




U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Information Policy
Sixth Floor
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Telephone: (202) 514-3642

December 30, 2021

Jason Leopold
BuzzFeed News



Re: FOIA-2021-00565
21-cv-00558 (D.D.C.)
VRB:JMB:BPF

Dear Jason Leopold:

This is a final interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated and received in this Office on January 11, 2021, in which you requested records concerning the events of January 6, 2021, in Washington, DC, the potential impeachment of President Donald Trump, and the potential invocation of the 14th or 25th Amendments.

On August 13 and November 16, 2021, we provided you with interim responses to your request. We have now completed the processing of an additional 408 pages. At this time, I have determined that 187 of these pages are appropriate for release with excisions made pursuant to Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and b(7)(F), and copies are enclosed. Additionally, I have determined that 221 pages containing records responsive to your request should be withheld in full pursuant to Exemptions 3, 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F) of the FOIA. Id.


Exemption 3 pertains to information exempted from release by statute, in this instance 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). Exemption 5 pertains to certain inter- and intra-agency communications protected by the attorney work-product and deliberative process privileges. Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(A) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. Exemption 7(C) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(D) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose the identity of a confidential source. Exemption 7(E) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would disclose certain techniques and procedures or guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. Finally, Exemption 7(F) pertains to records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

Please be advised that certain email communications within this production display a single question mark at the beginning of the email. This is the result of a technical error in the software used to obtain copies of emails for processing and was not placed by the author of the email or by OIP. Further, certain pages within this production contain highlighting. This highlighting was present on these pages as located by OIP and was not made as part of our FOIA review process.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2018). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact Bradley Craigmyle of the Department's Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, at 202-616-8101.

Sincerely,



Jonathan Breyan
Senior Supervisory Attorney
for
Vanessa R. Brinkmann
Senior Counsel

Enclosures

United States Department of Justice

Briefing for U.S. House of Representatives

Tuesday, January 12, 2021, 11:30 AM
Eastern

CORPORATE PARTICIPANTS

Chad Thorley – *Department of Justice*

Jill Sanborn – *Assistant Director of FBI Counterterrorism Division*

Steve D'Antuono – *Assistant Director in Charge of FBI Washington Field
Office*

Michael Sherwin – *Acting U.S. Attorney*

Ken Cole – *Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney*

PRESENTATION

Operator

Good day, and welcome to the DOJ Briefing for U.S. House of Representatives. All participants will be in a listen-only mode. Should you need assistance, please signal a conference specialist by pressing star, then zero. After today's presentation, there will be an opportunity to ask questions. To ask a question, you may press star, then one on a touchtone phone. To withdraw your question, please press star, then two. Please note this event is being recorded. I would like now to turn the conference over to Chad Thorley from the Department of Justice. Please go ahead.

Chad Thorley

Good morning, everyone. Again, my name is Chad Thorley from the Department of Justice, and I thank you for joining today's call. For the next hour, we are also joined by Assistant Director Jill Sanborn from the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, Assistant Director in Charge Steve D'Antuono from the FBI's Washington Field Office, and Michael Sherwin, Acting U.S. Attorney, and Ken Cole, Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, who will be providing a briefing on the events at the Capitol on January 6th, and investigative and law enforcement actions taken as a result.

As you are aware, this is a very fluid situation, with many moving parts, and new information is consistently being gathered and analyzed. At the conclusion of the briefer's remarks, members will be able to ask questions. The moderator will call on those wishing to ask questions at that time. I will now turn it over to Assistant Director Jill Sanborn from the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, who will begin the briefing.

Jill Sanborn

Chad, do you have me?

Chad Thorley

Yes, Jill.

Jill Sanborn

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you all today. It's always an honor to speak with members of the Hill. For many of you that don't know, I actually started my public service as a senate page in 1987. I'll start my briefing by noting that the content of my remarks are unclassified but law enforcement sensitive, so we ask that you utilize caution when discussing any of the following information outside of this call.

We know you have a number of questions and concerns, and rightly so, about the events of January 6th. We hope that during our time together today, we will be able to answer some of those questions and provide you with more insights into the FBI's posture leading up to January 6th, our whole-of-FBI response, and investigation into the siege on the Capitol complex, the overall threat picture we are tracking leading up to the inaugural activities, to include a few potential flash points for violence, and areas of heightened interest we will be closely following in the coming weeks, and lastly, our operational and investigative posture in the days and weeks ahead as we prepare for inauguration on January 20th.

So the posture ahead of the electoral certification. I know you are interested in our preparation and posture leading up to the events on January 6th, so I'll start there, with both an overview of the standard investigative steps we take ahead of events like these, and with notes regarding

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specific actions taken to prepare for the electoral certification and upcoming presidential inauguration.

Leading up to major large-scale events, such as the State of Union, the Super Bowl, and presidential elections, the FBI reviews potential threats to public safety, and follows all leads and threat information to the point of mitigation or conclusion. Among the standard comprehensive investigative activities, we perform ahead of events of this nature, we analyze intelligence to proactively inform and prepare our partners at the federal, state, and local levels for potential threats of violence and criminal activity. Our goal is to identify any potential threats to these large-scale events and mitigate them before they become violent acts and federal crimes.

To assist our partners in mitigating potential threats to the electoral certification on January 6th, 2021, and on the inauguration on January 20th, 2021, specifically, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

Leading up to January 6th, we were (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

We share and disseminate intelligence through the presence of task force officers on our joint terrorism task forces. Other government agency employees embedded throughout the (INAUDIBLE) community are robust relationships across the organizations. Further, the FBI holds quarterly and sometimes DHS executive board meetings to ensure there is complete transparency in coordination with our partners. The FBI and Washington field in particular also work closely with partners such as U.S. Capitol Police, which has multiple officers on the Washington field office terrorism and criminal task forces, and has senior U.S. Capitol representation on our National Joint Terrorism Task Force.

In addition to our day-to-day sharing of operational information, one of the methods for formally disseminating intelligence assessments is the Joint Intelligence Bulletin, a product we co-author with the Department of Homeland Security, and/or the National Counterterrorism Center. This product serves as a method for notifying our partners of significant disruptions, but also is used to notify state and local law enforcement of potential trends we are seeing in threat reporting and criminal activity.

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During the summer of 2020, we observed activity that led us to assess there was potential for increased violent extremist activity at lawful protests taking place in communities across the United States. To that end, in June of 2020, we issued two separate Joint Intelligence Bulletins, highlighting the potential for increased violent extremist activity. One of these bulletins advised our partners to remain vigilant in light of the persistent threat posed by domestic violent extremists and their unpredictable target selection, in order to effectively detect, prevent, preempt, and respond to incidents.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

When it became clear that some individuals had breached the Capitol grounds and were entering the U.S. Capitol, the U.S. Capitol Police requested assistance, and (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Along with our partners, the FBI surged and continues to dedicate substantial resources to ensure the safety and security of the Capitol. To identify those individuals involved in the breach and disruption of congressional activities, and to hold accountable those responsible for the acts of that day.

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So, a little bit about the current strategy and operations. I'll move into talking about two major lines of efforts we are currently tracking. We're still actively and aggressively tracking the investigation into the siege at the U.S. Capitol on Wednesday, January 6th. We're also tracking potential upcoming threats or violent activity leading up to the inauguration. I'll start with our investigation into the siege of the Capitol complex.

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

As of today, the FBI continues to exploit over 60,000 digital media tips received from the public. Also, as of today, we have received more than 8,000 leads via our National Threat Operations Center, which we continue to process and investigate (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The FBI has also issued eight Wanted posters for approximately 72 individuals in the Capitol who were captured on camera. As I speak, the investigation is ongoing, and we are aggressively working to identify those involved, their motivations, and whether any individuals or group planned and organized the violent and criminal activity.

To date, the Department of Justice has charged more than 20 individuals leading up to and since the protest at the Capitol, and is currently--and the FBI currently has more than [Redacted] pending criminal complaints awaiting DOJ approval. I want to highlight just a few of those for you. (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Richard Barnett, who was identified through social media when he provided an interview to the press wherein he admitted to being in the U.S. Capitol building on January 6th, 2021, and specifically, inside Nancy Pelosi's office, and taking official correspondence from her desk.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Jacob Anthony Chancily was charged with knowingly entering or remaining in a restricted building on the grounds without logged authority, and with violent entry and disorderly conduct on Capitol grounds. He was taken into custody on January

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9th. It is alleged that Chancily was identified as the man seen in social media coverage who entered the complex building dressed in horns, a bear skin headdress, and carrying a spear.

Local arrests. We are currently tracking slightly more than a hundred arrests by Washington's Metro PD and U.S. Capitol Police. As of particular significance i (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

So now that I've talked a little bit about the general threat posed by violent extremist actors to the national capital region--and again, I will emphasize that we're (b)(7)(E) per FBI [Redacted], I want to speak briefly about some potential flash points for violence that we are monitoring at this time. We remain concerned about the potential for violence at multiple protests and rallies planned at the U.S. capital, here in

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Washington DC, and potentially at state capitals across the country, starting as early as 16 January and through at least 20 January.

This could bring armed individuals within close proximity to government buildings and officials across the United States. (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Additional threats related to the Capitol siege and ongoing threats. Now I'll move into a discussion about a few additional threats related to the siege on the Capitol complex and some ongoing events. We are aware of some individuals involved in the breach on the Capitol complex stole items from members' offices, to include personally-identifying addresses and information. For example, reporting indicates that personal phone number of one member of Congress was obtained during the breach and later released online.

We are working closely with our Washington field office and U.S. Capitol Police t (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

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(b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

So, a little bit about our operational posture looking ahead. So, what are we doing about this? In addition to (b)(7)(E) per FBI that I mentioned earlier, it's important for you to know that we have been working over the last month to prepare for any and all threats to the inaugural activities. As I mentioned previously, (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[Redacted]

As I also mentioned, the joint multiagency command post activated on the fifth will continue through the inauguration and in the days that follow. While we also host a daily data call to all field offices through a Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity Survey, which asks our field offices to report significant investigative updates and threat reporting from their areas of responsibility.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

All of our field offices will have command posts active in their areas of responsibility by January 15th. And we will remain closely linked up with our federal, state, and local private sector partners to mitigate any and all potential threats leading up to the 59th Presidential Inauguration that may come in from those partners. In this name, we are hosting a call with all state and local law enforcement, tomorrow, January 13th.

Operator

Pardon me, ladies and gentlemen, it appears we have lost the connection to our speaker line. Please stand by while we reconnect. Thank you.

(MUSIC)

Michael Sherwin

Hello, everyone. This is Michael R. Sherwin, the Acting U.S. Attorney in DC. I think it's my turn here. I'll be relatively brief so we have time for questions, of course. So, let me just start off with a few things I just want to highlight for you ladies and gentlemen. So, first of all, as we sit here

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right now, in conjunction with the WFO, we've (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

So, again, (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

So, how are we doing that? (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted] That's a misnomer; that's not correct.

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

are looking at all the local charges. For example, some of the individuals outside of the Capitol that may have had firearms, ammunition, high-capacity magazines. So the whole gamut of cases are being looked at by the office, and the whole gamut of cases are being charged. We're going at a very fast pace, and again, I anticipate hundreds of cases charged within the next couple weeks.

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

Operator

We will now begin the question-and-answer session. To ask a question, you may press star then one on your touchtone phone. If you are using a speakerphone, please pick up your handset before pressing the keys. If at any time your question has been addressed and you would like to withdraw your question, please press star then two. Please limit your inquiries to one question. If you have additional questions, you may rejoin the question queue by again pressing star, then one. At this time, we will pause momentarily to assemble our roster. Our first question comes from Carolyn Maloney with Oversight and Reform. Please go ahead.

Carolyn Maloney

First, I want to thank all of you and all of my colleagues that are on the phone. You mentioned all of the planning protests that you're tracking. My question is, what step is the FBI taking--hello? Can you hear me? Hello?

Operator

Yes, we're able to hear you. Please continue with your question--.

Carolyn Maloney

--Okay. Okay, my question is, what are the steps that the FBI is taking to disrupt these armed gatherings that you're tracking, aimed at the White House and all 50 state capitals? And the Russian connection to Parler that is being alleged, or the communication system that was taken down by Twitter?

Steve D'Antuono

This is the Assistant Director in Charge Steve D'Antuono. So (INAUDIBLE)—

Operator

--Pardon me, ladies and gentlemen. It appears we have lost the connection to our speaker line. Please stand by while we reconnect. Thank you for your patience.

(MUSIC)

Pardon me, this is the operator. We have reconnected our speaker lines. Speakers, please go ahead and proceed.

Steve D'Antuono

Alright, thank you so much. So, again, ma'am, this is Steve D'Antuono. I'm the Assistant Director in Charge for the Washington field office here in the district, off of the FBI. So, just to answer your first question, like we always do, we're (b)(7)(E) per FBI

So, that's what we're actively doing. We're (b)(7)(E) per FBI

To answer your question about the--can you repeat the question for the second part with the--I think you said the Russia involvement in the Parler--?

Carolyn Maloney

--The Parler question, the communication system that Twitter took off the internet, claiming it was dangerous. They're alleged--people on the internet and others saying that there's a Russian connection. Have you seen anything like that? And what else do you know about Parler, which played such a prominent role in helping to organize the disruptions?

Steve D'Antuono

So, ma'am, I can tell you this, we are (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

Operator

Our next question will come from Congressman Matt Cartwright with Appropriations. Please go ahead.

Matt Cartwright

Thank you. Can you hear me?

Steve D'Antuono

Yes, sir.

