To: Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

From: AMICUS Act Subcommittee

Re: AMICUS Act and Potential Amendments to Rule 29

Date: March 12, 2021

This memorandum reports on the work of the AMICUS Act Subcommittee and offers some thoughts and recommendations regarding potential amendments to the amicus disclosure requirements of Rule 29.

By way of background, in May 2019, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse introduced S. 1411, the Assessing Monetary Influence in the Courts of the United States Act, or the AMICUS Act (attached as Exhibit A). An identical bill, H.R. 3993 (sponsored by Rep. Henry Johnson), was introduced in the House. As discussed in more detail below, the AMICUS Act was prompted by concerns that the funding of amicus briefs and of the organizations that file them was not being disclosed adequately to the courts or the public. The Act would have required organizations that file three or more amicus briefs per year in the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court to register publicly and to disclose the sources of significant monetary contributions they received. Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson also exchanged correspondence with Scott Harris, the Clerk of the Supreme Court, inquiring about the Court’s enforcement of Supreme Court Rule 37.6, which requires amici to disclose certain monetary contributions made in connection with the preparation and submission of amicus briefs, and requesting comment on the AMICUS Act.

During our October 2019 meeting, a subcommittee was appointed to monitor the AMICUS Act and, in the event it appeared to be moving forward, to examine the issues it raised more closely, and to make a recommendation to the full Committee regarding any further action that might be appropriate. In September 2020, Mr. Harris wrote to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, attaching his correspondence with Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson. He noted that Rule 29 included disclosure requirements similar to those of Supreme Court Rule 37.6, and that the Committee might wish to consider whether to amend Rule 29, which would in turn “provide helpful guidance” on whether Supreme Court Rule 37.6 should be amended. Letter from Scott S. Harris to Hon. David G. Campbell and Hon. John D. Bates (Sept. 18, 2020) (attached as Exhibit B).

The AMICUS Act as introduced in 2019 ultimately died in committee and did not receive a vote during the last session of Congress. On February 23, 2021, however, Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson wrote to Judge Bates to request that the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure establish a working group “to address the problem of inadequate funding disclosure requirements for organizations
that file *amicus curiae* briefs in the federal courts” and amending Rule 29. Letter from Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse and Rep. Henry C. Johnson, Jr. to Hon. John D. Bates (Feb. 23, 2021) (the “2021 Whitehouse Letter”) (attached as Exhibit C). On March 1, 2021, Judge Bates responded that the issue had been referred to the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, which had already established a subcommittee to consider it.

The Subcommittee met to discuss the 2021 Whitehouse Letter, the AMICUS Act, and the issues they raise. As discussed in more detail below, the Subcommittee believes these issues are important and deserve further study. Some of the solutions proposed by the AMICUS Act may fall outside this Committee’s remit. The Subcommittee does, however, believe that the Committee should consider certain amendments to Rule 29’s disclosure requirements. While we are not yet making any specific recommendations, we offer some potential language for the Committee’s consideration. We also think it would be helpful for the full Committee to discuss whether more extensive amendments should be considered and for the Subcommittee to conduct additional research and analysis on that question, informed by the Committee’s initial views, before the Committee’s October 2021 meeting.

**Rule 29’s Current Disclosure Requirements**

Rule 29(a)(4)(E) currently provides that an amicus curiae other than the United States, a federal officer or agency, or a State must include in its brief “a statement that indicates whether”:

(i) a party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part;

(ii) a party or a party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and

(iii) a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person.

This provision was adopted in 2010 and was modeled on Supreme Court Rule 37.6.1 The Committee Note explains its purpose as follows:

The disclosure requirement . . . serves to deter counsel from using an amicus brief to circumvent page limits on the parties’ briefs . . . . It also

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1 That rule provides in relevant part: “[A] brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief, and shall identify every person other than the *amicus curiae*, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution.”
may help judges to assess whether the amicus itself considers the issue important enough to sustain the cost and effort of filing an amicus brief.

**Concerns Regarding The Current Disclosure Regime**

The 2021 Whitehouse Letter describes several concerns regarding disclosure of funding of amicus briefs and related issues that drove the introduction of the AMICUS Act and the current request that the Committee revisit the disclosure requirements of Rule 29. We offer a summary below, but the full letter (again, attached as Exhibit C) describes the issues in much more detail, as does an article by Sen. Whitehouse, *Dark Money and U.S. Courts: The Problem and Solutions*, 57 Harv. J. Leg. 273, 293 (2020) (attached as Exhibit D). These concerns largely fall into three categories.

1. **Parties can still fund amicus briefs.** The letter argues that the disclosure requirements of Rule 29 and its Supreme Court analogue are too narrowly drawn to achieve their intended goal of preventing parties to a case from circumventing the length restrictions on party briefs by funding amicus briefs instead. As written, the letter argues, the rule still allows parties to fund amicus briefs through undisclosed monetary contributions to the amicus organization. 2021 Whitehouse Letter at 1–2. For example, the letter argues that because Rule 29 requires disclosure only of monetary contributions “intended to fund preparing or submitting” an amicus brief, parties can still effectively fund amicus briefs by making contributions to the amicus organization that are not specifically earmarked for a particular amicus brief. *Id.* at 3–4. The letter even suggests that the rules could be construed “so narrowly as to only encompass the costs of formatting, printing, and delivering the specific brief.” *Id.* at 3. Because money is fungible, the letter contends, these disclosure requirements are easily evaded. *Id.*

The letter offers as an example *Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.* (No. 18-956), a pending Supreme Court copyright case, citing reports by Bloomberg that both Oracle and Google had made undisclosed contributions to organizations that filed amicus briefs on their respective sides of the case. According to Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson, the Internet Accountability Project had received between $25,000 and $99,999 from Oracle in 2019, without disclosing that in its brief in support of Oracle—presumably because the funds were not specifically earmarked for the brief. *Id.* at 3.

2. **Donors may anonymously fund a party and/or multiple amici.** The letter also notes that “many high-profile, politically charged cases are financed directly by ideological foundations,” which “also exploit the courts’ lenient *amicus*
funding disclosure rules to anonymously fund armadas of amicus briefs.” Id. at 4. The letter asserts, for example, that in *Friedrich v. California Teachers Ass’n*, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) and *Janus v. AFSCME*, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), which challenged mandatory union agency shop fees as unconstitutional, a private foundation provided funds both to the plaintiffs and to several different organizations that filed amicus briefs supporting the plaintiffs, without any disclosure to the Court. 2021 Whitehouse Letter at 4.

Relatedly, the letter notes that Rule 29 expressly exempts amici from disclosing funding by their members, creating “the possibility that parties to litigation can secretly fund amicus briefs in support of their position by funneling money to organizations of which they are members.” Id. at 6. The letter offers the example of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is funded by its members and which files amicus briefs without disclosing the members’ identities or participation in funding a brief. Id.

3. **Inequitable enforcement of disclosure requirements.** In one recent case in the Supreme Court, an amicus brief was “crowdfunded” through small donations from a large number of donors. Because some of the donors chose anonymity via the GoFundMe service, the brief was unable to comply with the Court’s rules for disclosing contributors, and the brief’s authors were obliged to return the anonymous donations. Id. at 7. Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson cite this example to suggest that the existing disclosure rules disadvantage ordinary citizens as compared to “the large and anonymous corporate funders of sophisticated repeat-players.” Id.

In general, the letter argues that the current disclosure regime has thus enabled “a massive, anonymous judicial lobbying program” that “systematically favors well-heeled insiders over the average citizen.” Id. at 6. The letter concludes by noting that while “it would be salutary for the judicial branch to address these issues on its own,” “a legislative solution” like the AMICUS Act “may be in order to ensure much-needed transparency around judicial lobbying, and to put all amicus funders on an equal playing field.” Id. at 8.

**The AMICUS Act**

The AMICUS Act, as introduced in 2019, has several components worth noting.

**Covered Amici.** The Act does not apply to all amici, but only to any “covered amicus,” defined to mean “any person . . . that files not fewer than 3 total amicus briefs in any calendar year in the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of appeals of the United States.” S. 1411, § 2(a) (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(a)).

**Disclosure.** The Act would require any covered amicus who files an amicus brief in the Supreme Court or courts of appeals to “list in the amicus brief the name
of any person who—(A) contributed to the preparation or submission of the amicus brief; (B) contributed not less than 3 percent of the gross annual revenue of the covered amicus for the previous calendar year if the covered amicus is not an individual; or (C) contributed more than $100,000 to the covered amicus in the previous year.” S. 1411, § 2(a) (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(b)(1)). It makes an exception for “amounts received by a covered amicus … in commercial transactions in the ordinary course of any trade or business conducted by the covered amicus or in the form of investments (other than investments by the principal shareholder in a limited liability corporation) in an organization if the amounts are unrelated to the amicus filing activities of the covered amicus.” Id. (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(b)(2)).

Registration. The Act would require each covered amicus to register yearly with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. S. 1411, § 2(a) (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(c)). The registration would include the name of the covered amicus; “a general description of [its] business or activities”; the name of any person who made a contribution subject to disclosure; “a statement of the general issue areas in which the [amicus] expects to engage in amicus activities”; and “to the extent practicable, specific issues that have, as of the date of the registration, already been addressed or are likely to be addressed in [those] amicus activities.” Id. (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(c)(2)). The Comptroller General is to conduct an annual audit to ensure compliance with the registration requirements, and the registrations are to be maintained indefinitely and made available to the public on the Administrative Office’s website. Id. (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(d)-(e)).

Prohibition on Gifts. The Act would prohibit covered amici from making any gift or providing any travel, other than reimbursement for travel for an appearance at an accredited law school, to any court of appeals judge or Supreme Court Justice. S. 1411, § 2(a) (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(f)).

Civil Fines. Covered amici who “knowingly fail[] to comply with any provision” of the Act “shall, upon proof of such knowing violation by a preponderance of the evidence, be subject to a civil fine of not more than $200,000.” S. 1411, § 2(a) (proposing new 28 U.S.C. § 1660(g)(1)).

Analysis and Recommendations

As noted above, Sen. Whitehouse’s letter addresses several potential concerns. First, parties may enjoy more influence over amicus briefs than the current disclosure regime reveals. One of the major goals of the existing disclosure provisions in Rule 29 is to prevent parties from evading the length requirements imposed on their briefs. If those provisions are not accomplishing their ends, they may need to be revised.
Another concern raised in the letter is the difficulty faced by anonymous small-dollar donors under a “crowdfunding” regime. Here there are important interests on each side. While small anonymous donations may pose little danger to the integrity of the court system, permitting them may also undermine efforts to regulate the involvement of parties.

Finally, the most fundamental concern expressed in the letter and underlying the AMICUS Act is that the current disclosure rules allow deep-pocketed persons or organizations to wield outsize influence anonymously through amicus briefs. Under the current regime, the letter suggests, neither the courts nor the public may know who is supporting the position a particular amicus brief urges a court to adopt. As discussed above, a single individual or foundation could potentially fund multiple amicus briefs nominally submitted on behalf of different organizations. This could create the impression that the position endorsed by the amicus briefs enjoys wider support than it actually does.

The AMICUS Act essentially treats the filing of amicus briefs as akin to lobbying, and its registration and disclosure regime appears to be inspired by the regime that covers lobbyists. Indeed, Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson’s letter refers to repeat-player amicus organizations as engaged in “judicial lobbying.” 2021 Whitehouse Letter at 6; see also Whitehouse, Dark Money and U.S. Courts, 57 Harv. J. Leg. 273, 293 (2020) (comparing “dark money” funded amicus briefs to lobbying and urging transparency).

There are obvious differences between lobbying activity subject to registration requirements under current law and amicus briefs. In particular, amicus briefs are filed publicly; lobbying activity, by definition, consists of non-public attempts to influence the legislative or executive branch. See 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(B) (excluding communications “distributed and made available to the public” or “submitted for inclusion in the public record of a hearing” from the definition of “lobbying contact”). The arguments made by amici can be rebutted by the parties.

