

September 28, 2021

The Honorable Nancy P. Pelosi  
Speaker of the U.S. House of Rep.  
The Capitol Room H-230  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Chuck Schumer  
Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate  
The Capitol Room S-230  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Kevin McCarthy  
Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Rep.  
The Capitol Room H-204  
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Mitch McConnell  
Minority Leader of the U.S. Senate  
The Capitol Room S-221  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Speaker and respective leaders:

*The U.S. Senate Joint Committee Report faults the USCP's Intelligence for failing to inform USCP's planning and operations reference January 6<sup>th</sup>. It states that the failure of USCP's Intelligence to convey critical information adversely impacted the USCP's security and operational planning ability to prepare for the 6<sup>th</sup>. Reference the Senate Report, the OIG stated that their assessment was "Spot On".*

This document is filed as a whistle-blower and focuses on two primary topics. One is the failures of Chiefs Pittman and Gallagher of the USCP leading up to, on and after January 6<sup>th</sup>. The second is the topic of the failed honesty of the congressional community with the members of the USCP. As this document focuses on the leadership of the Congress it mostly speaks of command USCP officials. It is not meant to minimize the heroic efforts of so many incredible officers, supervisors and civilians throughout the Department. I truly have the utmost respect and gratitude for their bravery and efforts before, on and since January 6<sup>th</sup>.

The congressional community speaks of honoring the brave men and women of the USCP with a gold medal, awards and monetary benefits. As honor and honesty are derived from the same Latin root, *Honeste*, I submit that you can't honor without honesty. The OIG stated in his initial testimony that it was important to deliver the truth for the officers. I assert that the truth of the leadership/intelligence failures of the 6<sup>th</sup> is purposefully not being delivered to the officers and public. I assert that those that failed so epically are purposefully not being held accountable. Also, those that did perform at a high-level are being marginalized so as not to highlight the failures of those two chiefs. The truth may be valued less than politics by many members of the

congressional community to include those that have made decisions about the leadership of the USCP post January 6th, but I believe the truth still matters to real people and certainly the men and women of the U.S. Capitol Police. Trust, most everyone knows the truth about the intelligence failure and who is to blame. It is offensive for congressional entities to think it is not obvious to most of the members of the Department. The continued attempts to purport otherwise only tarnishes the reputation of the Congress. The sad conclusion that has yet to be reached is that these two chiefs failed so bad that they have forfeited their ability to lead the Department.

The Senate Report was enlightening for those that new much of the truth. It revealed some of the lies being told behind closed doors to the committees. Though the Senate report revealed some of the lies, it stopped just short of calling the acting chief a liar, but they knew she did. Moreover, the fact that most other entities have published some information that is demonstrably inaccurate, incomplete and/or failed to publish corroborated information is a shameful ruse on the members of the USCP. This concerted effort to protect the two members of the Department without question the most responsible for the tragic events of January 6<sup>th</sup> is repulsive. Protecting their failures and the failures of others at the cost of the esteem of every other commander of the Department is unconscionable. To allow these two to hide within a cloak that the "Department failed" has the overt stench of politics unlike anything I saw in my 31-years on the Hill. This lack of accountability has directly led to mass resignations of officials and officers that amongst other reasons refuse to work for two of the most unethical leaders in the history of the Department. The fact of the matter is those two failed in every facet of their jobs, and in doing so they failed every member of the Department, the Congress and the Country. This is not just my opinion, but is supported by the facts in reports already written and testimony to investigators.

Recently, I read a press release where these same two individuals along with a couple other senior commanders that failed leading up to, on and after January 6<sup>th</sup> want to hold officers accountable for their performance that day. These two officials' failures is what directly led to the officers being placed in an outnumbered, overwhelming and violent situations where the consequences included catastrophic injuries and death to officers. Officers trying to diffuse these situations by whatever means possible should be afforded great leniency by the Department and especially these two who failed them. For them to celebrate holding officers accountable in a press release as they and their friends are given more than a free pass is a reflection on their leadership, the Department and the entire congressional community. Parading these officers to the public to create the façade of accountability while refusing to perform at minimum a cursory investigation of themselves and other officials that they know didn't provide any level of leadership prior to and on the 6<sup>th</sup> is unconscionable. The irony and hypocrisy are breath-taking.