Matt Cartwright

Okay. This is for Assistant Director Jill Sanborn, and also, Michael Sherwin. Thank you both and thank you all for being on this call. My question is about the entering restricted areas, section 1752 prosecutions. I walked to the Capitol on January 6th, and I saw that there were cornered

off areas that people were breaking through. So, there was an awful lot of people who didn't go inside the Capitol, but were clearly in something that was supposed to be a restricted area. I would--I hope we are planning to prosecute those people too as a deterrent for future events like this.

Michael Sherwin

Yeah--yes, sir. This is Michael Sherwin, and you raised a great point. We are doing that, we are charging persons with unauthorized access that were not only in the Capitol, sir, but also outside. And I'm sorry I didn't clarify that on the front end, sir.

Steve D'Antuono

And sir, for AD Sanborn, we're having a problem with the connection, getting them back up. So, I can answer for the FBI for the same question. We are working with our partners--our state and local partners in this investigation and the U.S. Attorney's Office. We're pouring through all the video, every single angle that we possibly can get and every single video that we can get from all across the Capitol area. I have teams working on that 24/7, identifying individuals.

And then we put out--you've seen the Wanted posters--I hope you've seen the Wanted posters, I hope you see the proactive social media that we've put out there to the American public, and they have stepped forward. I'm going to tell you; I think AD Sanborn had a very low figure for the tips. I think she either said 16, or I couldn't hear, maybe she said 60,000. We have over 100,000 social media tips to the FBI, from the American people. We are pouring through that, and we are--with Mike and his office, we're aggressively going to prosecute everyone that we possibly can.

Operator

Our next question will come from Adam Schiff. Congressman, please go ahead.

Adam Schiff

Thank you very much, I appreciate all your work on this. I really wanted to ask you for your sense at this point of what went wrong? And I'm looking at this from an intelligence point of view, it doesn't seem like it requires any great sleuthing to have foreseen that the possibility of this assault on the Capitol. Can you share with us what intelligence that the Bureau shared with Capitol Police, or DC police? Was this a situation where we didn't have the intelligence we should, or we had the intelligence but didn't share it, or we shared it and law enforcement agencies didn't act on it? How do you assess what went wrong here?

Steve D'Antuono

So, sir, the--so this is Steve D'Antuono, the Assistant Director for the Washington field office. So, in the weeks leading up to the sixth, as I'm referring it to, you know, we worked internally with every field office to gather intelligence for any threats that were coming through the district, and for the events that we were seeing as people--so the aspirational as well as operational rhetoric and (b)(7)(E) per FBI. We tracked a lead down, with our partners, of course, 56 field offices, that may have developed potential violence during that rally. We are in constant sharing mode with our partners, state and local.

We held several meetings well up before the sixth. And you also know as well that there were also planned protests within the district a few weekends prior to. So, all this stuff was going on; it was a constant flow of information sharing back and forth. We shared with our partners, they shared with us (b)(7)(E) per FBI, and we're sharing that information with everyone. We had a lot of different types of meetings and

such, so, that stuff was going on. And like I said, to the last question (b)(7)(E) per FBI

Operator

Our next question will come from Stephen Lynch with Oversight and Subnational Security. Please go ahead. I'm sorry, Stephen, your line might be muted—

Stephen Lynch

--I'm sorry, can you hear me?

Operator

We can hear you. Please proceed with your question.

Stephen Lynch

Okay. Alright, thank you. So, our Subcommittee on National Security has been involved in a number of the investigations of breaches at the White House, both during the Trump administration and also a few during the Obama administration, as well as some of the breaches at our embassies overseas, including the station at Benghazi and Sena'a in Yemen. One of the things I'm worried about here is that we found that the videotape (b)(7)(E)

And I'm just concerned that we need to make sure that we get custody of the tapes that had eyes on this whole protest.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

So, if we really--I would just encourage--and I know Chairwoman Maloney's on the call, I just heard from her, but we should issue a subpoena to those other institutions that had eyes on this, to make sure we get custody of their videotape sequences. And we can--I know we have a lot on social media, but I'm very concerned about losing the videotape that has been acquired thus far by those systems.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

. Thank you, I yield back.

Steve D'Antuono

So, sir, this is Steve D'Antuono, again, AD to WFO. So, we are actively working with our partners (b)(7)(E) per FBI

FBI evidentiary systems. So, my (INAUDIBLE) agents and everyone else I have working these things can review that for not only criminal but also for intelligence value as well leading up to this next couple days. Hope that answers your question.

Operator

Our next question comes from—

Steve D'Antuono

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

A large rectangular area of the document is completely redacted with black bars, covering approximately 10 lines of text.

Stephen Lynch

Right.

Operator

Our next question will come from Rodney Davis with House Administration. Please go ahead.

Rodney Davis

Hey, everyone. Thanks for the briefing. With the planned vote on impeachment happening tomorrow, are you noticing an uptick in any of activity in the security problems that you've just mentioned before? And do you believe that the House campus has been hardened enough with one complete set of fencing around the House campus, while the construction of the second set around the entire office campus is still being constructed?

Steve D'Antuono

So, I believe as my Director--Director Wray has spoken to some of your leadership the other day, you know, he said that the Capitol is probably the hardest target in the country right now. You know, that's why we're concerned about where we're--spill over into other states and such. We're in cooperation with the Secret Service. I think you know that NSFB, that they have primary authority over, right, once the current gets turned on. It's supposed to be turned on; my understanding is tomorrow.

So, that's really got hardened, not just the Capitol but the hardened--sorry, I'm a Rhode Islander so I have an accent, hardened the overall structure of the district, right? So, we always had great cooperation with the Secret Service with that. But also, to answer your question about planning upon the physical security. As our Director I think also said to the leaders as well, you know, our role in federal--for the FBI is the law enforcement of (INAUDIBLE) agency, and it's not like physical security or crowd control, so we are not the experts in determining if the Capitol was hardened enough.

Operator

Our next question will come from Denny Thompson with the FBI. Please go ahead.

Denny Thompson

It's Denny Thompson with the Homeland Security Committee. So, I'd like to know what kind of intelligence did you share with the Capitol Police? And I heard the presentation. But I want to know, did your intelligence say that these people were coming to the Capitol, had the potential for violence, or they talked about it? And I'm just kind of interested in what happened. It just looked--from somebody who was in the Capitol at the time, that the crowd was just woefully too big for the security personnel there.

I'm just trying to see if your intelligence said that that was a potential for violent crowd there. And I guess the last thing is, you know, I'm from Mississippi. And when I was a young kid, and every time there was a demonstration, in my area, there was always somebody there to arrest us. I'm just trying to figure out, were you part of the decision-making not to arrest anybody who had breached the Capitol, or was that a decision made by the Capitol Police?

Michael Sherwin

You know, I think AD Sanborn's back on the line, I believe. I think we've reaffirmed the connection with her. Jill, are you there? Do you want to take that?

Jill Sanborn

Do you guys have me?

Michael Sherwin

Yep.

Jill Sanborn

Alright. I'm having to do the star one as well, so there's no way--it's not keeping me on as a speaker, so I apologize to all of you on the line. I'll take the first question first on what did we share. It's a great question, and I tried to get to it a little bit in the presentation. Despite the information that we were seeing, whether it was aspirational or intelligence, we were constantly, via the JTTF construct, trying to flag information that we thought would be valuable to our partners. And so again, our biggest challenge is really trying to find out and ferret that intentional (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

And so, through the JTTF construct, we were constantly sharing that kind of information, both at Washington field and then here in our command post. I don't have much to add to the second question, and Steve might have more, but I do not believe that we were involved at all in decisions at the time of who to arrest. And keep in mind that the FBI mission is really dual-hatted, right? Like our role is to protect people's right to do just what you said, sir, which is assemble and have their free speech and peaceful assembly. So, we take that part of our mission very seriously as well. But Steve, feel free to chime in.

Steve D'Antuono

Yeah. And sir, this is Steve D'Antuono, again. So, we weren't involved with any decisions for arrest or anything like that with Capitol Police. That's not our role. Our role in this was a support role to them. Once we were asked for assistance, within I believe (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

So--and then, after that, we had (b)(7)(E) per FBI. But we did not have a role in decision-making of arrests. Also, you have to realize, too, that there are work permits pulled for protests. And there was a lot of protests being planned which we were aware of, but under protected First Amendment rights, it was peaceful protests that were being planned. So those were all planned for the Capitol grounds, so people were going there. And then, obviously, you know what happened, so I'm not going to speculate.

Operator

This concludes our question-and-answer session, which also concludes our conference for today. Thank you for attending today's presentation. You may now disconnect.

Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)

From: Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 5:24 PM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA); Raimondi, Marc (PAO); Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Cc: Moran, John (ODAG); Grieco, Christopher (ODAG); Creegan, Erin (ODAG); DiZinno, Richard (ODAG); (b)(6) (NSD); Keilty, Michael (ODAG); Michel, Christopher (OAG); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD); Greer, Megan L. (OLA); (b)(6) (NSD)
Subject: RE: FBI Inauguration Briefings - ALL MEMBERS

All –

As you are aware, FBI and USAO conducted briefs for FBI/DOJ oversight committee leadership (House and Senate) today. Both calls went well and concluded with Q&A. General themes were as follows:

Prevention of Future Actions: The Members' primary concern was future criminal activity. They had questions about the safety of the Capitol now, whether there was any uptick in threats related to impeachment, (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED] and specifically asked the Department publicize the potential criminal sentences as a method of deterrence. A few expressed concern that (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

Intelligence Failure / Capitol Police Failure: Members wanted to know whether the FBI had the intelligence in advance of the attack on the Capitol, (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI, and whether they shared the intelligence with the Capitol Police. One Member asked why no arrests were made on January 6th. Upon being specifically asked, FBI stated all issues will be examined for investigation and prosecution and including (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

Miscellaneous Investigative topics: Members did not question the aggressiveness or pace of investigations and prosecutions but had a few questions including (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

Additionally, this afternoon's brief to Senate Members regarding the upcoming inauguration included briefs from USSS and FBI (DD Bowdich). Q&A themes included:

Drones: Several members asked what was being done to keep the Capitol and inauguration attendees safe from drones and whether law enforcement has the capacity and capability to intercept any drones that may be detected.

Foreign Amplification of Threats: Members asked whether threatening messages from US-based groups targeting the Capitol or inauguration were being amplified by foreign actors and if so, what was being done to track and disrupt such action.

Law Enforcement Authorities: Several members asked whether both law enforcement agencies had been granted all the necessary authorities to be able to respond to threat against the Capitol and the inauguration in a timely manner.

Thank you.

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6) [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 8:46 AM

To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6) Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6)

Cc: Moran, John (ODAG) (b)(6) Grieco, Christopher (ODAG) (b)(6)

Creegan, Erin (ODAG) (b)(6) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG) (b)(6) (b)(6)

(NSD) (b)(6); Keilty, Michael (ODAG) (b)(6) Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6) Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6) Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)

(b)(6) Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6); (b)(6) (NSD)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: FBI Inauguration Briefings - ALL MEMBERS

SCHEDULED HILL BRIEFINGS 1/12 & 1/13

1/12 @ 11:30 am: ADIC Steven M. D'Antuono (WFO), USA Michael Sherwin, and AD Jill Sanborn (CTD) brief the Chair and RM for the following committees on the events of January 6.

- House Appropriations (both full committee and Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies)
- House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
- House Committee on Oversight and Reform
- House Judiciary Committee
- House Committee on Homeland Security

1/12 @ 1:30 pm: ADIC Steven M. D'Antuono, USA Michael Sherwin, and AD Jill Sanborn brief the Chair and RM for the following committees on the events of January 6.

- Senate (both full committee and Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies)
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Senate Judiciary Committee
- Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
- Senate Committee on Rules and Administration

1/12 @ 3:00 pm: DD Bowdich and AD Jill Sanborn participate in an interagency briefing for all members of the Senate coordinated by USSS and the JCCIC on Inauguration security. Agencies listed below.

- USSS – NSSE Lead, Coordination
- FBI – NSSE Lead, Intelligence + Crisis Response
- FEMA – NSSE Lead, Consequence Management
- DoD – Recommended is National Guard Bureau
- USCP – Inaugural Security Plans

1/13 @ 4:00 pm: DD Bowdich and AD Jill Sanborn participate in an interagency briefing for all members of the House coordinated by USSS and the JCCIC on Inauguration security. Agencies listed below.

- USSS – NSSE Lead, Coordination
- FBI – NSSE Lead, Intelligence + Crisis Response
- FEMA – NSSE Lead, Consequence Management
- DoD – Recommended is National Guard Bureau
- USCP – Inaugural Security Plans

(+ Anne Pings)

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 8:25 AM

To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6); Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6)

Cc: Moran, John (ODAG) (b)(6); Grieco, Christopher (ODAG) (b)(6)

Creegan, Erin (ODAG) (b)(6); DiZinno, Richard (ODAG) (b)(6); (b)(6)
(NSD) (b)(6); Keilty, Michael (ODAG) (b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6); Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)
(b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: FBI Inauguration Briefings - ALL MEMBERS

Plus Kristina.

Kristina, please send this group the releases at least 15 minutes prior to sending to the media. Longer lead time if possible. Please also give this group a heads up on what to expect today release wise and what time to expect it so they can be ready to provide to the Hill expeditiously.

I'll also send out a schedule of expected information releases to supplement this once I lock down some things.

OLA, please do the same regarding your events and timing.

Marc Raimondi
Acting Director of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 12, 2021, at 8:16 AM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6) wrote:

?

