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FAR EAST SURVEY 24 MAY 1951

NORTH KOREA: AMERICAN AGGRESSORS RESORT TO FORGERY: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The campaign against American aggression, the major component of Radio Pyongyang's broadcast output in the period under review, is intensified by reference to the recent "forged documents" submitted to the U.N. by the American command in Korea and by Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong's message protesting American use of bacteriological weapons in the Korean war. The Ridgway documents, "completely and thoroughly exposed" as false by Pak Hon Yong, elicit an outburst of indignation against the American "forgers." Commentaries picture the presentation of the documents as a U.S. contrivance designed to shift the responsibility of aggression to the North Koreans. Typical is the charge that the U.S. was compelled to resort to forgery "in the face of approaching doom" and "in an attempt to deceive world opinion indignant over the pillage of Korea by the American troops and ... demanding a cessation of armed intervention in Korea." One commentary of 21 May declares that Ridgway's promotion to full general "was made for his contributions in the forgery of documents. A statement on 17 May mentions one other attempt of the U.S. imperialists to "divert attention from reality by branding China as an aggressor in Korea."

U.S. Emulates Japanese Bacteriological Criminals: The familiar denunciation of U.N. atrocities is provided by Pyongyang in a new context occasioned by Pak Hon Yong's 8 May dispatch protesting American use of bacteriological weapons. Pyongyang alleges that the U.S. is following Japanese bacteriological techniques used in the war against China, and asserts that MacArthur used Japan as an intermediary in the mass production of bacteria. Other comment imputes responsibility for the incidence of smallpox in North Korea to the spread of the germ by the Americans during their temporary occupation. Pyongyang comments that the "bestial acts of the American invading troops against the Korean people have done nothing but enhance the fighting spirit of the Korean People's Army units."

Radio Pyongyang continues to devote considerable attention to the campaign in behalf of "everything for the front and everything for victory" initiated 3 May to alleviate the shortage of war material. Firm confidence in ultimate victory is the keynote in all broadcasts. Together with the appeal to the Korean nationals, broadcasts continue to express gratification for the aid received from the Soviet Union and China. Pyongyang military communiques on the current situation carry only general statements on the continuing success of the People's Armed Forces and the Chinese volunteers.

The U.N. embargo against China is reported in a news item quoting TASS, but Pyongyang avoids further comment.

SOUTH KOREA: EVILS OF COMMUNISM: POLITICAL CONFUSION

Pusan broadcasts on the current situation continue to direct attention, in various contexts, to the evils of Communism in contrast to the noble principles of the U.N. Specific statements denounce Stalin's enslavement of "small nations," report increasing rebellions within the Communist orbit and predict the "inevitable collapse" of Communism.

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- A 2 -

In connection with the disturbed political situation, broadcasts report the election of Kim Sung Soo to the office of vice president, but offer no comment on the circumstances which induced Li Si Yong to submit his resignation. On 15 May Pusan carries a statement by Rhee assuring the people that the "confusion" in home politics will result in no great change in the "political picture" and that "everything will work out smoothly." Another effort to ensure internal stability comes in a statement by the Public Information Office asserting that Rhee's refusal to become a presidential candidate has nothing to do with the attitude of either the National Assembly or any agency of the Government and that "not a single protest in the National Assembly against the reelection of President Rhee has been reported."

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14 August 1951

CIA No. 49305 Copy No.

DAILY DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DIA and PACOM review(s) completed.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETE

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State Department review completed

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7

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8. KOREA. Appointment of new ROK Defense Minister rumored: A 12 August dispatch from a Chinese Nationalist news source in Korea reports a rumor that Lee Bum Suk, present ROK Ambassador to Nationalist China, is slated for the post of Defense Minister in the ROK Government. The item notes, however, that Lee has expressed reluctance to accept any Cabinet office and desires to return to his diplomatic post.

25X1

Comment: Lee, an ex-Prime Minister and Minister of Defense in the ROK, was considered a strong man in the early days of the Republic. There is no evidence to indicate that President Rhee will replace the present Minister of Defense Yi Ki Bong, a competent official and personal friend of Rhee, with Lee.

FECOM notes danger to UN forces if aerial reconnaissance limitations are imposed in cease-fire agreement: Communist air capabilities in Korea and Manchuria have been reevaluated by the US Far Eastern Command and the US Far Eastern Air Force. This new estimate, based on the possibility that hostilities may cease in the near future as a result of the Kaesong talks, notes a considerable danger to the UN forces in Korea should an agreement be reached limiting UN aerial reconnaissance over North Korea. In FECOM's opinion, such limitations might allow the reoccupation of North Korean airfields by Communist aircraft, thereby posing a serious threat to UN aerial superiority in the event of renewed hostilities.

25X1

North Koreans protest use of gas by UN forces: An 11 August radio broadcast in Korean released the text of a North Korean note to the UN protesting against the use of poison gas by "American interventionists." The broadcast cites the 6 August dropping of two "bombs" on the city of Yonan (southwest of Kaesong) and the 7 August bombing of a North Korean troop installation as evidence of these "deliberate atrocities."

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Comment: North Korea has previously accused the US of employing chemical and biological warfare. These accusations are probably for Soviet Orbit internal consumption in order to strengthen the "hate America" feeling.

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Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000300390001-7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

RECORD COPY

Information Report

COMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES
WITH THE USE OF BW IN KOREA

CIA/8I 29-51

20 August 1951

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the mesning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law,

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: APR 2000

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES WITH

USE OF BW IN KOREA

CONCLUSIONS.

- 1. Current propaganda takes the form of:
 - a. Outright prevarication
 - b. Distortion of facts
 - c. Imputation of insidious motives to innocent acts
- 2. The majority of propaganda is directed from Moscow toward the Far East and Western Europe while a proportionately small amount of material, mostly from newspapers, is planned for whome a consumption.
- 3. An effort is underway to reach the Chinese, whose political and military affection need to be solidly won, and those West Europeans whose remilitarisation by and for the West would present a precarious situation for the USSR.
- 4. Charges of inhuman methods of warfare by bacteriological means would have a definite emotional and psychological effect upon those nations considered on the edge" in political affiliation.
- 5. The wide "Hate America" campaign launched by the USSR propagandists endeavors to disillusion and demoralize the defenders of Kores and advance the cause of staunch Communism in the Fer East.

HISCUSSION &

- 1. Shortly before the outbreak of the present Korean hostilities, Kim Song Yun, chief of the Epidemic Prevention Bureau, Ministry of Public Health, North Korea, warned Koreans of the possibility of summer epidemics emanating from South Korea where no preventive measures had been undertaken to combat them. Mr. Yun stated it would be difficult to foretell what kind of epidemics might be permitted to spread northward from South Korea.
- 2. When the Communist Army captured Seoul, it purported to discover in the intelligence offices of the General Staff of the South Korean Army documents written in rather technical detail and designated "Plan A" and "Plan B." Some chapters entitled

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"Destruction," "Arson," and "Bacteriological Dissemination," supposedly mapped outreconnuissance work for 1950 and described how rivers and reservoirs of North Korea were to be infected with bacteria. Whether the capsules of bacilli were to be obtained from American Camp Detrick or from Japanese stocks was left in question.

- 3. USSR press reported an alleged typhus epidemic raging in American occupied areas of Korea and that the population was recaiving no medical aid. It was further claimed that, within two weeks, each village in the region had been penetrated with the disease with an increase in the overall death rate up to minety (90) per cent. American authorities were reported as incoulating only servicemen and Syngman Rhee government officials, and it was also charged there had been numerous cases where seriously ill persons had been killed. Actually, the situation is quite different in that:
 - a. Shortly after the beginning of the war, ROK Ministry of Health, with vaccine furnished by ECA, began a vaccination program against smallpox for civilians, concentrating especially upon children under fifteen years of age. No records were kept, and the efficiency of the program cannot be ascertained.
 - b. United Nations reported vaccination of millions of Koreans against smallpox, typhus, typhoid, and cholera.
 - c. There are confirmed reports of typhus epidemics and a substantiated presence of smallpox in the Wonsan area. Many Communist troops are suffering from both diseases. All civilian doctors have been mobilized; penicillin and other drugs have been confiscated for Communist Army needs; civilians have been evacuated.
- 4. It is also purported that a serious skin disease is caused by a new United Nations' weapon and that the disease, where it is encountered, is responsible for fifty (50) per cent caeualties. This propaganda may refer, of course, to casualties from the United Nations use of napalm incendiary weapons.
- 5. Soviet propaganda also depicts American forces as prepared to use bacteriological weapons against the Korean people to excuse the failure of their troops in the field. Macarthur's headquarters in Japan was purported to have been producing bacteria with the aid and assistance of unpunished Japanese war oriminals. For this activity the Yoshida government had appropriated 1.5 million yen.

The propaganda then resolved into a condemnation of MacArthur by Soviet scientists and an assurance that they (the Soviets) are discovering methods to combat such warfare.

- 6. Reports have also been disseminated by Communist sources that plague-carrying fleas have been employed by American forces to spread plague in Korea. It is claimed MacArthur sent eighteen Japanese Dacteriologists, in 1946, to War Department laboratories to continue the culture of BW agents.
- Chinese Communist radio broadcast from Peiping, allegedly quoting from the American magazine, "Weekly Newspaper" (NEWSWEEK) and Allied war prisoners, states Chinese Communist prisoners ware subjected to bacteriological experiments on a small island outside Wonsan. Moscow, in a broadcast quoting Peiping sources, states that the Chinese Red Cross has revealed the Americans are testing bacteriological weapons on captured Chinese volunteers and gruesome experiments are being conducted under the guise of epidemic control. These facts were reportedly admitted by the United States magazine. NEWSWEEK, 9 April 1951. The Chinese Red Cross called on all the sixty-eight countries belonging to the International Red Cross and on all peace-loving peoples to punish this vicious enemy. Actually, the excerpts from the NEWSWEEK item referred to involved an article about a Navy epidemic control laboratory ship eff Wonsan harbor on the east coast of Korea . . . where Navy landing parties have been capturing a number of Chinese Reds from the tiny island and have taken them back to the ship where they are tested for symptoms of bubonic plague because of reported epidemics among enemy troops . which may endanger our troops. The ship is an infantry landing vessel on which a laboratory complete with mice and rabbits is installed.

An American naval medical officer immediately and publicly denied these charges and stated that the United States does maintain an "epidemic control ship" docked near a small island off the coast of South Korea. For the benefit of United Nations' forces, this laboratory provides facilities for studying all types of diseases contracted by the military personnel so that epidemics may be prevented. This officer further stated that no prisioners have been taken aboard nor has any experimental work been performed.

- 8. Pak Hun Yong, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, protested in a message to the Chairman of the United Nations General Assembly and the President of the Security Council against the use of bacteriological weapons by American forces. He cited the following incidents:
 - a. American Far East Command, under orders from General MacArthur, has been preparing BW with the aid of Japanese finances and personnel.