Since January 6<sup>th</sup>, I have attempted to ensure accountability for those responsible for the January 6<sup>th</sup> failure. One committee promised they would interview me numerous times, but this never occurred as I understand one side didn't want facts that differed from what was already provided. After almost 6 months, I was finally interviewed for the first and only time for almost two hours by the OIG about command and control. There were many questions to me about what I did that day and the performance of others to include Pittman and Gallagher. I then read OIG Report #5

on Command and Control and realized nothing was included. The information I provided, corroborated by others, about the failures of Pittman and Gallagher on the 6<sup>th</sup> was absent. There was nothing about their failures in the document except a veiled suggestion about training on what their job is during an emergency. The lack of any assignment of responsibility or accountability for their gross failures and their press release on officer accountability for the 6<sup>th</sup> is too much.

This continued neglect of accountability and the lack of publication of their failures leading up to, on, and post January 6<sup>th</sup> is unacceptable. Their failures have been marginalized, negligibly investigated, categorically underreported and without accountability. In fact, as pointed out by many they have been restored to their exact same positions as if they were not responsible for the single greatest intelligence failure in the history of the U.S. Capitol Police is astounding. As if they are not most answerable leaders on the Department for the death and injuries (physical and emotional) to the brave officers and officials from the USCP and every Agency. The fact that they don't feel the accountability and enough shame to resign but believe they should be promoted reflects their true character. It also reflects directly on the Congress.

Sadly, the command-and-control report and the other reports have failed to recognize those commanders, like so many officers and other supervisors, that more than rose to the occasion on the 6<sup>th</sup>. Those that truly did lead. There is no mention of the handful of senior officials along with officers and supervisors that truly fought harder and longer than anyone in the history of the Department. There were Commanders that led and fought with such bravery and resolve that can only be described in words that are reserved for few people in history such as "epically" and "heroically". Their gallantry and leadership that day are recorded in video for all to see. Their efforts, especially after being failed by these commanders who oversaw intelligence and the area command, to protect the Congress and dedication to the mission and officers are more than worthy of note in a command-and-control report. It is shameful that since the 6<sup>th</sup>, the Congress and the Department led by these two failures, have sought to protect themselves at the expense of the leadership heroes of the day such as Eric Waldow, Thomas Loyd and many others.

It is a tragedy Waldow and Loyd were not acknowledged for their leadership and heroism. I challenge any entity to review the video footage of Eric Waldow on the West Front and refute this fact. This hero ran into the fight on the West Front and the first person he engaged was a man assaulting a USCP officer. He then rallies troops and leads officers for HOURS as demonstrators targeted him for his courage and leadership. He was decontaminated so many times, only momentarily stepping off the line to have water poured on his face, and then he launched himself immediately back into the fight with the officers. When the Lower West Terrace fell, he could be observed on the Upper West Terrace rallying officers and fighting with such tenacity to still hold the building. He never left the fight...never. At the end of the night after the building was re-secured, he finally responded for a debrief. He was literally unrecognizable from the burns to his swollen face. You could tell, he like so many other officers and officials had given it their all.

Thomas Loyd was everywhere that day and providing leadership at locations throughout the Capitol Building. He was quick into the fight on the West Front and fought to hold the building.

After the Building fell, he proceeded to direct subordinates and the reinforcements to re-secure individual areas of the building. As he stabilized one area he immediately moved on to the next location and fight. He was easily the USCP official most responsible for re-securing the Capitol building and it seemed like he was everywhere at once restoring order and security.

Any attempt by any person or entity to diminish the performance of any official as an incident commander is uninformed and tasteless. The incident commanders were doomed from the start by the failures of Area Command who is ultimately responsible in the ICS system. Area Command is the one that provides the intelligence and resources needed for the incident commanders. I submit the deliberate failure to acknowledge the efforts of these two heroes and others was purposefully to ensure the failures of Pittman and Gallagher were not highlighted. It also calls into question why these two, without any investigation, were named to lead the Agency even though they failed every member of the Department.