My understanding is that it is closed to media and by phone (I'll advise if I hear differently) but with such a large numbers of attendees, we can assume it will be functionally open. That said, these briefings are Inauguration-focused so I don't think it is critical to move the press call. It would be helpful to coordinate with your office as we did last time to get the release and charging documents out to the Hill a few minutes before they hit the street.

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 7:52 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6)
Cc: Moran, John (ODAG) (b)(6); Grieco, Christopher (ODAG) (b)(6);
Creegan, Erin (ODAG) (b)(6); DiZinno, Richard (ODAG) (b)(6); (b)(6)
(NSD) (b)(6); Keilty, Michael (ODAG) (b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6); Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)
(b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6)
Subject: Re: FBI Inauguration Briefings - ALL MEMBERS

Will this briefing be open or closed? Televised?

We were planning a press call at 3 to brief on new cases. Would it be helpful to move that up in the day (if operationally possible) ahead of our Hill briefings?

Marc Raimondi
Acting Director of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 12, 2021, at 7:44 AM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6) wrote:

?

Good morning,

The Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCCIC) contacted USSS and insisted on an interagency all-member briefing on Inauguration security. USSS agreed (on behalf of all agencies) to the briefing for the Senate today (3pm - 4pm ET) and House on Wed (TBD) at the Unclassified level. Agencies will provide a five minute overview of their roles and preparation for the Inauguration. Q&A to follow.

Agency Briefers:

USSS – NSSE Lead, Coordination

FBI – NSSE Lead, Intelligence + Crisis Response

FEMA – NSSE Lead, Consequence Management

DoD – Recommended is National Guard Bureau

USCP – Inaugural Security Plans

FBI feels they must participate given the other agency's participation. DD Bowdich +1 will act as the FBI briefers but they are scrambling given the briefings on the events of January 6 today.

(b)(5)

Thanks,

Kira

Kira Antell
Office of Legislative Affairs
Department of Justice

o: (b)(6)

c: (b)(6)

Allen, Joseph J.

From: Allen, Joseph J.
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 2:24 PM
To: Braverman, Adam L. (ODAG)
Subject: FW: Capitol breach inquiries
Attachments: ATF Timeline of Coordination for January_ 6_2021 (b)(5).docx

FYSA see chain below.

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 1:01 PM
To: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF
C: (b)(6) per ATF
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Ok, I will add those points into the summary.

Thanks,
Mike

From: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 12:59 PM
To: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
C: (b)(6) per ATF
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Mike, A couple supplemental points to the summary:

(b)(5)

Thanks, Joe

From: Allen, Joseph J.
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 12:26 PM
To: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
C: (b)(6) per ATF
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Mike, Summary attached. Sorry for the delay. Please let me know if you have any questions or need additional information.

Thank you, Joe

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 12:17 PM
To: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Hi Joe,

Any luck with this? Sorry to nag, but I want to get this to the A/DAG as soon as possible.

Thanks,
Mike

From: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 11:22 AM
To: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6)); Kilgallon, John (USM (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F))
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODA (b)(6)); Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6))
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Mike, Will do (b)(5)

Thanks, Joe

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 11:09 AM
To: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF; Kilgallon, John (USM (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F))
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODA (b)(6)); Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6))
Subject: Capitol breach inquiries

Joe and John,

ODAG is assisting OLA in responding to Congressional inquiries regarding the breach of the Capitol last Wednesday. To assist us, could yo (b)(5) If you need more information please give me a call. I'm (b)(6). Thanks in advance.

Best,

Mike

Keilty, Michael (ODAG)

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG)
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 5:32 PM
To: Knierim, Paul E; Thiemann, Robyn L; Liskamm, Amanda N. (ODAG)
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Thanks, Paul.

From: Knierim, Paul (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - DEA
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 5:30 PM
To: Thiemann, Robyn (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - DEA; Liskamm, Amanda N. (ODAG (b)(6)
Cc: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

Please let me know if additional information is needed.

Paul E. Knierim
Chief of Intelligence
Drug Enforcement Administration
Office (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Cellular (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: Thiemann, Robyn (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - DEA
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 1:51 PM
To: Liskamm, Amanda N. (ODAG) (JMD (b)(6); Knierim, Paul E
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - DEA
Cc: Keilty, Michael (ODAG) (JMD (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Capitol breach inquiries

We did not have anyone engaged on the operational side (b)(7)(E) per DEA (b)(7)(E) per FBI. I have added Paul Knierim for details.

On Jan 11, 2021, at 1:48 PM, Liskamm, Amanda N. (ODAG (b)(6) wrote:

?

Hey Mike, I'm cc'ing Robyn (COS for DEA) so she can assist with this, but I do not believe that DEA was involved in anything prior to the event. Let me know if you need anything else. Thanks!

Amanda

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 1:42 PM
To: Liskamm, Amanda N. (ODA (b)(6))
Subject: FW: Capitol breach inquiries

Hi Amanda,

Can you reach out to DEA (or provide me a POC) who can provide this information? (b)(5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Thanks,
Mike

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG)
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 11:09 AM
To: Allen, Joseph (b)(6) per ATF [Redacted]; Kilgallon, John (USMS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F))
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG (b)(6)) [Redacted]; Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6)) [Redacted]
Subject: Capitol breach inquiries

Duplicative Material

Keilty, Michael (ODAG)

From: Keilty, Michael (ODAG)
Sent: Monday, January 11, 2021 9:49 AM
To: Moran, John (ODAG)
Subject: FW: Capitol breach inquiries
Attachments: Overview US Capitol coordination DRAFT 01102021 U_LES_.pdf; Overview US Capitol coordination DRAFT 01102021 U_LES .docx

We received this from USAO-DC.

Mike

From: Kohl, Ken (USAD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))
Sent: Sunday, January 10, 2021 9:51 PM
To: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG (b)(6)) Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Subject: RE: Capitol breach inquiries

Rich, I'm happy to work with Mike Keilty on this.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per EOUSA/FBI



Ken

*Kenneth Kohl
Acting Principal Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office (DC)*

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From: Donoghue, Richard (ODA (b)(6))
Sent: Sunday, January 10, 2021 7:46 PM
To: Kohl, Ken (USAD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)); Crabb, John D. (USAD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))
Cc: Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))
Subject: Fwd: Capitol breach inquiries

Ken and John,

Please see email below from Friday morning. Mike Keilty still needs someone in USAO-DC who can provide accurate info about the planning and coordination efforts that preceded Wednesday' events. We need this ASAP.

Thanks,

Rich Donoghue
Acting DAG.

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Keilty, Michael (ODAG (b)(6))"
Date: January 8, 2021 at 10:35:38 AM EST
To: "Sherwin, Michael (USADC (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))"
Cc: "Donoghue, Richard (ODAG (b)(6))"
Subject: Capitol breach inquiries

Duplicative Material

(b)(6) (NSD)

From: (b)(6) (NSD)
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2021 12:56 PM
To: Rosen, Jeffrey A. (ODAG)
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG); Moran, John (ODAG); Sherwin, Michael (USADC)
Subject: AM SIOC BRIEFING

Sir,

Here are the highlights from the SIOC AM brief :

Intel (b)(5) per NSD

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) pers NSD and EOUSA

MPD (b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per NSD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per EOUSA

Capitol Police (b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per NSD and EOUSA

Secret Service : anticipated demonstration tomorrow at 1200 US Capitol hosted by Shut Down DC. Demonstrators will urge Congress to impeach Pres Trump, unknown number of participants

National Guard (b)(7)(E) troops on ground, expecting addt (b)(7)(E) today.

(b)(7)(A) per EOUSA

Media more wanted posters going out this morning re assaults on POs

Announcement re SIOC : full staffing will resume on Friday 1/15

Best,

(b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000

JAN 03 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Timeline for December 31, 2020 – January 6, 2021

The purpose of this memorandum is to memorialize the planning and execution timeline for the Washington, D.C., National Guard's involvement in the January 6, 2021 First Amendment Protests in Washington, D.C.

The timeline is as follows:

Thursday, December 31, 2020 (New Year's Eve)

- Mayor Muriel Bowser and Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, D.C. Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, deliver a written request for D.C. National Guard (DCNG) support to D.C. Metro Police Department (MPD) and Fire and Emergency Service.

Saturday, January 2, 2021

- The Acting Secretary of Defense (A/SD) confers with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) on the Mayor's written request.

Sunday, January 3, 2021

- DoD confirms with U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) that there is no request for DoD support.
- A/SD meets with select Cabinet Members to discuss DoD support to law enforcement agencies and potential requirements for DoD support.
- A/SD and CJCS meet with the President. President concurs in activation of the DCNG to support law enforcement.

Monday, January 4, 2021

- USCP confirms there is no requirement for DoD support in a phone call with SECARMY.
- The A/SD, in consultation with CJCS, SECARMY, and DoD General Counsel (GC), reviews the Department's plan to be prepared to provide support to civil authorities, if asked, and approves activation of (b)(7)(E) members of the DCNG to support Mayor Bowser's request.
 - Support provided in response to Mayor Bowser's request includes support at:
 - Traffic Control Points: (b)(7)(E) personnel (total/2 shifts); Metro station support: (b)(7)(E) personnel (total/2 shifts); Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team: (b)(7)(E) personnel; and Internal Command and Control: (b)(7)(E) personnel.
 - A/SD also authorizes SECARMY to deploy a Quick Reaction Force ((b)(7)(E) personnel staged at Joint Base Andrews) if additional support is requested by civil authorities.

Tuesday, January 5, 2021

- Mayor Bowser delivers a letter addressed to the Acting Attorney General, A/SD, and SECARMY confirming that there are no additional support requirements from the D.C.
- 255 DCNG arrive in D.C. and begin to manage traffic control points alongside local law enforcement.

Wednesday, January 6, 2021

0830: A/SD and CJCS review DoD plan to support law enforcement agencies and request an exercise regarding DoD contingency response options.

1130: A/SD participates in table-top exercise regarding DoD contingency response options.

1305: A/SD receives open source reports of demonstrator movements to U.S. Capitol.

1326: USCP orders evacuation of Capitol complex.

1334: SECARMY phone call with Mayor Bowser in which Mayor Bowser communicates request for unspecified number of additional forces.

1349: Commanding General, DCNG, Walker phone call with USCP Chief Sund. Chief Sund communicates request for immediate assistance.

1422: SECARMY phone call with D.C. Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Dr. Rodriguez, and MPD leadership to discuss the current situation and to request additional DCNG support.

1430: A/SD, CJCS, and SECARMY meet to discuss USCP and Mayor Bowser's requests.

1500: A/SD determines all available forces of the DCNG are required to reinforce MPD and USCP positions to support efforts to reestablish security of the Capitol complex.

1500: SECARMY directs DCNG to prepare available Guardsmen to move from the armory to the Capitol complex, while seeking formal approval from A/SD for deployment. DCNG prepares to move 150 personnel to support USCP, pending A/SD's approval.

1504: A/SD, with advice from CJCS, DoD GC, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), SECARMY, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, provides verbal approval of the full activation of DCNG (1100 total) in support of the MPD. Immediately upon A/SD approval, Secretary McCarthy directs DCNG to initiate movement and full mobilization.

In response, DCNG redeployed all soldiers from positions at Metro stations and all available non-support and non-C2 personnel to support MPD. DCNG begins full mobilization.

1519: SECARMY phone call with Senator Schumer and Speaker Pelosi about the nature of Mayor Bowser's request. SECARMY explains A/SD already approved full DCNG mobilization.

- 1526: SECARMY phone call with Mayor Bowser and MPD police chief relays there was no denial of their request, and conveys A/SD approval of the activation of full DCNG.
- 1546: CNGB phone call with the Adjutant General (TAG) of Virginia to discuss support in Washington D.C. TAG said Governor had ordered mobilization of forces at 1532.
- 1548: SECARMY departs Pentagon for MPD HQ.
- 1555: CNGB phone call with TAG of Maryland to discuss support in Washington D.C. TAG said governor ordered the mobilization of the rapid response force. TAG reports Governor had ordered mobilization of the rapid response force at 1547.
- 1610: SECARMY arrives at MPD HQ.
- 1618: A/SD, CJCS, SECARMY, and CNGB discuss availability of National Guard (NG) forces from other States in the region. A/SD gives voice approval for out-of-State NG forces to muster and to be prepared to deploy to D.C.
- 1632: A/SD provides verbal authorization to re-mission DCNG to conduct perimeter and clearance operations in support of USCP. SECARMY to provide public notification of support.
- 1640: SECARMY phone call with Governor of Maryland. Governor to send Maryland NG troops to D.C., expected to arrive on January 7, 2021.
- 1702: Departure of (b)(7)(E) DCNG from D.C. Armory in support of USCP. Arrive at Capitol at 1740, swear in with USCP, and begin support operations.
- 1745: A/SD signs formal authorization for out-of-State NG to muster and gives voice approval for deployment in support of USCP.
- 1814: USCP, MPD, and DCNG successfully establish perimeter on the west side of the U.S. Capitol.
- 1936: A/SD provides vocal approval to lease fences in support of the USCP for security of the Capitol building.
- 2000: USCP declares Capitol building secure.

(b)(6) per DOD

Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

From: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 9:26 AM
To: Moran, John (ODAG); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
Cc: Antell, Kira M. (OLA); Raimondi, Marc (PAO); Greer, Megan L. (OLA); Creegan, Erin (ODAG); DiZinno, Richard (ODAG (b)(6) (NSD); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Free at the times you suggest below.

From: Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Friday, January 8, 2021 8:20 AM
To: Hanson, Alan R. (JM (b)(6))
Cc: Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher (ODA (b)(6))
Raimondi, Marc (PA (b)(6)) Greer, Megan L. (OL (b)(6)) Creegan,
Erin (ODA (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODA (b)(6) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG (b)(6))
Subject: Re: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Happy to talk later today.

