UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Case No. 19-23649-rdd

In the Matter of:

PURDUE PHARMA L.P.

Debtor.


United States Bankruptcy Court
Tele/Video Proceedings
300 Quarropas Street, Room 248
White Plains, NY 10601

August 23, 2021
9:50 AM

B E F O R E :
HON ROBERT D. DRAIN
U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

ECRO: UNKNOWN

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HEARING re Notice of Continuation of Hearing on Confirmation of Seventh Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Purdue Pharma L.P. and Its Affiliated Debtors filed by Eli J. Vonnegut on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P.. with hearing to be held on 8/23/2021 at 10:00 AM (ECF \#3617)

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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: On oral argument, the record having been closed at the end of last week's hearing, I know there's been some back and forth by the parties as to the time allotted, as opposed to the actual issues and the order in which they would be heard. I don't actually think this really is the appropriate subject of a -- any sort of additional conference or discussion. This meaning, how much time the parties are going to take. Ultimately oral argument is for the Court's benefit. The Court has already received lengthy, in fact, over the page limit, although I authorized it, briefing on most of these issues, including the one that the parties propose taking the most time on. I'll just cut people off if they're being repetitive.

So, I'm happy to begin with oral argument, unless there's any other announcement that the parties would like to make.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, good morning, for the record, Marshall Huebner, Davis Polk \& Wardwell, on behalf of the Debtors. Can $I$ be heard and seen clearly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUEBNER: Terrific. Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, before we actually start oral argument, in our other capacity as just resharing and stewards of the cases, we have three things to announce on what the Court, through
it and others, these things more or less, two of them appeared on the docket, but it is important, I think, because it does narrow the issues.

The newest piece of news is that Dr. Rothfein and his client, the Emergency Room Physician, we have reached a settlement, and so their issues are going to be resolved. That settlement has the support of the $A H C$ and the MSGE, and the UCC does not expect any problem in approving it. It essentially, on its face, contemplates a $\$ 375,000$ broadly supported substantial contribution claim for the work that the doctor and his counsel have done. There have been some changes, obviously, into some of the issues that they raised, periodically throughout the case, and with that, that issue is resolved and needs no other further discussion, nor oral argument.

We will, obviously, file appropriate papers as we did with, for example, Mr. Stuart (indiscernible), resolving their objections, and again, we already have, $I$ believe, the support we need since $I$ was able to note is the residual money that the Debtors hope to be able to make available to abatement, or it goes to non-Federal Governmental creditors, and so between the UCC, AHC, and MSG, those are all of the organized groups, essentially, whose representatives, in essence, having their recoveries diminished by that amount and they are all either supportive over all or they (indiscernible) supported. So hopefully we can -- one third of one box, I'll have it can make to (indiscernible) chambers.

I would like to apologize to the NCSG and the two halves, or really 62 percent and 37 percent, who just did not have time, this only happened a few minutes ago, but although, Peter (indiscernible) and Mr. (indiscernible), by seeming looking happy on the webcam, as Your Honor was walking out. He obviously he will explain this either to Mr. Troop, if he is still representing the full group, per this is other than confirmation, to which $I$ believe he is, plus obviously, happened to talk to any individual nonconsenting states, but, you know, to say it in its more simple form, we would probably save more for these very creditors by not continuing to wrestle with these issues, but an opinion contemplates, which is one of many reasons why we believe the settlement is appropriate. I hope that no party is offended, but we're desperately looking to settle things, and my other attorneys that were on phone calls, literally this happened, Mr. McClammy stepped out and made these phone calls in about the last 120 seconds, and so this is about as hot and breaking a piece of news as one could possibly have.

THE COURT: Okay. So just to -- just to be clear, this is a -- an agreement to support a substantial

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contribution claim in that amount?

MR. HUEBNER: Mr. McClammy, please keep me honest, is that correct? That's what I've been told. We got this -- literally just happened.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, the second piece of good news, and I'm about to turn over the podium, because I think both of the next two things are from Mr. Vonnegut, they are complicated and -- and not for me, I have no capacity and ability to describe them, are that we have settled with the DMP's. And this is a very material development in the case, letting the Court knows it avoided needing to -- oh, it's not a full settlement, but Mr. Vonnegut will walk us through it. And then the third thing, which he will also walk us through is taking our cue as we have from the first moment of this case, both from what creditors and other stakeholders articulate to us, as their needs and concerns and issues, and of course, listening to the Court as be as we know how. We did file, I believe in the middle of the night last night, because there has been negotiating until moments before it was filed, amended documents that $I$ do believe narrow and change a variety of things that have been the subject of objections, and so, probably to avoid inaccuracy, which would help no one, I think I will probably sit down and ask Mr. Vonnegut to walk the Court and parties,
and Ms. Deedee, I'm sure, will keep him honest of the DMP side, where we are on those two issues, and then after that we can turn to oral argument on the --

THE COURT: Okay. I -- I did see the eighth amended plan, and $I$-- actually, I was a little late getting onto the bench because $I$ was reviewing the black line. But I'm happy to hear a brief explanation of the settlement with the, so called, DMP group.

MR. VONNEGUT: Good morning, Your Honor, for the record, I'm Eli Vonnegut of the Davis Polk \& Wardwell, on behalf of the Debtors, can you hear me clearly?

THE COURT: Yes, thanks.

MR. VONNEGUT: Thank you. So to respect the allocation of time for argument, $I$ will only be giving a factual explanation of the plan revisions that were filed overnight.

Those revisions, in the eighth amended plan, fall into a few principal categories. First, we have revisions agreed to with the distributors, manufacturers, and pharmacies, I will call them the DMP's to resolve the bulk of their objections to the plan. On this $I$ will be describing only the agreed revisions. My co-counsel, Jeffrey Gleit of Sullivan, and Worcester, is acting as conflicts counsel for the Debtor, with respect to the sole component that the DMP's objection that remains unresolved,
and he will be addressing that later in argument.

Next we have revisions to the release provisions to attempt to narrow concerns that have been raised, and also, hopefully just to make it a little easier to understand the releases. Lastly, there are three miscellaneous changes that $I$ will just cover very briefly.

So first, with respect to the DMP settlement, the agreement reached with the DMP's resolves all aspects of their objections other than those related to the Debtor's insurance policies, which Mr. Gleit will be addressing later. The crux of the agreement is very simple. It's a bilateral release. The DMP's have agreed to release their co-defendant claims against the Debtors, and to the assumption of their contracts without payment of those claims. The Debtors, in turn, have agreed to release their claims against the DMP's, including those that arise under the assumed contract and to remove the DMP's from the schedule of excluded parties.

The DMP's have also now been added to the reciprocal release, meaning that they receive a release from the Sacklers and the other shareholder release parties. There are a couple exceptions to this overall framework. Both the Debtors and the DMP's preserve their ordinary course, claims that are not related to opioid litigation, and as before, all holders of co-defendant claims, continue
to retain what we call their co-defendant defensive rights. Those are rights that they have to attempt to reduce their liabilities, judgements, or obligations, but those codefendant, defensive rights cannot be used to seek or obtain any affirmative recovery from any protected party.

Mechanically, this settlement is implemented in a few different places in the plan. In Section 4.16 , which covers the treatment of co-defendant claims, we've just simplified this a lot. It now just says that co-defendant claimholders don't receive any distributions but do retain their defensive rights. Section 8.4, addressed treatment of co-defendant contracts, contracts that have -- that give rise to co-defendant claims. That now just says that those agreements are assumed with all co-defendant claims arising under those contracts, having been released.

This treatment, with the exception of the issue that Mr. Gleit is going to address, is now consensual as to all counterparties. The DMP's withdrew the objections that they filed for this treatment and no other parties objected to this treatment prior to the deadline, which was August 2nd.

Lastly, for the DMP settlement, excluded party, the defining term now does not include any settling codefendants. Settling co-defendants is the DMP's. These parties also become reciprocal releasees, which means that's
how they get a release from the Sacklers and the other shareholder related parties. The settling co-defendants have also been added to both releasing parties and released parties, so on both sides. And then lastly, 10.6 preserves the ordinary commercial claims I referred to earlier, and Section 10.18 preserves the defensive rights of the codefendants.

Unless, Your Honor, has any questions about the DMP settlement --

THE COURT: I did have -- I did have a question, you describe this essentially as a mutual release of claims with the exceptions for ordinary course claims, and the like, so given that, there is no third-party release of the DMP's under the plan? If someone has a third-party claim against them, that's not being released?

MR. VONNEGUT: The DMP's are now removed from the excluded party schedule, which means that if they are -- if they are a released party in other capacities, that they would be included in the third-party release, by virtue of having them removed from the excluded party schedule.

THE COURT: See I -- I don't understand that provision. There are -- I'm not sure who is included within the DMP group, but there's pending litigation against distributors and manufacturers, it's not stayed by me, around the country, including in the $M D L$, and $I$ wouldn't
think that the plan would be able to release them in that litigation.

MR. VONNEGUT: I'm -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. No, that litigation is -- is not released. So in -- in the definition of released parties, $I$ actually, in the inserted language, clause 3 , Subsection $B$, the settling co-defendants and their related parties are become released parties for Section 10.6A, which is the release granted by the Debtor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TROOP: Your Honor, Andrew Troop, on behalf of the Non-Consenting States --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. TROOP: -- thank you for asking my question.

But it seems to me that the plan should be perfectly clear about this (indiscernible) --

THE COURT: I -- I agree. I just wanted to make sure I understood the intent. I think you do, Mr. Vonnegut, did point me, correctly, to the fact that that for purposes of the definition, it's just for 1.06 , but $I$ think you probably should beef that up, because just based on the breadth of the third-party litigation around the country, there shouldn't be any confusion on this point.

MR. VONNEGUT: Thank you, Your Honor, happy to clarify that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. STEEGE: Your Honor, this is Catherine Steege, on behalf of the DMP's, I think no one thought to go through the language, it is very clear that the relief they're receiving is from the Debtor and from the Sackler shareholder parties, or whatever that terms is. It does not in --

THE COURT: I think --

MS. STEEGE: -- in any way suggest that other parties are released from this.

THE COURT: I think that's right, but I -- I understand that to be the case, but since the third-party release also uses the term, released parties, maybe -- I mean, my suggestion might be that you drop a footnote in the definition of released parties where it says in Section 10.6A, and just make it clear that -- that this is the Debtor release and not any third-party release.

MR. VONNEGUT: We're happy to do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. STEEGE: And Your Honor, we would expect the Debtor would share whatever language it's requesting --

THE COURT: Of course, sure.

MS. STEEGE: -- with the Court.

MR. VONNEGUT: Both parties.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. STEEGE: The other point, Your Honor, I'd make
about the withdrawal of our objection to the plan, is we have preserved one objection, which is the objection to the provisions that only insurance flights, we've agreed to rest on our brief's in connection with that objection. In addition, many of the DMP's are involved in litigation up in Canada, or are only involved in Canadian litigation, and they all reserve their rights to make the appropriate arguments in the Canadian courts, including in the recommended decision.

THE COURT: With respect to -- with respect to what?

MS. STEEGE: With respect to preservation of their defensive rights up there and there are other issues up there that interplay with the litigation that they need to be able to argue in the Canadian Courts.

THE COURT: But $I$ just want to make sure, is it the preservation of their rights goes to the reserved issue here that the parties have briefed as to rights to insurance, and the -- and the carveout for their defenses judgement reduction, those sorts of points?

MS. STEEGE: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Not that they will -then we argue in Canada, in the recognition proceeding, the objection that they've waived here?

MS. STEEGE: No, Your Honor, well, we would not be

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rearguing the objections that we've agreed to in the plan here.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. Thank you. Okay. Thanks for those two updates.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, Evan Jones of O'Melveny Myers, we represent Johnson and Johnson, which is one of the DMP's. In Your Honor's question, we do believe under Canadian law, it may be appropriate to (indiscernible) the recognition of this Court's order, if the plan is confirmed, and we're reserving that. We're not going to reargue an objection to the plan, but to the extent Canadian law limits recognition, we believe it is appropriate to reserve.

THE COURT: All right. I -- my point's a very simple one. I wanted to make sure that that reservation of rights doesn't include raising the same objection that has been settled here.

MR. EVANS: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Very well, thank you.

MR. VONNEGUT: Thank you, Your Honor. Next I will outline the revisions made to the release provisions on our few miscellaneous changes. So on the releases, I'd just like to revisit, briefly the basic architecture of the releases, $I$ think it's -- it's helpful in understanding them.

In order to be released, a claim has to be first, held by a releasing party. Second, asserted against either a released party or a shareholder released party, and third, based on relating to or arising from, in full or in-part, the Debtors, their states, or the in the Chapter 11 cases. It also has to be not held by the federal government, not against an excluded party and not an excluded claim.

The simplest revisions to the releases that we made fall into the category of just fixing bad drafting, that tends to result when you have a document being commented on by as many intensely interested parties as we have in this case. So you'll see, throughout, we've removed duplicative language; in many cases we've attempted to streamline use of defining terms, like cause of action. I won't go through that in detail, unless, Your Honor, has any questions.

Sections 10.6 and 10.7 , they've gotten a lot shorter, and we hope a lot clearer. We've removed duplicative or otherwise unnecessary language, and our core standard in sections 10.6 and 10.7 is that in order to be released, the cause of action must be based on or relating to, or in any manner arising from, in whole or in part, the Debtors, the estates, or the Chapter 11 cases, and we have a parenthetical illustrating certain types of claims that might relate to the Debtors, but that does not expand their
provision in any way. Those claims still all have to relate to the Debtors. We don't do any of those revisions as substantively changing the scope, we're just trying to make things a little bit easier to read.

On the more substantive side, we have revised both what is an excluded claim and who is a shareholder released party, to attempt to address concerns about the breadth of the releases. So in the definition of excluded claim, the two most substantive additions are 1) mindful of, Your Honor's commentary and input from creditors regarding claims related to non-opioid issues. We've now excluded from the releases non-opioid related claims against shareholder released parties, or those shareholder released parties on willful misconduct. There are a set of definitions that impact this. We've added new defining terms for what constitutes willful misconduct, and what constitutes a willful non-opioid claim, which is a non-opioid claim arising from willful misconduct.

We also heard concerns regarding the breadth of the releases for advisors and contractors of the Sacklers, and so we have also excluded claims against those parties for their own willful misconduct, regardless of whether they are opioid related or not opioid related. That provision, again, is founded on the definition of willful misconduct and the term for those claims that are excluded is willful
party related claim, which means a claim against a shareholder, released party that is identified in Subsection VII(b) of Shareholder released party or such parties, actually and separate, willful misconduct. And that means it's their own conduct, not conduct that was imputed to them.

Both of these provisions have a deep keeping function pertinent to the plan to provide some protection against strike suits. This lives in new Section $11.01(e)$, and that requires a claimant that believes they have a claim that fits one of these carveouts, before they prosecute that claim, to first come to the bankruptcy court and make a showing that their claim is both colorable and within one of the two definitions.

Also, in excluded claim, we did some less substantive cleanup to just try to address some provisions that seem to have been causing confusion. First in II, we made clear that nobody is getting income tax claims released. This was always the case, but we took apart that use to apply to only to shareholder released parties and make -- and made it global, just to make clear what we're doing there.

Next in $V$, we eliminated a provision that only applied to releases among different shareholder released parties. That now lives in its own provision in Section

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$10.7(b)$, and lastly, we excluded any cause of action based on conduct after the effective date. This again was always the case, but there were a lot of questions about future conduct during the -- during the presentation of evidence, so we just wanted to make that very clear.

Next in the definition of shareholder released party. We've heard concerns about the scope of releases for transferees of the Sacklers, and so in VI, we have simplified that prong so that persons in which the Sackler's own an interest are no longer released parties, and we've replaced that with a provision for mediate and immediate transferees of the Sacklers, but that is very strictly limited to make clear that those parties are only released in their capacity as such, and only for the amounts that they received.

Other revisions to that -- that term, were just clarifying and we did not give a substantives. Unless, Your Honor, has any questions, $I$ can briefly cover the -- the few other revisions that were made to the plan.

THE COURT: Okay. I -- I had a couple of questions on this topic.

MR. VONNEGUT: Sure.

THE COURT: First, in the definition of willful
misconduct, it -- it comes under an action taken or not taken in bad faith and with actual knowledge that such
action or failure to act is unlawful, prohibited, or false, and will be harmful to another. It -- it doesn't include the word fraud, and much of the litigation here, asserts fraud claims, one way or another, including under Consumer Protection Act statutes, and I just want to make sure is fraud included within this?

MR. VONNEGUT: Well, I don't want to get ahead of Mr. Uzzi, who looks like he's ready to address that.

MR. UZZI: Your Honor, for the record, Gerard Uzzi, Milbank, on behalf of the Raymond Sackler Family. It was actually rose to address just a clarification on the -the prior statements with which I -- which I can address, but to answer this question. Your Honor, I -- I -- I think we mean what we say here. It's not intended to -- to pick up fraud. It's intended to pick up what it says here. THE COURT: I think you should pick up fraud. MR. UZZI: All right. Understood, Your Honor. We will -- we will -- we will take -- we will discuss that with our clients, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UZZI: The clarification $I$ wanted to make, Your Honor, is Mr. Vonnegut had made -- we made -- we made a correction as it relates to -- I'm sorry, I'm just flipping the page to get there, Your Honor, but the definition of shareholder of these parties, as it related to transferees
and we did clarify that and we limited that language, but Mr. Vonnegut made a statement that we had taken out the reference to Sackler owned entities, that's true as a cleanup comment, but that's just simply because it's picked up later in the definition as far as a catchall for subsidiaries and controlled affiliates.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. UZZI: So it was a cleanup on transferees.

THE COURT: The purpose -- the purposes of this change was to limit the release to -- to those that would be otherwise sued, as being the recipient of a fraudulent transfer that's released under the plan, right, and in that accord --

MR. UZZI: Correct, Your Honor -- correct, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. UZZI: Or similar theories.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. All right. The other -- the other point $I$ had is a much smaller one, and again, $I$ 'm not -- I'm just trying to understand what's in here, I'm not -- I'm not commenting the merits of the changes or whether they're enough. Although, I appreciate the work done to narrow the release. If you go to the last paragraph of 10.6 , $I$ think there's -- I think there's potential for a little confusion in the fourth line there.

It says, in each case, unrelated to the Chapter 11 cases or the subject matter of the pending opioid actions, I think you probably should put unrelated, and then add the word either to the Chapter 11 cases or to, I think that's supposed to be disjunctive, right? It's unrelated to either one of those two or both?

MR. UZZI: Yes, sir, that's right.

THE COURT: All right. I had to read that a couple of times to figure that out and I think that would make it clearer.

MR. UZZI: We will fix that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay.

MR. UZZI: Your Honor, so, but the last three changes, just to highlight for the Court and the parties, one in continuing foundation members, which describes the individuals that will be appointed to run the two Sackler Family Foundations, we've just removed from -- from that term, the possibility of the Court appointing those people, which the State of New York didn't like and didn't like and frankly we thought the Court might not like, so now that -those foundations will just be run by either the NOAT Trustees or people otherwise agreed to by the Debtors, the governmental consent parties, and counsel for the newly consenting states.

THE COURT: A good change.

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MR. UZZI: Thank you. In Section 11.1, XVII, we fixed a conflict between the plan and the NOAT and Prime Trust documents regarding jurisdiction over those documents, to make clear that they will be concurrent and not exclusive bankruptcy court jurisdiction over those entities. And lastly, to conform to the revisions to the confirmation order, we've removed the waiver of the 14 days stay imposed under Rule 3020, from 9.2, and we adjusted Section 12.8 to conform there.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UZZI: And that is it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well.

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, Lawrence Fogelman from the US Attorney's office. I wanted to quick thank the (indiscernible), we did get a draft on Saturday of some of the changes, but just this morning when we woke up, a lot of the changes that we had discussed over the weekend weren't there, and some others were different. So and a lot of it deals with the releases, which are an important part to what my offices has been the states, and the Debtors in our office don't necessarily always agree on interpretation of the same language. So to the extent that we -- we can (indiscernible), I guess the new language that came up, since it's hard to do it on the fly, I just would ask that to be involved in this and to be allowed to revisit an
issue, if we discover something prior to the final -- final (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VONNEGUT: Your Honor, that's very much
understood. We were just describing the revisions made and did not mean to suggest that they resolved anybody's objection, unless somebody has said their own objection is resolved.

THE COURT: Right. I -- I --

MR. FOGELMAN: We would not think, Your Honor, that revisions developed a new issue that we didn't know about 12 hours ago. We want to be able to look at those documents and figure that out.

THE COURT: That -- that's fair, but I also think it's helpful to confine the oral argument on this point to the actual wording of the plan, at this point. Which, as I said, may or may not be sufficiently narrow.

MR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VONNEGUT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor, I think I will turn the podium over to Mr. Huebner.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TROOP: Your Honor -- Your Honor, Andrew Troop for the Non-consenting States, just -- just quickly on this point. I have not objected, nor have I reserved any time as

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part of the oral argument, but in light of this particular change, there is a question that has been raised about the formulation with regard to what the third-parties and state law, that a Uniformed Deceptive Trade Practices, I have to thank for the uniform one, that -- that imposes liability without there having to be a proof of willful misconduct or fraud, and so we may need to fold some time in for me when other parties are talking about releases or later, as I come up to speed on that particular issue.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TROOP: If that's fine with everyone, just to be clear.

THE COURT: That's fine. I mean, I think -- I mean, my view on this is that when you're covering related parties, which are independent contractors, co-promotors, third-party sales representatives, medical liaisons, subcontractors, agents, and the like, it's a big step forward to carve out the defined term, willful misconduct, but there may well be other types of misconduct that should fit into that definition. I think, generally, independent conduct that is wrongful is what is really meant by that language, and if an applicable law covers that, as opposed to just some form of strict liability, because you're in the -- in the same room or the same building, then $I$ think it probably should be covered by the carve out.

MR. TROOP: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. We'll review that language again and make a proposal to the Debtors before the close of argument on Wednesday, so that if we have to revisit it --

THE COURT: I mean, to be fair, I think that the consumer laws that might apply here all are largely addressed to engaging in activity that's misleading or fraudulent. They may not use the word fraud, they may use the word misleading, but it's some activity that where someone has their own independent role in it.

Okay.

MR. TROOP: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VONNEGUT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HUEBNER: Good morning, Your Honor. Again, for the record, Marshall Huebner, Davis Polk. Can the Court hear and see me clearly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, Mr. Kaminetzky and I are splitting the Debtors' -- well, what we thought was an allocated one hour, 50/50. I will be handling more of the Iridium and TMT Trailer and explain the releases. Mr. Kaminetzky will be doing the more technical legal issues of equal important on constitutionality, due process, Metromedia, et cetera, just to give the Court some sign
posting on how we're splitting things up.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, let me begin with an admission. This Plan is most assuredly not perfect. No plan in these unthinkably painful and complex cases possibly could be. There is no allocation, no plan, no settlement, no amount of money that could ever compensate for the loss and devastation suffered by those impacted. The imperfect task that is, in fact, before us is to find the best available resolution for over 614,000 contingent opioidrelated civil claims for money, by which the objectors' civil claims for money are one part.

At the beginning of this journey, the most likely scenario for the Purdue Bankruptcy was years of endless wasteful litigation. We had many -- a myriad of creditor claims, federal, state, and local governments, commercial counterparties, hospitals, personal injury victims, and others. Each fought with one another and with the Sacklers year after year over a diminishing asset.

So, during -- there will no doubt be two contentious days of legal arguments -- let's not lose sight of the extraordinary thing so many have collectively achieved. More than 95 percent of Purdue's creditors, including 97 percent of its governmental creditors, have come together in support of a Plan that will allow as much
pot value as possible to be used as soon as possible, for only two purposes and no others, abatement of the opioid crisis and compensation of the individual victims, to save, ameliorate, and improve as many human lives as possible in the face of one of the worst health crises in world history.

If we do no seize this opportunity, if we squander this moment, billions of dollars, and the creation of a public benefit company, all dedicated to abatement of the opioid crisis will be lost.

The legal inquiry at the heart of this hearing is whether the many interlocking, interdependent settlements embodied in the Plan and the releases are "fair and equitable" in the best interests of the estates, which of course, include their stakeholders, consistent the Supreme Court's TMT Trailer decision and the seven Iridium factors.

The Plan is a tighten woven tapestry of no fewer than 14 incredibly complex and totally mutually dependent sets of settlements among tens of thousands of the Debtors' creditors, including:

1. The split of value between the public and private side, agreed to in phase one mediation;
2. Allocation among the many private groups from phase one mediation;
3. Allocation of funds among different individual victims;
4. The interstate allocation incorporate into NOAT;
5. The intrastate allocation among the states and municipalities incorporated into NOAT;
6. Resolution of the claims of the public schools;
7. Allocation to Tribal creditors;
8. Resolution of the civil and criminal claims of the United States;
9. Allocation of the resolution of the fees due to the attorneys of both public and private creditors;
10. Resolution of federal healthcare claims and liens pertaining to personal injury recoveries;
11. Resolution of private healthcare claims and liens relating to personal injury recoveries;
12. Resolution among the United States and the AHC of certain claims of the United States that could easily -- or could have massively impacted the recovery of nonfederal governmental entities;
13. The Shareholder Settlement itself; and
14. Allocation among the 10 family groups of the Sackler family.

And this list of 14 , Your Honor, most of which were fully supported by the group formerly, and sort of currently known, as the nonconsenting states, that includes
the objecting states, is a simplified count. Mr. Price's number is 30 interconnected settlements. This is likely, whatever the number, whether it's 14 or 24 or 34 , the most complex set of interlocking mutually dependent settlements involving the representatives of hundreds of thousands of partis, more than 10 ad hoc groups, and the federal government ever reached in the history of Chapter 11. Pull out a core thread, and the tapestry unravels.

At face, Your Honor, maybe it's an oversimplification, but I have always thought that a court's job is to apply the facts to the law, and that a lawyer's job is to demonstrate that the law is on their side when applied to the facts.

At face, the Sackler aspect of the settlement involves the giving of releases and getting \$4.325 billion in cash, and scores of pages of binding covenants and other material concessions. So, it is truly remarkable that not a single one of the objectors even cites TMT Trailer. That's right, Your Honor, there's not one cite to the Supreme Court's governing decision in a single objection. Almost as remarkably, only two objectors, Washington and Oregon, even mention Iridium, the governing Second Circuit case, and even then, it is only in passing.

The objections are no less empty with respect to the facts. Despite 450 pages of objections and six trial
days, the affirmative factual case, including direct testimony by 17 expert witnesses and 18 fact witnesses, is virtually uncontroverted. For the record, of the 35 witnesses offered by the Plan proponents, 14 of them, 3 fact witnesses and 11 expert witnesses, had their direct testimony admitted with no objection and no crossexamination by any party.

In our view, clearly the objectors will it somewhat differently, there remaining 21 witnesses were asked non-germane questions, and not very many of those either, and their written and oral testimony is overwhelming in support of confirmation.

Not only have the objectors not challenged the overwhelming affirmative evidence of the Debtors, the UCC, fiduciary for all creditors, the AHC, and other parties, which includes over 4,000 pages of sworn declarations and expert reports -- 4,000 pages of evidence, Your Honor, had we had to put those witnesses on, we would have heard weeks of affirmative testimony that went unchallenged. Perhaps even more shockingly, they have no facts of their own, no evidence, none.

So, the objectors totally ignore the governing law, both from the Supreme Court of the United States of America and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. They have no evidence and they have done nothing to even tap
the massive overwhelming fact record in favor of confirmation.

Please allow me now to turn to the Iridium factors which will frame out the necessity and propriety of these releases.

Factor one, the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits. The enormous, monumental, varied benefits of the Plan settlements are undeniable and unobtainable other than under the Plan. As so many parties have advised in their briefs, and testified under oath, and the UCC has it in their letter, the Plan is the only, only viable solution that can provide this extraordinary set of benefits to the stakeholders of this case and the American people.

Among these benefits:

1. The preservation and dedication of 100 percent of the Debtors' very material assets to opioid abatement and victims, all while maintaining continuity of supply of the many medicines made by the Debtors to ensure access for appropriate patients, subject to comprehensive covenants and injunctions and under the oversight of both a monitor and a new Board of Directors.
2. Comprehensive resolution of all claims relating to these Debtors, thereby avoiding years and probably decades of intercreditor and other litigation.

More on that to come.
3. $\$ 4.325$ billion of additional value on top of everything the estate has.
4. The commitment to spend all of those billions specifically for funding opioid abatement and the PIs.

On the first day of the case, every one of us swore that this would not be another tobacco, this would not be a case where the money went to potholes and redecorating. Only this Plan and no other can deliver on this collective vow. Because, Your Honor, absent the NOAT structure, and we checked, we believe that pretty much every state attorney general is legally bound to deposit settlement monies in their general state treasuries, just like they did in tobacco. See, e.g., Section 7-310.1 of Maryland State Finance and Procurement Code, which provides, and I quote, "Any money received by the State or otherwise subject to the director or control of a State official, as a result of a settlement, judgment, or consent decree...shall be deposited in the State treasury."
5. The ability to maximize value even further to all parties through the public good spillover and multiplier effect of abatement spending. This is the evidence in this case, and it is uncontroverted.

Professor Gaurisankaran testified, both in writing at length, and quite eloquently on the witness stand, about
the material public good and poverty spillover effect and multiplier, economic value provided to yet far more Americans than even the many hundreds of thousands of direct beneficiaries under the Plan.
6. Of tremendous import to noneconomic benefits. Let's start with the public document repository. Tens of millions of documents, the most in history, including tens of thousands of attorney-client privileged documents, basically never before in any major case in history, released to the public as far as we know.

And, Your Honor, there was testimony on this. It's not lawyer argument. There's testimony of Mr. Weinberger and Ms. Conroy about the monumental importance to our society of this unprecedented repository and its potential to reveal lessons to stop a crisis like this from ever happening to the American people again.

Next, the creation of a public benefit company, that will operate with substantial oversight in a responsible and sustainable manner, not only providing cash to the abatement trust, but also developing or providing at or below-cost life-saving medicines for the treatment of opioid use disorder and for reversing overdoses.

Next, the complete removal of the Sackler families from any and all involvement with Purdue or its assets from the end of 2018 until the end of time.

Next, the Sackler families' exit from the opioid business globally over time, under a complex reticulated covenant that many have been involved in negotiating.

And next, barring the Sackler families for seeking or requesting any new naming rights with respect to charitable or similar donations for years until they have fulfilled their core obligations under the Settlement Agreement.

But, Your Honor, now we need to flip it over because equally important, and maybe even more important than the extraordinary, monumental benefits of the Plan is avoiding the Hobbesian Horror that is its only alternative.

But without the shareholder settlement the many other mutually dependent and equally important complex settlements fail. For example, first the phase one mediation agreement expressly conditioned by the states themselves including the objecting states on Sackler participating in the Plan, all fail. There are no more any agreed public/private splits. There are no more intraprivate splits. There are no more intrastate splits, and no more interstate splits. All gone, replaced by a maelstrom of years of litigation.

Second, there is not enough value, nor the emergence of a public benefit corporation or similar entity to satisfy the conditions precedent for the $\$ 1.775$ billion

DOJ forfeiture judgment credit. This would require the Debtors to pay the DOJ at least $\$ 2$ billion in cash that the Debtors do not have. It would also raise the specter of the DOJ having billions and billions of other potentially priority non-dischargeable claims.

Third, billions of dollars that will not go to abatement. The evidence -- it is evidence, it is not argument -- is clear and uncontested that the only alternative to the Debtors' Plan is the global May deal scenario described by Mr. Turner in his declaration.

Mr. DelConte testified that the alternative would provide, at most, $\$ 669.1$ million in aggregate recoveries for all than the more than 614,000 contingent liability creditors who have asserted tens of trillions of dollars in damages.

And for the record, no objector challenged the results of Mr . Turner's alternative plan analysis for the scenarios considered. No objector identified any other feasible scenario. No objector submitted a competing liquidation analysis. The facts are uncontroverted and incontrovertible.

Fourth, unthinkable intercreditor warfare for years. Other than under this Plan, the over 600,000 private creditors absolutely, positively, under no circumstances would agree to limit their collective recoveries to only
about 20 percent of their recoveries from Purdue and the Sacklers. Rather, as they have told us again and again, absent this deal, they will object to the claims of the states, they will seek to subordinate the claims of the states, while asserting their own trillions of dollars of damage claims.

Fifth, uncontrollable and uncoordinated litigation by thousands or tens of thousands of creditors and the Estate itself against the Sacklers. The creditors would be brutally competing against one another in hundreds or thousands of suits, each seeking hundreds of millions or billions or tens of billions or hundreds of billions, collectively seeking tens of trillions against the same set of defendants.

Sixth, a delay of years or decades in getting money out to help victims and facilitate abatement because while this fire tornado of inter and intra-creditor litigation and claim allowance and reconciliation grievously eroded value month after month, year after year, there would likely be no material cash flows from the Debtors' business, no public health initiative to save lives, and a significant risk of supply disruption of much needed approved drugs.

And seventh, and finally, Your Honor, hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps $\$ 1.56$ billion or more in legal fees, not even counting the additional public and private
resources that would need to be spent as creditors, the estates, and state, and local governments, and the Sacklers, engaged in a war of all against all. And this is not speculation, this is not a lawyer spouting a doomsday scenario, it is in the record evidence, including the declarations of Mr . DelConte and Mr. O'Connell. Your Honor, that's just factor one.

Now, please let me turn to Iridium factor two. The likelihood of complex and protracted litigation with its attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, including the difficulty in collecting on the judgment. Your Honor, probably happily for all, $I$ actually will be quite brief on this point because from Page 69 to Page 103 of our confirmation brief, we address this factor at great length, and tie it to the record evidence that is now undisputed again and again.

So, I will tap this only very lightly. The road to winning and collecting net judgments in excess of $\$ 4.325$ billion against the Sacklers would be a fight that would be long, hard-fought, uncertain, and incredibly expensive. I don't think anybody disputes that.

The Debtors, like many other parties, passionately believe that they have strong and material claims against the Sacklers. But even the most valuable claims, including intentional or constructive fraudulent transfer will of
course be litigated to the bitter end by the Sacklers, including as to statutes of limitation, solvency, intent, and recoverability of tax distributions, and the many other factors described both in our disclosure statement and in the UCC Plan support letter.

The issues are many and they are not simple, and material loss on even one of them could be a material potential hit to the recovery profile.

Finally, Your Honor, for very good reason, we have all used the phrase, "the Sacklers" as shorthand throughout these cases. But if it ever comes to it, you can't file a lawsuit and have the defendant be "the Sacklers." You actually have to sue, and serve process, and mitigate, and win, and collect judgments against actual persons and trusts and companies.

