had to try to establish security. Security was left to the Marines, but how can you pull security without synchronization. I know that if Golf Company had the Gate by themselves that is not how they would have run the gate. If they could have, they would have shut that gate down, but they couldn't because there were so many countries. If you had been there, you would have seen that an attack was coming. It wasn't imminent, but it was a high probability. If you go to the gate, and go to the Barron Hotel it could have happened there. They had a whole crowd there, we couldn't believe it. The day after MG Donahue and I visited, we said that we were going to shut that gate down. It was so chaotic. People knew that gate was their opportunity to leave and they exploited it. Unfortunately that was at the cost of the Marines. But everyone that was there performed well in terms of the MASCAL from the Marines, to the Army, to the QRF, to the Role I, to the Role II. It was a tough day for Golf Company, but everyone worked well together. It was seamless, there was no friction. BGen Sullivan came to our updates every day, we were all synched. It was just a very bad incident.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 138 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 148 - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 139 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 140 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 141 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 142 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 143 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 144 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 145 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 146 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 147 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 148 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 149 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 150 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 151 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 152 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 153 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 154 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 155 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 156 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 149

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO 18 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, 18 October 2021

1. On 18 October 2021, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, conducted an interview of the above personnel at 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, Fort Bragg to discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. Approximately 30 minutes into the interview, BG Lance Curtis, USA, joined the interview to discuss a specific question.

2. Methodology: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) asked a series of questions throughout the interview, which (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) often answered collaboratively. When only one person provided an answer, it is annotated accordingly. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, recorded the interview for transcription below. The question asked by BG Curtis is annotated with (C1).

3. Discussion.

a. The interview began with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) providing an overview of scope of the investigation, which included the fact-finding concerning actions before, during, and after the attack, chronology, leadership, task organization, force protection, gate operations, and medical operations. He stated the intent was to make notes of the conversation and prepare a memorandum of the statement. The subject would have the opportunity to review and make additions, add context, or remove anything not correctly captured and rendered to writing.

b. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. When did you get to HKIA?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) 18-19 August during the period of darkness.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. What is the atmosphere at HKIA when you arrived?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) They told us on the flight to lock but not load weapons, full battle rattle, eye pro, ear pro, but no one really knew what to expect. We had a few aircraft maintenance issues along the way which caused several delays. There was a

Approved for Release

little issue in Bangor, Maine and also a few issues in Ramstein, Germany. Everything was pretty much like every deployment, where stuff happens.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) In (b)(1)1.4a because the situation changed so rapidly, there were issues with who needed to be where and what supplies were needed where.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) They would send a blast over Signal for the manifest of people that would leave/stay in (b)(1)1.4a until they could get another flight.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Ambassador Bass joined on our flight with three others. They rearranged the manifest a few times to get them on.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. What were the conditions like when you landed?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) It was fairly calm with sporadic gun fire. We were kind of waiting for someone to come get us. They came by with a bus and box truck to pick us up. They brought us to the All American DFAC where we would be sleeping.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) It wasn't too bad because of the air conditioning, when it worked.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. What medical capabilities did you have when you got on ground?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Not much for the 82nd. There were elements of the (b)(6) who arrived two days after us, about the 20th, but they arrived without their equipment. The most important thing was the Role II-E, was already established. It provided the more important services such as the lab, were in a permanent structure, and had the CT machine. It took us about a day or two to get linked in with everyone in the medical community. We had a nightly medical sync with the Germans and British who also had Role II capabilities as well.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Some of the equipment that was supposed to come didn't arrive due to things rapidly changing, and off-loading.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Due to the nature of Airborne Operations, we are expected to go into an area with minimal amount of equipment. There is a small portion of the medical team that would jump in, which means they are on their own for about 72 hours, to build combat power. They were prioritized initially because we were going into something that we didn't know fully know about in the first place. I don't think we really needed all the equipment because we still had the Role II-E, which was a much better facility. It's like having a small tent field hospital on the airfield and having Womack next door. We would rather go to Womack.

Approved for Release

f. Question and Answer 5.

(1) Question. When did the Role II get stood up?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) I would say about the 23rd, which would have been Monday. After the meeting on the 19th, I was meeting with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) about two to three times a day to give him intel briefs, threat updates, retrograde information, and how we were going to support them to leave. Each day our plan changed a little bit as thing progressed. The first couple of days MG Donahue was adamant that we were going to be hit with a MASCAL.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) It would change the way we were looking at retrograde. Once the threat level went up, we change the way we were going to do the retrograde.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) We weren't able to keep up with the NEO with our own medical assets. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) realized this and stated that we needed to stay a little longer to help out. The problem now is that we are running out of real estate, because of all the support we had. We had two Special Operations Surgical Teams (SOST), one coming from (b)(1)1.4a and the other coming from Eglin Air Force Base, insert into HKIA, and two Surgical Resuscitation Teams (SRT) with our Role II. This created four surgical teams plus TF MED (Air Force) had a team. We were now looking at each team's capabilities in reference to how we would have them retrograde. One FSRD was redeployed early. We deployed with our Role II, the 246th, which was assigned to the 82nd's IRF duties. The 936th was already at HKIA.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Each one of these teams have a slightly different capabilities so we were looking at which teams made the most since while retrograding.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) People were just hanging around until the end. We were coming up toward the end where we were running out of aircraft and space for equipment. The SOST is designed to conduct surgery on the ramp of a C-17, so it made the most since they would stay for the JTE.

g. Question and Answer 6.

(1) Question. How much interaction did you have at the Role 2-E?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Too much; I was probably annoying them towards the end. I would just go down and talk to them to see how they were doing. I would check on the class VIII status, blood status, and if they needed any additional assistance.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Everyone from the Pentagon on down was asking us about blood and class VIII.

h Question and Answer 7.

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6), USA, 18 October 2021

(1) Question. (C1) Did your team find any fishing weights in the bodies of the injured/KIA?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) There were ball bearings that some of the surgeons were able to remove. There were no small arms or fishing weights that were pulled out of people. If you imagine how the blast happened, when we took off the plates, the female Marine just got peppered. It had come up from underneath the plates. Her spinal cord was either compressed or cut. Big pieces were torn off her extremities. I was more concerned with how the pattern impacted along her spine. Was there one or two detonations? Was she laying down? Because that is how it kind of looked. Did the plates save her? Probably yes. I think her injuries were mainly due to the angle of the projectile entering her body.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) The small girl we worked on wasn't a gunshot wound. If it was it would have been a completely different injury. You could see the pattern was more like a ball that skirted around her skull.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) There was one person that we left a ball bearing in their forearm, because it would have caused more damage to get it out than to leave it in. I did not pull out any small arms from people. There were people calling it out from other rooms, but not from what I saw. The size was about the size of a marble.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) The ball bearings were maybe a quarter inch in size.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Depending on the proximity of the blast some were able to go through and through. They were mostly in the extremities due to the depth and distance. It would be pretty easy for them to go through.

i. Question and Answer 8.

(1) Question. What did you think of the triage prior to arrival at the Role-IIE?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) I think they did great. Everyone that came in was mostly likely going to die no matter the lifesaving measures taken. We did some heroic saving on some of the Marines.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) There were some that had multisystem trauma that you couldn't save.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) There was one Marine named Hunter that we put into the expectant category and moved him off to the side. He eventually passed away. It was important that we prioritized getting people in so that we could stabilize each person. There were a few that we were able to save like (b)(6). We didn't have their real names so we identified them through the trauma system. There should have been about three people that should have died, but didn't.

Approved for Release

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) We had a lot of things going for us. We had a lot of experience on our teams plus all the other teams helping us.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) We had orthopedic, trauma, critical care, general surgery, O-5 and above in charge of those sections. The only limited factor was bed spacing. We were doing everything we could to use all the real estate we had. We had enough supplies, but we didn't have anywhere to store it. We reorganized the Class VIII with our Norwegian teammates to get it all cleaned out just in time. Would it have mattered if we had more class 8 or personnel? No, because we had all we needed. Did we need more people? No, we had a lot of experience on the team and plenty of people.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) Everything pretty much shutdown while we were doing the triage operations after the blast. Everyone was helping take care of the wounded.

j. Question and Answer 9.

(1) Question. Was there a helicopter doing a CASEVAC?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) No, not that we knew about.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) It could have been at the other camp.

j. Question and Answer 10.