John

On Jan 7, 2021, at 11:39 PM, Hanson, Alan R. (JM (b)(6)) wrote:

?

Thanks, and I expect that will work for me, Kira.

(b)(5)

On Jan 7, 2021, at 10:29 PM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) wrote:

?

Thanks Alan. I think it would be helpful to have a quick call tomorrow to nail down how, and to what extent, we plan to respond to this type of inquiry. It looks like many of us are free at 12:00 or 1:30. I'm happy to send an invite if that works for others.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 7, 2021, at 10:19 PM, Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6) wrote:

?

An additional set of inquiries from Senate CJS Minority staff, now shifting toward interactions with Capitol Hill Police:

Did the Capitol Police reach out to DOJ for any assistance before January 6 (possibility of backup if needed, advance intel, etc)? Did DOJ offer any assistance [before Wednesday](#) to Capitol Police (as in, there may be a large protest coming, let us know what you need)?

Regarding yesterday, did Capitol Police reach out directly to DOJ for assistance when the situation started spiraling out of control and if so, approximately when? If not, was it MPD or another LEA that called DOJ components for backup?

On Jan 7, 2021, at 5:34 PM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6) wrote:

?

Thanks Chris. I think our emails crossed. OLA has reached out to FBI on this. As of this morning, FBI OCA represented that they spoke yesterday afternoon as events unfolded with staff for McCarthy, Pelosi, and McConnell. Those conversations were primarily about the FBI response in the moment i.e., the number of FBI personnel on the Hill (footage of whom was broadcast) and their limited supporting role. I was told that FBI is not doing ongoing briefings today. Happy to provide additional details by phone if that would be helpful.

From: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 5:29 PM
To: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6))
Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6)) Antell,
Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran, John
(ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard
(ODAG (b)(6)) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

And oversight demanding briefing from FBI

<https://twitter.com/OversightDems>

(b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 5:22 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran, John
(ODA (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher
(ODA (b)(6))
Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard
(ODAG (b)(6)) (b)(6) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

New inquiry from House CJS Minority staff (I have already sent them the information provided to Senate CJS Minority staff thus far):

Could you possibly tell me the approximate number of FBI and ATF officers and agents and U.S. Marshals who were deployed to assist yesterday (by agency). I'm providing some materials to my boss, and I want to be a little more specific than yesterday's statement from Acting AG Rosen, if possible.

Thanks for anything more specific you can provide.

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 1:57 PM
To: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Antell,
Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran, John
(ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher
(ODA (b)(6))
Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard
(ODA (b)(6)) (b)(6) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

I would say (b)(5) [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2021 12:40 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran, John
(ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher
(ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard
(ODAG (b)(6)) (b)(6) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Thanks much. For awareness, ALO has received this follow-up inquiry from Senate CJS Minority(/incoming Majority) staff in response to this statement:

Yup, this has been reported by the media. So no one can give you more figures/details on resources used (b)(7)(E) per FBI

Also saw ATF agents assisting with cleanup of the Rotunda again in the publicly reported press. At a minimum, bot (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA have to have some kind figures as to the number of individuals being charged and components should know how many officers/agents were sent and what their duties were.

So is it that no one is coordinating at Main? Or that no one wants to give us the full information from Main?

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 12:02 PM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran,
John (ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher
(ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Greer,
Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin
(ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG)
(b)(6) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

This is going out:

Acting Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen Statement “Yesterday, our Nation watched in disbelief as a mob breached the Capitol Building and required federal and local law enforcement to help restore order. The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those responsible for this attack on our Government and the rule of law face the full consequences of their actions under the law. Our criminal prosecutors have been working throughout the night with special agents and investigators from the U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, ATF, Metropolitan Police Department and the public to gather the evidence, identify perpetrators, and charge federal crimes where warranted. Some participants in yesterday’s violence will be charged today, and we will continue to methodically assess evidence, charge crimes and make arrests in the coming days and weeks to ensure that those responsible are held accountable under the law.”

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6))
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2021 11:17 AM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco,
Christopher (ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Greer,
Megan L (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin
(ODAG (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG
(b)(6)) (NSD)
(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 10:58 AM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco,
Christopher (ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Greer,
Megan L (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin
(ODA (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG
(b)(6)) (NSD)

(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

(b)(5)

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))

Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 10:56 AM

To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher (ODA (b)(6))

Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin (ODA (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG

(b)(6) (NSD)

(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

We are working on releasing a statement as soon as it is cleared by Mike Sherwin.

(b)(5)

?

From: Antell, Kira M. (OL (b)(6))

Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2021 10:47 AM

To: Moran, John (ODAG (b)(6)) Grieco, Christopher (ODAG (b)(6)) Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))

Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin (ODA (b)(6)) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG

(b)(6) (NSD)

(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Thanks John. Marc, can you please be sure to loop in ALO and OLA prior to release of any statement?

From: Moran, John (ODA (b)(6))

Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 10:34 AM

To: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG (b)(6))

Cc: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD (b)(6)) Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Creegan, Erin (ODAG

(b)(6) DiZinno, Richard (ODAG

(b)(6) (NSD)

(b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

We have a draft statement in the works to that effect.

Regards,
John

On Jan 7, 2021, at 10:16 AM, Grieco, Christopher (ODA (b)(6)) wrote:

?

We shoul (b)(5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] John, cc'd above, may have more insight.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 10:13 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
(b)(6)
Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
(b)(6) Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
(b)(6) Creegan, Erin (ODAG)
(b)(6) DiZinno, Richard
(ODAG (b)(6) (b)(6)
(NSD (b)(6); Michel,
Christopher (OAG (b)(6)
Moran, John (ODAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

And a follow-on inquiry from Senate CJS Minority (incoming Majority) staff from this morning:

We'd like more information/after action (and ongoing action regarding prosecutions) on this today.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 4:51 PM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
(b)(6)
Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
(b)(6) Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
(b)(6) Creegan, Erin (ODAG)

(b)(6) DiZinno, Richard
(ODA (b)(6) (b)(6)
(NSD (b)(6); Michel,
Christopher (OAG (b)(6)
Moran, John (ODAG)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Got it.

Thanks much, Kira.

On Jan 6, 2021, at 4:35 PM, Antell,
Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6) wrote:

?

Marc Raimondi offered the following
cleared statement when I asked if we
had released anything:

“The Acting Attorney General is
coordinating with our law
enforcement partners to add
additional Federal law enforcement
support to the Capitol Grounds.”

(b)(5)

(b)(6) I invite
others on the chain to chime in if
they have additional information to
add.

-K

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021
4:33 PM

To: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6) Antell,
Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG)

(b)(6)

DiZinno, Richard (ODAG)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(NSD (b)(6)

Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Moran, John (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re:
January 6 Protests

(b)(5)

I am passing along the following just-received update inquiry from Senate CJS Minority staff for Departmental response if and when such is deemed appropriate:

Soooo this has taken a turn for the worse. Can we have an update as to DOJ involvement, please? Capitol Police has apparently made an open appeal for LE assistance/back up.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021
12:49 PM

To: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6) Antell,
Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6) Creegan,
Erin (ODAG)

(b)(6)

DiZinno, Richard (ODAG)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(NSD (b)(6)

Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Moran, John (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re:
January 6 Protests

Got it and will do. Thanks much.

From: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021

11:49 AM

To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6)

Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Creegan,
Erin (ODAG)

(b)(6)

DiZinno, Richard (ODAG)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(NSD (b)(6)

Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Moran, John (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re:

January 6 Protests

Good by me.

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021

11:46 AM

To: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6)

Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Greer,
Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Creegan,
Erin (ODAG)

(b)(6)

DiZinno, Richard (ODAG)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(NSD (b)(6)

Michel, Christopher (OAG)

(b)(6)

Moran, John (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re:

January 6 Protests

Hi Alan,

Adding in others here. OPA coordinated with BOP as to an answer to the first question and provided the following bullets to a media inquiry:

(b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)



I do not thin (b)(5)



Below is cleared language we are using for a HPSCI inquiry. It seems to m (b)(5)



LANGUAGE

Thanks for your inquiry. With respect to Department of Justice efforts, the Department has prepared to respond as necessary and appropriate to ensure that constitutional liberties and public safety are protected. That preparation has included close coordination with local authorities and federal agency partners, such as the Department of Defense. Given the ongoing and evolving nature of the protests this week and the need

to protect operational interests, we are not able to provide additional details at this time. We understand your interest and expect to continue to update you should additional information become available.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021
11:38 AM

To: Moran, John (ODAG)

(b)(6)

Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6) Antell,
Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6) Greer,
Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re:
January 6 Protests

John,

We have received the additional inquiries, below, on this subject from Senate CJS Minority. Please let me know if/how you would like for us to respond (b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(5).

Thanks.

Alan

Per the latest NDAA, federal law enforcement officers responding to “civil disturbances” must wear visible identification including the insignia of their agencies. Are the uniforms for BOP COs coming to DC in compliance with this regulation?

Were other agents and deputies flown in (like USM (b)(7)(E)) or are these all local DOJ LEOs? Who is in charge of these teams? One of my colleagues on another committee

indicated that while MPD has primary responsibility, that DOJ/FBI has first chair for assistance/aid to local LE and DHS has first chair for assistance with protection of federal property.

Doesn't the FBI have a command post set up as well? Are any DOJ air assets being used?

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 11:47 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
(b)(6) Moran, John (ODAG)
(b)(6)
Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
(b)(6) Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Agreed. Thanks much, John.

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 11:25 AM
To: Moran, John (ODAG)
(b)(6)
Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
(b)(6) Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
(b)(6) Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: DOJ Activities re: January 6 Protests

Thanks John. I think that is sufficient for our needs for now. We will let you know if we get further inquiries.

From: Moran, John (ODAG)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021

11:25 AM

To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Cc: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

(b)(6) Hanson,
Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6) Greer,
Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: DOJ Activities re:
January 6 Protests

Kira,

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA

MPD has primary responsibility here; the DC USAO is in close contact with MPD and ready to provide support and assistance as needed. It's fine to relay that, but I

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA

Regards,
John

On Jan 4, 2021, at
10:44 AM, Antell, Kira
M. (OLA)

(b)(6)

wrote:

?

Good morning,

Senate CJS Minority has reached out to Alan (copied here) to ask what the Department's plans are for protests on January 6 and whether there plans to deploy additional LEA personnel. I

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA

Is there any information or a statement we can

share? Happy to
coordinate with others
or jump on a call.

Thanks,
Kira

Kira Antell
Office of Legislative
Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Raimondi, Marc (PAO)

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 1:29 PM
To: Stueve, Joshua (PAO)
Subject: FW: Capitol response - DOJ LE numbers

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (NSD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 2021 12:03 PM
To: Rosen, Jeffrey A. (ODAG (b)(6))
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODA (b)(6)) Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
(b)(6) Creegan, Erin (ODAG (b)(6)) Hodes, Jarad (ODAG)
(b)(6) Moran, John (ODA (b)(6)) Sherwin, Michael (USADC)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Capitol response - DOJ LE numbers

Sir,

Good afternoon. This is the most accurate DOJ LE response data according to FBI, ATF, and USMS senior management.

FBI appro (b)(7)(B) personnel

FBI response to US Capitol and grounds on Wednesday, January 6, 2021:

(b)(7)(E) per FBI
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(A) per EOUSA; (b)(7)(E) per FBI

USMS (b)(7)(E) personnel

On January 6, 2021 at approximately (b)(7)(E), the USMS deployed (b)(7)(E) personnel for the response to Capitol. This number includes (b)(7)(E) team with (b)(7)(E). The (b)(7)(E) personnel (b)(7)(E), conducted exterior (b)(7)(E). Meanwhile, Deputy U.S. Marshals including personnel from (b)(7)(E) Deputy Marshals conducted (b)(7)(E). Deputy Marshals also (b)(7)(E). Finally, Deputy Marshals (b)(7)(E). Deputy U.S. Marshals were relieved from their assignments (b)(7)(E).

ATE (b)(7)(E) personnel

(b)(7)(E) per ATF

Total DOJ personnel (b)(7)(E) per personnel

Best,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Acting Chief of Counterterrorism
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)

From: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 12:47 PM
To: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (NSD)
Subject: RE: Capitol response - DOJ LE numbers

Thanks.

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (NSD (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 12:45 PM
To: Grieco, Christopher (ODAG (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Capitol response - DOJ LE numbers

Chris,

Inadvertently left you off of this...

Best,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Acting Chief of Counterterrorism
National Security Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (NSD)
Sent: Thursday, January 7, 2021 12:03 PM
To: Rosen, Jeffrey A. (ODAG (b)(6)
Cc: Donoghue, Richard (ODA (b)(6) Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
(b)(6) Creegan, Erin (ODAG (b)(6) Hodes, Jarad (ODAG)
(b)(6) Moran, John (ODA (b)(6) Sherwin, Michael (USADC)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Capitol response - DOJ LE numbers

Duplicative Material

Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 6:54 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO); Michel, Christopher (OAG); (b)(6) (NSD); Sherwin, Michael (USADC); Antell, Kira M. (OLA); Donoghue, Richard (ODAG)
Subject: RE: BOP (b)(5)

That makes sense and all sounds good. I'll send your proposed reply (bullets) to Justin at BOP if no concerns raised by 7pm.

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 6:37 PM
To: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6); Michel, Christopher (OAG) (b)(6) (NSD) (b)(6) Sherwin, Michael (USADC) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C); Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6) Donoghue, Richard (ODAG) (b)(6)
Subject: RE: BOP (b)(5)

Kristina, (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

Please let us know by 7PM if anyone has any issues with the points below.

Proposed response:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Marc

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 6:04 PM

To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)

Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

(b)(5)

LMK if any concerns.