More generally, the right to participate anonymously in the public square is one recognized as protected by the Constitution. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). When a vaguely named organization publishes a leaflet or newspaper advertisement, the public usually does not know who is behind it, and under First Amendment doctrine it has no right to know. Of course, an amicus brief is neither a leaflet nor a newspaper advertisement, and courts may restrict amicus briefs in ways that the government may not regulate ordinary expression. Yet similar First Amendment concerns may be implicated by the forced disclosure of an organization’s members or supporters as a condition for the organization’s ability to petition the government for a redress of grievances. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Nonetheless, the current rules do require disclosure of some funding of amicus briefs by non-parties, and it is worth considering what purpose those disclosure requirements are intended to serve, whether they in fact do so, and whether more expansive disclosure requirements could benefit the courts and the public without infringing on constitutional rights. The extent to which amicus briefs are controlled by, or represent the views of, undisclosed persons or entities, and the steps that might be appropriate to further greater transparency, are important and complex issues that deserve further investigation and consideration by the Subcommittee and the full Committee. Because much of the concern around this issue appears to be driven by practice in the Supreme Court, it may also be appropriate for the Subcommittee or Committee to consult with the Clerk of the Supreme Court regarding this issue before making any final recommendation.

That said, in order to move forward, the Subcommittee has begun to consider potential amendments to the Rules, and offers some initial thoughts on potential amendments below. In considering such amendments, the Subcommittee’s current view is that the Committee should focus in the first instance on disclosure requirements for parties who file amicus briefs. The other steps proposed in the AMICUS Act, such as the establishment of a registration scheme for repeat-party amicus filers, prohibitions on gifts, and fines for non-compliance, are either not within the Committee’s purview or less obviously so than disclosure requirements for briefs. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (rules of procedure may not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right).

Below we identify certain amendments to existing Rule 29(a)(4)(E) that the Committee may want to consider. We do not yet recommend any specific language, but offer these thoughts as a starting point for discussion.

1. **Who must make disclosures.** The AMICUS Act applies only to repeat filers—persons or organizations that file three or more amicus briefs in the Supreme Court and/or courts of appeals in a calendar year. That is consistent with the Act’s focus on deep-pocketed special-interest groups and its implicit analogy to lobbying. Because rules of procedure typically apply evenhandedly to all participants in litigation, however, the Subcommittee’s initial view—subject to further discussion—is that amendments to Rule 29’s disclosure regime should apply to all amici, not just to repeat filers.

2. **The meaning of “preparing or submitting.”** The 2021 Whitehouse Letter suggests that Rule 29(a)(4)(E)’s requirement that amici disclose persons who “contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief” could be read narrowly to encompass only money used for printing and filing the brief. We do not believe that the Rule was ever intended to be so narrow, or that amici typically interpret it so narrowly. Nonetheless, the point could potentially be clarified.
by changing the rule to cover contributions of “money that was intended to fund drafting, preparing, or submitting the brief,” or similar language.

3. **Parties' ability to evade the rule by making non-earmarked contributions.** The letter contends that parties can easily evade Rule 29(a)(4)(E) via contributions to amicus organizations not specifically earmarked for a particular amicus brief, given the fungibility of money. Since the consideration that originally motivated the adoption of Rule 29(a)(4)(E) was preventing parties from circumventing the limitations on the length of party briefs, a party’s funding or control of an amicus seems particularly relevant. One possibility would be to adopt a disclosure rule specific to parties, requiring the amicus to indicate whether a party or a party’s counsel has an ownership interest in the amicus curiae above a certain threshold (say, the 10% threshold used for Rule 26.1(a) disclosure statements), or whether it contributed some amount of the amicus curiae’s gross annual revenue above a certain threshold during the twelve-month period preceding the filing of the amicus brief.

4. **Parties' ability to evade the rule by contributing to amici of which they are members.** The letter also suggests that parties can evade disclosure by contributing to organizations of which they are members. We believe that a specific requirement of disclosure of funding by parties should trump a general rule allowing amici not to disclose contributions by members. If clarification is needed, however, the rule could be amended to provide for a statement whether any “person—other than the amicus curiae, its counsel, or its members who are not parties or counsel to parties to the case—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief” and identifying each such person.

5. **Small donations by non-members of an amicus.** We are not currently suggesting any changes to address the situation of the “GoFundMe” brief discussed in Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson’s letter—that is, a brief funded by many small donations from people who are not members of the amicus. The current rule requires disclosure of the identity of such donors, and it is not obvious that the requirement imposes an undue burden on the amici in question.

With the amendments suggested above, the Rule might require, for example, that an amicus curiae other than the United States, a federal officer or agency, or a State must include in its brief “a statement that indicates whether”:

(i) a party’s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part;

(ii) a party or a party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund drafting, preparing, or submitting the brief; and

(iii) a party or a party’s counsel has a [10%] or greater ownership interest in the amicus curiae or the amicus curiae’s direct or
indirect parent, or contributed [10%] or more of the gross annual revenue of the amicus curiae or the amicus curiae’s direct or indirect parent during the twelve-month period preceding the filing of the amicus brief, not including amounts received in commercial transactions in the ordinary course of the business of the amicus curiae or its direct or indirect parent or in the form of investments (other than investments by the principal shareholder in a limited liability corporation), if such amounts are unrelated to the amicus curiae’s amicus activities; and

(iiiiv) a person—other than the amicus curiae, its counsel, or its members who are not parties or counsel to parties to the case—or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund drafting, preparing, or submitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person.

6. Other entities’ ability to evade the rule. Just as parties can potentially evade the rule by making contributions not specifically earmarked for a particular brief or by becoming a member of an amicus organization, so can influential nonparties, as amici are only required to identify persons other than their members or counsel who “contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting” the specific brief at issue. This issue raises more complex questions, however, and we have not proposed any language to address it, although we believe it deserves further consideration.

It would be possible to adopt a rule, similar to the proposed Rule 29(a)(4)(E)(iii) above, requiring an amicus to disclose any person or entity that holds a 10% or greater ownership interest in the amicus or that contributed more than 10% of the amicus’s gross annual revenue for the previous year. Such a rule might well have salutary effects, in that it could reveal the existence of orchestrated amicus campaigns funded by a single person or entity (who might be funding a party to the litigation as well). It would thus, at least to some extent, make the courts and the public aware of who is speaking through the amicus briefs filed in a case, and would lessen the likelihood of mistaking an organized campaign funded by one or a few donors for widespread agreement.

On the other hand, as discussed above, such a rule—especially to the extent it would require disclosure of an organization’s membership—could potentially raise concerns regarding freedom of association. Cf. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449. Sen. Whitehouse and Rep. Johnson’s letter seeks to distinguish Patterson, which struck down an Alabama law that would have compelled disclosure of the identity of the NAACP’s members, on the ground that the corporate members of an organization like the Chamber of Commerce “face no serious threat of reprisal for the public expression
of their views.” 2021 Whitehouse Letter at 6. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee believes that this issue and its implications should be given further consideration.

We look forward to discussing this set of issues with the full Committee.
TAB 5F (Ex. A)
116TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1411

To amend title 28, United States Code, to require certain disclosures related to amicus activities.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 9, 2019

Mr. WHITEHOUSE (for himself, Ms. HIRONO, and Mr. BLUMENTHAL) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 28, United States Code, to require certain disclosures related to amicus activities.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Assessing Monetary
Influence in the Courts of the United States Act” or the
“AMICUS Act”.

SEC. 2. DISCLOSURES RELATED TO AMICUS ACTIVITIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 111 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing:
§ 1660. Disclosures related to amicus activities

(a) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘covered amicus’ means any person, including any affiliate of the person, that files not fewer than 3 total amicus briefs in any calendar year in the Supreme Court of the United States and the courts of appeals of the United States.

(b) DISCLOSURE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Any covered amicus that files an amicus brief in the Supreme Court of the United States or a court of appeals of the United States shall list in the amicus brief the name of any person who—

(A) contributed to the preparation or submission of the amicus brief;

(B) contributed not less than 3 percent of the gross annual revenue of the covered amicus for the previous calendar year if the covered amicus is not an individual; or

(C) contributed more than $100,000 to the covered amicus in the previous year.

(2) EXCEPTIONS.—The requirements of this subsection shall not apply to amounts received by a covered amicus described in paragraph (1) in commercial transactions in the ordinary course of any trade or business conducted by the covered amicus or in the form of investments (other than invest-
ments by the principal shareholder in a limited li-
ability corporation) in an organization if the
amounts are unrelated to the amicus filing activities
of the covered amicus.
“(c) Registration.—
“(1) In general.—Each covered amicus shall
register as a covered amicus with the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.
“(2) Contents.—The registration described in
paragraph (1) shall include—
“(A) the name of the registrant;
“(B) a general description of the business
or activities of the registrant;
“(C) the name of any person described in
subsection (b)(1);
“(D) a statement of the general issue
areas in which the registrant expects to engage
in amicus activities; and
“(E) to the extent practicable, specific
issues that have, as of the date of the registra-
tion, already been addressed or are likely to be
addressed in the amicus activities of the reg-
istrant.
“(3) Deadline.—Each amicus shall submit to
the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts the registration required under this subsection not later than—

"(A) 45 days after the date on which the amicus becomes a covered amicus; and

"(B) January 1 of the calendar year after the calendar year in which the amicus was a covered amicus.

"(d) AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an annual audit to ensure compliance with this section.

"(e) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE LISTS.—The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall periodically update the website of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the information described in subsection (c)(2), which shall be made publicly available indefinitely.

"(f) PROHIBITION ON PROVISION OF GIFTS OR TRAVEL BY COVERED AMICI TO JUDGES AND JUSTICES.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), no covered amicus may make a gift or provide travel to a judge of a court of appeals of the United States, the Chief Justice of the United States, or an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
“(2) REIMBURSEMENT FOR TRAVEL FOR AP-
PEARANCES AT ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOLS.—Para-
graph (1) shall not apply to reimbursement for trav-
el for an appearance at an accredited law school.
“(g) CIVIL FINES.—
“(1) IN GENERAL.—Whoever knowingly fails to
comply with any provision of this section shall, upon
proof of such knowing violation by a preponderance
of the evidence, be subject to a civil fine of not more
than $200,000, depending on the extent and gravity
of the violation.
“(2) USE OF FINES.—Amounts collected from
fines issued under paragraph (1) may be used to
maintain the website described in subsection (e)(2).
“(h) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—
“(1) CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.—Nothing in
this section shall be construed to prohibit or inter-
fere with—
“(A) the right to petition the Government
for the redress of grievances;
“(B) the right to express a personal opin-
ion; or
“(C) the right of association, protected by
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
“(2) Prohibition of Activities.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to authorize any court to prohibit, amicus activities by any person or entity, regardless of whether such person or entity is in compliance with the requirements of this section.

“(i) Severability.—If any provision of this section, or the application thereof, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this section and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”.

(b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—The table of sections for chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘1660. Disclosures related to amicus activities.’.
TAB 5G (Ex. B)
September 18, 2020

The Honorable David G. Campbell  
Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on  
Rules of Practice and Procedure  
401 West Washington Street, Suite 623  
Phoenix, Arizona 85003

The Honorable John D. Bates  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Judge Campbell and Judge Bates:

The Supreme Court has received correspondence from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and  
Representative Hank Johnson concerning disclosure requirements for those filing amicus curiae  
briefs in the Supreme Court and in the federal courts of appeals. The correspondence focuses  
upon Supreme Court Rule 37.6, which includes a requirement that an amicus disclose the  
identity of any person who made a contribution to fund the submission of the brief.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)(4)(e) includes a similar requirement for  
amicus briefs in the courts of appeals. In light of the similarity of the two rules, the Committee  
on Rules of Practice and Procedure may wish to consider whether an amendment to Rule 29 is in  
order. The Committee’s consideration would provide helpful guidance on whether an  
amendment to Supreme Court Rule 37.6 would be appropriate.

For your information, I am enclosing the correspondence with Senator Whitehouse and  
Representative Johnson. Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions or if you need  
any additional information.

Very truly yours,

Scott S. Harris
TAB 5H (Ex. C)
February 23, 2021

Honorable John D. Bates  
Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure  
333 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 4114  
Washington, DC 20001

Re: Funding Disclosure Requirements for Amicus Curiae Briefs

Dear Judge Bates,

We write you to request that the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure consider the establishment of a working group to address the problem of inadequate funding disclosure requirements for organizations that file amicus curiae briefs in the federal courts, which implicates Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 29(a)(4)(e). This letter follows previous correspondence with Hon. Scott Harris, Clerk of the Supreme Court, regarding the Supreme Court’s parallel Rule 37.6. We understand that Mr. Harris recently brought this correspondence to your attention, suggesting that the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure may wish to consider whether an amendment to Rule 29 is in order in light of our concerns.