- b. Documents, "Plan A" and "Plan B," found in ROK headquarters in Seoul, outlined, for 1950, sabotage plans, based on use of bacteria, against vital North Korean installations, towns, and army units.
- o. American armed forces, temporarily holding areas of North Korea, contaminated the inhabitants of these areas with smallpox. In this connection, Yong pointed out no cases occurred in areas not occupied by the Americans and that outbreaks in Japan were undoubtedly caused by infected American troops involved in covert dissemination (of the germs) in North Korea.

Yong then concluded that Americans have thereby violated Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, prohibiting the use of.... bacteria in warfare and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea demands the arrest and trial of MacArthur and Ridgway who have followed in the steps of the Japanese war criminals.

- 9. The Department of State of the United States has issued to all consular offices a statement of policy guidance advising that such charges should not be dignified by direct refutation. On the contrary, every opportunity should be used to demonstrate that the epidemics were the result of Communist leaders' disregard of troops and civilian population as shown by their failure to take adequate measures to prevent disease. Emphasis should be directed to the fact that United Nations forces, ROK civilians, and POW's are subject to inoculation and sanitation programs throughout the Republic of Korea. (The United Nations fosters this preventive measure.)
- Last March (1951), the United Nations command in Korea knew some sort of epidemic, feared to be bubonic plague, was raging north of the 38th parallel. Brigadier General Crawford Same, United Nations Army Chief of Public Health and Welfare, volunteered to obtain details. With three other officers, Sams entered North Korean territory and learned that the epidemic was not plague but hemorraghic smallpox. For this exploit, he received the D.S.C. The Communists, learning of his mission, broadcast the fantastic story that the United States had deliberately planted germs in North Korea thereby causing the epidemic, and, with the clear intention of perverting these facts, IZVESTIA published a statement, supposedly attributed to a United Press release, which recounted a fantastic story of the miraculous salvation of the United Nations forces from a smallpox epidemic as the result of a special raid by a group of American doctors in the North Korean rear; For this "heroic exploit," according to the purported United Press report, the American Brigadier General Crawford SOAMES (Sams), the is "head of the public health and social security department at the headquarters of the United Nations forces, " received a very high

military award since Scames' detachment "discovered" the presence of a smallpox epidemic in North Korea.

11. Moscow propagandist again quoted an alleged Associcated Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, furnishing details of United States preparations for BW by using Korean PW's as guinea pigs aboard the American landing vessel No. 1091 off Koje (Koje-do) Island. The ship was reported to have installed " a modern laboratory, completely equipped with all gear her scientists would need."

TASS, again quoting the alleged Associated Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, adds to the above the charge that the landing vessel was relocated from Wonsan to Kojede (Koje-do) Island, 40 kilometers S-W of Pusan, in order better to utilize the PW's confined in some half-dozen nearby convict prisons. According to TASS's version of the Associated Press dispatch, 3,000 experiments on oral bacteria and rectal bacteria are being made daily by a 38-man medical team. Brigadier General Crawford Sams is mentioned again as participating in these experiments.

- 12. The propaganda picture was further enlarged by a Moscow Korean-language broadcast which claimed that 3,000 Korean families have been banished from Japan and that General Ridgway's headquarters were making every possible effort to conceal where the expelled Koreans were sent and what became of them after their deportation. The broadcast raised the conjecture that some of these Koreans had been taken to some deserted island and used for testing new types of bacteriological weapons.
- 13. A special delegation from the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), an international Communist organisation, has been dispatched to Korea to investigate United Nations "war crimes." Their report is being widely publicized by Communist propaganda media and will, undoubtedly, provide background for additional stories of atrocities.

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9. KOREA. North Koreans order precautions against alleged bacterinlogical warfare: A North Korean battalion commander was ordered on 27 February to take special precautions to avoid contamination of his unit's food and water because "the enemy dropped bacteria" in central Korea. Covering wells and disinfecting United Nations leaflets were additional recommendations.

These latter measures were probably inspired by a 16 February message which stated that "spies are putting poison into the drinking water" and distributing paper which causes death to anyone using these papers for the nose." (SUEDE AFSA-251, 1547Z, 28 Feb; 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/6456, 16 Feb 52)

Comment: There is no evidence that a serious health problem exists in North Korea. Following recent charges made by both the North Korean and the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministers that the United Nations were using bacteriological warfare in the Korean war, the entire Soviet Orbit has been giving great emphasis to this subject. The American Embassy in Moscow observes that Soviet press and radio coverage links the BW issue with the Panmunjom truce talks.

North Korean major commands have large political unit:
A 27 February message to the North Korean "Front Line Head-quarters" noted that "the table of organization of political platoon was changed....it should consist of 42 persons in corps headquarters, while 51 persons in division as before."
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, SK-G-919, 28 Feb 52)

Comment: This disproportionately high number of political personnel assigned at staff level is further evidence of the great emphasis placed on indoctrination in the North Korean army.

11. Supply of foodstuffs for three North Korean battalions listed: A North Korean message of 22 February -- possibly between two rear-area units on the east coast -- listed the foodstuffs on hand for three battalions and the number of days the provisions are to last. Each battalion had approximately 11 days supply of rice on hand and a ten-day supply on requisition. In general, the battalions had a one to three week supply of miscellaneous grains and vegetables on hand with no additional supplies on requisition. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Co Korea, 15RSM/6760, 22 Feb 52)

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Comment: Units in a static defensive role on the east coast might be expected to maintain a somewhat higher level of rations on hand. This relatively low level may reflect continued transportation difficulties.

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1. North Koreans order precautions against alleged bacteriological warfare:

US Army Korea Arsa A North Korean battalion commander was ordered 16, 28 Feb 52 /SY12 on 27 February to take special precautions to SUEDE avoid contamination of his unit's food and water /5MSM/L456 - /L/LLSbecause "the enemy dropped bacteria" in central Korea. Covering wells and disinfecting United Nations leaflets were additional recommendations.

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7. Messages suggest transfer of several MIG-equipped divisions: Messages of 1 and 2 March disclose "test flights" by seven MIG-15's of the Communist 14th and one transport of the 17th Division. Similar flights have preceded unit moves in the past. According to the reporting agency, these messages suggest that the 17th Division, now based at Tangshan in North China, may move to Tatungkou near Antung, and that the 14th which is at Takushan, another Antung area field, may move to Peiping. (SUEDE 6920 Security Group Johnson AB Japan, SG 593 and SG 616, 1 and 2 Mar 52)

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Comment: Another Communist division of MIG-15's--the 12th--is in the process of transferring from Shanghai to Takushan. Assuming that all these moves occur, Communist MIG strength near the Korean border will be increased from the present two divisions of about 50 MIG's each to three divisions.

8. "Allied" MIG's fly to Korean border from Mukden: Six "allied" MIG-15's flew from Mukden to Tatungkou near the Korean border on 21 February, according to a Chinese flight message. (SUEDE ASAPAC SPOT 30961, 29 Feb 52)

Comment: In·mid-February, 24 "allied" (presumably Soviet) MIG-15's flew from Tatungkou to Mukden. The six mentioned above may be part of that group on a return flight, or they may have been replacements. Flights of Soviet MIG's between fields on the Korean border and ones deeper in Manchuria were not noted in intercepts before February.

9. KOREA. Bacteriological warfare in Korea now major Communist propaganda theme: A North Korean east coast defense unit was alerted on 1 March to hold protest meetings among the troops to intensify "hostile feelings" against alleged bacteriological warfare by the UN forces. The addressee was admonished to "make sure they (the troops) are awake at the lecture."

The seriousness with which the enemy is treating the charges of BW is evident from a series of 28 and 29 February North Korean messages which contained such instructions as "the contaminated area must be covered with snow and spray... do not go near the actual place" and which ordered that "injections with number nine (unidentified) vaccine will be made." Another message stated that "the surgical institute members left here to investigate the bacteria bombs dropped on the 29th." (SUEDE AFSA 251, 1000Z, 2 Mar; Det 151, 15RSM Korea, CS 259, 1 Mar 52)

Comment: The entire Soviet Orbit continues to give unusual prominence to the bacteriological warfare charges, and Communist China has reportedly dispatched "anti-epidemic teams" to combat the UN's alleged BW campaign in Korea. A Communist correspondent at the truce talks reported that the charges lend "a most sinister aspect to the new American delaying techniques in the conference tent," and predicted that the full effects of BW will become evident as the weather gets warmer.

There is still no evidence of an epidemic in North Korea sufficient to justify the current all-out propaganda effort of the Communist world.

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
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)



3. KOREA. Chinese unit in Korea reports UN bacteria drop: An unidentified Chinese Communist unit on 26 February reported that "yesterday it was discovered that in our bivouac area there was a real flood of bacteria and germs scattered from a

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plane by the enemy. Please supply us immediately with an issue of DDT that we may combat the menace, stop the spread of this plague, and eliminate all bacteria." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, K-1221, 3 Mar 52)

Comment: Reports such as this from enemy field units provide the Communists with the "proof" which they apparently require to support a propaganda campaign. This is the second instance during the current BW scare that a Communist field unit has actually reported the discovery of UN bacteriological agents.

4. Kaesong guard force criticized: The assistant regimental commander of the North Korean 82nd Regiment, charged with the security of Kaesong, was notified on 29 February by an unidentified senior that "the spirit of your unit from the highest rank to the lowest has decayed. It has been forgotten that our comrades at the front lines are fighting to the death." This message was apparently inspired by a financial misappropriation which resulted in the 82nd's supply officer being sent to the provost marshal. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7253, 1 Mar 52)

Comment: The North Korean 82nd Regiment has been in the Kaesong area almost since the start of the truce talks. Its only combat during this period has been limited to minor patrols.

North Koreans will hold critique on abortive Yang-do operation: A major North Korean coastal security station informed a subordinate station on 29 February that "the training documents pertaining to the operation at Yang-do must be brought by you when you come up to Pyongyang for the instruction meeting." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7194, 1 Mar 52)

Comment: The disastrous North Korean attempt to capture Yang Island off the coast near Chongjin in northeastern Korea was conducted by elements of the newly identified 63rd Independent Infantry Regiment. FECOM reports suggest that the assault unit which attempted to take the island against ROK marines suffered nearly 100 percent casualties.

6 Mar 52

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Air defense communications between Sariwon and Pyongyang being organized: A 29 February message from North Korean Air Headquarters in Sinuiju instructed an air unit near Pyongyang to make a topographic survey to establish "the direct line to connect Pyongyang and the radar station in Sariwon." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7224, 1 Mar 52)

Comment: This intelligence, in addition to indicating that land lines linking Pyongyang and Sariwon will be laid, suggests that the radar station at Sarawell is subordinate to the North Korean Air Force.

North Korean Air Force expands its operations: During a two-week period in mid-February, 142 aircraft communicating in Korean, Russian and Chinese were active on the Korean-coerated GCI net in North Korea. Operations to date on the net have been mainly limited to training and observation. However, aircraft controlled by the Korean ground system have made one possible contact with a UN plane, and Korean ground operators have tracked UN aircraft on three occasions.

In addition, there is evidence that some North Korean aircraft are performing reconnaissance missions and protecting their airfields.