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Proposed response:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Also an update FYA - (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 8:49 AM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6) wrote:

?

Sorry, didn't look through the threat. Please disregard. Kristina will certainly know who we should reach out to.

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 05, 2021 8:48 AM

To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

(b)(6)

Cc: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6); Navas, Nicole (PAO)

(b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6)

Subject: RE: BOP (b)(5)

Hi Marc – I don't think Alan is the right POC for this request. OLA should be able to track down a BOP media contact for you.

From: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:46 AM

To: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6)

Cc: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6); Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6); Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: BOP (b)(5)

Thank you Alan, can you please ask BOP to keep us in the loop on any media interest they receive and who their public affairs contact for this deployment will be. I'd like to meet with whomever that is going to be and/or, the team leader, at main justice when they arrive, to make sure we know how to get in contact with each other.

Thank you,

Marc Raimondi

Acting Director of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

All correspondence contained in this e-mail, to include all names and associated contact information, may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 05, 2021 7:35 AM

To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)

Cc: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6); Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

(b)(6); Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

Thanks. We will plan to go back to CJS with this updated statement.

On Jan 4, 2021, at 8:07 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)

wrote:

? Thanks

Marc Raimondi

Acting Director of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 8:01 PM, Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

? FYA (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 7:51 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

?
Yes

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2021 7:46 PM
To: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6)
Cc: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6); Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6); Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

+Megan and Alan

Was this language cleared by ODAG?

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 4, 2021, at 6:09 PM, Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

? Sounds good. Thanks, Marc.

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 6:03 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6) wrote:

?
(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

Thank you,

Marc Raimondi
Acting Director of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

All correspondence contained in this e-mail, to include all names and associated contact information, may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552.

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
(b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2021 5:34 PM
To: Navas, Nicole (PAO)
(b)(6) Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
(b)(6)
Subject: BOP (b)(5)

FYA (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) assembled and are on alert in case needed this week. Bop drafted the below statement in case of inquiries.

(b)(5)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] LMK if any issues or concerns.

Proposed Response:
(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 1:46 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
Subject: Re: BO (b)(5)

LMK if you spoke with USMS and if I'm good to send the proposed response to Zach to confirm.

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 6, 2021, at 1:16 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6)) wrote:

?

Whoever your contact is there.

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO (b)(6))
Sent: Wednesday, January 06, 2021 1:16 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6))
Subject: Re: BO (b)(5)

Ok will do. Zach Kelton, yeah?

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 6, 2021, at 1:15 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO (b)(6)) wrote:

? Call Zach and make sure that is true and please let him know we want to know if their mission changes.

Marc Raimondi
Acting Director of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 6, 2021, at 1:14 PM, Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

? Clare followed up wonderin (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

My thought (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

LMK if that works for you.

Kristina Mastropasqua

Office of Public Affairs

Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 7:46 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

? My talking points are accurate then.

Marc Raimondi

Acting Director of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 7:24 PM, Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

? From bop cos re mission:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua

Office of Public Affairs

Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 6:37 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO)

(b)(6) wrote:

Duplicative Material



Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 8:05 PM
To: Navas, Nicole (PAO)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

Yes definitely avoiding! (b)(5)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 8:04 PM, Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6) wrote:

? Wow, I suggest stay clear of going into RFK.

Thank you,

Nicole Navas Oxman
Spokesperson
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
(b)(6) (cell)
Nicole.Navas@usdoj.gov

On Jan 4, 2021, at 3:01 PM, Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
(b)(6) wrote:

Duplicative Material

Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:30 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

Thanks for the additional info, Kira. ALO will sit tight for now. (b)(5)

Much appreciated.

On Jan 5, 2021, at 7:38 AM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6) wrote:

?

Alan – you may want to wait a bit. (b)(5)

Regardless, it is up to you if you want to share this with approps now and update later or hold.

From: Hanson, Alan R. (JMD) (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 7:35 AM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6)
Cc: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6); Antell, Kira M. (OLA) (b)(6); Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6); Greer, Megan L. (OLA) (b)(6)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

Duplicative Material

Donoghue, Richard (ODAG)

From: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 7:59 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
Cc: Moran, John (ODAG)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

This is fine.

On Jan 4, 2021, at 5:49 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6) wrote:

?

Rich/John, if you have a specific counsel you'd like me to coordinate this please let me know. Please see the BOP draft response below and then my recommended response, which is shorter,

Proposed OPA Response:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 04, 2021 5:34 PM
To: Navas, Nicole (PAO) (b)(6); Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
(b)(6)
Subject: BOP (b)(5)

Duplicative Material

(b)(6) Richard Donoghue

From: (b)(6) Richard Donoghue
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 7:59 PM
To: Raimondi, Marc (PAO)
Cc: Moran, John (ODAG)
Subject: Re: BOP (b)(5)

This is fine. The JCS Chairman suggested that we and others put out a statement in advance tomorrow - 1st A

On Jan 4, 2021, at 5:49 PM, Raimondi, Marc (PAO) (b)(6) wrote:

Duplicative Material

Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)

From: Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 11:47 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)
Cc: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA); Greer, Megan L. (OLA)
Subject: Re: Priority RFI on FBI Activities Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

Copy. Thanks

On Jan 6, 2021, at 11:46 AM, Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6)) wrote:

?

Chad - Please use the below to respond.

LANGUAGE

Good afternoon,

Thanks for your inquiry. With respect to Department of Justice efforts, the Department has prepared to respond as necessary and appropriate to ensure that constitutional liberties and public safety are protected. That preparation has included close coordination with local authorities and federal agency partners, such as the Department of Defense. Given the ongoing and evolving nature of the protests this week and the need to protect operational interests, we are not able to provide additional details at this time. We understand your interest and expect to continue to update you should additional information become available.

From: Thorley, Charles A. (OL (b)(6))
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:42 AM
To: Antell, Kira M. (OLA (b)(6))
Cc: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA (b)(6)) Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6))
Subject: Re: Priority RFI on FBI Activities Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

Can do. Thanks.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 6, 2021, at 9:22 AM, Antell, Kira M. (OL (b)(6)) wrote:

?

Just FYSA working through language with OAG and ODAG. Chad, can you please send to the Committee when we get it cleared? NB it will be very short.

From: Antell, Kira M. (OLA)

Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:51 PM

To: Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA (b)(6))

Cc: Greer, Megan L. (OLA (b)(6)) Thorley, Charles A. (OLA

(b)(6))

Subject: Re: Priority RFI on FBI Activities Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

I'm running point. Thanks. I'll share with OAG and ODAG.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 5, 2021, at 8:48 PM, Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA

(b)(6)) wrote:

?

FYI See below re protests. I am not sure who is working protest issues in OLA. Thank you, Joanne

From: Sikorskyj, Lucia (b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 8:42 PM

To: Thorley, Charles A. (OLA (b)(6)) Johnson, Joanne E. (OLA (b)(6))

Cc: Bergreen, Timothy (b)(6) Congressional Email; Williams,

Douglas A. Jr. (OCA) (FB (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

(OCA) (FB (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

Subject: Re: Priority RFI on FBI Activities Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

Good evening ?Chad and Joanne,

The FBI deferred the Committee's referenced priority request to DOJ, with respect to any communications between the Bureau and the Department of Defense on interagency coordination and support related to tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress. As set forth below, we are particularly interested in recent discussions at the leadership level, if any, between the Bureau and the Department of Defense. Please find a full copy of our request in the below email thread and the FBI's response.

Specifically, in that context and regarding tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress, please also clarify whether and to what extent Department of Defense leadership, including the Acting Secretary or his staff, have sought information from or are coordinating with FBI regarding activities or support related to tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress and/or any expected protests, rallies, or security events in the city. As you can imagine, [given heightened public concern about the role of federal law enforcement and the military during this transition period](#), the Committee wants to ensure that the Bureau is transparent not only about its own preparations and planned activities, but also is not ensnared in any improper or questionable activities or requests for information by any other component of the government, including DOD.

Because the Joint Session of Congress is tomorrow, we respectfully request your response this evening or early tomorrow morning.

Many thanks in advance for your attention to this matter.

Best,
Lucian

Lucian D. Sikorskyj
Subcommittee Staff Director (Majority) | Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence,
and Counterproliferation Subcommittee
Oversight and Budget Monitor | DEA, DHS, DOJ, FBI, and USCG
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Capitol, HVC-304

(b)(6) | [202-225-7690](tel:202-225-7690) (office) (b)(6) (desk)
(b)(6) (secure) (b)(6) (mobile)

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Date: January 5, 2021 at 17:56:01 EST
To: "Sikorskyj, Lucian (b)(6)
Cc: "Bergreen, Timothy (b)(6) Congressional Email
Subject: RFI on FBI Activities Related to Joint Session of Congress

?
Lucian,

Good evening, relative to the Committee seeking information on the FBI's efforts and preparations concerning tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress, particularly on its assessment of the various threats, its overview of interagency coordination and support, and any recent discussions at the leadership level between the Bureau and the Department of Defense, please see below.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

_____t

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

The FBI's mission is to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States. The FBI focuses on criminal acts, threats of violence, and violations of federal law, and does not investigate solely First Amendment-protected activity. Rather, the FBI investigates those activities that threaten the safety of our communities and will use authorized methods and available charging instruments when appropriate.

The FBI prides itself on robust partnership and coordination with local, state and federal law enforcement officials. For information related to DoD communications with the Department of Justice (to include the FBI), we defer you to DOJ.

As always, the FBI will continue to advise the committee on threats consistent with our law enforcement and national security obligations.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

?

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Date: January 5, 2021 at 11:50:50 EST
To: "Sikorskyj, Lucian (b)(6)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Cc: "Bergreen, Timothy (b)(6) Congressional Email
Subject: RE: Priority RFI on FBI Activities Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

?

Lucian,

Your request has been forwarded to the appropriate unit. Once I receive a response, you will be notified. Attempts to have appropriate personnel on stand by for a call will be made, but their availability/logistics will determine. Any questions please advise.

Thanks,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI

From: Sikorskyj, Lucia (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 11:41 AM
T (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI (OCA) (FBI)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
Cc: Bergreen, Timoth (b)(6) Congressional Email
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Priority RFI on FBI Activities

Related to Tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) per FBI,

The Committee requests a quick turn update on the FBI's efforts and preparations concerning tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress, including (1) its assessment of the various threats and (2) its overview of interagency coordination and support. In the latter regard, as set forth below, we are particularly interested in recent discussions at the leadership level, if any, between the Bureau and the Department of Defense.

A brief email should address the request, as the event is tomorrow; we also ask that appropriate personnel also stand ready to speak by telephone later today, and to address any follow up questions from Committee staff.

This matter is of high interest to the Committee, especially in light of recent press reporting suggesting that individuals, possibly with links to violent extremist groups, may be involved with violence or criminal activity in the vicinity of the U.S. Capitol or in relation to the event. The Committee believes it essential to ensure that security and law enforcement measures are lawful and appropriate, especially when there may be a nexus to First Amendment activities at National Special Security Events (NSSEs) or those with similar high profile characteristics.

In that context and regarding tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress, please also clarify whether and to what extent Department of Defense leadership, including the Acting Secretary or his staff, have sought information from or are coordinating with FBI regarding activities or support related to tomorrow's Joint Session of Congress and/or any expected protests, rallies, or security events in the city. As you can imagine, given heightened public concern about the role of federal law enforcement and the military during this transition period, the Committee wants to ensure that the Bureau is transparent not only about its own preparations and planned activities, but also is not ensnared in any improper or questionable activities or requests for information by any other component of the government, including DOD.

Because the Joint Session of Congress is tomorrow, we respectfully request your response by COB today. Many thanks in advance for your attention and help.

Best,

Lucian

Lucian D. Sikorskyj
Subcommittee Staff Director (Majority) | Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, and Counterproliferation Subcommittee
Oversight and Budget Monitor | DEA, DHS, DOJ, FBI, and USCG
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Capitol, HVC-304

(b)(6) | [202-225-7690](tel:202-225-7690) (office) (b)(6)
(b)(6) (desk) (b)(6) (secure) (b)(6) (mobile)

Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 11:11 AM
To: Justin B. Long
Subject: RE: Final Proposed edit for media inquiries on BOP team clothing identification (CBS News inquiry)

Both edits look good. Thanks, Justin.

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

From: Justin B. Long (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 10:23 AM
To: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6)
Subject: Final Proposed edit for media inquiries on BOP team clothing identification (CBS News inquiry)

Kristina,

In addition to the proposed edit in my last email, we are curious if we can tweak your first bullet to read (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) [redacted]?

Thanks,
Justin

Justin Long

Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> Justin B. Long 1/6/2021 10:17 AM >>>

Kristina,

After consulting our correctional staff, we propose one edit in red text for the sentence (b)(5) [redacted]

DOJ's CURRENT STATEMENT:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) [redacted]

NEWLY PROPOSED STATEMENT:

For CBS who's asking generally about identification:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

For other reporters who may ask specifically about badges:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Clare Hymes (CBS) last night said she is fine with an answer today on this.

BACKGROUND FOR YOU:

Each BOP officer has the following on their clothing:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Thanks,
Justin

Justin Long

Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> "Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO (b)(6) 1/5/2021 7:04 PM >>>

Ok proposed response below for Clare and anyone inquiring. Als (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Thanks! We will get through this week 😊

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

From: Justin B. Lon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 5:56 PM
To: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO (b)(6))
Subject: Media inquiry - CBS News - Re: BOP teams' identifying uniforms

Good evening Kristina,

Zach helped me finalize this answer for your review now:

Reporter:

CBS Evening News - Clare Hymes

Follow-up inquiry:

Sorry – also meant to ask whether or not the officers will be wearing the same un-identifying uniforms that they did in the District last summer? Or if they will have identifying markers saying they are with the Bureau of Prisons?