To give one sense of this -- and then I'll turn Iridium three -- there are 204 Sackler Trusts in six jurisdictions. There are 57 individual members of the Sackler families, including spouses, children, minors, and decedent estates, in five jurisdictions. And many of the Sacklers were never on the Board, live overseas, and are not U.S. citizens. And there are 201 IACs and $2(a)$ entities in 58 jurisdictions.

Iridium factor three, the paramount interests of the creditors. I believe I already addressed in factors one
and two, so $I$ will actually not address it further at all. As I've indicated, it's so clear and so overwhelming that it was also tied to factor four, whether other parties in interest affirmatively support a proposed settlement.

The facts are in. 97 percent of the 4,924-voting governmental non-federal creditors and 95 -- it's actually really 96 , but we usually say 95 , so nobody can say, which way did you do it -- of a over 120,000 voting creditors, the most voting creditors in the history of Chapter 11 , support the Plan. Every single voting class carried by massive margins, and every single one of the 10 ad hoc groups and the UCC supports the Plan.

The group include (1) the UCC, (2) the AHC, (3) the MSG, (4) the Native American Tribes, (5) the adult PI victims, (6) the NASBI victims, (7) the NAS medical monitoring claimants, (8) the hospitals, (9) the third-party payors, (10) the late payers, and (11) of the independent school districts.

As to the states, of course, Your Honor, let us not lose sight of this. 15 of the 24 formerly nonconsenting states that fought us all through the case, more than 62 percent, now support the Plan. Which brings us, after the further improvements they got in phase three of mediation, to 38 of the 48 states participating in these cases, and also Puerto Rico -- which when I checked a couple of years
ago, I think was something like the 21st most populous, had to be considered a state.

In dramatic, dramatic contrast, the objectors to the settlements are the attorneys general of nine states the District of Columbia, one city, and the U.S. Trustee, who collectively comprise less than one, five-hundredth of one percent of the Debtors' creditors -- one five-hundredth of one percent.

Out of the approximately 22,495 cities, towns, villages, and counties in the United States, one city, Seattle, literally one, objected.

As to the nine states and the District of Columbia, even if we stick them into their own states-only class, more on that later, that class carried by 80 percent, well over the 66 and two-thirds in 1,126 , which is really 50 percent, paint by number, and even greater than the 75 percent arguably, analogously, intellectually relevant in the 524. The class they were actually in, Class 4, had 4,924 voters, and carried by 97 percent.

Moreover, Your Honor, and I say this with some trepidation, but unfortunately, $I$ mean it, it is not actually clear to me who the few objecting attorneys general are even speaking for because on average 95 percent of the private and 97 percent of the governmental stakeholder within their own states, all support the Plan. And
basically, zero claimants -- basically, literally zero in each of the states who has objected has joined them in objecting.

THE COURT: Can I --

MR. HUEBNER: In other words --

THE COURT: -- can $I$ get in a word for a second? How do you -- how do you arrive at the figure -- how do you know that those supporting the Plan are voting in favor of the Plan, comprise -- in the states where there have been objections, comprise 95 percent of those, that group?

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, I don't know, which I said on average. Your Honor, we don't -- we didn't use Prime Clerk to give us customized analysis to use at trial. I don't know the break down per state, I just know on average across the country. It's certainly possible that in some of those states the vote was 99 percent, and in some states it was lower. And of course, each class had a different voting percentage, right? They ranged from 88 percent to 100 percent. So, I can't know how exactly it splits. It's more of the point that looking overall, the creditor acceptance is overwhelming, including as to the governmental units and divisions within the states.

Is it possible that within a specific state, if we did a state-by-state analysis my rhetorical point would be lost as to the some of the objectors? Absolutely. I'm not
stating it as a fact, $I$ said, on average, because $I$ don't know the answer to the Court's question.

THE COURT: Okay. I might as well as this to you. Now, how -- what's the basis for stating that the actual vote here was the largest in Chapter 11 history?

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, we can provide a chart. Our team looked very, very hard at all of the biggest cases that we know of, and we've been doing this for rather a while. It's possible somebody could say a case you didn't know of it, what -- had more voters. But Lehman Puerto Rico, G.M., PG\&E -- we have a very long chart, in which we went through every case we could find to verify the veracity of the statement. I would not be comfortable putting it in a sworn declaration because it's possible I'm wrong, but we looked very, very hard and have a long list of all the mega cases, and believe we have the highest number of voters.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

MR. HUEBNER: Iridium factor five, Your Honor, the competency and experience of counsel supporting, and the experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy judge reviewing settlement, and seven -- I'm going to combine them, "the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm's length bargaining."

Your Honor, we're obviously going down the why on all seven factors, and we think each one is overwhelming.

No party has contested or possibly could contest that these agreements, when tensely negotiated, indeed brutally negotiated, over a period of years by sophisticated counsel on all sides, and with over a year -- a year of assistance, from three of the most highly respected mediators in the country, the Honorable Layn Phillips, and Mr. Kenneth

Feinberg, the Honorable Shelley Chapman, whose selection was supported by the objectors.

These are not someone else's mediators. Mr. Feinberg and Judge Phillips are the mediators we all agreed on and jointly presented to the Court. With respect to negotiations, Your Honor, the testimony is thick and uncontroverted. Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Guard, and Mr. Gotto all testified about the negotiations. We also heard from Mr. Weinberger and Ms. Conroy who have spent over twenty years suing Purdue and the Sacklers. The UCC described all this in their letter facilitated by tens of millions of legal documents conducted in a no-stone-left-unturned investigation into these issues. And, of course, Your Honor, a 4.275-billion-dollar number which came out Phase 2 mediation was the joint proposal of the mediators. It didn't come from the Debtors. It didn't come from the UCC. It didn't come from the AHC, didn't come from the NCSG. It came from the mediators after almost a year of full-time work on these pieces.

And, of course, the final number, 4.325 billion dollars with further material concessions came from the third mediator, a sitting federal judge.

So let's turn to Factor Six, which is the only one that is left. The nature and breadth of the releases obtained by officers and directors, which in this case, of course, we'll expand to include released parties, not just officers and directors.

Your Honor, no one ever would suggest that these releases are not broad. Of course they are broad, but they are the only way these cases can be resolved for many reasons. The objecting states are singularly focused on the fact that the Sacklers will not pay 4.325 billion without the finality that come from broad, binding third-party releases. But this is only one of the very many reasons that the plan must have third-party releases and could never go effective without them because, Your Honor, even if the Sacklers agreed to pay over four billion dollars and still be sued for hundreds of billions of dollars, the plan dies. This has been totally misunderstood by so many parties. It's time to hopefully make it clear.

Why would the plan never, ever work, irrespective of the wishes of the Sacklers without third-party releases?

One, fundamental fairness and equal treatment. Let us consider arguendo, a world in which the objecting
states or other material creditors are allowed to opt out from the third-party releases. The nine objecting states and the District of Columbia have filed proofs of claim alleging under penalty of perjury over 439 billion dollars in damages against Purdue and based on their theory, by extension, against the Sacklers.

Let us assume that they recover only 5 percent of the 439 billion dollars they say they are owed and they get judgments for 22 billion dollars. Even if the Sacklers somehow could pay both this 22 billion dollars, which is only 5 percent of the claims they've sworn they have, and also the 4.326 billion for the whole rest of the country, that would mean that only nine states and D.C. get 22 billion dollars, while 38 states, 614,000 creditors and every other Ad Hoc Group is supposed to share only 4.325 billion dollars. That does not and could not ever work for anyone.

But, of course, it's much worse than that because the Sacklers don't have 26.325 billion dollars to pay 22 and then another 4.325.

So in this hypothetical opt-out scenario, even if the objecting states only get judgment for five cents of what they claim they are owed, everything will fail and collapse if the Sacklers can't pay the settlement.

And to add insult to the extraordinary collective
national injury, if any of the objecting states were successful, they might be able to assert judgment liens and prime everybody else. So everyone else in American might literally end up sharing little or nothing, not even 4.325 billion, while an opt-out state could get a judgment lien for billions. Of course no one is going to do that deal, which is reason number two, no one will do that deal.

No creditor group in these cases, to my knowledge, would or will agree to a resolution of their claim if any material party remains free to pursue direct claims against the Sacklers for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. A tragedy of the common cannot be solved by only some parties agreeing not to drain a common resource. It can only be solved if everyone is bound to the deal.

Mr. Preis and I stopped at six. But between us, we confirmed and I hereby represent that the UCC and the AHC, the NSGE and Adult PIs, the NES Committee and the Hospitals will not support a plan that allows for opt-outs that are material along the lines requested by the objecting states. Even if the Sacklers consented to the carve out, everyone of those six groups would instantly support -withdraw -- excuse me -- would instantly withdraw their support for the plan and fiercely oppose it. And of course they would because they wouldn't ever get paid what they've agreed to.

This is precisely why, Your Honor, the objectors should be held to this. The Phase 1 Mediation Agreements agreed to among the publics and the privates with virtually no involvement of the Debtors and no involvement of any kind, of any kind by the Sacklers who were not Phase 1 mediation parties are expressed conditioned on Sackler participation in the plan.

Number three, Your Honor, $1129(a)(11)$, there actually is a bankruptcy code that governs what you need to make a plan go effective. 1129(a)(11) requires that a plan be feasible. I cannot and would not ever ask a federal judge to confirm a plan that $I$ did not believe was feasible. If there are no third-party releases and material opt-out parties are allowed to sue the Sacklers for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars, $I$ could not stand here and represent to the stakeholders, with whom I am a sworn fiduciary, or to this Court, to whom I have obligations as an officer, that the plan and its many settlements would or could be successfully consummated.

The people who so desperately need it and deserve it would get what they bargained for and what they voted for, including, because the overwhelming creditor support we have built after years of effort, would instantly supernova. The Sacklers have no right to vote on our plan, but our creditors do.

Four, without the third-party releases objected to by $1 / 500$ th of 1 percent of our creditors, everything collapses and those directly impacted by the opioid crisis would lose the billions in hand under the plan and have to wait for recoveries they may never receive and abatement programs that may never launch.

Five -- and this is very, very important to me. I find the professed outrage and shock from the objectors about the number of parties on the Sackler side being released to be some combination of confusing, misguided, or utterly hypocritical. Let me explain why with details.

I would venture a guess that every single lawyer listening to this hearing right now has done five or ten or twenty or fifty settlements that have releases in the last several years. And I would further venture a guess that virtually every single one of those settlements with any large company or enterprise expressly releases its present and former officers, directors, affiliates, subsidiaries, attorneys, accountants, and representatives or a substantial subset of those representative category because otherwise, the releases are of gossamer spun and essentially worthless.

And now I'm not going to speculate. Now I'm going to tell you facts because $I$ know for a fact that of these exact objecting parties, every one of them, including in the last few months, and including in the opioid states, agreed
to releases with parties with whom they settled. This is exactly how they structured them.

For example, in the McKinsey settlement, trumpeted by many Attorneys General as critical and a milestone, guess who was released? And I quote: "By execution of this judgment order, the State of California -- there is a model they all used, 47 separate settlements, very complicated, allows you to do the same for all of them -- releases and discharges McKinsey and its past and present officers, directors, partners, employees, representatives, agents, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, operating companies, predecessors, assigns, and successors, collectively the releasees.

I don' know what some of these categories mean. I don't know what an operating company is separate from the affiliate, but I guess everyone else does. Your Honor, that's all true in Insys, and Medtronic, and Career Education, and Johnson \& Johnson, and Apple, and Emarsys and, and, and. I have a demonstrative in the end, I'm actually not going to use because it's very dense and its very intent. It does on for (indiscernible) and I'm happy to send it in to the Court and all parties. I was told by the litigators that it is very usable because it was all just quotes from public dockets which shows you how the release language works for case, after case, after case
including many cases to which the objectors are party as to categories of released parties: Oregon, Connecticut, Maryland, D.C., New Hampshire, California, Delaware, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia. There's McKinsey. There's Apple. There's Honda. There's Johnson \& Johnson. There's Medtronics. All subsets and I'm not going to read them all. I'll just send it if Your Honor would find it useful -- past and present, directors, officers, employees, representatives, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, assigned, and successors.

Your Honor, we would have given you two hundred examples from the public dockets but we stopped at ten including many that included the objecting states of which Your Honor can take judicial notice.

It is quite clever actually that the handful of objectors have often repeated the phrase -- I'm so used to seeing it getting used by the media -- that the Sacklers are getting "immunity." That is a gross mischaracterization of what is happening. This is a civil settlement of civil claims. A non-opt-out, civil-only settlement with historic, overwhelming support. While it is nothing less, it is also nothing more. Now I grant you that the drafting may have been a little bit unusual. May I list by name some of the people and entities in this ubiquitous, omnipresent categorical
approach to who gets released in a complex situation because the number of releasees in every case like this numbers in the hundreds or thousands or more. Our plan, ironically, provides more information about the identify of the parties being released than the many, many settlements to which everybody, including the objectors, are so frequently a party.

And, Your Honor, I'm going to venture a guess that McKinsey, Apple, Honda, Johnson \& Johnson had tens and tens of thousands more present and former directors, officers, and employees, representatives, affiliates and subsidiaries than do the Sacklers and the objecting AGs were that categorical approach in all of those cases and dozens or hundreds of others.

Your Honor, I'm about a minute from done, so let me wrap up. At bottom, these broad releases are unavoidable and indispensable first because fairness among victims and creditors demands them. Among victims and creditors, not against the Sacklers.

Two, because the tragedy of the commons cannot be solved any other way. It is impossible. Believe me, we've all tried for years.

Three, because we have no creditor support for the plan without them. It's not just that the Sacklers are insisting on them. It's that the plan doesn't work.

And four, because $1129(a)(11)$ cannot be satisfied without them.

Your Honor, the plan is the only way to avoid years or decades of Hobbesian hell and billions of dollars of added costs and lost value. It is for very good reason that very creditor class, every creditor group, and virtually every voting creditor has accepted it not only as the best, but as the only viable outcome. Thirty-five witnesses, over 4,000 pages of sworn declaration and expert reports, TMT Trailer, Iridium, et cetera, et cetera.

The plan and it's 14 or 24 or 34 totally interdependent, mutually conditioned settlement is indispensable and is in everyone's best interest and we ask that it be approved.

Your Honor, as promised, $I$ will now turn the podium over to Mr. Kaminetzky for the legal factors on the release.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAMINETZKY: Good morning, Your Honor, Benjamin Kaminetzky of Davis Pope for the Debtors.

As the Court has recognized repeatedly and, in fact, as recently has the final pretrial conference, the law governing the availability of third-party releases is well established in this Circuit dating back to the 1980 s since the historic mass tort bankruptcy of Johns Manville.

In Johns Manville, the court fashioned a Section $105(a)$ injunction to channel asbestos personal injury claims against third-parties to a trust set up to handle asbestosrelated claims. And the propriety of that injunction has been upheld on direct appeal and collateral attack for over 30 years. Most recently in Metromedia, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that non-consensual third-party releases may be granted in the "unique" or "rare" cases, including nonasbestos cases where such releases are "important to the success of the plan."

And this followed the Drexel case in the Second Circuit where the court held "in bankruptcy cases, a court may adjoin a creditor from suing a third-party provided the injunction plays an important part in the Debtor's reorganization plan."

The centerpiece of the plan, as we just heard, is the 4.325 billion in cash that the Sacklers will contribute in exchange for these third-party releases. Without the third-party releases, however, any one state, county, tribe, city, town, or other governmental claimant could make the unthinkable value-destructive scenario that Mr. Huebner just vividly described earlier a reality.

For all of their pages and words, the objectors have no response to this. They offer no alternative nor any hope for anything other than a meltdown. The objectors
merely allege without submitting a shred of factual, expert or any other support, and I quote from Washington's objection at Paragraph 7, they actually say this "Had Purdue Pharma simply reorganized as a business entity, this case would have been a relatively simple one. The structure would have essentially been the same as the current plan with the Sackler settlement excised."

There is simply nothing in the evidentiary record that supports this, nothing. The current plan would not be possible without the releases. This is spelled out in black and white in the unrebutted testimony of John Dubel, John Guard, Mike Atkinson. These are precisely the sort of unique and rare circumstances in the words of the Second Circuit, demanding the application of non-consensual thirdparty releases.

Now turning to the objections, to the extent the objections address Metromedia on its own terms at all rather than just arguing that it was wrongly decided, they resort to arguments that many of the paradigmatic circumstances justifying third-party releases discussed in Metromedia are not present here. But the Second Circuit in Metromedia explained that whether third-party releases are appropriate in any particular plan is -- and I quote -- "not a matter of factors and prongs," 416 F.3d at 142.

Instead, the point is whether under the particular
facts of the case, the third-party releases play "an important part of the Debtor's reorganization plan," same case at 143.

And for all the reasons Mr. Huebner discussed, they absolutely do. But even if we just look at the factors and prongs as the objectors would have the Court do, we win because those factors are, indeed, present here.

First, the Metromedia court recognized that thirdparty releases are appropriate in cases where estates receive "substantial consideration." That's at Page 142 of Metromedia. Here, the Sackler families are making a substantial contribution by parting with $\$ 4.325$ billion among other terms. This is substantial from any reasonable measure.

From a qualitative perspective, it is critical and necessary consideration that enables the value maximizing resolution contained in the plan. In other words, the shareholder contribution ensures that the plan is feasible and that contingent liability creditors receive significant and defined, as opposed to potentially de minimis or actually zero value on account of their claims.

We note in our brief at Paragraph 136 that this alone is sufficient to support a finding that the contribution is substantial.

Now the shareholder contribution is no less

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substantial from a quantitative perspective. 4.325 billion is a large sum. It is at least twice the value of the Debtor's business as a going concern, which Mr. Turner testified is roughly 1.6 billion to 2 billion. That's Turner's declaration at Paragraph 22. It is also more than the number in the mediator's proposal made during the Phase 2 mediation and is the number that induced the UCC and AHC, the MSGE and 15 of the 25 then non-consenting states to support the shareholder settlement. There is absolutely no support whatsoever for an ability-to-pay standard that the objection seemed to be suggesting. That would be a dangerous precedent.

With that said, I think it's relevant and hopeful, Your Honor, to remember that combined net worth of every single Sackler that is an actual defendant in the action, i.e. an alleged wrongdoer, is 400 million on Side $A$ and 700 million on Side B. That is 1.1 billion compared to a payment of 4.325 billion. That's less than a quarter. And Your Honor you can find that at JX-0408, which is Martin's report on the Mortimer side of the Sackler family and JX192, which is the Martin report on the Raymond side.

THE COURT: That's ex the trusts, right? This is just their own net worth separate from putting their interests in the trust.

MR. KAMINETZKY: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KAMINETZKY: Second, under Metromedia, thirdparty releases may be appropriate in cases where the "enjoined claims would indirectly impact the Debtor's reorganization by way of indemnity or contribution." That's on Page 142 of Metromedia.

Here, the release claims would have an effect on the Debtor's reorganization. Without the third-party releases as we set out in detail in our brief, released parties or shareholder released parties would certainly deplete shared insurance policies that constitute a significant asset of the estates or assert contribution or indemnification claims against the estate. In fact, many already have submitted proofs of claims asserting such claim.

The objectors contest whether these claims would ultimately succeed, but that's not right question. The outcome of those claims is uncertain and the fact that they could have an impact on the value of the estates further supports a finding that third-party releases here are appropriate and necessary.

Third, Metromedia recognized that third-party releases are appropriate in cases where the "enjoined claims were channeled to a settlement fund rather than extinguished."

Here, the domestic opioid litigation claims are to be channeled to the trust created by the plan rather than extinguished, a fact, that at least one of the objectors has not acknowledged, Washington objection at Paragraph 59, under Metromedia, the circumstances to illustrate that the third-party releases are appropriate.

Fourth, and last, but certainly not least, some cases have looked at and considered the level of support for a plan as relevant and here the plan has overwhelming support. As you've heard, Your Honor, over 95 percent of voting creditors have voted to accept the plan. More specifically, over 96 percent of domestic government entities that voted have voted to accept the plan. The fact that roughly 80 percent of the States support the plan would be more than sufficient level of support even in an analogous context of an asbestos-related channeling injunction where channel classes must vote in favor of a plan by least 75 percent.

This takes me to the remainder of the arguments raised by the objecting states, the U.S. Trustee, and the DOJ, all of which boil down to nothing more than an attack on well-established Second Circuit law. Their arguments basically fall into four buckets.

First, third-party releases should not be permitted under the bankruptcy code.

Second, even if third-party releases are authorized by law, this Court should craft a new exception to Metromedia for the so-called police power actions.

Third, they argue that third-party releases cannot be imposed because they violate due process, which, as Your Honor will see, is really just their first argument recast as a constitutional argument.

And finally, they argue this Court lacks jurisdiction or power to confirm the plan containing these releases.

Now each of these arguments are meritless. Let me begin with the first bucket of arguments which are just an attack on Metromedia itself, and I'll be brief.

Along these lines, the DOJ and U.S. Trustee, for example, claim that a third-party release should not be allowed in any case other than asbestos case because the only provision under the code expressly and specifically authorizing the injunction of third-party claims, Section $524(\mathrm{~g})$, is limited to asbestos cases. Note that there is no limiting principle. They say it is categorically unavailable. Any single objector, according to them, the law mandates if there is a single objector according to the DOJ and the U.S. Trustee, the law mandates utter destruction. This is despite the unbelievably collaborative work we have done with the DOJ to craft an abatement plan, a
public benefit corporation, and public health initiatives that the DOJ fully supports, but would disappear, simply disappear if the objection is sustained.

The objectors also claim that third-party releases should be categorically prohibited as they operate as a broader discharge than would be available to a Debtor. Suffice to say though that the Second Circuit indisputably permits non-consensual third-party releases under appropriate circumstances, as do the majority of Circuits. And the Second Circuit on Page 142 of Metromedia actually addresses both of these arguments, the 524(g) argument and the discharge argument and nonetheless concludes that thirdparty releases are permissible.

So I will not spend more time on these particular arguments unless the Court has any questions because the Court of Appeals has already decided this issue.

Now, the second argument raised by the objecting states is that even if Metromedia is good law, this Court should essentially craft an exception to it for the objecting states so-called police power claims, the automatic stay police power exception in $362(d)(4)$ for governmental units.

Now, let's be clear what about the objecting states are asking for when they seek the creation of a carve out from Metromedia for their claims. They are seeking a
veto power that would effectively allow them or any one of them to decide whether the plan may be confirmed even though a super-majority of the states and over 95 percent of voting creditors have said that it should.

And to be clear, this requested police power veto would not be limited just to states. The Objecting States make much of their supposedly unique sovereign status, but the Bankruptcy Code makes no categorical distinction between them and their political subdivisions.

The definition of governmental unit under the Code also includes any "district, territory, municipality, foreign state, or any department, agency or instrumentality of the state." So if there was an exception for so-called police power claims brought by governmental units, each and every one of these entities would also have a unilateral power to impede in otherwise consensual and value-maximizing resolution, even if, say, every single state in the country was onboard. And Your Honor, you don't have to look too far to see how absolutely absurd this would be.

In this case, the State of Washington objects to the plan. And the City of Seattle joins that objection. But King County or Washington County, in which Seattle is located, is a member of the $A H C$, and whose lawyer, Mr . Donado, testified in favor of the plan in this case. Any one of these parties would have a veto over the others in
the Objecting States world.

It is therefore unsurprising that the objectors cannot cite a single authority, not one, remotely suggesting that there is or should be an exception to Metromedia for police powers.

Now, the Objecting States say that their consumer protection claims or public nuisance claims cannot be released because enforcement of their laws is "constitutionally protected function", or because states are "independent sovereigns in the Federal system or because their actions are parens patriae actions that seek to enforce non-monetary interests." But none of the authorities on which they rely come close to establishing that their claims should be treated any differently from others.

Let me just address a few examples, beginning with their purported statutory authorities. The Objecting States first point to the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay under $362(\mathrm{~b})(4)$. But the provision provides no support for their carveout. For one, the exception to the automatic stay is just that. It just means that stays don't apply automatically, nothing more.

As this Court already ruled in the preliminary injunction context, and Judge McMahon affirmed on appeal, this Court has the power to enjoin police power actions
under $105(a)$, notwithstanding 362's exception. And the Objecting States, of course, do not dispute that Section 362 does not apply to the confirmation context at all.

Let's also be clear about something. Section 362 (b) (4) creates an exception to the automatic stay for governmental units' enforcement of police and regulatory power, but not to the collection of money judgments. Here, make no mistake, the Objecting States are seeking not only to enforce their laws, but also to collect on any judgment they may ultimately obtain outside of bankruptcy, in real dollars, not in bankruptcy dollars.

Your Honor, I have never heard and of the Objecting States once say that they would share their resulting recoveries with any other states. Nor have they agreed to provide the recoveries to NOAT to be distributed for abatement purposes, or to only those deposit recoveries into their treasuries once the privates are paid off per Phase 1 mediation.

In reality, the carveout they seek is instead just another attempt in a long succession of attempts to jump the line to pursue their billion dollar money damages claims for their own state treasuries at the cost of causing the entire abatement-centric enterprise, the entire value-maximizing plan, to collapse.

Now, next, the Objecting States state in Paragraph

37 of Washington's objection that $524(g)$ of the Code, which covers injunctions of third-party claims in asbestos cases, does not clearly apply to governmental units, which they say indicates a Congressional intent not to allow third-party releases of claims by government units. But this is just plain wrong.

Section $524(g)$ does clearly authorize courts to enjoin is asbestos claims held by government units. It applies to "entities", which is defined under Section 101, to include governmental units.

They also cite 28 U.S.C. $1452(\mathrm{a})$, which governs the removal of police power actions to federal court. But that is irrelevant. The issue here is not whether this Court may remove and hear the state's claim, but enjoin the pursuit of those claims under $105(a)$ as part of a plan of reorganization. It's a different issue.

The Objecting States also say an exception to Metromedia should be gleaned or implied from 523 (a) (7), which makes claims for fines, penalties or forfeiture against individuals nondischargeable. But as I noted earlier, Metromedia considered this general concern and rejected it as a basis to bar third-party releases categorically.

Indeed, Johns Manville case considered and rejected this argument back in 1988 at 837 F.2d at 91 . And

I'm going to quote, and just substitute names of our parties. And I'm quoting now Johns Manville. The flaw in the objector's reasoning is that injunction orders do not offer umbrella protection of a discharge in bankruptcy. Rather, they preclude only those suits against the Sacklers that arise out of or relate to Purdue. And again, 837 F.2d 91.

The Objecting States' case law citations cited more for sound bites than applicable law are even further appealed. For example, many of the cases cited by the Objecting States are invoked for the vague notion that a state's ability to enforce its own regulatory laws is an essential function of its sovereignty. But these cases stand only for the narrow and irrelevant proposition that a parens patriae action does not fall within the statutory definition of class action under the Class Action Fairness Act, and thus cannot be removed to federal court under that statute.

This Court's power in no way depends on that statute here, of course, in those cases say nothing about it Bankruptcy Court's ability to enjoin parens patriae actions in the context of confirming a plan.

The states also cite a pair of Supreme Court cases, White and Medtronic, to assert that public health regulation is an important function of state government.

That's Washington Objection at Paragraph 34.

These cases, however, address the extent to which federal regulatory approval of drugs or medical devices preempts state law liability in suits by private plaintiffs. They do not support any special treatment for enforcement of actions brought by state governments during the plan confirmation process.

Now, the Objecting States rely most heavily on a single out-of-circuit case. It's called In Re First Alliance Mortgage Company, where a district court reversed a preliminary injunction against a governmental unit pursuing certain claims arising from subprime lending. In the state's view, this case somehow supports a categorical carveout in a plan confirmation context. It simply does not.

Putting aside that this case is factually inapposite, $I$ actually love this case because it fully exposes what's going on here. The First Alliance Court found in balancing the risk of harm to the parties in the preliminary injunction context, that there was, "no risk of unequal treatment of creditors because, as the governmental unit agreed, while they are allowed by the regulatory and police power exception to proceed to judgment against the Debtor in other forums, they are not allowed to enforce any money judgments against the Debtor in any proceeding other
than the bankruptcy proceeding." 264 BR 658.

That could not be further from the case here, where the Objecting States seek not only to enforce their claims, but to collect on them outside of bankruptcy. To jump the line and to gather funds for themselves in front of everybody else.

Now, Your Honor, taking a step back, if there were any case where the Court should feel compelled to create a Metromedia police power exception from whole cloth, this is certainly not it. The Objecting States, for example, suggest that third-party releases "block the Attorneys General in their efforts to exercise the states' police powers to protect their vulnerable population from the massive ongoing scourge of the opioid epidemic. Washington Objection, at Paragraphs 1 and 4.

The plan of the third-party releases here, however, no such thing. As this Court has recognized again and again, these Chapter 11 cases are about money. And now, after nearly two years and these Chapter 11 cases and numerous days of testimony at the confirmation hearing, $I$ think the record is clear on this point.

The Debtor stopped marketing opioids almost four years ago. They have been subject to an involuntary injunction overseen by this Court and two preeminent monitors for almost two years. Purdue will be dissolved
under the plan. NewCo will be required to operate under numerous, onerous injunctions and covenants ensuring it acts in the public interest. And pursuant to the shareholders' settlement, the Sackler Family will have no involvement with the post-emergent Debtors or the opioid business worldwide after the sale of the IACs under the plan.

The Objecting States' only response is that their claims cannot be released because they also serve "nonmonetary interests", as Washington says in Paragraph 34 of its objection, or because, "bringing the Sacklers to justice through the adversarial process, however that might turn out, is a legitimate consideration," as Mr. Goldman suggested in his cross-examination on August 12, on Page 187 of the hearing transcript. But that, frankly, does not withstand scrutiny either.

The overwhelming majority of states and all but one municipality out of thousands, as well as hundreds of thousands of other creditors, have manifested the public interest in their votes in favor of the plan. In the face of the near universal support for the plan, the onus must be on the objectors to explain to this Court how these socalled nonmonetary interests, whatever those might be, under the facts of this case could possibly justify the massive destruction to a plan that will provide literally -literally -- billions of dollars to communities and
individuals in need, including their own constituents. They have not and they cannot.

The Objecting States next supposed justification for a carveout is that their claims cannot be released because -- and I quote again from Washington's pleading -"that a process has been shielded from public view and scrutiny." Then that's Washington's Objection at Paragraph 5.

This assertion is not only false but is also belied by the very public trial this Court is currently presiding over, which included the cross-examination of multiple Sacklers, as well as the enormous amount of disclosure and information that has been produced by the Debtors, the Sacklers, the IACs, and their financial institution.

As this Court observed, "More information has been provided with respect to this plan, and more specifically with respect to the elements of a settlement with the Sacklers, than the Court has ever seen, and perhaps has ever been provided in any Chapter 11." And I'm quoting Your Honor from the March 24 th hearing.

To recap just briefly what the Court well knows, discovery included the production of over 100 million pages of material from dozens of custodians, going back decades. Publication on the docket of hundreds of pages of forensic
reports. That's the $1 A$ and 1B Report detailing all transfers of value to the Sacklers, both cash -- announced cash -- or for their benefit. Production of millions of pages of materials by the Sackler Families. The UCC and the non-consenting states also took the deposition of over a dozen Sackler Family members and current and former Board members and others.

The extensive disclosure of the Sackler wealth, extensive disclosures from the Sacklers law firm, Norton Rose. Extensive disclosure by foreign entities, which would likely never happen in a context of normal litigation.

And as Mr. Huebner noted, the plan will result in the creation of a public document repository that will include all material produced in these cases, and tens of millions of additional documents and privileged documents, which a number of witnesses touted as an important essential element of the plan.

Finally, the Objecting States claim at Paragraph 5 of Washington's objection that the principal parties making the critical determination are not public health officials, but rather bankruptcy professionals. That is false.

As the Objecting States must surely know, the decision to support the plan was made by thousands of elected officials, including the Attorney General of the death majority of states, and representatives of thousands
of personal injury claimants, including lawyers, who have pursued Purdue and the Sacklers for decades.

At bottom, Your Honor, the Objecting States' claims are trying to collect money from the Debtors and their related parties. There is no basis in law or in fact the craft and exception to Metromedia previously unrecognized in the case law.

Moreover, the objectors articulate no limiting principles that they espouse. One Objecting State is enough. One objecting County. For any reason, financial or political or otherwise, according to them, this exception would doom any plan by one no vote by any governmental unit. There is no basis to grant the objectors, actually each objector, an effective veto over historic, almost entirely consensual, value-maximizing reorganization, that in inures fully to the benefit of the American public.

Your Honor, the third set of objections raised by the U.S. Trustee and the DOJ is that third-party releases somehow contravene the due process clause. When attacked, however, it becomes apparent that this argument is really just an attack on Metromedia by another name.

The first due process argument clearly illustrates that point. The DOJ and U.S. Trustee assert that in order to satisfy due process, a holder of the claim must receive an opportunity to either litigate the final judgment or
settle on their own accord. But if the holders of release claims must still be able to litigate those claims, as the DOJ and U.S. Trustee argue, then bankruptcy courts have no power whatsoever to impose nonconsensual releases of such claims, despite finding Second Circuit law to the contrary.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the DOJ and U.S. Trustee cannot cite a single case, not a single case, concluding that third-party releases violate due process because they do not provide an opportunity to be heard. Holders of claims do in fact have an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of third-party releases. Many have filed objections in this very case on this very issue. This very hearing is indeed proof positive of the opportunity to be heard.

So the DOJ and U.S. Trustee then quickly pivot to claiming that the notice of third-party releases in this case was not constitutionally sufficient. As an initial matter, Your Honor, this Court's June 3rd order approving the disclosure statement, so as to (indiscernible) procedures and voting procedures at Docket Number 2988, Paragraph 17, expressly provides -- and I quote -- "that the Confirmation Hearing Notice, Publication Notice, and plain language summary of the Confirmation Notice each, if properly delivered or published, provides sufficient notice of the releases and injunctions to any holder of a Channeled

Claim or Shareholder Release Claim."

In other words, the Court already found that the notice provided of this confirmation hearing was sufficient and constitutionally adequate. And the U.S. Trustee and DOJ certainly did not raise any alleged notice deficiency back in May. So the government's belated attempt to litigate that issue as a basis to deny confirmation should be rejected as out of hand.

In any event, the record in this confirmation hearing is clear that the notice provided in these proceedings, including on third-party releases, has been one of the most extensive, expensive, and effective noticing programs in Chapter 11 history. And although the thirdparty release terms are complex, the notice was simple, clear and unmistakable.

The confirmation hearing notice, which was mailed to all known holders of claims in these cases, sets out the release expressly. I'm looking JX-0937.

The Debtors also undertook an extensive supplemental publication notice campaign. A key component of the supplemental publication hearing notice plan was a plain English noticing of the potential for third-party releases that made clear in no uncertain terms that the plan could potentially release all claims and causes of action against the Sackler Families.

Take, for example, Your Honor, the Debtors' publication notice, which I'm putting up now, which was published in "The Wall Street Journal", "New York Times", "U.S.A. Today", "Financial Times", and "International Herald Tribune", that appears at JX-0939.