The failures and inactions of these two prior to and on the 6<sup>th</sup> unquestionably contributed to the death of officers and the serious physical and emotional injury of hundreds of other members of law enforcement. It contributed to the death of citizens and caused harm to the reputation of the Congress, the USCP and other commanders. Yet, the truth of their performance is not in the command-and-control report and appears to be of little importance to the congressional community. It is obvious that the congressional community has purposefully failed to provide the truth to the members of the USCP that fought so valiantly to protect them on the 6<sup>th</sup>. This level of dishonesty must start at the top and taints every level of USCP oversight throughout this Congress.

Thus, I submit this document to the addressed congressional entities to formally report severe violations of policies and law by Pittman and Gallagher leading up to, on, and after January 6<sup>th</sup>. I believe the investigations of these specific failures will provide significant illumination and provide a contrast to the "truth" that has been provided to date to the rank and file of the Department.

These allegations, which will be further detailed, are already corroborated by reports and testimony. These allegations include:

- Failure to Supervise:
  - Failing to supervise the intelligence operations of the Department. According to the Senate Report the intelligence adversely impacted the planning and operational components of the Department. This was 100% an intelligence failure. The intelligence possessed, if distributed, would have provided the Department with understanding of the magnitude and threat to be faced. Most important it would have provided the documentation needed to support securing the National Guard and other allied agency manpower for January 6<sup>th</sup>. It would have provided the intelligence needed to change the posture of the Agency to include shutting doors and deploying hard gear and more less than lethal weapons. These two had the intelligence information needed (21-TD-159 and other reports) but never shared it with the rest of the Department, particularly those commanders with real

operational experience. If provided, this information would have changed the paradigm of that day.

- Failing to investigate all officials on the Department that failed to take any acceptable level of action on the 6<sup>th</sup>. This includes officials that failed to even respond. This includes failing to investigate their friends that were rewarded with promotions and transfers shortly after the 6<sup>th</sup>. It was requested numerous times that all officials complete a CP-1009 and provide a statement of their actions and performance that day to be corroborated by video and if necessary investigated. It was and continues to be refused as they publicly denounce officers.
- These officials were the only officials that had all the intelligence information for the 6<sup>th</sup>. After being briefed on the CDU Plan and provided a driving tour of the campus to view the set-up; approved the operational plan for January 6<sup>th</sup> as being appropriate for the intelligence. There was no disagreement about the plan by the intelligence chiefs, yet they were the only ones with all the intelligence information. This contradicts any statement that that they were not involved in the planning or operations for the 6<sup>th</sup>.
- It was reported to one of the subordinate commanders of IIAD, by the Special Events Section, that the demonstration permits for those groups surrounding the Capitol on the 6<sup>th</sup> were all facades for Stop the Steal. This was later corroborated by the intelligence analysis. The fact that IIAD was provided information that Stop the Steal was surrounding the Capitol from every side by separate entities was never relayed to operational commanders. This piece of intelligence like the 21-TD-159 document was also game changing information that was never reported. In fact, the IIAD reported the opposite to commanders that the demonstrations were separate events and groups.
- Per the OIG, the IIAD commander failed in many aspects of their duties as outlined in policy. This policy is written and signed by the chief of protective services. It is their duty to ensure the IIAD commander is doing their job. They failed to supervise this position and its many failures, which is outlined in the OIG Report.
- Ultimately, the IIAD, that they supervised, produced approximately 50 pages of documents in a dozen plus reports reference the demonstrations on the 6<sup>th</sup>. These documents did NOT contain the critical information that was possessed and needed by the Department to operationalize a plan and procure the resources to stop this attack. In 50 pages, there was one paragraph tacked on page 15 of one document that vaguely spoke of the target of the demonstration being Congress this time. The remaining 99% of the 50 pages of documents, including those produced after the one assessment, repeated the chances of any police action were "unlikely or remote". The issues the USCP would face was perhaps counter demonstrators clashing with the group, which could cause harm to law

enforcement. A final note about the paragraph about the target being Congress. For what it is worth, in my 31 years, I have never known the Congress to NOT be the target of a demonstration group. This is true whether the issue is DACA, Health Care or Confirmation Hearings. The target is always Congress.