Proposed response:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
[Redacted]

Note:

Zach let me know our BOP officers' clothing has "BOP" written on it with a BOP officer number unique to each staffer. (b)(5)
[Redacted]

Like earlier in the year, our staff are again carrying badges. (b)(5)
[Redacted]

Justin Long

Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)



U.S. Department of Justice

United States Marshals Service

Tactical Operations Division

Washington, DC 20530-0001

January 5, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: Andrew Smith (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Assistant Director

SUBJECT: Special Deputation Request

PURPOSE: To obtain the Deputy Attorney General's approval or disapproval for a Special Deputation request from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP).

CATEGORY: This is a Category 5 request for Special Deputation.

TIMETABLE: Expedite.

SYNOPSIS: Special Deputation is requested by BOP to grant federal law enforcement authority to (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

DISCUSSION: Per BOP, Acting Attorney General Rosen has requested that BOP provide support to assist with the management of potential civil unrest in the Washington, D.C. area beginning on January 5, 2021. Accordingly, BOP has identified (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) be deployed to provide protection for the Main United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Building at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Pursuant to the Deputy Attorney General's memorandum dated December 9, 1999, the Deputy Attorney General retains authority in seven categories of Special Deputations. This request falls within Category 5, where the deputation is for the purpose of granting additional federal law enforcement authority to a federal employee.

RECOMMENDATION:

(b)(5)

APPROVE: _____

DISAPPROVE: _____

OTHER: _____

Attachments: Form USM-3C (Application for Group Special Deputation), re: (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)
Memorandum from BOP



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Prisons

Washington, DC 20534

January 5, 2021

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

Chief Inspector (b)(7)(E)-Special Deputations
United States Marshals Service
United States Marshals Headquarters
1215 S. Clark Street
Arlington, Virginia 22202

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F):

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(7)(E) to assist with the management of potential civil unrest in the Washington, DC area. See attached for names.

(b)(7)(E)

and do
I have

full confidence in their ability to represent the BOP.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter of mutual concern.

Sincerely,

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

Acting Assistant Director
Correctional Programs Division

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)



U.S. Department of Justice
United States Marshals Service

Application for Group Special Deputation

SPONSORING AGENCY/DISTRICT/DIVISION

1. Sponsoring Agency/District/Division: *
Federal Bureau of Prisons

2. Point of Contact: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

3. Work Email Address: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

4. Phone Number: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

5. District Address - Street: *
320 1st Street, NW

6. City: *
Washington

7. State: *
DC

8. ZIP Code: *
20534

AGENCY BEING SPONSORED

9. Agency Being Sponsored: *
District of Columbia (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

10. Agency Point of Contact: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

11. Work Email Address: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(F)

12. Phone Number: *
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

13. Agency Address - Street: *
320 1st Street, NW

14. City: *
Washington

15. State: *
DC

16. ZIP Code: *
20534

LIMIT OF SPECIAL DEPUTATION AUTHORITY

17. To seek and execute arrest and search warrants supporting the DC CIVIL UNREST Task Force, Operation, or Mission. *

This Deputation is valid from (b)(7)(E) (Month/Day/Year) to (b)(7)(E) (Month/Day/Year)

NOTE: Special Deputations cannot be back-dated and are not retroactive. Special Deputations will be valid from the date the applicant(s) are sworn-in to the expiration date indicated on Page 1, Question 17 of this form.

18. I have reviewed the attached form submitted by the applicants for Special Deputation and verify that the information submitted by them is true and accurate.

Authorized Signature: _____ Date: 1/5/21

Sponsor, U.S. Marshal, Chief Deputy, or Designee

SDB Staff Only: Approval Disapproval Application Incomplete Other

Authorized Signature: _____ Date: _____

Chief, Special Deputation Branch or Designee

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

* = Required Field

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

1. Agency Being Sponsored:

District of Columbia

2. Applicant's District (District of Swearing in Location):

District of Columbia

3. I certify that the following statements are true and accurate. (False or fraudulent information knowingly provided on this form is criminally punishable pursuant to federal law, including Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.)

- I am a citizen of the United States (includes naturalized citizens).
- I am employed with a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency.
- I have successfully completed the basic law enforcement training program approved by my employer.
- I have at least one year previous law enforcement experience to include general arrest authority.
- I have not been convicted of a crime of domestic violence as defined in Title 18 U.S.C., Section 922 (g)(9) Lautenberg Amendment
- I have qualified with my primary authorized firearm within the past 6 months.
- I understand I am not authorized to participate in federal drug investigations unless authorized by DEA or FBI.
- I have read and agree to comply with the deadly force policy of either my agency or the Department of Justice.
- I have included a copy of my employer's authorization letter stating that they concur with my participation and that I have no internal investigations pending within the organization. (Exception: ESF-13)
- I understand that Special Deputy United States Marshals are prohibited from conducting electronic surveillance in USMS and USMS-adopted investigations without the written approval of the USMS Investigative Operations Division, Technical Operations Group.
- I understand that SpDUSM, acting under the authority of their federal deputation, may only conduct electronic surveillance in non-USMS investigations in strict adherence to federal and state law, and United States Department of Justice policy, and only with the explicit approval and under the supervision, control and scope of authority of the non-USMS sponsoring agency, whose responsibility it is to ensure that all ELSUR conducted by its sponsored SpDUSM personnel is conducted lawfully and consistent with United States Department of Justice policy. SpDUSM may not conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to their SpDUSM authority on non-sponsoring agency cases. Violation of these proscriptions will result in this special deputation being revoked.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

1. Agency Being Sponsored:

2. Applicant's District (District of Swearing in Location):

3. I certify that the following statements are true and accurate. (False or fraudulent information knowingly provided on this form is criminally punishable pursuant to federal law, including Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.)

- I am a citizen of the United States (includes naturalized citizens).
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- I understand that SpDUSM, acting under the authority of their federal deputation, may only conduct electronic surveillance in non-USMS investigations in strict adherence to federal and state law, and United States Department of Justice policy, and only with the explicit approval and under the supervision, control and scope of authority of the non-USMS sponsoring agency, whose responsibility it is to ensure that all ELSUR conducted by its sponsored SpDUSM personnel is conducted lawfully and consistent with United States Department of Justice policy. SpDUSM may not conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to their SpDUSM authority on non-sponsoring agency cases. Violation of these proscriptions will result in this special deputation being revoked.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

* = Required Field

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

1. Agency Being Sponsored:
District of Columbia

2. Applicant's District (District of Swearing in Location):
District of Columbia

3. I certify that the following statements are true and accurate. (False or fraudulent information knowingly provided on this form is criminally punishable pursuant to federal law, including Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.)

- I am a citizen of the United States (includes naturalized citizens).
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- I have included a copy of my employer's authorization letter stating that they concur with my participation and that I have no internal investigations pending within the organization. (Exception: ESF-13)
- I understand that Special Deputy United States Marshals are prohibited from conducting electronic surveillance in USMS and USMS-adopted investigations without the written approval of the USMS Investigative Operations Division, Technical Operations Group.
- I understand that SpDUSM, acting under the authority of their federal deputation, may only conduct electronic surveillance in non-USMS investigations in strict adherence to federal and state law, and United States Department of Justice policy, and only with the explicit approval and under the supervision, control and scope of authority of the non-USMS sponsoring agency, whose responsibility it is to ensure that all ELSUR conducted by its sponsored SpDUSM personnel is conducted lawfully and consistent with United States Department of Justice policy. SpDUSM may not conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to their SpDUSM authority on non-sponsoring agency cases. Violation of these proscriptions will result in this special deputation being revoked.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

And Additional Rows

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

1. Agency Being Sponsored:

District of Columbia

2. Applicant's District (District of Swearing in Location):

District of Columbia

3. I certify that the following statements are true and accurate. (False or fraudulent information knowingly provided on this form is criminally punishable pursuant to federal law, including Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1001.)

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- I have read and agree to comply with the deadly force policy of either my agency or the Department of Justice.
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(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Application for Group Special Deputation (continued)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Add Additional Rows

Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)

From: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Sent: Tuesday, January 5, 2021 3:51 PM
To: Justin B. Long
Subject: Re: Media inquiry - due asap - CNN - re: BOP's deployed teams

10-4 thanks

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 3:42 PM, Justin B. Lon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP wrote:

? Zach just confirmed our BOP teams are there now at RFK, arrived about noon (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) .

Justin Long
Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> "Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6) 1/5/2021 2:58 PM >>>
Looks good. But to clarify, teams are not going to rfk? I thought that is where they were going.

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 5, 2021, at 2:26 PM, Justin B. Lon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP wrote:

?
Kristina,

We got our first media inquiry on the crisis management teams for your review below.

CNN is asking which buildings our teams may defend; Zach and I are thinkin (b)(6)

[Redacted]

Zach also told me BOP now ha (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Proposed Response:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Justin Long
Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> "Carrega, Christina (b)(6) [1/5/2021 1:07 PM >>](#)

Good Afternoon,

Happy New Year!

Can you confirm if members of the BOP's riot team have been deployed to Washington, DC today and tomorrow? **If so, what areas or buildings are they designated to guard or are they assigned for crowd control?**

My deadline for this inquiry is as soon as possible.

Please feel free to give me a call to discuss if quicker.

Christina Carrega
Crime and Justice Reporter/Producer
Working remotely
Twitter.com/ChrisCarrega

(b)(6)

P.S. Please excuse any poorly formatted em dashes.

Justin B. Long

From: Justin B. Long
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 9:03 PM
To: Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO)
Subject: Re: Draft response to potential media inquiries this week on BOP

That sounds good (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F), thanks Kristina

Justin Long
Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> "Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6) 1/4/2021 8:02 PM >>>
Thanks for the flag. Maybe sa (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F) ?

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice
(b)(6)

On Jan 4, 2021, at 7:58 PM, Justin B. Lon (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP wrote:

? Kristina, fyi (b)(5)

Justin Long
Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> Zachary Kelto (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP 1/4/2021 6:53 PM >>>
10-4; it's good for now bu (b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

----- Original message -----

From: "Justin B. Long (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP"
Date: 1/4/21 6:47 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: Zachary Kelto (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP, "Jennifer L. Edens (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) - BOP"
Subject: Re: Draft response to potential media inquiries this week on BOP riot teams

>>> "Justin B. Long" 01/04/2021 18:47 >>>
Kristina's folks came back with an edited version below if this looks okay to you...

Justin Long
Public Information Office
Federal Bureau of Prisons

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

>>> "Mastropasqua, Kristina (PAO) (b)(6) 1/4/2021 6:10 PM >>>
Hey Justin (b)(5). Thanks again for doing this!

(b)(5), (b)(7)(E), (b)(7)(F)

Kristina Mastropasqua
Office of Public Affairs
Department of Justice

(b)(6)

Hart, Rosemary (OLC)

From: Hart, Rosemary (OLC)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:59 PM
To: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG); Moran, John (ODAG); Michel, Christopher (OAG)
Cc: Whitaker, Henry C. (OLC); Heim, Laura; Craft, Conor (OLC)
Subject: DC National Guard
Signed By: (b)(6) Rosemary Hart (OLC)

Gentlemen: I was just contacted by the Secretary of the Army's staff, who told me that it is their understanding that the Acting AG orally approved the Secretary of the Army's plan to approve DC National Guard support to the DC Government this week to cover the planned First Amendment activities. They are going to send me a written request (maybe tonight) from the Secretary of the Army formally asking the Acting AG to memorialize his approval.

Can you confirm that the Acting AG approved the request today in a meeting with the Acting SecDef and the SecArmy? If so, the approval has already been given, and the support can go forward all OLC will need to do tomorrow is prepare paperwork that would memorialize the oral approval.

Thanks,
Rosemary

*Rosemary Hart
Special Counsel
Office of Legal Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice*
(o (b)(6)
(cel (b)(6)

From: Hart, Rosemary (OLC)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:49 PM
T (b)(6) per DOD
C (b)(6) per DOD Heim, Laura
(b)(6) (b)(6) per DOD; Craft,
Conor (OL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Updated Memo to DoJ

(b)(6) per DOD: Thank you very much for the call just now, advising me that Acting Attorney General Rosen has given his oral concurrence today to the request from Secretary McCarthy for approval of the plan to provide the District of Columbia government with specified support from the D.C. National Guard this week. We await a written request from the Secretary of the Army for memorialization of the Acting Attorney General's oral approval, which we will facilitate as expeditiously as we can tomorrow.

Again, I appreciate the call tonight and will be in touch tomorrow for final coordination.

All best,
Rosemary

*Rosemary Hart
Special Counsel*

Office of Legal Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice

(o (b)(6)
(cel (b)(6)

From (b)(6) per DOD
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:34 PM
To: Hart, Rosemary (OL (b)(6)
C (b)(6) per DOD Heim, Laura
(b)(6) (b)(6) per DOD Craft,
Conor (OL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Updated Memo to DoJ

Ms. Hart,

Good evening.

Ma'am, I a (b)(6) per DOD for the Secretary of the Army.

We are finalizing a concurrence memorandum from Secretary McCarthy to Mr. Rosen that permits the DC National Guard to support Mayor Bowser's request for support this weekend.

I was informed that Mr. Rosen participated in a meeting with the Acting Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army earlier today regarding the support. We will follow this email with Secretary McCarthy's letter to Mr. Rosen requesting his concurrence.