I. Overview

FRAP 29—modeled after the Supreme Court Rule 37.6—provides that an amicus filer must include a statement in their brief whether “a party or a party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief,” and whether “a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person” (emphasis added). Mr. Harris explained in our correspondence that this rule “strikes a balance.” “By requiring the disclosure of those who make a monetary contribution specifically intended for a particular amicus brief,” Mr. Harris explained, “the rule provides information about funding directly aimed at advocating specific positions” in court. “At the same time,” he continued, “it recognizes that requiring broader disclosure of an organization’s membership information or general donor lists could well infringe upon the associational rights of the organization . . . .”

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1 Similarly, Supreme Court Rule 37.6 provides that “a brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief, and shall identify every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.”
In practice, however, this “balance”—between the public’s interest in transparency and organizations’ associational rights—is badly off-kilter. Thanks to these rules’ narrow requirements that amici disclose only such funding “that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief,” amici rarely if ever disclose the sources of their funding. This is apparently permissible under the rules so long as the funding was not specifically earmarked to fund “preparing or submitting the brief.” In other words, the rules permit an amicus group not to disclose even large donations earmarked generally to fund its amicus practice; in fact, the rules could plausibly be construed so narrowly as to only encompass the costs of formatting, printing, and delivering the specific brief in the specific case at issue. The rules thus fail to account for the reality that “money is fungible,” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 32 (2010), creating a loophole that allows an amicus filer, in practice, to never disclose its funders, even if those funders include a party-in-interest to the case. As we detail here, sophisticated parties, amicus groups, and their wealthy funders have successfully exploited this loophole to exert anonymous influence on our courts. As a result, opposing parties, the public, and courts themselves are left in the dark about who is seeking to influence judicial decision-making, compromising judicial independence and the public perception thereof.

II. The Current Amicus Disclosure Rules Do Not Achieve Their Intended Goals.

Amicus briefs—written by non-parties to a case for the purpose of providing information, expertise, insight, or advocacy—have increased in both volume and influence in the past decade. During the Supreme Court’s 2014 term, amici submitted 781 amicus briefs,² an increase of over 800% from the 1950s and a 95% increase from 1995. From 2008 to 2013, the Supreme Court cited amicus briefs 606 times in 417 opinions. Supreme Court opinions also often adopt language and arguments from amicus briefs.³ That increase in the volume of amicus filings—and the concomitant rise in high-dollar investment in amicus participation—reflect a growing recognition among those who seek to shape the law through the courts that the federal courts are susceptible to their influence.

The Supreme Court adopted its amicus funding disclosure rule in 1997 “in an effort to stop parties in a case from surreptitiously ‘buying’ what amounts to a second or supplemental merits brief, disguised as an amicus brief, to get around word limits.”⁴ Likewise, the parallel rule of federal appellate procedure—expressly modeled after the Supreme Court Rule—“serves to deter counsel from using an amicus brief to circumvent page limits on the parties’ briefs.”⁵ In 2018, the Supreme Court’s public information office explained that “the Clerk’s Office interprets [the Rule] to preclude an amicus from filing a brief if contributors are anonymous.”⁶

It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s interpretation of these rules as precluding an amicus from filing a brief if contributors are anonymous with the Court’s practice of routinely accepting

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⁵ Committee notes on the 2010 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
⁶ Id.
amicus curiae briefs from special-interest groups that fail to disclose their donors. To the extent the rules were devised to preclude amici from filing “supplemental merits briefs” on behalf of parties, or if their financial backers are anonymous, they are not achieving those goals. A review of amicus practice before the Supreme Court illustrates how parties to litigation—as well as large donors who fund and develop “impact litigation” with the goal of shaping law and public policy through the courts—use amicus briefs to get around page limits on the parties’ briefs, advance boundary-pushing arguments on behalf of the donors’ long-term interests, and do so under a cloak of anonymity. This can take any of several forms.

a. Parties Directly Funding Amici

The narrow demands of Rule 37.6 and FRAP 29—requiring disclosure of only those donations that were given “to fund preparing or submitting the brief”—allow parties to litigation to do precisely what the rules were intended to prevent, i.e., surreptitiously buy what amounts to a supplemental merits brief, disguised as an amicus brief. One recent high-profile Supreme Court case illustrates this problem. In Google LLC. v. Oracle America Inc. (No. 18-956), the Internet Accountability Project (IAP)—a 501(c)(4) “social welfare” organization that does not disclose its funders—filed an amicus brief supporting Oracle's position, telling the Court that it wanted to “ensure that Google respects the copyrights of Oracle and other innovators.” Bloomberg subsequently reported that Oracle had itself donated between $25,000 and $99,999 to IAP in 2019 as “just one part of an aggressive, and sometimes secretive, battle Oracle has been waging against its biggest rivals,” including Google.7 The report further documented donations from Google to at least ten groups that filed briefs in support of its position.

The Court’s amicus funding disclosure rule did not require that any of these donations—assuming they were not specifically earmarked for the “preparation or submission of the brief”—be disclosed to the Court. And indeed, the majority of these party-funded amici did not disclose that they had been funded by a party to the case.8 IAP, for example, misleadingly (yet compliantly) attested that “none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other person or entity other than amicus or its counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.” Nevertheless, at least four of these amicus filers—but not IAP—voluntarily reported the financial support they had received from one of the parties in the case, in the words of one amicus, “[i]n an abundance of caution and for the sake of transparency.”9 These voluntary disclosures suggest that some attorneys believe their ethical obligations required

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8 See, e.g., Google LLC. v. Oracle America Inc. (No. 18-956), Brief of Internet Accountability Project, at n.1
9 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Petitioner; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Python Software Foundation et al. fn. 1 (“Counsel for amici curiae was previously engaged to advise Google in connection with this matter earlier in its history, and represents Google in other matters[.]”); Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Democracy and Technology et al. fn. I (“Counsel for amici curiae was previously engaged to advise Google in connection with this matter earlier in its history, and represents Google in other matters, but Google has had no involvement with the preparation of this brief.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Computer and Communication Industry Association and Internet Association et al. fn. 2 (“Google is a CCIA member, and Oracle and Sun Microsystems were formerly members of CCIA, but none of these parties took any part in the preparation of this brief . . . Google is a member of IA. As noted above, Google took no part in the preparation of this brief.”).
a greater degree of disclosure than the Supreme Court requires. Plenty of others, however, have been content to conceal these suspicious financial arrangements, which the Court’s Rule permits.

b. Donors Funding Amici and Litigants in the Same Case, and Donors Anonymously Orchestrating Amicus “Projects”

In recent years, thanks to the work of investigative reporters, we have seen how many high-profile, politically charged cases are financed directly by ideological foundations. Often, the same foundations that fund the litigation also exploit the courts’ lenient amicus funding disclosure rules to anonymously fund armadas of amicus briefs that support their preferred outcomes. For example, in the orchestrated challenge to union agency shop fees first initiated in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), one organization, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation—a conservative foundation that has long sought to weaken labor rights, including by financing impact litigation—bankrolled not only the nonprofit law firm bringing the case, but also eleven different organizations that filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the plaintiffs.10 Surely if the disclosure Rule were operating to its intended effect, the Court would have required disclosure of that funding. Yet none of those amicus filers disclosed the Bradley Foundation (or any other source) as a source of its funding for the brief under Rule 37.6, and none of those briefs was rejected by the Court for lack of such disclosure.

The Bradley Foundation’s coordinated, undisclosed funding of the litigants and amici in Friedrichs was not a one-off. In Janus v. AFSCME, the follow-up to Friedrichs, investigative reporters found that the Bradley Foundation again funded both groups representing the plaintiffs, as well as 12 groups that filed amicus briefs.11 Similarly, the two groups representing the Janus plaintiffs, plus 13 amicus filers, all received funding from an organization named Donors Trust (or its sister organization Donors Capital Fund), a so-called “donor advised fund” that has been described as “the dark-money ATM of the right.”12 None of this common funding was disclosed to the Court. Thus, the current disclosure rules permit wealthy donors like the Bradley Foundation to finance litigants and law firms to bring ideologically motivated cases while simultaneously funding upwards of a dozen amicus briefs supporting those cases, circumventing Court limits on the parties’ briefs and creating the false impression of broad popular support for the donors’ preferred position.

In an amicus brief in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (No. 19-7), Senators documented how thirteen amici aligned with Petitioner received financial support from the same entities that fund the Federalist Society.13 That brief also detailed how the Federalist Society had long promoted the “unitary executive” legal theory advanced by Petitioner and ultimately adopted by the Court—a theory that redounds to the financial benefit of Federalist Society funders. The Center for Media and Democracy subsequently found that “16 right-wing foundations,” including the Bradley Foundation and Donors Trust, “have donated a total of

12 Id.
13 Brief of Amici Curiae U.S. Senators Sheldon Whitehouse, Richard Blumenthal, and Mazie Hirono, Appendix A.
nearly $69 million to 11 groups that filed amicus briefs in favor of scrapping the CFPB.”

Recently published documents reveal how influential donors like the Bradley Foundation use tax-exempt money to coordinate amicus “projects” to influence court results through legal networks such as the Federalist Society, as presumably occurred in Seila Law. In 2015, a representative of the Bradley Foundation emailed Leonard Leo, then Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society, to ask if there was “a 501(c)(3) nonprofit to which Bradley could direct any support of the two Supreme Court amicus projects other than Donors Trust,” the identity-laundering “donor-advised fund” described above. Leo replied: “Yes, Judicial Education Project could take and allocate.” In turn, Judicial Education Project—a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization that does not disclose its donors—submitted a grant proposal to Bradley seeking $200,000 to coordinate and develop amicus briefs in two politically charged (yet completely unrelated) cases: the aforementioned Friedrichs, and King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2015), a challenge to the Affordable Care Act. The Bradley Foundation estimated that “each of the two amicus-brief efforts costs approximately $250,000, for a total of $500,000,” and the Bradley staff recommended a $150,000 grant to JEP to support this work. The Bradley staffer explained the strategy behind this investment as follows:

At this highest of legal levels, it is often very important to orchestrate high-caliber amicus efforts that showcase respected high-profile parties who are represented by the very best lawyers with strong ties to the Court. Such is the case here, with King and Friedrichs, even given Bradley’s previous philanthropic investments in the actual, underlying legal actions.

In the King and Friedrichs cases, none of the amici supporting the Bradley-funded litigants’ positions disclosed their Bradley Foundation funding, or any of their funding sources for that matter, pursuant to Rule 37.6. While this nondisclosure arguably violated the Rule, it also arguably did not, if one interprets the Rule narrowly to require disclosure of only such funds intended to cover the costs of formatting, printing, and delivering the briefs. In any event, this example illustrates why a broader and more demanding disclosure rule is necessary.

c. Member-funded Amici Who Do Not Disclose Their Members

The amicus funding disclosure regime’s transparency aims are also undercut by its own terms, which specifically exempt from disclosure any contributions by an amicus-filer’s members. See FRAP 29(a)(4)(E)(iii) (“An amicus brief . . . must include . . . a statement that indicates whether a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.”). This again

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16 Id. (emphasis added).
leaves open the possibility that parties to litigation can secretly fund *amicus* briefs in support of their position by funneling money to organizations of which they are members.

For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—by far the Court’s most prolific *amicus* filer—routinely submits influential *amicus* briefs in Supreme Court litigation. The Chamber has complied with Supreme Court Rule 37.6 by affirming that “no person other than *amicus*, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.” However, the Chamber does not disclose its members to the public, so there is no way to know who is influencing the positions the Chamber takes in litigation. As a result, its disclosure is effectively meaningless, and the deep-pocketed corporate contributors to the Chamber’s *amicus* activity can enjoy, in complete anonymity, the fruits of its unparalleled Supreme Court win rate—9-1 in cases in which it participated last term. The Chamber makes similar disclosures in briefs it files in the circuit courts.

We are sensitive to claims that required disclosure of membership lists may implicate associational and/or speech rights, such as those at issue in *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which the Supreme Court refused to allow compelled disclosure of the identities of NAACP members who faced significant threats to their physical safety during the civil rights era. But granting sweeping anonymity protections to all member organizations, including business networks like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce whose corporate members face no serious threat of reprisal for the public expression of their views, simply does not follow. Indeed, “applying *NAACP v. Alabama*’s holding in a formally symmetrical manner to the relatively powerful . . . without regard to context may undermine rather than affirm the values underlying that decision.”

d. The *Amicus* Funding Disclosure Regime Creates Absurd Results, Unfairly Favoring Sophisticated Repeat-Players.