- Finally, if these two individuals truly believed the attack was coming and was warning everyone, why didn't they use their political positions to secure the extra staffing? Did they go the congressional leadership and state we really needed the National Guard and officers from partner agencies? Did they go to the Police Board and ask what additional information did the Board need in an assessment to secure additional resources and the National Guard? Why did they approve the operational plan for the 6<sup>th</sup> if they knew the intelligence?
- Performance of Duty – for failure to take appropriate action in a police emergency. This is the most egregious failure I have seen by an official in my career. As the area commander:
  - These two failed to take appropriate action which directly contributed to the deaths and wounding of officers and civilians. In the command center, they simply watched mostly with their hands in their laps. They did not try to help or assist as officers and officials were literally fighting for each other, their lives and the Congress. These two instead, while officers were being injured, elected to do nothing, lie and attempt to profit professionally. They chose to watch, as one non USCP witness stated “like two bumps on a log”, make calls and start to blame everyone for their failures. They blamed the planning and operational components of the Department. They obviously succeeded, by the end of the day, there was the demand of the Chief's resignation, and they were placed in-charge. Thanks to the Senate Report, we now know that they were the ones that failed the planning and operational components of the Department, every officer and the Congress.
  - These two failed in their responsibilities to every incident commander working that day. These two were the Area Command. They sat at the head of the dias next to MPD and failed in every facet of their defined responsibility to provide:
    - Overall strategy
    - Allocating resources
    - Providing intelligence
    - Ensuring incidents are properly managed
    - Ensuring objectives and strategies are followed.
  - They instead chose to publicly and cowardly blame incident commanders for their failures. The OIG report insinuate that they didn't know they were in charge by

stating the need for training on Area Command and CICG. This is unconscionable, especially as one of these entities is the former Deputy Chief and signature on the policy for the area command system in the command center. In fact, the justification for them having home to work vehicles in the first place is to respond and assume area command. I don't think it is by accident that the failure of the Area Command has yet to be discussed in any report by any entity or discussed by them. In fact, I haven't seen the term Area Command mentioned in any report to date, but they were the Area Command and failed everyone in that duty. Beyond being Area Command these two wear rank insignias that are not just a symbol of status and authority. What they represent is the responsibility that a chief has for every incident, every officer, the Department, the Congress and the Country.

- False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001 – Amongst other statements testified to in the Senate Rules Committee report Pittman states that the Department sent the single most critical intelligence report, 21-TD-159, to “Command staff to include assistant chiefs and deputy chiefs” (Footnote 232). This is unconditionally false. It was never sent or shared. It also was never used to update any intelligence brief forwarded to the commanders. The single most important piece of intelligence information, known since December 21<sup>st</sup>, as identified by the Senate Report and the OIG Report was never shared with any members of USCP Leadership. The congressional community is aware of this fact that she lied to Congress as they have all the emails which would include proof that it was never sent. This is the simple for them these two to disprove, just produce the email.
  - It should be noted that they both have failed to correct this statement to Congress despite conversations that it was a false statement to Congress that impugned the reputation of everyone. They have also never corrected the reports that critical intelligence information was provided to all commanders.
- Conduct Unbecoming – In that they have lied to the Congress, the officers and officials of this Department. They have had directed other officials to champion their lies to members of the Department. This includes the lies told directly to me immediately after the 6<sup>th</sup>.