1:50:36 And if we could just blow it up here, it says very clearly, the plan contemplates the shareholders that have been fighting among the Debtors, the master distribution trust, and certain of the shareholders' released parties, including members of the Sackler Family, and certain other individual (indiscernible). (indiscernible) for that release of any actual or potential claims or causes of actions against the shareholder lien parties relating to the Debtors, including claims in connection with opioid related activities.

The Debtors also broadly distributed a shorter, plain-language version of the confirmation hearing notice in the form of fliers, magazine ads and newspaper ads, and bought online advertisements across the U.S., Canada and 39 countries.

Here is an example of a magazine ad. Did you file a claim against Purdue Pharma as part of its bankruptcy proceeding? Do you have a claim against Purdue Pharma's owners? And it goes on to say, releases of any actual counterclaims against Sacklers Family members and certain
other individuals and related entities.

Now, one more, Your Honor. And now here is what you would find on an online display ad. These are the various online ads that we had. And again, let's just blow one up. Could not be clearer. Did you file a claim against Purdue Pharma? Did you have a claim against the Sacklers or any of Purdue Pharma's owners?

Now, in the cross-examination of Ms. Finegan, counsel for the U.S. Trustee seemed to make much of the fact that neither the publication version nor the plain-language version of the confirmation hearing notice contained the full text of the releases or the full list of shareholderreleased parties. But for all the supposed complexity and length of the shareholder releases in the plan, the plain English descriptions in the notices could not have been any more clear or simple.

As Your Honor just saw, the releases reach any actual potential claims against members of the Sackler Families. It said it loud and clear. It's not clear to me what else could be done to make this point more plain. Indeed, I would respectfully submit that if the Debtors were to have included the full text of the releases and full list of shareholder release parties, that notice would not have been nearly as effective, or easily understood, and I'm sure the Court would agree.

The record is also crystal clear that the reach of the -- crystal clear as to the reach of the supplemental confirmation hearing notice plan and how effective it was. It was conducted in 27 different languages, served over 3.6 billion online and social media impressions, and resulted in over 3,700 news stories across the U.S. and Canada. And Your Honor, this was all in addition to the extensive bar date notice and plans.

On this truly extraordinary record, set out in even more detail in our papers, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there can be no doubt that the holders of release claims received adequate notice, both of these bankruptcy proceedings and the general bar date, and that there claims against the Sackler Families and related entities would be released under the plan.

Finally, Your Honor, just a minute on this, because Your Honor know this better than anybody. Several objectors, including the Objecting States, the U.S. Trustee and the DOJ, claim that this Court lacks even the power to enter an order approving the plan or the third-party releases, including because the Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1334, statutory authority under Section 157, or constitutional authority under Stern v. Marshall. Now, each of these arguments is meritless and this is just going over well-tread case law.

Let me begin with the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, because it frankly is not controversial in the least, that this Court has jurisdiction to approve the third-party releases. Congress granted comprehensive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings that are arising under or arising in cases under Title 11 U.S.C. $1334(\mathrm{~b})$.

Confirmation of a plan of reorganization is without a doubt a proceeding that arises under or arises in a case under Title 11. And as Judge McMahon explained in the Tier 1 case, this does not change merely because a plan would contain third-party releases. As Judge McMahon explained, and I quote, "A confirmed reorganization plan that includes such releases does not address the merits of the claims being released. . . rather, it effectively cancels those claims so as to permit a total reorganization of the Debtors' total affairs in a manner available only in bankruptcy."

She continues, "That a bankruptcy court's decision may have a preclusive incidental effect on claims beyond the scope of the immediate bankruptcy proceeding does not render the bankruptcy court jurisdiction non-core, i.e., outside the arising under grant of jurisdiction."

Now, the Objecting States' only response is that Kerwin did not address a release of so-called police power claims. But that, of course, is analytically irrelevant.

There is no please power exception to Metromedia. And in any case, whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and whether there are substantive limits on how it should exercise that power are entirely separate. And even if the Court did not have arising under or arising in jurisdiction related to jurisdiction also provides a separate basis for approving the third-party releases as part of a plan.

As set out at length in our papers, Your Honor, the release claims and shareholder claims without a doubt have an all you need -- "a conceivable effect on the estates, either because such claims will result in a diminution of the Debtors' insurance policies, or would result in an indemnification or contribution claims, or would potentially prejudice the rights of the MPT and future Snap Act litigation.

That brings us to the last set of arguments raised only by the U.S. Trustee and the DOJ, that subject matter jurisdiction aside, this Court lacks either the statutory or constitutional authority to enter a final order confirming the plan, including -- that includes third-party releases. Those suggestions are meritless. Confirmation of the plan is clearly a core proceeding under Section 157 (b) (2) (1).

Numerous courts, including the Kerwin court and this one, have held that where, as here, a Bankruptcy Court considers nonconsensual third-party releases in connection
with plan confirmation, it acts pursuant to its core statutory authority, and thus has the statutory power to enter a final order. That's Kerwin case, 592 BR at 504. Similarly, there can be no doubt that the Court also has constitutional authority to enter a final order confirming a plan with third-party releases. The Third Circuit, in Millenium Labs Holding, and the District Court in Kerwin, both held these are both recent decisions that are directly on point, a Bankruptcy Court has constitutional authority to confirm a plan containing third-party releases, so long as the injunction is integral to the plan. And that's Millenium Labs at 945 F.3d 137-140, and In Re Kerwin, 592 BR 509-512. And Your Honor made your views very clear in the $\operatorname{In} \operatorname{Re} N$

PN Silicon case.

So, for the reasons that we have just discussed, third-party releases are integral to Debtors' plan and therefore pass constitutional muster.

In sum, Your Honor, the third-party releases are the bedrock of the plan. They are also lawful, wellestablished law in this and the majority of the Circuit. In a way, it all comes down to one test. All of these issues all combine into one question. Are these releases integral, important, necessary, indispensable? Use any word you like, and we still win, because if they are, Metromedia is
satisfied, subject matter jurisdiction under 1334 is satisfied. It is a core proceeding under 157 , and the constitutional Stern V. Marshall test is satisfied. And there is not a shred of evidence offered by the other side that these releases are not integral, important, necessary and indispensable.

Thank you, Your Honor. I believe I'm going to turn the podium now to Arik Preis, from the UCC.

MR. PREIS: Actually, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think the AHC, one of you, are ahead
of --

MR. KAMINETZKY: I apologize. That was my mistake.

MR. ECKSTEIN: That's fine, Your Honor. Good morning, Your Honor.

WOMAN: Wait.

MR. ECKSTEIN: We'll try to adjust our cameras so that $I$ zoom in a bit. Your Honor, I guess it's good afternoon. Is this close enough to me?

THE COURT: Yes. I can see and hear you fine.

MR. ECKSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, good afternoon. Kenneth Eckstein, of Kramer Levin, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee of Consenting States and Local Governments.

Your Honor, before $I$ begin my remarks, $I$ want to
acknowledge the law firm of Brown, Rudnick \& Otterbourg, our co-counsel in this case, who have worked side-by-side with Kramer Levin on all aspects of the Chapter 11 case and join in their remarks.

Your Honor, thank you for the opportunity to address the Court at this momentous time. And I would like to supplement the very substantial, effective and comprehensive presentations made by Mr. Huebner and Mr. Kaminetzky.

Your Honor, I think as you have heard from all of the presenters, this case is truly unprecedented. Rarely, if ever, has the Bankruptcy Court been called upon to address matters of such public importance, both to the states, municipalities, tribes and other non-federal governmental creditors represented in this case by the Ad Hoc Committee and to the public at large.

Your Honor, the opioid crisis is a horrible and intractable public health emergency, one that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee have been working arduously to address for many years, together with many other constituents who have been active in this Chapter 11 case.

This plan is a concrete step towards a resolution, a vehicle to attempt to address this national health crisis in an extremely creative and constructive manner. The centerpiece of the plan is a voluntary agreement by the

Sackler Family to turn over the Purdue business, including all of its insurance policies, as well as contribute an additional $\$ 4.325$ billion to their creditors, and the related agreements by the public and private creditors to devote substantially all of the plan proceeds to abate the opioid crisis.

There is no precedent for such a Chapter 11 plan. And the fact that the parties have agreed to this arrangement, with overwhelming consensus, in and of itself is a remarkable achievement.

The plan, importantly, is a global settlement of many disparate issues and it required multiple integrated agreements to get there. There is, as just mentioned, the financial settlement with the Sackler Family and the agreement by creditors to contribute essentially all of the settlement monies to abatement.

But there are also other crucial component parts of the settlement, including the detailed agreement among the States and Local Governments and Tribes as to how the funds will be distributed and employed within states to abate the crisis.

There is the allocation among the states, which will be addressed in more detail by my partner, Mr. Wagner, in a later segment of oral argument. There is a settlement between public and private creditors, which spared the
parties years of debilitating litigation and was resolved in Phase 1 of the mediation in this case.

There is the DOJ settlement, which like the Sackler settlement helped enable the public-private allocations and permitted the parties to focus their efforts on an abatement plan. And there is the attorneys fee resolution set forth in Section 5.8 of the plan, which will also be discussed in more detail at a later stage of the argument.

As the undisputed evidence shows, and as $I$ will highlight, each of these settlements are interrelated and the removal of any piece would jeopardize the plan and the important abatement objectives it serves.

Since Mr. Huebner and Mr. Kaminetzky have thoroughly addressed the factual and legal underpinnings of both the settlement and the releases, $I$ will focus on three specific points.

First, the dissenting states and others have focused much attention on what the plan arguably takes away from them, including the argument that they are being deprived of the opportunity to have a public airing of their claim against the Sackler Family. But what is lost in their objections is what the plan confers on the states and all creditors. Not just by way of monetary compensation and the opportunity to begin abating the opioid crisis, which are
extremely important on their own, but also in terms of how the plan helps to facilitate the very goals that the dissenting states highlight in their objections.

The plan does not, as an initial matter, provide criminal (indiscernible). This is not a criminal trial. This is a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The plan represents a substantial financial settlement that dedicates more than $\$ 6$ billion over the life of the settlement to abate the opioid crisis.

The plan also provides for an unprecedented public presentation of the history of Purdue's and the Sacklers' involvement in the opioid crisis. The document repository is the centerpiece of that presentation.

I would point Your Honor to the testimony of Jayne Conroy, who spoke eloquently of the importance of the document repository. That testimony can be found at the August 16th hearing transcript at Pages 83-84. According to Ms. Conroy, who has been litigating against Purdue for longer than almost anyone, "In addition to any monetary settlement, it could be that the document repository is actually the most valuable piece of this settlement."

This is on top of the testimony elicited through the confirmation hearing from three members of the Sackler Family and their advisors. Even if the Court were to allow parties to go to trial outside of the bankruptcy, it is
inconceivable that the volume of documents that Purdue is committed to disclose through the repository, including documents that are privileged and confidential, would ever become public through a non-bankruptcy proceeding.

So at the end of the day, while individual creditors will not have an actual trial on the Purdue or Sackler civil liability, the benefits of the trial are largely achieved in terms of substantial monetary compensation, through the public airing of the facts of the case, and through the injunctive relief that will shut off the dangerous prepetition marketing practices and prevent the Sackler Family from having any continued role in Purdue, and ultimately, the opioid industry.

Second, Your Honor, I want to highlight the importance of the third-party release to this case and to the non-governmental creditors who are supporting the plan. Simply put, without a comprehensive release that is binding on all of the states and other public creditors, there simply cannot be a deal that will hold this case.

The public creditors that have agreed to the deal have agreed to accept a nine-year payment schedule, with substantial amounts due to the public creditors in years 59. Those settling creditors would never agree to a structure under which their own recoveries were delayed and in fact exposed to the threat of complete dissipation if
other similarly situated creditors asserting claims in the billions of dollars were allowed to pursue their claims to judgment now against the Sacklers.

So putting aside what the Sackers themselves would do, and the testimony is clear that they will not agree to a partial settlement and release, the states and other public creditors would not agree to such a structure either.

Third, $I$ want to spend a short amount of time highlighting some of the critical pieces of evidence put into the record by the Ad Hoc Committee witnesses. This uncontroverted testimony establishes that each of the prongs of the global settlement, and indeed the entire abatement plan, could not survive if any leg of the stool was removed.

For instance, as to the interrelated nature of the Sackler settlement and the public-private settlement, Mr. John Guard testified, "Without the availability of the Sackler assets, compromise between the non-federal public claimants and the private claimants would not have been possible, in my opinion. Absent the large pool of assets to divide that the Sackler contribution gives, it is my opinion that each side would have likely been at an impasse and asserted its various defenses to allowance of the other's claims, and there would've been a lengthy set of estimation hearings in this bankruptcy matter, further dissipating this estate." That's the Guard declaration at Paragraph 67.

As to the importance of the DOJ settlement, Mr. Guard testified, "The DOJ settlement itself likely would not have been possible absent the Sackler contribution. Had those funds not been available and the federal government not as interested in monies going to abatement through the states, the states would've had no choice but to fight the allowance of federal government claims to the extent they reduce or eliminate assets available for abatement." That's the Guard declaration at Paragraph 68.

As to the critical issue of whether any states or other parties could "opt out" of the plan without upsetting its delicate balance, Mr. Guard testified, "The Sackler settlement is predicated on the understanding that no state will retain its claims against the Sacklers, and outcome that could cause all other states to revisit allocation and settlement." That's the Guard declaration at Paragraph 71.

The testimony of Jayne Conroy at the August 16th hearing also makes clear that no opt-outs were contemplated, and that the "peace premium" included in the Sackler settlement would not have been available with the prospect of opt-outs. That's the August 16 th hearing transcript at Page 76-77, and at Page 87.

As to the role of the attorneys fee resolution in facilitating an abatement plan, Mr. Guard testified, "Absent some sort of attorney fee fund, there would have been no way
to set up an abatement fund because governmental creditors, needing to pay their counsel, could not have relinquished control over monies distributed on account of their claims, and attorneys would not have been comfortable waiving the contractual fees owed to them." That's the Guard declaration at Paragraph 75.

The testimony of Mr. Gary Gotto and Peter Weinberger is also supportive of this point. See the Gotto declaration at Paragraph $25(\mathrm{~g})$ and the Weinberger declaration at Paragraph 49 and Paragraph 59-60.

In sum, Your Honor, the plan reflects a global resolution to this Chapter 11 case, with a substantial financial settlement dedicating funds to opioid abatement and a public presentation of the record, unlikely to be obtained by going to trial. But the plan reflects a resolution of many disparate issues and is an important step toward healing the nation from the devastating impacts of the opioid crisis.

On these bases, the Ad Hoc Committee supports confirmation of the plan. Unless Your Honor has any further questions, I thank Your Honor for the time.

MR. PREIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Can you hear me?

THE COURT: Yes. I can hear you and see you fine.

MR. PREIS: Okay. Good morning. For the record,

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Your Honor, Arik Preis from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer \& Feld, on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. I will try very hard not to repeat anything that the Debtor said or that $M r$. Eckstein said, although I will touch on some of the issues that they mentioned in the UCC (indiscernible). Also, while $I$ will briefly discuss certain issues related to the third party releases, I will not be discussing any of the underlying law of such releases. Mr. Kaminetzky handled that, and I'll be handling that on rebuttal.

I'll divide my comments (indiscernible). First, I'll make a few preliminary remarks about the settlements of the objections (indiscernible). Second, I'll address three items regarding the objections of the states and the pleadings of the federal governmental entities. Third, I will conclude with three remarks about the settlement, the public good and the personal injury victim.

As I mentioned the first time we were before Your Honor, then repeated a number of times since. The case is fundamentally about three issues: First locating valuable opioid (indiscernible). Second, maximizing that value. And, third, utilizing that value and utilizing these cases for the public good.

Today, we're using the Court to confirm a plan that addresses these three issues in a manner that, as Mr.

Huebner pointedly started with, is not perfect but it's the most viable path. It's important to emphasize, as Mr . Huebner did, that the plan has the support not only of the UCC but the numerous ad hoc groups, and it's not objected to by 15 of the previously nonconsenting states. Then Mr . Huebner went through the vote. No need to repeat that.

Despite this overwhelming support and putting aside the prosaic (indiscernible) there are a few objectives. In light of the unique facts of the cases and the fact that this plan is the only agreed upon way to get what could be more than 7 billion in values to communities to abate the opioid crisis and victims to compensate them for their loss, it's difficult to understand the position of the objectives. Why are they objecting? What happens if they (indiscernible)? Do they not understand that they cannot demand (indiscernible) for one of the claim without the balance of crumbling?

As Mr. Huebner and Mr. Eckstein pointed out, the plan is a path (indiscernible) we count 30 (indiscernible) settled that have been reached on various far-reaching (indiscernible). This case is the prototype of a case that hangs by a thread with the Sackler dollars as a foundation. As obvious as that it is for those of us who have lived the case for the last two years, the objectors missed it or willfully ignore this fundamental fact.

They seem to think if you make just one change here with allowing a class of incarcerated (indiscernible) to have a class, or to change the states' allocation so that West Virginia gets more, or to give an opt-out to certain states so that they can imperil the distribution to everyone else, the rest of the plan will simply hang together. Not true.

Even more frustrating is that certain of the objectors, mainly the states, are merely trying to create a record because they fully intend on appealing any order of this Court, if the Court confirms the plan, all the way perhaps to the Supreme Court, as they say, regardless of the impact that such a lengthy and complex appeal might have on the Debtor's ability to get the (indiscernible) to the creditors. A long messy appeal does not help the still struggling people, nor does it help rebuild communities devastated by the crisis. It will have the opposite effect, by delaying recoveries for those who gave them the most.

Next, I will address three points of the objecting states of the federal government. First, the inter(indiscernible) allocation. A lot has been said by Mr. Huebner and Mr. Huebner and Mr. Kaminetzky and Ms. (indiscernible) about mediation Phase 1 and informal Phase 3 that resulted in numerous settlements, including the allocation deals. It's impossible for those who
(indiscernible) this case to fully understand how difficult and hard-fought the mediation was, as Mr. Guard testified to.

I think it's safe to say that there were many times it was unclear that any settlement was reached, or that if settlements were reached, certain groups would be left out and subject to the -- object to the plan. The fact that it took six months to reach four or five two-page termsheets and another nine months to close out the (indiscernible) tells you all you need to know.

To be clear, the UCC does not believe the allocations are perfect, and every party, as Mr. Huebner pointed out, would undoubtedly say it's begotten more. If every supporting party is willing to live with those settlements, because not only would doing so result in claimant versus claimant litigation, which is not only costly and time consuming, but, as many people forget, would result in a lot of unhelpful dialogue about alleged weaknesses in each other's claims. They also understand that we need to focus on moving forward, abating the crisis and compensating victims.

The objecting states and the District of Columbia were part of those negotiations. They know exactly how hard they were, and they agreed to those (indiscernible) and now they want to throw them away. In fact, as Mr. Atkinson
stated in his declaration and Mr. Kaminetzky alluded to, the states refuse to agree that the private public negotiated (indiscernible) which would be honored if there was no settlement with the Sacklers.

In other words, the objectors now know full well that if the Sackler contribution is removed, the allocation settlements go away, and we would be back in claimant versus claimant litigation where the states who are far along in their prepetition litigation would think they have a leg up. And as importantly, but something not one of these attorney generals has publicly admitted to their citizens, they will have reneged on the negotiated resolution with public or private citizens.

Second, some facts about the (indiscernible) and use of the Sackler fund. The objecting states have stressed that Purdue distributed more than $\$ 10$ billion in cash -- the Sacker could've made more than $\$ 1$ billion in non-cash transfers for a decade. As you know, we have strong views about whether these were intentional or constructive thoughts on (indiscernible). But the objecting states like to gloss over the fact that because the transferees of more than 4 billion of the 10.4 billion in cash for the state and the federal government through various tax statements made by the Sacklers and their affiliates on their behalf.

In other words, they're putting aside a
substantial amount for prejudgment interest, a total value to non-cash transfers. About 40 percent of the cash transfers went to the very political bodies they're objecting to. Ironically, the objecting states and the federal government are filing a (indiscernible) that would prevent their citizens and others from receiving the settlements that (indiscernible) negotiated. And yet, at no point has any objecting party, one, offered to give back their ill-gotten value into the estate for equitable distribution among creditors. Two, agreed to a full deduction on their distribution on account of the fact the party receives (indiscernible) value. Or, three, earmarked any of the they received in the last decade during the Sackler (indiscernible).

And, in addition, the federal government, one, had already taken another $\$ 225$ million from the Sacklers while every other party in the case is still waiting for its distribution. And, two, is looking to stop a plan that will permit distribution.

You'll recall, Your Honor, that at the beginning of the case, we pushed for an ERF that was for less than (indiscernible) million, and recall when the federal government sought approval of a settlement with the Sacklers, we urged them to use the 225 million for abatement, to give to victims, or for an ERF, and they
refused. It's almost tragic that now, as we stand on the precipice of potentially getting more than $\$ 7$ billion to use for abatement and compensate victims, the objectors, who have received more than 4 billion from the Sacklers and Purdue since 2008, want to stand in the way.

Third, the DOJ and the US Trustee. Throughout these cases, the DOJ has taken some confusing (indiscernible). For instance, during mediation, they chose to be -- not to be in mediation but to be an observer and to maintain their right to reopen the settlements, once reached. And once the settlements were reached, the DOJ did exactly that. This included, most dishearteningly, reaching into the distribution that was supposed to go the PI plan and negotiating with them, which resulted in almost 4 percent of the guaranteed $P I$ (indiscernible) to go into the DOJ. And now as we get to confirmation, the DOJ has not filed an objection, has not voted against the plan, under the plan will get $\$ 225$ million, plus 50 million for their unsecured claim, plus 26 million they've taken for the (indiscernible). They've already taken from the Sacklers an additional 225 million in addition to 4 billion of tax revenue, and yet filed a scathing statement about the nonconsent (indiscernible) releases. And the U.S. Trustee, an arm and a component of the DOJ, has filed a scathing objection to releases.

Your Honor, the DOJ failed to vote, did not file an objection and made its settlement with Purdue and the Sacklers. The DOJ's statement should be ignored, and the U.S. Trustee's objection should be viewed (indiscernible).

I want to conclude, Your Honor, by addressing the Sackler agreement and the releases, the public good, and the PIs. First, let's talk about the Sackler settlement and the releases. During the evidentiary portion of the trial, we were silenced because of the no prejudice stipulations, but, unfortunately, there were a number of communications during the trial that could leave people with quite a few misunderstandings. We want to create -- we want to somewhat fix the record and give you the example.

First, a lot has been said about the so-called opioid business (indiscernible) whereby certain individuals have agreed in general terms to no longer (indiscernible) opioid business. It's actually contained in 80901 separate (indiscernible) agreement. To be clear, there are three tiers of individuals who it applies to. The first tier being the ICSBs, the second being all the living Sacklers over the age of 18 , other than certain specified individuals in one of the (indiscernible), and the third tier being every other living Sackler Family member.

The first tier has the most stringent restrictions and the longest period for the (indiscernible). That's the

ICS tier. The second tier has looser restrictions, and the covenant's only applicable so long as the settlement payments have not been paid in full. In other words, when the settlements are paid, the second tier no longer is bound by (indiscernible). And the third tier has no requirements whatsoever.

A second example is the IACs and the use of the sale proceed for the IACs to pay down the Sackler obligation. It's true, the Sacklers are required to take (indiscernible) sell their interest in the IACs when they're out of their ownership of the IACs for seven years. But the proceeds from such sales are not, as has been implied, used to pay for the settlement. Rather, the settlement agreement requires (indiscernible) to make yearly (indiscernible) to the NBT regardless of the sale of the IACs.

Further, to the extent that an IAC is (indiscernible) the proceeds from such sale will be used to pay transaction cost and taxes from the sale and then to repay the Sacklers for any amounts they previously paid to the (indiscernible). Only if there are proceeds left over, after both of those, will the proceeds be used to prepay upcoming payment due for the Sacklers.

Third, with regard to the nonconsensual (indiscernible) -- in a vacuum, of course the UCC did not want to agree to the breadth of relief, but were prepared to
live with it in order to see the (indiscernible). A lot has been made about the fact that a lot of parties are getting releases and not providing any financial contribution. This is (indiscernible). It was a condition to the deal. But because our focus had always been (indiscernible) transfer, we were not concerned about getting releases (indiscernible) solely in their capacity business. And as you heard earlier from Mr. Vonnegut, even those releases have been (indiscernible).

That being said, and to provide some people's -people some comfort, if one pod defaults, every entity and person within the pod loses its relief if the NDT chooses to step back. For people not within a specific pod, for instance, there's in (indiscernible) etc., who don't fall into a pod, we negotiated for something called (indiscernible) parties. These are people who lose their (indiscernible) and the NDT determines to step back. From our perspective, these are also some of the people we believe know the most about what the Sacklers did, and would be the most dangerous if they were concerned about their own liability.

Second, the public good aspect of these cases. I just want to highlight some of the aspects of the plan settlement that relate to the public good, which both Mr . Huebner and Mr. Eckstein alluded to, but I want to make a
few notes about them.

First, the use of the money for abatement. Is this the better off principle of the plan? And while there's no specific language that prevents supplanting of funds, we sincerely hope that the state and other parties will work to ensure that the funds distributed through this plan, if confirmed, supplement and do no supplant preexisting funds designated to abate the opioid epidemic. We believe they will and we've had conversations with them. Second, the breadth and scope of the document repository. A lot has been said about this. I'm not going to repeat it.

Third, the continuation of the voluntary business development and, importantly, the fact that any buyer of the business has to continue (indiscernible). Fourth, the continuance of the job of the monitor who oversees the voluntary business injunctions. And, fifth, the establishment of Newco as a PBC and the use of funds by Newco for potential public (indiscernible).

Third, and finally, Your Honor, I want to touch on the personal injury victim, the (indiscernible). As you may know, (indiscernible) is a member of the UCC. He was selected to be on the UCC on the basis of a claim that she filed on one of her three sons, Cory, who died of an opioid overdose in 2011 at the age of 23 after starting to take
opioids at the age 15 , when he was given them by his doctor after hernia surgery. When he died, he had a four and a half month old child.

Unfortunately, while this is very sad and traffic, (indiscernible) grew up without a biological father -- it's not terribly unique, but the story didn't end there. (indiscernible) dutifully served on the UCC for almost two years. In June, two months ago, her middle son, Sean, also died of an opioid overdose on June 25th. Sean had actually turned his life around and was working to help other people with OUD when he relapsed and ultimately died alone. He too left a daughter and a son. One family, two opioid overdose deaths, three children being raised without their father (indiscernible).

I raise this story not because $I$ want to make people angry or grandstand about the plight of victims, or highlight Cheryl's story. This is more important than the audio. I raise this because, like Your Honor, we're all very touched and personally (indiscernible). Like Your Honor said, we need to remember the (indiscernible) but most poignantly, $I$ raise this because one would think that people like Cheryl may want to keep pursuing this (indiscernible) like the states do.

After all, it's the human tendency -- reactions of revenge. But Cheryl, like the other fiduciary members of
the UCC, agrees that it's time to move on. Time to stop chasing and start abating the epidemic, start combating the crisis, start compensating the victims and their families so that less people die, less people become victims to OUD, more people can get recovery support, more people can get to community organizations and more victims and families of victims can get the support they need.

We wish the objecting politicians agreed. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Shore, I think you're next in line.

MR. SHORE: I think I am, Your Honor. Good afternoon. (indiscernible)

THE COURT: Mr. Shore, can you get a little closer to the microphone? You're fading out some.

MR. SHORE: Sure. Let me turn (indiscernible).

All right. Perhaps the Court has noticed that during this confirmation hearing we've been very quiet, and I intend to remain quiet. I'll just addressing three points. I'm going to touch on the releases now and how they affect the personal injury victims. I'm going to address the provision in the TDP allowing for payment of the ad hoc group fees. And $I^{\prime} m$ around to address -- and maybe $I$ will, in any event, address any issues that the Court has or any questions the Court has with respect to the PIT (indiscernible).

On the releases, I'm not going to address the U.S. Trustee's objection, other than to say this: As bankruptcy professionals, we can all understand the need for the UST to make its policy points and the importance of the protection of the law without regard to any economic interest in the outcome of the case. We just hope that, given the extraordinary nature of this case, the U.S. Trustee would have, as it has in many other cases, let this case proceed without creating more risk around the releases.

Hopefully, in light of the material revisions, the release provisions noted by Mr. Vonnegut, the U.S. Trustee can see its way to avoid pressing objections which ultimately are not legally supported, and let the actual victims get the closure.

With respect to the state, there's already been a good deal of talk regarding the victims by people other than the victims throughout the case in the hearing today. I'm not going to do that. I don't feel eloquent enough to try to (indiscernible). What I do want to do is focus on what the actual victims had said for themselves in the evidentiary record.

If the Court looks at the final declaration of Christine Pullo of Prime Clerk -- it's ECF3372 -- it establishes three key uncontested facts. Fact one. After having received a detailed disclosure statement explaining
the case, total yes votes on the plan were 114,307 . Fact two. If the Court combines Classes $N, A$ and $B$-- that's the (indiscernible) claimants and the adult PI claimants, 62,433 of them voted in favor of the plan.

And let me pause here. The record establishes that if 5 percent of all yes votes in number and amount, in this case -- and everybody voted with $\$ 1$ claim -- are from personal injury victims. The personal injury victims are, in fact, the largest supporting voice in this case for this plan.

Point three. Classes 10A and B accepted a (indiscernible) rate of approximately 97 percent in number and amount. We pause again. The notion that you could get 97 percent of a cross section of individuals in America to agree on anything, much less the (indiscernible) of such passion and personal import is to whether the Sacklers should ever receive closure is astonishing. But for those who are not familiar with bankruptcy cases, we hardly ever see a class of this size of individuals accept at such a high rate, unless the commercial deal is so overwhelmingly compelling to the class (indiscernible).

The evidence shows that whatever pundits may say about this plan, it represents the best available commercial deal for the victims in every state. We pause for a moment on the point raised by Mr. Huebner and Mr. (indiscernible).

This is a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy cases and courts and professionals cannot fix everything. All we can do is apply the law to the facts to reach a commercial resolution of (indiscernible) issues consistent with the law.

This is not a criminal case or a regulatory investigation, as Your Honor has repeatedly pointed out. Each state reserves all of its police powers consistent with the Code and the law. But with respect to the commercial people, it's a completely mystery why any state would refuse money on the table and choose uncertain chaos when so many of their own citizens support.

Your Honor raised the question of whether you could break down the claims data state by state. You can't because the individuals' addresses have been redacted. I'd certainly like to see who my own state of Connecticut is purporting to represent in objecting to this deal. But the Court just has to look at the total no votes. (indiscernible) declaration in evidence. Only 2,600 individuals in classes NA and $B$ voted no.

To be clear, there's absolutely nothing wrong with any individual exercising their right to say no, for good reasons or no reason at all. It's a terribly emotional issue for all of us. But it seems unimaginable that eight states are spending millions of dollars of their own money and causing other people to spend millions of dollars of
their own money, vindicating the rights of 2,600 people -particularly given the state's historical (indiscernible) towards their opioid victim citizens and the tens of thousands of citizens who have voted yes for (indiscernible).

But let's give Connecticut and the other states the benefit of the doubt, that this is a matter of principle. It's not as if the rhetorical objection is without effect if their objections are sustained. Under this plan, the actual victims have set aside $\$ 750$ million for payment of injury. That is an unprecedented and monumental achievement only made possible by this Court, the mediators, the professionals, and the process participated in in good faith by all the claimants in the case.

In the absence of this deal, it is hard to see how there will ever be money set aside for victims. Remember, the prepetition deal that was cut set aside zero for personal injury victims. Maybe the objecting (indiscernible) have the wherewithal and patience to chase the Sacklers into eternity. The victims didn't before and they don't now. For that reason, the ad hoc group supports confirmation of the plan, even if it means that Purdue will continue on as a business. Factors (indiscernible) own form of closure and release it.

Given the balancing of the risks and the rewards,

97 percent of actual people who were harmed by the conduct of the Sacklers and Purdue want this deal done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHORE: And other than -- if Your Honor doesn't have any questions, I'll just respond later in the hearing...

THE COURT: All right, fine. Thank you. I don't at this point. So, the Multistate Governmental Entities Group, I believe, is next?

MR. MACLAY: Thank You, Your Honor. Kevin Maclay for the Multistate Governmental Entities Group. And, of course, we've just heard a lot of argument and $I$ will do my best, Your Honor, not to repeat any of it but to hit on a couple of points that are important to my group and I think to the case.

As Your Honor knows, I represent the Multistate Governmental Entities Group, a group of approximately 1,300 local governmental entities and tribes across 38 states and territories. And, Your Honor, one thing that $I$ would like to highlight in my comments here today is the difficulty of getting to the resolutions reached. As Your Honor knows, it took many months of extensive negotiations involving the services of two of the most highly qualified mediators in the country in former Judge Lane Phillips and in Ken Feinberg, to get to the deal we have today.

As the mediators reported on September 23 rd to Your Honor, that mediation resulted in Phase 1, in the agreement that all value received by the state and local governments would be exclusively dedicated to programs designed to abate the opioid crisis, and that such value cannot be used for any other purpose other than an amount (indiscernible) administration of the (indiscernible) themselves and to pay legal fees and costs.

And that was followed, Your Honor, by Phase 20 of the mediation by those same two esteemed mediators, which resulted, as of March 23, 2021, in a report noting a consensual agreement as to the allocation percentage between and among the public and private creditor groups engaged in the mediation. As that same mediator's report also noted, Your Honor, it also achieved an allocation inter se among the public and private creditor groups, among the overwhelming number of mediation participants. Of course, it resulted in a contribution of over $\$ 4$ billion from the Sackler Family and associated entity, as also noted by that same mediator's report.

And that was followed, Your Honor, by the able assistance of a sitting a sitting court judge, Judge Chapman, who successfully concluded Phase 3 of the mediation, which resulted in additional funds and additional terms that were favorable to both state and local government
and all private entities.

And so, as a result of those very difficult and time-consuming negotiations overseen by extremely able and experienced advisors, the global settlement was reached.

Each aspect of that global settlement is a crucial component of the basis of this plan, and all of them are interconnected (indiscernible) a couple of other people speaking here today.

So, just to make it completely clear, Your Honor, the releases are necessary as part of that global settlement, as part of that global deal for the public creditors and the private creditors to receive the funds they have been allocated under the plan, to put towards abatement of the opioid crisis. (indiscernible) releases could be (indiscernible) class of this carefully negotiated and very difficult to achieve settlement. It would allow other creditors to potentially cut in line and obtain funds that would otherwise go towards abatement by the states and local governments.