(1) Question. What number of patients were medically evacuated?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) The first flights came with two Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATT) that took six vented patients with an additional 12 wounded, all US, to Landstuhl. There was second flight that came in and took Afghans to (b)(1)1.4a and a third departed for Landstuhl. The first flight took every American that was stabilized, besides the one that was in the OR. This was probably the largest evacuation in a single lift during all of GWOT. Anyone that was stable and on a ventilator went on this first flight. I think the total amount that we were able to return to duty was seven. As

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) As for overall number of evacuated, you would have to ask (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) He kept the names confidential for casualty notification purposes.

l. Question and Answer 11.

(1) Question. Anything you think should be considered or known for the investigation?

(2) Answer. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) When was the first notification/arrival to the hospital? This was one of the things I wish I had done better. Why didn't I put a piece of tap on me or something to document?



Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, and (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) USA, 18 October 2021

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) When we got the notification of the blast I had time to walk over to the Role IIE and walked back to the JOC. By the time I returned to the Role II-E, we were receiving patients, which was within about 15 minutes.

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) The Air Force would have the exact time of the wheels up and down. It was about 14 hours between getting the first patient to the last.

(b)(3) 50 U.S.C. 3024(i) We were fortunate we had already requested mortuary affairs. We were running into issues on how we would handle the dead Afghan bodies. We had identified that we didn't have enough space, so we had to use the Refrigerator Container as a possible freezer space for the additional remains.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 163 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 150 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 164 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 165 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 166 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 167 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 168 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 169 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 170 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 171 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 151 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 172 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 173 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 174 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 175 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 176 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 177 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 178 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 179 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 152 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Page 8 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Page 10 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 12 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 14 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 15 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Page 17 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 18 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 153 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Page 8 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 10 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 12 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 14 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 15 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 17 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 18 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 21 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 154 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 8 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 10 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 12 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 14 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 15 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 17 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 18 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 21 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

# JTF COMMANDER'S PLACEMAT | HKIA BATTLE SPACE FRAMEWORK

Exhibit 155

CAO: 23AUG 2021_0600L

**Force Composition:**

- ❑ JTF-CR HQ (83)
- ❑ 24MEU (1,250)
  - BLT 1/8
  - A, B, C, WPNS Co
  - CAAT, LAR, MRF
  - CLB 24
- ❑ SPMAGTF-CR-CC (785)
  - E, F, G, WPNS Co, STP
- ❑ 10th MTN DIV
- 2-30 INF (TF Wild Boar)
  - HHC BDE (SAF)
- ❑ 82 ABN DIV
  - 1-82 ABN BDE
  - 1-504 INF Bn
    - A, B, C, D, WPNS Co
  - 2-504 INF Bn
    - A, B, C, D, WPNS Co
  - 2-501 INF Bn
  - 1-194 INF Bn
  - 3-319 AFAR
  - 4-31 INF (TF Polar Bear)






Approved for Release

230600AUG






Approved for Release

Page 244 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 156 - (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 245 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 246 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 157 - (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 247 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 248 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 158 - (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 249 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 250 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 159 - (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 251 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 252 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 160 - (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 253 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 161, (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 162,(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(5)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 163

| Rank | L Name | F Name | EDIPI |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSgt | Hoover | Darin | (b)(6) |
| Sgt | Gee | Nicole | |
| Sgt | RosarioPichardo | Johanny | |
| Cpl | Lopez | Hunter | |
| Cpl | Page | Daegan | |
| Cpl | Sanchez | Humberto | |
| LCpl | Espinoza | David | |
| LCpl | McCollum | Rylee | |
| LCpl | Merola | Dylan | |
| LCpl | Nikoui | Kareem | |
| LCpl | Schmitz | Jared | |
| HN | Soviak | Maxton | |

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 164 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Exhibit 165

# ISIS-K suicide bomber who carried out deadly Kabul airport attack had been released from prison days earlier

By Oren Liebermann and Natasha Bertrand, CNN
Updated 11:38 AM ET, Wed October 6, 2021

**(CNN) —** The ISIS-K suicide bomber who carried out a terrorist attack at Kabul international airport in late August, killing 13 US service members and dozens of Afghans, had been released from a prison near Kabul just days earlier when the Taliban took control of the area, according to three US officials.

Two US officials, as well as Rep. Ken Calvert, a California Republican who said he had been briefed by national security officials, said the suicide bomber was released from the Parwan prison at Bagram air base. The US controlled the base until it abandoned Bagram in early July. It had turned over the prison to Afghan authorities in 2013.

CNN politics • LIVE TV

perimeter of the airport.

**Related Article:** Women in Kabul return to work, school and the streets, in defiance of the Taliban

The Parwan prison at Bagram, along with the Pul-e-Charkhi prison near Kabul, housed several hundred members of ISIS-K, as well as thousands of other prisoners when the Taliban took control of both facilities hours before taking over the capital with barely a shot fired in mid-August, a regional counter-terrorism source told CNN at the time. The Taliban emptied out both prisons, releasing their own members who had been imprisoned but also members of ISIS-K, which is the terror group's affiliate in Afghanistan.

Eleven days later, on August 26, it was one of those prisoners who carried out the suicide bombing at Abbey Gate, killing the 13 US service members, including 11 Marines, one soldier and one sailor. They would be the last US troops killed in Afghanistan as part of America's longest war.

As of Tuesday, one Marine injured in the attack remains in a serious but stable condition at Walter Reed Military Medical Center near Washington, the Marine Corps said in a statement. Another Marine is receiving care at a specialty facility, while 16 others are receiving outpatient treatment.

## Two US officials confirmed attacker's identity

ISIS-K took credit for the attack and named the suicide bomber as Abdul Rehman Al-Loghri. Two US officials confirmed the identity of the attacker. FirstPost, an English-language news site based in India, was first to report that he had been released from the Bagram prison.

Approved for Release

WHAT MATTERS

Sign up for **CNN What Matters Newsletter**

Every day we summarize What Matters and deliver it straight to your inbox.

Sign Me Up

No Thanks



The rapid transition from released prisoner to suicide bomber highlights the dangers Afghanistan could pose without a US military presence on the ground to monitor the latest developments in the country. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley said the threat from Afghanistan is currently lower than it was after the 9/11 attack, but he warned that conditions "could be set" for a reconstitution of al Qaeda or ISIS-K.

"It's a real possibility in the not too distant future -- six,12, 18, 24, 36 months that kind of timeframe -- for reconstitution of al Qaeda or ISIS," Milley said at Capitol Hill hearing last week, "and it's our job now, under different conditions, to protect the American citizens against attacks from Afghanistan."

**Related Article:** Five takeaways from senior military leaders' testimony on Afghanistan

Calvert, who serves as the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, represented one of those killed in the suicide attack, Marine Corps Lance Corporal Kareem Nikoui. In a statement released last month, Calvert said he was briefed by national security officials on the identity of the suicide bomber and his release from Bagram prison.

In the statement, Calvert said the "disastrous" handling of the withdrawal "led to a series of events that culminated with the tragic loss of life on August 26th outside of the Kabul airport. Thirteen Americans, including one of my constituents, were killed because of the poor judgement and execution of our troop withdrawal."

The Biden administration faced widespread criticism for its withdrawal from Bagram, not only because of the decision to abandon a sprawling military complex that was the heart of the US military operations in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, but also for the way in which it was done.

Some Afghan officials said the US left the base in the middle of the night with little warning. The Pentagon insisted there had been communication and coordination about the handover of the base about 48 hours before the US left, but that the exact time of the final departure from Bagram was never given to the Afghan government.

## Majority of Bagram prisoners were terrorists

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 1840 02/02/22
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



Approved for Release

The US handed Bagram Air Base over to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) on July 1, as the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan neared 90% completion.

At the time, there were approximately 5,000 prisoners at Bagram, an Afghan Ministry of Defense spokesman told CNN. A few hundred were criminals, but the vast majority were terrorists, the spokesman said, including members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. There were also foreign prisoners from Pakistan, Chechnya, and the Middle East detained there. It was up to the Afghans to secure the compound.