The US Air Force concludes that "allied" aircraft are probably active in the training phase of the North Korean GCI net, and that some North Korean air units are now participating in combat. (SUEDE USAFSS Brooks AFB, ODD-2-20694, 1 Mar 52)

Korean border: Possibly 38 MIG-15's of the Chinese Communist 12th Division were scheduled to leave Shanghai on 4 March on a northbound 211 ht. The US Air Force points out that this brings the Division's strength to at least 49 MIG-15's, including 11 which left Shanghai for Takushan, near the Korean border, in February. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 45, 2133Z, 4 Mar 52)

Comment: The strength of Chinese MIG divisions is usually about 50 planes. This is the first evidence that the 12th Division has a full complement. The transfer of

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the 12th Division will raise the number of Chinese jet divisions at the Korean border to three, although one of them--the 14th--is believed scheduled to transfer to China Proper soon.

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4. No sickness from BW reported in North Korean coastal unit: A North Korean unit on coastal security in eastern Korea reported to Naval Defense Headquarters near Wonsan on 2 March that although on the 28th insects were again dropped at Paekyang, Sinpung, and Innam, "no one has been infected yet." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15 RSM/7413, 3 Mar 52)

Comment: This provides some indication that no actual epidemic is current in this area, in which the UN has been accused of carrying on bacteriological warfare. It is also noteworthy that Communist propaganda to date has concentrated on the actual dropping of infecting agents rather than on the incidence of disease due to the employment of BW.

North Korean east coast unit claims BW caused hardships:
A North Korean coastal security unit in eastern Korea reported on 3 March that UN bacteriological warfare agents in the surrounding area had prevented the movement of transportation since 21 February. Later in the day the unit reported to Pyongyang that "Pupyong (just southwest of Hamhung) . . . is the contaminated area. According to the correct news, no one can pass through it. If you do not act quickly, the 12th and 13th guard stations will have fallen into starvation conditions." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/7459, 5 Mar 52; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/7502, 5 Mar 52)


Comment: These messages raise the possibility that the enemy is blaming the east coast transportation difficulties, caused by UN air and naval strikes, on the more provocative BW theme.

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March North Korean unit has unidentified "secret" weapon: A 4 March North Korean message, possibly from the 23rd Brigade, informed a subordinate unit that the inspection which will be performed very soon will mainly concern the "special weapons which are being handled secretly at your unit." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/7524, 5 Mar 52)

Comment: There have been no indications as to what these new weapons might be. The Soviet Union has previously sought to avoid compromise of new materiel, and most weapons and equipment encountered to date -- with the notable exception of the MIG-15 -- have been World War II models.



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
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

1. KOREA. BW scare continues to occupy Communists in Korea:

A long detailed 6 March message from the North Korean 23rd
Brigade to one of its subordinate battalions suggested
preventive measures to be used against bacteria allegedly
dropped by UN aircraft. The report stated that "three
persons... became suddenly feverish and their nervous
system have benumbed." After treatment, "two persons alive"
and one dead." The report concluded with the astounding
statement that "the government will soon take pictures of
specific appearance of the germs collectively and correct
photographic data will be provided."

Another manifestation of the theme is a 1 March query from Pyongyang to a North Korean air unit at Sariwon, in the supposedly contaminated area, "Have you not had any victims as a result of certain bacteria weapons?" (SUEDE 324, 1 Mar; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-184, 6 Mar 52)

Comment: Enemy messages have not yet mentioned epidemic conditions in North Korea. There is no doubt, however, that the enemy has succeeded in convincing his troops that BW agents are being used against him.



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3. Fear of future epidemic suggested in Communist messages:

Army Security Agency 29 Feb, 4 Mar 52 SUEDE A Chinese Communist artillery unit was informed on 29 February that "all personnel will be reinoculated at once" with bubonic plague vaccine. Healthy individuals, however, are to take only

a half-strength shot or may "temporarily not be inoculated."

Another message from a Chinese Communist artillery regiment reported on 27 February that "we have now fully obtained the vaccine required for smallpox in the spring time, malaria, and bubonic plague." The sender notes that the smallpox and malaria shots have already been given, but queries, "How shall we administer the bubonic plague shots?"

Comment: The Communists evidently are carrying out a large-scale immunization program in Korea, probably because the threat of epidemics will be heightened in the coming months.

These messages provide further evidence that there is no serious epidemic within these units. The continued and unprecedented coverage given the BW theme in Communist broadcasts, moreover, supports the view that propaganda motives are behind the charges of UN use of BW in Korea.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1. USSR. Reappearance of messages to Moscow from Soviet Military Mission in Korea: Messages from a radio station which Is believed to serve the Soviet military advisers in Korea to an office in Moscow previously identified as the "Military Administration of Areas outside the USSR" reappeared on 21 January 1952 after a period of inactivity since 29 October 1951. The unusually high volume of this traffic to Moscow on 12, 20, and 24 February may indicate military activity of some sort. The station was heard as recently as 26 February.

An apparent correlation between battle activity and the volume of messages, presumably of a military nature, from the administrative office in Moscow to this station in Korea is suggested by the fluctuation of traffic in this direction during the last seven months; traffic volume was high in the period from August to October 1951 when fighting was comparatively heavy. The last time the station was heard was on 28 October, after which date fighting has been at a virtual standstill.

AFSA suggests that the resumption of combat activity on a large scale might be accompanied by reappearance of military messages to Korea but cautions that such an analysis is not definitive since the radio traffic is believed to be an overflow from landline traffic. (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667, 6 Mar 52)

Comment: The period of high volume of this traffic to Moscow noted in February coincides roughly with that of "Operation Clam-up", a tactical feint by UN forces to develop indications of enemy intentions.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

KOREA. Ex-South Korean soldiers in Communist army again listed separately: The North Korean 82nd regiment, guarding Kaesong, reported on 8 March that "supplemental investigation" revealed "15 liberated soldiers" in the organization. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/7883, 10 Mar 52)

Comment: "Liberated soldiers" is the term the Communists generally apply to the 30,000 to 50,000 ex-South Korean soldiers impressed into their armies. The enemy's special handling of these prisoners suggests that the Communists may be preparing to negotiate this pressing issue at the truce talks. They have continued to deny, however, the existence of any more prisoners of war than those listed in December.

3. Sickness due to BW reported by enemy unit: A North Korean anti-aircraft unit in the Hamhung area of north-eastern Korea reported on 10 March that "a man who ate

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ice using the hand with which he had touched the leaflets of the enemy forces, fell prey to the sickness." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/8108, 11 Mar 52)

Comment: This would appear to be a farfetched rationalization for a possible outbreak of disease in a North Korean unit.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

2. Further sickness blamed on BW: A 6 March Chinese Communist message states that one of the soldiers of the 345th regiment picked up a UN propaganda leaflet and "was immediately poisoned." The soldier was administered "fever medicine, the fever abated and he is now recovered." All other units are warned not to handle leaflets. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1421, 11 Mar 52)

Comment: This is the second instance noted of the Communists linking sickness to UN leaflets. These allegations may discourage the enemy soldiers from reading UN propaganda.

3. CHINA/KOREA. Evidence establishes that Chinese and Korean pilots actually engage in combat: In late February and early March the ground-controlled intercept net directing enemy jets in combat over Korea was heard giving specific combat orders in the Chinese and Korean languages. Directions intercepted included: "Attack," "Guard yourselves," and "The enemy is just behind you."

The US Air Force comments that the first evidence of organized Chinese units in aerial combat occurred 27 September 1951. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 50 and 51, 2055Z and 2128Z, 11 and 12 Mar 52)

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Comment: Russian is the language usually employed on this net. These messages establish that Chinese and Korean pilots are engaging in actual combat with UN planes -- not just flying patrols over Korean territory. The 1st Korean Division and the 6th Chinese Division, with about 50 MIG's each, were believed based in the Antung area in February.

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6. Russian message suggests typhus epidemic in Korea: A Russian administrative message on a military net in north-western Korea reported that "... villages an epidemic of typhus has broken out. Please urgently send... assistance." (SUEDE 331, 6 Mar 52)

Comment: The very fragmentary condition of the message and the position of the missing words could make it misleading. If it describes actual epidemic conditions, it is the first to reveal an outbreak on such a scale in any North Korean area this winter. Louse-borne typhus occurred in epidemic proportions among Communist troops and civilians in eastern Korea during the winter of 1950-51.

The Peiping radio denied on 13 March that epidemic conditions prevailed in North Korea. Poor santary conditions, the generally low level of immunization among the civilian population, and the lack of an effective lousicide makes such an outbreak a constant possibility.

7. Campaign against BW continues unabated in North Korea: A considerable portion of Chinese and Korean communications still are concerned with reports of BW, with preventive measures, and with incidence of disease.

Two coastal security stations in northeastern Korea reported on 11 March that "the bacteria bomb classified as mosquito, fly and flea were dispersed" and "an enemy plane dropped ants, fleas, mosquitoes, flies and crickets."

A Chinese Communist unit commander in western Korea demonstrates his conviction that BW is being employed against him in his order to a subordinate unit who captured some UN soldiers. The subordinate unit is instructed to ask the prisoners what "type of immunization shots were administered recently. . . . in preparation for defense against what disease," and "what type of common literature (was) made available regarding disease immunization and prevention."

Two 12 March North Korean naval messages to units in Songjin and Chongjin, cities in coastal northeastern Korea, ordered the units to cooperate with city officials to "have a counterplan which includes injections, vaccinations and rat poison" and "to prevent an epidemic the rats. . . must be hunted."

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Two 13 March North Korean messages, one from northeastern Korea, report deaths due to cholera. (SUEDE - Det 151 15th RSM, Korea, CM IN 20412, 12 Mar 52, 20791, 13 Mar 52, 21099, 14 Mar 52; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1395, 11 Mar 52)

Comment: The campaign against rats in Songjin and Chongjin is a sound preventive measure insofar as these animals are the primary vectors of bubonic plague. The reported incidence of cholera is surprising since this is normally considered a summer disease.

8. North Korean unit is stockpiling large quantities of food: An inventory of food stuffs submitted on 9 March by a North Korean supply battalion commander to his regimental headquarters lists approximately 8,000 metric tons of rice and 3,800 metric tons of wheat, in addition to large quantities of potatoes, meat and vegetables on hand.

A 10 March message -- perhaps a reply to the above intercept -- from a rear regiment commander to one of his subordinate battalions orders that the food situation be reported on a monthly basis, and that empty bags be sent to the myon organization. (SUEDE 2959, 9 Mar; 2960, 10 Mar 52)

Comment: Despite the serious food shortage among North Korean civilians, it appears that this unit has accumulated a considerable quantity of food for what, judged by the stockpile's size, is apparently a major North Korean command.

Mention of the myon organization, a low level Korean political subdivision, suggests that the North Korean armed forces are permitted to deal directly with local civilian components for food without having to channel requests through higher civilian authority.

9. Additional facts reported on North Korean operated GCI net: USAF analysis of communications traffic on the North Korean operated GCI net in northwestern Korea reveals that two airfields are associated with the system and three other fields may be similarly linked. One field is probably in Korea near Sunchon, a city 40 miles south of Sinuiju.

