1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - WESTERN DIVISION
3	HONORABLE OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
4	IN THE MATTER OF THE SEIZURE OF ) ALL FUNDS ON DEPOSIT IN DEUTSCHE )
5	BANK SECURITIES, INC., ACCOUNT ) NUMBERS 5XL-066365; 5XL-066605; ) CASE NO.
6	5XL-069104; 5XL-069112; ) 5XL-069120; 5XL-878025; ) CV 15-0389-ODW(VBKx)
7	5XL-878033; 5XL-878264; ) 5XL-878272; 5XL-878579; )
8	A3V-943232; AND A3V-943240, )
9	AND )
10	UP TO \$11,666,645.00 ON DEPOSIT ) IN BANK OF AMERICA ACCOUNT NUMBER )
11	11548-63190, AND UP TO ) \$5,630,385.00 ON DEPOSIT IN BANK )
12	OF AMERICA ACCOUNT NUMBER ) 11548-63195. )
13	<b>)</b>
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15	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
16	MONDAY, APRIL 13, 2015 2:17 P.M.
17	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
18 19	
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22	DEBI READ, CSR 3949 CRR RMR
23	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER  312 NORTH SPRING STREET 432A
24	LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 READIT3949@GMAIL.COM
25	

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16	ALSO PRESENT
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 2015 1 2 2:17 P.M. 3 -000-(Call to Order of the Court.) 4 5 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling Item 4, CV 15-389, In 6 the matter of the Seizure Funds on Deposit in Deutsch Bank 7 Securities, Inc. Counsel, come forward and state your appearances, please. 8 MR. UMHOFER: Good morning, your Honor. Matthew Umhofer and Luke Kuo on behalf of the movants. 10 11 THE COURT: Counsel, good afternoon. 12 MR. WELK: Good afternoon, your Honor. 13 Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven Welk for the government. 14 And with me is paralegal Tina Keleshyan. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 15 All right. Well, all right. We begin here with a Notice 16 17 of Motion and a Motion for Return of Property pursuant to 18 Title 18 United States Code Section 983(a). And of course the 19 government has taken the position that the defendants are 20 seeking return of personal property pursuant to the wrong 21 statute and that this is tantamount to a new civil action for 22 the return of seized property under Rule 41(g) of the Federal 23 Rules of Criminal Procedure. 24 I'll just tell you preliminarily I'm inclined to adopt the 25 government's position. So --

MR. UMHOFER: An uphill battle then, your Honor.

THE COURT: Indeed.

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MR. UMHOFER: Your Honor, first I'd note that our original motion that the government is moving to dismiss now and our opposition were filed — both which were filed under seal — I know the government did not seal its papers in the case — but given the fact that we are proceeding on something that was originally filed under seal, I would ask to clear the courtroom so that we could conduct the proceedings under seal.

THE COURT: We are not going to be discussing anything other than the applicability of one statute over the other. We're not going to talk about the facts. The facts don't matter.

MR. UMHOFER: Understood, your Honor. Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: I had a friend in law school. He never read the facts, just get to the law. I'm not saying that, but I'm saying in this particular case we don't have to talk about the facts of the case at all.

MR. UMHOFER: Let's get to the law then, your Honor. Let's start from the prospective that within the Ninth Circuit forfeiture statutes are strictly construed against the government. So this statute must be strictly construed against the government.

So then we move from there to what does the statute say

1 and what have courts said about what the statute says. 2 THE COURT: I guess which statute? We're talking 3 about 983? MR. UMHOFER: 983. Yes, your Honor, 983. 4 5 THE COURT: Which they say is not applicable. MR. UMHOFER: That's right, your Honor. And what I 6 7 found interesting was that the government, even though exceeded 8 the required page limit and had plenty of space to do it, never took issue with the central case that we cited, which we cited 10 in our original motion and in our opposition. We put it front 11 and center, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: I always find it interesting that 13 counsel would bring up that the -- that fact that the other 14 side has violated a page limit. Does that annoy you if you 15 have to read a few too many pages? Or should that be my 16 concern? 17 MR. UMHOFER: Your Honor, I'm sure that if I'd 18 exceeded the page limit, Mr. Welk would have filed something on 19 the other side as well, so --20 THE COURT: I would have ignored that, too. 21 MR. UMHOFER: I understand, your Honor. Look, your 22 Honor, let's get to it. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. UMHOFER: The core case here which is the case 25 from this district is In re Return of Seized Property 625

F.Supp.2d 949. That case is directly on point and the government never says a thing about it anywhere, never addresses it once.