And that, Your Honor, is why the MSG group believes strongly that this plan should be approved. And that's what I have to say about that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. MACLAY: Thank you.
(Recess)

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CLERK: Good afternoon, everyone. If everyone could just turn on their video feeds, just to make sure that everyone is able to connect. And at this time, can everyone just give me a thumb's up if they could hear me clearly?

MAN 1: Yes.

CLERK: That sounds fantastic. Okay, so we're just going to go through a few house rules just to set the expectations for today's hearing -- afternoon hearing continuation. Please keep in mind to have your mics on mute when not speaking, to avoid any background noise. Also, make sure to unmute yourself when you do need to speak so that the judge, all the parties and the court reporter could keep track of who's speaking at the time.

Also, when you're not part of the -- part of the hearing and you're also -- let's see, when you're not part of the hearing or part of that portion of the hearing, can you please turn off your video feed so that way you're able to continue if you need to multitask in the background and it's not a disruption for the other parties?

Also, although this is a -- this is a video hearing, also make sure that you remind yourself that only the audio is being recorded, so please state your name again every time you speak. And although it's being conducted through Zoom, the hearing constitutes the court proceeding, and any recording other than the official court version is
prohibited. No party may record images, sounds from any location. The formalities of the courtroom must be observed.

And with all that said, also, please make sure that you could also use the AT\&T telephonic listening line only, the dial conference bridge. The phone number is 844-867-6163. Again, the number is 844-867-6163. And we encourage everyone that, if you're not going to be taking part in the hearing and you just want to listen, to please utilize that system. And the access code is 9263332 -pound. Again, the access code is 9263332-pound.

Finally, make sure that -- make sure that all -all of you guys have your full name displayed on the screen so that we could make sure and keep track of the person who's speaking and the judge also could know who he's speaking to. And also, you could rename yourself under the participant part of the Zoom or the app. If you guys have any questions, you may ask now. If not, we're going to start soon. The judge should be joining us shortly. Thank you for your cooperation.

THE COURT: Okay, good afternoon. This is Judge Drain and we're back on the record in In Re Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. with resumed oral argument now by the objectors to the plan, as to the issues that were addressed in the oral argument this morning by the parties who support the
plan, namely, the plan's Rule 9019 settlements and the issue of third party releases and injunctions.

I have a statement of allocation by those parties that has the United States Trustee being the first person or the first objector to speak. And I see Mr. Schwartzberg there for the U.S. Trustee, so you can go ahead, Mr. Schwartzberg.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, as you know, the U.S. Trustee has objected to the confirmation of the Purdue Pharma plan on statutory, constitutional and prevailing circuit law grounds.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're going to have -we're having a hard time hearing you, Mr. Schwartzberg.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I'll talk up, Your Honor, and if that doesn't work, I'll put on -- I'll put on some earphones.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: And I'm going to adjust my volume as well.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: But, Your Honor, as you well know, the United States Trustee has objected to confirmation of the Purdue Plan on statutory, constitutional and

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prevailing circuit law grounds. Testimony -- testimony (indiscernible) over the past several days -- over the past several days only reinforces our argument. The Debtors assert that third party releases may be granted in rare and extraordinary cases. We do not concede that that is a valid legal justification, but we do concede that this case is rare and exceptional, which were the reasons the Debtors do not profess.

The plan is breathtaking, Your Honor, and probably unprecedented in releasing the claims of a countless number of victims who hold direct claims against the Sackler Family members and related entities, many of whose members are not named and who may number on the thousands. The plan is also extraordinary in granting a discharge of liabilities in favor of the Sackler Family that far exceeds any discharge that would be available to individuals who, like the Sackler Family members, actually filed bankruptcy (indiscernible).

By the terms of the plan and testimony of the witnesses, the Sacklers are to be discharged from the consequences of opioid-related fraud that may -- that they may have committed and for any future harm that grows out of that fraud. By evading the obligations currently posed on every bankruptcy Debtor while also seeking the benefits of a court-ordered discharge, the Sackler Family members attempt to purchase for themselves a bespoke bankruptcy (indiscernible), an extra statutory tailor-made scheme to preserve their wealth and avoid a public reckoning. While those who hold direct claims against the Sacklers get nothing for those claims, some of them will receive $\$ 3,500$ for the claims against Purdue. The direct claims of the Sacklers -- the direct claimants of the Sacklers receive no adequate notice that they may lose their day in court, and the Sacklers and they -- against the Sacklers, and that they will receive no compensation for their claim against the Sacklers.

Your Honor, why are we in this situation? Because the Sacklers say so. There's plentiful testimony, including from David Sackler himself, (indiscernible) the Sackler Family adamantly refuse to pay a penny unless they received an extraordinary release. Interestingly, they gave no reason except they bare no legal responsibility for the opioids crisis. And the Sackler Family promises that, unless they receive this extraordinary release, they will fight tooth and nail against anyone who sues them from the District of Connecticut to the isles of Jersey.

They even say they' re untouchable because their trust was put together so intricately that the money is beyond the reach of the victim. In contrast, the victims, who have no adequate notice of the release provision of the plan, are losing their right to sue the Sackler Family. In
effect, Your Honor, the Sackler Family and Purdue Pharma say to the victims they' re within the jurisdiction of this court and thereby within the reach of the Sackler Family, but the Sacklers are beyond your reach.

Your Honor, that cannot be so under the Bankruptcy Code, the Constitution, (indiscernible) and valid case law. As the Court is aware, the United States Trustee objects to the third party releases of the Sackler Family on all three grounds. Your Honor, first $I$ will (indiscernible) the Code.

As we state in our objection, Your Honor,
nonconsensual releases of claims held by non-debtors against other non-debtors are not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(a) of the Code describes the discharge of nondebtors, and Section $1129(a)(1)$ prohibits confirmation of a plan that does not comply with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Section $1141(d)$ specifies the scope of discharge upon confirmation and does not include non-debtor parties within its scope. And, Your Honor, Law v. Siegel bars the equitable powers of Section 105 and being used -- used to allow that Section 524 and Section 1141 (d) (2) neither authorized or (indiscernible).

Simply put, Your Honor, these charges are for debtors. The Bankruptcy Code says so. And as the Debtors (indiscernible) full stop, end of discussion. Metromedia,
the sole authority on which the Debtors rely as legal justification for the (indiscernible) releases, the Second Circuit itself recognizes that there's no authorization in the Code for approval of involuntary releases. And if the individual members --

THE COURT: That's your reading of Metromedia? MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I'm sorry, Your Honor? THE COURT: That's your reading of Metromedia? MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, Metromedia -- a few things indicated that if there's a blanket of releases that could potentially be abusive, then --

THE COURT: That's different than what you said. I understand your point now.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Oh. Also, Your Honor, there is no code section in the Bankruptcy Code that authorizes nondebtor limits.

THE COURT: Well, there wasn't one in the Mandel case either, as $524(\mathrm{~h})$ and the legislative history to 524 (g) recognize.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Yes, Your Honor. Because there's no exclusive authorization in the code, we believe if Congress wanted to allow the debtors -- non-debtors discharges, what we believe is an extraordinary (indiscernible) due process, they would have done so explicitly, as they did with 524 (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Well, except -- except in $524(\mathrm{~h})$, they make it clear that the enactment of 524 (g) does not undo any such release that was entered before the enactment of 524(g). And the legislative history makes clear that Congress very clearly wanted the law to develop in that area, and was not limiting it just to the asbestos trusts in 524 (g).

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, if you're talking about the legislative history, $I$ read that as dealing just with normal plan injunctions, such as assets transferred from one -- from the Debtor to a third party and the injunction --

THE COURT: Really? Well, maybe you weren't in the room when it was being drafted.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I was not, Your Honor. THE COURT: Or representing the companies that needed the protection, and had already gotten the injunctions before $524(g)$.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I do point out, Your Honor, the Mandel injunction is based on enjoining claims that are derivative of the debtor, whereas the injunction here that the parties received more of a direct indiscernible)... THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, if individual
members of the Sackler Family have filed their own Chapter

11, they did not obtain the (indiscernible) the third party releases being given here, which absolves them from fraud claims, the result of (indiscernible) by growing individual and hypothetical bankruptcy cases. Moreover, if the Sackler Family plan (indiscernible) in exchange for the broadest brief possible, and actually propose individual bankruptcies to the Sackler Family, it would almost certainly not be confirmed under the best interest test of creditors, the text that requires creditors to be treated (indiscernible) Chapter 11, they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. In other words, virtually all the Debtor's assets must be liquidated and paid to creditors.

Why? Because all available information suggested the collective assets of the Sackler -- of the (indiscernible) Sackler Family exceed $\$ 10-11$ billion.

THE COURT: Can we stop there? What information are you referring to? What evidence are you referring to? You heard the testimony and you read the declarations where there was no cross as to the Sackler Family's assets. So, which evidence are you referring to?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, I'm referring to the Debtor's disclosure statement.

THE COURT: You're not referring to the -- to the declarations as to the Sacklers' assets that were admitted without cross-examination in this hearing?

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MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, in the Debtor's disclosure statement, they indicated that it was estimated that the value --

THE COURT: So, the answer's no. You're not -you're not citing any of the evidence in this hearing?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I'm citing the disclosure statement, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Fine. Can $I$ ask you one more question, Mr. Schwartzberg?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Absolutely.

THE COURT: You've couched this so far as the Sacklers' plan. Now, you've heard the oral argument today, including the remarks by counsel for the Official Creditors Committee and the Multistate Governmental Entities Ad Hoc Committee, the lawyer for the Personal Injury Ad Hoc Committee and the AHC, the committee of setting governmental entities. None of them referred to this as the Sacklers' plan or the Sacklers' deal. None of them referred to the condition that the Sacklers were placing on it. They said that if there was no such release, they would not be supporting the plan because they believe that the plan was necessarily as a whole for their recovery. What is your response to that argument?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, in most cases or in a lot of cases that we see where an entity files for
bankruptcy and there are individuals who own that entity who also have liabilities in connection with it -- those individuals themselves file bankruptcy and they get a discharge. We believe here the Sackler Family, or the members who are seeking releases, are seeking the discharge for things they just thought that should not be permitted, especially since that, in some instances, victims are only getting \$4,500.

Whereas $I$ was discussing, Your Honor, if the Sacklers as a whole filed bankruptcy, there would potentially be significantly more money than -(indiscernible) put on the table for that.

THE COURT: So, essentially, you're ignoring the statements by the representatives of all of the people that spoke today that speak for the roughly 95 percent of the people that voted in favor of the plan?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, we don't believe the plan complies with the Constitution. And we believe that Your Honor is only authorized to do what is authorized under the Bankruptcy Code, and that therefore the plan could not be (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Okay. So, it's your principle against their vote?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, I believe it's the Constitution and the Bankruptcy Code against their vote.

THE COURT: Okay. I was just curious about the -who you were speaking for. I understand now.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: As I was indicating, Your Honor, the 4 billion being put into this case may be a huge amount of money but it is less than the -- what we believe is the 10 billion that would be considered in the best interest of the nation test.

THE COURT: So, you think all of that would come in? All of that $\$ 11$ billion would come in in a bankruptcy -- in a liquidation?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: You know, it's hard to say, Your Honor, because unlike the Debtor, the Sacklers have not provided -- the Sackler Family has not provided a fulsome set of financial information.

THE COURT: Well, you didn't cross-examine the expert who provided the liquidation analysis.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: We did not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you didn't cross-examine the expert who provided the analysis of the Sacklers' wealth and where it lies, right?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: We did not, Your Honor. THE COURT: And so you're just, therefore, assuming that money would be available? Those transfers
would be avoidable and recoverable?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: My argument, Your Honor, is we don't know because there has not been a fulsome disclosure of the Sackler Family (indiscernible) which would be --

THE COURT: Well, there was a declaration.

Actually, there were two declarations. So, I -- I should rely on that, right? No one cross-examined, no one questioned the declarations -- the declarants.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I believe there was one, although $I$ don't know what Your Honor's final decision on it was -- indicated after the period of ten years, the Sackler Family wealth would be in excess of 15 --

THE COURT: No, that's wealth. We're talking about recovery in a liquidation.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, we do concede that there are -- there is money that's in a trust, and that would have to be a (indiscernible) asset.

THE COURT: And your -- obviously, your office isn't able to do that, right?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, I believe there are un-consenting -- or nonconsenting, excuse me, states that could pursue that as well as -- if the plan (indiscernible) perhaps the Committee could pursue that.

THE COURT: Okay. The Committee that has
supported the plan?

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MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: As I was saying, Your Honor, because the Sackler Family members are not debtors, they've not been subject to the comprehensive disclosure obligations required of (indiscernible). The testimony does show that certain of the Sackler Family trust went to Royal Court in (indiscernible) Jersey where secret proceedings (indiscernible) no parties in this case other than perhaps the Sackler Family could obtain a court order preventing the sale of the (indiscernible) unless the Sackler Family receives a release of fraud and other conduct.

Does this court enjoin the hundreds of pending lawsuits against the Sackler Family when the Debtor for Chapter 11 -- no lawsuits (indiscernible) judgment (indiscernible) have been liquidated. The trial testimony establishes that, despite effectively discharging the Sackler Family in this -- excuse me -- from discharging the Sackler Family in this bankruptcy from the claims of opioid victims, the Debtors liquidate -- either try to evaluate the assets and liabilities --

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartzberg, can you go a little slower? Your -- I'm not sure the court reporter will be picking up what you're saying.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Yes, I apologize, Your Honor.

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The Debtor's liquidation analysis didn't even try to evaluate the assets or liabilities of the Sackler Family, including the opioid-related liabilities. But if the Sackler Family members are being discharged as if they were Debtors, then their assets and liabilities should be included in the liquidation effort.

Simply put, the Sackler Family members are reliable for only an infinitesimal portion of the 41 trillion opioid liability in the Debtor's liquidation analysis. The (indiscernible) arithmetic reality is that they were -- that if they were debtors (indiscernible) liquidate all of their assets (indiscernible) under the plan.

Moreover, in a Chapter 7 case, the Sackler Family wouldn't be granted the luxury of liquidating their assets over a decade (indiscernible) effectively retain (indiscernible) normally paid creditors for investment income generated over a decade, which is precisely what is being allowed here with the decades-long payout of (indiscernible).

When asked on cross-examination what the Sackler Family loss would be after the decades-long payout, David Sackler did not know what the net effect will be. He said, I don't think anybody can say that with certainty. Other witnesses were forced to draw conclusions based on the
incomplete information precisely that there's no Sackler Family member as a debtor, who made -- who has made the complete and public disclosure required of debtors so that their complete financial situation can be understood in (indiscernible).

Your Honor, not only did the releases violate the Bankruptcy Code, but they' re also fundamentally at odds with the U.S. Constitution, both the Due Process clause and the Bankruptcy clause. (indiscernible) of claims against the Sackler Family for their role in the opioid crisis (indiscernible) is at the consent of this Court. Due process provides that those litigation claims (indiscernible) both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Debtors repeatedly and (indiscernible) conflate the due process afforded Purdue creditors for their claims against Purdue and their participation of Purdue's bankruptcy with due process for those with claims against the non-debtor Sackler Family members. For example, the reply brief goes to great lengths to extol the notice given of the bar date in this bankruptcy. That is a red herring, Your Honor, because the United States Trustee does not challenge the adequacy of notice to produce creditors regarding the treatment of their claims against Purdue. But there was no bar date for filing (indiscernible) claims
against the Sackler Family precisely because they are not Debtors. We don't even know the universe of claims against them beyond the 400 lawsuits that were enjoined.

Moreover, all the notice in the world can't legitimize the Court's dictating settlements (indiscernible) not agreed to sell or forcing -- or being forced to relinquish their claims without the consent of their day in court.

THE COURT: Well, can we -- can we break that down? I'm not -- I'm not quite sure what the last point makes. But as far as due process is concerned, there's, again, $I$ believe, evidence of extensive notice of the release that built on the notice to creditors and potential creditors of the case, as well as extensive media notice of the release. And there was certainly an opportunity to object in this court to the release.

So, at one level I think what you're arguing is an issue for the future, as the Second Circuit discussed in the Motors liquidation case. The analysis of whether some party who arguably is subject to an injunction got notice sufficient to oppose the injunction is a fact-based inquiry based upon their own particular circumstances and the debtor's knowledge of them. So, isn't that really an issue for the future?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Well, I think we don't believe
the notice is appropriate and, therefore, this Court should not approve the --

THE COURT: Why -- on what basis do you say the notice was not appropriate?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Well, Your Honor, with testimony that the confirmation notice, the publication notice, the plain language notice did not include a (indiscernible) list of the releasing parties. All it did would say the Sackler Family members or the Sackler Family. It didn't include the thousands of other people that were being released.

In addition, Your Honor, the actual notice or the actual solicitation packet that went out was incomprehensible. Richard Sackler himself said reading Section $10.7(b)$ was too dense and he couldn't get through it. And John Long, the CFO and the man who actually signed the petition -- the schedules -- the schedules, I'm sorry -the disclosure statement in the plan, indicated that he could not identify all of the release parties, and he didn't believe that an opioid -- an average opioid victim could either.

We believe that if you're going to take away someone's right to sue a person or an entity that you -they should -- that entity should be identified. So, that is reasons why we don't think there was appropriate notice.

As well as future claims, Your Honor. (indiscernible) future claims did not receive notice and there was no future claims representative. But I'll continue, Your Honor.

The releases -- as $I$ was saying -- the uncertain and amorphous definitions of the releases and who was being released, it was virtually impossible to understand who are the released parties and releasing parties, and what are released. So, we believe no matter how many times the Debtor advertised the shareholder releases on CNN, those advertisements never provided adequate notice because those releasing and those released were never adequately specified.

The (indiscernible) even hearing the advertisement and then sought out the plan and read every word of Section $10.7(\mathrm{~b})$, basically it still wouldn't have notice, because it was incomprehensible. And as I indicated, Your Honor, Mr. Lowne didn't appear to have knowledge of all released parties. In fact, on cross-examination we asked if it would be possible for an average opioid victim, based on publicly available information, to identify all the assets in individuals that are getting released, he indicated, I would presume if $I^{\prime} m$ not, they would not be able to, no.

And he further testified he couldn't identify the Sackler Family's children and grandchildren included in the releases, and he didn't know that this is an entity Sackler

Family members --

THE COURT: Well, let me just stop you there. You have referred consistently to the Sacklers, right, as a collective?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the notice itself said the Sacklers, right?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Doesn't that include children and grandchildren?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: The average person looking at it may or may not know that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: And they would --

THE COURT: Let's move on, Mr. Schwartzberg.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, the purported -purported narrowing in both the seventh amended plan and the eighth amended plan, both filed on the morning of the trial, eliminated -- eliminated certain references. For example, the seventh amended plan got rid of the reference to all other persons. We still believe, even though those changes were made, they don't do anything to clarify or materially limit the scope of the extraordinary (indiscernible) releases.

From the trial testimony, we have ascertained that
the releases extend the fraud claim to non-opioid liabilities related to Purdue's manufacture, sale and distribution of many other pharmaceuticals into future conduct -- meaning, the parties who have not yet been injured and not credited to the Debtors are having future claims extinguished. And, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Can I -- can I stop you on that point? I'm not quite sure... As far as future conduct is concerned, if they are excluded -- I'm talking now from the Sacklers -- from having anything to do with -- with Purdue or Newco in the future, what are we talking about by future conduct?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, we're talking about acts that would have occurred prior to the effective date. So, for instance, appropriate (indiscernible) prior to the effective date that are used after the effective date, that would be a future claim -- that a claimant would have -THE COURT: But the evidence is clear that the Sacklers themselves have not been involved with this company in any way, shape or form in terms of running it since before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, then if that's -there are no (indiscernible) claims, they should eliminate the future claims from releases.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, you're going to have to
slow down. I couldn't really hear that.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I said, Your Honor, if there are no future claims, they should eliminate them through the releases. But it appears that any actions that occurred before the effective date, whatever they may be, if it causes harm after the effective date, those claims are being released.

THE COURT: Right. But you're not aware of any claims that would exist against them?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: I'm not aware of any, Your Honor, but $I$ do know that they're being released under the plan and there must be reason for that -- or there may be a reason for that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, the Court also, we believe, does not have the power to -- or authority to enjoin claims by one third party against another third party (indiscernible) there both parties to the same bankruptcy proceeding. (indiscernible) Section 105 was used to create it. The Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress power to enact uniform laws on bankruptcy. Bankruptcy reorders the rightful debtors and the creditors. It does not reorder the rights of non-debtors against non-debtors, and any effort to do so exceeds the constitutional authority granted.

It is ironic that the Debtor -- that the Debtors
and the shareholder release parties go to great lengths to explain how creditors could never obtain personal jurisdiction of the shareholder release parties and how their assets are in trusts and (indiscernible) accounts beyond the reach of creditors, while dismissing the United States (indiscernible) argument that the Bankruptcy Court does not have unlimited related to jurisdiction to adjudicate or distinguish claims between non-debtors.

And, Your Honor, $I^{\prime} d$ like to turn to Metromedia because that was discussed. Despite much argument otherwise, we didn't believe that Metromedia reflects the imposition of third party releases or dictates the outcome in this case.

First, Your Honor, Metromedia did not decide or discuss the issue of constitutional due process. Second, (indiscernible) Supreme Court decisions undercut Metromedia's analysis. Law v. Siegel established yet again that Section 105 cannot be used to grant relief that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize. And even the Second Circuit picks up -- it expressed doubt with Metromedia about relying on Section 105.

And Stern v. Marshall established that article in Bankruptcy Courts that constitutional authority to adjudicate many state law claims. The Bankruptcy Court cannot adjudicate a claim held by one debtor against another
non-debtor -- it certainly cannot extinguish that claim their a plan confirmation.

Third, Your Honor, the statements in Metromedia on third party releases were not beholding of the case. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal for equitable (indiscernible).

And, fourth, Your Honor, Metromedia doesn't set out factors and filings, but it does suggest that releases can't be a discharge, as this one is; a release can confirm blanket immunity, as this one does, and --

THE COURT: Can we stop on that point? It's not a discharge, right? It doesn't discharge all their debts.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: But, Your Honor --

THE COURT: And it doesn't provide blanket immunity.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: But, Your Honor, as it said in the Second Circuit in Metromedia, a third party release may operate as a bankruptcy discharge arranged without a filing and (indiscernible) safeguard to (indiscernible). In fact, Your Honor, this discharge provides a greater -- a superdischarge. The shareholder released parties -- if the Sackler Family filed for bankruptcy, they wouldn't be discharged from fraud. And in this case, they' re getting -they're getting fraud as part of (indiscernible) against them.

THE COURT: So, what is your view about the MacArthur-Manville case then that deals with this issue?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, I'm not familiar with this case -- that case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: But Metromedia did establish factors and -- although it did not establish factors and filings, it did at least require some types of substantial contribution for the parties being released. Mr. Lynam testified to a litany of parties being released -- perhaps hundreds of people or entities, without paying so much as a dime into the estate. And, indeed, Richard Sackler himself did not know his personal assets, including his checking account would be used for the final count.

Your Honor, I just want to point -- before I go into my next point. Mr. Huebner, in his presentation, had a whole litany of cases where there are fraud releases, and $I$ just wanted to note that it appears that those were all consensual. Here, we're talking about nonconsensual releases, we're talking about settlement. And just before I forget that, $I$ wanted to just address that issue.

And then regarding something that came up on cross-examination, Your Honor. The United States Trustee (indiscernible) the vote-counting rules of Section 1126 and does not contest the Debtors have established acceptance of
a plan by the voting process. It is well established that 1126, as interpreted, only counts votes actually cast and does not direct courts to consider the toll number (indiscernible) of the votes -- the voters.

But Purdue and the Sackler Family have misused the voting percentage to create the impression that the stakeholders overwhelmingly support the non-debtor involuntary releases, and that's simply not true. And to give the final (indiscernible) is not deserved. The Debtors represent that each and every class of creditors that voted has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan. However, they also say in Paragraph 243 of the reply brief that 95 percent of all the creditors voted in favor of it.

Your Honor, 95 percent of all the creditors did not vote in favor of the plan. However, 95 percent of 20 percent of the creditors who voted --

THE COURT: Mr. Schwartzberg, how do you propose to measure overwhelming support except by how everyone measures an election, which is based on those who actually vote? Can you name me one election that counts people who just answer polls or say later what they think, as opposed to those who actually vote?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, we're noting that in the --

THE COURT: You live -- I know you live in this
area instead of Washington, D.C., but I think it would be a surprise to politicians that you don't count the vote, you count something else, something amorphous?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, I am not -- we are not challenging what 1126 --

THE COURT: Are you aware of any case that has looked at support, as far as overwhelming support, other than by the vote?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, what we're doing is we're challenging Debtor's talking points by --

THE COURT: But on what basis?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, 95 percent of all the creditors did not vote --

THE COURT: So, you don't answer my question. You would poll the man on the street?

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: We're not talking about polling, Your Honor. We're not talking about -THE COURT: No, you're not talking about counting at all. Just move on from this point. I think the politicians who are objecting to this plan at least understand how elections work.

MR. SCHWARTZBERG: Your Honor, if the Debtors wanted to establish that the creditors consent to the releasing of claims, all they had to do was ask, but they did not.

Your Honor, in conclusion, the Bankruptcy Code is a carefully drafted, comprehensive statutory scheme that strikes a balance between the rights and obligations of debtors and creditors. But what the Debtors and the Sackler family propose here turns that scheme on its head and eviscerates both the statutory and constitutional protections to which creditors are entitled. It creates a bankruptcy-like option for the Sackler family without their actually filing for bankruptcy and being subject to obligations (indiscernible).

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Constitution allow this Court to approve a plan that cuts off the rights of individuals (indiscernible) parties other than the debtors, yet that is exactly what the Debtors ask this Court to do.

Millions have already been victimized by the opioid crisis that the Sackler family helped create. They shouldn't be victimized a second time by having the claims against them extinguished in the bankruptcy case against those who are not debtors.

And so $I$ (indiscernible) where $I$ began. This plan is indeed extraordinary, and it is extraordinary for all the wrong reasons and confirmation should be denied. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Okay. I think --

Mr. Goldman, are you next?

MR. GOLDMAN: I believe I am, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. For the State of Connecticut.

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Irve Goldman, Pullman \& Comley, for the State of Connecticut and also for -- we've agreed to coordinate our arguments and I'll be presenting also for Delaware, Vermont, Oregon, Rhode Island, District of Columbia, and Washington, to conserve argument time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: And just also preliminarily, Your Honor, Mr. Gold and I will be dividing up the arguments. I'll be addressing for the most part subject matter jurisdiction and certain other aspects of the third party releases. And then Mr. Gold will be addressing Metromedia. THE COURT: Okay. MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Before $I$ proceed with my prepared remarks, if I could just go over or respond to the points that were raised by the plan proponents this morning and into the afternoon.

First, it's been suggested, although I'm not entirely clear on this point, that 9019 would govern a settlement of a creditor's direct non-state claims against non-debtors, which are really not the property of the Debtors to sell. I'm not aware of any authority that exists
for the proposition that a debtor or a trustee can attempt to force a settlement of non-state claims held by creditors based on the TMT standard that essentially says that if the settlement does not fall below the lowest in the range of reasonableness, it should be approved.

THE COURT: Yeah. I don't think that was Mr. Huebner's intention. I think he was covering the 9019 Iridium TMT Trailer Ferry argument, the one that Mr. Gold is going to cover.

MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. I just wanted to be sure.

THE COURT: Having said that, it's not a factor that the courts in the Second Circuit regularly consider, at least expressly as a factor when considering a release of a third party claim. But in the Third Circuit, they do discuss fairness or unfairness. They say that the third party release should not be unfair. So I guess at least in other jurisdictions, fairness does come in in some respects. And it probably does indirectly in the Metromedia factors by focusing on the consideration provided and who it goes to.

MR. GOLDMAN: Point well taken, Your Honor. So I'll go to the next point that $I$ wanted to respond to.

I don't believe anything said by Mr. Huebner justifies overriding the sovereign judgements of nine states and the District of Columbia, that their view of justice and an acceptable resolution with the Sacklers given the amounts
that they propose to contribute requires a full airing of their alleged culpability in the courts of the objecting states.

The very concept of sovereignty requires that the judgements of those states be respected and that they not be forced to give up their property rights against non-debtors by a majority or even a supermajority vote.

As Ms. Conroy, who others have invoked earlier, had to acknowledge in her testimony, reasonable minds can differ about the amounts the Sacklers should be contributing in order to get a third-party release. And you have kind of those minds in the he objecting states falling on the side of inadequacy.

There was also a point that the current state of affairs was portrayed as leaving a binary choice of taking a stand or liquidating. However, there is a scenario in which additional consideration could be provided in order to achieve full consensus, but the parties have simply chosen to draw the line here and attempt to force a resolution on the objecting states.

There was another point made about --

THE COURT: Can I stop you -- can interrupt you on that point?

MR. GOLDMAN: Certainly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's assume for the moment that

Connecticut agreed -- let's assume for the moment that we had a fourth mediation and the Sacklers agreed to contribute another $\$ 50$ million like they did in the third mediation, the one that Judge Chapman supervised. And Connecticut, Washington, Oregon, they all went along with it except one state. Or even just the City of Seattle. Do you say that the whole thing should still be put aside for that creditor's rights?

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, that would be assuming that with that one holdout the Sacklers would refuse to go forward with the contribution?

THE COURT: Yeah. Let's just say one holdout just decided that no amount of money was enough.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, that is the difficult question to be answered. I think to be principled about things, we would have to respect the judgement of that one holdout. And if we believed that truly it was an adequate settlement ourselves, $I$ think it would be up to us to prevail on that one holdout, to see it our way. And that's the best way I can answer Your Honor's question.

If I could move to my next point that $I$ wanted to respond to.

There was a reference to other claimants in our state or maybe in the other objecting states to claimants who may have voted in favor of the plan. And as Your Honor
brought out, there really is no evidence of that. But even if they did, they' re not elected officials of the objecting states who are charged with protecting what they believe to be in the public interest. So it really is a beside the point type of observation that was made.

There was also an observation made that municipalities overwhelmingly voted in favor of the plan, and we acknowledge that. But again, just like the individual claimant that might have voted in favor of the plan, they have no authority to assert the (indiscernible) claims on behalf of a state's citizenry, as the attorneys general in the objecting states do.

THE COURT: Do you say that applies in all of the objecting states?

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Notwithstanding the home rule laws? MR. GOLDMAN: Notwithstanding the home rule laws? THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GOLDMAN: That $I$ can't -- I'm honestly not sure about home rule law, but I do know that one of the -at least one of the cases was -- of the municipalities, I believe it was the City of New Haven that was dismissed because they didn't have standing to assert the type of claims that the State of Connecticut AG has asserted.

And there was also a reference $I$ believe by the

Unsecured Creditors' Committee that the state AGs have reneged on the allocations formula. I don't believe that is the case. That allocation formula was formulated and agreed to on the premise that there would be a fully-consensual settlement as part of a plan. And that obviously has not occurred. So those are my points in response to the points that were made this morning and this afternoon. And if $I$ can now turn to my formal part of my argument.

It was observed by Circuit Judge Henry Friendly in the pre-Code days that conduct of bankruptcy proceedings should not only be right, but seem right. And it's our view and the view of the other objecting state that the breadth of the releases provided for the Sacklers given what we believe they've done leading up to this bankruptcy. It does not seem right to us, and we would contend is not right. And that belief is based on the recognition that if the plan is confirmed, they will have gotten every bit of protection and more than they would have received in their own bankruptcies and will be able to put a permanent halt to all of these suits, which certainly have exposure. Yes, I understand they submitted what they believe to be strong defenses. But they will be wiped away without having to undergo the rigors of their own personal bankruptcy, which $I$ think is a really important consideration for the Court to
take into account. And unlike individual debtors --

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you on that?

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There's two parts to that. There's the rigorous part and there's the personal bankruptcy part. As far as the rigors, we'll come back to that. But if it's putting them into or forcing them to go into personal bankruptcy, if one would get less or recover less or materially less in a personal bankruptcy scenario than the states would be getting under the plan, that's really just a punishment, right, at that point? That's what you're talking about, as opposed to doing an analysis of recovery under either scenario.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, if you assume that you would be getting less and --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- I'm not sure that --

THE COURT: We can explore that in a minute. But, I mean, assume that for the moment.

MR. GOLDMAN: I think to a certain degree you can view it as penal. But that is one of the purposes of the consumer protection laws as well as providing a deterrent to future wrongdoers that in essence sends a message that they can't be bailed out by piggybacking on a corporate bankruptcy to get a discharge. I mean, most individual --

THE COURT: But again, the -- to me -- and you were quite candid about this, and I think I understand the logic behind it. Reasonable minds may differ about the amount and the other consideration to be paid. But it is one thing to say $I$ want punishment, it's another thing to say we're not getting enough money. Those are two different things. Right? I think.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I would -- I do understand.

And I think that I would say that if the amount of compensation, so to speak, in the sense of cumulative damages reaches an amount that the states can say -- all states can say, you know, this is sufficient punishment, or however you want to phrase it, and what we believe these people caused, what we believe, then $I$ don't see an issue with the dichotomy that Your Honor proposed.

THE COURT: Okay. And can we focus on the rigor part for a second?

MR. GOLDMAN: Absolutely.

THE COURT: I don't know whether Connecticut is a party with the McKinsey lawsuit.

MR. GOLDMAN: I'm not a hundred percent sure. I believe we are, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

MR. HUEBNER: Okay. I mean, there was certainly, I think you'd have to agree, much less rigor as far as the disclosure regarding McKinsey and the claims against it and
its involvement and the rigor in this case with regard to the discovery pertaining to various Sackler family members' role in Purdue and their assets and liabilities. You would agree with that, right?

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, not knowing what was provided in McKinsey, $I^{\prime} m$ at a little bit of a disability to respond.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, as far as the discovery taken of the Sacklers in this case, can you imagine that there would be any other discovery taken if they filed bankruptcy as far as their liabilities, their assets, and claims against them?

MR. GOLDMAN: I'm not sure that $I$ know what you're getting at. There was extensive discovery. You know, whether that should serve as a substitute for what one goes through in the bankruptcy process, I would question.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, there are schedules that you have to fill out. There are forms you have to fill out in bankruptcy. They' re not tens of millions of pages. And the discovery and the disclosure with regard to assets that you have a beneficial interest in are even less rigorous in your own personal bankruptcy. Wouldn't the discovery just repeat itself if various members of the Sackler family were compelled to file bankruptcy that we've already had?

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, to the extent that Rule 2004 exams would be taken --

THE COURT: But wouldn't it just be updated? I mean, that's all been done, right? And in fact, more than done, because $I$ insisted that it be broader than even normal 2004 discovery as a condition for the preliminary injunction.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I understand what you're saying, Your Honor. But it just seems to me that it's not really a complete substitute for having to go through the bankruptcy process oneself. You know, obviously there are non-dischargeability concerns and deadlines. And all of that could -- would likely be brought to bear on a settlement that everyone would consider acceptable, the prospect of that $I$ would think would naturally bring parties together. But since we don't have that dynamic, I could understand why the parties here are pushing this when they have a critical mass. So that's the best response I can give.