As the US was turning over Bagram to the ANDSF, the Taliban accelerated their sweep across the country, claiming to control 150 of Afghanistan's 407 districts by July 5. It was a sign of things to come, as provincial capitals began falling to the Taliban offensive in rapid succession. By mid-August, the Taliban were on the doorstep of Kabul and the complete collapse of the Afghan military was virtually complete.

CNN politics • LIVE TV

**Related Article:** 'Still waiting for what is to come for us': American University of Afghanistan students face fear and uncertainty

On August 15, the day former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani secretly fled the country, the Taliban reached the capital city, taking control of Bagram air base and the Pul-e-Charkhi prison facility.

In releasing the prisoners, the Taliban introduced another threat into an already chaotic environment, just as thousands for an attack at the airport and a threat from ISIS-K, and the State Department repeatedly cautioned American citizens to stay from the airport or certain gates.

The Taliban also viewed ISIS-K as an enemy, despite releasing some of their number from the prisons at Bagram air base and Pul-e-Charkhi.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin acknowledged in Capitol Hill hearings last week that the Pentagon was surprised by the collapse of the Afghan military within 11 days. But in his opening statements in the hearings, Austin defended the decision to leave Bagram.

"Retaining Bagram would have required putting as many as five thousand U.S. troops in harm's way, just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed little to the mission that we had been assigned, and that was to protect and defend our embassy which was some 30 miles away," he said. "Staying at Bagram -- even for counter- terrorism purposes -- meant staying at war in Afghanistan, something that the President made clear that he would not do."

*CNN's Katie Bo Lillis and Tim Lister contributed to this report.*

Search CNN...

US

World

Politics

Business

Approved for Release

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545 1841 02/02/22

(Abbey Gate Investigation)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL**
**HEADQUARTERS, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION**
**FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28310-5000**

AFVC-CG 08 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: JTF-82 EXSUM Operation Allies Refuge

1. EXSUM for JTF-82 at Hamid Karzai Airport (HKIA), Afghanistan from 16 to 30 August, 2021.

2. Commander's EXSUM.

a. We are proud to be part of the CENTCOM, USFOR-A, JTF-CR, Interagency, and Coalition partners team that, over the course of twenty days, was able to retrograde approx. 9,500 US, Coalition, and over 124,000 evacuees and AMCITS. We did so in an extremely complex environment that challenged us and required us to accomplish a wide-range of interdependent tasks against multiple timelines. The team not only synchronized efforts across multiple USG and Coalition organizations, but also ensured and maintained Taliban compliance with an international spotlight on our efforts.

b. The summary that follows covers some of JTF-82's key events. We will publish a follow-on document that captures the complete detailed account of the events and efforts not covered in this summary.

c. The 82nd Airborne Division was alerted and started the process to deploy IRF1 on 12 1600Z AUG in support of USFOR-A and JTF-CR. Subsequently, our DTAC and support elements were alerted and deployed. Within 72 hours IRF1 arrived on the ground in HKIA and the 82nd Airborne Forces continued to flow in over the next several days. The team's main priority was to ensure USFOR-A could evacuate AMCITs, SIVs, Coalition members, and Afghan partners. Our initial key tasks were:

- Secure the airhead
- Support the NEO
- Plan to retrograde all personnel and equipment
- Plan and execute the Joint Tactical Exfil (JTE)

d. To accomplish our mission, we quickly assessed the need to synchronize SOF, DoS, (b)(1)1.4c JTF-CR, and USFOR-A, and Coalition forces. With the approval of USFOR-A, we established a battle rhythm to drive this alignment.

e. Previous relationships also played a critical role in quickly aligning unity of effort. I served with the USFOR-A and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) commanders in various organizations over the

Approved for Release

preceding years. Ambassador Bass and CdA Wilson also worked with myself and this group of commanders during their time at the embassy. Finally, I had existing relationships with the international SOF commanders from previous SOF assignments and my time as the NSOCC-A commander. These relationships served as a foundation of trust and enabled us to communicate, establish and maintain shared understanding, and work through the complexities of the mission.

f. From a security perspective, we assessed the Taliban were unable to control the population on HKIA which hampered AMCIT access to the gates. We were also concerned about miscalculation between Taliban and Coalition forces in an environment of an increasing ISIS-K threat. Based on this assessment, we met with Taliban to:

- Establish a position of tactical advantage over the Taliban to ensure mission success and force protection
- Establish conditions for AMCITs/SIVs/Coalition citizens/At-risk Afghans to get to the Taliban and through the gates
- Prevent miscalculation by the Taliban
- Build a bridge for future AMCIT/Coalition departures
- Address multiple threats and risk that included large crowds at HKIA and ISIS-K
- Share intel on emerging threats
- These efforts allowed us to continue the evacuation efforts up until the final hour of our departure and deescalate potential flashpoints during the operation.

g. Based on the scope and scale of the challenges we faced, USFOR-A decided to retain control of JTF-CR. Our biggest challenge was to balance our initial four key tasks with the critical tasks outlined below, while maintaining the right amount of capability and capacity on HKIA for security and to conduct a JTE by 31 August. We also had to be prepared to extend beyond 31 August or resume operations if required.

h. As the mission evolved, we managed the CUOPs fight, executed the retrograde, managed the A/DACG, opened three additional gates, prepared for and executed the JTE, and were prepared to resume offensive operations to retake the Kabul Bowl, while managing the below:

- Demilitarize all military and strategic equipment
- Conduct an operational clearance of all personnel and military equipment
- Build capacity at the gates (opened three gates) and airfield
- Establish a battle rhythm to align efforts across coalition, DoS, and DoD, which included AM/PM ambassador working groups, KLEs, US Military/Coalition/MNCC WG, and planning touch points/briefs for all parties
- Establish and maintain dominance over the Taliban and enforce their cooperation
- Reopen the international airfield for commercial traffic



Approved for Release

- Mitigate several threats while maintaining capability and capacity to deal with any contingency
- Prepare for contingences

i. Risk to mission remained high throughout the operation. As an example, each night we had approximately fifty Afghans breach the perimeter –each breach required our service members to assume the civilian had an SVEST, yet maintain restraint and avoid CIVCAS. We planned for multiple contingencies, to include downed aircraft scenarios, MASCAL, and possible hostage situations.

j. We assessed ISIS-K was attempting to conduct SVEST, VBIED, and indirect fire attacks all way up to and during our final departure. At 1741 on 26 August ISIS-K executed a suicide bomber attack on Abbey Gate, killing thirteen US service members, injuring twenty-two more, and causing more than 170 Afghan civilian casualties due. The response to the MASCAL was as close to as rehearsed as possible due to a number of rehearsals, based on current threat, prior to the attack. We remain grateful for the efforts of Norwegian medical professionals and Special Operations Surgical Team who provided care for the wounded.

k. We also assessed ISIS-K launched five rockets on the morning of 30AUG. 2x HKIA CRAMs successfully interdicted one of the rocket rounds which caused it to fail to detonate vicinity the Airhead line. EOD responded and rendered safe 2x warheads. ISIS-K also attempted to attack coalition forces and aircraft parked on HKIA the evening of 30 AUG just prior to the JTE. However, we assessed they were unsuccessful due to the actions and monitoring by the US and Taliban.

l. We wanted to build a bridge into the future and focused efforts to posture the international airport to continue evacuation post 31 AUG. In support of the State Department, we met with Taliban representatives to lay the groundwork for them to continue to allow AMCITS, coalition citizens, and SIV holders to depart Afghanistan. We ensured critical airport terminal and equipment was preserved, such as the firetruck and airplane stairs, and that the airfield was fully operational prior to the Qatari team arriving. We brought in a Qatari Airfield Inspection team to the civilian terminal and facilitated their inspection of the facility to ensure it was capable of continuing international flights once the military transitioned control of HKIA. Based on US efforts and those of the Qataris, the airport remains operational.

m. At end state, we were able to retrograde all equipment (minus a few pieces of inoperable military equipment and a HMMWV) by 28 AUG. This was largely in part due the US military/coalition working group efforts, which brought together fifteen US military units and over 18 nations to synchronized demilitarization, clearing, security transitions, end of mission timelines, and complete the retrograde of pax and equipment.