The analysis discloses that one of the Korean GCI stations is mobile and very likely in the Pyongyang area. The system is now comprised of at least six GCI stations.

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The Korean early warning system, however, seems to operate independently from the GCI net.

An 11 March North Korean air message mentioned a "transmitter lokkattor," possibly located at Sariwon, which may indicate a D/F installation. (SUEDE USAFSS, ADV SUMM RU-AIR-Weekly Digest 46, 8 Mar AF Roundup 52, 13 Mar 52)

Comment: The Korean-operated portion of the Communist air defense system in northwestern Korea continues to expand its facilities and to improve its operations. Korean radar installations are now identified at Sariwon and Pyongyang.

There are no known operational airfields in north-western Korea, south of Sinuiju and Viju along the Korean side of the Yalu river, except for a sod airfield at Pyongyang.

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Sinuiju-Viju	ı area, moved	l during éarl	ter reorganiz y March to an	area east	
	of Pyongyang. The general morale of the understrength corps is low and about 30 percent of the troops "are bedridden with				
typhoid feve	er or typhus,	" A high mo	rtality rate		
these diseas	sed patients.				

Comment: Some substance is lent to this report by a fragmentary 6 March message on the Russian GCI net in north-western Korea reporting an outbreak of typhus in this general area.

While the existence of epidemics in North Korea cannot be determined, a lack of sanitary conditions and preventive measures and a shortage of medical personnel have probably made conditions ripe for an epidemic.

The present whereabouts of the North Korean VIII Corps are unknown, although recent reports have indicated that it was in the process of reorganization in northwestern Korea.

High-level inspection to be carried out in North Korean Army soon: In a 14 March message, an unidentified North Korean regiment informed a subordinate unit that the "division" would carry out a preliminary inspection on I April "in order to satisfactorily meet the Supreme Headquarters inspection."

In this same regard, a 16 March message, probably from the North Korean VII Corps in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, reported that "National inspection will be opened from the 17th day. Prepare for it sufficiently." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea ALT-845, 15 Mar; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-747, 17 Mar 52)

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Comment: This impending high level inspection may indicate the culmination of the extensive training and reorganization program which has been going on in the North Korean Army in past months.

Communists continue organizing to meet threat of BW: A Chinese Communist message on 15 March reported that "a certain unit has discovered a large concentration of plague germs. Many people have been afflicted with this undiagnosed disease and already several persons have succumbed with the illness." Another Chinese Communist unit on 14 March listed four preventive measures for carrying out the "anti-small-pox campaign" and the "anti-plague program."

Meanwhile, a 17 March North Korean message detailed preventive steps to be taken by subordinate units "to prevent various diseases which may intrude into here by the new weapons used by the enemy." These measures included establishment of infectious disease hospitals, cooperation with local governments in the anti-epidemic campaign, stricter hygienic discipline, isolation of infected units, high priority reporting of the outbreak of disease, and strict observation of "enemy aircraft . . . of bacterial bombs." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1499, 17 Mar; K-1500, 17 Mar; SK-H-768, 18 Mar 52)

North Korean food economy measures not as harsh as previously reported: A more accurate translation of a 15 March North Korean message (see Special Intelligence Supplement, 18 March, Item 4) concerning economy in food consumption has been received. The message urges conservation of provisions in the military establishment and decrees that "50 grams of meat and 800 grams of rice" will be "deducted" from each man's monthly ration. The previous translation indicated that each man's monthly ration would be "limited" to "509 grams of meat and 800 grams of rice." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-897, 17 Mar 52)

Comment: While this new translation still indicates a shortage of food in North Korea, the deduction of roughly one day's ration per month is not nearly as severe as the measures suggested by the previous interception.

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7. Chinese MIG-15's move to Korean border: Twenty-seven MIG-15's, probably of the Chinese Communist 17th Air Division, were scheduled to fly from Tangshan in North China to Tatungkou near Antung on 17 March. Thirteen MIG's of this division left Tangshan for Manchuria on 9 March. (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 55, 2100Z, 18 Mar 52)

Comment: Since the 17th Division is equipped with about 50 MIG-15's, its transfer will raise the total enemy jet strength at Antung and Tatungkou to nearly 250, a record number. The 17th may, however, replace a combat-depleted unit in the area; rotation of this nature has occurred before.

Aircraft of the 17th Division were noted in an advanced stage of training in February. On 26 February they practiced releasing auxiliary fuel tanks, the first intercepted reference to auxiliary tanks on MIG-15's.



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8. Propaganda value of BW scare stressed in North Korean unit: An 18 March North Korean message notes that in reference to the "public opinion project: progress is slow at battalion units. In accordance with the outlined regulation, you must report public opinion concerning the appearance of bacteria weapons in a wide sphere." (SUEDE Det 151 15th RSM Korea, CS 351, 19 Mar 52)

Comment: This intercept shows that the current BW propaganda campaign is intended to increase both civilian and military feeling in North Korea against the UN.

9. North Korean IV Corps units identified in western Korea:
A series of 17 March North Korean messages, possibly including duplicate interceptions, indicates that an antiaircraft unit of the "11th Regiment" shot down a UN F-84 in western Korea, south of Chinnampo. An altercation developed between the "11th Regiment" and a unit of the North Korean 23rd Brigade, known to be in this area, as to the credit for downing the UN plane.

A 19 March North Korean message, probably from the 23rd Brigade in western Korea, reports the alleged dropping of bacteria in the area occupied by the "18th Regiment, 4th Division." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea ALT-936 and ALT-937, 18 Mar; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15 RSM/8724 and 15 RSM/8725, 18 Mar; Det 151 15th RSM Korea, CS-355, 19 Mar 52)

Comment: The 11th North Korean infantry regiment is organic to the 5th Division, IV Corps. No recent information has been received on either the 4th or 5th North Korean Divisions, both good combat units, which were last located in the Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon area of western Korea.

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4. North Korean Army unit disproves police report of BW incident: Two messages from a North Korean battalion in the Hamhung area reported on 25 March that a civilian police officer had discovered an American bacteria bomb. The policeman's findings apparently were based on the coincidence of a UN bombing attack and the appearance of "flies" in the area.

A North Korean military sanitation officer, sent to affirm this incident, reported that the policeman's report was false and that the flies "were not caused from the bacterial weapon but from the fertilizers on the place." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-1045, 25 Mar; Det 151 15th RSM Korea, 26 Mar 52)

Comment: This is the first observed instance in which a Communist unit has investigated and entered a negative report on an alleged American use of BW agents.

5. Additional subordinate of new Chinese Communist army group reported in Korea: A recent message, probably passed by the Chinese Communist 7th Artillery Division, states that "the 18th Army requests that you compute the total number of all personnel under your command..."

FECOM comments that the 18th Army, subordinate to the 5th Chinese Communist Army Group, has been located in Korea by several collateral reports. The reference to "18th Army," FECOM warns, could be a garble for "68th Army" known to be in the general area of the 7th Artillery Division. (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 468, 26 Mar 52)

Comment: Communications intelligence in 1952 has suggested the presence in Korea of four new Chinese Communist armies—the 10th, 16th, 18th, and 21st. While it is possible that all or elements of these armies may have entered Korea, there is insufficient evidence to accept their presence in the combat zone.

6. North Korean V Corps loses two major units: A
29 January North Korean message mentions that "since the
V Corps is transferring the control of the 46th Division

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and the 25th Division (probably 25th Brigade), and since

	to" (SUEDE 3003, 29 Jan 52)	0-14
	Comment: The loss of these two major units leaves the V Corps with the 6th, 12th, and 32nd Divisions. It is possible that this January transfer was a preparation for the V Corps' return to combat in eastern Korea, possibly to relieve the II Corps.	
	The 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade has been generally identified in a coastal defense role. The V Corps has been engaged in training and coastal security duty in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, since it was relieved from combat by I Corps in the fall of 1951.	
•	North Korean regiment at Kaesong has large security element: A poorly translated 20 March message from the North Korean 82nd regiment, the Kaesong guard force, to its parent 8th Division reports the current strength of security men in the regiment as 324, organized into between 50 and 70 nets. (SUEDE 29/78, 21 Mar 52) HR7	'0-14
	Comment: Although it is not known what the normal complement of security personnel is in a North Korean regiment of 3,000 soldiers, this figure seems high. The "showpiece" role of the 82nd Regiment as the Kaesong guard force may account for the extra security precautions.	
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1 April 1952

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

State Department review completed

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ARMY and USAF review(s) completed.

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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	EASTERN EUROPE
1.	Livestock collections lagging in Hungary: Six villages have lost their free marketing privileges for delinquency in crop collection. In announcing this step, Szabad Nep, the Budapest Communist daily, pointed out that in spite of several warnings the villages had not complied with their obligations for months.
1	The US Legation in Budapest noted that the fact that one village was selected in each of six counties indicated that the measure was intended to frighten other delinquents.
·	Comment: The Hungarian Communist concern for production and delivery of crops is seen even in their attitude toward socialization of agriculture. Local officials were warned recently not to let their efforts at increasing the cooperatives
	interfere with the spring planting.
2.	American Embassy evaluates Yugoslav reaction to Italian Trieste policy: In commenting on Yugoslav counter-demonstrations and reaction to events in Trieste, the American Charge in Belgrade reports that the "general tone of events in Yugoslavia indicates a firm, well-controlled attitude on the part of the regime designed to impress the West with Yugoslavia's determination not to yield to solutions arrived at without Yugoslav participation,"
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	American Embassy evaluates Yugoslav reaction to Italian Trieste policy: In commenting on Yugoslav counter-demonstrations and reaction to events in Trieste, the American Charge in Belgrade reports that the "general tone of events in Yugoslavia indicates a firm, well-controlled attitude on the part of the regime designed to impress the West with Yugoslavia's determination not to yield to solutions arrived at without Yugoslav participation," Bitterness is carefully directed at "fascists and irredentists" in an apparent effort not to worsen inter-governmental relations further, according to the Charge.

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it may "lose the sympathy of our peoples" by supporting Italian territorial claims in the Free Territory of Trieste. He asserted that the United States and Britain are not attempting to correct the mistakes of the tripartite pledge to Italy, but, on the contrary, are extolling them. Yugoslavia, he contended, will never accept a dictated settlement of the Trieste dispute in favor of Italy.

The Charge warned in a cable last week that the reaction of Yugoslav officials to any semblance of Western support for Italian territorial claims would be strong, especially in the ranks of the Slovene members of the Communist Party.

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FAR EAST

Koreans incensed over Japanese property claims: Ambassador Muccio reports that, according to the Korean press, ROK Foreign Ministry officials are incensed over Japan's claim to property in Korea, which they consider is a repudiation of the Japanese peace treaty. Muccio believes the Japanese may be underestimating Korean sensitivities on the property issue in the current Japan-Korea talks. Asserting that the Koreans are unlikely to accept any compromise in their present mood, Muccio recommends that Japan be cautioned against giving the impression that it is repudiating the terms of the peace

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Comment: The San Francisco treaty binds Japan to recognize the validity of Japanese property dispositions made by the US Military Government in Korea. The Japanese Government, however, feels that Korean claims for property in Japan of Japanese corporations whose head offices were in Korea are likewise unacceptable, and undoubtedly is working for a mutual cancellation of claims by both nations.