THE COURT: Okay. That's a good response. MR. GOLDMAN: So I think that was my last point. And that was on to my argument as well.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: So the other point I was going to make is that they are contributing an amount which in the abstract could be considered substantial. But it's a negotiated amount of their considerable wealth. And that
wealth was in substantial part obtained by the cash and noncash transfers that they acknowledge receiving over a 10 or 11-year period, $\$ 11$ billion, yes. $\$ 4$ billion of it was used to pay taxes, but that's a benefit to them as well.

And it's apparent that those distributions were made in response to concerns like those expressed by David Sackler in an email to Richard Sackler dated May 17th, 2007 that, quote, "We will be sued", end quote. That is Exhibit JX2237. And that family offshore trusts were set up to protect the Sackler wealth from the claims they expected to -- that would be asserted against them, as board member Peter Boer advised Jonathan Sackler to do in his confidential email, memorandum --

THE COURT: But, Mr. Goldman, those claims are estate claims, right? That isn't a third-party claim.

MR. GOLDMAN: Absolutely agreed, Your Honor. I'm just making the point that they set up this offshore trust with the idea of protecting for claims they knew would be coming in this confidential memorandum, which is JX --

THE COURT: But isn't this Mr. Gold's point?

Isn't this the Iridium analysis?

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I'm at the point of the argument where $I^{\prime} m$ just making our preliminary view of why this does not seem right to us, the whole leadup to the -THE COURT: Is the State of Connecticut prepared
to give back the $\$ 285$ million in taxes it received from this company that was engaged in illegal practices? It got the most other than the federal government by way of tax payments.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, there was income that was derived on which taxes were owed. I don't know why we would be giving it back. But I understand the point you're making, that we benefitted also. But it pales in comparison to what was taken out by the Sacklers, surely.

THE COURT: Although as far as the tax payments are concerned, $I$ do have an uncontroverted affidavit that says that most of those payments, if they have not been -if it had not been a partnership structure, would have been paid by the Debtors directly. Right? They would have -they relieved the Debtors of the tax obligation.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, the fact is they set the structure up this way, they took the money out, and they owed the taxes. And they had Purdue pay the taxes on their behalf. But I do understand Your Honor's point.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: If I could just complete the memo for the benefit of the Court for what it's worth. I was going to give you the exhibit number. It was JX2241. And Mr. Boer told Jonathan Sackler, quote, "For the family, it may be that overseas assets with limited transparency and
jurisdictional shielding from U.S. judgments will be less attractive to litigants than domestic assets." And that suggestion proved to be prophetic, as the Debtors and the Sacklers are now using the difficulty of collecting any judgements against offshore trusts as one of the reasons why the shareholder settlement agreement should be approved.

So under these circumstances, we do not believe the non-consensual releases here seem right or are right -THE COURT: But can you wish that away? Can you wish those consequences away?

MR. GOLDMAN: The most we can do I think is doing what we're doing, Your Honor. And that is to try to prevent it from happening.

THE COURT: But, again, I think the avoidable transfer issue really is an estate issue. In other words, the Creditors' Committee and the Debtors and all the other parties have their say. You all have your say, too. But it's not a third-party release issue, it's an estate issue. And one could certainly come to the conclusion that as far as the avoidable transfers are concerned, the range of the settlement is within what is reasonable given the risks on the underlying liability and the risks of collection. I mean, if you want to go to the Isle of Jersey and seek to avoid the transfers under Jersey law and deal with enforcement with the Viscount of Jersey, there are obviously
some issues involved with that.

MR. GOLDMAN: I acknowledge that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: I do acknowledge that. But I think that what this goes to also, apart from the settlement, is really to the fairness of the release itself. Because it has to be put in context. You know, why are they getting these releases when they are really just giving back a lot of what was taken out over that period of time when they knew that claims were coming. And so that's really -- I'm not so much commenting on the Iridium settlement factors as I am on how that really should bear on the permissibility of the releases themselves, taking that -- in other words, you would really take that into account as to how they got that (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Well, that's a fair point. And I have thought carefully and listened carefully and read the evidence carefully to see how much of this $\$ 4.325$ billion would be attributable to estate claims and how much would be attributable arguably to non-estate claims. And no one has really addressed that issue directly. I do have arguments, and they're just arguments, because given that it is a settlement, we didn't try the merits directly. But I have a fair amount of facts and arguments that would lead one to think, $I$ believe, that the value here is not all on account of the estate claims necessarily, that you can evaluate this settlement as covering both. But no one particularly wants to allocate the value to one or the other set of claims because they're all quite aware of the possibility of a default in the future where they want to litigate as hard as they can.

But just the simple point as far as the non-estate claims are concerned that only -- or I actually think less than a handful of Sacklers served on the board. And I think two or three were officers out of the entire family group. So, you know, people refer to the Sacklers as a unit, but they're actually -- the testimony shows 16 , eight within Side A and eight with Side B, sets of contributors, some of whom I have to assume would have much stronger defenses to these types of claims than others. So it's -- you know, it's not an easy calculus.

MR. GOLDMAN: It is not, Your Honor. And I do not --

THE COURT: I agree with you on one point. Given the size of the claims here, which have not been liquidated, but they are gigantic, one could always and fairly easily say this is not enough, this $\$ 4.325$ billion isn't enough. And at one level, that's clearly the case. Everyone should get paid in full, right? On the other hand, we know, at least on the personal injury side, that payments on these
types of claims historically are fairly low, unfortunately. You know, the settlement that is in Ms. Conroy's declaration where she says her firm pretty much had the people with the best claims, who had prescriptions, et cetera, if you assume a reasonable contingency fee, it's about $\$ 13,500$ per person under that settlement. And I realize that was a while ago. But it's hard to look someone in the eye and say that's enough.

So at one level it would be quite easy for me to say to the Sacklers it's not enough. On the other hand, it's hard for me to say to Mr. Price and his committee you have to take the risk that this all falls apart over -- and it's never going to be enough, so it has to be some other bid or ask, whether it's another \$50 million or another 25 or another $\$ 100$ million. And at some point, there's a big risk.

And certainly AGs, who have been very aggressive in pursuing the Sacklers, including the State of New York and the State of Maryland -- I'm sorry, State of Massachusetts, excuse me, reached their point where they weren't willing to take any more risk of the whole thing falling apart.

So I would love for the Sacklers to pay enough to get your clients on board. I don't think that will happen if we adopt a rule that says any one governmental entity can

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kill the whole thing. So it's hard for me to see how you reconcile that ultimately without leaving somebody at least saying that they' re not on board with the plan.

MR. GOLDMAN: All points well taken. I think that, you know, it's a question of line drying as 1 tried to get Mr . Weinberger to acknowledge he didn't quite do it. But I think that it really is (indiscernible). And I think that what happened here, or at least what I perceive to have happened is there was a certain amount of fatigue that set in. Some states just threw up their hands and maybe saw the writing on the wall. But whatever it is, I do think that this does come back to our sovereign right to make these decisions for ourselves and not to be out voting and told to give up claims that aren't held by the estate.

THE COURT: But there's no -- there's no case in a bankruptcy context that holds that as far as states, right? MR. GOLDMAN: Well, not that I could find, Your Honor. But then again, there's nothing that goes the other way either on this.

THE COURT: Well, there's plenty of caselaw that says that police and regulatory monetary claims get discharged in a bankruptcy case. Now, those are claims against the debtor, $I$ understand. But they don't -- those cases don't distinguish between state claims and private claims if it's to collect money, like Peabody Coal, for
example.

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, I had cited in our objection a line of cases holding that these type of claims, consumer protection claims, claims brought under unfair and deceptive acts and practices acts are non-dischargeable under either Section 523(a) (7), again, I'm speaking now individual case, or in the Section 523(a)(2)(A).

In my brief in the section of the plan -- or argument that the plan usurped our rights to have those declared non-dischargeable.

THE COURT: Right. But that's for individuals. And if you're dealing with a Chapter 11 case, those wouldn't be applying except by analogy. And again, I think the circuit in the MacArthur case dealt with the 523 point.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, $I$ was directing it to the Sacklers and the point that the effect of discharge that we viewed they are getting by these releases really circumvented those non-dischargeability provisions, if they had --

THE COURT: I understand. I understand. But -well, we're dealing with a concept that $I$ guess when you're talking about the payment of money under a plan has not been directly addressed, but it's certainly been indirectly addressed by the Courts.

MR. GOLDMAN: Can I flesh out for a moment what I
believe the response is to the MacArthur argument?

THE COURT: Sure, yeah.

MR. GOLDMAN: So I'm looking at the case. And it says MacArthur argues that the injunctive orders constitute a de facto discharge in bankruptcy of non-debtor parties as not entitled to the protection of Chapter 11.

But that was directed to MacArthur, a corporation. It didn't really deal with the issue that I'm raising. And that is that the effect of discharge here in favor of the Sacklers really does circumvent the non-dischargeability provisions that would apply if they filed their own bankruptcy. That was not a -- the comment that the Second Circuit was addressing.

THE COURT: Except that you're not getting a discharge under this plan. They're settling claims in return for a release. And the MacArthur Manville case I think went off on that ground, as do a lot of the other cases. It's not the same thing as a discharge.

MR. GOLDMAN: It is not quite the same thing. But for the clear majority of their debts and for the clear majority of their current financial problems is solved by this release, we'll call it, not a discharge.

THE COURT: That's fair.

MR. GOLDMAN: And so I think it's as close as the discharges we're going to get, even though it's technically
not an actual discharge. I understand.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: But if $I$ can turn now just to the subject matter jurisdiction argument, which $I$ think is governed by Manville III cited in our papers, which was decided three years after (indiscernible).

And in the context of striking down the third party release there, the Second Circuit instructed us to look to a state's laws to see whether the claims are derivative of the Debtors or whether they are based on some wrongdoing of the third party to independent legal duty.

And if we look to state law here, I don't think there's any question that the Sacklers engaged, at least as alleged, in independent wrongdoing of their own as opposed to Purdue under state law.

The laws of some of the objecting states are directly on point on this. For example, in Connecticut, an individual can be liable for unfair deceptive acts of a business entity if the individual either participated directly in the entity's deceptive or unfair acts or had the authority to control them. To the same effect is Maryland law. As long as there is authority to control the acts, they can be liable under unfair and deceptive practices acts. To the same effect as Vermont law, where an individual could be liable under their consumer protection
act if he or she directly participates in the acts or gives direct aid to the corporate actor. And also too with Washington's Consumer Protection Act, where they can be liable for corporate wrongdoing if the individual participates in the wrongful conduct or with knowledge approves of it.

So all of those are independent legal duties that run to the Sacklers and that would satisfy the Second Circuit's testare of independent wrongdoing.

Now, I know that the Debtors have argued that the indemnity obligations and the insurance policies are part of the calculus here in determining whether there is jurisdiction. And I acknowledge the conceivable effects test, but maintain it is not so liberal a standard as to preclude consideration of the likelihood or probability that the indemnification claim will be upheld.

In the UBS case that the Debtor cited in their brief, the Second Circuit holds that there must be a reasonable legal basis for the claim of indemnity. And we contend here that that just doesn't exist. And they cite two sources for their obligation to indemnify the Sacklers, the Purdue Pharma bylaws and Purdue Pharma's latest limited partnership agreement, both of which require the indemnity to act in good faith in order to ultimately be entitled to indemnity.

But preliminary at least as to the limited partnership agreement, the Debtors overlooked that it's an executory contract that can be rejected along with the indemnity obligation. Judge --

THE COURT: It still creates a claim.

MR. GOLDMAN: It does. It would create a contingent claim of indemnity under the contract, no doubt. But it would remove those obligations at least going forward to indemnify. For example, for a defense clause. And there are a couple of cases that do hold it executory. In re Heafitz, 85 B.R. 274 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) and the court in Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Strouss Bldg. Associates, 204 B.R. 948 (N.D. Ohio 1997) strongly suggested it was executory.

But even if it was not rejected, the limited partnership agreement, which is at JX0872, states that the partnership shall not be obligated to indemnify the indemnity to the extent a final decision by a court having jurisdiction in the matter shall establish that the indemnity did not act in good faith.

THE COURT: But again, in SPV OSUS v. UBS, the putative claimant that gave the -- you know, it was third party versus third party, the putative claimant that would argue contribution claims was someone who was being sued independently for having knowledge and participating in Bernie Madoff's fraud, aiding and abetting BLMIS.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all of that dirty linen, the Circuit said that there was a basis for related to jurisdiction.

MR. GOLDMAN: Acknowledged, but I'm not sure that there was the level of dirty laundry presented to the court there as we have here. You know, we have --

THE COURT: The fundamental point, which is Manville II, 517 F.3d 52.

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. THE COURT: I mean, the case was vacated, right? MR. GOLDMAN: Yes, it was.

THE COURT: And if the Circuit -- which, by the way, was dealing with a plan that had already been implemented, so it was actually accurate that these lawsuits at this time against the insurers really didn't affect the estate, because this was many years after the Manville Trust or the Manville Plan went into effect.

But leave that -- leave both of those things aside, that it was vacated and that under those facts, there really was no effect on the estate because the plan was already in place, $I$ think over a decade, and the trust was -- had already been paying out billions of dollars of claims, in part from the insurance settlements. If the case really does stand for the notion, which it says that only derivative claims can be enjoined, it really stands for the
proposition that these injunctions really aren't including, in Metromedia and Drexel and the like, are really not what they purport to be. Because you don't need an injunction to enjoin derivative claims because the Circuit law has been clear since the '80s that derivative claims are property of the estate.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I believe -- I believe in that case they were asserting the derivative claims of Manville-- well, actually, if we're going to take Manville III, the claim against Travelers was -- were their own independent --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- wrongdoing --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- in failing to lead to the attention, $I$ mean, --

THE COURT: But --

MR. GOLDMAN: -- is dangerous.

THE COURT: -- but I think the point is that Drexel and Metromedia say that under the unusual circumstance where the injunction is necessary for the plan, it's an integral part of the plan, it could be granted if you meet other factors as well, including overwhelming support for it.

The injunction at this point, according to the Circuit in the subsequently vacated opinion, wasn't
necessary because the plan was already in effect and it was operating. The plan wasn't going to be unwound. Using Mr. Huebner's metaphor, there was no string to pull to unwind the Plan. Travelers probably would have gotten the raw -or whoever it was that was the settling insurer, would probably have gotten a raw deal, but there was -- it was after the fact.

MR. GOLDMAN: It was, indeed, after the fact, but they certainly offset their reliance interest, having paid -- I know it project -- it was upwards of $\$ 100$ million, maybe not that much, into the plan. But --

THE COURT: Well, then $I$ guess that was why --

MR. GOLDMAN: I --

THE COURT: -- they were -- they reversed, is that Judge Lifland had found there was, in fact, jurisdiction, and no one had challenged that, and therefore, it stood.

MR. GOLDMAN: It was, I thought, reversed on other grounds by the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Right. Which said that take -- it takes no position on the jurisdictional issue in the reversal at 557 U.S. 137.

MR. GOLDMAN: So, I suppose -- technically having vacated, it may not have precedent, but --

THE COURT: Well, I guess --

MR. GOLDMAN: -- certainly --

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THE COURT: -- you know, I looked at -- there were very good lawyers involved in this case, obviously.

MR. GOLDMAN: True.

THE COURT: But they were not the lawyers who were involved in the bankruptcy case. They were not the lawyers who were telling Judge Lifland, the District Court, and the Circuit Court, in Manville, this is absolutely essential to get our Plan done. They were lawyers who were looking to protect an insurance company after the fact.

And, by the way, in connection with a subsequent settlement where notwithstanding their argument that the order relieved them of liability, insurance companies agreed to pay $\$ 500$ million more, so you could see why perhaps the Circuit at that point thought that there something more to squeeze here.

MR. GOLDMAN: It doesn't appear that way. But I still think for purposes of analysis, it's still good law for determining whether there is subject matter jurisdiction for these type of released, irrespective of the fact that no threat needed to be -- or was pulled --

THE COURT: Well, it's odd though because --

MR. GOLDMAN: -- to unravel the fabric.

THE COURT: -- they didn't say that they were
reversing their earlier case law.

But anyway, $I$-- look, there's only -- there's

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only so much someone can say on these cases. And certainly, the Osus case -- and it relies heavily on Celotex, of course, the Supreme Court case, as far as with the breadth of jurisdiction over third-party disputes.

MR. GOLDMAN: I would just make the point, Your Honor, then in assessing the indemnity obligation, that you do need to take into account to some degree the probability that indemnity would be upheld. And I just think there is just too much on the record here of findings that would -will take it against a finding of good faith.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not, you know, again, the record here is in the context of a request to approve a settlement, not a trial on the merits. But having said that, the settlement here is with the entire Sackler family, some of whom, many of who -- I think the majority of whom had no role with these Debtors other than being a shareholder.

So, it's hard to, you know -- and as far as the others, we heard from three different Board member -- four different Board members, and two who were at some level, executives. They're being sued, I think, those people, for every claim throughout the relevant period, which $I$ think is after 2007. And it's fairly clear from the testimony that while they may have been informed of marketing efforts, and in fact, some of them may have been pushing for greater
sales, there is still a callable issue as to whether they're liable for all of those claims.

MR. GOLDMAN: It didn't come as any surprise to me that they were proclaiming their innocence, and --

THE COURT: I -- I understand -- I understand.

And I -- and one is skeptical, obviously, about this. I didn't use the word "pushing" lightly. But, you know, it's -- we certainly didn't have any Perry Mason moments, let's put it that way.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, acknowledge, Your Honor. But I would say that the states were under a substantial disability, having been had their actions stayed for the entire duration of the case, and really being forced to try -- not effectively try or -- the claims that were against the Sackler on this expedited track.

THE COURT: Well, they had --

MR. GOLDMAN: So --

THE COURT: -- they had approximately 10 million documents with a Creditors' Committee and an Ad Hoc group of Non-Consenting States combing them for any signs of active management.

If, for example, $I$ was shown a document about one ride with a salesperson, you would think that if that was unearthed and there were more then the others would be too in those 10-millions of documents.

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So, I appreciate that, again, this was in the context of a trial of the merits of a settlement instead of the underlying issues and $I$ have no brief for the Sacklers nor do $I$ believe any of the proponents of the Plan. But I think even if one is to do some analysis of the validity of an indemnification claim, it's hard to see that there wouldn't be some effect, some conceivable effect on an asset of the estate.

MR. GOLDMAN: I'm -- I would just make a point in that regard, Your Honor, that it's hard to believe that after being under investigation from the United States Department of Justice since June of 2016 , that the DOJ would come up with a document like Addendum A to the Sackler Settlement Agreement, which is the JX-2096. With the level of detail that is in there implicating the named players, after four years of investigation I think it's hard to believe that they were not well supported and then weren't proceeded by a thorough investigation.

THE COURT: Well, again --

MR. GOLDMAN: I'm saying, it's not --

THE COURT: -- I heard -- I heard the direct examination on those documents, and I'll push back a little bit in the level of detail. There are certainly a number of allegations, but a lot is left for the imagination. And I'm -- it is obviously very conceivable to me that there is
substantial potential liability here. I'm just -- I just, on this record, it's hard to see that there's no conceivable effect on the estate based on that potential.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I'll also add the point that -- and this references the guilty plea in 2020, which covers the conduct from -- Purdue's conduct from May 2007 to March 2017.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. GOLDMAN: Some rather serious allegations there about ceasing detailing prescribers that they knew were not prescribing correctly, and for medically and necessary reasons, and the kickbacks in the Practice Fusion. THE COURT: I agree.

MR. GOLDMAN: Right.

THE COURT: Although, I also note that there was -- although there were four Sacklers examined, I don't think any of them was asked about Practice Fusion. Maybe one was, who said, I didn't -- I never heard of Practice Fusion. So, look, I think -- I think we've probably said enough on this one.

I want to be clear. I think there is substantial risk that the Sacklers, or some of them, would be liable for huge amounts of money, no question, both to the Debtors and to third parties. The question is where you draw the line given the risks on the other side of not just the merits,
but maybe even more importantly the effect on who gets what under -- from them, the allocation issues, the abatement issues that were discussed, and collectability.

MR. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, I don't mean to take more than my allocated time. Can I --

THE COURT: That's fine. I --

MR. GOLDMAN: -- make a --

THE COURT: -- I'm prolonging it, so you're not to blame.

MR. GOLDMAN: I just want to make a quick few points about the Kirwan decision. And, you know, I -what's notable about Manville III is that it did not hold as did Kirwan. That's simply because it challenged third-party release position as part of a confirmed plan. The Bankruptcy Court therefore had core jurisdiction.

I think they were asserting related to jurisdiction there, and if the fact that that particular release was in the plan, you would think that if the reasoning in Kirwan, is thought to be correct, they would have just said, well, its core was in the plan. That's not what Manville III held.

THE COURT: But no one argued that because it -they weren't -- they weren't at confirmation. They were after the fact. It was a bunch of insurance companies fighting each other and a bunch of plaintiffs' lawyers. It
was not --

MR. GOLDMAN: But even so, after the fact, they certainly could have argued there was core jurisdiction because it was part of the Plan.

THE COURT: They didn't need to. They just needed -- well, the whole thing was academic because they -- they missed, because no one briefed it to them perhaps, that the key point, which the Supreme Court picked up on, which is the jurisdictional argument had decided 10 years before, or 20 years before by Judge Lifland's order.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, I would just make the point that the determination of whether something is core, really should depend on whether it happens to be inserted in the plan. It's just too convenient. And I understand that the Kirwan decision's response to that is that it has to be sufficiently related to the issues before the court, that's what the response was to that --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- argument. But if that's the case, every third-party release of an officer or director could be found could be -- could be related to the issues --

THE COURT: Well, not necessarily. I mean, those types of release may well be abused, no doubt. But I -- you know, the Third Circuit dealt with this from Judge Silverstein up to the other circuit in Millennium, same
point as CareOne.

MR. GOLDMAN: I understand and I still don't disagree -- still don't agree with the decision --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- as it's, you know, simply form over substance really when they say, if it's put in a plan, it must be poor, and the third-party releases really don't address the merits of the claims, but effectively cancel them in furtherance of the reorganization.

THE COURT: Except that --

MR. GOLDMAN: And whether the claims --

THE COURT: -- again, the Third Circuit standard includes fairness and whether you agree with Judge Garrity's interpretation of $1129(a)(7)$ as applied here in Dietech or not, that is at least a fairness element, a fairness analysis.

And again, you know, there is a difference if it's in a plan. You have the voting. You see how people voted, you see whether it's, you know, just barely accepted or overwhelmingly accepted, you have it in the context of a confirmation hearing with, in this case, six days of evidence being presented and, you know, approximately -well, a little under 40 witnesses. I mean, it's -- there is -- there is -- I think there is a difference by doing it through a plan, including the jurisdictional hook, which is

1123 and 1141.

This is not just a property of the estate issue. You have -- you have Congress providing for -- the proponents would argue, extraordinarily powerful tools in the confirmation context in Sections 1123 and 1141 , that 105 would be in assistance of.

MR. GOLDMAN: Well, the final point I'll make on this, Your Honor, and I understand you may have a different view on this. But, I mean, whether the claims are cancelled as part of a plan or are adjudicated on the merits, the result is the same from the perspective of the party who is being forced to give up the release. They're claims are gone, they can't prosecute them anymore, and their claims, although they might be channeled into a trust, are severely limited by what it is put into that pot. And the balance of their claim is extinguished.

So, to me it is form over substance to join up a dichotomy, but I understand the Third Circuit and Judge McMahon see it differently.

THE COURT: Okay. And frankly, I think the Circuit Courts generally see it differently. At this point, at least in the Blixseth case, the Ninth Circuit has said that some types of third-party claims could be eliminated under a Plan. In Pacific Lumber, Judge Jones actually seemed to say that perhaps in the mass tort context you
could do that, but not in this sort of general release of the Os and Ds.

So, I think at this point, the only Circuit on record, as opposed to several, like, the Seventh, Second, Third, First, Sixth, Eighth, support third-party releases, is the Tenth Circuit. But they haven't had a case since 1990 really on this point.

So, I -- look, this is the -- the cases, the courts, the Circuit Courts, that say that these types of releases are proper, and therefore, I think, supported jurisdictionally, do so requiring the bankruptcy court to take a very exacting hard look at all the facts and circumstances. That's different than the normal settlement where you take a look, and a good look if someone's objecting, but not that type of level of inquiry.

But they do say that if it's within those parameters, which of course, appellate courts are free to say, well, no, it really didn't fit within those parameters, but if it does fit within those parameters, that this is authorized.

MR. GOLDMAN: With that, Your Honor, I'll just make one final point in which $I$ haven't addressed yet. And that -- and that deals with what $I$ view as preemption, and relating to Section 1123 , which states, notwithstanding any

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDMAN: -- estate are, but the plan can provide adequate means for its implementation, which the Debtors would argue would include a third-party release. But I think that what that does, is it effectively is preempting the police power claims of the states that we're arguing here for by, you know, effectively eliminating them.

And there is case law that I cited in our objection, the PG\&E case in the Ninth Circuit and -- as well as the Urban Tanner decision in the First Circuit, that hold basically that the -- a plan has no right to preempt these type of police power claims.

THE COURT: No. Except in those cases, what the plan was doing was not channeling a monetary claim to a fund. What the plan in PG\&E was doing was changing the regulatory oversight of the debtor as far as the UC approval of fundamental corporate changes. They're really a couple different things. I mean, the Third Circuit's federal Mogul case, I think is pretty impeccable in its analysis of 1123 and what can be done under it and what can't be done under. And, of course, that didn't involve something exactly like this either.

But clearly, the statute means something, and it's hard to see the logic of applying PG\&E to channeling money. In fact, PG\&E itself said, 1123 applies to only financial
matters. Well, I think nothing's really more financial than wanting to get more than the agreed allocation for each state; that's money.

MR. GOLDMAN: I had viewed that -- and I know what Your Honor's referring to, the holding that it -- I had viewed that to be directly to the notwithstanding state law, applicable state law. I had viewed the court to meant that the state law they were talking about, being notwithstanding to, was financial related.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GOLDMAN: So -- but that's the way I took --

THE COURT: -- to me, I mean, you don't -- you don't need -- you know, that's too narrow a description because then, you know, Ohio v. Kovacs doesn't matter.

Right? I mean, you -- the statute to say it, instead of the fact that it's a discharge anyway. I mean, again, state law claims for money are discharged in corporate bankruptcies. So, I -- it has to -- it has to be broader than just getting rid of a claim.

But that's just my take on it. There's no holding exactly on point; $I$ understand that.

MR. GOLDMAN: Okay. Well, with that, Your Honor, I will yield to my colleague to finish up on the Metromedia factors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDMAN: And thank you for your time, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, on the -- on Iridium $I$ thought, but maybe not. Maybe I'm missing --

MR. GOLDMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: Anyway, Mr. Gold?

MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. Thanks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. Matthew Gold, Kleinberg Kaplan Wolff \& Cohen, representing the states of Washington, Oregon, and the District of Columbia.

And I'll just say it again that we have coordinated with the attorneys' generals' offices of Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Vermont in order to provide a unified presentation to the Court.

The parties were concerned because of some comments the Court had made in the context of joinders, that somehow their cooperating with us could be held against them. But -- and I am confident that that is not how the Court sees it.

THE COURT: No. The only issue that $I$ was addressing is that if someone doesn't file their own objection and just files a joinder, if the party to whose objection they joined settles or withdraws their objection, the joining party has nothing, and that's all, and nothing
more than that.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. And I guess I should have started just to make sure that you can hear me okay, and that I'm --

THE COURT: I can, but when you -- when you rock back, $I$ can't. So, if you could -- I hate to say it, if you could stay at a rigid position, or at least closer to the microphone, that would be good.

MR. GOLD: I will try to stay this way, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Your Honor, we urge you not to make the historic mistake of confirming this Plan. The Plan contains fatal flaws, will be reversed on appeal. The pain for all the people who are hoping for benefits under the Plan will be far, far worse if the Plan is confirmed and then reversed.

This Plan is like a huge rocket ship. Many people have worked long and hard to put it together, but it is clear upon inspection that the engineer's plans contain terrible flaws, in this case, the non-consensual third-party releases in favor of the Sacklers, imposed upon sovereign states.

The Debtors are saying, we worked so hard to put this rocket ship together, so we can't stop now. We'll keep
our fingers crossed that nothing bad happens after liftoff. But it clear that the wiser course of action is to keep the rocket on the ground and work hard to correct the flaws now. The parties need to focus on their joint goal of getting help to victims, but without the mistaken premise that sovereign states can be compelled to grant releases of police power actions against the Sacklers and against their will.

Now, Your Honor, I'm going to give you a brief road map into what our argument is going to be about. We have preserved in our papers for appeal the argument that Metromedia was wrongly decided, and the United States Trustee discussed that. But we will not repeat that for Your Honor. We understand that Your Honor was bound by Metromedia.

The focus of our argument today is that the proposed injunction, non-consensual third-party release are improper under Metromedia. The impropriety is based both on the nature of what is being enjoined, states exercising police powers, which $I$ will address briefly -- shortly, and the beneficiaries of the injunction, the Sackler family, the legal standards we think are relatively -- should be uncontroverted here.

Metromedia states that it is ultimately a matter of facts and circumstances, as the Debtors themselves
pointed out. But in addition, it is an elementary and ancient element of our laws that equitable relief, including the injunctions that are contained in the Plan, do not go to those who have unclean hands. The clean hands doctrine involves bad acts by the beneficiaries of the proposed injunction that relate to the relief sought, and that is exactly what our evidence does. It shows bad acts by the Sacklers that relate to the injunction being sought.

Now, one other housekeeping matter I need to clear up, Your Honor. It's not clear to me exactly why anyone had the impression, except for the way that the Debtors structured their chart, and I would be addressing Rule 9019/TMT Trailer/Iridium.

First of all, as Your Honor pointed out, the standards under Rule 9019 and the standards for nonconsensual third-party releases are very different things. Rule 9019 covers settlements of estate causes of action. It has nothing to do with non-consensual third-party releases. Whether the Estate has satisfied its burden under Rule 9019, Iridium or TMT Trailer is irrelevant to direct claims of third-parties against non-Debtors.

In any event, we have nothing to add to what was in our papers regarding Rule 9019 , Iridium or TMT Trailer with respect to the settlement of the Estate causes of action and $I$ will be focusing my argument with respect to
non-consensual third-party releases and Metromedia.

I will -- I think it is important to note about Metromedia that like all the decisions, it stuck to the facts in the case. The Debtors are trying to read into the case more than that. The main takeaway of the case is that releases are subject to abuse and should be used rarely. That holding is being mocked by the reported use here.

I will also note that the decision surveyed earlier decisions dealing with the topic and that is why, because no earlier decisions dealt with the circumstances here, that there's nothing in Metromedia that deals with our particular circumstances.

The Debtors have made the astonishing argument that the central holding in Metromedia is that releases are appropriate as long as they are important to the Debtor's restructuring. I submit that the Debtors got it backwards. Metromedia held that releases are inappropriate unless they are important to the Debtor's restructure. In other words, importance to restructuring is necessary but not sufficient.

Debtors also argue that payments to be made by the Sacklers are substantial. Their argument is basically, it's billions of dollars. Of course it is substantial, but it is easy to lose sight of the fact that claims in this case are in the trillions of dollars. In other words, the Debtors, under the stewardship of the Sacklers caused trillions of
dollars of harm to the people of the states of the United States. As a result, the Sacklers are facing exposure to those states that measures in the trillions of dollars. Getting rid of trillions of dollars of exposure through the payment of a billion dollars is a pretty sweet deal.

In short, there are a lot of cases --

THE COURT: Can we explore that?

MR. GOLD: Certainly, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That sounds like you're accepting that they would be liable for the trillions of dollars and that more than, or materially more than the settlement sum would be collected. What is your basis for saying that?

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I am not accepting that. I carefully used the word "exposure" --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: -- because there is the potential for that. We have not asked this Court -- I think all the parties have agreed that it is not for this Court to actually make findings regarding the exact merits of such actions and --

THE COURT: But I'm supposed to consider the risks and the rewards of both alternatives: the alternative of the plan versus the alternative where I deny confirmation of the plan.

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, your -- I think that
is taken into account in our argument. I'm not sure exactly what you're asking me here.

THE COURT: I think, again, if you're going to get to that, fine. But $I$ just don't accept the premise that because they face substantial exposure, they're not paying enough.

MR. GOLD: Well, no, that's not the argument that I'm making, Your Honor. I'm simply marking the argument that it's a very good deal from their perspective. And that the --

THE COURT: That's the same point. Not paying enough means it's a good deal. It's the same point.

MR. GOLD: That could be. I'm simply comparing the relative sizes of the two, Your Honor. But the Debtors have certainly not shown any case where a payment that was so trifling in connection with the claims in the case was deemed substantial.

Debtors also argue that we are --

THE COURT: But, again, trifling -- you can define trifling in a couple of different ways, but ultimately, it would seem to me that trifling means, if it really is trifling, that it is not sufficient in terms of the actual legal risk faced by both sides.

MR. GOLD: Well, first, Your Honor, we do not believe that it is for this Court to make an evaluation of
the risks faced by the sovereign states in determining whether or not to accept a settlement or to prosecute claims against the Sacklers.

THE COURT: But you were just telling me under Metromedia this is insufficient. So how am I supposed to determine sufficiency unless I do that?

MR. GOLD: What I am saying --

THE COURT: There are 38 sovereign states that say it is sufficient. So I think I need to ultimately make that determination as to whether they're right or you're right if I'm going to be applying the Metromedia factors. I understood Mr. Goldman that I shouldn't even get there. I got that point. But now we're at applying the factors and one of them is a materially sufficient contribution. So don't I have to inquire as to whether it's sufficient or not and just the fact that a state says it isn't shouldn't, end the day there if I'm applying the Metromedia Factors? And logically, because 38 states and thousands of governmental entities say it is sufficient.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I think we're talking about two different things here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: The fact that -- we do not dispute that reasonable minds can differ about whether or not the deal that is proposed by the Debtors can be accepted or not be
accepted and the fact that 38 states have decided that they wish to take this deal does not, in our view, mean that the Court can determine that they are being more reasonable than states that are not and therefore, their view should be imposed on them.

However, with respect to the substantiality prong, if you will, under Metromedia, we think that that can be measured in a couple different ways. What $I$ was addressing right here was the matter which $I$ think is fairly undisputed before the Court of comparing the amount of money that is being paid with the amounts of claims in the case. The amount of money that's being paid here is a tenth of a cent on payments to Unsecured Creditors in this case. And what I am simply saying is that none of the cases involving an application of the substantiality decision under Metromedia or otherwise have found that a payment was substantial when it was such a tiny percentage of the amounts of claims in the case.