What that case said was that the government made the same argument it's making here. The direct quote from that case is, "The government contends that this provision would only apply if it had initiated a 'nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding,' which it chose not to do in this case."

That's exactly what happened here, your Honor. So the government made in 625 F.Supp.2d, the Return of Seized Property case, this argument that 983 doesn't apply here because it's a nonjudicial forfeiture case.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UMHOFER: And the court in that case rejected it.

THE COURT: This is much to do about notice, right?

MR. UMHOFER: It is.

THE COURT: Why isn't that a frivolous argument?

MR. UMHOFER: It's absolutely not a frivolous

20 argument. But I --

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THE COURT: We're having e-mail exchanges either on the day of the seizure or shortly thereafter. I mean, clearly notice was given.

MR. UMHOFER: Well, your Honor, couple different things. First of all, the critical factual issue in this case

is whether whatever notice was received -- and we contend there 1 2 was no formal notice here which is required under the statute -- it wasn't sufficient. That's a factual issue we got 3 to get into in discovery and that's why summary judgment is 4 5 inappropriate here and why -- why, in particular, actual notice 6 isn't enough. And I point the Court to a case 386 F.Supp.2d 9. 7 So it's 386 F.Supp.2d 9. It's from the District of Puerto 8 Rico. It's all these strange case names, your Honor. This one is entitled In re Assorted Jewelry. 10 Trial court decision from Puerto Rico. THE COURT: 11 MR. UMHOFER: In that case, your Honor, considering 12 this very thing, the government argued actual notice, your 13 Honor, so no formal notice was required. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. UMHOFER: And the court rejected that argument and held because there was no formal notice --16 THE COURT: What's formal notice mean? 17 18 MR. UMHOFER: Well, your Honor, that's a very good 19 question, your Honor, and Mr. Welk knows this. Every single 20 time the government does a forfeiture and does notice, it sends 21 out a particular form that has lots of information on it. 22 this is one of the key issues in the case, that the government 23 never sent out that form. 2.4 THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait. Hang on. 25 talk very fast.

1 MR. UMHOFER: Sorry, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. But the statute doesn't require that -- under 983, the statute doesn't require that this form be sent out, right?

MR. UMHOFER: It requires notice. And so what we have is a dispute --

THE COURT: You're not answering my questions, are you?

MR. UMHOFER: It says notice; that's all it says.

THE COURT: Right. It doesn't require that a form go out, right? Or that the form contain certain identifying information -- or information?

MR. UMHOFER: The statute does not. 28 CFR 9.4 does. So 28 -- it's -- that's a Code of Federal Regulations that pivots on what sort of notice is required. And in that section, which we filed as a supplemental authority with the Court, 28 CFR 9.4(a), it says the government when it does send notice is required to notify the receiver that it has 30 days, and the government never did that. And these e-mails make no reference to 30 days being required.

And that gets to the larger issue of why notice was insufficient here, your Honor, is because notice triggers very specific deadlines under the statute. That's why formal notice is required and actual notice isn't enough.

And the reason why is because when the government sends

that formal notice, it's got to let you know what the deadlines are that are running, and because if you don't within 30 days of receiving that notice file a claim, you're out of luck, your Honor. And so that's why this idea of actual notice doesn't really work.

And if you take a step back and think about forfeiture, the government comes and takes something from you, takes the car out of your driveway, takes the funds out of your account, of course you have notice of that. But the government's required to provide formal notice. Everybody's going to have actual notice of the seizure, your Honor.

So the reason why Congress required formal notice and why the government always sends out a very formal form that has very specific information about what the next steps are is because if you snooze, you lose under the deadlines, and so actual notice creates this really questionable circumstance under which somebody may or may not know that their car's been taken. The government insists they must know because it was taken or we sent an e-mail, but -- and then the 30-day clock is running and the government gets to keep that if somebody didn't really realize that the money was taken or the car was taken.