4. North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon:
United Nations aerial reconnaissance on 24 March disclosed that two airfields in the Sariwon area, 35 miles south of pyongyang, had been repaired and that their runways were 25X1

Comment: Sariwon was reported in October 1951 as a storage area for concealed North Korean aircraft. These two airfields, both sod, are believed to be the bases for North Korean-piloted PO-2 biplanes which have made sporadic harassing attacks against UN rear installations.

The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield for anything heavier than PO-2's. It is possible, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish operational air installations within North Korea either in conjunction with cease-fire preparations or in preparation for a renewed offensive.

5. Japanese detainees remit funds from Communist China: Three million yen from Japanese nationals in Communist China were

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delivered to the Japan-China Friendship Society in Tokyo on 27 March, according to the newspaper Asahi. The funds, except for ten percent earmarked for the Zenshinza theatrical troupe, were addressed to 345 families.

This is the first time, according to this account, that the Chinese Communist Government has permitted Japanese to remit funds home.

Comment: This transfer of funds, which is unconfirmed, appears to be a Chinese Communist propaganda maneuver.

Both the Japan-China Friendship Society and Zenshinza are Communist fronts.

British firms in China now plan to close immediately: The British Government is preparing to ask Peiping authorities to allow immediate arrangements to be made for closing most of the remaining British firms in China. This approach has been requested by the principal British business interests operating in China, and will probably be made early in April because of their fear that the Communist authorities have planning retaliation.

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Comment: Most British interests operating in China now believe that the Chinese Communists are determined to eradicate all foreign economic influence, and that it is therefore existing handicaps

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However, these firms remain powerful advocates of a "non-provocative" British policy toward China, since they are in most cases based at Hong Kong, and anticipate continued profitable conditions elsewhere in the Far East this year.

7. French industrialists may force withdrawal from Indochina: French industrial and export interests may initiate a press campaign against the continued drain of wealth and manpower in Indochina if they fail to obtain substantial tariff preferences in the trade discussions scheduled to start 18 April with the Associated States. The Economic Counselor of the French High Commission, who has just returned to Saigon from Paris, is convinced that French troops would be withdrawn from Indochina within three months after the launching of such a press campaign by big business.

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Minister Heath comments that extensive preferences for French interests would defer the development of stable political institutions in the Associated States and also further reduce the number of adherents to the Bao Dai government.

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Comment: French business interests have supported the military effort in Indochina on the assumption that France would retain economic dominance when peace is established.

Even with business hostile, a complete withdrawal is unlikely for reasons of prestige. Nevertheless, a fettering of French economic activity in Indochina would probably result in determined efforts by France to arrive at a negotiated peace with the Viet Minh.

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Burmese Government's anti-Communist campaign continues: The Burmese War Office reports that its operations against the Communist insurgents in north-central Burma are continuing "with much success."

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Comment: Even if the success of these operations is exaggerated, the campaign indicates an increased determination to combat the Communists. This determination is also reflected in recent statements by the Premier and the Defense and Home Ministers rejecting Communist peace feelers and again demanding that the Communists lay down their arms.

10.

Anti-Communist campaign in Malaya seen endangered by American rubber policy: The American Consul General in Singapore reports that Malayan officials and rubber producers are arguing strongly that the present American rubber policy, if continued, will dangerously impair the Malayan economy and will play into the hands of the local Communists. They emphasize that this policy, which involves decreased natural

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rubber purchases in Malaya and support of synthetic production, will not only reduce the vitally important dollar contribution which Malaya makes to Britain but will also reduce the living standard of thousands of Malays who are highly vulnerable to Communist influence.	25X1
Comment: Although the arguments reported by the Consul General are plausible, they are influenced by self-interest. The extent to which the rubber industry and the anti-Communist campaign may be endangered by American rubber policies cannot now be assessed.	
SOUTH ASIA	
Maharajah of Bhutan is dead: The 50-year old Maharajah of Bhutan died on 24 March after a brief illness, according to a Reuters dispatch from Gangtok in nearby Sikkim.	25X1
Comment: The late Maharajah successfully prevented the expansion of both Chinese Communist and Indian influence in Bhutan. He established border posts and a system of travel permits to check Chinese infiltration from Tibet, and also resisted Indian requests to send troops and a mapping mission into Bhutan because of his fear of eventual Indian domination. The length of time Bhutan remains outside Chinese or Indian control will probably depend in large part upon the strength of character of the Maharajah's successor.	25X6
The Crown Prince of Bhutan, about 25 years old, has until recently displayed no great interest in governmental affairs. Since 1950, he has governed a portion of the country and has won much popularity because of his liberalism. He is married to a daughter of Bhutan's capable Foreign Minister, who has been responsible for much of his country's foreign policy. The Crown Prince is	25X1
The southern border of Bhutan is less than 50 miles from all major road, rail, and river communications routes connecting the province of Assam directly with the rest of India.	

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12.	Reported Afghan-Pakistani border raid still unconfirmed: No Afghan or American source in Afghanistan has heard of the attack alleged by the Pakistani Foreign Secretary to have been made on 24 March by 3,000 Afghans on a Pakistani border post near Chaman, close to the southern Afghan frontier. The Pakistani Charge in Kabul has been informed of the incident by his government but has received no instructions to protest it.
25X1 25X1	some sort of conflict between nomadic and settled Afghan tribesmen occurred on or about 23 March, during the course of the nomads' annual migration to the hills of central Afghanistan. The American Embassy in Kabul comments, however, that such incidents are regular occurrences and that they seldom have political significance.
	Comment: Neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani press has taken notice of the alleged raid. The Pakistani Foreign Secretary appears to have reported it to the American Embassy as part of a political maneuver to influence American thinking on the Kashmir issue in favor of Pakistan.
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
13.	Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office: Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has decided not to resign when the new Majlis meets, according to Minister of Court Ala. Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as though he intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on balancing the national budget without the oil income.
25X1	The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest. According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary resignation. Comment: Mossadeq's conversation with Ala appears to foreshadow a serious attempt by the Prime Minister to collect taxes from recalcitrant merchants and landlords. The govern-
,	ment, however, may choose to expand the note issue and to use the gold cover to finance its operations. Either move would arouse strong opposition.

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Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily growing worse, and the funds available to the government for the month ending 21 March barely covered government salaries and wage commitments.

14. Libya not considering Arab League membership: Libya has no intention of joining the Arab League at this time, according to the American Minister in Tripoli. The Minister noted that the King's speech at the opening of Parliament contained friendly references to other Arab states, but no mention of the Arab League. When the American Minister commented on this omission, the King smilingly said that it was enough to know one's friends without joining an organization for that purpose.

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Comment: While there is considerable sentiment among Libyans generally favoring Arab League membership, Libya resents the interference of the League, particularly of Egypt, in its domestic affairs.

Since the new Libyan Government recently invited the construction of American military installations in Cyrenaica and expressed interest in joining the proposed Middle East Command, King Idris may consider it more profitable now to strengthen Libya's ties with the West rather than those with the Arab countries.

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WESTERN EUROPE

15. 25X1	Possible Soviet moves in Berlin examined: Although American officials in Berlin believe that reports of a Russian plan for another Berlin blockade were planted by the USSR as part of a "scare campaign," they anticipate increased harassing in Berlin at the time of West Germany's signing or ratification of the contractual agreements.	25X1
25X1	These officials doubt that the Russians will step up interference in Berlin at the present time, however, particularly while they are trying to attract West German sympathy for their unity and peace proposals. Comment: Soviet harassing measures in Berlin have	25X1
	slackened in recent months, although the USSR is still causing some inconvenience by delaying the approval of export permits and by the occasional closing of some canal locks on the routes to Berlin.	
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17. United Nations investigating commission bolsters Berlin morale: American observers report that the reactions of West Berliners to the recent Berlin visit of the UN commission were characterized by restrained satisfaction and some disappointment. The appearance of the commissioners, whose task is to investigate the feasibility of free all-German elections, provided a "psychological shot in the arm" for most residents by focusing world attention on the problems of Berlin. Many residents, however, felt let down because the commission did not exert some kind of dramatic pressure on the East German Government to be admitted to its territories. Such pressure would have clearly put that government on the propaganda defensive.

Comment: When denied admission to East Germany, the commission returned to Geneva. It plans to wait several weeks before reporting to the UN Secretariat -- at least until the Soviet Union has had an opportunity to reply to the 25 March Allied note concerning a German peace treaty and all-German elections. Should the commission file a negative report immediately, it might appear as though the UN were closing the door to Soviet acceptance of the Allied position.

Major Communist propaganda effort anticipated in Vienna conference on child welfare: American officials in Austria report direct Soviet participation in the intense propaganda build-up for the Vienna International Conference for the Protection of Children scheduled for 12 to 16 April. As a part of the preparatory campaign, the Soviet Deputy High Commissioner delivered a protest to the American Embassy in Vienna on 25 March regarding the alleged "abduction" of children of Soviet nationality from the US Zone of Austria. Local Communist propaganda links the conference with such current issues as biological warfare and Western rearmament.

Invitations have been sent to major United Nations and non-Communist international welfare agencies. The official Soviet organ in Austria boasts that delegates from 45 countries will attend the meeting.

Comment: Local preparation for this conference closely parallels that which preceded the World Peace Conference

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last fall. That meeting was also prefaced with an official Soviet denunciation of Austrian remilitarization followed by an elaborate propaganda effort on the part of the Austrian Peace Committee. International meetings called by the WFTU in Vienna are also notable for recent efforts to obtain respectable international participation.

Austrian officials complain of Soviet unilateral intervention: The Austrian Minister of Interior complained at a recent cabinet meeting of the "continued unilateral interference" of Soviet occupying forces in internal Austrian affairs. He cited in particular the obstruction of roads in the vicinity of the Czech border, property requisitions, the harassment of local officials with personal questionnaires, and the interrogation of Austrian citizens at border crossing points.

Comment: Austrian efforts through publicity to discourage unllateral Soviet intervention in Austrian affairs may give an exaggerated impression as to the number of such episodes. Despite the increased vigor with which the Russians have in recent months pursued their economic and political objectives in Austria, a major shift in Soviet occupation policy has not yet been indicated.

Belgian budgetary deficit interfering with military production: Although Belgian officials generally believe that their country can balance its ordinary budget, the deficit in its extraordinary defense budget, which has already caused the government to suspend new commitments, has seriously interfered with the forward production planning of such important military suppliers as Fabrique Nationale and Poudreries Reunies. The Belgian Finance Minister has stated that it is impossible to finance 26 million dollars of the extraordinary budget of 596 million dollars without unblocking Belgium's EPU credits or raising loans above those now contemplated.