THE COURT: Do you have any cases that talk about a percentage? I know that there is language in Metromedia and in other cases that talk about paying all or substantially all of the claims. I'm aware of that language, but I'm also aware of decisions that support a payment and injunction where there is a substantial payment or contribution of consideration. So I'm not aware of --
other than that language that $I$ alluded to -- there being any analysis of a percentage versus the claims.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I agree with what you have stated. Some cases, yes, have talked about substantial payment of claims, which is certainly not the case there. And other cases, although they did not expressly go through that analysis, we tried to look at what was happening in those cases and we have not found a single case where there was such a disparity between the return to Creditors and the amounts being paid.

THE COURT: Nor I expect have you found an amount as large as 4.325 billion dollars either.

MR. GOLD: But also not any case where the number of claims were in the trillions, Your Honor. We believe those two are inextricably linked.

THE COURT: Well, not necessarily.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Well, that is at least our argument, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: The Debtors argue that we are inventing
a police powers exception to non-consensual third-party release juris prudence. It is not entirely a blank slate.

First of all, we are not arguing for an exception to Metromedia or carve out from Metromedia. We are suggesting that Metromedia properly applied would result in
no third-party releases being imposed on sovereign states, not that it's an exception to the case.

But we also note that there are strong hints, if you will, from related context regarding the importance of claims asserted by governmental entities.

THE COURT: Can I -- I think I'm going to do this and I apologize, but your colleague, Mr. Goldman, really did cover it. We spent a good 45 minutes on this police power argument. You've also briefed it. $\quad$ just don't know if it really makes sense to spend more time on it.

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, I will try to make just a few brief points then even though -- I apologize if I am running over on what Mr . Goldman said.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: I will fist note that Mr. Kaminetzky tried to distinguish the First Alliance case -- I don't believe Mr. Goldman addressed that -- because the governmental entities would not enforce judgments against the Debtors. That is not the issue here. Here we are talking proceeding against non-Debtors.

I will also note caselaw in the Southern District in Ion Media, 419 Bankruptcy Reporter 585, the court approved third-party releases after governmental claims have been carved out. And I will also state that the Debtor has argued that, in connection with this, that we are trying to
create an exception here, we would just note -- and I don't think that $I$ need to cite them -- that there several provisions in the Bankruptcy Code as we've noted the rule statute, the automatic stay provision, that creates special rules protecting claims asserted by governmental entities. But the circumstances though -THE COURT: Actually, those rules don't protect against the constraints on paying those claims.

MR. GOLD: All I'm saying, Your Honor, is they demonstrate that Congress had in mind that claims and police power actions could be treated differently from other claims in areas where Congress had specifically provided a power in the first place. Where Congress provided that there was an automatic stay, they provided that there would be exceptions for police power actions. Where Congress provided a removal statute -- excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, they did it specifically and narrowly the way they actually laid it out. MR. GOLD: But only in connection with the power that they had first granted. Likewise with removal. They had a removal power. They provided an exception. Congress has not provided for non-consensual third-party releases and so it has not had an opportunity to carve out an exception that demonstrates the special treatment that such claims should be afforded.

THE COURT: Well, they've certainly known about it since the enactment of 524 (g).

MR. GOLD: They've known about it but they've not added an expressed provision that provides any breadth to it, so we are left with a statutory void.

THE COURT: They actually did acknowledge the validity of the pre-524(g) injunctions and then Legislature said this should be worked out in the caselaw, which has happened. If they want to act, they will act in the future which is before Congress this very day so I'm not sure how much one can take away from their lack of acting other than that they've been aware of these issues for decades.

MR. GOLD: I agree with Your Honor and clearly, we are not dealing here with previous injunctions of the sort that are referred to in $524(\mathrm{~h})$. I simply note that Congress should not be faulted for not crafting an exception to a rule that they have yet to legislate on specifically.

Now the Debtors also argue that this case is not about police powers, but instead about money and point out that criminal conduct is being carved out of the releases that are being granted. With all respect, this shows a fundamental misunderstanding of police powers.

Police powers go well beyond the criminal law and the carve out of criminal violations, though laudable, is completely inadequate. The Estate claims that we are
addressing here are brought in the State's parens patriae capacity. Now $I$ want to briefly address parens patriae.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You guys have done this in your briefs. I think you should tell me why this isn't about money and leave it at that. Isn't that all this is about?

MR. GOLD: That's why --

THE COURT: I mean the point that I think both you and either Mr. Goldman or Mr. O'Neill made is if there'd be a little more money, we might be on board, or a lot more money. There's no injunctive relief that you're seeking here. The allocation has been agreed. In fact, Mr. O'Neill touted it as the best thing since sliced bread, almost a miracle. So we're just talking about money.

MR. GOLD: With respect, Your Honor, we are not talking about money until the State agrees to take money. We are talking about a regulatory -- and if the State Attorney General decides --

THE COURT: What other relief would be sought? If the plan were confirmed and your clients were carved out, what other relief would be sought other than money? MR. GOLD: Your Honor, our clients are very concerned about the public perception and the precedent that this case sets. They are very concerned that this case establishes the situation which $I$ could call the perfect
crime. Now I have to backtrack because I'm not literally talking about accusations of criminal wrongdoing against the Sacklers. That's just the phrase that describes what I'm thinking of.

What I'm talking about here is the situation where a family in control of a company that is, itself, admittedly engaged in criminal activity, takes the proceeds of that activity, then dangles those proceeds in order to obtain a full release from the consequences of that action or maybe not a full release, maybe just a very, very huge release. The point is that our clients are very concerned about that precedent that is being set and recognize that the actions that are being brought here have a -- the actions that are being not brought here, the actions that are proposed to be stopped in part have the effect of disincentivizing wrongdoing on this scale. And by --

THE COURT: So, how do they make -- I've already asked Mr. Goldman. They're going to keep the tax money though, right?

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, honestly, I -- if a request is made for tax money to be returned -- this is a context that I'm not particularly -- that I don't think has been addressed in any caselaw in this context and is honestly an issue that has yet to be addressed, but I've heard of a case that faulted a state for accepting tax money under what, at
the time, it thought was a legitimate tax payment.

THE COURT: And Connecticut is not going to see the return of charitable contributions to various colleges in Connecticut and other charities? And let's just move to a different topic than that, which is -- does this mean that the State of Connecticut won't, in the future, settle with the McKinsey's and J\&Js of the world?

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, just to be clear, I represent the State of Washington, not the state of Connecticut.

THE COURT: Okay. The State of Washington won't settle with the J\&Js and McKinsey's of the world?

MR. GOLD: They may, Your Honor, and, in fact, they have reached a settlement with the McKinsey's, but that was their choice to do so. We maintain that there is a huge and significant difference for the State of Washington to reach a settlement that is its choice or to have this Court tell the State that that is the choice it has make.

THE COURT: All right, but that's really what it comes down to, right? That's really, ultimately, all of this police power argument in this context boils down to, which is the states that are objecting want to have the ability to decide whether the settlement money should be paid or not, right? And $I$ guess what you're telling me is one of two things: either there is no amount of money that
would be sufficient or there just hasn't been enough so far. One of those two.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I am not telling you either of those. I am just telling you that the Attorney General of the State of Washington and likely the other Attorneys General who are part of the Objecting States, have weighed the package. It's a complex package. It has what I'll call apples and oranges because there's several different components to it. Money is a part of it. Money is not the only part of it. And they have weighed those in determining whether or not the settlement has the right elements in that. THE COURT: Well, I --

MR. GOLD: Even if the settlement is brought forward here --

THE COURT: -- haven't heard anything other than -- I'm sorry, Mr. Gold. I haven't heard anything other than their dissatisfaction with the money. I don't -- I haven't heard anything else about the plan being objectionable.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, honestly, to begin with, I think properly so that Your Honor has not been privy to all of the discussions that have gone on -THE COURT: I know, but -MR. GOLD: -- in mediation -THE COURT: -- as far as the -MR. GOLD: -- that discuss the --

THE COURT: -- settlement is concerned, I haven't heard any aspect. I mean, a major part of the planned proponent support for this settlement is based upon their argument that it is not just one settlement, but it's an integrated multi-settlement settlement, and you can't pull out the Sackler piece without destroying the rest of it. And if there's something about the Sackler piece beyond the amount of money being paid that is affecting the objecting states' determination, $I$ should know about it because so far I'm thinking that this is just about money. Now, money's important.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: Believe me, and I --

MR. GOLD: -- I think that --

THE COURT: -- understand your argument about each state and each municipality should have the right to say I'd need to be carved out. And I understand that issue. We don't need to cover it anymore, but if there is something other than money here that the settlement is deficient on, I should know about it.

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, $I$ think that the answer to that question $I$ can start with a few easy items. For one thing, as you've heard repeatedly, the settlement also contains provisions carefully negotiated regarding making public certain documents and not other documents in a
document repository.

THE COURT: Oh, so, okay. We don't have any -MR. GOLD: And --

THE COURT: -- document repository at all, and we'll waive the attorney-client privilege. We'll have the Sacklers waive the attorney-client privilege, which I'm sure the AGs would like to have established as a precedent for their privilege in the future.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, we ask the --

THE COURT: Let's be realistic, Mr. Gold (sic), all right?

MR. GOLD: Yes.

THE COURT: So I guess what you're saying is you want to have a trial without a document depository, right? Or repository. You want to have a --

MR. GOLD: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- full trial on the merits.

MR. GOLD: I -- I've not said that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: I will try to restate what I am saying here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOLD: First of all, $I$ just -- let me mention by comparison. Mr. Huebner and I -- this may seem slightly roundabout, but I am honestly answering Your Honor's

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question. Mr. Huebner put up a very fine chart during his presentation earlier where he showed a whole bunch of other cases that -- dealing with opioid liability. And his point was that, in those cases, there were complete releases that were granted of the scope like what was being done here.

But he left out the most compelling parts of his chart. First of all, in those cases, there were no nonconsensual third-party releases imposed. The cases got resolved without having to have non-consensual third-party releases. And those cases did not devolve into the dystopian Hobbesian nightmare that the Debtor sketched out as the only alternative to the plan.

In fact, $I$ would submit that they demonstrate the exact opposite, that the States Attorneys General are not wild, crazy actors, but extremely responsible public servants who, while trying to obtain justice and payments for their states, are mindful of trying to avoid chaotic situations and are very capable of negotiating with each other to keep things from devolving into chaos.

We submit that if this case does not proceed from the mistaken premise that non-consensual third party releases could be imposed on the states that it is likely that responsible heads would come up with a solution that protected the public interest and achieved some kind of justice. Exactly what that would be would have to be
thrashed out.

But the experience in these other cases suggests that the dismissive comments posed to Washington to say that you just want chaos, you just want to sue, you want everything to go away is far from the truth in that while what happens in one case doesn't necessarily prove what's happening in another case, it certainly gives strong reason to believe that cooler heads will prevail and that the parties, once they understand what the bounds of their jurisdiction and what they can get are, can reach a resolution.

Very compelling evidence was presented in the case by the Sacklers about how much they want the resolution, about how important it is that they have a resolution, that they need and want global finality. And they are, in fact, paying \$4.25 billion, albeit over ten years, in order to obtain that, which suggests that they -- that that is important to them too. So we submit that it is -- even though no one can make predictions, especially about the future, the -- that the likelihood here is that there are plenty of different possible outcomes, and that it is a mistake to assume that, while chaos would come from having parties be able to negotiate from the premise that it is up to them when to grant a release rather than up to the Court through bankruptcy power.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I did direct a second mediation on this issue, and I think the Sacklers, because I know they're well-represented, would've understood that that was a pretty good indication. I didn't believe that they had dug deep enough. Are you saying I should just deny confirmation and just trust that, as these cases proceeded, there would be some organization, including as to reviving all of the allocation provisions in the plan as between private and public, and within the public, and as far as abatement is concerned? Or are you saying something else?

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, I'm saying something close to that, but not exactly that. I am saying, first of all, this would be far from the first case where the parties have come together to try to propose a plan have learned that there was some problem or legal problem with the plan, had been sent back to the drawing board by the Court because they have to work out that problem. And then after a period of time, negotiations produced a new plan.

And the -- and you scarcely need me to list the various tools that judges use in order to reach that point between mediations, consideration about whether the effective theory, whether other plans could be permitted to be filed, and so forth. I'm just saying that we've seen this process in many cases, and that there is ample scope if the parties are proceeding under a realistic assessment of
what they can achieve, that they will be able to reach a resolution.

Just by way of an example because it came up in our testimony, the Sacklers understood, the Debtors understood that the reach of this Court did not encompass the claims of certain Canadian creditors. They understood based on that premise that they were going to have to allow the liability and exposure to stay on one side and to address what was left. And in all these other cases that are not Perdue, resolutions have been reached where parties have negotiated around the problem that they can't compel all of the states to reach a resolution. We just submit that that would likely be here. And it's a shame we agree

THE COURT: Look, your group --

MR. GOLD: -- that this case has reached this point.

THE COURT: -- can't even agree on how to submit evidence, right? You had your client's and you had Maryland. What assurance would I have that the extra time spent here would actually achieve anything given the theories that you are ultimately relying upon, and the apparent inability of your group to act as a unit?

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, I will not contest Your Honor's observation that sometimes dealing with this group
resembles the Seamus herding of cats. What I will say, though, is that this is far from the only situation that that has occurred. And again, I simply culled out the facts of so many things that the states have managed to agree on. They've managed to agree on allocations amongst themselves. They've managed to agree on many issues.

They have not been able as of yet to reach agreements under all issues. And that can be frustrating, I understand, but that does -- the fact that it may be painstaking and frustrating does not create a standard under Metro Media where the Court can grant releases of non -- of state claims that it wouldn't otherwise have.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know. When I've already had two mediations by two of the best mediators in the world on this issue?

MR. GOLD: And Your Honor, progress has been made. The -- I would submit that part of the problem with the mediation process so far is that the parties were proceeding under the premise that they would be able to get -- if this Court would rule that under Metro Media and otherwise that non-consensual third-party releases could be imposed on the states.

If the parties had an indication that that was not the case, I think you would see a lot of movement in the litigation because the parties have to reassess. This is
true of all mediations. Parties make their assessment based on where they think the law is going to go. So that has affected what -- how these mediations have gone.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I have not talked to Judge Chapman about her mediation, but we view these issues, I am sure, very much the same because we're guided by precedent. So what you're asking would actually artificially tilt the playing field. But maybe we should move on. I think I did have an answer to my question.

MR. GOLD: Okay. The -- thank you, Your Honor. I will ask your indulgence for 30 seconds to address parens patriae because I don't believe Mr . Goldman addressed this point specifically. But because -- and I don't believe it's been properly explained in the Debtor's response. I believe it evidences a confusion regarding its significance here. The -- $I$ will just say that -- it's an odd Latin phrase that I'm probably mispronouncing. It's been mentioned in the briefs, but they show so little understanding of the concept that the Debtor's simply argue -- excuse me, but this is not a parens patriae case. Nothing could be further from the truth. My definition of parens patriae is democracy. Or to take Abraham Lincoln's definition, government of the people, for the people, by the people.
is government by the people. Parens patriae is nothing less than government for the people the principle that the state has the right and the obligation to protect its people from harm. And as exercised by the people's elected officials so that the people can judge them. The Creditors Committee is constituted to look at the financial interests of creditors. It is not looking at protecting the people of the states from harm. The Debtor's Special Committee is not looking at that. The Debtors are not looking at that, and we --

THE COURT: All right. But Mr. Gold --

MR. GOLD: -- submit that --

THE COURT: -- we've already covered this. The way the states are protecting people from harm here is by asking for more money. It's not to stop someone or make someone build a better fence. It's not to stop someone from polluting. It's to get more money. So it is financial. So let's move on. I understand parens patriae very well.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. The -- I will
-- there's been a lot of discussion about how difficult a case this is, and that's been mentioned by many parties. I just want to again say that the attorneys general, including Attorney General Ferguson of Washington -- I've been grappling with this process for a long time, and I hope that the parties grant him the respect of recognizing that the actions of him and the other attorneys general are based on
a full and serious grappling of what they consider to be the proper response to this.

And again, which we say, buck stops with the attorneys general, not with these other parties. Mr.

Huebner revealed what $I$ consider to be a shocking ignorance of how our country is organized. The municipalities are subsets of the state, but more to the point, Mr. Huebner and Mr. Price had the audacity to ask in argument who supports the attorneys general.

My answer is very simple. Attorney General

Ferguson of Washington received $2,226,418$ votes in his last election. That's who supports Attorney General Ferguson, and he will have to face the voters again who can weigh in on whether he has made the proper choice in connection with these releases. And we again submit that's an issue for him and the voters, and not for this Court.

The Debtors argue that giving the Sacklers nonconsensual third-party releases produces the best result for creditors. Now, that's a value judgment that weighs the dollars brought in this case. It ignores that I've already described as the perfect crime message that can be -- that can also be read in the result of this case.

But the key point that $I$ want to emphasize here is that it is easy to produce a better result when one contributes value that one doesn't own. I will illustrate
this with a simple analogy. The Debtors could've improved the plan greatly and produced much more value for Creditors and opioid victims if they included the plan an injunction requiring Bill Gates to contribute several billion dollars to the plan trusts. Now, the flaw here is obvious. It is Bill Gates' money. It is up to him whether to contribute to the plan trusts.

My point is that the good that can be done with the money is irrelevant to the question of whether the debtors have the right to compel the contribution, and the same is true here. All the good that can be done with the money is not relevant. All the hard work that everyone has done is not relevant. The results of plan voting is irrelevant. What is relevant is that the Court cannot and should not grant these releases.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GOLD: The --

THE COURT: -- I -- that sounds pretty odd. I don't think your attorney general really means that, right? Ignore the good result because, and the "because" is what? What can be done better?

MR. GOLD: Oh, I'd -THE COURT: Not what could be done better, right? MR. GOLD: Well -THE COURT: Something else?

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MR. GOLD: Because one of two things has to happen, Your Honor. Either a -- either an offer can be made with all its components, including money, but not exclusively money, that is satisfactory to the attorney general, or litigation continues until the parties are ready to reach a resolution that is satisfactory. That's the rule in most litigation. Happens all the time.

Now, $I$ understand that in some contexts it's convenience to jump ahead there and to compel parties to do that, but we submit that this is not an area where the Court has the authority to do that. And so he -- so in this case, yes, it has to await the elected properly constituted attorney generals deciding that either the -- whatever's offered with all its component are adequate or to continue until a different resolution can be reached. The --

THE COURT: That's not really a Metro Media argument, though. That's really Mr . Golden -- Goldman's argument. So $I$ think we're probably coming to the area of diminishing returns at this point.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Well, I will -- I have one more legal point to make, Your Honor, and then I'll move onto the next part of my presentation. The -- Mr. Huebner invokes the tragedy of the commons in his argument, but it's really the same issue. What would be the commons here? It seems, to understand his analogy, that the commons has to be the

Sackler family and its property.

THE COURT: No, that's not --

MR. GOLD: Yes.

THE COURT: -- at all what he's talking about.

You guys just aren't listening. You have hundred and thousands of people who hate the Sacklers who have agreed to this. It's not for the Sacklers' benefit. It's because they have made a calculation that they do better, "they" the creditors do better, "they" the victims do better. They would love to have the Sacklers pay more money. This is not a plan for the Sacklers. You just get over that rhetoric, all right? I agree with you --

MR. GOLD: I'm sorry --

THE COURT: -- and I agree with Mr. Goldman.

Reasonable minds can disagree as to what is the best result, but this rhetoric really doesn't help. And frankly, it just -- it's just not consistent with the record or with the constituents in this case or --

MR. GOLD: And I'm sorry --

THE COURT: -- with my view of it, which is I could care less what the Sacklers want other than the effect of pushing them too far so that you do have a tragedy of the commons. So actually address the tragedy of the commons instead of just bloviating about a plan being for the Sacklers' benefit.

MR. GOLD: Your Honor, $I$ am sorry if $I$ did not express my thought properly, and I certainly don't wish to upset the Court. I am simply trying to understand the analogy that when someone refers to the tragedy of the commons, that refers to some common asset that is being used by some parties to the detriment of others. A lake, perhaps, that some are polluting in so that others cannot use. I understand the basic concept, and I'm asking myself in this context what is meant by the commons.

What is the commons here that is -- that we are being accused of spoiling for the benefit of others? What I am suggesting here is that the commons in this context cannot mean the debtors or their estates because we are really not contesting what is happening with the property of the Debtors' estates --

THE COURT: Wait.

MR. GOLD: -- and what is being done there.

THE COURT: But the record is crystal clear that the current plan at least, and the work that the parties spent for over a year in allocating the value of the Debtors' estates wouldn't survive the collapse of the settlement with the Sacklers.

MR. GOLD: I understand that, Your Honor, and it was carefully constructed that way. I simply wish to observe that -- and I did not bring the analogy of the
tragedy of the commons into this. This was the Debtors' argument.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLD: My only point is that the commons here, if I'm understanding the Debtors' analogy, is the money that the Sacklers are contributing or the assets of the Sacklers in general, that's what is meant by the commons in applying this analogy. And it is not really the Debtors' property at issue, and that's --

THE COURT: All right. I guess -- I think they would disagree with you, which is that the commons is the entire set of agreements that the parties have agreed to, not just the Sackler piece of it.

MR. GOLD: Well, that --

THE COURT: And I do understand your point, but we're just coming back to the same point every time, which is that you believe every state needs to agree to this, and perhaps every governmental entity.

MR. GOLD: Well, I'm not arguing --

THE COURT: And that's really what it comes down to --

MR. GOLD: -- with respect to other --

THE COURT: -- because there's really not a whole lot of on-point, directly on-point, precedent on that issue. MR. GOLD: We agree, Your Honor, and that's why

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I'm now ready to move onto new points.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GOLD: The -- which are the factual issues.

Pursuant to a stipulation and order that the state's reached with various parties, it's on the docket at, excuse me, number 3601, all of our exhibits have been admitted into evidence without an objection for all purposes. I just note that we submitted a fair amount of evidence, and the amount of evidence we introduced is very much part of the point.

Our argument, as I said before, is that the conduct of the Sacklers weighs tremendously upon whether or not the leases are proper under Metro Media and under general federal law. And so that when we say that the Sacklers' conduct renders them undeserving of the benefits, it is significant that we are not talking about isolated pieces of evidence.

Mr. Huebner made the incredible statement that the objectors have introduced no evidence. Nothing could be further from the truth, as I've said before. Now, I'm going to -- now, Your Honor, I'm -- what I am prepared to do, but Your Honor can stop me at any point, is to address the evidence that we put forward, some of which was addressed by Mr. Goldman, and $I$ will not repeat any piece of evidence that he discussed. But $I$ feel that $I$ am caught between $a$ rock and a hard place here candidly, Your Honor, because - -

THE COURT: No, I wanted you to get to the evidence about an hour ago. So please do it, yes.

MR. GOLD: Okay. I'm sorry. Okay. Very good. So the -- I will summarize the evidence that we submitted as first a series of state complaints. I could give the joint exhibit numbers if necessary. The Debtor guilty plea and DOJ statement. The DOJ Sackler settlement. Those documents are, we believe -- certainly the last several -- well-known to Your Honor. Several of them are on the court docket and were part of motions that were approved.

However, these documents have not been given their due in this context. The point has been made all too often that the salient point of these documents is that the Sacklers have not conceded that they are true, and we don't dispute that point. But this leads to what $I$ call the fallacy of they-said-we-said. The argument is essentially being made that if a statement is made and the Sacklers deny it, that all that one can do in that circumstance is to simply not know what the answer is, or to consider that as equally likely that the fact be true or not true. And -THE COURT: Well, you can assume that $I$ don't approach it that way.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. That's why we think it is significant that the complaints that we're talking about here are not fishing expedition
allegations from some commercial complaint, but are based on years of investigations by the U.S. attorneys and the state attorneys general. And we submit that it is simply not credible that anyone would conclude that no one has any idea whether these allegations are true.

Furthermore, due to this Court's injunction, the state of knowledge is somewhat frozen in place from 2019. Now, I recognize that discovery was taken in the court process, but the Debtors and the Sacklers have often pointed to statements like, these are the only Sacklers who have been named in complaints. Well, no new complaints could be filed, so the -- even as new information came out, no new Sacklers could be named in any complaints.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. GOLD: Without that freeze, we would --

THE COURT: -- are there any documents that actually show other Sacklers in a management role or a hands-on board role that are in evidence?

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, the -- let me turn to what the documents are. The -- we would start by urging the Court to carefully consider addendum $A$ to the Sacklers' settlement. It's 31 pages long and contained 170 numbered paragraphs. It contains in detail the manner in which the named Sacklers abused their stewardship of Perdue.

I can cite to some highlights if that's helpful to
the Court, or if the Court's familiar with it I can skip through that at the Court's discretion.

THE COURT: No, we've spent a lot of time on it, and $I$ am very familiar with it.

MR. GOLD: Okay. Then I will presume that Your Honor is familiar with this. The -- those allegations are corroborated, the statements really, are corroborated by significant extrinsic evidence, such as the Practice Fusion guilty plea, the McKenzie judgment, what $I$ have referred to as the Price exhibits, and the exhibits that were attached to motion by the non-consenting state group at docket number 2012.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. The McKenzie -- you said the McKenzie judgment?

MR. GOLD: It was a settlement that was incorporated in the judgment --

THE COURT: All right. So it's a settlement with

MR. GOLD: -- that are part of our papers --

THE COURT: -- McKenzie.

MR. GOLD: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. And the Practice Fusion judgment.

MR. GOLD: Yes, and please.

THE COURT: And the motion that you referred to is

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the one seeking further discovery to waive the privilege? Is that the one you're referring to?

MR. GOLD: Yes. The purpose of the motions clearly was not -- and some of the legal issues involved in that motion are not directly germane to our issue here. But facts can be relevant to several different legal issues at the same time, and we submit that the facts that were adduced in connection with that are very relevant to an assessment of the -- whether the Sacklers are deserving parties to receive the benefit of a federal injunction.

I can -- again, Your Honor, I can indicate some of the elements that are taken from there or $I$ can assume that Your Honor is familiar with all of them and that it is not necessary for me --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not familiar with the --

MR. GOLD: -- to go through them.

THE COURT: -- Practice Fusion judgment. Does that judgment refer to the Sacklers' role in dealing with Practice Fusion?

MR. GOLD: It pulls together, Your Honor, the -- a -- we submit that has two components to it. On one hand, the Debtors' interactions with Practice Fusion were part of the Debtors' guilty plea. The -- but again, we have this curious construct with respect to the guilty plea where the guilty pleas was done by the Debtors as an entity, but no
admissions were made regarding the underlying factors that went into it.

We submit that the facts of the Practice Fusion guilty plea, which are consistent with and support the elements that are described in the relevant statement, and that provide corroborating independent evidence to suggest that certainly the portions of those statements that deal with activities with Practice Fusion are, in fact, true, notwithstanding the blanket denials that have been issued by the Sacklers and the Debtors.

THE COURT: I think -- I'm not sure about the blanket -- I don't think there is a blanket denial by the Debtors, one. Two, my question really went to whether the Practice Fusion judgment or any other document related to Practice Fusion in evidence adds to the examination that was had on Addendum $A$, as far as any Sacklers role vis-à-vis Practice Fusion.

MR. GOLD: Honestly, Your Honor, I'm not sure I can give you a specific answer to the question the way you have phrased it there.

THE COURT: Well, I would have thought during the examination, one of the attorneys that was doing it would have pointed to some document besides Addendum $A$ if it pertained to the Sacklers role with Practice Fusion. And I'm leaving aside general testimony that I've received as to
the four witnesses role at Purdue.

MR. GOLD: Well, Your Honor, I will simply note that Mr. Edmunds from Maryland is going to be wrapping up the presentation, at least this side, and he is probably better suited to answer that particular question than $I$.

Okay. I will mention, subject to Your Honor telling me you're familiar with these things, a few items from what we're calling the UCC exhibits, if Your Honor understands what I'm referring to. They're all independent -- they have all been admitted as part of the joint exhibit book.

There is an email from 2012 -- this is JX-2938 -that describes the Sacklers as providing micromanaging the sales team beyond belief.

There is a memo -- this is JX-2943 -- in which Dr. Landeau identifies as a problem that the board was serving as de facto CEO.

There is an email exchange -- this is JX-2943 -between Richard and Jonathan Sackler from February of 2011, attaching a memorandum discussing the board that states, "There seems to be a consensus that the role of the board and that of management is blurred, compared with the distinctions made by other major corporations."

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I think you gave me the exhibit number for both of those two, the Landeau memo and
the one you just went to.

MR. GOLD: I believe you are correct, Your Honor. If you give me just a moment, $I$ will give you the correct numbers here. I'm sorry. The first of the two I mentioned is 2943 and the second is 2941.

THE COURT: Okay. And what's the date of that memo?

MR. GOLD: If by memo, you mean the second one, that is February 15th, 2011.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: There is an October 2013 business plan -- this is JX-2995 -- that are excerpt. Section 5 (b) is a focus for the board on increasing sales by targeting high volume prescribers.

There is JX-2951, a September 2013 memorandum, which reflects a McKinsey presentation to the Purdue board that suggests turbocharging the sales engine, and it's a quote. There are corroborating matters also from what I'm referring to the non-consenting state group -- this was originally filed as Docket 2012, but JX-2931 are emails from 2013 reflecting that the board gave a ringing endorsement of the McKinsey proposal.

And JX-2925, a 2008 McKinsey email, describing that decision making at Purdue was an utter failure due to board interference.

THE COURT: All right. Never mind, you can go ahead, Mr. Gold.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. I will also note that this relates now to Ilene Sackler. Due to a stipulation that was entered just at the very end of the trial, rather than having her be examined at trial, her deposition was admitted into evidence.

It is JX-3298. She admitted at Pages 84 and 85 of her deposition that she didn't pay much attention during board meetings. At a minimum, that cinches the case for breach of fiduciary duty that could be brought with respect to her.

Counsel for Maryland --

THE COURT: All right, but that's not a thirdparty claim, right?

MR. GOLD: No. That reflects to -- that reflects the proprietary of the state claims more than third-party claims, I believe, Your Honor. I'm not going to say that they're completely irrelevant. It just jumped off the page at me in one consequence.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, it's hard for me to -the ultimate issue here, as far as the third-party claims, is the balance between being what you just described Miss Ilene Sackler admitting to and someone being more than a proper board member in terms of being hands on, so why don't
we just focus on the third-party claim documents.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. In conclusion, I just wish to respond to the question that has been asked by plan proponents: Why are estates opposing this settlement?

I will simply say that we have not questioned the good faith that states and other parties who've accepted the settlement. I think we've established, Your Honor, that we recognize it's a difficult decision that involves weighing apples and oranges, and we ask that the decision of the objecting states be respected as well.

With respect to respect and good faith, I will not respond specifically to the cruel comments that Mr. Price made regarding the Attorneys' General of several states. I will simply say that just speaking for Washington in this regard, we suggest that you look at what Washington has done rather than what anyone might insinuate.

And for instance, the funds that McKinsey -- that Washington received in the McKinsey settlement have gone to abatement, and that was done by Washington without the need of having the Bankruptcy Court or anyone else direct Washington that that's what they had to do.

Unless the Court has any --

THE COURT: Is that in the record?

MR. GOLD: I do not believe it is on the record,

Your Honor. It's only a matter that this was raised for the first time to me by Mr. Price's comment earlier.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLD: I believe it's a matter of public record and that the Court could take judicial notice of it if we had to brief that one.

THE COURT: Did it enhance abatement or just replace funds that had already been allocated towards abatement?

MR. GOLD: Actually, I would ask -- I see that Mr.

O'Neill is Mr. O'Neil is here and he can answer that specific question better than $I$ can if $I$ can yield to him for this, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess Mr. Gold put you on the spot, Mr. O'Neil, so if you could answer that question.

MR. O'NEIL: The State of Washington would be happy to supplement the record, Your Honor. It was appropriated for abatement services, and it was not replacement money. It was appropriated ad initio by the legislature on the recommendation of the attorney general.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Gold.

MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, unless you have any questions, I am ready to yield to Mr. Edmunds.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. Thanks.

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, if you're ready for me,

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I'm here.

THE COURT: Yes, and I can see you and hear you fine.

MR. EDMUNDS: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. Brian Edmunds for the State of Maryland.

Let me first of all say that $I$ will adopt for our state the arguments that Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gold have made on behalf of the other states. And I'm going to kind of -there are specific points that were assigned to me today. I think the Court has gotten into them to some extent in its questions, so I'm just going to try to, at this point, address the questions that $I$ think may be left over that the Court has at this stage of a lengthy argument.

I mean, I think the first one that is important and what $I$ was going to talk about anyway, is what it is that we are seeking here to do. Is it just about money? It's not. What this is is about implementing the police power that we have, and specifically about achieving deterrence and regulating the opioid market.

Money is certainly important, receiving money in the form of compensation, disgorgement, penalties that are authorized under not only the Maryland statutes, but all of the state's statutes that I'm aware of, is important. But it's important not just for the purpose of compensation. It's important for the purpose of deterrence, for the
purpose of the regulation that it provides to the conduct of businesses in the marketplace, especially in a marketplace as important as the prescription drug marketplace.

To that end, the statutes that we proceed under, Maryland's is mentioned in our separate objection, but they give -- ours is called a cease and desist proceeding, and we are authorized in that context incidentally to recover compensatory damages.

But the proceeding generally operates for an injunction, which we would I think, you know, certainly, we would seek an expansive one against both Debtors and the Sacklers in the proceeding in Maryland, and it also permits the recovery of disgorgement, of damages as $I$ said, and of civil penalties among other things that the statute provides for.

And when I look at this, when we look at this, right, my full-time job is to assist our attorney general in carrying out the police powers that are assigned to him by our Constitution and statutes. What $I$ look at here and what he looks at is whether this actually will bring about a change in conduct, and from that standpoint, it's not enough.

And that, I think, is also the reason why to have our claims sort of brought in the same context -- and everything $I$ heard this morning, you know, relegates us to
the status, $I$ think, of a co-creditor, of a private creditor is the problem that we're dealing with, right.

We have a set of responsibilities that is greater than the responsibilities of counsel who appear here for private creditors. We have a set of responsibilities to the public that yet elects our attorney general that instituted our government, for which the protection of which is what we are paid for, to see to it that conduct is changed, and we don't think that this settlement does that.

I think that when you look at it from the ex-ante perspective of somebody who operates within the marketplace, what you see from this is that the Sacklers were able to get away with a majority of the money that they took, both from Purdue and from consumers. And that, $I$ think, as well as a full airing of the conduct and the full adjudication of the conduct is what, more than anything else, we seek.

I mean, money is certainly important, Your Honor.

It is.

THE COURT: Can we just stop on that point? So I have no doubt, Mr. Edmunds, that you're a dedicated public official. So you're saying that you need a full litigation of the claims against the Sacklers; is that what you're saying?