As we have documented here, wealthy and sophisticated repeat players have exploited the Supreme Court’s ineffective *amicus* funding disclosure regime to develop what amounts to a massive, anonymous judicial lobbying program. They similarly exploit the lower appellate courts’ Rule, where orchestrated *amicus* projects are arguably even more influential.

One rare example of the Supreme Court actually enforcing its Rule 37.6 illustrates the absurd results created by this regime, demonstrating how it systematically favors well-heeled insiders over the average citizen who wishes to make his or her voice heard. In 2018, the
Supreme Court rejected an *amicus* submission made by the U.S. Alcohol Policy Alliance for its failure to comply with Rule 37.6, because its brief failed to disclose the names of each of the group’s donors, many of whom had contributed to the brief through the small-dollar “crowdfunding” website GoFundMe. As a result, *amicus* was forced to return donations from individuals who wished to remain anonymous, and re-file its brief, disclosing the names of individuals who had supported the GoFundMe campaign. Donations to the brief ranged from $25-$500.

The Court’s disparate treatment of the crowdfunded, small-dollar-backed brief filed by the U.S. Alcohol Policy Alliance and the wealthy, repeat-player *amicis* who routinely file anonymously funded briefs is troubling, and telling. It reflects an elemental tension in a democracy between two classes of citizens. One is an influencer class that occupies itself with favor-seeking from government, and therefore desires rules of engagement that make government more and more amenable to its influence. The second class is the general population, which has an abiding institutional interest in a government with the capacity to resist that special-interest influence. This is a centuries-old tension. When courts establish and apply rules designed to promote transparency and integrity, they should not overlook this latter abiding interest.

Ironically, the Court’s application of its own Rule is what has posed the most significant threat to associational and speech interests. By applying Rule 37.6 to require small donor disclosure for an *amicus* brief funded through GoFundMe, the Court directly chilled the ability of individuals to band together on an *ad hoc* basis to support a legal position of importance to them. A rule that forces disclosure of these donors, but not the large and anonymous corporate funders of sophisticated repeat-players like the United States Chamber of Commerce, does not “strike[] a balance” at all.

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23 See Theodore Roosevelt, *New Nationalism Speech* (1910) (“[T]he United States must effectively control the mighty commercial forces [...] The absence of an effective state, and especially, national, restraint upon unfair money-getting has tended to create a small class of enormously wealthy and economically powerful men, whose chief object is to hold and increase their power.”); DAVID HUME, PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 290 (1854) (“Where the riches are in a few hands, these must enjoy all the power and will readily conspire to lay the whole burden on the poor, and oppress them still farther, to the discouragement of all industry.”); Andrew Jackson, 1832 Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10, 1832) (transcript available in the Yale Law School library) (“It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purpose ... to make the richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society ... have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of the Government.”); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE IX (1532) (“[O]ne cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed.”).
24 See Letter from Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse to C.J. John Roberts and Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 4, 2019); see also Tony Mauro, *Supreme Court Rule Crimps Crowd-Funded Amicus Briefs*, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2018).
25 Letter from Scott S. Harris, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (Feb. 27, 2019).
III. Recommendations

As noted in our correspondence with Mr. Harris, we believe a legislative solution may be in order to ensure much-needed transparency around judicial lobbying, and to put all *amicus* funders on an equal playing field. While we disagree with Mr. Harris’s suggestion that legislation along these lines would improperly “intrude into areas historically left to the Court” or implicate separation-of-powers concerns, we agree it would be salutary for the judicial branch to address these issues on its own.

There are better ways to structure a disclosure rule to achieve the public interest in transparency while protecting the associational interests of those who risk real danger of physical harm or other demonstrable injury as a result of funding organizations that file *amicus* briefs. Our AMICUS (Assessing Monetary Influence in the Courts of the United States) Act, for example, would require funding disclosure by only repeat *amicus* filers—defined as those who file three or more *amicus* briefs in the Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeals during a calendar year. The bill also narrowly targets only high-dollar funders of *amicus* filers, requiring disclosure of only those who contributed three percent or more of the *amicus* group’s gross annual revenue, or over $100,000. We have attached a copy of the bill text and offer it merely as one possible approach the judiciary might take to adopting a rule that strikes a better balance between these competing interests.

We appreciate the Committee’s attention to this issue and hope it will take these concerns seriously. It should not fall to members of Congress and investigative journalists to scrutinize court dockets and IRS forms to expose conflicts of interest that, left hidden, could undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary’s work. More than ever before, the judiciary should be vigilant about this threat, as political actors seeking to shape American law and public policy increasingly turn to the courts to achieve those goals, through multi-million dollar judicial confirmation campaigns, sophisticated *amicus* “projects,” and the like. As Justice Scalia wrote: “Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns anonymously . . . . and even exercises the direct democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home of the Brave.” We fully agree.

Sincerely,

Sheldon Whitehouse
United States Senator

Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr.
Member of Congress

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I. Appendix

a. AMICUS Act
TAB 5I (Ex. D)
POLICY ESSAY

DARK MONEY AND U.S. COURTS: THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS

Senator Sheldon Whitehouse*

“There are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”
– James Madison

I. INTRODUCTION

The Founding Fathers had many threats in mind when they crafted a constitution for our young and fragile nation. Locke, Montesquieu, and other Enlightenment thinkers offered helpful political theory, but theory went only so far. Our Founders knew that patriotism could be overcome by selfish impulses and personal passions; that foreign governments and rapacious elites could exploit weak institutions; and that sharp differences divided the thirteen colonies. They planned for a lot of threats and dangers—but they did not plan for the corrupting power of corporations.

Today, corporations wield commanding power in our democracy. They do so directly, and through a network of trade associations, think tanks, front groups, and political organizations. That power too often is directed by corporate forces to dodge accountability for harms to the public; to subvert the free market to their advantage; and to protect their own political power by undermining democratic institutions.

This Article explores the expansion of that corporate power in our government, and its extension into a branch of government customarily viewed as insulated from special interest influence: the federal judiciary. I begin

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* Sheldon Whitehouse served as Rhode Island's United States Attorney and Attorney General before being elected to the United States Senate in 2006. He is a member of the Judiciary Committee and the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism. Senator Whitehouse has worked to strengthen American cybersecurity capabilities, improve resources to fight drug abuse and treat addiction in Rhode Island, and reverse the rise in prison populations and costs. He is a leading advocate for protecting access to justice, including the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury.

In response to a series of judgments favoring powerful corporate interests, Senator Whitehouse has warned of the dangers of judicial activism and dark money influence over the judicial selection process. A strong supporter of greater transparency in the judicial system, Senator Whitehouse has introduced legislation to require Supreme Court justices and federal judges to disclose travel and hospitality perks they receive as prominent public figures, and to require the meaningful disclosure of funders of amicus curiae briefs.

In addition to Judiciary, he is a member of the Budget, the Environment and Public Works, and the Finance Committees.
with a brief historical overview of corporate influence in America and a
discussion of how that influence grew after the Supreme Court’s decision in
_Citizens United v. FEC._\(^1\) I then turn to the fifty-year-long project of the
corporate right to reshape both federal law and the federal bench; to the
scheme’s tools, particularly anonymous “dark money” and the network of
front groups behind which these interests hide; and to the long-fought
scheme’s ultimate successes, culminating in the massive power grabs
achieved in the Trump administration. The Article concludes with recom-
endations for legislation that would increase transparency at the Court. We
must address the crisis of legitimacy the courts now face before captured
courts become a national scandal.

## II. Corporations, Then and Now

The Federalist Papers provide an important window into the concerns
that animated the Founding Era as citizens considered a new Constitution for
their colonies. The concerns that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay addressed were the prominent ones around which debate centered
and on which the public needed reassurance. The main concerns were pro-

\(^1\) 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
\(^2\) _The Federalist No. 51_ (James Madison).
\(^3\) _The Federalist No. 38_ (James Madison).
\(^4\) _The Federalist No. 10_ (James Madison).
\(^5\) _The Declaration of Independence_ (U.S. 1776); _see also_ Gerard N. Magliocca, _The
Bill of Rights as a Term of Art_, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 236 (2016) (noting that “Jeff-
erson did write one letter in 1792 that stated: ‘[M]y objection to the Constitution was, that it
wished a bill of rights securing freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom from stand-
ing armies, [and] trial by jury . . . . The sense of America has approved my objection and
added the bill of rights.’ ”).
reference to municipal corporations. The word barely registers in Madison’s notes of the Federal Convention. On our American continent, the big British corporations threatened no harm: The British Hudson Bay Company operated in remote areas of Canada; the Massachusetts Bay Company had become a colony; the British East India Company had been humbled. Such smaller corporations as existed in the colonies were creations of state legislatures, and operated under the watchful eye of local political forces, usually to provide roads, canals, and other welcome infrastructure. If a corporation overstepped its bounds or harmed its local community, political authorities could revoke its charter. At the Founding, corporate entities were no threat to the fledgling democracy, and the idea of such non-human entities achieving a dominant role in a republic of “We the People” would have seemed fanciful.

Fast forward to the modern era where corporations are now ubiquitous and hold massive political power throughout government. Let’s consider how.

One obvious exercise of that power is through corporate lobbying. Congress swarms with corporate lobbyists. In 2018 alone, corporations spent $3.4 billion on direct lobbying. One trade organization, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, has spent over $1.5 billion lobbying over the past two decades. Much of its effort has been on political mischief like climate denial. Mick Mulvaney, after leaving Congress to serve as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, said something that illustrated one aspect of the problem: he told an American Bankers Association conference that “[w]e had a hierarchy in my office in Congress, [i]f you’re a lobbyist

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4 See The Federalist No. 37, 45 (James Madison), No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
6 See Massachusetts Bay Colony, Fletcher Cyclopedia, Encyc. Britannica Online, s.v.
11 See, e.g., Corinne Girili, The US Chamber of Commerce Might Not Be What You Think, Vox (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/10/2/16370014/us-chamber-commerce-explainer [https://perma.cc/7UUV-GE7F] (“Defying to the goals of its large corporate backers, [CEO and then-president Tom] Donohue vowed to get the Chamber involved in ‘many important political battles’ in Washington. And climate was one of the first things on his list.”).
who never gave us money, I didn’t talk to you. If you’re a lobbyist who gave us money, I might talk to you.”

Which takes us to the next problem: corporate spending in elections. Gone are the days when the problem was trickles of corporate money flowing from corporate political action committees (“PACs”) and lobbyists’ checkbooks into candidates’ campaign war chests. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s infamous *Citizens United* decision,19 corporate interests have flooded huge sums of money into electioneering and advocacy groups, often anonymizing themselves in the process, and used this flotilla of front groups to sway election results. In the 2012 federal election cycle immediately following *Citizens United*, spending by these so-called “outside” groups surged to more than triple their political spending from the cycle before.18 By 2016, outside groups would spend over $1.4 billion in American elections.17

Today, in major elections around the country, outside groups often outspend the actual candidates: in 2018, outside groups spent more than the candidates’ campaigns in twenty-eight different federal races,18 and in Indiana during the last election cycle, dark-money and outside groups outspent the U.S. Senate candidates by nearly $35 million.19 You don’t spend this kind of money for long if you are not getting results.

Much of this spending is “dark money”—funding that cannot be traced to actual donors. In the decade since *Citizens United*, groups that don’t disclose their donors have spent nearly $1 billion in elections, compared to only $129 million over the previous decade.20 This staggering figure does not even include money spent on “issue ads,” which are often just thinly veiled political attack ads, but are not reported to the Federal Election Commission.

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Although the Citizens United decision imaginatively presumed a campaign finance system with "effective disclosure," corporate interests quickly exploited loopholes to keep their spending anonymous, and the Court has conspicuously failed to police its supposed "effective disclosure." Three loopholes have been particular favorites. Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(4) "social welfare" organizations have been allowed to spend on political activities, but need not disclose their donors to the public. Shell corporations (e.g., limited liability corporations that obscure their true beneficial owners) are a simple tool to hide donor identities. And donor-directed trusts have been subverted into massive laundering shops that strip donor identities away from contributions to politically active non-profits. Because corporate brands and reputations are precious commodities, a broad array of trade associations, think tanks, and advocacy groups insulates corporations from the dirty practices and unpopular purposes of this vast new enterprise.