Although government officials responsible for defense and foreign policy state that NATO commitments must be met, those responsible for financial policy insist that expenditures must not lead to inflation.

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Comment: It is widely accepted within the Belgian Government that no substantial reduction in budgetary expenditures can be obtained without cutting into military allotments, and

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the Finance Minister has asserted that he will not agree to inflationary measures to meet rearmament needs. The government also has refused to raise taxes.

This attitude toward defense is also probably an attempt to obtain sympathetic consideration of Belgium's position in the EPU, currently being negotiated, as well as a favorable reception for its proposal for pre-financing defense production.

Explaining that the impact of the Communist BW propaganda campaign:
paign in Britain has been "negligible to slight," the American
Embassy in London comments that heavy counterpropaganda from
Washington would be unnecessary, but not harmful in effect,
as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Pointing out that
Foreign Office sources indicate the Communist campaign has
had a more substantial effect in the Far East and other areas,
the Embassy recommends that the countercampaign be continued,
with primary responsibility remaining with Washington.

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
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25X1 24. US Embassy suggests military grant aid to Dominican Republic: Since the Dominican Republic has been considered as an alternate for the receipt of military grant aid, the US Embassy in Havana is interested in knowing whether the availability of funds originally allocated for Mexico and possibly other countries will make it possible to offer

grant aid to the Dominican Government during the current fiscal year.

The Embassy has been unofficially informed that Dominican efforts to have the arms production facilities of the country used in the collective defense effort have just been turned down. It feels that this will undoubtedly result in an unfortunate reaction on the part of the Dominican authorities which might be largely counteracted if any contemplated military grant aid were to be offered without delay.

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NEAR EAST-AFRICA

Iranian Prime Minister seeks US support: Former Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam has approached the American Embassy in Paris seeking US support should he be named Prime Minister. Qavam said that he does not want the premiership unless he is drafted by the Mailis and has the full confidence of the Shah and Parliament.

25X1

Comment: Qavam is the strongest candidate for Prime Minister outside the National Front and, despite his advanced age, he is one of the few able leaders in Iran. He is, however, distrusted by the Shah, who would be unlikely to approve him except as last resort.

2. Britain and Egypt unable to agree on Sudan question:

Egypt and Britain have made a little progress in their talks on the proposed defense of the Middle East, but the Egyptian Foreign Minister has reiterated that no real agreement is possible without British recognition of Farouk's title as King of the Sudan.

The Foreign Minister issued what was "practically an ultimatum" that Britain give its answer on the Sudan by 1 April in order that Prime Minister Hilali might determine what action he should take in regard to the 18 May elections. The American Ambassador, however, intends to advise Egypt's official not to insist on the 1 April time limit.

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SECRET Security Information

OCI 4885 1 April 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

Army

Scattered patrol clashes and several enemy probes up to platoon size were reported across the Eighth Army front. Occasional enemy mortar and artillery fire, including 26 shells with propaganda leaflets, was encountered.

<u>Navy</u>

Naval air units flew 269 sorties, principally against east coast transportation targets. Shore bombardment continued on both coasts.

<u>Air</u>

The Far East Air Force flew 313 sorties, including 26 missions by medium bombers against the Chinnempo and Hamhung marshalling yards and traffic choke points west and northeast of Sinanju. In three engagements with a total of 40 MIG's, 88 F-86's destroyed six MIG's and damaged two. One F-86 sustained minor damage.

II, Military Intelligence

<u>Air</u>

US naval aircraft pilots observed on 27 March that an airfield at Chongjin in northeastern Korea was being resurfaced with a black material. There was evidence of much vehicular traffic in the vicinity of the airfield and supplies for a hangar framework were seen in the Chongjin railyard. (Chongjin airfield, much farther from the front lines than Antung, offers little advantage for Communist air operations against UN ground installations. It is, however, strategically situated for operations against UN naval forces operating off northeastern Korea. This airfield has been almost continuously operational, but little activity has ever been noted there. Unconfirmed intelligence reports have indicated that a North Korean air force unit with some unidentified operational aircraft is stationed here.)

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SECRET Security Information

III. General Situation

Cease-fire

South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun, commenting on the cease-fire talks, stated that if the Russians were allowed as a neutral inspection team, "it would be tantamount to moral defeat. . . and succumbing to the USSR." On the question of prisoners of war, Pyun held that no prisoners should be forcibly repatriated. He added that the Chinese Nationalist Government had requested the ROK to retain custody of those Chinese prisoners who do not wish to return to Red China until such time as they can be transferred to Formosa.

Propaganda

Radio Pyongyang on 31 March gave an interim report on the alleged US biological warfare effort in Korea. The broadcast charged that from 20 January through 25 March, the US had dropped germ-laden insects on more than 400 occasions a

The broadcast concluded with a summary of the detailed preventive measures taken in Pyongyang.

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FAR EAST

3. Enemy units still reporting BW agents in Korea: An unidentified North Korean regiment notified its battalions on 30 March that "the enemy is actively dropping bacterial weapons in general now." All units were to report promptly UN biological warfare attacks.

A Chinese Communist artillery division reported the formation of a five man "health program" committee "in an attempt to check the spread of bacteria."

Preventive measures are still being pushed actively in North Korea as indicated by continuing reports of unit inoculations. One Chinese Communist unit on 24 March reported, however, that inoculations have not been made and that a "grave situation" has developed because "the friendly troops (probably North Koreans) have developed (some sort of disease?)." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-1226, 30 Mar; K-1813, 26 Mar; K-1729, 29 Mar 52)

Chinese Communist unit helps North Korean civilians:
The gist of a 27 March message from the Chinese Communist
7th Artillery Division, deployed in central Korea, reveals
that two members of that unit on 23 March "participated in
an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of the North Korean
people, who areat a loss to supply themselves with food."
(SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1797, 30 Mar 52)

Comment: On previous occasions, Chinese Communist troops have assisted North Korean farmers in their harvesting. However, recent Chinese Communist messages have indicated that certain supplies are requisitioned directly from the North Korean civilian population.

The distress of civilians in Communist-held areas of North Korea is believed to be serious. All indications point to lower grain yields in 1951 and 1952 and to the continued priority of military supply over the civilian economy.

5. Conventional North Korean aircraft division mentioned:
A 29 March message from a North Korean air unit near Pyongyang to air headquarters at Sinuiju mentioned "seed to the LA Division." (SUEDE Det 151 15 RSM Japan CS 397, 30 Mar 52)

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Comment: The term "LA Division," named after the Soviet-made LA-9 conventional fighter aircraft, has long been identified with the North Korean Air Force, although the term has not recently been observed. Recently, however, North Korean messages have referred to numbered divisions: the MIG-15-equipped lst; and the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th, which have not been definitely identified. Probably the "LA Division" also bears a numbered designation.

Communist "command post" hit by UN bombers: A North

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SECURITY INFORMATION

7 April 1952

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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GENERAL

Conference: The US Embassy in Moscow reports that the sessions of the World Economic Conference will be equally divided between plenary meetings and committee meetings.

Three committees have been formed: International trade, with Lange as chairman and vice chairmen from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Italy; economic co-operation, with Boyd-Orr as chairman and vice chairmen from the Soviet Union and Pakistan; under-developed areas, with the chairman from India and vice chairmen from France and Italy.

British and French delegates are reported to have had private meetings with Chinese Communist delegates. (C Moscow 1587, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: The organization of the conference into committees is a concession to non-Communist criticism of conference plans for mass meetings.

The committee on international trade, possibly the crux of the whole conference, will be directed by an Orbit chairman and vice chairman. Western Europe is the best represented of the non-Orbit areas on the committees, while the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia have apparently been given no committee positions despite the interest shown in these areas for the conference. This lends support to the various estimates that Western Europe is the primary target of the Soviet Union's economic counteroffensive.

The private meetings between French and British and Chinese Communist delegates may be for the purpose of exploring trade possibilities between these countries recently suggested by conference organizers in Moscow.

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SOVIET UNION

2. Soviet retail price cuts offset by heavier taxes in 1952: The US Embassy in Moscow reports official estimates that the people of the Soviet Union will save 28 billion rubles in 1952 because of the reduction in retail prices effected on 1 April. (C Moscow 1577, 2 Apr 52)

Comment: The alleged 28 billion savings is more than cancelled out by increases of 15.1 billion rubles in turnover taxes, 4 billion rubles in direct taxes, and 9.1 billion rubles in compulsory loans, which will amount to at least 28.2 billion rubles.

EASTERN EUROPE

Finnish Premier regains unanimous support of his party:
Finnish Premier Kekkonen has withdrawn his resignation
following a unanimous vote of confidence accorded him on
2 April at a meeting of his political party, the Agrarians.
The Agrarian Party also fully approved Kekkonen's economic stabilization policy.

The US Legation in Helsinki comments that these developments appear to represent a sweeping repudiation of Kekkonen's critics within his own party at least for the time being. (R Helsinki 401, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: Well informed observers believed when Kekkonen offered his resignation that it was merely a tactic to bring his party back into line. During recent months the Premier has suffered most criticism from his own party group in the Finnish Diet.

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FAR EAST

is no evidence that the Chinese Communist Party exercises any direct control over the Japanese Communist Party, according to CINCFE. It is known that the Japanese and Chinese Communist Parties maintain liaison, primarily for the exchange of nist Parties maintain liaison, primarily for the exchange of propaganda, and there are indications that the JCP seeks and propaganda, and there are indications that the JCP seeks and propagands. CINCFE values CCP approbation of its policies and programs. CINCFE values, however, that the JCP has always been more heavily notes, however, that the JCP has always been more heavily influenced by the Soviet Communist Party, and that it mainifluenced by the Soviet Communist Party, and that it mainifluenced liaison with Soviet representatives in Tokyo. (S Tokyo 1208, 28 Feb 52)

Comment: The Cominform's criticism of the Japanese Communists in January 1950, which forced a reversal of JCP policy, as well as a continuing adherence to the Moscow propaganda line, amply demonstrates Soviet control over the JCP. Peiping's success in September 1950, nowever, in enjoining the two opposing factions of the party to unite, indicates that the JCP is responsive to Chinese influence.

25X1 5. Preparations for Communist offensive in Korea reported:

Preparations for a Communist general offensive in North Korea

Two Chinese Communist armies began moving southeast on 28 March from staging areas in east central Korea near the 39th Parallel, according to this report. Four additional Chinese armies have also been alerted for the offensive. Four North Korean corps, now in the east coast area, are scheduled to participate.

Comment: There are no firm indications that Communist forces in Korea intend to launch another major offensive in the near future. It is possible, however, that a limited objective offensive may be undertaken in eastern Korea, the apparent focal point of the reported preparations, where UN forces hold a considerable amount of North Korean terrain.

6. Communist MIG-15 flies photo mission over Seoul area: On 2 April, a UN aircraft in the Suwon area, south of Seoul, observed a Communist MIG-15 jet fighter with two mid-wing fuel tanks. The MIG dived from an altitude of 22,000 feet to 17,000

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feet over Suwon airbase, then proceeded to Kimpo, another important UN airfield. Over Kimpo, the enemy jet turned toward Seoul, where it again dived to a lower altitude.