Thank you for your time. More to follow this evening.

v/r

(b)(6) per DOD

Secretary of the Army

101 Army Pentago (b)(6) per DOD
Washington, DC 20310-0102

Offic (b)(6) per DOD

SVOIP (b)(6) per DOD

Mobile (b)(6) per DOD

NIP (b)(6) per DOD

SIPR (b)(6) per DOD

From (b)(6) per DOD
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 6:24 PM
T (b)(6) per DOD
Cc: Hart, Rosemary (OL (b)(6); Heim, Laur (b)(6); Craft, Conor (OLC)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: Updated Memo to DoJ

(b)(6) per [REDACTED]

The wonderful folks that I work with for concurrence from the DAG are cc'd. I usually correspond and discuss actions with Rosemary directly. Her number (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED].
v/r,

(b)(6) per DOD
[REDACTED]

Operations & Personnel Practice Group
Office of the General Counsel
104 Army Pentago (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]
Washington D.C. 20310-0104

(b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:41 PM

T (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Updated Memo to DoJ

(b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Please send your POC in Mr. Rosen's office. I understand your POC is staff level.

Ma'am, thank you for all your help and for your responsiveness today.

v/r

(b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

From (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:12 PM

T (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Subject: Re: Updated Memo to DoJ

Sorry for the delay; correct!

From (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Date: Monday, January 4, 2021 at 5:02:28 PM

To (b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Updated Memo to DoJ

(b)(6) per DOD [REDACTED]

Thank you for the quick turn. I assume at this point your official position is NLO on each memo?

Thank you.

v/r

(b)(6) per DOD

(b)(6) (NSD)

From: (b)(6) (NSD)
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:21 PM
To: Donoghue, Richard (ODAG)
Cc: Moran, John (ODAG); Sherwin, Michael (USADC)
Subject: NCR Civil Unrest Prep Planning Update - 4 January 2021
Attachments: Preparations for Civil Disturbances Week of 4 January 2021.docx

Rich,

Good afternoon. For your background and awareness, the attached document is a good overview of the USG posture going into Jan 6.

Best,

(b)(6)

Acting Chief
Counterterrorism Section
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) per DHS
Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 12:03 PM
T: (b)(6) (NS (b)(6))
C: (b)(6) per DHS
Subject: NCR Civil Unrest Prep Planning Update - 4 January 2021

UNCLASSIFIED // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

As requested, attached please find an updated version of civil unrest planning efforts for the 5 to 6 January planned events in Washington, DC. DHS OPS Director Tomney has shared this with the DHS front office.

Following is an iPhone version of the attached.

(b)(7)(E) per DHS

(b)(7)(E) per DHS

(b)(7)(E) per DHS

Interagency Preparations

Washington Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

- MPD [activated](#) their Joint Operations Center [on 4 January](#) for this week's planned protests.
- [MPD will have all staff reporting for response on 5 and 6 January.](#)
- The DHS OPS National Operations Center is in direct contact with the MPD JOC Supervisor.

US Capitol Police (USCP)

- All personnel will be on duty or standby from 4 through 6 January.
- Off watch personnel are considered response assets and are equipped with Civil Disobedience Unit equipment.
- The USCP Operations Center stood up the morning of 3 January and will be hosting several liaison officers.
- 'Bike rack' and 'snow' type fencing around the Capitol grounds has been added in advance of the State of the Union Address, which will also assist with crowd control this week.

DOI US Park Police (USPP)

- [POTUS intends to speak at 1100 EST 6 January at a permitted Women for America First event to be held on the White House Ellipse. Per National Park Service \(NPS\), expected attendance is around 5,000 participants for this 0500 to 1630 EST 6 January event. Previous similar First Amendment demonstrations have led to widespread violence in the downtown DC area.](#)

- USPP has a detail of personnel identified/assigned for increased operations support on 5 and 6 January.
- On 6 January, USPP will have all personnel originally scheduled to be “Off”, resourced to support operations, along with the detailees.

DOJ FBI

- FBI operations relative to the potential unrest will be conducted out of their Washington, DC Field Office (WFO) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

DOD

- The National Guard Bureau (NGB) advise (b)(7)(E) DC Guardsmen will be under an active recall for 5 and 6 Jan, to include (b)(7)(E) Civil Support Team.
- NGB and the US Army (DOD Executive Agent for defense support of civil authorities) will participate in the DHS virtual SITROOM on 5 and 6 January.

(b)(7)(E) per DHS

Vr, Chip
Chip Strangfeld
Duty Director
DHS Office of Operations Coordination
National Operations Center

Comm (b)(6)
Secur (b)(6); CM (b)(6)
(b)(6) per DHS

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UNCLASSIFIED // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



4 January 2021

Preparations for Civil Disturbances - Week of 4 January 2021

(b)(7)(E) per DHS



4 January 2021

(b)(7)(E) per DHS



4 January 2021

(b)(7)(E) per DHS

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4 January 2021

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(b)(7)(E) per DHS



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 21 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 21 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) DIOG Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]. According to US Park Police (USPP), there were no permitted protests for 21 January. **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 21 January, **(b)(7)(E)** National Guard members are actively providing site security for 30 (-1) state capitals. A total of **(b)(7)(E)** National Guard members are on duty in the NCR, with **(b)(7)(E)** at the US Capitol; **(b)(7)(E)** National Guard members have been deployed nationally. The National Guard intended to draw down the members on duty in NCR by **(b)(7)(E)** by end of day 21 January.
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 0700 on 21 January, the FBI has received more than 208,799 digital media tips.
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-
-
-

(U) POST INAUGURATION FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-

(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the Presidential Inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

• (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 20 JANUARY 2021

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(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- (U//~~LES~~) NCR: As of 1400 on 20 January, there are no immediate threats to the National Capitol Region (NCR). According to US Park Police (USPP), all permits for 20 January protests in Washington have been revoked, excluding two small First Amendment events with no nexus to terrorism.
- (U//~~LES~~) According to US Park Police and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, there are 45 planned events in the NCR through 1 February, with estimated sizes of inauguration-related protests ranging from one to 60 committed participants. Twenty-three permit applications listing between four to 5,000 participants were submitted as of 18 January. Planned demonstrations specific to Inauguration Day range in size from one to 897 committed participants with permit applications listing between three to 1,000,000 participants.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 20 January, (b)(7)(E) National Guard members are actively providing site security for 31 (+3) state capitals. A total of (b)(7)(E) National Guard members are on duty in the NCR, with (b)(7)(E) at the US Capitol; (b)(7)(E) National Guard members have been deployed nationally.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 0700 on 20 January, the FBI has received more than 206,717 digital media tips.

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(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- [REDACTED]

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-
-
-
-
-
-

(U) POST INAUGURATION FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the Presidential Inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
-
-
-
-

(U) OTHER

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
-

(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 19 JANUARY 2021

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(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~LES~~) According to US Park Police and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, there are 45 planned events in the NCR through 1 February, with estimated sizes of inauguration-related protests ranging from one to 60 committed participants. Twenty-three permit applications listing between four to 5,000 participants were submitted as of 18 January. Planned demonstrations specific to Inauguration Day range in size from one to 897 committed participants with permit applications listing between three to 1,000,000 participants.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 19 January, **(b)(7)(E)** National Guard members are providing site security for 28 state capitals. A total of **(b)(7)(E)** National Guard members are on duty in the NCR. As of 18 January, the National Guard in Washington, DC reported attempts by individuals to photograph vehicles and credentials at security checkpoints.

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. **As of 0700 on 19 January, the FBI has received more than 202,926 digital media tips.**

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the Presidential Inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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-

(U) OTHER

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

(b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 18 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 18 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

(U) The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~LES~~) According to US Park Police and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, there are 45 planned events in the NCR through 1 February, with estimated sizes of inauguration-related protests ranging from one to 60 committed participants. Twenty-three permit applications listing between four to 5,000 participants were submitted as of 18 January. Planned demonstrations specific to Inauguration Day range in size from one to 897 committed participants with permit applications listing between three to 1,000,000 participants.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 18 January, (b)(7)(E) National Guard members are providing site security for 24 state capitals. A total of (b)(7)(E) National Guard members are on duty in the NCR. In Washington DC, the National Guard is reporting attempts by individuals to photograph vehicles and credentials at security checkpoints. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 0600 on 18 January, the FBI has received more than 200,476 digital media tips.

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- [REDACTED]

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) OTHER

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

(b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 17 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 17 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~LES~~) According to US Park Police and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, there are 24 planned events in the NCR through 1 February, with estimated sizes of inauguration-related protests ranging from one to 5,000; 12 permits were approved. Planned demonstrations specific to Inauguration Day range in size from one to 900.

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 17 January, the number of National Guard personnel in Washington, DC exceeds 12,365. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT CHANNELS WITHOUT FBI HQ APPROVAL

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 1400 on 17 January, the FBI has received more than 169,954 digital media tips.
- (U//~~LES~~) (b)(7)(E) per FBI
[REDACTED]

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) OTHER

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

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(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 16 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 16 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 16 January, the number of National Guard personnel in Washington, DC exceeds 9,500. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 1400 on 16 January, the FBI has received more than 160,747 digital media tips.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) OTHER

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) STATE AND LOCAL SURVEY RESPONSES

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 15 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 15 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~LES~~) There are currently 51 identified demonstrations in the National Capitol Region scheduled on or before 20 January, three of which are expected to involve civil disobedience, arrests, and violence, according to the US Capitol Police. **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 15 January, United States Secret Service (USSS) has closed the National Mall. No permits have been issued yet so the potential event locations may change.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 15 January, the number of National Guard personnel in Washington, DC exceeds 7,200, and the number will expand above 11,000 by 16 January. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 1400 on 15 January, the FBI has received more than 137,608 digital media tips.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 13 January the House of Representatives impeached President Trump. (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- [REDACTED]

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours


- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
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(U) Threat To Life

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) OTHER

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.
- (U) On 15 January, the FBI disseminated a Public Service Announcement titled “Iranian Cyber Actors Continue to Threaten US Election Officials” (Alert Number I-011521-PSA) to assist the public in recognizing Iranian activity intended to create fear, divisions, and mistrust in the United States and undermine public confidence in the US electoral process. **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 14 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 2000 EST on 14 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~LES~~) There are currently 51 identified demonstrations in the National Capitol Region scheduled on or before 20 January, three of which are expected to involve civil disobedience, arrests, and violence, according to the US Capitol Police. **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 14 January, United States Secret Service (USSS) has developed two plans regarding permitted protest activities during the Presidential Inauguration. Plan A would consist of closing the mall and allowing no protest activity. Plan B would consist of limiting protest activity to a small, designated area between 13th and 14th streets. The gatherings would allow only 25-30 participants to comply with COVID restrictions and would be segregated with avenues for first responders. Open source currently reports the mall will be closed.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 1951 on 14 January, the National Guard Bureau advised of assets being deployed for local in-state defense in: DC, GA, IL, MA, NJ, NY, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, and WI. In Washington, DC there will be nearly 7,000 Guardsmen, and the number will expand above 19,000 by 16 January. Metal anti-scale fencing has been installed around the US Capitol Complex and other areas on Capitol Hill in advance of the Presidential Inauguration.

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. As of 1400 on 14 January, the FBI has received more than 137,000 digital media tips.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (U//FOUO) On 13 January the House of Representatives impeached President Trump. (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- [REDACTED]

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- (U) Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-
-
-

(U) Transition and Inauguration

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-
-

(U) Threats related to President-Elect Biden

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

(U) OTHER

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 13 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1700 EST on 13 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION

- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which opened to the public. **As of 0700 on 13 January, the FBI has received more than 118,000 DMTs.**
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 0800 on 13 January, **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- *(U//FOUO) (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED], the House of Representatives has impeached President Trump.*

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints by Geographic Location

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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-

(U) Transition and Inauguration

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-
-

(U) Threats related to President-Elect Biden

- (U//~~EES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

(U) OTHER

- (U//~~EES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 12 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1700 EST on 12 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI is investigating the death of US Capitol Police (USCP) Officer Brian Sicknick who died from injuries sustained during the US Capitol breach. There were 14 other officers injured during the incident.

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 0800 on 12 January, **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**


- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 12 January, the FBI has received nearly 100,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- *(U//FOUO)* According to open sources, the House of Representatives is set to vote to urge the Vice President to invoke the 25th Amendment at approximately 1930 on 12 January, and will vote to impeach POTUS at 0900 on 13 January.

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 Hours

- Nothing Significant to Report

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

(U) Potential Protests at State Capitols and the US Capitol

• (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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- (U) As of 8 January, (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

(U) Transition and Inauguration

• (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

• [REDACTED]

(U) Threats related to President-Elect Biden

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

(U) OTHER

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.

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- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which is now open to the public. As of 0700 12 January, the FBI has received nearly 100,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1700 11 JANUARY 2021

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(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION AND INAUGURATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI is investigating the death of US Capitol Police (USCP) Officer Brian Sicknick who died from injuries sustained during the US Capitol breach. There were 14 other officers injured during the incident.
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1300 on 10 January, **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 11 January, the FBI has received nearly 55,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). The **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**
-

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 hours

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

(U) Potential Protests at State Capitols and the US Capitol

- (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
-

- (U//~~FOUO~~) USSS confirmed POTUS will visit McAllen and Harlingen on 12 January. POTUS will arrive at 1300 in Harlingen and travel to McAllen to the portion of the barrier wall near Alamo. POTUS will depart Harlingen for Washington, DC at 1540. (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) Transition and Inauguration

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

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(U) Threats related to President-Elect Biden

- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

(U) OTHER

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which is now open to the public. (b)(7)(E) per FBI .
As of 0600 on 11 January, FBI received over 55,000 Digital Media Tips (DMTs).