At the heart of this is money, but money alone is not the entire danger. As any politician can tell you, with the ability to spend millions of dollars in elections comes the ability to threaten or promise such expenditures. With the ability to spend millions of dollars anonymously, the menace of such threats darkens. Sometimes the threats or promises might be general and public, but the greatest danger of corruption comes from threats or promises made covertly. The threat is real—a massive barrage of anony-

22 See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (2019); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS J. & Pol'y 59, 60 (2011) ("One way that for-profit corporations can throw their support behind, or undermine, a particular candidate after Citizens United is by donating money to a non-profit, which then, in turn, purchases a political ad. Under current tax law, for-profit political spending through non-profits such as social welfare organizations organized under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(4) . . . is undetectable by the public.").
23 Richard Biffault, Upcoming Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & Pol’y 683, 708 (2012) (arguing that “[t]he real disclosure issue arises when a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization, 501(c)(6) trade association, or Super PAC reports donations from a dummy or shell corporation or LLC which gets its funds from one or a small number of shareholders, or from a nonprofit that does not have a mass membership base but serves primarily as a vehicle for pooling funds from a small number of large donors and channeling them to independent spending committees").
24 Donors Trust is one of these groups, for example. See Andy Kroll, Exposed: The Dark Money ATM of the Conservative Movement, Mother Jones (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/donors-trust-donors-capital-fund-dark-money-koch-bradley-devos/ ("Donors Trust is a so-called 'donor-advised fund,' a breed apart from a family foundation like, say, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, which helped build the conservative movement over decades with donations totaling tens of millions of dollars. The people who donate to Donors Trust don't get final say over how their money is spent. But they get to recommend where their cash goes, and in exchange for giving up some control, they get a bigger tax write-off than they would with a family foundation. (And those who wish it get anonymity.").
mous campaign spending in the waning days of a campaign can leave voters with no information about who is making the attack and the target with no time to respond. An early barrage can “define” (read, mercilessly smear) a candidate before his or her campaign even gets up and running. So threats are credible, and covert threats and acquiescence is the very definition of corruption.

Dark money fuels political debate, as well. From the shelter of anonymity, corporate interests can without accountability propagate a “tsunami of slime”28—the manufactured front group bears the onus for the smears and attacks, and can be disposed of like Kleenex.29 And of course if just the threat of a slimy political attack is successful, it saves the special interest from actually having to spend the money. Worse, it leaves the public unaware that anything went on behind the scenes.

The policy result of unlimited special-interest spending power is unsurprising: a powerful political current bends elected officials toward the will of the special interests, even against the will of their constituents.30 This weakens the political system’s response to the general population, and skews political response toward wealthy interests. Empirically, one study found:

The views of constituents in the upper third of the income distribution received about 50% more weight than those in the middle third, with even larger disparities on specific salient roll call votes. Meanwhile, the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution received no weight at all in the voting decisions of their senators.29

The problem is not just in Congress. The ability of big interests to deploy unlimited money from behind dark-money front groups into presidential races has similar effects.30 But much of the corporate political effort is down at the executive agency level. Corporations have grown adept at cap-

23 See, e.g., Martin Gilens, APLICATION AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 70–123 (2012) (explaining that the country’s policymakers respond almost exclusively to the preferences of the economically advantaged); see also Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—And A Plan to Stop It 143–47 (2011) (noting that dependency donors cause Congress to spend more time on issues that matter to their funders than to the general public).
uring regulatory agencies. This involves some amount of high-powered agency lobbying, and some amount of simply outgunning ill-funded public interest advocates in administrative procedures; but more often than not it involves sending industry personnel to embed with regulators—the “revolving door.” According to an analysis by ProPublica and Columbia Journalism Investigations, the Trump administration has brought in to official positions at least 281 former corporate lobbyists, just through October 2019.32 That number increases when one includes the corporate executives embedded in the Trump administration, who may not have technically lobbied for their company but nonetheless are motivated to influence outcomes for their industry.

The result has been an unprecedented capture of regulatory agencies by the interests they should be regulating.33 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the Trump administration, for example, has been overrun with officials tied closely to polluting industries. Former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt rose to political power by raising funds for oil and gas industry groups.34 Pruitt had demonstrated an unusual willingness to do the industry’s bidding; in one instance, he put fossil fuel industry text verbatim onto his official Oklahoma Attorney General letterhead and submitted it to the EPA.35 Later, as EPA Administrator, Pruitt could do the industry’s

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31 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1543, 1555 (2018) (arguing that “[w]hile capture can occur through corruption, it can also happen in less obvious ways, such as when a regulator receives a job offer from a company which he or she regulates, or through a ‘revolving door’ between the agency and the regulated industry”).


33 See Lindsay Dillon et al., The Environmental Protection Agency in the Early Trump Administration: Prelude to Regulatory Capture, 108 Am. J. Pub. Health 589, 589 (2018), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304360 [https://perma.cc/GQX6-DXRV] (explaining that an agency is effectively captured by the private interests it regulates when its “‘regulation is . . . directed away from the public interest and toward the interest of the regulated industry’ by ‘intent and action’ of industries and their allies” (quoting Daniel Carpenter, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It 73 (2014))).

34 See Andrew Perez & Margaret Sessa-Sawkins, Conservative Group Led by EPA Chief Pruitt Received Dark Money to Battle Environmental Regulations, Fast Co. (June 7, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40428088/conservative-group-led-by-epa-chief-pruitt-received-dark-money-to-battle-environmental-regulations [https://perma.cc/863K-7UEW] (reporting that “[a]n organization once led by [Scott Pruitt] raised more than $750,000 from conservative dark money groups to battle federal regulators, including officials at the agency he now leads”).

bidding directly, without need for such subterfuge. Andrew Wheeler, Pruitt’s successor as Administrator, had been a leading lobbyist for the coal industry.\textsuperscript{36} Trump’s first head of the EPA Office of Air and Radiation, Bill Wehram, gained prominence by helping build and run an array of fossil fuel industry trade associations and front groups.\textsuperscript{37}

Former oil lobbyist David Bernhardt serves as Secretary of the Department of the Interior, an agency charged with administering the bulk of federal lands.\textsuperscript{38} In that position, Bernhardt has a central role administering oil and gas leasing, offshore drilling, and areas of policy of interest to the oil and gas industry. Bernhardt and his predecessor, Ryan Zinke, have helped to open massive tracts of federal land to oil and gas development during their tenures.\textsuperscript{39} They have also overseen suspicious delays in siting New England

\textsuperscript{36} See Nihal Krishan, Andrew Wheeler’s Long History with the Energy Sector, CTR. FOR_RESPSIVE POL.: OPENSECRETS NEWS (July 10, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/07/andrew-wheeler-long-time-coal-lobbyist/ (discussing how Wheeler became “a lobbyist for the law firm Faegre Baker Daniels, where he represented energy companies such as coal producer Murray Energy, which was his best-paying client. The coal-mining company paid his firm between $160,000–$559,000 annually from 2009 through 2017, according to CRP’s records. Murray Energy is privately owned by Robert Murray, whose company donated $300,000 to President Trump’s inauguration.”).


\textsuperscript{38} See Anthony Andragna, Senate Confirms Bernhardt to Head Interior, POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/11/david-bernhardt-secretary-interior-department-134562 (https://perma.cc/66HE-L2KN (“Bernhardt, currently acting secretary, will replace Ryan Zinke, who left Interior in January in the midst of several ongoing ethical investigations. Bernhardt won bipartisan backing from the chamber despite concerns that he has conflicts of interests related to past lobbying clients, criticism that he failed to keep adequate records, and worries about the department’s plans to expand offshore drilling along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.”)).

\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Top Leader at Interior Dept. Pushes a Policy Favoring His Former Client, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/climate/david-bernhardt-endangered-species.html (https://perma.cc/3D4C-KNSN) (“As a lobbyist and lawyer, David Bernhardt fought for years on behalf of a group of California farmers to weaken Endangered Species Act protections for afinger-size fish, the delta smelt, to gain access to irrigation water. As a top official since 2017 at the Interior Department, Mr. Bernhardt has been finishing the job: He is working to strip away the rules the farmers had hired him to oppose.”).
offshore wind energy projects—projects that would displace gas-fired electric generation in the region.\textsuperscript{40}

The Founders would likely have been astounded that such a commanding political force arose in our Republic, exerting such control over our executive and legislative branches. Industry lobbying distorts legislative outcomes. Post-\textit{Citizens United} dark-money election spending constricts America’s political aperture. Regulatory capture in the Trump administration has spread corruption widely through government agencies. But the most coveted prize, the pearl beyond price of influence-seeking, lies in the courts.

III. \textbf{THE CORPORATE INFLUENCE MACHINE TARGETS ARTICLE III COURTS}

Courts set rules. Federal courts decide what the Constitution means. Federal courts decide how laws are applied. Federal courts set the ground rules for challenges to legislation; they set rules for executive agency process and review; and they set rules that govern commercial and political activity.

The prospect of resetting all those rules to advance systematically one’s own power and position makes courts an alluring target for the influence machine. At the same time, because so many judicial practices and principles are designed to keep courts honest and independent, they are a difficult target. The stalking and capture of the courts had to be measured and slow.

In 1971, prominent corporate lawyer and future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell wrote a secret memo to an official at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Powell warned that “the American economic system”—by which he seemed to mean corporate America—“is under broad attack” from academics, the media, leftist politicians, and other progressives.\textsuperscript{41} To counter the progressive spirit that had delivered the New Deal and Great Society, Powell wrote, it was time for an unprecedented influence campaign on the part of corporate America. He advised:

[I]ndependent and uncoordinated activity by individual corporations, as important as this is, will not be sufficient. Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available only through joint effort, and in the


\textsuperscript{41} Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Snyder, Jr., Chairman, Education Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1 (Aug. 23, 1971), https://scholar-commons.law.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=powellmemo [https://perma.cc/5Q9B-RPTX].
political power available only through united action and national organizations.\textsuperscript{42}

Corporate forces followed this advice, and today we see how much the "political power" made available through "united action" has delivered in the executive and legislative branches. Powell also flagged the value of pro-corporate "activist" judges to shape the courts and the law, and slowly but surely corporate forces began to reshape our judiciary. Over many patient years, they produced not only pro-corporate, anti-regulatory judges and doctrines, but a coordinated array of front groups set up to effect this infiltration. Behind this network of front groups lurks a network of corporate, right-wing donors who secretly fund this "united action" in the judiciary.\textsuperscript{43}

There have long been competing philosophies of adjudication and legal analysis, a debate reflected over decades in different judicial philosophies from Republican and Democratic presidents’ court nominees. This exercise was different. This was about winning, not about theories. Tellingly, the record of the many "conservative" wins under Chief Justice Roberts in the Supreme Court shows more often that conservative entities are the victors than that conservative judicial principles are followed.\textsuperscript{44} The donors behind the scheme want victories and are not fussy about philosophy.

It is slowly becoming clear how the so-called conservative legal movement has been secretly bankrolled by corporate interests which benefit from that legal movement. It is even sometimes frankly admitted. Describing his efforts to stock the federal judiciary, Donald McGahn, the former White House Counsel and early architect of the Trump administration’s judicial selection efforts, did not even try to hide the connection: "There is a coherent plan here where actually the judicial selection and the deregulatory effort are really the flip side of the same coin."\textsuperscript{45} In other words, the "plan" is to groom and select judges who will then support the Republican political effort to roll back unwelcome laws passed by Congress and unwelcome regulations developed by independent agencies.

The influence machine’s efforts in the federal judiciary are particularly pernicious for government. First, unlike legislators and political appointees,

\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 11.

\textsuperscript{43} See Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. Times (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html [https://perma.cc/W59k-ZS9B] (arguing that "[e]ven circuits that are decidedly liberal are undergoing significant changes" and that "a radically new federal judiciary could be with us long after Trump is gone").


federal judges receive lifetime appointments. Successfully capturing a judicial seat can reward the capturer for decades,\textsuperscript{46} and popular umbrage cannot "throw the bum out" in the next election.

Second, in a captured court, strategic advances can be won deep in the weeds of jargon and theory, where the public is less likely to appreciate the ultimate impact; judicial decisions expanding the "unitary executive" theory\textsuperscript{47} or limiting \textit{Auer}\textsuperscript{48} and \textit{Chevron}\textsuperscript{49} deference to administrative agency expertise are not obvious blows to the environment or public health. Mischief can be done outside the spotlight of popular attention.

