

Integrating Operational Energy Implications into System-Level Combat Effects Modeling

Integrating Combat Effectiveness and Logistics Requirements for This Assessment

The ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company in March 2003 in OIF was an early indication that support forces were not safe in this conflict.² The insurgents began attacking convoys with simple IEDs or direct-fire weapons on single vehicles. They honed in on soft targets that would pose no or minimal threat to them. The insurgents allowed convoys to pass and waited to attack the soft targets following behind. Initially, they targeted isolated vehicles, but as their tactics improved, their targeting operations also increased. On April 9 to 11, 2004, the insurgents carried out multiple ambushes to destroy entire convoys with kill zones several miles long. From October 2001 to December 2010, of the approximately 36,000 total U.S. casualties in OIF and OEF, about 18,700 (52 percent) occurred from hostile attacks during land transport missions.³

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