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1700 10 JANUARY 2021

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- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) As of 0900 on 10 January, the FBI has received nearly 45,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) National Threat Picture Through Inauguration 2021

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

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(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- *(U//~~LES~~) On 9 January, approximately 100 pro-Trump individuals organized a gathering in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego which prompted anti-Trump individuals to gather and counter-protest in the same area. The opposing individuals pepper sprayed each other, and several physical altercations occurred. There were reports of weapons (knives) and SDPD recovered one fake gun. SDPD arrested three individuals and the individuals eventually dispersed.*

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 hours

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

(U) Potential Protests at State Capitols and the US Capitol

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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(U) Transition and Inauguration

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
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- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple reports indicate various threats to harm President-Elect Biden ahead of the presidential inauguration. Additional reports indicate threats against VP-Elect Harris and Speaker Pelosi.

(U) OTHER

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, the FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which is now open to the public. As of 0900 on 10 January, FBI has received nearly 45,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). (b)(7)(E) per FBI

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Crisis Coordination Center Update:

Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity January 2021

1600 8 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1400 EST on 8 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DEA, DOD, DOJ, DHS, US Park Police, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

(U) The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the FBI and may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

(U//LES) Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on First Amendment activity. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Moreover, the FBI will "maintain no record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Privacy Act of 1974, section (e)(7).

(U//LES) DIOG Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION 2021

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U//~~FOUO~~) One of the 15 US Capitol Police officers injured during the 6 January US Capitol breach died of his injuries. **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**
- (U) As of 0700 on 8 January, FBI has received nearly 17,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). The **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

(U) Preventing Violence & Criminal Activity (PVCA)

(U) CURRENT FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSES

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Planned in the next 12 – 24 hours


- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Ashli Babbitt, the woman who was shot and killed when she breached the Capitol has been identified as a San Diego County resident. As of 8 January, arrangements are being made to have her body returned to San Diego. Local news stations are covering the shooting extensively. Funeral arrangements are pending.



(U) Criminal Activity

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 6 January, the FBI issued a request for information leading to the location, arrest, and conviction of the person(s) responsible for the placement of the suspected pipe bombs on 6 January in Washington, D.C. The FBI is offering a reward of up to \$50,000 for information.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 6 January, FBI activated a digital media tip line URL (<https://fbi.gov/USCapitol>) which is now open to the public. As of 0700 on 8 January, FBI has received nearly 17,000 Digital Media Tips (DMT). (b)(7)(E) per FBI



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity, January 2021

7 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1500 EST on 6 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DOD, DOJ, DHS, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U//LES) DIOG Appendix L further restricts the collection of information regarding First Amendment protected activity: the FBI may only collect information relating to the exercise of a First Amendment right if (1) the collection is logically related to an authorized investigative purpose, (2) the collection does not materially interfere with the ability of an individual or a group to engage in the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, and (3) the method of collection is the least intrusive alternative that is reasonable, based upon the circumstances of the investigation. (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U//LES) Within this legal, and policy framework, the information requested from field offices in this communication is intended to provide timely information to appropriate law enforcement and/or public safety personnel who are authorized to protect facilities, personnel, and the public from imminent threats of violent and/or criminal activity. This document is meant as a summary of significant investigative highlights and NOT as a comprehensive review of ongoing investigations. The information contained in this communication is NOT to be incorporated into any formal or informal written document nor further disseminated without the authorization of the FBI Headquarters, SIOC. Unauthorized use of this information may jeopardize sensitive national security and/or criminal investigations, result in the possible identification and/or physical harm of human sources, or create undue notification into the FBI's interest of intended targets.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3)

Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION 2021

• **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//~~LES~~) FBI Director Christopher Wray issued a statement regarding the violent activity at the U.S. Capitol Building. The full press release can be found [here](#).
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1400 on 6 January 2021, Capitol Police reported protesters stormed the U.S. Capitol Building. **The certification of Electoral College votes was paused until the building was cleared. The certification resumed at 1950 and was completed at 0340 on 7 January with no further activity.**
- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple law enforcement agencies confirmed reports of a shooting that occurred inside the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol Building. The female victim was transported and later pronounced deceased. **The ongoing investigation into the shooting is being conducted by Capitol Police and Metropolitan D.C. Police Department.**
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1700 on 6 January 2021, the U.S. Capitol Building was cleared by US Capitol Police, US Park Police, FBI, HSI, FPS, ATF, USMS, FBI, DC Metro Police and Virginia State Police. **A static perimeter around the Capitol grounds has been established by federal police D.C. National Guard.**
- (U//~~LES~~) Additional law enforcement agencies may respond to provide assistance. Maryland State Police have deployed in support of police operations.
- (U) As of 1429 on 6 January, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a city-wide curfew for the District effective 1800; **the curfew will continue through 0600 EST 7 January. A State of Emergency has been declared and extended to 15 days.**
- (U) The FBI has established the following national digital tip line to collect information regarding the events of 6 January: [TIPLINE](#)

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- (U//~~LES~~) The breach of the U.S. Capitol Building and subsequent criminal activities is the subject of an ongoing investigation conducted by the U.S. Capitol Police, other federal law enforcement agencies, and the United States Attorney's Office District of Columbia.

(U) GEORGIA SENATE RUNOFF 2021

(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) KENOSHA, WI

(U//~~LES~~) On 5 January 2021, the Kenosha County District Attorney's (KCDA) Office declined to file criminal charges against the police officer who shot Jacob Blake on 23 August 2020.

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

0700: 7 January 2021

(U) Preventing Violence & Criminal Activity (PVCA)

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

(U) Past/Ongoing in the last 12 – 24 Hours

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- (U//LES) Shortly after 1400 on 6 January, the United States Capitol Building in Washington D.C. was breached by several individuals and Capitol Police put out a call for assistance from any available law enforcement officers. At approximately [REDACTED], FBI [REDACTED] was deployed to the Capitol Building. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Federal Protective Services, and the U.S. Marshal Service have also sent personnel to the Capitol Building to assist.
- (U) As of 1429 on 6 January 2021, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM city-wide curfew for the District effective 1800 until 0700, 7 January.

- **(b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI**

- [REDACTED]

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

- (U) As of 1429 on 6 January, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a city-wide curfew for the District effective 1800 on 6 January. **MPD initiated over 40 arrests to enforce curfew violations throughout the city; the curfew will continue through 0600 EST 7 January.**
- (U) According to open sources, the Governor of Virginia declared a State of Emergency and imposed a curfew in Arlington and Alexandria from 1800, 6 January to 0600, 7 January.

• **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**



(U) National Crisis Coordination Center Update: Preventing Violence and Criminal Activity, January 2021

1900 6 JANUARY 2021

(U//LES) This update was compiled by the Joint Inter-Agency National Crisis Coordination Center in the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center. Information is accurate as of 1500 EST on 6 January 2021. The following agencies contributed to the development of this SITREP: ATF, DOD, DOJ, DHS, and USMS. Responses provided after the cut-off time will be included in the next SITREP.

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(U) National Crisis Coordination Center (NC3)

Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) THE FBI, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH ITS FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERS, CONTINUES TO MONITOR AND RESPOND TO EVENTS RELATED TO THE VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH LAWFUL PROTESTS.

(U) NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION ELECTORAL CERTIFICATION 2021

- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1255 on 6 January 2021, U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) reported information regarding two potential pipe bombs discovered at each of the headquarters of the Democratic and Republican National Committees in the Capitol Hill South area.
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1400 on 6 January 2021, Capitol Police reported protestors stormed the U.S. Capitol Building. FBI Police is coordinating with local federal law enforcement partners to gauge what assistance can be deployed. The certification of Electoral College votes has paused while the Capitol is currently on lockdown.
- (U//~~LES~~) Multiple law enforcement agencies confirmed reports of a shooting that occurred inside the House Chamber of the U.S. Capitol Building. The female victim was transported and later pronounced deceased.
- (U//~~LES~~) As of 1700 on 6 January 2021, the U.S. Capitol Building was cleared by US Capitol Police, US Park Police, FBI, HSI, FPS, ATF, USMS, FBI, DC Metro Police and Virginia State Police.
- (U//~~LES~~) Additional law enforcement agencies may respond to provide assistance. Maryland State Police have deployed in support of police operations.
- (U//~~LES~~) Protesters are reportedly compliant with police directives to leave the Capitol Building.
- (U//~~LES~~) (b)(7)(E) per FBI [REDACTED]
- (U//~~LES~~) A large crowd remains outside on the west side of the U.S. Capitol Building. Police are gradually widening the perimeter.
- (U//~~LES~~) District of Columbia National Guard personnel were deployed to the NCR but are not engaged in law enforcement activity at the Capitol Building.
- (U) As of 1429 on 6 January 2021, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a city-wide curfew for the District effective 1800 until 0700, 7 January.

(U) GEORGIA SENATE RUNOFF 2021

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) KENOSHA, WI

(U//~~LES~~) On 5 January 2021, the Kenosha County District Attorney's (KCDA) Office declined to file criminal charges against the police officer who shot Jacob Blake on 23 August 2020.

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

1900: 6 January 2021

(U) Preventing Violence & Criminal Activity (PVCA)

(U) Potential of criminal offenses or violence related to the 6 January 2021 Electoral College certification of the 2020 Presidential Election results for situational awareness – past/ongoing (within last 12-24 hours) and planned (next 12-24 hours) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

[REDACTED]

- (U//~~LES~~) In Washington D.C multiple suspicious packages were reported in and around the protest area and two suspicious devices were identified, one near the Republican National Committee building and the other near the Democratic National Committee building.
- (U//~~LES~~) Shortly after 1400 on 6 January, the United States Capitol Building in Washington D.C. was breached by several individuals and Capitol Police put out a call for assistance from any available law enforcement officers. At approximately [REDACTED], FBI [REDACTED] was deployed to the Capitol Building. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Federal Protective Services, and the U.S. Marshal Service have also sent personnel to the Capitol Building to assist.
- (U) As of 1429 on 6 January 2021, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser issued a 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM city-wide curfew for the District effective 1800 until 0700, 7 January.

(U) UPCOMING FLASHPOINTS AND RESPONSE

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(U) Potential Flashpoints

- (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(E) per FBI
As of 1500, there was no threat activity to report.

(U) (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

- **(b)(7)(E) per FBI**

Call w/ Miller Shewsky

12/30/20

- Social media suggests $\leq 10K$
- also looking at hotel res. + travel

Thus far, solely pro-Trump protesters planning to come in.
- no intel re. counter-protesters

This weekend trip is a coordination call with:

- NS
- WFO
- Park Police
- MPD

MS

- Will send email update on Friday describing details + planning - including what specific planning is for DOS HQ Bldg.
- will send daily email thereafter - he is having evening calls at 1900 each night.

(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)

11/4/21 Call - Mr. Shewsky, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DMS, (b)(7)(D)

- No need for additional resources now.

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- MPD estimates $\leq 10K$

- Major activities DC NS - (b)(7)(E) available for road closures

- ~~WFO will be~~

+ ground control

- 0700 MPD TOC on Thursday - MPD UCs will find N1414

- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- 0500 + 2000. Int'l Report

- No credible reports of attacks on targets

SECDEF + call - DHS, DOS, NSC,

1/4/21

MVD - (b)(7)(E) officers + Capital Police

0600 tomorrow - ops ctr.

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per DOD

IRMWBE
Anny

DAG:

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A) per DOD; (b)(7)(E) per FBI

(b)(6) (NSD)

From: (b)(6) (NSD)
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2021 11:40 AM
To: Rosen, Jeffrey A. (ODAG); Donoghue, Richard (ODAG); Sherwin, Michael (USADC); Moran, John (ODAG)
Cc: Demers, John C. (NSD)
Subject: FBI SIOC-WFO AM Brief

Sir,

Good morning. Here's the latest...

WFO

- (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA, (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- Secret Service
(b)(7)(E)

- National Guard
(b)(7)(E)

- (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA, (b)(7)(E) per FBI
- (b)(7)(E) per FBI

- Media

- USA of EDVA inauguration related press release, FBI's role
- Multiple inquiries about Williams arrest in PA and Caldwell in VA

- (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(A) per EOUSA, (b)(7)(E) per FBI



Direct Wray was present and made general remarks – we will ensure a peaceful transition of power, but DC will be a target for quite some time.

Claire McCusker Murray Mobile Call Log 1-6

Date	Time	Min	Wireless Number	Number
01/06	9:01A	30	(b)(6)	877-465-7975
01/06	9:31A	1	(b)(6)	877-465-7975
01/06	9:31A	30	(b)(6)	877-465-7975
01/06	10:09A	4	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	11:47A	1	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	12:15P	3	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	12:24P	9	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	1:11P	19	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	1:33P	28	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	2:01P	57	(b)(6)	877-465-7975
01/06	3:00P	51	(b)(6)	877-465-7975
01/06	3:50P	1	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	3:53P	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	4:01P	3	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	4:23P	16	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

Kira Antell Mobile Call Log 1-6

Date	Time	Min	Wireless Number	Number
01/06	7:52A	1	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	7:57A	2	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	9:49A	6	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	1:23P	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	2:17P	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	4:36P	4	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	9:54A	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	10:19A	3	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	11:10A	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	8:50A	1	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	9:14A	5	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
01/06	3:44P	6	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

Marc Raimondi Desk Call Log 1-6

Date	Time	Call Duration	Originating Tel Number	Terminating Tel Number
01/06	10:55:00 AM	0.6	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

Marc Raimondi Mobile Call Log 1-6

Date	Time	Min	Wireless Number	Number
01/06	4:53P	2	202-532-(b)(6)	(b)(6)