MR. EDMUNDS: I am saying that that is one thing that we would seek and that is one thing that $I$ think would
have value. Is it the only thing we would seek; is it something we would pursue --

THE COURT: Well, if you're going to seek money -MR. EDMUNDS: -- or everything else? THE COURT: -- and that in any form other than -if you're seeking money in the form of a settlement, $I$ think you'd have to agree with me that you wouldn't have a full public airing and a trial.

MR. EDMUNDS: I think that's true, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: I mean, and I think that there are tradeoffs that have to be made, right?

THE COURT: So it isn't the main thing you're seeking.

MR. EDMUNDS: I didn't say it was. I said it's one --

THE COURT: Well, I thought I heard you actually say it was the most important thing, but maybe I misheard you.

MR. EDMUNDS: Deterrence and changing conduct are what I've said. And if I misspoke -- to be very clear, those are the most important things, right? I think they're the same thing, but that is what is most important to the State of Maryland. I believe that that is what is most important to the other objecting states.

THE COURT: And the --

MR. EDMUNDS: There are other thing- --

THE COURT: Could I just focus. The conduct that you're seeking to deter is fraudulent transfers?

MR. EDMUNDS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: That is some conduct. Well, I should -- our action against the Sacklers and against Purdue did not have as its focus fraudulent transfers.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. EDMUNDS: But I think we are the State and fraudulent transfers are something that we prohibit, so I would not carve them out completely from what $I$ think is in the State's interest to seek to redress.

THE COURT: Well, except it's not covered by any of your unique statutes. It's an estate -- not estate, a estate cause of action.

MR. EDMUNDS: I would -- I mean, I --

THE COURT: There's no dispute about that, Mr. Edmunds.

MR. EDMUNDS: I would actually --

THE COURT: There's literally no dispute about that proposition. And I hope your boss doesn't understand it differently because then that person is operating on a misconception.

MR. EDMUNDS: I don't think that we understand that differently, Your Honor, that those are the estate's causes of action.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: But $I$ do think we have an interest in seeing that even the estate's causes of action are successful and maintained.

THE COURT: But that's not a --

MR. EDMUNDS: But for our part --

THE COURT: -- that's not a state parens patriae protected interest.

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, that's certainly not the interest, as $I$ said, for which we brought actions against Purdue and the Sacklers, the members of the Sackler family who served as its directors.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. EDMUNDS: But those actions relate to what they have done in the marketing and sale of OxyContin and other opioids. And our interest is clearly in preventing the deaths that result from when people commit unlawful practices in the marketing and sale of dangerous drugs, and we have --

THE COURT: So let me be clear. When you're talking about a cease and desist proceeding, you're not talking about having the Sacklers ceasing and desisting,
right? Because under this agreement, consistent with their actions for the last two years, they have ceased and desisted, right?

MR. EDMUNDS: I'm not sure that that's true.

THE COURT: You're talking about someone else ceasing and desisting, not the Sacklers, right?

MR. EDMUNDS: I think that this -- no, I'm talking about direct claims against the Sacklers, Your Honor, and I think it's --

THE COURT: Well, you referred to a cease and desist proceeding, which means stopping something from happening. And I'm assuming what you're referring to is other people, stopping other people, right?

MR. EDMUNDS: It can also stop conduct that has happened from further happening, right? I mean, we don't lose the relief just because the actor, when faced with a suit, stops committing the problematic conduct. We still have the right to continue.

THE COURT: But as far as that actor is concerned, it's not a cease and desist relief that you're seeking at that point. I'm not disputing that you wouldn't have a claim, you're seeking money still. But if they've stopped, they've stopped.

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, first of all, I think factually, there is room for disagreement that they have
stopped. They have stopped serving as members of the board of Purdue. There is a website that is out there now that makes false claims about OxyContin on behalf of part of the Sackler family that is at issue here.

So, I mean, I don't -- you know, stopping -- they have stopped some of the conduct perhaps. But I still think in a cease and desist order proceeding and a proceeding we would bring under our Consumer Protection Act, we still have the ability to seek a cease and desist order and an injunction that keeps them from restarting the conduct, for example.

THE COURT: And isn't this -- doesn't the plan do that very thing with an injunction?

MR. EDMUNDS: I think that the injunction in the plan would be perhaps broader and have more in it if we were to do it separately.

THE COURT: Have you made any suggestions to that effect on how to make it broader?

MR. EDMUNDS: I have not personally, but I believe that members of the NCSG have, and I would have to leave it to them to explain because it's been a while since I looked at it. But $I$ know that that has been something that is in the works. You know, you have to divide up, I guess, and that's a part that $I$ have not looked at specifically for purposes of what $I$ would say to Your Honor today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: But I do think that there is that issue, right? I mean, we are concerned -- and not just conduct that relates to opioids. If we sought an injunction at the state level against the Sacklers, I think we would be looking at more broadly prohibiting them from engaging in future violations in the pharmaceutical space and perhaps just future violations in the sale and marketing of products in the state in general, which $I$ believe that this injunction does not do.

So I think that that is the issue here, right? The money is important, but to put it in perspective, Your Honor, I mean, we spend -- the last figure I saw was something close to a billion dollars a year on the opioid crisis. And so, our share of this gets paid out in weeks, maybe a month, right, by money that we are already spending.

And I would note, Mr. Huebner I think erroneously cited the Maryland statute as the example of what states would do with the money were it not for the plan. In fact, Mr. Huebner overlooked our 2019 statute that dedicates all money we receive by virtue or settlement or by judgments against opioid industry participants to opioid abatement period.

There's no need for that language in Maryland's case. There's no need for the plan to commit it to
abatement. And so, if that was his example for all of the states, I can't -- I don't have a 50 state survey prepared, but I do know that a lot of others have statutes and the ones that do not have agreed.

THE COURT: Although the statutes, in some instances, have subsequently been amended as far as other types of settlements, right, and they can be amended.

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, they can be amended. But, I mean, I think that they are as committed as they can get when there is a statute that dedicates opioid -- you know, when the legislature enacts, and the governor signs a statute that provides the money from opioid crisis related litigation goes for relief of the opioid crisis and cannot be replaced, I think that that's, you know, maybe the gold standard.

But I know that other states, like Washington as Mr. Robinson O'Neill just mentioned, have done it in other ways, not by statute. But there is a lot of money that $I$ think the states have worked hard on recovering for themselves and for their citizens that are being spent on abatement without the need to impose a bankruptcy plan of reorganization that, you know, mandates that they do that.

So I think that -- but I think that, you know, money is important certainly, but the bottom line is that this is conduct that will keep going on and in our judgment
as we look and make decisions about what is necessary to protect our citizens and what is necessary to kind of avert a crisis that leaves $I$ think 140 in the United States dead each day, almost seven in Maryland dead each day. We look at this and we don't think that it does it. We don't -- we think it --

THE COURT: Well, again, that's my question.

Whose conduct are you referring to?

MR. EDMUNDS: The Sacklers here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. EDMUNDS: I mean, the particular -- I know that there has been some question as to how broad that category of the Sacklers is and how far into the family it reaches. But $I$ would say for at least the ones who served as directors, their conduct needs to be addressed and they need to --

THE COURT: Well, listen. I think if that is your state's issue, that can certainly be address very easily I believe by the Sacklers, consistent with all that has been represented to me during this trial as to their lack of a role going forward. So $I$ don't -- I really -- you know, but that's fine.

MR. EDMUNDS: But I suppose, Your Honor, it's the Sacklers plus, right? It's also future people who engage in the marketplace, future directors, because we don't -- you

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know, we can't, we don't have the resources to regulate all conduct. I think that the deterrent effect, the general deterrent effect $I$ think is the word that the law professors would use for it, is important too.

We are worried about the conduct that the Sacklers engaged in here, but we are also worried that it will be repeated by others. And I think that the idea the amount, you know, 4.3 billion in this context when you've taken so much more and when your conduct has caused so much harm, I think that the amount is insufficient to effectuate that kind of deterrence.

It doesn't -- it's our tool to kind of stop bad conduct that we're exercising here. That's what the police power is, and I think that we don't succeed in doing that from this settlement.

THE COURT: Well, do you succeed if the result is years of litigation and, in all likelihood, a lower recovery?

MR. EDMUNDS: I don't -- I just don't agree with that.

THE COURT: I'm not asking you to accept the truth of that. I'm just posing you a hypothetical, and I should have introduced what $I$ was saying by saying that.

MR. EDMUNDS: I think that the issue -- I mean, obviously, you can compare outcomes, right, and you can
hypothesize the outcome that wouldn't be as good but might be what happened and compare it and you see what the comparison is. But $I$ think that the issue is that, you know, we can't know and it's our decision to make, right? THE COURT: Well, I guess that comes back. You can actually make a fairly well-informed decision on that point, and that's why we have a six-day trial with, you know, 200 binders of evidence and thirty some plus witnesses.

MR. EDMUNDS: Right. I could talk about that. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: Well, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to -THE COURT: No, no. So I think that that is a point that needs to be addressed.

MR. EDMUNDS: Okay. Well, what I saw from the trial, right, our standard, the standard under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. I believe it's the standard in all states. It derives from a case in $I$ think the Seventh Circuit called FTC v. Amy Travel Services, and that's a case where the Seventh Circuit sets out the standard for holding people, you know, corporate individuals, individuals who are in business associations liable for conduct.

And the standard it sets is that, one, is obviously direct participation, and I think that there is evidence of that, clear evidence of that. In particular, in

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Richard Sackler's concession that he engaged in things like the McKinsey marketing, the McKinsey marketing plan, and you know, had by himself a call with McKinsey's -- with the McKinsey employees that were proposing these things, and that the board then subsequently implemented their recommendations and that the board also discussed them, and it certainly didn't change them.

So I think that -- so the Amy Travel standard is direct participation, and then there's another prong and it is the right to control the conduct and knowledge or constructive knowledge of what the conduct is. And each of the board members who testified before Your Honor said that they read the board materials, which are in evidence and are, you know, among -- I think there's more, but there are documents that have been presented to the Court.

And each of them made clear that the board discussed and engaged in, you know, the review of proposals on marketing and sales put forward by management. They have -- two of the board members who testified have a disagreement as to what their purposes were in doing that, but I think they all admit to the fact that they, in fact, had the right to control the conduct and were, on some level, aware of what the conduct was.

THE COURT: What do you think the degree of that awareness was as far as the evidence shows and the conduct
that you're referring to?

MR. EDMUNDS: Well, I have to get to another point, and I will answer that. But I have to answer that based on what we've been permitted to do. Right? I was careful. We were careful to follow what Your Honor had ruled as to what evidence we were allowed to present. And as you know, you know, there is more that we did not use.

So I think that the evidence on that shows a high level of awareness of at least two of the Sackler Family members. The documents for Mortimer Sackler, the few on which we actually cross-examined him because they had a relevance directly to other issues before the court, such as the milking the business email demonstrate a degree of participation in sales and marketing that is sufficient to establish liability under Maryland, and I think, under other states' law.

So I think that the evidence, just the limited evidence before the Court, which was presented not for the purposes of establishing these claims, demonstrates that we have what we need if we were to go forward. You know, Richard Sackler's testimony goes pretty far to establishing his liability and the liability of others.

And I think that Mortimer Sackler, even, who defended his conduct, the evidence still shows that he has his hands in the sales operation and is aware of it, and is
reading reports, and is participating in discussions. And the email and documentary evidence, limited though it was -THE COURT: Well, can we --

MR. EDMUNDS: -- under the circumstances --

THE COURT: You've said that three or four times. I limited it so that it would be necessarily for the truth, but you are certainly entitled to examine each witness on whatever documents you had.

MR. EDMUNDS: I had understood the Court as having made relevance rulings as to whether -- because Debtors' case, you know, sort of carved out the states' claims against the Sacklers from what Debtors were presented that we were not allowed to go beyond what $I$ would call a very limited -- you know, I mean, set of things that we did. THE COURT: Well, I don't know why -MR. EDMUNDS: Because that wouldn't be -THE COURT: -- you asked -MR. EDMUNDS: -- relevant to the -THE COURT: -- Richard Sackler -MR. EDMUNDS: -- determining -THE COURT: -- about his participation in actual settlement marketing calls, then.

MR. EDMUNDS: I asked that to establish the repeated conduct. I mean, I cross-examined him based on the document.

THE COURT: Right. I know.

MR. EDMUNDS: But as relevant to the issue that I mentioned before, which is the need to change conduct, the need for the settlement to --

THE COURT: That's why --

MR. EDMUNDS: -- (indiscernible) the conduct.

THE COURT: -- you were cross-examining him on that? Okay, fine.

MR. EDMUNDS: That is why I was.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. EDMUNDS: I mean, the issue there is that they had to guilty pleas, 2007 and 2020, and that they continued after 2007, and to some extent, the conduct in 2018 was repeated with respect to other foreign entities. I mean, that was the purpose. And so we did not dig underneath that to show the documents that the DOJ may have had in its possession when it came up with those allegations and incorporated them into what it did.

THE COURT: Are you representing to me that you have those documents?

MR. EDMUNDS: I have some of them. Certainly.

THE COURT: And they were offered to be introduced ever in this case?

MR. EDMUNDS: Your Honor, we understood that the underlying merits of the states' claims were not at issue,
and so limited ourselves to a short cross, short direct, rather, of each of these witnesses. I mean, you know, at one point $I$ had sent, $I$ think $M r$. Joseph said, 6,200 pages for use. And we didn't do that. But we had those documents. The Court received them.

So, I mean, that was the... You know, we had had before the bankruptcy a much longer trial planned than the State of Maryland. It was on the schedule, I believe. And that, I think, would have been necessary to fully present the claims.

But in any case, the point is that it's the conduct, right? And to the extent the states are being treated as if they were -- you know, needed to make decisions in the same way that private creditors do here, which I'm not faulting, that's just not our consideration.

THE COURT: Okay, well --

MR. EDMUNDS: We have more.

THE COURT: I've heard them from all three lawyers, and I don't need to hear it again, because you guys have made that point and that's fine.

MR. EDMUNDS: Okay. Your Honor, let me just -- I wanted to talk -- I have one more point, and that is about the third-party -- and I think that maybe this is going to be addressed more in what the parties to over the next night and into Wednesday on the third-party releases, to the
extent they apply to third parties other than the Sacklers. Right?

And the issue is just that that -- when Mr . Huebner presented this morning, he referenced some other settlements. I think that the list of released parties in this case is broader than any of those that he mentioned. The consultants, advisory board representatives, contract sales representatives of Purdue Pharma, whose conduct is released related to at least Purdue's opioids.

And I think that that is a broad area, that if changes aren't made we need to talk about, because those releases are so broad as to even further prevent us from changing the conduct here. Everybody who participated with Purdue and what Purdue did gets out of it. Some of them have not contributed a thing to the plan. And, you know, I hope that we are still -- I have received confirmation, but I hope that we are still discussing those issues and can present something different to the Court for its consideration jointly with other parties on Wednesday.

And I guess I'll stop at that for now. I don't think it makes sense to go farther until we know the answer to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDMUNDS: But that is a concern. And so with that, yeah, $I$ think that that -- those are the points that $I$
would like to make in addition to what Mr . Gold and Mr . Goldman said.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Thank you. MR. EDMUNDS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ROBINSON-O'NEILL: Your Honor, this is Tad Robinson-O'Neill from Washington. You had asked if the McKinsey documents are in the record. They are. It's JX2623 and JX-2624. The operative provision of the 2/4 document, which is the McKinsey settlement in Washington state is Paragraph 2 under the payment information, which obligates the State of Washington to spend all of the proceeds from the McKinsey settlement on opioid abatement. I don't think Your Honor really wants me to track down the budget allocations -THE COURT: No, that's fine. MR. ROBINSON-O'NEILL: -- into the program -THE COURT: That's fine. I also know there were similar provisions in the tobacco settlement. But states have developed since then. I appreciate that.

MR. ROBINSON-O'NEILL: Thank you, Your Honor. If you have no more questions, I'll step down. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Fogleman, you're going to go? MR. FOGELMAN: If that's all right with the Court. THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.

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MR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. My name is Larry Fogelman, and I represent the United States of America in these proceedings. I would like to make a few points on three key issues: due process, Metromedia, and subject matter jurisdiction.

Your Honor, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution if this Court strips the rights of sovereign states as to the Sacklers and the rights of individual victims of the opioid crisis due to the Sacklers. The states and individuals must be provided with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before their property interests are taken away.

And let's make no mistake. This third-party release takes away property rights of states and individuals in their causes of actions against the Sacklers. The release is effectively a judgment on the merits. It has res judicada affect and it will render their claims worthless.

The Second Circuit in Metromedia recognized this point. The Court said, on Page 142, "In form, it is a release; in effect, it may operate as a bankruptcy discharge arranged without a filing and without the safeguards of the Code."

Now, let's talk about notice, Your Honor. The notice provided in this case was not a summons and complaint seeking to take away property rights of states and
individuals against the Sacklers. Rather, it was noticed that there would be a confirmation hearing with disclosure about losing your right to sue the Sacklers. But this short form of notice in a bankruptcy proceeding to which the Sacklers are not even debtors, is not a substitute for service of a summons and a complaint.

A notice of an impending confirmation hearing does not confer personal jurisdiction over states and individual victims, and their claims against the Sacklers, and it is not sufficient to give the Court power over those claims. Rather, formal service of process is required.

As Mr. Huebner said this morning regarding the Sacklers, to sue the Sacklers, you have to sue --

THE COURT: Did the Second Circuit --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- and secure --

THE COURT: -- require that in the Motors

Liquidation case? The service of a summons and complaint? The most recent Second Circuit case --

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, that --

THE COURT: -- discusses due process in this area?

MR. FOGELMAN: That case address claims against the estate, not third --

THE COURT: And against the --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- not claims against third parties

THE COURT: -- and against the successor entity? MR. FOGELMAN: Well, yes, Your Honor. But again, there was no third-party release at issue in GM, so it's a totally --

THE COURT: You know, Mr. Fogelman --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- distinct issue.

THE COURT: -- I think I understand this argument.

I also understand that if this plan is not confirmed, your client gets roughly $\$ 2$ billion more and essentially all of the value of the Debtors. So $I$ will read your brief. I really don't think $I$ need to hear anything more on this. You're at a complete conflict --

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, that is not true, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've said enough.

MR. FOGELMAN: May I address that point?

THE COURT: I've read your brief. Your brief is thorough. But I just, frankly, do not understand the position of the United States, and I don't believe it can be articulated in this case.

MR. FOGELMAN: I believe it can, Your Honor. And I'd be happy to do so, if you'd give me an opportunity.

THE COURT: You should do that now.

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, it is not true that if this plan is not confirmed, then
automatically the government has a $\$ 2$ billion claim. Purdue has a right to back out of the settlement if this plan is not confirmed. And in terms of having different positions, Your Honor, it is -THE COURT: You have a $\$ 1.7$ billion -MR. FOGELMAN: The government did (indiscernible) -THE COURT: -- superpriority claim. And there's no --

MR. FOGELMAN: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And there's no --

MR. FOGELMAN: But the Debtors have the right -THE COURT: Then there's no abatement trust, right?

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, the Debtors have the right unilaterally to pull out of its resolutions with the government. If the plan is not confirmed, that creates the PVC. We have worked very hard, Your Honor, to come up with resolutions that work towards the public interest, that create a PVC.

We have been working tirelessly throughout this process to help draft documents relating to the covenants of the new company, the injunction relief of the new company. We have worked nights, we have worked weekends, even leading up to this confirmation hearing, towards that end.

At the same time, Your Honor, it is also true that we believe that this release violates the due process provisions of the Constitution, and we feel it is incumbent upon us to explain that view to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's --

MR. FOGELMAN: We don't think that is --

THE COURT: -- been explained.

MR. FOGELMAN: -- inconsistent, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I've read the brief and I don't need to hear more on this, Mr. Fogelman.

MR. FOGELMAN: May I move on, then to, briefly, the Metromedia and subject matter jurisdiction points?

THE COURT: Briefly, because it's been covered already, and again, it's covered in your brief.

MR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. With regard to Metromedia, I'll just make a few quick points. First, with regard to one of the factors described by the Second Circuit that enjoined claims were channeled to the settlement fund, rather than extinguished.

Well, the only settlement fund that's set up here is for the opioid claims relating to Purdue's conduct. But the release that's at issue covers a far broader, almost incomprehensible, number of topics for which there is no settlement fund that's set up. It would cover -- I mean, the language in the release is, anything based on or
relating to or in any manner arising from in whole or in part, the Debtors as such entities existed prior to or after the petition date, including the Debtors' opioid-related activities, manufacture, marketing and sale of products, interactions with regulators concerning opioid-related activities or products, and involvement in the subject matter of the pending opioid actions, and the past, present or future use -THE COURT: And I -MR. FOGELMAN: -- or (indiscernible) use. THE COURT: I understand that point, Mr. Fogelman, and I'm very sympathetic to it. And I think I've made my views known to the Debtors.

MR. FOGELMAN: I appreciate that, Your Honor. But it's not just the fraud claims that are a problem.

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. EDMUNDS: This release covers -THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. MR. EDMUNDS: -- everything, from -- okay. THE COURT: And in fact, some of the testimony by, I believe, the Sacklers who are closest to the issues, have focused on a release related to Purdue's opioid-related activities. That was what they're looking for. Although then they said, well, we're going to rely on our lawyers. And I think I made it very clear that the lawyers run a real
risk of proposing a release that is far too broad, and that will have the effect of not being approved, as opposed -instead, proposing one that's consistent with the consideration is being paid for.

MR. FOGELMAN: I appreciate that, Your Honor. And in fact, that language is so broad, as to reach things like workplace safety claims, if they existed, employment packs issues, environmental law, civil fraud, beyond opioids, contracting fraud, state ADA laws, labor laws. I mean, this list is so broad that it would cover the example Your Honor gave that if somebody ran over a pedestrian while delivering opioids, the Sacklers get a release for that too. I mean, it's just an impossibly broad release that shouldn't be approved by the Court.

And Your Honor, who does it cover? It doesn't just cover the Sacklers. It covers financial advisors, attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, consultants, experts, other professionals. I mean, why is Paul Weiss getting a release in this case? It's incomprehensibly broad. And there's no evidence that any third party has contributed to the releases, and so they're not entitled to get them.

THE COURT: Well, except they're --

MR. FOGELMAN: Garrett Lynam testified --

THE COURT: I'll check on only one point on that,
which is -- and we're leaving out the excluded parties, of course -- but there are --

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: -- directors and officers who are contributing their insurance rights. So they are contributive something. But I understand your broader point.

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes. No matter how you slice it, Your Honor, maybe there's a handful of people who are contributing something, but it is not the thousand-plus people on Schedule $H$ and all of their attorneys, accountants, investment bankers and so forth. I mean, this release would cover the McKinsey example that Your Honor given court. And I'm calling it McKinsey because they're an excluded party, but you can call it Company $X$, and McKinsey is off the hook or, you know, if there's turbocharging and what McKinsey did.

And Your Honor, carving out just fraud isn't enough, because a lot of state statutes that are based on the False Claims Act, you can find somebody liable for acting in reckless disregard. And so if a McKinsey type acted with reckless disregard, that's enough for a fault of claims act liability. And so, the idea that you're just going to carve out fraud doesn't get you there.

And public nuisance, another big issue we've heard
about throughout this case, that there's -- according to this release, you can't bring a public nuisance claim against McKinsey or other consulting firm that's engaging turbocharging.

Your Honor, another factor in the Metromedia standard is that the enjoined claims would directly impact the Debtors' reorganization by way of indemnity or contributions. I take Your Honor's point that there may be a few of those. But again, there's been very limited, if any, evidence presented on that point. And so the Debtors have not met the Metromedia standard for the vast majority of entities and people covered by the release.

THE COURT: But the --

MR. FOGELMAN: Another factor the Second -- yes?

HE COURT: No, I think you're making the same point. And I'm trying to say as clearly as I can, generally I agree with you.

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: So, okay.

MR. FOGELMAN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple more here on Metromedia, and then I move on to subject matter jurisdiction. Another factor that the Court mentioned you had looked at is whether the plan provided for the full payment of the enjoined claims. That's obviously not the case here. I think creditors are getting less than
a tenth of a cent on the dollar.

And then there's the question of the estate receiving substantial contributions. And I'm not --

THE COURT: You know --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: If you had full payment, you wouldn't need a release. So clearly, there's something wrong with that point. I think --

MR. FOGELMAN: I'm just raising it --

THE COURT: -- it has to be if you --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- because it's one of the standards --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. FOGELMAN: -- the Second Circuit set.

THE COURT: But it's --

MR. FOGELMAN: I --

THE COURT: It has to be reviewed. I think, frankly, the Third Circuit formulation, which is, is it fair, is a better way to look at it than that factor, which just can't... I mean, it just seems really boneheaded to say that because $\$ 4.325$ billion won't pay off or resolve the opioid crisis, you shouldn't take it. I think you need to really analyze what the alternatives are, and of course, how tied in it is to the plan, and who is covered by the release.

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MR. FOGELMAN: Understood, Your Honor. One other factor that the Court in the Second Circuit mentioned was whether the estate receives substantial consideration. We address that point in terms of Exhibit $H$ and in terms of very few, if any, individuals providing contribution.

I want to just point out that Garrett Lynam, the Executor of the Sackler Estate, was asked a question. "So, for example, all the facts that the release provision -- and I believe it's discussed before -- but it references his financial advisor, his attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, consultants, experts, and other professionals, none of those are giving a financial contribution to the estate, right?: And he answered, "Correct."

Richard Sackler testified that, "Question: I have just one, or expect to have just one question to you, other than members of the Sackler Family or Trust, in which they may be beneficiaries, are you aware of any personal entity that will be contributing monetarily to the more than $\$ 4$ billion in settlement payments that are contemplated by Purdue's plan. Answer: I am not aware of any."

And Your Honor, with regard to the Sacklers themselves, $I$ think there is a really important question here about the use of their trust fund assets as opposed to their personal assets. It's not clear on this record that the Sacklers themselves are actually personally contributing
anything. They're using their trust as a sword and a shield, Your Honor --

THE COURT: But can we --

MR. FOGELMAN: It's a sword because they're trying to use their contribution into the estate by their trust to say, aha, look at what we're doing; we're entitled to a release. But then, when you ask them, well, you know, is that money -- like could you be sued for that amount? And you know, if you have a judgment creditor, if the judgment creditor gets a judgment against you, can you be sued? I asked that to Mortimer Sackler. He essentially said no. So u sing your trust as a sword and a shield, and it's all their money?

THE COURT: Why is that -- I don't --

MR. FOGELMAN: It's coming from the trust, and why are the Sacklers getting a release?

THE COURT: But I guess I really would push back on that one. First of all, they're obligated for an amount. They're not obligated, you know, just from a particular asset.

Secondly, if in fact their own assets would be insufficient to make the payments and there is, as $I$ think the record is clear, at least say an issue as to whether in a contested context, third parties could get at the trust assets, why shouldn't the trust assets be viewed as a
positive being contributed to the relief? Because they couldn't find it without it.

MR. FOGELMAN: They're trying to have it both ways.

THE COURT: No, but --

MR. FOGELMAN: They're trying to have it both ways.

THE COURT: But --

MR. FOGELMAN: They should acknowledge, then, that it's their money. I mean, I think a few of them did testify to that --

THE COURT: I'm not sure --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- and that, you know, if this plan is --

THE COURT: To me, these are both clichés. But sometimes a negotiation is a win-win, where is if you litigate, it's a lose-lose. So maybe --

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, Kathe Sacker said, "My trust assets or my personal assets are my assets as well."

THE COURT: I agree. That --

MR. FOGELMAN: She treated them like they were hers.

THE COURT: That is an issue that we'll --

MR. FOGELMAN: But then when she was asked --

THE COURT: No, no. That is an issue that will be
litigated.

MR. FOGELMAN: -- do you have personal control -THE COURT: That is an issue that would be litigated, and I don't know how it would ultimately come out because I'm not ruling on the merits. But I can see how it could come out either way, if this was a litigated attempt to reach a judgment. And this settlement avoids that issue. And to me it's --

MR. FOGELMAN: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- you know, I don't see a problem with it because in fact the record, I believe, is uncontested that without those trust assets, neither side of the family could pay this settlement. They could pay about \$1.1 billion --

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- at most. And that's before lawyers.

MR. FOGELMAN: I have a simpler point. I have a simpler point, Your Honor. There's no evidence in the record, $I$ don't think -- someone can correct me if I'm mistaken -- that the Sacklers actually are making any personal contributions. When Mortimer Sackler was asked that question, he said, you know, in terms of how much ends up coming out of my personal estate versus my trust, $I$ don't know at this time.

Kathe Sackler --

THE COURT: But that's because it's --

MR. FOGELMAN: (indiscernible)

THE COURT: -- it's an aggregate number that they have to pay, and ultimately, the estate doesn't care where it comes from. They have bargained to have them be out of these foreign companies by a certain date. But it's an aggregate number --

MR. FOGELMAN: Understood. But --

THE COURT: -- so those answers were accurate answers. They don't know, because it could be under either source. But it is also true --

MR. FOGELMAN: But it's a test in the Second --

THE COURT: -- that they don't have the money on their own to make the payments in a contested context. So to have --

MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, it's --

THE COURT: -- to have the --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- it's a test in the Second Circuit --

THE COURT: -- the trust agree to make the payment to go to the Royal Court of Jersey and asked for permission to do it is actually -- I actually think a win for the estate, because they don't have to fight that issue. They might ultimately win the issue --

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MR. FOGELMAN: But it --

THE COURT: -- but they don't have to fight it this way. So I think we're being a bit --

MR. FOGELMAN: Okay. Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: -- a bit metaphysical on this point, Mr. Fogelman.

MR. FOGELMAN: I'll move on to subject matter jurisdiction, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FOGELMAN: I just wanted to make the point that it's a test of, you know, who's provided substantial contributions. On this record, it's not clear if the Sacklers personally are providing --

THE COURT: Well, they're --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- their (indiscernible).

THE COURT: -- on the hook for it. They're definitely on the hook for it.

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. On subject matter jurisdiction, Your Honor, $I$ just wanted to briefly touch a couple of points that have been raised. Your Honor, third-party releases do not arise under Title 11. There's nothing in the lawsuits of the States and individuals against the Sacklers, lawsuits that predated the bankruptcy, that arise under Title 11. They instead arose under the State substantive laws cited in those complaints that
alleged causes of actions against the Sacklers.

And so, you know, just because there is a plan and releases are included in the plan, does not mean that the settlement agreement -- I'm sorry -- that the litigations themselves arise under the Court's core jurisdiction.

The correct question is whether the Court has jurisdiction over the lawsuits filed by the sovereign states and individuals, not whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over confirming a plan. And that issue was addressed in the Ninth Circuit Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit said, when presented with a mixture of core and non-THE COURT: core claims, you must employ a claim-by-claim analysis to determine whether the Bankruptcy Court could enter a final order for that claim. And that's a similar holding from the matter of Zale in the Fifth Circuit, that landed in our brief as well.

Judge Bernstein wrote in the Drier case, 429 B.R. 112, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the question is not whether the court has jurisdiction over the settlement, but whether it has jurisdiction over the attempt to enjoin the creditors' unasserted claims against the third party. You've got to break it down and look at what's at issue. In this case, it's the lawsuits themselves, not just the plan. The plan, the fact that it's part of a plan, doesn't confer core
jurisdiction over the third-party release. And the reason that has to be right --

THE COURT: So, I guess --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- Your Honor, is that --

THE COURT: I guess this is why I was somewhat upset with the government's stance here. I understand these are live issues. I understand that there are courts that disagree with your position, including the Third Circuit. And frankly, even the Ninth Circuit in the (indiscernible) case?

But I don't see why the United States is picking this case to raise this issue. And we'll just leave it at that.

MR. FOGELMAN: We're doing our best to get it right, Your Honor. And we believe this is the correct -THE COURT: Right.

MR. FOGELMAN: -- legal analysis.
THE COURT: Right. Notwithstanding --

MR. FOGELMAN: And it's a case that --

THE COURT: -- what would happen as a result.
MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, there are 10 sovereign states that are going to lose their rights to file lawsuits. We think that's really important. As well as individuals who filed lawsuits against the Sacklers --

THE COURT: Right. So they --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- who are losing their rights -THE COURT: -- will have a lawsuit --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- and that's why we're here.

THE COURT: -- and the United States will have a \$1.7 priority claim, superpriority claim.

MR. FOGELMAN: Again, Your Honor --

THE COURT: So I think there must be --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- they do have the right to pull out of the settlement.

THE COURT: -- very grateful that you're looking after their interests as you pick their pocket. Let's move on.

MR. FOGELMAN: I disagree with Your Honor's characterization. I don't think that's fair --

THE COURT: Well --

MR. FOGELMAN: -- or correct. Your Honor, the reason that it has to be the case that Your Honor -- that you can't have core jurisdiction over a lawsuit between third parties that is included in a plan, the reason that has to be true is that it's a bedrock principle of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court, in Insurance Corporation of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702, from 1982, wrote, "No action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court."

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And so, Your Honor, if the Court doesn't have jurisdiction over the lawsuit from one third party against the Sacklers, then simply by putting it in a plan, if that were permitted, you'd be doing exactly what Insurance Corp. of Ireland said you can't, which is manufactured in jurisdiction. Plans are not magic. It can't be that anything you put inside a plan automatically comes within the Court's core jurisdiction.

The Johns Manville case also noted it was inappropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to enjoin third-party claims against third-party non-debtors solely on the basis of that third-party's financial contribution to a Debtor's estate. If that were possible, a debtor could create subject matter jurisdiction over any non-debtor third party by structuring a plan in such a way that it depended upon the third-party contributions.

As we have made clear, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. And so too here, Your Honor, again, just by including these releases in the plan does not confer jurisdiction. Even if Your Honor disagreed and you found that because this is a plan, it was core jurisdiction of the Court, it would violate Article 3 of the Constitution for a bankruptcy judge to ultimately make the decision on whether the lawsuits filed by sovereign states and individuals against the Sacklers can be released.

The Bankruptcy Court simply can't reach (indiscernible) when it's the final adjudication of the merits of the state law claims, when neither the states nor the parties are parties to the bankruptcy proceeding. And that's Stern v. Marshall. The Supreme Court held there that just because the Code -THE COURT: Mr. Fogelman -MR. FOGELMAN: -- with certain -THE COURT: I -MR. FOGELMAN: You know Stern well. I get it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FOGELMAN: But Your Honor, look, just because the Bankruptcy Court -- look. In that case, the Bankruptcy Court lacked constitutional authority to hear Anna Nicole Smith's cross-claims --

THE COURT: I don't need to hear about Anna Nicole Smith, for the 5,000th time. All right, please. You covered this in your brief. You're apparently going to appeal this --

MR. FOGELMAN: Yes, Your Honor, my point --

THE COURT: -- whenever, and hold up the
distributions to these people forever, and that's the United States' choice. So, be my guest, all right. I'm done with this argument. I want to hear the Canadian municipality -MR. FOGELMAN: Your Honor, my point is simply that
it --

THE COURT: No. I want to hear the Canadian municipality creditors. I don't understand this. There has to be some level of prosecutorial discretion here. So, Mr. Underwood, you're next.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Good evening, Your Honor, Alan Underwood from Lite DePalma Greenberg Afanador, on behalf of certain Canadian municipal creditors, Canadian First Nations creditors.