The allegations are not mine alone but corroborated by the completed investigations by the OIG, Senate and other witnesses on the Department. Reference:

- Failure to Supervise - as Assistant Chief Pittman Chief, Chief of Protective and Intelligence Operations and Deputy Chief Gallagher, Commander of Protective Services Bureau. These two are the top two commanders of the USCP

Intelligence Operations as confirmed by the U.S. Senate Report (Page 37) failed the entire Department as stated in multiple reports. Their specific failures include:

- *“USCP’s intelligence components failed to convey the full scope of threat information they possessed. Although USCP mainly relies on the FBI and DHS for intelligence and threat information, USCP has three components responsible for intelligence-related activities. These components, and the materials they produce, are supposed to inform USCP’s security and operational planning. This, however, was not the case for January 6.” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)*
- *“USCP’s lead intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (“IIAD”)—was aware of the potential for violence in the days and weeks ahead of January 6. It received information from a variety of sources about threats of violence focused on the Joint Session and the Capitol Complex and the large crowds expected to gather in Washington, D.C. on January 6. Yet, IIAD failed to fully incorporate this information into all of its internal assessments about January 6 and the Joint Session. As a result, critical information regarding threats of violence was not shared with USCP’s own officers and other law enforcement partners.” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)*
- *“USCP’s preparations for the Joint Session also suffered because of the decentralized nature of its intelligence components. On January 5, an employee in a separate USCP intelligence-related component received information from the FBI’s Norfolk Field Office regarding online discussions of violence directed at Congress, including that protestors were coming to Congress “prepared for war.” This report, similar to other information received by IIAD, was never distributed to IIAD or USCP leadership before January 6.” (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)*
- *IIAD was aware of the potential for violence at the Capitol on January 6 through social media posts, monitoring of relevant websites, and warnings from private citizens. Internal records and USCP officials’ testimony confirm that USCP began gathering information about events planned for January 6, 2021 as soon as demonstrations to protest the Electoral College vote certification were announced in mid-December 2020. IIAD analysts completed a first special event assessment on December 16, 2020 and updated the assessment on three occasions to include new information, such as recently collected intelligence and approved demonstration activity. Although these special event assessments captured some of the intelligence available about the potential for violence, none*



conveyed the breadth of information that IIAD possessed at the time.  
(Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)

- *"The United States Capitol Police's ("USCP") Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division ("IIAD") possessed information about the potential for violence at the Capitol on January 6 but did not convey the full scope of information, which affected its preparations. Internal records and USCP officials' testimony confirm that USCP began gathering information about events planned for January 6 in mid-December 2020. Through open-source collection, tips from the public, and other sources, USCP IIAD knew about social media posts calling for violence at the Capitol on January 6, including a plot to breach the Capitol, the online sharing of maps of the Capitol Complex's tunnel systems, and other specific threats of violence. Yet, IIAD did not convey the full scope of known information to USCP leadership, rank-and-file officers, or law enforcement partners." (Examining the USCP Capitol Attack, Senate Report)*
- *IIAD did not always include past reporting into later assessments. IIAD Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, Joint Session of Congress – Electoral College Vote Certification, dated January 3, 2021 (Appendix D), was IIAD's final special event assessment for planned events on January 6, 2021. However, IIAD did not directly incorporate or reference past IIAD reporting. Through interviews with Department officials, another IIAD report related to January 6, 2021, came to our attention. The report, Investigative Research and Analysis Report, IIAD Case #: 21-TD-159, dated December 21, 2020, states that on December 21, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security notified the Department of a blog referencing tunnels on U.S. Capitol grounds used by Members of Congress and research of the website identified four "threads/blog topics containing comments of concern." (OIG REPORT #2)*
- *The IIAD Assistant Director stated they didn't know if IIAD included specifics of IIAD Case #: 21-TD-159 in future reporting. The IIAD Assistant Director recalled discussions with PSB officials about the tunnels and the context of the report and stated that IIAD mentioned "donald.win" in its special event assessment but didn't mention tunnels. The IIAD Assistant Director thought that may be because they were not contemplating anyone breaking into the tunnels. The IIAD Assistant Director stated that the special event assessment did mention Congress was going to be targeted and it would be dangerous for law enforcement. Our review of Special Event Assessment 21-A-0468 v.3, January 3, 2020, revealed no references to <https://thedonald.win> or IIAD Case #: 21-TD-159 and neither of them are listed as a source. Because the Department*