So that's why the government has to send out notice and why the government usually not only sends out the specific form, which wasn't sent in this case, but also does publication. It actually publishes and puts it out as far as

it can in order to make sure that all interested parties get the information that they can. The government didn't do anything of that. They sent a couple e-mails, your Honor.

THE COURT: So you're maintaining that this is a forfeiture action.

MR. UMHOFER: Your Honor, this is a seizure action, right?

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. UMHOFER: This is -- there's been a seizure.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. UMHOFER: And the government has a decision to make within 60 days, right? It has to figure out what it's going to do within 60 days. That's what the statute says.

So if you look at 983 and you start from the beginning, it starts with in a nonjudicial forfeiture case it's got to send out notice within 60 days. That's what the statute says, not disputing that.

The next thing it says is no notice is required if before the 60-day period expires the government files a civil judicial forfeiture action. So built into the statute is this notion that the government has got to move within 60 days: either give notice with a nonjudicial forfeiture action or file a civil forfeiture complaint within 60 days.

And then the third piece is, again, if before the 60-day period expires the government doesn't go civil but goes

criminal, then no notice is required.

So this really points to one of the biggest problems with the position the government's taking is that Congress could not have made this mistake; they must have intended this notice provision to apply only to the 60-day time period. That's absolutely not true because if you look at the government's Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, which I presume Mr. Welk had some involvement in drafting, it specifically talks about Congress having made a mistake. At page 59 of the Asset Forfeiture Manual, this is what — this is what it says and this is the DOJ speaking, "Congress did not consider, however, that not all forfeiture cases begin as administrative forfeitures." Congress didn't consider that the government doesn't always start with administrative forfeiture. It left that out.

Now, I'm going to -- I'm going to point the Court to another case that's directly on point, goes the wrong way for us, but it involves reasoning that I think is very persuasive here. It's In re Funds on Deposit 919 F.Supp.2d 169. It's from the District of Massachusetts. There's only two cases in the country that I found that are on point on here. One is the case from this district that rejects the argument that the government's making today. The other one is this case from the District of Massachusetts. And it specifically talks about how there is a hole in the statute and it cites directly to that

Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual where the government's conceding that Congress did make a mistake here. Congress requires notice for a thousand dollar seizure but not a hundred million dollar seizure and that frustrates the statutory scheme. That's what the court held in the District of Massachusetts case.

Now, if that's the case, then the plain language of the statute must be ignored under the Ninth Circuit's law. The Ninth Circuit says specifically that you can't -- you must ignore the plain meaning, the plain language of the law if the statutory structure and scheme is frustrated by the interpretation in the plain language, or if leads to an absurd result. And I've got both here, your Honor, because the scheme is there to make sure that everybody gets notice, and to go down the list, the statute is clearly designed to make sure something happens within 60 days, either a notice or a filing of the civil forfeiture case -- hasn't happened -- or the filing of a criminal forfeiture case. That hasn't happened.

So all those things haven't happened here in the 60 days and the government's own policy memorandum concedes the government made -- that the Congress made a mistake here. Congress thought that every single forfeiture that comes through the door is going to start as an administrative forfeiture case. That's why it says only nonjudicial forfeiture cases require the 60-day time period. So now