Third, special interests can ask captured courts to do things Republican legislators wouldn't dare vote for—like allowing unlimited and ultimately anonymous money into politics.\textsuperscript{50} Courts are designed to make unpopular decisions in the service of justice; a captured court can deliver unpopular decisions in the service of politics.

Finally, courts have traditionally been viewed as mostly apolitical—neutral arbiters of law and fact.\textsuperscript{51} Accordingly, the political branches have treated them with deference, largely leaving it to the judiciary to set its own ground rules. As a result, the courts, and most notably the Supreme Court, operate in unusual secrecy, protected by a veneer of neutrality.

IV. The Apparatus of Capture

To accomplish the capture effort, special interests and their sophisticated teams of lawyers and political operatives have systematically developed an apparatus whose purpose is first to influence the selection and confirmation of judges, and then to influence the judges' decisions in the courts.\textsuperscript{52} This apparatus is most visible at the Supreme Court, but it operates in lower courts, too. Here is its battle plan:

\textsuperscript{46} See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (providing for lifetime tenure of federal judges).
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Auer} v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
\textsuperscript{50} See, \textit{e.g.}, Brief for U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (acknowledging that "immensely wealthy individuals play a significant role in our political process" and asking the Court to allow "corporations to spend freely on independent candidate advocacy").
\textsuperscript{51} See, \textit{e.g.}, The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The judiciary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may be truly said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment.").
\textsuperscript{52} Press Release, Brennan Center, Three Nominations Reveal Contrasting Influence of Interest Groups in High Court Nomination Process (Jan. 26, 2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/three-nominations-reveal-contrasting-influence-interest-groups-high-court [https://perma.cc/564L-WQHE] (finding that "interest group spending on television ads and other lobbying tools can have a potent effect on who becomes a judge in America").
• Select carefully vetted judges who embrace the desired pro-corporate world view. This is done by giving a controlling role in judicial selection to an organization to which the interests give millions of dollars (the Federalist Society);

• Unleash millions in dark money supporting the nominee (or opposing him in Judge Merrick Garland's case). This is done through an organization (the Judicial Crisis Network ( "JCN")) that uses anonymous donations to fund political advertising campaigns for (or against) nominees;

• With their judges in place, tee up strategic cases and inundate courts with amicus briefs—best understood as lobbying documents. This is done through a flotilla of closely related front groups. These front groups sometimes appear as the litigant, behind a plaintiff of convenience; and sometimes among a flotilla of "amicus curiae" signaling in harmony how the influence machine wants the court to decide.

It's quite an investment, but it has paid stunning dividends.

The funding that fuels the judicial influence machine is difficult to expose because of its secrecy, but the coordination, tactics, and strategy of the influence machine are becoming less obscure. One case study is the outside spending group, JCN. According to tax filings, an unnamed donor gave $17 million to JCN to help block President Obama's nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court and support President Trump's nomination of Neil Gorsuch to that same vacancy. Then, in 2018, a donor—perhaps the same one—gave another $17 million to JCN to support the troubled nomination of

53 See, e.g., Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges Is Now a Trump Appointee, Wash. Post (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-every-four-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/3TJ6-WQK7] ("The three circuit courts that have flipped to Republican majorities this year have the potential to not only change policy but also benefit Trump professionally and politically. The 2nd Circuit, with its new right-leaning majority, will decide whether to hear a case challenging Trump's ability to block critics on Twitter, as well as one regarding Trump's businesses profiting while he's in office. The 11th Circuit, which handles appeals from Georgia, Florida and Alabama, is set to take up several voting rights cases."); Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Shawn Boburg, A Conservative Activist's Behind-the-Scenes Campaign to Remake the Nation's Courts, Wash. Post (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/leonard-leo-federalists-society-courts/ [https://perma.cc/G52H-ZLMU] (describing Federalist Society president Leonard Leo's role in selecting Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh).

54 See O'Harrow & Boburg, supra note 53 (noting the Judicial Crisis Network spent $10 million to support Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch's confirmation after spending $7 million to block President Barack Obama's Supreme Court pick, Merrick Garland).

55 See, e.g., Brian R. Frazelle, Corporate Clout: As the Roberts Court Transforms, the Chamber Has Another Big Term, CONN. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (July 26, 2017), https://www.theusconstitution.org/think_tank/corporate-clout/ [https://perma.cc/VM69-TUYE] (noting that in the 2016–17 term, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce "submitted friend-of-the-court briefs in 15 cases . . . [a]nd in 12 of those cases, or 80%, the position advocated by the Chamber prevailed").

56 See Robert Maguire, Group that Spent Millions to Boost Gorsuch Also Paid Mysterious Inaugural Donor, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL.: OPENSECRETS NEWS (May 16, 2018), https://
Brett Kavanaugh. JCN received many more anonymous multi-million-dollar donations along the way. A sophisticated media relations campaign, orchestrated by a firm CRC Public Relations interconnected in this web of dark money groups, put those millions to work on political-campaign-style advertising. JCN is one of many groups working in close coordination. To understand that coordination, let's visit one prominent individual: Federalist Society Co-Chairman Leonard Leo. From his perch at the Federalist Society, Leo has been the lynchpin and chief strategist of the conservative legal movement's court-packing plan for the better part of two decades.

The Federalist Society claims it is merely a not-for-profit group for like-minded aspiring lawyers seeking to discuss conservative ideas and judicial doctrine. The truth, however, is more complicated. In effect, there are three incarnations of the Federalist Society. The first is perfectly appropriate: a debating society for conservatives at law schools and in legal communities across the country to discuss traditionally conservative judicial values, like originalism and the merits of limited government. The second is familiar in Washington, D.C.: a think tank that attracts big-name conservative lawyers, scholars, politicians, and even Supreme Court Justices to events; that publishes and podcasts; and that holds galas. The third role of the Federalist Society is the dangerous one: it is the vehicle for powerful interests seeking to reorder the judiciary by grooming, vetting and selecting amenable judges.

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39 See Jonathan Swan & Alayna Treene, Leonard Leo to Shape New Conservative Network, Axios (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.axios.com/leonard-leo-crc-advisors-federalist-society-508d8446-19a3-4eab-a2b-7b74f167d1c.html [https://perma.cc/8RBG-CMVT] (noting that until recently, and for the period relevant to this Article, Leo served as the Federalist Society’s Executive Vice President and that it has been reported that he has limited his role in the Federalist Society in order to establish a new dark money operation focusing on the judiciary).


41 See Jason Zangerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. Times Mag. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html [https://perma.cc/W598-ZS9B] ("Trump might not have known much about the law, but he needed . . . to create the impression that he ‘would be reliable in terms of conservative judges, because that would calm down and consolidate a very large bloc of his coalition.’ That is, what mattered to the Federalist Society—and the Heritage Foundation—was
This Federalist Society role is the result of many years of work by Leo and his network of donors. As early as 2003, Leo was known in the Bush White House as the coordinator of “all outside coalition activity regarding judicial nominations.” In October 2006, Leo presented to students at the University of Virginia (“UVA”) School of Law an overview of the measures used to help confirm George W. Bush nominees John Roberts and Samuel Alito. According to an article about the UVA event, Leo’s strategies included the following:

- “Aggressive fundraising to hire a top media firm. About $15 million was spent for both confirmations on earned and paid media, telemarketing, and other grassroots mobilization
- “Advance work recruiting more than 60 organizations to support the nomination and confirmation of a person committed to conservative priorities
- ‘Polling to figure out what the American people thought the role of the court should be so that the message could be framed in a way that resonated with the public
- “Preparation of background memos and briefing materials on every conceivable nominee
- “Research into how Justices William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor affected the vote count in controversial areas of law
- “A search of history to learn how controversial issue areas had been handled in earlier confirmations
- “Publishing white papers to paint the ground favorably when it comes to the questions that are appropriate for a nominee to answer
- “Training expert lawyers in how to talk to the media
- “Holding dozens of background, off-the-record meetings with reporters to give them information about the nomination and confirmation process”

This playbook is still in use today. In the spring of 2019, The Washington Post published an in-depth investigation of Leo and his present network of organizations. It is massive, secretive, and lavishly funded, and its purpose is to pack and influence the courts. As the Post found through public records and interviews, the groups in Leo’s orbit work in close coordination

that Trump take their advice on judicial nominees. In an interview with Breitbart in June 2016, Trump pledged, “We’re going to have great judges, conservative, all picked by Federalist Society.”


See O’Harrow & Boburg, supra note 53.

See id.
and are linked through multiple vectors: finances, board members, phone numbers, addresses, office support staff, and operational details.\textsuperscript{66}

Anonymous funding is the lifeblood of this network and its judicial influence campaign. Between 2014 and 2017, Leo’s nonprofits collected more than $250 million in dark-money donations.\textsuperscript{67} Secret donors providing money at that quarter-billion-dollar scale obviously expect a robust return on their investment, and this money was used to carry out all manner of activities to achieve that return. The Post unearthed a list of clients of a conservative media relations firm outlining the network’s role in the Garland and Gorsuch nomination battles:

Nine of the [Leo-affiliated] groups hired the same conservative media relations firm, Creative Response Concepts, collectively paying it more than $10 million in contracting fees in 2016 and 2017. During that time, the firm coordinated a months-long media campaign in support of Trump’s Supreme Court nominee, Neil M. Gorsuch, including publishing opinion essays, contributing 5,000 quotes to news stories, scheduling pundit appearances on television and posting online videos that were viewed 50 million times, according to a report on the firm’s website.\textsuperscript{68}

This description tracks closely the methods outlined by Leo years before at UVA.

While the plan has been long in the making, in the Trump administration it has become open and obvious. As a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I have seen the dark-money-funded politicization of the judicial nomination and confirmation process emerge, climb to top political priority (it now dwarfs any legislative activity in the Senate), and pay remarkable dividends. According to an October 2019 analysis by the Senate Democratic Policy and Communications Committee, the Republican-controlled Senate had allowed less than one-sixth the number of votes on legislation and amendments compared to the Democratic-controlled House.\textsuperscript{69} Meanwhile, as of February 2020, the Senate has confirmed 193 Article III judges during the Trump administration, including fifty-one influential appellate judges—nearly as many as President Obama appointed in his eight-year presidency (fifty-five).

The Federalist Society now counts eighty-five percent of the Trump administration’s Supreme Court and circuit court nominees as members.\textsuperscript{70} In November 2019, at his first major public event since taking his seat on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Kavanaugh spoke to a high-priced Federalist

\textsuperscript{66} Id
\textsuperscript{67} Id
\textsuperscript{68} Id
\textsuperscript{69} Analysis on file with Democratic Policy and Communications Committee.
\textsuperscript{70} Statistic on file with Office of Senator Whitehouse.
Justice Kavanaugh thanked Federalist Society member and Trump White House Counsel Donald McGahn for his help during the confirmation process. McGahn once quipped that he had been "insourced" to the White House to deliver on the Federalist Society's priorities. Justice Kavanaugh appreciatively called McGahn his "coach." With vetted and selected judges in place comes the next step: strategically guiding the Court to desired outcomes. Again, dark money plays a role: over years, anonymously funded groups have sprung up to serve this effort. One task is to seek out cases with fact patterns that support arguments for changes in law the big interests desire, and then bring those cases before the Court. To get there, these legal organizations recruit plaintiffs, usually with the offer of free services. (Ordinarily, in real litigation, the plaintiff selects the lawyer, not vice versa.)

I saw this happen in a case I argued before the Supreme Court. The dark-money-funded Pacific Legal Foundation swept in from across the country and recruited a Rhode Island plaintiff, who agreed to let them bring his case before the Supreme Court. When the Court's decision ultimately did not get them the result they wished to achieve, they dropped him, and went on to other cases. Pacific Legal Foundation is still at it before the Court.

Once one of these groups gets the case up before the Court, an armada of related amici curiae ("friends of the court") sails in to echo and amplify the corporate message. Many of these amici are funded by the same donors. In a recent amicus brief I wrote, I pointed out the common funding of many of the other amici in that very case, and how at least thirteen of those amici were funded by entities that also have funded the Federalist Society.