*plans event security and relies on IIAD documents for event intelligence, IIAD analytical statements or reporting should be carried uniformly from one IIAD document to another. (OIG Report #2)*

- Daily reports leading up to and on the 6<sup>th</sup> stated the chance of any civil disobedience was “REMOTE” or “Unlikely”.
  - Failed to include all appropriate intelligence information in the written and verbal briefs to the planning and operational components of the Agency.
- Performance of Duty – for failure to take appropriate action in a police emergency. As the area commanders:
    - These two sat at the head of the Dias, position of command, in the Command Center next to MPD. For most of my time in the Command Center they were the two highest ranking persons in the room and sat in the position of authority. The observation by many where they did nothing to help. They didn’t try to provide direction or try to help the brave men and women of the Department fighting to protect the Congress and keep the Capitol secured.
    - They provided no direction or assistance to incident commanders in any fashion. They stated that the directed DPD evacuations. This was already done and would take less than a moment of the 5+ hours and certainly not require 3 command level officials to direct.
    - What I observed was them mostly sitting there, blankly looking at the TV screens showing real time footage of officers and officials fighting for the Congress and their lives. This observation of their inaction was reported and corroborated by other officials and non-USCP entities. Even the IG investigator stated at one time during my interview that he was starting to wonder what they were doing.
    - It is my allegation that these two with intent and malice opted to not try and assist the officers and officials, blame others for the failures, and chose to try and use this event for their own personal promotions. This was done not after the event but while officers and officials were still fighting the demonstrators. I clearly heard one comment being made on the phone to the extent of: We told him this was going to happen, and he did nothing. (I believe they were referencing Chief Sund).
    - As the highest-ranking officials, they have a duty to do everything they can to protect the members of this Department and achieve the mission.
    - More important they have failed the oath of office they took which amongst other words states they will: *“faithfully discharge their duties to*

*support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic". They did not choose to defend the Congress from these groups.*

- False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001
  - *Specific to Investigative Research and Intelligence Report, 21-TD-159 (December 21, 2020):*
    - It should be noted the great job the analyst of the IIAD. They literally had the information provided on January 5<sup>th</sup> by the FBI on DECEMBER 21<sup>st</sup>. This document was the most critical piece of intelligence information as identified in the Senate Report in the OIG Report. However, this information was never shared. Actually 21-TD-159 document was never provided to anyone, and the information was never used to update the assessments actually provided to everyone.
    - According to the Senate Report, *The December 21 IIAD Report attached a map of the Capitol campus that was posted to the blog and noted: "several comments promote confronting members of Congress and carrying firearms during the protest."*<sup>230</sup> *It flagged approximately thirty screen shots of comments on the website, including:*
      - *"Exactly, forget the tunnels. Get into Capitol Building, stand outside congress. Be in the room next to them. They wont have time [to] run if they play dumb."*
      - *"Deploy Capitol Police to restrict movement. Anyone going armed needs to be mentally prepared to draw down on LEOs. Let them shoot first, but make sure they know what happens if they do."*
      - *"If they don't show up, we enter the Capitol as the Third Continental Congress and certify the Trump Electors."*
      - *"Bring guns. It's now or never."*
      - *"If a million patriots who up bristling with AR's, just how brave do you think they'll be when it comes to enforcing their unconstitutional laws? Don't cuck out. This is do or die. Bring your guns."*
      - *"Surround every building with a tunnel entrance/exit. They better dig a tunnel all the way to China if they want to escape."*
      - *According to Ms. Pittman, this report (21-TD-159) was distributed only to "command staff," including the deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs. (Pittman Interview to Committee on April 20, 2021).*