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Congress has made this mistake. DOJ has conceded, contrary to
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    what the government has argued here, that Congress made a
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    mistake.
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               THE COURT: Okay. You're starting to repeat
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    yourself now. Let's forget --
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               MR. UMHOFER: That's fine, your Honor. I'll move on
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    from that point.
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               THE COURT: Well, before you go too far, I got a
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    couple of questions.
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               MR. UMHOFER:
                             Sure.
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               THE COURT: Number 1, you'll have to excuse me if
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    it -- if Congress concedes that it makes a mistake, that's one
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    thing. Every now and then I concede that Congress has made a
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              That doesn't mean a thing, nor does it when DOJ says
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    Congress made a mistake. This arbitrary cutoff of $500,000, do
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    you know why? I don't. But it's there, right?
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               MR. UMHOFER: It is there, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. UMHOFER: It is.
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               THE COURT: All right. Maybe it's a mistake, maybe
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    it was an oversight. I don't know. But it's there and we're
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    dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars.
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               MR. UMHOFER: Understood, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Now tell me. I think I've missed
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    something in the proceedings. I understand Judge Kenton has
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been working with you all for some time now. I assume some
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    things have happened because now all of a sudden we're at
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    forfeiture. What has gone on before that we are now at
    forfeiture of a significant sum of money?
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               MR. UMHOFER: Your Honor, nothing has happened and
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    that's the problem.
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               THE COURT: Well, then, why is it forfeiture?
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               MR. UMHOFER: Because there is a notice requirement
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    in 983 --
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               THE COURT: Well, forget that.
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               MR. UMHOFER: -- which dims off the seizure.
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               THE COURT: No, forget that. Forget that. I'm
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    trying to figure out the basis upon which the government can
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    contend that these moneys are now forfeit? What happened?
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    What went on before? What gave them that authority?
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               MR. UMHOFER: So let me -- let me make something
    clear, your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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               MR. UMHOFER: Are you asking -- just to clarify the
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    question -- are you asking how did the government seize these
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    moneys?
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               THE COURT: No. I know how they seized it.
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    had a warrant.
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               MR. UMHOFER: They had a warrant.
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               THE COURT:
                           They went and got the money and I don't
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1 know how this happened. 2 MR. UMHOFER: Right. 3 THE COURT: Was there some confession to judgment? Apparently it's nonjudicial so there are no courts involved. 4 5 MR. UMHOFER: Correct. THE COURT: I don't understand about -- I understand 6 7 about seizures, right, and the government wrongfully seizes 8 someone's property, then someone can say, "Whoa. Give me my property back." 10 MR. UMHOFER: Right. And that's what I'm trying to 11 do, your Honor, and they won't let me because I don't have a 12 proceeding in which to do that yet. 13 THE COURT: It's like a -- well, you don't. You 14 can -- I took this as a new pleading. Okay? 15 MR. UMHOFER: No --16 THE COURT: As far as I know, I look at the docket, 17 there's nothing going on here, we have no case, right? 18 apparently you've lost -- your clients have lost some money and 19 you've demanded to have that money back, and I look at this as 20 a brand new civil action to get your money back or your 21 client's money back. Okay? 22 MR. UMHOFER: That's right, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And I'm thinking that I'm -- you know 24 how sometimes we take one motion that's got a whole lot of

extraneous material in it and then we -- we simply construe

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that motion under Rule 56 as one for summary judgment? Well, 1 2 I'm construing this -- your motion your new action for return 3 of personal property under Rule 41(q). I know you don't like that. 4 5 MR. UMHOFER: I understand, your Honor. THE COURT: Go on with your arguments then. 6 7 MR. UMHOFER: I'll speak to that if you want to, but 8 the truth of the matter is -- and I just point the Court here to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Purcell --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. UMHOFER: -- on Rule -- just on the Rule 41 12 issue. Ninth Circuit in Purcell said that styling such 13 proceedings, a motion for return of property, as Rule 41(e) 14 motions when no criminal proceedings are pending can lead, as 15 in this case, to needless waste of limited judicial resources. 16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 17 MR. UMHOFER: What it really is is a civil action, 18 civil equitable action. It's not even -- it's not a Rule 41 19 motion and it's really not even a 983 motion. It's a civil 20 equitable action. That's what we've brought here. We cited 21 983 as our basis to do that, but at the end of the day Ninth 22 Circuit says it all goes into the civil equitable pot, not 23 Rule 41, not 983, and that's where we are. 2.4 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. UMHOFER: So that's my only point on that, your

Honor. So -- but I want to pick up on that point you raised, your Honor, because what we do have here is the government seized the money, we had a proceeding, and they submitted to Judge Kenton in an affidavit. They sealed that.

We went to Judge Kenton, said we've got a Fourth Amendment right to see that, and Judge Kenton denied that. We're going to appeal it. But that's what happened with Judge Kenton.

So just to clarify, we're trying to -- I want to be able to challenge this seizure, right? I don't have a proceeding to do that in and now I can't even right now see the affidavit that established the probable cause for that seizure.

This action here -- so I want to eventually bring, once I get that affidavit, a motion for return of property that seeks the return of property based on the lack of probable cause in that affidavit. That's what I want to do.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. UMHOFER: This one is a different one and it's very narrow because I can't bring the larger one yet; I don't have my affidavit. And this one is just because the government blew the 60-day deadline, we get the money back under 983. And that's the narrow point we're raising.