Approved for Release

n. Final retrograde was 169 pieces of major US equipment, including vehicles, artillery, rotary wing aircraft, and mission command systems as well as 2xMD-530s.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

p. Clearance Operations ensured all personnel departed HKIA and no sensitive equipment was left behind. It was a 3 phased operation beginning on 20 AUG with final clearance on 30 AUG prior to JTE.

q. In the final 24 hours on HKIA, our priority remained keeping the gates open to ensure all AMCITS/SIVs could be evacuated. We prepared to and postured to receive any last minute AMCITs and escort them directly to HKIA up until our departure. The last main body departed HKIA at 1621D, leaving 807 personnel (803 JTF-82, 4 DOS) to execute the JTE.

r. The JTE was the result of a detailed joint planning effort and multiple rehearsals between then 82nd Airborne HQ, CENTCOM components, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a. First, we repositioned the PRTF to (b)(1)1.4a to ensure full PR coverage. Next, we demilitarized the HKIA servers, which triggered the displacement of JTF-82 mission command TAC to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a compound to oversee the JTE. During the last two hours of the JTE, TF CRAM demilitarized the final two CRAMs. The JTE force then moved to the airhead line, maintained a reduced security posture, and loaded the five remaining C17s. The threat of RPG, machine gun fire, and IDF increased leading up to the JTE. The last US Soldier stepped aboard the last C17 and departed HKIA at 2359D on 30 AUG.

s. Throughout the operation, AMCIT/coalition recovery remained a priority for the task force at HKIA. During this operation, fifteen US military units and over eighteen nations came together as a team to successfully retrograde approximately 9,500 US coalition and over 124,000 evacuees and AMCITS from HKIA by AUG 31, 2021.

**End of EXSUM**



Approved for Release

Exhibit 167
USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0546
(Abbey Gate Investigation)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
02/02/22

Exhibit 168
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Exhibit 169
(b)(6)

Exhibit 170

Archive Request

Approved for Release

Approved for

Approved for Release




Approved for Release

Approved for

Exhibit 176

Exhibit 177
(b)(3):130b; (b)(6)

Exhibit 178
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)(130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)(130b; (b)(6)

Page 26 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 179 (b)(1)1.4b

Approved for Release

Work Product

Exhibit 181
(b)(3)|130b; (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Exhibit 182

Approved for Release

Page 30 redacted for the following reason:
---
Exhibit 183 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Page 31 redacted for the following reason:
Exhibit 184 (b)(3)130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)A

Approved for Release

Exhibit 185

Approved for Release

Exhibit 186
(b)(3)130b (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Approved for release

Page 35 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 188 (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 37 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 190 (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Page 38 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 191 (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Exhibit 192
(b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)
USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)
1871
02/02/22

Exhibit 193

Approved for Release

Page 41 redacted for the following reason:
Exhibit 194 (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)(A)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 43 redacted for the following reason:
----------
Exhibit 196 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Exhibit 197
(b)(3):130b; (b)(6)
(b)(3):130b; (b)(6)
Approved for Release

Exhibit 198

Exhibit 199
Approved for
USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

Approved for Use

Exhibit 201

Exhibit 202
Approved
Evidence

Approved for Release

Exhibit 204
Approved
(b)(3)(B)
(b)(3)(B)
1883

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 223 (b)(1)1.4c

Approved for Release

Exhibit 224

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

21 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Exhibit 224, SUBJECT: Interview with Psychological Operations Non-Commissioned Officers Group Interview and Sketch

1. On 19 October 2021, Army Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) from the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) group were gathered for an interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) concerning the attack at Abbey Gate on 26 August 2021. At the conclusion of the interview, I had the NCOs diagram the location of Soldiers at the time of the attack and who was KIA.

2. Using paper and a pen, Exhibit 224 was collaboratively sketched by (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6). Both are members of the Army PSYOP group present at HKIA.

3. Each participant was instructed to only rely on their direct memory and not what they heard from others. They were also instructed to categorize the certainty of their memory. The sketch was drawn with definitive locations or uncertain locations for the location of Soldiers and a service member who was KIA.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or at (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release




Approved for Release

Page 55 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 225 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 56 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 226 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(7)(A), (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 57 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 227 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 58 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 228 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 59 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 229 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 60 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 230 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 61 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 231 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 62 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 232 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 63 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 233 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 64 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 234 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 65 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 235 (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 66 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 236 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 67 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 68 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Page 69 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

Page 70 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

Exhibit 237

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO, AE 09366

ACTS-SCK-DO

27 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Follow up interview with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 27 October 2021

1. On 27 October 2021, Brigadier General Lance Curtis contacted (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) via the Signal App to clarify the previous conversation captured in Exhibit 106 on 13 October 2021.

2. Methodology: BG Curtis asked a serious of questions to clarify (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) statement from 13 October 2021, specifically with regard to which direction warning shots were fired at Abbey Gate on 26 August. BG Curtis used the context from the prior statements to ask generic questions on an unclassified medium. (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) responded, using prior context. The conversation is captured below, with minor corrections for clarity.

3. Discussion.

a. Question and Answer 1.

(1) Question. Was the guy in the ball cap at the bridge, or closer to the sniper tower, and peeking over the inner corridor wall when (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) fired the four warning shots?

(2) Answer. We believe he was standing on the bridge, he was deep away from the blast sight when it detonated.

c. Question and Answer 2.

(1) Question. Was he peeking over the wall when warning shots were fired, and how far away was (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) from him when firing?

(2) Answer. Yes, his bust (shoulders to top of the ball cap) was clearly visible over the wall to us. We were approximately 30-40 meters from him.

d. Question and Answer 3.

(1) Question. Was he peeking into the inner corridor on the near side (the side of the canal with the sniper tower and closest to the Marines) of the canal?

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Follow up Signal chat with (b)(3)130b, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a 27 October 2021

(2) Answer. He was staring straight down towards the detonation site and the entrance of our interior corridor of the Abbey Gate.

e. Question and Answer 4.

(1) Question. Towards the Barron Hotel? And the bridge closer to the Barron?

(2) Answer. He was standing closer to the bridge, or on it. It was the foot bridge area close to the Barron Hotel.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) and (b)(3)130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b, (b)(6)
LANCE G. CURTIS
BG, US Army
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Page 73 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 238 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 74 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 75 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 76 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 239 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 77 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 78 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 240 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 79 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 80 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 81 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 241 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 3 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 5 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 242 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 6 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 8 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 243 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 9 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 10 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 12 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 13 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 14 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 15 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 17 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 244 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 18 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 21 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 245 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 23 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 24 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 25 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 26 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 27 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 246 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Exhibit 247

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
**3RD SUSTAINMENT COMMAND (EXPEDITIONARY)**
**CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT**
**APO, AE 09366**

ACTS-SCK-DO

29 October 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Follow up Interview with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) 3/10 IBCT, (b)(1)1.4a 29 October 2021

1. On 29 October 2021, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) conducted a telephonic interview with (b)(6) (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) 3/10 IBCT to clarify the task organization and activities of his subordinate units at HKIA during August 2021. (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) previous statement is Exhibit 126, captured on 18 October 2021.

2. Summary of Interview.

a. Both TF Wild Boar (2-30 INF BN) and TF Polar Bear (4-31 INF BN) were task organized under (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) had TACON over both TFs. By 17 August, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) had no direct/operational command responsibilities for these units and focused almost solely on USFOR-A FWD Chief of Staff responsibilities.

b. TF Polar Bear was a mounted truck company and employed as QRF for HKIA. The TF had LNO's in the JTF-CR JOC. 1/82 IBCT ultimately controlled when they were commited to execute tasks. TF Polar Bear depated HKIA on 26 August.

c. TF Wild Boar was also employed as a QRF by 1/82, but performed targeted personnel recovery at gates at the direction of the MNCC or ICC. 1/82 IBCT would approve the tasking to assist the MNCC/ICC if operational requirements permitted. When TF Polar Bear departed, TF Wild Boar became the sole QRF on HKIA and continued assisting the MNCC/ICC.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) or (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release

ACTS-SCK-DO
SUBJECT: Follow up Signal chat with (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a 27 October 2021

Approved for Release

Page 30 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 248, (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 31 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 249 (b)(5)

Approved for Release

Page 32 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 250 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)130b; (b)(5), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/us/politics/marines-kabul-airport-attack.html

Exhibit 251

# As U.S. Troops Searched Afghans, a Bomber in the Crowd Moved In

Officials are still piecing together the chain of events in the attack that killed scores of people, including 13 U.S. service members, outside the Kabul airport.

By Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

Published Aug. 27, 2021 Updated Oct. 3, 2021

WASHINGTON — The suicide bomber waited until the last possible moment, U.S. officials said.

A crowd straining to get into Hamid Karzai International Airport had converged on Abbey Gate, a main entryway patrolled by Marines and other service members. The troops knew that they could be targeted in an attack; just the day before, the State Department had warned of a "credible" threat at three gates at the airport, where more than 5,000 American troops had helped to evacuate more than 100,000 people in less than two weeks. Abbey Gate was on the list.

Airport security had closed two of the gates, but decided to leave Abbey Gate open, U.S. officials said.

They also said that, earlier in the day, Taliban commanders and fighters patrolling checkpoints along the airport route twice pushed back surging crowds, but they came back again.

That third time, someone else came with them.

At 5:48 p.m., the bomber, wearing a 25-pound explosive vest under clothing, walked up to the group of Americans who were frisking people hoping to enter the complex. He waited, officials said, until just before he was about to be searched by the American troops. And then he detonated the bomb, which was unusually large for a suicide vest, killing himself and igniting an attack that would leave dozens of people dead, including 13 American service members.

"This is close-up war — the breath of the person you are searching is upon you," Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of United States Central Command, said on Thursday after the attack, describing the face-to-face contact between Marines at the airport gate and Afghans they must search before allowing them to enter.

Pentagon officials said they were still piecing together the chain of events that took place at Abbey Gate on Thursday. There will be after-action reviews and storyboards with detailed lists of what led up to that moment. There will be questions: Why were so many service members grouped so close together? How did the bomber evade the Taliban checkpoints? Did someone let him through?

U.S. military forces conducted their first reprisal strike in Afghanistan since the attack on Friday, "an over-the-horizon counterterrorism operation" in the Nangarhar Province "against an ISIS-K planner," said Capt. Bill Urban, a spokesman for U.S. Central Command, referring to the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State that claimed responsibility for Thursday's attack.

"Initial indications are that we killed the target," he said. "We know of no civilian casualties."

As the scope of the damage from Thursday's bombing became clearer, health officials in Kabul raised the death toll, saying at least 170 people had been killed. Afghans seeking to escape Taliban rule continued to stream to the airport on Friday, but the size of the crowd was estimated in the hundreds, down from the thousands who were there when the blast occurred. The airport remained largely locked down, although evacuation flights continued.

Just after 2 p.m. Friday, as another gray-tailed U.S. aircraft lifted into the sky from the airport, this one carrying the flag-draped coffins of the 13 Americans, the anguish from Thursday's bombing spread from Kabul to Kansas. At the mortuary at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, service members were bracing for the ritual of dressing and preparing yet another group of American troops killed in Afghanistan.

Approved for Release

"I'm never been one for politics and I'm not going to start now," Marilyn Soviak, the sister of Maxton Soviak, a Navy corpsman from Ohio who was among the dead, posted on Instagram. "What I will say is that my beautiful, intelligent, beat-to-the-sound of his own drum, annoying, charming baby brother was killed yesterday helping to save lives."

**Updates on Afghanistan** Sign up for a daily email with the latest news on the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. Get it sent to your inbox.

Just after the bomb went off, Defense Department officials said, fighters nearby began firing weapons. The officials said that some of the Americans and Afghans at Abbey Gate might have been hit by that gunfire. There was so much confusion in the aftermath of the explosion that the military initially reported that a second suicide bombing had taken place at nearby Baron Hotel. That turned out to be false, according to Maj. Gen. Hank Taylor, the Joint Staff deputy director for regional operations.

At 25 pounds, the vest worn by the suicide bomber did untold damage. According to Army manuals, suicide bombers typically wear either a belt containing 10 pounds or less of explosives, or a vest packed with 10 to 20 pounds of explosives. With a 25-pound vest that included pieces of metal that acted as lethal shrapnel, the bomber also wounded dozens of Afghans, as well as 14 additional American troops, who were medevacked to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center near the Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

From the moment last month that Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III ordered a Marine Expeditionary Unit from the U.S.S. Iwo Jima to disembark in Kuwait and be ready to help with evacuations in the event that Kabul fell to a surging Taliban, it has been clear to American troops that they could once again end up on the front lines of a war in Afghanistan that has been declared finished by a succession of presidents.

It did not take long for Hamid Karzai International Airport to transform from a commercial hub to the final defensive position for the U.S. military, which had once surged tens of thousands of troops to far-flung corners of Afghanistan. Apache gunships circled overhead, and Marine quick-reaction forces orbited the perimeter. In the command center, feeds from drones and surveillance cameras piped in infrared images of crowds massing at the gates.

**Understand the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan**

**Who are the Taliban?** The Taliban arose in 1994 amid the turmoil that came after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. They used brutal public punishments, including floggings, amputations and mass executions, to enforce their rules. Here's more on their origin story and their record as rulers.

The Marines who were patrolling Abbey Gate on Thursday had arrived in Kabul about a week earlier. They were fresh, and linked up with their British paratrooper counterparts with one goal in mind: Get as many people through as possible. That meant using an interpreter and a loudspeaker to persuade a surging crowd to move back, a painstaking task that allowed the Marines to open two entry points.

The fall of Kabul had unleashed a tsunami of phone calls, emails and desperate texts from the foreign organizations that had worked in Afghanistan over the past 20 years, all imploring the Pentagon for help getting their Afghan workers and allies evacuated. Other people who worked with Afghans, including teachers who visited schools in Afghanistan, joined American senators, media chiefs and the heads of global organizations in asking for help for their former partners, who are in danger of Taliban reprisals.

The requests reached the American troops at Kabul airport. "The Marines who died were the ones who were helping our team," said Cori Shepherd, a filmmaker who once helped Afghan girls come to school in the United States. "These men were quite literally going into the masses and pulling our women to safety, while coordinating with our guy to find them.

Approved for Release

The men who worked Abbey Gate were brave beyond measure."

U.S. Marines guarding the perimeter of Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on Sunday. Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times

Rear Adm. Peter G. Vasely, a former member of the Navy SEALs running the airport operation, asked Taliban commanders to check people heading toward Abbey Gate more closely, the officials said. The Taliban, General McKenzie told reporters on Thursday, may have "thwarted" other attempts.

But in the end, "there's no substitute for a young man or woman — a young United States man or woman — standing up there conducting a search of that person before we let him in," General McKenzie said.

The effort to get vulnerable people out of Afghanistan will continue, he said. "Because that is why we are there."

John Ismay contributed reporting.

Approved for Release

Exhibit 252

**AFGHANISTAN** | UPDATED AUG. 27, 2021

# Biden Vows Retribution for Kabul Attack That Killed 13 Americans

*By Paola Rosa-Aquino and Matt Stieb*



(Abbey Gate investigation)

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545

A victim being treated after the attacks. Photo: Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

An explosion triggered by a suicide bomber ripped through crowds outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on Thursday, killing 13 U.S. service members and as many as 170 Afghans a— marking the deadliest day for American troops in Afghanistan since 2011. ISIS-K, the Afghanistan branch of Islamic State, claimed responsibility for the attacks. At least 15 American service members and more than 200 Afghans were wounded.

**encer**

ows Retribution for Kabul Attack That Killed ırked to prevent

people from massing at the airport gates. 55

Responding to the attack in an address on Thursday afternoon, President Biden warned those responsible for the attack that "we will hunt you down and make you pay" and said that he has directed the Pentagon "to develop operational plans to strike ISIS-K assets, leadership, and facilities." Intelligence officials are warning of more possible ISIS attacks in the coming days, but Biden said that the U.S. would continue its evacuation of U.S. citizens and Afghans from the airport ahead of the August 31 deadline to withdraw completely from Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the attack, evacuation flights continued to leave the airport. Early on Friday, the White House said that 12,500 people had been flown out in the past 24 hours.

The suicide bombing took place at Abbey Gate, a main entrance to the airport. Initial reports indicated there was a second bombing at the Baron Hotel nearby, followed by gunfire into the crowd, but on the Friday, the Pentagon said that it no longer believed there was a second explosion. (Witnesses reportedly heard two, however.)

U.S. intelligence officials had warned in recent days of imminent violence from ISIS, which is a sworn enemy of the Taliban.

Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said, "We strongly condemn this gruesome incident and will take every step to bring the culprits to justice."

"I saw a baby girl and I looked at her and I picked her up," an Afghan interpreter who witnessed the blast described to CBS News. "I took her to the hospital, but she died on my hands. What's going on right now is heartbreaking. This whole country is falling apart."

As thousands of Afghans have amassed at the airport in an effort to flee the country since the Taliban takeover earlier this month, the U.S. and U.K. recently warned that an attack could be imminent, while Belgium suspected it would take the form of a suicide bomber.

Approved for Release

The U.S. military deaths are the first in the country since early 2020, when then-President Trump negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban. Around 1,500 Americans still remain in Afghanistan, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Wednesday — days before Biden's deadline for all U.S. forces to withdraw from the country.

*This post has been updated.*

TAGS: AFGHANISTAN KABUL TALIBAN

55 COMMENTS

Approved for Release

## THE Intelligencer FEED

10/30/2021 JANUARY 6

### Trump Lawyer Blamed Pence for Capitol Riot While It Was Still Happening

*By* PAOLA ROSA-AQUINO

John Eastman, who wrote a legal blueprint for Trump's authoritarian power grab, emailed the Pence team after rioters breached the Capitol.

10/30/2021

### Is next week the week?

New - House Democratic leaders are eyeing votes on both infrastructure bill and larger $1.75T economic plan as soon as Tuesday, per three sources familiar with the matter.

**—@mkraju**

10/30/2021 CHRISTIANITY

### Are Conservative Christians the Real 'Secularists' Now?

Page 39 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 253 (b)(1)1.4a

Approved for Release

Page 40 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 254 (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 41 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 42 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 43 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 44 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 45 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 46 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 47 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Page 48 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.7e

Approved for Release

Exhibit 254

~~SECRET/REL TO USA, FVEY~~

# Blast Site HKIA Abbey Gate 26 Aug 2021

- Suicide Borne IED (SBIED) consisting of a vest or bag with approximately 15-20lbs of explosives, held chest high in front of the individual who initiated the device.
- Directional fragmentation charge w/ ball bearings (improvised claymore).
- The device was detonated on east side of the canal.
- Due to frag velocity and full consumption of explosives it is assessed that the device was constructed with commercial or military grade explosives, this will be tested to confirm at the forensics lab in (b)(1)1.4a.
- The frag pattern shows that the charge was aimed at the location where most U.S. forces consolidate and the lack of frag surrounding the blast seat indicates it was a directional charge.
- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(6)

(b)(6)






SPMAGTF-CR-CC 21.1 EOD

~~SECRET/REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Page 50 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 254 (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 51 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 254 (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 52 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 254 (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Page 53 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Exhibit 254 (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Forensic Exploitation Laboratory - CENTCOM
Forensic Exploitation Laboratory - CENTCOM - Arifjan Bldg 777; Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 09366

Exhibit 255

**Controlled by:** Forensic Exploitation Laboratory - CENTCOM
**CUI Category:** Basic
**Distribution/Dissemination Control:**
**POC:** (b)(6)

Approved for Release

# CASE: S-FXL-C-21-0085 ( S-FXL-C-21-0085 ) - SUMMARY

**Case Status:** Approved

**Case Approved By:** (b)(6)

Approved for Release

# Triage

## Info

**Classification/Releasability:** CUI

**Report Type:** FXL-C

**Case Number:** S-FXL-C-21-0085

**DTG of Report:** 30-Aug-2021 13:36 +03

**Triage Examiners:** (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

**Case Priority Justification:**
- Death/serious injury/missing in action affecting coalition forces.

**Justified Priority:** !!! Red Priority Level

## Associations

**Submitters Assigned to Case:**
- (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

**Case(s) Associated to Report:**

| Report | Number | Reason | Primary |
|---|---|---|---|
| WEAT Report Number | S-FXL-C-21-0085 | External parent case association | ✓ |

## Incident

**Incident Type:** Explosion

**Discovered By:** *No data*

**Target Type:** *No data*

Approved for Release

**DTG of Incident:** 26-Aug-2021 13:33 +03

**DTG Type:** Estimated - Exact Time Unknown

**Location Type** *No data*

**Grid Coordinates:** *MGRS: No data*
*LOC: No data*

**Country:** Afghanistan

**Province:** Kabul

**District:** *No data*

**Locality:** *No data*

**Regional Command/MSC:** *No data*

**Task Force/AO:** *No data*

**FOB:** *No data*

**Background Summary:** *No Background Comment Provided*

## History

**Similar Devices Used in this Region:** No

**History Comments:** N/A

Approved for Release

## Casualties

| Force Type | Casualty Type | Casualty Count | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|
| No casualties recorded | | | |

## Vehicles

| VIN | Vehicle Type | Date | Status | Impact Point | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No vehicles on record for this case | | | | | |

## Detainees

| Subject | CAPTAG Number | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| No detainees on record for this case | | |

## Comments

Approved for Release

**Investigator Comments:**

CUI

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) *30-Aug-2021 14:00 :*

The items submitted with this case were visually inspected and\or x-rayed to check for the presence of EXPLOSIVE and Non-Explosive hazards. Although items have been Certified Free From EXPLOSIVES (FFE) any item that has contained Homemade EXPLOSIVES (HME) may still have residual trace amounts of HME that was not detected during the Triage process. If trace amounts of HME is detected during the exploitation process the examiner should immediately stop the exploitation process and contact the Senior Triage Technician to have the hazard immediately removed from the item and sent to chemistry if required. Caution should be utilized when utilizing alternate light sources on any items that has contained HME due to the possibility of the impregnation of the item with the HME or by products. The submission of the Triage Report and the placement of an Triage FFE label is signatory validation the Triage Section DID NOT detect any hazards visually or thru the use of X-rays.

Evidence will be processed as a priority RED for Triage, Latent Prints, Chemistry and DNA.

Item(s) were NOT forensically handled.

Report completed by (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

Technician NIPR: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

SIPR: (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

NVOIP

SVOIP: (b)(6)

**Requirements for Level 2 Exploitation:**

CUI

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) *30-Aug-2021 14:04 :*

Evidence will be processed as a priority RED for Triage, Latent Prints, Chemistry and DNA.

Approved for Release

**Evidence Recovered:**

CUI

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) *30-Aug-2021 13:48 :*

This case consist of the following:

Item 1 ..... DNA swab for exclusionary purposes

Item 2 ..... Suppressor

Item 3 ..... 5.56 projectile

Item 4 ..... 5.56 rifle magazine

Item 5 ..... (5) Ball bearings pulled from white Land Cruiser at blast site

Item 6 ..... Pieces of cloth from backpack of potential container

Item 7 ..... Torn jacket of potential suspect

Item 8 ..... Human flesh from scalp of potential suspect

**Disposition Of Evidence From Level 1:**

CUI

(b)(3)130b; (b)(6) *30-Aug-2021 13:49 :*

Submitter did NOT request items returned

Approved for Release

## Media

### IMAGES

S-FXL-C-21-0085 07 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 01 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 03 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 08 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 06 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 05 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 09 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 02 TRIAGE.JPG

S-FXL-C-21-0085 04 TRIAGE.JPG

### DOCUMENTS

Approved for Release




Approved for Release

# CASE NUMBER: S-FXL-C-21-0085 (S-FXL-C-21-0085) - CHEMISTRY REPORT

## Report Information

**Classification/Releasability:** CUI

**Report Date:** 02-Sep-2021 15:08 +03

**Incident Type:** Explosion

**Submitter Name:** (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

**Examiner(s):**

**Examiner Signature:** (b)(6)

**Examiner POC**

Approved for Release

be USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Findings

### Disclaimers:

- Only those exhibits discussed in the forensic discipline reports were examined.
- The following results are opinions and interpretations formed using accepted scientific and professional practices.

No explosives/explosive residues were detected in Exhibits 2, 3, 3.1, 4, 5, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.1, or 7.3.

Due to the nature of the samples submitted, testing for inorganic explosive materials was not performed on Exhibits 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.1, and 7.3.

The organic extracts of Exhibits 2, 3, 3.1, 4, 5, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.1, and 7.3 were combined for testing purposes.

No explosives/explosive residues were detected in the combined organic extract of Exhibits 2, 3, 3.1, 4, 5, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.1, and 7.3.