76 In 2019, Pacific Legal Foundation represented the petitioner in Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), where the Supreme Court overruled precedent that required property owners to seek compensation for state and local property takings in state courts before seeking compensation in federal courts, id. at 2179.
Center for Media and Democracy noted the brief and followed up with a more robust analysis—indeed a stunning analysis—finding that “sixteen right-wing foundations gave nearly $69 million to groups urging the Supreme Court to abolish the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau since 2014” and that the same sixteen foundations had given over $33 million to the Federalist Society over the same period.79

Applying the “united action” campaign to the courts required a long and patient effort, but the end result of all this investment is profound. A small group of large donors is funding the vetting and selection of judges, and funding the campaigns for their confirmation, and funding the litigants who present cases to them, and funding a swarm of front-group amici who provide amplification of the donors’ message and an illusion of broad support.

V. RESULTS AT THE COURT

Mired in dark-money influence, the Supreme Court has become a reliable ally for corporate and Republican partisan interests. Professional observers know it. As renowned New York Times columnist Linda Greenhouse reluctantly concluded, it is “impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Republican-appointed majority is committed to harnessing the Supreme Court to an ideological agenda.”79 Her sentiment is not unique. Veteran court watcher Norm Ornstein has written that the Supreme Court “is polarized along partisan lines in a way that parallels other political institutions and the rest of society, in a fashion we have never seen.”80 The New Yorker’s Jeffrey Toobin was blunt in an assessment of Chief Justice Roberts, comparing Justice Scalia, “who has embodied judicial conservatism during a generation of service on the Supreme Court,” with Chief Justice Roberts, who “has served the interests, and reflected the values, of the contemporary Republican Party.”81

The hard proof is in the numbers. As I have documented, from the 2004 through 2017 Terms, the Roberts Court issued seventy-three five-to-four partisan decisions benefiting big corporate and Republican donor interests. By partisan, I mean that it was all Republican appointees making up the five. The benefits to Republican donor groups are not hard to discern. They in-

clude allowing corporate interests to spend unlimited money in elections, hobbling pollution regulations, enabling attacks on minority voting rights, curtailing labor’s right to organize, and restricting workers’ ability to challenge employers in court. In its 2018 Term, the Court added seven more of these five-to-four partisan decisions to this tally.

In this run of now eighty partisan five-to-four cases (and counting), something else quite telling took place. The Republican majority routinely broke traditionally conservative legal principles, such as respect for precedent, “minimalism” in the scope of their decision, or “originalist” reading of the Constitution. The Justices in these bare partisan majorities even went on remarkable fact-finding expeditions, violating core traditions of appellate adjudication that leave fact-finding to lower courts. (It added no luster to this effort that the facts they found were false.) The consistent measure across these decisions is not traditional doctrines of conservative jurisprudence; it is the interests that win.

A results-oriented judiciary is anathema to our Founders’ vision. A judiciary independent of the political branches, and with justice as its end rather than political gains for factions, is fundamental to our constitutional democracy. As Montesquieu put it, “There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” But corporate and partisan special interests are purposefully eroding that fundamental ideal to win this array of victories, and the Court seems content to be shepherded down that path. Some of these victories go beyond donor interests just pocketing a win in a particular case; the most dangerous victories actually tilt the political or legal or regulatory playing fields in favor of the donor interests in ways that will enable streams of future victories.

It is perhaps not a coincidence that polls show the public’s faith in the courts receding. In one poll, only thirty-seven percent responded that they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Supreme Court.

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82 Whitehouse, supra note 44.
84 Brief for Sen. Whitehouse et al., supra note 77.
86 Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748); accord The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
By seven to one, Americans have reported in polling the belief that they are less likely before the Justices of this Court to get a fair shot against a corporation, compared to vice versa. That ought to be a hazard light flashing for the Court.

VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: BRINGING TRANSPARENCY TO THE JUDICIARY

Millions of dollars in dark money have no business coursing through the judicial nomination and selection process, or funding litigants and so-called “friends of the Court.” All this coordinated, anonymous funding creates an odor of rot, and it risks lasting damage to the institution of the Court. Congress can take steps to stop the erosion of confidence and restore the Court to its proper, constitutionally prescribed lane. While some have called for dramatic and sweeping structural change—like imposing term limits, or adding seats to the Court—a logical first step is to shine the light of greater transparency and accountability into the Court.

In the political branches, we require transparency as a safeguard. Congress and the Executive Branch have extensive reporting requirements: the Lobbying Disclosure Act provides insight into who is influencing the legislative and rulemaking processes; the Federal Election Campaign Act mandates public disclosures about political campaigns; and the Ethics in Government Act requires financial disclosures from officials.

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89 See Supreme Court Justice Term Limits: Where 2020 Democrats Stand, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-2020/voting-changes/supreme-court-term-limits/ [https://perma.cc/X7AU-WX95] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020) (showing that several 2020 Presidential candidates support or are open to term limits for Supreme Court Justices); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/6F65-B7JV] (stating that “[t]he surprising openness from White House hopefuls along with other prominent Senate Democrats to making sweeping changes—from adding seats to the high court to imposing term limits on judges and more—comes as the party is eager to chip away at the GOP’s growing advantage in the courts”).

90 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(1) (2018) (“No later than 45 days after a lobbyist first makes a lobbying contact or is employed or retained to make a lobbying contact, whichever is earlier, or on the first business day after such 45th day if the 45th day is not a business day, such lobbyist (or, as provided under paragraph (2), the organization employing such lobbyist), shall register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives.”); Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(10) (2018) (“The term ‘lobbyist’ means any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a 3-month period.”).


By comparison to the other branches, the judiciary is largely a black box. It’s not just that hidden donors lurk behind amici seeking to influence courts, or that groups like JCN need not disclose the donors behind political campaigns for judges; loopholes also allow Supreme Court justices and federal judges to avoid disclosing travel and hospitality perks. Judges are nominally covered by the Ethics in Government Act, but judicial disclosures, as implemented by the regulations of the Judicial Conference, are the least comprehensive and effective.\textsuperscript{93} We would never have known of Justice Scalia’s all-expenses-paid hunting vacation, except that he died on that vacation so it made the news.\textsuperscript{94}

For a branch of government without either force or purse, for one that bases its authority on its legitimacy, it’s a mess. If conflicts of interest lurk behind the millions of dollars in anonymous money, it could produce a reputational crisis for the Court. Legislation that I propose would go a long way to protect against those potential conflicts through the sunlight of public disclosure. Not for nothing did Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis say that “sunlight is the best disinfectant.”\textsuperscript{95}

It is hard to predict what true transparency would disclose, but the worst scenario is that a small cabal of special interest funders anonymously pays to (a) select the Justices, (b) campaign for their confirmation, (c) have cases strategically brought before the Court, (d) flood the Court with an echo chamber of scripted amici, and (e) fund elaborate travel and hospitality for the agreeable Justices. Ample evidence suggests the worst-case scenario may not be far from reality. So here are some proposed repairs for various danger areas.

\textbf{A. Anonymous Amici Curiae}

Amicus curiae briefs, written by non-parties for the purpose of providing information, expertise, insight or advocacy, have surged in both volume and influence in the past decade. Supreme Court and circuit court opinions often adopts language and arguments from amicus briefs.\textsuperscript{96} During the Supreme Court’s 2014 term, it received 781 amicus briefs, an increase of over


\textsuperscript{96} See Paul M. Collins Jr., Pamela C. Coley, & Jesse Hamer, \textit{The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content}, 49 L. & Soc’y Rev. 917, 917 (2015) (finding “the justices adopt language from amicus briefs based primarily on the quality of the brief’s argument, the level of repetition in the brief, the ideological position advocated in the brief, and the identity of the amicus”).
80% from the 1950s and a 95% increase from 1995.\textsuperscript{97} From 2008 to 2013, the Supreme Court cited amicus briefs 606 times in 417 opinions.\textsuperscript{98}

Amicus briefs are an increasingly powerful advocacy tool for special interest groups. When these interest groups lobby Congress, they face stringent financial disclosure requirements;\textsuperscript{99} no similar requirements exist for this form of judicial lobbying.

\textit{Janus v. AFSCME}\textsuperscript{100} (and its precursor, \textit{Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association})\textsuperscript{101} presents a textbook example of coordinated, dark-money judicial lobbying in a case with massive political implications.\textsuperscript{102} The case garnered over seventy-five amicus briefs, including many opposing the right of public-sector labor unions to collect fees from non-union members. Many of these briefs were by amicus groups with funding from the same source: the conservative Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, which has a stated goal of ‘reduc[ing] the size and power of public sector unions.’\textsuperscript{103} None of this information was disclosed in either case to the Court or the parties. Instead, it fell to the diligent later research of transparency groups, using what public data is available, to document this web of influence with the Bradley Foundation at its heart.\textsuperscript{104} While the Court in \textit{Friedrichs} deadlocked at four-to-four because of the death of Justice Scalia, the radical right was right away ready with a new case in \textit{Janus}. With Justice Gorsuch confirmed, the Court by a vote of five-to-four overturned forty years of settled law and undermined public sector unions’ ability to engage in political advocacy.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{98} Id. at 1941.
\textsuperscript{99} Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(4) (2018) ("Each registration under this section shall contain . . . the name, address, principal place of business, amount of any contribution of more than $5,000 to the lobbying activities of the registrant, and approximate percentage of equitable ownership in the client (if any) of any foreign entity . . . ").
\textsuperscript{100} 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
\textsuperscript{101} 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
\textsuperscript{102} See Mary Bottari, \textit{Behind Janus: Documents Reveal Decade-Long Plot to Kill Public-Sector Unions}, In These Times (Feb. 22, 2018), https://inthesetimes.com/features/janus_supreme_court_unions_investigation.html (https://perma.cc/K3KN-SSXS) (noting "[i]n the past decade, a small group of people working for deep-pocketed corporate interests, conservative think tanks and right-wing foundations have bankrolled a series of lawsuits to end what they call ‘forced unionization’ . . . Most of the groups pursuing this agenda, including Bradley and SPN, are tax-exempt charitable groups.")
\textsuperscript{104} Brian Mahoney, \textit{Conservative Group Nears Big Payoff in Supreme Court Case}, Politi-

rcco (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/friedrichs-california-teachersunion-supreme-court-217525 [https://perma.cc/93MA-RWW7] (discussing that in \textit{Friedrichs}, "The Bradley Foundation funds the Center for Individual Rights, the conservative D.C. nonprofit law firm that brought the case; it funds (or has funded) at least 11 organizations that submitted amicus briefs for the plaintiff[s] and it’s funded a score of conservative organizations that support the lawsuit’s claim that the ‘fair-share fees’ nonmembers must pay are unconstitutional").
\textsuperscript{105} As Justice Kagan noted in her dissent, ‘The majority has overruled \textit{Abeld [v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.}, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)] for no exceptional or special reason, but because it never
In *Seila Law v. CFPB*, 106 the case in which I filed my brief disclosing the common funding of other amici, a group of common funders had (a) supported at least thirteen amici attacking the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, (b) developed and propagated the so-called "unitary executive" theory of executive power their amici supported, and (c) funded the Federalist Society's efforts to bring on to the Court Justices who would be agreeable to this theory.107

Many of the amici in both *Janus* and *Seila Law* claim status as "social welfare" organizations, and thereby keep their donor lists private.108 Without knowledge of the common funding, one might consider thirteen amicus briefs to present a broad outpouring of support; once the common funding becomes apparent, it suggests an artificial echo chamber manufactured by a small cabal of self-interested entities.

Judges and parties should know who is trying to influence the outcome in their case, but disclosure rules are woefully inadequate for today's dark-money fueled legal advocacy. Supreme Court Rule 37(6) requires only that amicus briefs:

[I]ndicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief, and shall identify every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution.109

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have a similar disclosure requirement,110 but these rules allow for easy evasion. A group like the Bradley Foundation can fund dozens of organizations to participate as amici in a case. As long as the money is not directed to the "preparation or submission" of a particular brief (which may be taken to mean merely printing and mailing costs), the amicus need not tell the Court where it gets its money. The real interests lie back in the shadows, while their front groups—often groups with anodyne names that belie their true purposes—create an illusory chorus of support.

Worse, the rule is inconsistently applied. In 2018, the Court rejected an amicus brief funded through a GoFundMe campaign, with most donors giv-
ing tens or hundreds of dollars. At the same time, the Supreme Court routinely accepts amicus briefs from the United States Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber refuses to disclose its funding; indeed, the anonymity of Chamber membership is a selling point for corporations seeking to influence policy and the courts without associating their names with the often-toxic positions of the Chamber. It is difficult to conjure any valid reason to reject one brief because an individual who donated $50 to the effort did not disclose her identity, while accepting another whose corporate donors in the millions of dollars remain anonymous.