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7. UNCURK decides to observe South Korean elections: The United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in Korea (UNCURK) decided in late March to conduct a formal observation of the local elections scheduled for 25 April and 10 May, according to Ambassador Muccio. South Korean officials are being notified informally of the Commission's intention but no invitation from the ROK is being requested.

Muccio comments that it is in the interest of the ROK to have its elections held under international scrutiny. The Ambassador credits Cordier, a high UN official, and Plimsoll, the Australian delegate, with responsibility both for this decision and for putting new life in the Commission. (C Pusan 966, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: This UNCURK action is the first result of a concerted effort to improve the calibre of the UN organization which, since the outbreak of war, had gradually lost all effectiveness. ROK failure to invite UNCURK to observe the early 1952 by-election indicated the low ebb of UNCURK influence.

8. Peiping may agree to investigation of its BW charges: The Indian Ambassador to Peiping has received the impression from a Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that there is a "considerable possibility" that the Chinese will agree to an impartial international investigation of their biological warfare charges. Pannikar expected to discuss this subject with Peiping's Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, on 5 or 7 April.

The Indian Foreign Office advised Pannikar that any international investigative body should have full freedom to undertake independent investigation in the localities concerned, as well as to review evidence submitted to it. (S New Delhi 3617, 4 Apr 52)

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reports on "American germ air raids" in China:
newly arrived at Hong Kong from
has supplied details on the alleged American germ air raids
there on 5 and 8 March. During the alerts, a single searchlight played in one direction for two hours, while antiaircraft batteries fired wildly in all directions. No planes
were heard or seen on either date.

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On 9 March, hundreds of children wearing face masks and equipped with fly swatters and bottles, and thousands of soldiers were led out to collect insects. For days afterwards, the police led people on insect hunts.

25X1

while is convinced that there were no raids, he states that many Chinese believe the Communist BW charges. (C Hong Kong 2802, 2 Apr 52)

10. Desperate plight of Americans in China reported: The

American Consul General in Hong Kong reports that

in Shanghai telephoned the

25X1

company's Hong Kong office and declared that the plight of American businessmen was desperate. He was afraid, not so much of jail, as of "the other thing."

The Consul General calls attention to an authentic report from Tsingtao of the arrest of an American missionary on 7 March under circumstances indicating that the seizure might be connected with the germ warfare propaganda campaign. (C Hong Kong 2791, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: All Western businessmen in China are subjected to extortionate financial demands as a condition for permission to leave the country. Over 200 Americans are still in Communist China, nearly 40 of them under arrest.

11. Letourneau considered best man available for Indochina

post: Minister Heath in Saigon believes that the French Government made the best possible choice in appointing Minister for
Associated States, Jean Letourneau, High Commissioner in Indochina. Heath explains that Letourneau has the personal
qualifications necessary for the post, is familiar with the
situation, and has a "friendly understanding" of American
policy. (C Saigon 1935, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: Since Letourneau retains his position as a member of the Pinay government, his new assignment may be

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interpreted as an indication of French determination to push for a solution of the Indochina problem. The important decisions on Indochina policy, however, which will still be made in Paris, are apt to suffer by his absence from the capital.

Letourneau's appointment is not being received with much enthusiasm in Vietnam. He has a rather low opinion of the ability of the Vietnamese to maintain their independence, and he is identified in the minds of many Vietnamese with French equivocation on the subject of negotiations with the Viet Minh.

12. French plan to reduce training program for Vietnamese recruits: A French defense official informed the American Legation in Saigon that the call-up of the fourth increment of Vietnamese draftees under the two-month training program will be postponed indefinitely. Lack of money and the need to use the camp training cadres in the activation of regular Vietnam Army units were given as the reasons.

The Legation considers the French decision evidence that the mobilization program has proved less useful than anticipated and that it was designed principally for psychological purposes. (C Saigon 1931, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: This report indicates that the time and effort expended since the training program started last October, might have been more advantageously employed if existing irregular units had been transferred into regular army formations. These irregulars number over 200,000.

Netherlands condemns Indonesian imprisonment of its nationals: Prompted by strong pressure in Parliament, a Dutch Foreign Office official has asserted that the nationals of no other country in the "free world" have received as bad treatment as the Dutch have in Indonesia. As of last November, 108 Dutchmen were under arrest and awaiting trial, about half of whom had been detained longer than six months. Indonesian Foreign Office promises of information have not been forthcoming.

Attributing the situation to an "exaggerated Indonesian conception of its newly won sovereignty," the Dutch official stated that his government prefers not to take reprisals which are allowable under international law. Privately, the

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Foreign Office admits that it probably will not submit the problem to the Union Court of Arbitration, hoping that the new Indonesian Government will be more effective in controlling its local authorities, who ordered most of the arrests. (R The Hague 1043, 2 Apr 52)

Comment: Parliamentary attacks, especially by the rightwing groups, against the passivity of the Dutch Government's policy toward Indonesia have been increasingly severe. A specific target is expected to be the government's failure to take action against Indonesia for its seizure of Dutch vessels enroute to New Guinea.

With the appointment of the Sultan of Jogjakarta as Indonesian Defense Minister, two serious difficulties -- the lack of internal security and the absence of administrative efficiency on a local level -- may be substantially ameliorated.

SOUTH ASIA

14. Ceylonese Government dissolves parliament and calls immediate elections: Lord Soulbury, Governor General of Ceylon, proclaimed dissolution of parliament effective 8 April 1952 and set new elections for 28 April to 31 May 1952. The new parliament will meet 10 June 1952. The Governor General believes that the United National Party now in power will retain its position by holding immediate elections.

25X1C says that the Akuressa by-elections, in southern Ceylon, will be cancelled. (S Colombo 558, 3 Apr; R FBIS, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: Before the recent death of popular Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake, the United National Party planned to delay the elections as long as possible so that party forces could consolidate their position. By calling parliamentary elections at once, the party can take advantage of the personal popularity and memory of the late Prime Minister whose aura now falls about his son, Dudley Senanayake, the new Prime Minister.

Also, dissolution of parliament and timely elections may discourage defections from the United National Party and prevent leftist-Communist parties from gaining strength, particularly in Akuressa — the heart of Communist Party influence in Ceylon. The Akuressa parliamentary seat became vacant upon the death on 30 December 1951 of W. P. A. Wickramasinghe, brother of the secretary-general of the Ceylon Communist Party, and a supporter of that party.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

Iranian financial collapse not necessarily imminent: The Iranian Government, by resorting to special devices such as indirect loans from the National Bank, floating an internal loan, and transfer of uncommitted foreign exchange, has raised sufficient funds to cover its salary and wage commitments for the last two months of the Iranian year which ended on 20 March and will probably be able to meet its other year-end obligations without unusual difficulty.

The Ministry of Finance is considering expansion of the note issue and use of the gold note cover reserve. The American Embassy believes that Prime Minister Mossadeq might be able to persuade the Majlis to dilute the currency on the basis of "patriotic expediency." Even without such Majlis action, the Embassy believes it possible that the government could carry on financially through May 1952. (C Tehran 3636, 24 Mar 52)

Comment: In order to meet current financial obligations, the Iranian Government has improvised successfully for months. It would be difficult to estimate the length of time it could continue to function by reducing the government payroll and facilities. However, the increasing financial and economic deterioration has forced the government to consider the unpopular step of debasing the currency. The new Majlis, with its strong National Front representation, might be amenable to taking such a step as the only means of maintaining Iran's freedom.

16.	Egyptian King may be planning new government under present	
	Minister of Interior: The Egyptian Minister of Interior has	
25X10	given "a strong implication" that	
	ne and King Farouk are planning the Minister's accession to	
	power.	
	The Minister, Maraghi Bey, apparently expects the resig-	;
	nation of Hilali, the postponement of elections, his own	
	accession to power on the basis of a strong program for social	
	reform, and, should the Anglo-Egyptian dispute still not be	
	settled, an ultimatum from Farouk giving the British 60 to 90	
	days to satisfy national aspirations. Should these not be	
25X1C	satisfied, concludes that "a national struggle	
,	would begin under Maraghi's direction." (2	5X1A
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Comment: This is the first indication that the possible resignation of the Hilali government might be followed by something other than general chaos. Maraghi is considered able and ambitious.

There have been rumors, termed "absolutely untrue" by the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, that Farouk is not fully supporting Hilali. Lending some credence to these rumors is a report that Hilali has resisted royal pressure to take into his cabinet two of the King's friends who are notoriously corrupt.

17. Egyptian parliamentary elections likely to be postponed:
King Farouk has stated categorically that the Egyptian parliamentary elections, now scheduled to take place on 18 May, will not be held

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Comment: There have been previous indications that Farouk would postpone the 18 May election date.

18. Egypt denounces action of British Governor General in Sudan:
The Egyptian Foreign Minister has denounced the British Governor
General in the Sudan for submitting a new constitution to
the Legislative Assembly. The Foreign Minister, who considered
the act "provocative," seriously contemplated breaking off
talks with the British Ambassador.

Egyptian newspapers, though severely limited by censor-ship, have unanimously accused Britain of extending its imperialism and of a new move to separate the Sudan from Egypt. (S Cairo 1718, 3 Apr; C Cairo 1728, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: If the Governor General's action does not lead to a complete breakdown in current preliminary Anglo-Egyptian talks, it will at least certainly harden the Hilali government against making concessions on the Sudan and Suez issues.

19. British see less promising outlook in talks with Egypt:
The results of the 1 April conversation between the Egyptian
Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador make the prospect
for agreement look less bright to the British Foreign Office.
The Foreign Office is agreeable to a formula that would not
specifically and publicly commit Egypt to participate in a
regional defense arrangement, but objects to the Egyptian

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phrasing, which would necessitate the removal of all British military units from Egypt.

The British Foreign Office hopes that if Britain and Egypt can agree on a joint statement as a basis for negotiations, the Egyptian Prime Minister will agree to call offthe elections and perhaps suspend the constitution in order to conduct the negotiations in a calm atmosphere. As the situation stands negotiations office officials feel that Hilali could not win now, Foreign Office officials feel that Hilali could not win the elections, and a negotiated agreement would become useless. (S London 4384 and 4450, 2 and 4 Apr 52)

Comment: The willingness of the British Foreign Office not to insist on a public promise of Egyptian participation in the defense of the Middle East is a concession from the position taken by the British Cabinet on 13 March, according to which British combat troops would be withdrawn only in exchange for British commitment. Britain still seems to regard the estabsuch a commitment. Britain still seems to regard the establishment of joint air defenses in Egypt as a strategic necessity.

Turkish Republican Party leaders face severe criticism

from membership: The Congress of the Turkish Republican Party,
founded by Remal Ataturk, met from 26 March to 30 March and
strongly criticized the party's program and administration.
Former Prime Minister Gunaltay, emerging as the strongest and
most popular figure among the Republican leaders, directly
attacked the Secretary-General's organizational failures and
less openly criticized President-General Inonu's leadership.