## Exhibits

| Exhibit # | Quantity | Evidence Type | Description | Doc No | Item No |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1 | | SUPPRESSOR | | 2 |
| 3 | 1 | | 5.56 PROJECTILE | | 3 |
| 3.1 | 1 | | Possible 5.56 Projectile Fragment | | |
| 4 | 1 | | 5.56 RIFLE MAGAZINE | | 4 |
| 5 | 5 | | BALL BEARINGS PULLED FROM WHITE LAND CRUISER | | 5 |
| 6 | 1 | | PIECES OF CLOTH FROM BACKPACK OF POTENTIAL CONTAINER | | 6 |
| 6.1 | 1 | | Larger Portion of Backpack | | |
| 6.1.3 | 1 | | Swab of Black Side | | |
| 6.1.4 | 1 | | Swab of Grey Side | | |

Approved for Release

be USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

| Exhibit # | Quantity | Evidence Type | Description | Doc No | Item No |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.2 | 1 | | Smaller Portion of Backpack | | |
| 6.2.1 | 1 | | Swab of Grey Side | | |
| 7 | 1 | | TORN JACKET OF POTENTIAL SUSPECT | | 7 |
| 7.3 | 1 | | Swab of Outside of Jacket (Front) | | |

Approved for Release

be USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Chemical Samples

### Chemical Sample # 1

**Exhibit:** 2

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 2 consisted of an apparent metal suppressor.

**Chemicals:**

### Chemical Sample # 2

**Exhibit:** 3

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 3 consisted of an apparent projectile.

**Chemicals:**

### Chemical Sample # 3

**Exhibit:** 3.1

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 3.1 consisted of a mixture of black-colored, white-colored, and translucent irregularly shaped particles.

**Chemicals:**

### Chemical Sample # 4

**Exhibit:** 4

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 4 consisted of an apparent rifle magazine.

**Chemicals:**

Approved for Release
USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Chemical Sample # 5

**Exhibit:** 5

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 5 consisted of apparent ball bearings.

**Chemicals:**

## Chemical Sample # 6

**Exhibit:** 6.1.3

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 6.1.3 consisted of a swab collected from the black-colored side of Exhibit 6.1.

**Chemicals:**

## Chemical Sample # 7

**Exhibit:** 6.1.4

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 6.1.4 consisted of a swab collected from the grey-colored side of Exhibit 6.1.

**Chemicals:**

## Chemical Sample # 8

**Exhibit:** 6.2.1

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 6.2.1 consisted of a swab collected from the grey-colored side of Exhibit 6.2.

**Chemicals:**

Approved for Release

be USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Chemical Sample # 9

**Exhibit:** 7.3

**Physical Description:** Exhibit 7.3 consisted of a swab collected from the green-colored and black-colored material from Exhibit 7.

**Chemicals:**

Approved for Release

by USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Media

### DOCUMENTS

S-FXL-C-21-0085-CHEM-Photos-V2...




S-FXL-C-21-0085-Discrepancy Fo...

Approved for Release

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
02-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

# CASE NUMBER: S-FXL-C-21-0085 (S-FXL-C-21-0085) - DNA REPORT

**Classification/Releasability:** CUI

**Report Date:** 30-Aug-2021 14:47 +03

**Incident Type:** Explosion

**Submitter Name:** (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

**Submitted For Approval** 01-Sep-2021 16:36 +03

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Exhibits

| Exhibit # | Quantity | Description | Doc No | Item No |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | DNA SWAB FOR EXCLUSIONARY PURPOSES | | 1 |
| 5 | 5 | BALL BEARINGS PULLED FROM WHITE LAND CRUISER | | 5 |
| 5.1 | 1 | Possible Hair (1x) | | |
| 6 | 1 | PIECES OF CLOTH FROM BACKPACK OF POTENTIAL CONTAINER | | 6 |
| 6.1 | 1 | Larger Portion of Backpack | | |
| 6.1.1 | 1 | Swab of Zipper Area | | |
| 6.1.2 | 1 | Swab of Velcro/Strap | | |
| 7 | 1 | TORN JACKET OF POTENTIAL SUSPECT | | 7 |
| 7.1 | 1 | Swab of Interior Collar | | |
| 7.2 | 1 | Swab of Interior Armpit | | |

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Autosomal Results

| Exhibit # | Serology Result | # of Contributors | Component # | INCLUSIONS * | Types As | Additional Results ** | Upload |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1.1 | N/A | 2 | 1 | UI1 | Male | Exhibit 1 is excluded as a contributor to the mixture detected. | NO |
| | | | 2 | | N/A | Inconclusive due to mixture complexity &/or lack of data | NO |
| 6.1.2 | N/A | 2 | 1 | UI1 | Male | Exhibit 1 is excluded as a contributor to the mixture detected. | YES |
| | | | 2 | | N/A | Inconclusive due to mixture complexity &/or lack of data | NO |
| 7.1 | N/A | 3 | 1 | UI1 | Male | Exhibit 1 is excluded as a contributor to the mixture detected. | NO |
| | | | 2 & 3 | | N/A | Inconclusive due to mixture complexity &/or lack of data | NO |
| 7.2 | N/A | 3 | 1 | UI1 | Male | Exhibit 1 is excluded as a contributor to the mixture detected. | NO |
| | | | 2 & 3 | | N/A | Inconclusive due to mixture complexity &/or lack of data | NO |

*: UI = Unknown Individual.
**: UI = Exclusions are from the entire mixture or if not listed in the Inclusions column, all other references, knowns, elimination profiles eliminated from the Exhibit(s).

Approved for Release

lw USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
01-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Other Samples Results

| Exhibit # | Serology Result | STR Type | Insufficient DNA for Further Testing | # of Contributors | Inconclusive Reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | No examinations performed | | NO | N/A | Upon review of case details, Exhibit 5.1 was determined to be unsuitable for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis. |

Approved for Release

lw USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
01-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Knowns Results

| Exhibit # | # of Contributors | Types As | Autosomal Results | Autosomal Upload |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | Male | Partial profile was obtained. | NO |

## Findings & Technical Notes

### Disclaimers:

- Only those exhibits discussed in the forensic discipline reports were examined.
- The following results are opinions and interpretations formed using accepted scientific and professional practices.

### Findings

1. The DNA profile from Exhibit 6.1.2 will be submitted to the appropriate database(s). In the event of a hit, additional information can be obtained from the hit table located in the DNA or Images/Documents tab and, if available, from the intelligence report located in WEAT - WTI (Weapons Technical Intelligence) Exploitation and Analysis Tool.

### Technical Notes

1. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) extraction procedures were performed on Exhibits 1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 7.1, and 7.2.

2. A DNA profile was obtained from Exhibits 1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 7.1, and 7.2 using PCR (polymerase chain reaction) technology on 21 STR (short tandem repeat) loci, a Y-STR (Y-chromosome short tandem repeat) locus, a Y Indel (insertion/deletion) locus and a gender identification locus from the ThermoFisher Globalfiler or Globalfiler Express kit.

3. Exhibits above identified as swabs, with the exception of Exhibit 1, were consumed during DNA analysis. The disposition of the remaining exhibit(s) will be in accordance with submitting agency requests or laboratory policy.

4. The point of contact for this report is (b)(6)

Approved for Release

lw USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
01-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Report Information

| | |
|---|---|
| **Examiner(s):** | (b)(6) |
| **Technical Reviewer(s):** | |
| **Administrative Reviewer(s):** | |
| **Submitter Name:** | (b)(3)130b; (b)(6) |
| **Submitted For Approval:** | 01-Sep-2021 16:36 +03 |
| **Examiner Signature:** | |
| **Report To:** | |
| **Technical Reviewer Signature:** | (b)(6) |
| **Technical Review POC:** | |

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

**Approval Signature:** (b)(6)

**Report To:**

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

# CASE NUMBER: S-FXL-C-21-0085 (S-FXL-C-21-0085) - FIREARMS & TOOLMARKS REPORT

**Submitter Name:** *Submitter info not available*

**Submitted For Approval:** 01-Sep-2021 11:35 +03

**Examiner Signature:**

**Report To:**

**Technical Reviewer Signature:**

(b)(6)

**Technical Review POC:**

**Approval Signature:**

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

**Report To:** (b)(6)

Approved for Release

## Report Information

**Classification/Releasability:** CUI

**Report Date:** 30-Aug-2021 16:44 +03

**Incident Type:** Explosion

**Examiner(s):**

**Technical Reviewer(s):**

**Administrative Reviewer(s):**

**Last Edit By:**

(b)(6)

Approved for Release

gov USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
01-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Media

### DOCUMENTS

S-FXL-C-21-0085_FATM Photos v1...