I understand I haven't convinced the Court, but I think that if you look at *In re Return Seized Property* here within this district, it's right on point. It rejects the argument the government's made here.

If you look at *In re Funds*, the case from the District of Massachusetts, all the reasoning there that happened favors a finding that — that reading the case — reading the statute as the government would would not only frustrate the structure of CAFRA, but lead to the absurd result of a thousand dollar seizure's requiring notice, but a million dollar seizure's not.

And with that, your Honor, unless you have any more questions, you got the core of my argument. I understand I may not have convinced you, but I did my best.

Any other questions, your Honor?

THE COURT: Thank you counsel. Thank you very much. Mr. Welk?

MR. WELK: Just briefly, your Honor, just to respond to a couple of the things that Mr. Umhofer said. You know, they filed these copies of the Remission Regulations the other day in a surreply. The section that Mr. Umhofer was just discussing, 28 CFR Section 9.3, is entitled Petitions in Administrative Forfeiture Cases. The following section, Section 9.4, is titled Petitions in Judicial Forfeiture Cases.

I think, as I understand the Court's point that you were just making, is there are no forfeiture — there are no formal forfeiture proceedings pending against these assets at this point. They've been seized. The government hasn't given — well, the government's just not required to give them notice under 983(a) because the statute specifically provides that it

doesn't.

But the point is that the government did give notice of the seizures, detailed notice. In fact, with our original papers, the movants filed a copy of the seizure warrant that they admit in the declaration of Luke Kuo was provided to them by me, by AUSA Steven R. Welk. And I didn't just give them the seizure warrant, I gave them the seizure warrant with the return. So they knew what had been seized, precisely what had been seized, when it had been seized, and the legal basis under which it had been seized because that's laid out in the face of the seizure warrant.

THE COURT: His complaint, of course, is that you didn't also advise them that something must be done in order to protect their interests.

MR. WELK: Well, there's nothing for them to do at this point because the government has not yet initiated formal forfeiture proceedings, and that's because the criminal investigation is still ongoing and we're at a point where going forward — there is — there is a gap in the statute and that's what's recognized in the forfeiture manual.

The gap is that the -- there's no deadline for forfeitures -- for seizures that are not subject to administrative forfeiture proceedings. But even if there were, there are many -- and I discussed them in the papers; I won't go through them again because they're described in here --

there are numerous provisions in the statute that provide that the government is entitled to additional time and those deadlines can be set aside by the Court for good cause shown.

And the primary purpose of that good cause is always an ongoing criminal investigation. So there's a very strong policy in the statute to protect ongoing criminal investigations.

This one, as the numbers will suggest, is a big one. It's a big criminal investigation and there were a lot of seizures of data and evidence in addition to the money here, and that investigation is ongoing.

THE COURT: And I know that what you say is true, but no such request for extensions were made, so I'm not even sure why we're talking about it. I'm fairly certain that had the request been made it probably would have been routinely granted, as they generally are. I know I can't substitute my judgment for that of those who are actively involved in investigating these things, so — all right.

Listen, this is -- this is all very entertaining -- no, it's not. This is just a strange consumption of time and I know you're going to be back -- right? As soon as you get a chance to take a look at the affidavit, then you will be back, and I so like hearing matters over and over again.

But I'm going to deny your request for the return of property and grant your -- the government's motion to dismiss. It's not over. We will be back.

1	MR. UMHOFER: Thank you, your Honor.
2	MR. KUO: Thank you, your Honor.
3	(Proceeding concluded at 2:40 P.M.)
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1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
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5	I, DEBRA READ, FEDERAL OFFICIAL REALTIME COURT REPORTER, IN AND
6	FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT
7	OF CALIFORNIA, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT PURSUANT TO SECTION 753,
8	TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, THAT THE FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND
9	CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF THE STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED PROCEEDINGS
10	HELD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER AND THAT THE TRANSCRIPT PAGE
11	FORMAT IS IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL
12	CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.
13	
14	DATED THIS 15TH DAY OF APRIL, 2015
15	
16	
17	/S/ DEBRA READ
18	DEBRA READ, CSR NO. 3949 CRR RMR FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
19	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COOK! REPORTER
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