- *There was no reference to the December 21 IIAD Report mentioning the donald.win blog or access to tunnels on the Capitol campus.*
- *In fact, IIAD concluded that "[t]he protests/rallies [were] expected to be similar to the previous Million MAGA March rallies in November and December 2020." The December 23 Special Assessment also found that "[d]ue to the tense political environment following the 2020 election, the threat of disruptive actions or violence cannot be ruled out. Actions of individuals or small groups are generally not broadcast publicly making them impossible to detect."*
- *When asked about the inconsistency between the December 23 Special Assessment and the information in IIAD's possession at the time, Ms. Pittman acknowledged that there was a discrepancy but could not explain why the discrepancy existed: ...."*
- *According to Ms. Pittman, this report (21-TD-159) was distributed only to "command staff," including the deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs. (Pittman Interview to Committee on April 20, 2021). This is a False Statement to Congress 18 USC 1001. Report 21-TD-159 was NEVER distributed to command staff including deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs as testified to the Senate Rules Committee. As this information was never incorporated into any report then these two were the only ones that knew.*
  - *This document was incredibly important and damning to Assistant Chief Pittman and the Deputy Chief Gallagher, which is why I allege they lied and stated it was shared with the command staff. The command staff would have NEVER known they were lied about if it wasn't for the work of the U.S. Senate.*
  - *The "TD" report was never heard of by any member of the executive management team other than Pittman and Gallagher. They were the ones that implemented this numbering system to track internal documents for their command unbeknownst to other commanders.*
- *In the USCP provided timeline has many false statements used to obscure their full responsibility and deflect blame to every other commander for their failures. This includes the lines:*
  - *DEC 31 – "IIAD had briefings with Captains and above on Dec 30<sup>th</sup> assessment." This is false, they may have had some briefings with some captains and above but certainly not with all captains and above, to include deputy chiefs, and/or those assigned to the administrative side of the Department. (USCP Timeline)*

- *January 4 – "ILAD had briefings with Captains and above on January 3<sup>rd</sup> Assessment."* This is false, they may have had some briefings with some captains and above but certainly not with tall captains and above, to include deputy chiefs, and/or those assigned to the administrative side of the Department. (*USCP Timeline*)
- Failed to mention that Pittman approved the operational plan for the Department as appropriate for the intelligence (*OIG Report*).

I am requesting that these allegations be fairly and independently investigated, just like the allegations against the officers in the press release. I am requesting that these officials are treated equally as the officers reference any temporary duty status. I am also requesting there is a press release, like they did for the officers for any punishment administered to them. As they have said and written, officials should be held to a higher standard. I am just asking that if nothing else they are held to the same standard they applied to the officers.

In short, it is truly unconscionable that those that truly failed every member of the Department and are most responsible for the 6<sup>th</sup> have NOT been held accountable. Nothing has been done to these two chiefs responsible for the greatest intelligence failure and tragedy in the history of the Department and Congress. These same two chiefs that unconscionably failed to even attempt to help officers on the 6<sup>th</sup> and instead watched emotionless and sought to scapegoat others to obscure their failures and advance their own careers. This while officers were literally fighting for their lives.

These same chiefs that have blamed everyone for their failures to include those real heroes that tried to overcome all their failures and protect the Congress. Now, these two publish a press release on how they are holding officers accountable for their underperformance on the 6<sup>th</sup>.

An overwhelmed officer takes a selfie gets a five-day suspension. What do the two chiefs that failed the entire Department get? What happens to the two chiefs that failure and inactions contributed to the death and injuries of hundreds of officers? What about the two chiefs that have lied to Congress and/or failed to correct the record? What about those that have falsely slandered others and impugned the reputation of others for personal advancement? If Intelligence failed the rest of the Department, which it did by the declaration of the U.S. Senate and the OIG, how are the two people most responsible for this epic failure not held accountable? Why are they being protected? Why are the planning to offer one person a golden parachute and the second being groomed to be the next Chief of Police?

It is my opinion that these two enjoyed enough political favors to get unmerited promotions and assignments without the operational experience necessary to understand the importance of intelligence information to the planning and operations of the Department to include the ability to get an Emergency Declaration from the Board to secure resources. It is their lack of any significant operational work experience including any demonstration command experience that greatly contributed to their failures prior to, on and after the 6<sup>th</sup>. I believe the OIG's report

supports this with the recommendation about having a transparent promotional process for these positions in the future.