This discrepancy seemed so obvious that I wrote to the Supreme Court to suggest that its disclosure rule should be changed. Responding for the Court, Clerk of the Court Scott Harris wrote, “The language of Rule 37.6 strikes a balance . . . . While your letter suggests that non-disclosure of donor or member lists favors ‘well-heeled’ amici, it is just as likely to protect organizations that advocate for the disadvantaged or unpopular causes. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (recognizing right of NAACP not to provide membership lists where disclosure might lead to retribution and could chill group activity).”

The Court’s response was troubling in two ways. First, it draws a false, if not outright offensive, equivalence between Alabama NAACP members at risk of physical violence during the Civil Rights era and large corporate interests seeking to bend the law anonymously to their advantage. Second, the Court did require the disclosure of the small donors, who were the ones much more comparable to the ordinary NAACP members protected in the Alabama case. The Court’s unwillingness to look behind these hidden big-money influence campaigns runs contrary to longstanding precedent that disfavors anonymity in judicial proceedings. It would not be difficult to

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112 Dan Dzidz, Chamber of Commerce Wages War Against Political Transparency, Tax Hq.T. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://thehill.com/blog/pundits-blog/finance/3102067-chamber-of-commerce-wages-war-against-political-transparency [https://perma.cc/TDCG-9AR2] (stating that “Chamber President Tom Donohue has said that the Chamber is in the business of providing ‘reinsurance’ to companies that need help lobbying for positions that aren’t publicly or politically palatable. And key to the Chamber’s ability to provide this ‘reinsurance’ is the fact that it can do the dirty work for its members without them leaving their fingerprints behind”).
113 Letter on file with author.
114 Letter on file with author.
116 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that a lower court erred when granting the "'true dispensation' of anonymity against the world" when it allowed an amicus to file a brief anonymously, and that "the court has 'a judicial duty to inquire into the circumstances of particular cases to determine whether the dispensation is warranted’"); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) ("A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters
honor that precedent and fashion a rule of disclosure that allows an exception for true associational threats of violence, had the Court wished.

A legislative solution to this problem is the AMICUS (Assessing Monetary Influence in the Courts of the United States) Act. This very limited legislation would require disclosure by repeat players in the influence game—those who file three or more amicus briefs in the United States Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeals during a calendar year. Disclosure would be required only of these groups' big-dollar funders, those who contributed three percent or more of the entity’s gross annual revenue or over $100,000. In addition, the bill would prohibit covered amicus brief filers from making gifts or providing travel or hospitality to judges, akin to current restrictions on legislative lobbying.¹¹⁷

B. Judicial Travel and Hospitality

Another means of influence is the “soft” lobbying of gifts and travel. Supreme Court travel paid for by others is not infrequent. Reporting by the nonpartisan Center for Public Integrity and by the Washington Post revealed that the nine Supreme Court Justices received over 365 trips paid for by outside groups from 2011 to 2014.¹¹⁸ Unlike the vulgar and immediate quid pro quo exchange of a thing of value for a specific judicial outcome in a particular case, soft lobbying plays the long game of mutual habituation and good will through more decorous activities, like travel, which happen to avail access to the donors and their intermediaries. The long game is well known to Leonard Leo, his corporate cabal, and the savvy repeat players who represent them.

There are myriad unreported ways interests can cultivate the good will of the Court. Linda Greenhouse described a recent Federalist Society gala as sending a message from the corporate donor community to the Justices: “We’ve been here for you, and we expect you to be here for us. If you want to come back, don’t disappoint us.”¹¹⁹ Current judicial travel and gift disclosure requirements do not provide enough sunlight into these relationships.

While the Ethics in Government Act requires judges to provide some financial disclosure, judges and Justices are not required to identify the exact

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dollar value of the reimbursement, and they are exempted entirely from reporting any gifts in the form of “food, lodging, or entertainment received as personal hospitality.” 120 The Executive Branch personal hospitality exemption is limited to “hospitality extended for a nonbusiness purpose by an individual, not a corporation or organization, at the personal residence of or on property or facilities owned by that individual or the individual’s family”; 121 the Senate’s is virtually identical, and is commonly understood to be an exception for old friends and family. 122

The death of Antonin Scalia demonstrated the difference for Justices. Justice Scalia was a well-known traveler, reporting 258 trips paid for by private sponsors over eleven years. 123 The $700-per-night accommodations at the West Texas hunting lodge where Justice Scalia died were paid by John Poindexter, owner of a corporate defendant in an age discrimination lawsuit, 124 Hinga v. MIC Group, 125 that the Supreme Court the year before refused to hear, 126 to the company’s advantage. 127 This all-expenses-paid hunting trip with a litigant was treated as personal hospitality.

It seems fair to require that judges and Justices make the same disclosures that elected officials do. The Judicial Travel Accountability Act would require judicial officers’ financial disclosure statements to include the dollar amount of transportation, lodging, and meal expense reimbursements and gifts, as well as a detailed description of any meetings and events attended. It would align judicial disclosures with disclosures required in the other branches. This legislation has bipartisan support and has been introduced in both houses of Congress. 127

C. Supreme Court Transparency

The Supreme Court is such an opaque institution that the public has no idea whom the Justices meet with in their chambers. Recent reports show why that information matters.

In October 2019, Justices Alito and Kavanaugh met with representatives of the National Organization for Marriage (NOM). 128 NOM is a political advocacy group with both 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) not-for-profit corporate status. 129 It uses that dual status to oppose same-sex marriage ini-

123 Lipton, supra note 94.
125 Id.
126 See Lipton, supra note 94.
tiatives in federal and state legislatures and in the courts,130 promoting “an understanding of marriage as the union of one man and one woman.”131 In this instance, NOM was an amicus curiae in three consolidated cases then pending, which presented the issue whether the Civil Rights Act protected against discrimination based on sexual orientation.132

It is a fair question whether Justices should even take such meetings with amici.133 At a minimum, those meetings should be disclosed. If the disclosures show patterns suggesting bias, or might influence a recusal motion, or appear to tread close to ex parte meetings, further action may be appropriate. But no disclosure is required. We know the Justices met with these advocates only because of a social media post from NOM President Brian C. Brown.134

Most judges take great care to avoid even the appearance of an ex parte contact during pending litigation. To be sure, NOM was a friend of the court, not a party to the litigation. But it would seem fair for parties litigating an issue to know if their opponents among the amici are getting a special audience with two of the Justices deciding their case.

Similarly, the Associated Press recently reported that the Supreme Court can be rented for private events.135 The Supreme Court’s website says nothing about such a service, but again thanks to social media we know that for a fee, and with the sponsorship of a Justice, the Court’s premises are available for hire. No surprise, the Federalist Society, sponsored by Justice Alito, held an event at the Court in July 2018.136 The Court refuses to disclose either the groups that rent the Court or the sponsoring Justices. Ac-

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130 Id. (explaining that NOM “organiz[es] as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization, giving it the flexibility to lobby and support marriage initiatives across the nation” and that “[c]onsistent with its 501(c)(4) nonprofit status, NOM works to develop political messaging, build its national grassroots email database of voters, and provide political intelligence and donor infrastructure on the state level”).


133 See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Conservative Supreme Court Justices Are Showing Their Biases on Twitter Now, Above the Law (Oct. 31, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/10/conservative-supreme-court-justices-are-showing-their-biases-on-twitter-now/ [https://perma.cc/ M5GW-63BA] (“It’s really bad enough that conservative justices are so willing to give public aid and comfort to right-wing groups like the Federalist Society. Brett Kavanaugh, who has been credibly accused of attempted rape, has promised to take revenge on his enemies, so you can’t really claim the justice’s partisan hackery is surprising. But this meeting with the NOM is outrageous.”).


cording to court spokeswoman Kathy Arberg, “The court does not maintain public records of organizations holding events.”\textsuperscript{137} If a Justice were sponsoring an event for a litigant, or regularly sponsored events for particular amici curiae, it would seem that other litigants and the public ought to know.

Simple legislation would make all this information public. The official calendars of the Justices and a list of private events with sponsoring Justices could be made public by the Court after an appropriate interval. The Justices could still meet with whomever they choose, and sponsor groups for events they support, but they would do so knowing their choices will become public. For an institution whose authority is grounded in its public legitimacy, it is far better to be open with the public than not.

D. Supreme Court Records

Currently, no law provides for the preservation of Supreme Court Justices’ papers. The Federal Records Act specifically excludes the Supreme Court, and the Justices’ papers are considered private property rather than public records.\textsuperscript{138} As The New Yorker’s Jill Lepore wrote in 2014:

The decision whether to make these documents available is entirely at the discretion of the Justices and their heirs and executors. They can shred them; they can burn them; they can use them as placemats. Texts vanish; e-mails are deleted. The Court has no policies or guidelines for secretaries and clerks about what to keep and what to throw away. Some Justices have destroyed virtually their entire documentary trail; others have made a point of tossing their conference notes. “Operation Frustrate the Historians,” Hugo Black’s children called it, as the sky filled with ashes the day they made their bonfire.\textsuperscript{139}

Given the life tenure and extraordinary power to shape American law that comes with a seat on the Supreme Court of the United States, there is a public interest in public access to Supreme Court records.

Following the model provided by the Presidential Records Act, which ensures public access to presidential records,\textsuperscript{140} my Supreme Court Records Act would make Supreme Court records the public property of the United States; place the responsibility for the custody and management of records with the incumbent Justice and, upon the Justice’s retirement, the Archivist of the United States; allow an incumbent Justice to dispose of records that no longer have administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value.

\textsuperscript{137} Sherman, \textit{supra} note 135.


subject to the approval of the Archivist; and establish a process for restriction of public access to these records.

E. **DISCLOSE Act for Judicial Nominations**

Judicial nominations and confirmations look more and more like political campaigns. Millions of dollars of dark money flow into social media, television, and radio advertising supporting and opposing nominees. The ads target states whose senators could be swayed on the nomination. It is political tradecraft, deployed for political purpose, and all of it ought to be regulated like the political campaign spending that it is.

Two things need to happen for effective regulation of political spending on judicial nominations. First, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) needs to cover these judicial nominations campaigns so the spending is reported to the Federal Election Commission.\(^{142}\)

Second, the law must deal with the post-*Citizens United* identity-laundering devices available to secretive donors. Existing FECA disclosures do not reach behind the nominal donor to give a true picture of who’s behind political spending.\(^{142}\) So we need a remedy like the DISCLOSE (Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections) Act\(^{143}\) to unveil the real parties behind political advertising, who are now hiding behind shell corporations, donor trusts, and 501(c)(4) organizations.

A Judicial DISCLOSE Act, which I plan to introduce, would require groups that run political advertisements supporting or opposing federal judicial nominations to disclose their biggest donors. The bill is modeled after the DISCLOSE Act, which would end the plague of dark money in our campaign finance system by requiring outside groups to disclose their donors to the FEC.

VII. **Conclusion**

We must be clear-eyed about the hurdles these reforms face. Enormous effort has been put by large and powerful interests into a fifty-year project to capture the courts. These interests seek to maintain, and indeed further entrench, the corporate-friendly outcomes into which they have invested hun-


\(^{142}\) Anna Massoglia, *Dark Money in Politics Skyrocketed in the Wake of Citizens United*, Ctr. for Responsive Pol.: OpenSecrets News (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/01/dark-money-10years-citizens-united/ ("Dark money groups have reported nearly $1 billion in direct spending on U.S. elections to the FEC since *Citizens United* with just 10 groups bankrolled by secret donors spending more than $610 million of that.").

\(^{142}\) S. 1147, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
drds of millions of dollars. Transparency is inconsistent with their scheme. They will fight.

This is a fight worth having. Dark money is a plague anywhere in our political system. Citizens deprived of knowing the identities of political forces are deprived of power, treated as pawns to be pushed around by anonymous money and message. Dark money encourages bad behavior, creating the “tsunami of slime” that has washed into our political discourse. Dark money corrupts and distorts politics. Bad as all that is, dark money around courts is even worse. The chances of corruption and scandal explode. The very notion that courts can be captured undermines the credibility upon which courts depend. It is surprising that the Judiciary has not come to its own defense in these matters, but that makes it our job.

As Justice Brandeis also said, “If we desire respect for the law we must first make the law respectable.” The legislation I have proposed here would be an important—indeed necessary—first step to bringing a respectable transparency to our judiciary.

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