## Exhibits

| Exhibit # | Quantity | Description | Doc No | Item No |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 1 | SUPPRESSOR | | 2 |
| 3 | 1 | 5.56 PROJECTILE | | 3 |
| 3.1 | 1 | Metal Fragment | | |
| 4 | 1 | 5.56 RIFLE MAGAZINE | | 4 |
| 5 | 5 | BALL BEARINGS PULLED FROM WHITE LAND CRUISER, METAL FRAGMENT | | 5 |

Approved for Release

gUSCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
01-Sep-2021
(Abbey Gate Investigation)



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

## Findings

### Disclaimers:

- Only those exhibits discussed in the forensic discipline reports were examined.
- The following results are opinions and interpretations formed using accepted scientific and professional practices.

1) Examination of Exhibit 2 revealed one 5.56mm rifle suppressor (Knight's Armament, QDSS-NT4, serial number T175044).

a. Exhibit 2 contains damage in the form of six holes. Ball bearings were lodged in two of the six holes and were left in place. Some of the damaged areas contain red-brown material, which was left in place.

b. The source of the damaged areas are undetermined. The damaged areas are not suitable for microscopic comparison.

c. See photos for measurements of holes and ball bearings.

2) Examination of Exhibit 3 revealed a damaged, unfired, 5.56 caliber bullet, consistent with MK 318 MOD 0.

3) Examination of Exhibit 3.1 revealed one grey, non-ferromagnetic, metal fragment measuring 5.90mm long, 3.84mm wide, and 1.25mm thick. No toolmarks were observed on Exhibit 3.1.

4) Examination of Exhibit 4 revealed one STANAG 5.56x45mm magazine body: Magpul, Pmag, Gen M3.

a. Exhibit 4 contains two damaged areas across the surface. The source of the damaged areas are undetermined. The damaged areas are not suitable for microscopic comparison.

b. See photos for measurements and factory markings.

5) Examination of Exhibit 5 revealed five (5) ferromagnetic ball bearings and one (1) non-ferromagnetic metal fragment.

a. The ball bearings are grey, shiny, and partially covered in a red-brown residue, which was left in place. Most of the ball bearings appear significantly damaged and/or deformed.

b. The average weight and diameter of the ball bearings was 1.03g and 6.49mm, respectively.

c. The metal fragment is grey, shiny on one side, and dull with a spot of red-brown residue on the other. It measures 7.63mm long, 5.92mm wide, 2.38mm thick, and weighs 0.10g.

d. No toolmarks were observed on either the ball bearings or metal fragment.

All measurements are approximate.

The point of contact for this report is report is (b)(6)

Approved for Release



This report may not be reproduced except in full without written permission of the laboratory

# CASE: S-FXL-C-21-0085 ( S-FXL-C-21-0085 ) - SUMMARY

## Exhibits

| Exhibit # | Qty | Description | Disposition | Exploited By |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | DNA SWAB FOR EXCLUSIONARY PURPOSES | Evidence Room | |
| 2 | 1 | SUPPRESSOR | (b)(6) | |
| 3 | 1 | 5.56 PROJECTILE | | |
| 3.1 | 1 | Possible 5.56 Projectile Fragment | | |
| 4 | 1 | 5.56 RIFLE MAGAZINE | | |
| 5 | 5 | BALL BEARINGS PULLED FROM WHITE LAND CRUISER | | |
| 5.1 | 1 | Possible Hair (1x) | Evidence Room | |
| 6 | 1 | PIECES OF CLOTH FROM BACKPACK OF POTENTIAL CONTAINER | Evidence Room | |
| 6.1 | 1 | Larger Portion of Backpack | Evidence Room | |
| 6.1.1 | 1 | Swab of Zipper Area | Consumed for DNA analysis | |
| 6.1.2 | 1 | Swab of Velcro/Strap | Consumed for DNA analysis | |
| 6.1.3 | 1 | Swab of Black Side | Consumed during Analysis | |
| 6.1.4 | 1 | Swab of Grey Side | Consumed during Analysis | |
| 6.2 | 1 | Smaller Portion of Backpack | Evidence Room | |
| 6.2.1 | 1 | Swab of Grey Side | Consumed during Analysis | |

Approved for Release

| Exhibit # | Qty | Description | Disposition | Exploited By |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 1 | TORN JACKET OF POTENTIAL SUSPECT | Evidence Room | |
| 7.1 | 1 | Swab of Interior Collar | Consumed for DNA analysis | |
| 7.2 | 1 | Swab of Interior Armpit | Consumed for DNA analysis | |
| 7.3 | 1 | Swab of Outside of Jacket (Front) | Consumed during Analysis | |
| 8 | 1 | HUMAN FLESH FROM SCALP OF POTENTIAL SUSPECT | Evidence Room | |

## Material Forms

| File Name | Classification | Thumbnail | Form | File Size | Uploaded By | Created Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *No Records* | | | | | | |

Approved for Release

## Result Status

**DNA Result:** No Hit

**Chemistry Result:** No explosives/explosive residues were detected

**Firearms Result:** Evidence Evaluation

**TEDAC Priority:** Red !!!

**Level 2 Findings:**

CUI

(b)(6) *on 02-Sep-2021 15:24 :*

DNA: No hits were obtained in this case, refer to DNA report for full details.

Chemistry: No explosives/explosive residue were detected, see chemical report for full details.

Firearms & Toolmarks: See firearms report for full details of evaluation.

Latent Prints: Material submitted was not conducive for any chemical or physical latent print processing.

**Initial Disposition of Evidence:** Transferred to TEDAC

**Disposition of Evidence from Level 2:**

CUI

(b)(6) *on 02-Sep-2021 15:11 :*

Material to be shipped to TEDAC accordingly.

Approved for Release

**Submitter Name:** (b)(3)130b; (b)(6)

**Approver POC Information:**

**Approval Signature:** (b)(6)

****Contact information may be changed in user profile and will be reflected on your next signature.*

Approved for Release

UNCLASSIFIED

Exhibit 256

# Lab Exploitation Summary for S-FXL-C-21-0085

## 02SEP2021

The overall classification of this product is ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

# Lab Exploitation Summary for S-FXL-C-21-0085

## (U) Case Data

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~

## (U) Case Background Info

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

## (U) Geographic Overview

(b)(1)1.4c

## (U) Exploitation Summary

(U) DNA: Upon examination, one (1) DNA profile was found suitable for upload and submitted for analysis, retrieved from backpack pieces (EX 6) and jacket pieces (EX 7). Upon results of database search, DNA profile (LW2277_1A21KLW0085Q6.1.2_Component 1) did not match to any DNA profiles previously stored.
(U) FA&TM: Upon examination, no significant tool marks were located on evidence received. Of note, damaged rifle suppressor (EX 2) examined was determined to be a 5.56 Knight's Armament suppressor, damaged magazine (EX 4) was determined to be a STANAG 5.56x45mm Magpul Pmag, Gen M3. ( (U) Analyst Comment: Magazine and Suppressor patented for use by US Service Members.)
(U) CHEM: Upon examination, no explosives/explosive residues were detected in Exhibits 2-7.

(Abbey Gate Investigation)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

UNCLASSIFIED

# Collected Exploitable Material (CEM) for S-FXL-C-21-0085

## (U) Submitted Exhibits

USCENTCOM FOIA 21-0545
(Abbey Gate Investigation)

2001

02/02/22

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release

## (U) Likelihood Estimates

| Almost no chance / Remote | Very unlikely / Highly improbable | Unlikely / Improbable | Roughly even chance / Roughly even odds | Likely / Probable | Very likely / Highly probable | Almost certainly / Nearly certain |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-5% | 5-20% | 20-45% | 45-55% | 55-80% | 80-95% | 95-99% |

## (U) JTFAC Contacts

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



Approved for Release

Exhibit 257

Exhibit 258

MARCUS YAM / LOS ANGELES TIMES

Exhibit 259