We want to make clear, first of all, Your Honor, is that Canadian creditors not -- and there's testimony to this -- they were approached. Mr. Dubel testified to this fact -- they were not approached by the Debtors' Special Committee, they were not approached by Debtors' counsel. They did independently try to become involved in this case, but unfortunately it didn't result in -- what they hoped for.

So, the irony here is, Judge, you've got ten parties that really are trying to figure out whether they want to be a part of the abatement and claims process here. And if you've got one foreign, or a group of foreign parties that desperately wanted to be a part of this, expected to be a part of this, and were ultimately not.

And so, ultimately, where we are today -actually, my understanding is there's 17 -- in the year

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2020, there were 17 Canadians who died each day from opioid toxicity. Ultimately, in terms of the plan, the proposed plan that is before this Court, $I$ think it's a close call, but $I$ think it probably, ultimately is in favor of the Debtors in terms of the scope of the releases that can be granted with regard to the US States.

I think the answer is different with regard to the Canadian municipalities. And that's why -- and certainly, as to the First Nations -- and that is why when the objection, a limited objection to the Provinces settlement was filed, we attempted to alert the Court to (indiscernible).

So, ultimately, in terms of what is pending right now, before you -- there is issue with regard to the fact that subject matter jurisdiction of this Court may not extend to these claims, and there's a couple of different reasons for that. And these claims are different from the state, 50 state and territory claims that we've otherwise addressed at great length before this Court.

In terms of --

THE COURT: It's not really a subject matter jurisdiction point, is it? Because they filed their claims here. And again, there may be a recognition issue; $I$ understand point. The Canadian Court may feel that these Canadian creditors' claims against the US entities --
because that's all we're talking about here; we're not their claims against the Canadian entities. The release doesn't extend to that. So, the Canadian Court may feel that their claims against the US entities aren't being sufficiently well-treated under the plan for recognition to be granted. But $I$ don't think it's a jurisdictional issue.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, I think it is an interesting
-- I understand the distinction the Court is making with regard to subject matter jurisdiction. I think, though, that the distinction may be a little bit finer. In the first case --

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor. Your Honor, (indiscernible) I apologize, the parties may have forgotten that we actually have a separate allocation of time for Mr . Underwood, on Wednesday, to discuss Canadian jurisdiction. This is only third-party releases. I think he already expressed his view. I certainly don't mean to cut anybody off, but there's actually a different pod for this exact issue. We obviously need to respond to some of the things that were said --

THE COURT: That's fair. I think -- and I didn't appreciate which way you were going there, Mr. Underwood. If this isn't on the release, we'll cover you later. We'll cover you on Wednesday.

MR. UNDERWOOD: I think, you know, it relates to

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the release, but it relates to the release in a different way than almost every other party, so $I$ have no problem, as long as I'm afforded the time that $I$ would have had here to address this independently later on. And I appreciate the Court's time.

THE COURT: Okay. I didn't want to cut you off totally. I just thought, on this one point, as we got into your argument, it seemed to be covering jurisdiction generally, as opposed to just the release. But if you could cover both points on Wednesday, that's fine. But I don't know if you have any other points on the release?

MR. UNDERWOOD: With the respect to the releases, if you'll just give me one very quick comment. Ultimately, I don't think that there are points that can't be addressed on Wednesday, other than $I$ can tell you that the Canadian creditors are not beneficiaries of any form of channeling, injunction or trust. And that's a --

THE COURT: They do get -- I'm paraphrasing, I think, the Debtors' argument on this, although I'll ask them about it. You're not getting money directly as part of the Sackler settlement, as $I$ understand it, as an unsecured creditor in that class. But I think the Debtors would say two things: First, it's far from clear that your clients have claims that are subject to the release, i.e., claims against the US entities as opposed to the Canadian entities.

And when you read the proofs of claim, I think there is some question as to, you know, how is the claim actually against the US entities? That's point one.

Point two is, I think they would say that the money that is going to unsecured creditors wouldn't go to them but for the release, and but for the Sackler settlement, because the parties that, in essence, would swallow up that money, that would be going to the unsecured creditors, aren't swallowing it up because of the money that the Sacklers are paying, which is supported by the liquidation analysis, which has unsecured creditors getting nothing. So, I think that's their argument.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Right. I mean, Your Honor, I don't know if you want to put this of until Wednesday or you want to carry forward with your --

THE COURT: Well, if you have a response to that.
MR. UNDERWOOD: Yeah, well, I do, and I think that there's a linkage there that may be the step too far under Second Circuit's holdings, meaning, you know, if we look back at where this comes from under, you know, 542 (g) Johns Manville and this whole progeny of cases, I think that there is a legislative intent and a judicial intent, in most cases, to link the channel injunction, the establishment of a trust with the relief that's provided. That link is missing here.

I would also say, you know, that look, if you look at the breadth of case law, there are releases, and there are releases. I would suggest that there are Section $105(\mathrm{a})$ releases that are related to the Debtors' business and professionals that are -- and no question -- commonplace. I think that the scope of these releases is something greater, much more in the fashion of a mass tort release -- that's what it is -- and $I$ think it requires a different analysis. That's my position on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, that's helpful. Okay, and I think the last group to speak to this is the Gulf Underwriters and St. Paul and Marine, et al.

MR. LUSKIN: Yes, Your Honor, Michael Luskin, Luskin, Stern \& Eisler for Gulf and for St. Paul. This is very limited objection to the scope of the release insofar as it covers three non-debtor entities. We have a settlement agreement; the contract with six Purdue entities: three are debtors, three are non-debtors. And under the terms of the release provisions in the plan, the non-debtors who are listed as Side B Shareholders in Appendix H -that's at page 498 of 499 in the disclosure statement are -their indemnity obligations are being released.

These are third-party claims, direct claims against the insurers. For instance, a coverage claim by the Committee against Gulf. I'll be very, very brief, since

Your Honor has heard the full book on third-party releases today, but look, Metromedia is not satisfied with --

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you -- I'm sorry, Mr. Luskin.

MR. LUSKIN: Yes, you may.
THE COURT: I just want to make sure, who is giving a release of what, that you're objecting to? Gulf and St. Paul are releasing who?

MR. LUSKIN: No, no, no. Gulf and St. Paul are my clients. The plan is releasing my counterparties. They are Purdue Frederick, PF Laboratories, and PRA Holdings. Those three companies owe -- have agreed under an agreement back in 2006, to indemnify the insurance companies for defense costs, for instance, in third-party suites that exist now, at that may exist in the future.

That was part of a -- the facts on this, they're very simple and they're set out in a stipulation which is ECF3589.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUSKIN: It's a two-page stipulation. So, what we have is a contract that's from 2006 -THE COURT: I got it. I just -- it wasn't -MR. LUSKIN: You got it, okay. Okay, I'm sorry, I wasn't clear. So, what the plan does, is it, it gives the three debtor parties, the three, my three -- three of the
six debtor counterparties, my counterparties, it gives them the benefit of the plan release. Fine, we don't have a problem with debtor parties getting release. These are nondebtor parties who have made no contribution, who have not participated in this case, who will owe us money, or do owe us money on the indemnities.

And, frankly, there's been zero showing whatsoever, that this release, for these three non-debtors is necessary for the plan. I do not see how a -- the elimination of a bargain for commercial benefit by nondebtors is fair, to use the Third Circuit, and I believe also the Second Circuit standard. I --

THE COURT: And because they're non-debtors there's no $502(e)$ or 509 issue.

MR. LUSKIN: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LUSKIN: They're non-debtors and I think that, under the standard, that seems to be a common theme in today's arguments. This is -- removal of this thread will not cause the tapestry to unravel. This is a loose end that can safely be trimmed off and should be trimmed off. I think that if the Court applies the exacting hard look that is required under Metromedia, you will require the Debtors to revise the plan to allow these -- to remove these releases and to allow the indemnity provisions to continue.

That's all I have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

MR. LUSKIN: Thank you.

THE COURT: I think those are all of the people on the list. I know it's fairly late, but I would like the Debtors -- unless they have someone else to do it -- to respond to the last two arguments, Mr . Underwood's and Mr . Luskin's.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, may I ask the Court a question --?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HUEBNER: -- before we -- sonto that. The objectors went for four hours, and obviously, the Court had many questions for them and that's fair. A bunch of things were said that $I$ believe, on behalf of the estates -- and based on emails and texts I've been getting, I think with the exception of two minutes for the UCC, I will make an omnibus response that will be relatively brief and targeted. But many things were said factually; many things were said about the Debtors and the plan and other constituencies. But I actually feel relatively strongly, in a case of this import, probably do merit a response.

Obviously, if the Court's view is -- you know, I read every single thing and I don't not need or want to hear from the Debtors or, in general, the proponents in the
aggregate, to the Debtors; clearly, we will take the Court's direction. But there are some points that I actually think are very important, but obviously, in this and in all things we're guided by what the Court thinks is important; not by what we think is important. Meanwhile --

THE COURT: I would like to hear the response to Mr. Underwood's point that there's no channeling injunction for a fund to his clients, and then a response to Mr. Luskin.

And then, it would seem to me, that if you think there was a clear factual misstatement, you should point me that and point me to the evidence that would show why. I don't think I need extensive rebuttal on the arguments though, or any rebuttal, frankly. I think it's really just -- I have to confess, I want to focus on those last two points: channeling, not for the unsecured, and the Gulf Underwriters' point. And then, if you feel that you have to correct the record you should do that too, with cites to the record.

MR. HUEBNER: You know, what I'll do is, I will cut out about 95 percent of what $I$ was going to say and confine myself to cites to the record that $I$ believe are important. I'll have to take a little extra pause between the two points, which I hope the Court is okay with, because I'll be skipping so very many things that are important to
us. But obviously, that's what I'm going to do.

In the interim, there will be Mr. Tobak getting read to address both of those points, to which $I$ think we're actually quite comfortable with our answers, which in part are in our papers, and part you will hear in a few minutes.

Your Honor, first of all, we heard from several of the objectors who sort of testified about the lack of adequate notice and the fact that they were stayed during the case, and they attempted to impress on the Court that that limited their ability, including with respect to disclosure of the assets and liabilities of the Sacklers.

Here are the record cites, Your Honor, that I think belie that claim. There are 2,188 pages of disclosures and forensic examination of the Sacklers assets and liabilities that are on the docket. Mr. Collura testified to the 355 -page report, 1A. Mr. Rule testified to the 400-page report, 1B. Neither of those witnesses was cross-examined. Mr. DeRamus testified to the valuation of the non-cash transfers and set forth his findings in a 520page report. No party cross-examined our witness Mr . DeRamus.

Mr. Martin, who submitted two declarations, spanning 913 pages, analyzed the assets of the $A$ Side and $B$ Side of the Sackler family. No one other than Mr. Underwood cross-examined Mr. Martin.

The UCC letter which was attached to Mr.

Atkinson's declaration goes on for about 15 pages, providing record evidence of the extraordinary diligence done by the Creditors Committee, specifically about -- sorry, someone is on camera who I'm guessing does not want to be, in the plaid shirt -- thank you -- specifically summarizing the discovery, the financial information and the analysis of the liability and culpability of the Sacklers. That evidence, Docket Number 3460, among many other things, talks about 450,000 documents produced by the Sacklers; 800,000 documents produced by the ACs; 40,000 documents produced by the other $2 A$ entities, which are a form of IAC, and close to 200,000 documents produced by Norton Rose.

In addition, Your Honor, Dubel declaration, paragraph 23, contains record evidence of the Special Committee of the Board, reviewed over 960,000 documents through its advisors.

A stipulation entered into, lo those many months ago, at the beginning of the case, Docket Number 518, called the Tripartite or UCC Stipulation, required the Sacklers to make detailed financial presentations. Paragraph 17, which I will not read, is very long and has many subparts, of all the financial information that the Sacklers were required to provide or risk contempt under the stipulation approved by this Court, to no objection. I believe, if my memory is
right -- and maybe it's not on that point, because it's been along day -- on Docket Number 518.

So, Your Honor, with respect to that, I'll say only one other thing: 257 parties signed the protective order entered in this case, that provided, I believe, 100 million pages of documents, to basically any and every party that participated in this case, to use as a treasure trove and a hunting ground to find things with respect to the liability and culpability of the Sacklers, 257.

So, when lawyers talk about lack of information and lack of transparency, it just seems so utterly belied by the record that it's not a surprise that they never have citations. Obviously, I will not cite Your Honor to Your Honor, since I'm directed to record evidence, but much of this information is about the foreign assets and the foreign entities where the money is. And it would be very, very difficult and arguably impossible to get in discovery without letters rogatory and (indiscernible) getting the cooperation of foreign jurisdictions, etc.

Item number two, which is factual. You know, I want to apologize to the State of Washington and to the State of Maryland. Apparently, in pulling together cites for the general proposition, that many states are obligated to put recoveries in their treasuries, I picked two bad examples. It was my fault and I take responsibility for
that.

There are many states who not only don't have such a special provision, but have the opposite provision. In Oklahoma, for example, right after we settled with them prefiling, they passed 74 Oklahoma Statute annotated 30.6, to bar the attorney general from doing settlements and putting money directly into opioid as opposed to in the state treasuries.

So, there are many devoted public servants and many elected officials, each doing the best they can. I should have left the point more general, which is there can be no assurance that the money will go to abatement if there are direct recoveries, as opposed to, I think citing Maryland -- and I apologize again, both to Mr. Edmunds and to the AG for my mistake in not knowing that there was a subsequent, more specific statute that, praise the Lord, directed opioid recoveries to abatement.

Your Honor, with respect to transparency and notice, $I$ will rest on the extraordinary record -- $I$ won't respond to that at all.

Your Honor, it's not record evidence, and forgive for straying for a nanosecond -- you know what, scrap that; delete it and retract it.

Your Honor, this is in order and this is fact:

Your Honor asked Mr. Gold, and got what I actually think --
actually from Mr. Goldman, excuse me -- possibly the most important question that is the cornerstone of the entire hearing. Under your theory, what happens if one governmental entity potentially is against the will of everyone else, if it's literally 613,999 creditors to one? Whether because that governmental entity is acting in the best of all possible fates and believes that the terms, etc., is not satisfied; or whether it's -- just wants much more than it deserves, and the now has ultimate extortion in a situation where a single foreign town or domestic town or municipality, or state, under 10127 which, as Mr. Kaminetzky pointed out, defines governmental units with breathtaking precision, the term that is incorporated as used in the Police Power Provision at 364.

And I apologize for picking on Connecticut, Mr. Shore's home state, as we learned today. But here's the fact? Connecticut's proof of claim, under penalty of perjury, asserts $\$ 50,686,000,000$ against Purdue. And of course, we know that -- and believe me, I'm not pushing back -- that many people believe that any claim against Purdue is a claim against the Sacklers.

So, on some level, that's all you need to know; which is, since individual states, almost all of them, are asserting claims in the tens of billions of dollars, and many municipalities are asserting massive claims, what they
are, in essence telling you, is that in their view, 99.999 percent consensus is irrelevant because one entity -- and under, you know, some of the theories we heard today, including my often very dear friend Mr. Fogelman -- and how he lives with the dissonance of being one of the hardest working people in this case, for abatement and for a PHI, and working on the injunction day and night, to make sure the DA is satisfied with it, to make the new company cleaner than any company ever, while at the same time filing a statement and arguing passionately, as far as $I$ can tell, an objector; not only has the settlement of a $\$ 2$ billion claim - I don't understand any of that.

But under his theory, defining the governmental entity, if any entity -- any entity in the world -- can put a proverbial block, even if all 50 states -- and we even get Seattle on board -- and all 22,495 cities, counties (indiscernible) support, with one group of tort plaintiffs, with one lawyer, with a $\$ 20$ billion asserted claim, says they're not in the deal, everything crumbles to the ground. There's no way that anybody actually believes that that can be the right answer.

You Honor, with respect to record evidence, sort of, on the direct claims versus estate claims, I would point the Court to paragraph 239 of our brief, where we clearly state that we believe that the estate claims are very
substantially stronger than any of the direct claims.

Because when it comes to invading the corpus of trusts, when you have a (indiscernible) claim for estate value that was transferred into a trust, you stand very differently than having an in personam claim against a beneficiary of the trust when you try to pierce the trust to get the value out of your trust.

Suffice it to say, Your Honor, I was as bewildered as you were by your colloquy with Mr. Fogelman. The fact that someone is agreeing to dip into a trust where there is an additional layer of recovery risk, I think speaks to the wisdom and strength of the settlement. There's no sword and shield at all. It's the opposite; they're putting down a force field and making the trust obligors, instead of saying that they have no liability and will only pay out of personal assets.

Your Honor, the record evidence $I$ think also shows -- I actually don't have pin cite for this.

You know what? Before $I$ say that, $I$ want to say something else, actually of extraordinary import (indiscernible) personally. And some of the new arrivals who are participating in this hearing probably do not know this, you know, we arrived, Davis Polk, for the first time, in March 2018 -- no prior connection to the Sacklers, no prior connection to Purdue.

I'll just let the facts speak for themselves; which is, by January 2019, every Saclker was gone from the Board and out of management. And there was a majority of new blue chip, independent directors, who not only were four of the seven, but were the entirety of the Special Committee, to whom there was irrevocable delegation.

I think it's fair to say that we understand cleaning house and deterrents and propriety.

So, now onto this point: It is simply a fact that out of the 57 human beings who, I believe, are descendants of Mortimer and Raymond Saclker, only 11 , to our knowledge, were ever on the Board at any time. And as I said before, a fair number of them are not US citizens, do not live in the United States and have never been involved.

So, those are just the facts that inform the landscape. And, you know, when people ... I'll leave that alone.

Next fact, Your Honor, the GDP of the United States of America in 2020, was $\$ 20,930,000,000,000$. That's a fact. Why is that fact relevant? Because what you heard from many people is a totally unsupported new theory that the ratio of harm alleged to the settlement, is somehow legally relevant. Under that theory, if the Sacklers had the entire wealth of the United States of America's 2000 GDP, and they contributed the whole thing, it would still be
insufficient. Because the $\$ 40$ trillion number, that we constantly remind people, is the amount of filed proofs of claim -- there's only 10 percent of them, because 90 percent were filed in an unliquidated amount.

So, if you extrapolate out, there could be \$400 trillion worth of claims, which means that the United States of America donated its GDP, would be about 5.2 percent of the alleged harm, and would not be sufficient to settle, due to the amount alleged.

Your Honor, with respect to the police and regulatory dimension -- and this is so important -- and again, $I$ 'm not going to make argument; I'm going to stick what's in the record. The covenants contained in the Eighth Amended Plan and in the Mediator's Report, supported by 80 percent of the states and the MSGE Group, speak passionately and directly to this exact point. We don't begrudge anyone who wishes we were getting a lot more from the Sacklers. I hereby swear that $I$ would rather take another billion or two billion or three billion from the Sacklers, and put it to work on abatement. So does everyone; that's not the issue. The issue is, did all the rest of the states and almost all the mutants -- and we'll talk the parens patriae and I'll direct Your Honor to the citations for that in just a moment -- are they entitled to have their views effectuated? Or does any individual not on board get a blocking right?

So what is the record evidence, Your Honor? The record evidence is that by the time the third mediation was concluded, the covenants to the deal that directly address deterrence and regulatory and even frankly penal include the following: the Sacklers are barred for life from any further connection to Purdue. Purdue is stomped out of existence in Chapter 11, and its assets are transferred to NewCo.

NewCo's governors are picked by the government. They will pick the board and the overseeing trusts. There will be a monitor continuing. We have had two illustrative -illustrious monitors.

And it was Your Honor's suggestion, and we did it at the very beginning of the case and it is not going away. There is an injunction that is going to be in place, and I was very confused by Mr. Edmunds until he said, quite understandably, because we're all overwhelmed by the needs of this case, that people had to divide and conquer, right?

The NCSG, as this Court remembers well, doubled in length the original injunction from 2019 after three or four or five weeks of negotiation. And we are now very close to an agreed injunction that goes yet further still that all of the states are involved in negotiating. And hopefully we will reach global piece.

Mr. Fogelman and the DEA is also deeply involved. And my understanding is that document is just about done and
has just about universal agreement. So there's that and then there's the repository which I'm not going to repeat the terms of because Your Honor has heard them enough. And then there are the naming rights, and then and then and then.

And so if you want to talk about deterrence and messaging to say we will take your company away from you, we will rip it out of your hands, we will stomp it out of existence, we will transfer its assets to a trust for the benefit of the American people, they will have a monitor, we will pick the board, you will be barred and you have to sell all your overseas companies and give us over $\$ 4$ billion, the largest settlement in the history of Chapter 11 , it's not what $I$ think matters because that's irrelevant. It's what 97 percent of our governmental creditors, 80 percent of the states, and as Mr. Shore and Mr. Arik so eloquently noted, an even higher percentage of the actual human beings injured.

Back to record evidence, Mr. Gold testified that there will not by dystopia of the plan fails. That's not what the record evidence shows because in this case, the past is a very excellent prediction of future performance. And Mr. Delconte's liquidation analysis, which I'll be talking a fair bit more about when we get to best interest on Wednesday, is the evidence on this as is what the Court
of course will take judicial notice of which was described at length in our pre-filing brief, the so-called informational brief, that describes exactly what was going on pre-filing, that states and municipalities and tribes and plaintiffs competing against one another to get there first and get value from the Sacklers with new litigations being filed, sometimes 20 a day, in different courthouses, et cetera.

And that's what the evidence shows. It's not that the AGs thought that it would be irresponsible. There are 600,000 people, each who passionately believe they have enormous claims that deserve vindication.

Your Honor, with respect to sovereignism -sovereignty, I'm not going to repeat what was in Mr . Maclay's brief, except to note that he goes on starting at Paragraph 9 on Page 5 for quite a few pages with a lot of pretty convincing-looking case law and statutory cites to me about home rule including ironically -- I'm not going to take the fall for this one if it's wrong since it's not my brief -- California, Oregon, Washington, Connecticut and Delaware are among the states that provide for home rule either in their constitutions or by legislation. Then he cites a lot of stuff.

So states are unquestionably critical sovereigns and it's true. It's true. I guess I don't know enough
about American politics as maybe I should. I don't -- I don't know that I'm profoundly ignorant. I think that may have been a little bit much. But I do know that out of the 4,924 U.S. governments who voted, 4,914 are not objecting to the plan and ten are.

Finally, Your Honor, $I$ think, $I$ want to note that every one of the objectors disclaimed a desire to talk about Iridium. They said, not my thing, I'm not talking about Iridium, that's not me. But then they all did, every one of them, because what they did was they cited a document or two or three or five that, you know, suggests that the Sacklers have a lot of risk here.

Let me be very clear because you can assume that the special committee, which has looked at 960,000 documents and the UCC that has done the same, share that view passionately. The Sacklers have very substantial risk here, in the billions of dollars. I've said it at so many hearings that only new entrants to the case, $I$ think, could possibly believe to the contrary. It is to settle that risk that they are agreeing to all of these covenants and paying this money.

Whether it's enough money is for the creditors to decide. And they have decided decisively and definitively. If it is truly unlawful, that's for the Court to decide. But for people to give you one or two documents and say,
look, Mortimer knew, that Dr. Richard knew, do you think we don't know that? Do you think the Court doesn't know that? This has been three-and-a-half years full-time. We know much more than this were the tip of iceberg, and we never would have allowed the Sacklers to get on the stand for three days and tell their story and defend themselves. To say that there were no Perry Mason moments is an understatement. But this is for bankruptcy is for. It's for collective action to solve otherwise unsolvable problems and to do the best or the most that one knows how. If it's truly illegal, then Your Honor will turn it down, and $I$ actually terribly fear what will happen, as you have heard from me in spades. But to say that it shouldn't go through because they found a document or two or three that suggested that the Sacklers had risk, we found hundreds.

We know what the risk is. And that's in the negotiation and the mediation, there Judge Layn Phillips and Mr. Ken Feinberg spent 11 months full-time. No one's even heard of hiring a mediator by the month, full-time for a year. All they did, without breaching mediation privilege, was get presentations, hundreds of pages long with attachments and excerpts and arguments and quotes. And they then jointly recommended 4.275.

So I don't appreciate the kind of, you know, sub silentio Iridium testimony to people who keep saying that's
not their issue. We are very comfortable that the will of the overall number of creditors and governmental creditors supports the deal. The issues that are left are really entirely legal, and we stand both on Mr. Kaminetzky's argument which $I$ think address everything, along with the papers of all the supporting parties.

So with that, Your Honor, I've left out a lot of what I wanted to say. But I would ask you to indulge me. I just want to say one last thing, I promise, and then I'll turn to Mr. Tobak.

When either litigants in this case or those who report on what's happening refer to this plan as the Sackler plan or the Sacklers, you know, exploiting a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code, it's almost impossible to overstate how painful that is, not to me, but to the UCC and the AHC and the MSGE and the Native American tribes and the adult PI victims and the NASPI victims and the MAS medical monitoring claims and the hospitals and the third-party payers and the ratepayers and the schools.

Every one of those groups had to look deep inside and figure out whether they would support this plan or not. The Sacklers are the defendants. That's all they are. They're not the voters. They're not the proponents. They're not the supporters. They're not the craftsmen. In fact, they didn't even see this plan for months. They sent

Howard to get copies of it because it wasn't their business. We are the plaintiffs. And they are the defendants.

Unless the plan is unlawful, the 4,500 pages of uncontested testimony and expert reports make it clear there is no better way out of this. We all wish there was more. But the consensus of everyone in the case, except for ten people basically, is that we're not getting more voluntarily and the involuntary route is vastly, vastly worse.

With that, Your Honor, I'll ask Mr. Tobak to please come up and address the two technical questions. Your Honor, I promise you I cut out 90 percent of what $I$ was going to say. I apologize for straying a little bit from record evidence. Obviously this is a case of tremendous, tremendous import to the Debtors who, while not government officials, are in fact the fiduciaries for all parties for whom we actually care rather desperately and passionately. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. TOBAK: Marc Tobak -- oh, sorry. Thank you, Your Honor. Marc Tobak, Davis Polk \& Wardwell for the Debtors. With respect to Mr. Underwood's point that his clients' claims are not channeled, that's entirely correct and appropriate for four reasons. One is simply that the Canadian munis' claims are fundamentally different from those of domestic non-federal-governmental entities.

As has been discussed over the course of these
hearings, the plan treats claims against the Debtors and has refocused at length today on claims against release parties and shareholder release parties that relate to the Debtors. Thus the plan treats Canadian municipal and First Nation creditors' claims against the Debtors or claims against the shareholder release parties that relate to the Debtors.

But unlike the domestic federal -- domestic nonfederal public claimants, the Canadian municipalities and Canadian First Nations can look to a separate company, to Purdue Canada for recoveries and, to the extent that they have claims against any shareholder release party that relates to the conduct of Purdue Canada and not the conduct of the Debtors, can look to those parties for those non-debtor-related claims. That means that they're both fundamentally different from the claims that are treated through NOAT.

As a consequence of that, they've received different classification and treatment under the plan. They're classified in the class 11-C as a general unsecured creditor and, unlike the participants in NOAT, don't receive distributions on account of abatement. They could however, to the extent that they succeed in proving their claim and withstand the objection that the Debtors would intend to pursue, would receive those recoveries directly in the form of a recovery from the pool of money set aside from those
creditors, unlike NOAT that receive abatement funds which are obviously subject to a great deal of carefully negotiated covenants and promises about how those funds would be used.

To the extent that this argument is intended as an argument that the releases -- the fact that these claims would not be channeled matters for the Metromedia analysis, Your Honor, I would say as we sorted out and as Mr. Kaminetzky noted, Metromedia is not a matter of factors and prongs and ultimately turns on the importance of the release to the plan and the fact that these claims, as is appropriate given their different treatment, are not channeled does not matter for the Metromedia analysis of why the third-party release of those claims with respect to claims against or related to the Debtors is appropriate.

Finally, to turn to the sovereign immunity argument, $I$ think it's very clear, as we set forth in our brief, that Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code abrogates sovereign immunity and abrogates the sovereign immunity of a foreign -- of a foreign entity, whether it be a foreign state or one of its instrumentalities. And there's really no case that we've been pointed to or evidence that we've been shown that a foreign sovereign immunity has any application here.

That's $I$ think all we had to say on that argument,
unless Your Honor has any further questions.

THE COURT: Okay. No, that's fine. And then you were also going to address the insurance companies' argument.

MR. TOBAK: Yes. With respect to Gulf Underwriters, ultimately I think the safest thing to point out is that we obviously do not represent the IACs or nondebtor entities that were party to that settlement agreement. And I think the safest point is to say that that point has been the subject of discussion and I think should be continuing to be the subject of discussion. On the other hand, to the extent the analysis for the release of those claims is really the same as the analysis for all those which we've discussed.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. TOBAK: I see Mr. Underwood is on.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Underwood, you've made your point too. I just wanted to hear a response to it. I don't think I needed any point/counterpoint at this point.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Preis, I see you
there. I don't know if you have anything brief to say in rebuttal.

MR. PREIS: I do, Your Honor. It will be less than 60 seconds. Can you hear me?

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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PREIS: Thank You, Your Honor. Just for the record again, Arik Preis, on behalf of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. As Mr. Peter pointed out, there are a lot of misquotes, a number of factual assertions that were simply wrong including about things that -- but it doesn't really change the legal argument. So I'm not going to take Your Honor's time.

What I did want to ask, and just to get confirmation to this point, is that the stipulation that we agreed to at the beginning of the evidentiary -- of the hearing also extends to anything that was said about the evidence during the oral argument. One could read that stipulation as not extending further.

But there was some colloquy that you had with Mr. Gold or Mr. Goldman about evidence that they had or didn't have. Obviously we're staying out of it, as we did during the evidentiary portion. But $I$ just wanted to make sure that the stipulation also extends to the oral argument.

THE COURT: Right. That's my understanding. Again, $I$ think the stipulation ultimately is built in suspenders in any event because $I$ can't imagine anything being effective collateral estoppel. But yes, that's my understanding.

MR. PREIS: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all.

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THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'm not sure -MR. UZZI: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. UZZI: Just -- Gerard Uzzi, from Milbank on behalf of the Raymond Sackler Family. Just to deal with a factual issue on the Gulf Underwriters objection, and I appreciate Mr. Tobak saying that there are discussions going on and we're happy to continue those discussions.

But just in case we don't come back to this topic, just to explain, you know, the background here, these relate to -- the indemnification obligations relate to policies that predate or ended in 2003. So it all deals with prior conduct prior to 2003. The only parties that can make a claim under this policy would be the MDT.

We have given not just in connection with this but other things, the Sackler family and the related parties have turned over all their insurance rights to the Debtors. So this release is just to make sure something doesn't come back through the back door just like any other claim that could be made against us for the debtor's conduct, Your Honor.

And again, I'm happy to continue the conversations with the Debtors, with Mr. Luskin as well. But in case we don't come back to it, $I$ just wanted to put some context around that, Your Honor. And I'm happy to answer any
question you have.

THE COURT: Okay. No. That's fine. Thanks. MR. UZZI: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. LUSKIN: Your Honor, may I -- I just wanted to

THE COURT: Yes. But you're not coming through clearly for some reason.

MR. LUSKIN: Because I'm not using my microphone and now I am.

THE COURT: There you go.

MR. LUSKIN: I took Mr. Huebner's admonition and got myself a headphone, and $I$ don't know how to use it. THE COURT: Okay. All right. MR. LUSKIN: I apologize. I certainly welcome the opportunity to talk to Mr. Uzzi. Please do call. And also our objection -- we have no idea whether additional claims can or will be made. These are indemnity claims. The point is they have not been -- or the possibility of such claims has not been obliterated.

They still could be asserted. And there are some litigations pending where we do have defense costs that are covered under the settlement. So there are both existing claims and potential claims. But we are happy to discuss any resolution. Give me a call. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And just for the record, that
was Mr. Luskin on behalf of Gulf Underwriters.

MR. LUSKIN: Oh, sorry. Yes.

THE COURT: And I guess I had thought that there was some preservation of insurers' rights in the MDT. But maybe I'm missing that. I'll just leave it at that. I know that that subject is heavily documented. Okay. Anything else before we break?

MR. UNDERWOOD: Your Honor, if I may, this is Allen Underwood on behalf of the Canadian municipalities and First Nations. I do want to reserve the right on Wednesday to very briefly unpack this issue, a little bit of sovereign immunity as well as why --

THE COURT: Right. No. That's -- that's fine, and that's the jurisdictional issue. But that's fine.

MR. UNDERWOOD: Thank You, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's break until

Wednesday morning then. This -- these two issues have taken up a full day. But $I$ have little doubt that we would finish on the remaining issues in a full day. These issues were much more significant, I believe, not to really belittle the other issues, but $I$ think they require more time so that the parties' arguments could be fully understood.

I hope the parties use that day productively, not just on the last issue that we were discussing, but also on the release issues in two ways: first, in narrowing the
release further; secondly, while I believe I fully understand Mr. Huebner's point, that it just can't be the case that one creditor or one public creditor could veto or crater this plan, there is still risk on all sides with respect to the plan and potential appeals of the plan if only insofar as it would pertain to delay and cost and of course the delay here includes not only getting money to individual personal injury creditors but also in getting money to governmental entities to abate or help to abate the opioid crisis.

I told the parties once that they should have another mediation. That mediation went to Judge Chapman. I can't imagine anyone who would be able better to get the parties to see the pros and cons of their cases and to facilitate a settlement than Judge Chapman. I'm not going to direct further mediation. I think this hearing should illustrate to the parties on both sides of the table, that is the objecting states on the one hand and the Sacklers on the other, the risks that they face.

I will note that $I$ found Kathe Sackler's testimony cogent and her stating that she and her family members wanted to avoid spending more money on lawyers and have that money directed to abating the opioid crisis and to personal injury creditors.

I will note however that a lot of money has been
spent on lawyers in getting to this point. If there is any message in what I've just said, it is that if an agreement can be reached with the objecting -- remaining objecting states that involves not only narrowing the release but providing for additional funds or clarifying the injunctive relief in the plan, the parties should focus on that tonight and Wednesday.

That will clearly be your best opportunity to do so. And you should use it. The time has passed at this point to speechify. One really needs to focus on the type of analysis that $I$ was discussing with Mr. Goldman. And I'm speaking not just to the states but also to the Sacklers. So please use that time productively. Thank you all. I'll see you all on Wednesday at 10:00.
(Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at
$6: 41 \mathrm{PM})$


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Date: August 24, 2021
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Veritext Legal Solutions