Again, after the 6<sup>th</sup>, they enjoyed enough political favor for their lies to be acted on and to be immediately placed in charge of the Department. They had other commanders including the Intelligence Division Commander, the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Police relieved, but not them (The Intelligence Bureau Commander and Chief of Intelligence). This even though they oversaw the intelligence that failed every component and officer on the Department.

My 31 years of experience leads me to the opinion is that the controlling congressional entities that pushed them forward in the first place and are protecting them are doing it for a several reasons.

First, they seek to control the USCP's message reference January 6<sup>th</sup>. It is a different narrative if the 6<sup>th</sup> happened because of their intelligence failures.

Second, it is a poor reflection on the congressional leadership and those key staffers for championing the promotions of inexperienced and incapable leaders that directly led to the events of the 6<sup>th</sup>.

Third, it is immensely embarrassing to the congressional leadership and staff that they selected the two individuals most responsible for the 6<sup>th</sup> to lead the Department after the 6<sup>th</sup>. Especially since some entity selected them without any investigation. To hold them accountable would require this same group to admit they were wrong.

Finally, it is a blemish upon the Congress that these actions have led to the continued mass resignation of exemplary and experienced officials and officers that don't have faith in the character or competency of these two people. They can promote whoever they like but you can't replace the real operational experience that has been lost.


Before I am attacked, which is what the USCP and some congressional entities will do, I would like to state for the record that my family has over 100 years of honorable and dedicated service protecting the U.S. Congress. Reference my credibility, I am:

- The most experienced operations commander with a lengthy list of noteworthy accomplishments to include planning and commanding the security for the Justice Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearings and commanding the arrest of 580 demonstrators in the Hart Atrium. These events were recognized by the Congress and many members on this letter for the exceptional work of the USCP.
- The highest-ranking person on the Department that was not involved in any intelligence brief prior to and for January 6<sup>th</sup>. I was not involved in the operational plan for the 6<sup>th</sup>, even as a reviewing entity. I was not involved in operations for the 6<sup>th</sup> until my arrival on the Hill after the Capitol was entered by demonstrators.

- The highest-ranking person assigned to the Chief Administrative Office. My duty assignment for the last year and my assignment on the 6<sup>th</sup> was in an administrative assignment in Southern Maryland.
- The official that responded with my team of dedicated men and women, without being recalled by any entity. We responded from Southern Maryland to the Hill Code one and immediately started to support the mission and the officers on site.
- The official that was directed to oversee the deployment of outside law enforcement resources to the Capitol. Ultimately, I assumed much of the area command role as the two chiefs on the dias had abandoned their responsibilities to the officers in the fight. This included working determinedly with a small group of officials in the command center and staging area to quickly deploy incoming resources to the operation commanders.
- The official that was reassigned immediately after the 6<sup>th</sup> as the National Guard Liaison and developed the manpower and deployment strategies for the Department post January 6<sup>th</sup> through my retirement.
- The official that has received multiple awards for my performance related to the 6<sup>th</sup> and subsequent work with the National Guard.
- Also, the official that both retired in good standing from the Department with 31 years of service to the Congress because of the issues raised in this document, and yet falsely and publicly accused by the USCP for being provided intelligence information and failing in my duties related to the 6<sup>th</sup>.
- The official that seeks nothing from this but for the truth to come out. There needs to be accountability of those leaders that truly failed every member of the USCP and recognition of those heroes the Department has degraded for the pre-determined advancement of these two by congressional leader.

I hope this complaint and requests are taken to heart and are investigated to their logical end and actions are taken to correct the issues identified. Most of all, I hope the Congress finally reports the truth to the brave men and women of this once incredible Department.

Very Respectfully,



cc: The Honorable Steny Hoyer  
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren  
The Honorable Rodney Davis  
The Honorable Amy Klobuchar  
The Honorable Roy Blunt  
The Honorable Jim Jordan  
*The Honorable Liz Cheney*