The American Embassy believes that the Republican leadership will attempt to hold the party together for the 1954 general elections. Failure to make a better showing at that time than in the 1950 elections would make it unlikely that the party could continue in its present form. (C Ankara 995, 1 Apr 52)

Comment: The Democratic Party's continued popularity has stimulated dissension in the Republican Party's ranks over the proper policy to be adopted by the latter in its effort to return to power. The Republican Party's traditional leaders, such as Inonu, Nihat Erim and Kasim Gulek, have been increasingly criticized by the younger, more liberal group led by Gunaltay and Cavid Oral. Despite the recent resignations of several Republican deputies who protested the "chief mentality" of Inonu and his group, there is no evidence that the dissension between the two groups is yet great enough to bring about dissolution of the party.

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WESTERN EUROPE

21. Anti-Communist French labor campaign suffers setback:

A "severe blow" may be dealt efforts toward collaboration among the principal non-Communist French labor organizations by a sharp split in the leadership of the rightist Independent Labor Confederation. A failure to mend this split would benefit considerably the Communist-led General Labor Confederation.

The moderate majority of the Independent Labor Confederation's executive committee recently defied an attempt by the minority and the organization's principal financial backer to place ex-Vichyites in certain top positions. (S Paris 6055, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: The Independent Labor Confederation seeks an inter-confederal grouping of non-Communist labor representatives. The present leaders of Force Ouvriere, one of the two principal non-Communist labor organizations in France, would be excluded because of their unaggressiveness and deep distrust of the Catholic Labor Confederation.

The Gaullists no longer considered a French opposition party:
The Gaullists can no longer be considered part of the parliamentary opposition to the Pinay government, in the opinion of the American Embassy in Paris. The Embassy sees in the strong Gaullist support for Pinay's budgetary program evidence that the RPF is badly divided and that its leaders are afraid to call for opposition tactics at this time. (C Paris 6089, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: In the past De Gaulle's strategy has permitted his followers to support the government on specific measures consonant with his own program. While De Gaulle is probably wary of running counter to public opinion, in view of the current interest in giving Pinay a chance, it is unlikely that he has modified to any degree his basic opposition to coperation with "the parties."

23. French leadership in agricultural pool planning weakened:
The Pinay government has greatly weakened France's leadership
in the planning for a European agricultural pool by supporting
the position of the French National Management Association,
which opposes the "green pool" because it would destroy the

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association's exploitation of cartels based on restricted markets. The future French position will depend upon farm leaders' ability to consolidate forces and overcome this political opposition.

A high French Government official predicts that the plenary "green pool" session, now due to open about 23 April, will end without decision, but will appoint a committee of experts to study problems and make recommendations, as was done in the preliminary stages of the Schuman Plan. (C Paris 6081, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: Non-Communist labor leaders have alleged that Pinay, a conservative businessman himself, opposes all current long-range economic plans such as the agricultural pool. His government, moreover, has the support of deputies representing conservative rural elements, apt to reflect the narrow opinions of many French farmers rather than farm organizations which fully appreciate the advantages of agricultural integration.

Netherlands regards continuance of European Payments
Union essential: The Dutch Government considers the European
Payments Union essential for the preservation and expansion of
intra-European multilateral trade, which it holds is a necessary
basis for rearmament and for maintaining a standard of living
high enough to resist further Communist inroads. The possibility
of a return to bilateralism and quantitative restrictions is
considered real in view of the present low level of western
European gold reserves.

The functioning of the EPU indicates that its reserves within the existing quota system are inadequate, and the Netherlands regards these reserves, which provide for swings in creditor-debtor positions, as the key to the importance of the Payments Union. The Dutch feel that each EPU member should contribute a fair share toward the proposed additional reserves of 178 million dollars. (C The Hague TOMUS 184, 1 Apr 52)

25. American Embassy believes Irish budget proposals may precipitate general election: The American Embassy in Dublin believes that there is a strong possibility of an early general election in Ireland because of widespread hostile reaction to price increases provided for in the budget which has been presented to Parliament. To fill a 42-million-dollar gap between estimated revenues and expenditures, the government

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has proposed higher taxes, lower subsidies on bread and flour, and the elimination of subsidies on tea, sugar, and butter. (R Dublin 153, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: So long as the De Valera government has to depend upon the support of five independents to maintain its parliamentary majority, there is the prospect of a general election; but there is no indication of any clear-cut policy differences between the two major parties.

The presentation of the "harshest budget in the history of the state" follows conferences in London between Irish and British Treasury officials on the necessity for improving the sterling area's financial position. The Irish Government, evidently impressed by the seriousness of the country's balance of payments deficit last year, which was equivalent to 185 million dollars, has announced its intentions of also reducing non-sterling imports. The Opposition, on the other hand, has maintained consistently that there is no economic crisis, but has made no clear statement of its own financial policy for Ireland.

Norway insists on maintaining trade with Orbit: Officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office and Ministry of Commerce insist upon importing 275,000 metric tons of coal from Poland rather than increasing coal shipments from the United States. While Norway could finance increased imports of American coal in 1952, the government argues that it cannot afford to use dollars indefinitely to meet its coal deficit, particularly in view of the uncertainty of US economic aid and its limited extent. Norwegian officials believe that if they fail to reach an agreement with Poland now it will be difficult to reopen negotiations later. (S Oslo 865, 2 Apr 52)

Comment: Like Denmark, Norway hesitates for both political and economic reasons to sever trade relations with eastern Europe. Norwegian officials are currently willing to pay for the Polish coal with 750 tons of aluminum.

27. Swedish Defense Minister proposes extended training period:
Swedish Defense Minister Nilsson has proposed that the period
of conscription be extended from 10 to 13 months. Noncommissioned officers, officers, and those assigned to special
duty, would receive further instruction. (U FBIS, Stockholm,
2 Apr 52)

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Comment: As part of its postwar demobilization program, Sweden in 1948 reduced the period of compulsory military service from 12 to 9 months. Subsequently the increasingly precarious international scene stimulated a demand for more extensive training and a token increase of one month was made in 1951. The American Army Attache, however, considers an extension to 18 months as the minimum need of the Swedish Army.

LATIN AMERICA

28. Bolivian President appeals to President Truman on tin issue: President Ballivian has sent a personal letter to President Truman asking his aid in obtaining a "remunerative" price for Bolivian tin. The letter, friendly in tone, stressed Bolivia's urgent need for a prompt solution of differences impeding US-Bolivian negotiations.

Ballivian's action indicates that the junta is approaching the end of its patience. Further unproductive sessions between the negotiators can "break the camel's back," and result in a wave of anti-US sentiment not only in Bolivia, but throughout Latin America. (R La Paz Joint Weeka 13, 28 Mar 52)

Comment: Negotiations for a long-term US-Bolivian tin contract have extended over a year, and the junta apparently believes that Bolivia's strained political and economic situation would not support another prolonged delay.

Thus far there is no evidence that Bolivia has prepared to renew its campaign to mobilize Latin American support for charging the United States with "economic aggression" under article 16 of the Organization of American States. The Bolivian Foreign Minister stated in March that his country would consider taking the case before international organizations only if the subsequent decision on the tin price should be unfavorable.

29. Leftist opposition parties in Mexico sign campaign pact:
The Popular Party, the Federation of People's Parties, and the Party of the Revolution have signed a pact to draft a "minimum political platform for the present electoral campaign." Once this has been approved by these three Mexican parties, they will discuss the formulation of a list of congressional candidates to be given joint support in the coming elections. (R FBIS Radio, Mexico, 31 Mar 52)

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Comment: The reputed "pact" suggests the possibility of a working arrangement between the pro-Communist supporters of Lombardo Toledano and those of the opportunistic General Henriquez Guzman, whose Federation of People's Parties includes both leftists and conservatives. Should the working agreement materialize, extreme leftists may be able to elect a few congressional deputies. However, the coalition is unlikely to congressional deputies dominance of the administration party threaten the political dominance of the administration party (the Party of Revolutionary Institutions) which will undoubtedly win most of the congressional seats and whose presidential candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, is virtually certain to be elected.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FAR EAST

Japanese official reiterates views on future status of Soviet Mission in Tokyo: In the opinion of the Treaties Bureau Chief of the Japanese Foreign Office, any attempt by the Soviet Union to remain in Japan as an occupying power, after the peace treaty becomes effective, would be contrary to the 1945 Moscow Agreement which named SCAP Headquarters as the sole organ of occupation control. The official also told a Diet committee that the dissolution of SCAP would leave the Soviet Mission no legal basis for remaining in Japan. Admitting that Japan was unable to force its views on the USSR, he contended that the state of armistice between Japan and the USSR will continue. (R S/S Tokyo 2107, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: The provision in the Japanese Peace Treaty requiring ratification by a majority of the members of the Far Eastern Commission was designed to prevent the USSR or any other FEC member nation from inheriting the position of SCAP.

The Japanese Government on 16 March indicated that if no allied decision were forthcoming by the effective date of the peace treaty regarding the status of the Soviet Mission in Japan, the government would treat the Soviet personnel as ordinary foreign nationals without diplomatic status.

2. United States urges Japan to modify its position in the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations: The Department of State has requested the American Political Adviser in Tokyo to inform the Japanese Government that its proposals at the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations are inconsistent with the commitments expressed in Yoshida's 24 December letter to Dulles. The Department points out that the Japanese are committed to negotiate a treaty "in conformity with the

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principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace," and, in the view of the United States, the Japanese Government should not attempt to exclude mention of these principles, including that of Japan's obligation to pay reparations. (S S/S to Tokyo 2646, 3 Apr 52)

Comment: Negotiations at Taipei are stalemated due to Japan's attempt to conclude a treaty which would not extend "victor" status to the Chinese. China, for reasons of prestige and its international legal status, cannot accept this limitation.

Japanese to propose simplified treaty with Chinese

Nationalists: In an attempt to resolve the impasse in the

Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations, Japan will propose that
certain controversial matters pertaining to the Chinese mainland be dropped from the treaty now under negotiation. This
will permit an immediate resumption of full diplomatic relations between Japan and Formosa, leaving controversial substantive matters to be left for subsequent separate negotiaion. (S S/S Tokyo 2123, 4 Apr 52)

Comment: It is noted that the Japanese have proposed a similar technique in their negotiations with the Republic of Korea. The Japanese undoubtedly feel that their bargaining position vis-a-vis their former colonies will be considerably strengthened after Japan regains its sovereignty. The Chinese however, hoping for United States assistance, are likely to hold out for whatever concessions can be gained during the current negotiations.

The Japanese urging Koreans to conclude limited treaty:
The Japanese are pressing the Koreans to conclude agreements on only three of the five issues currently under negotiation: amity and basic "relations," the nationality of Korean residents in Japan and the transfer of vessels, according to Acting US Political Adviser Bond in Tokyo. Fisheries and claims would be deferred pending further "fact finding."

Wording of the documents covering the first three issues is substantially agreed upon and thus the Koreans are maneuvered into a corner as a result of the imminence of Japanese sovereignty, which may force them to accept Japanese proposals. Bond believes Japanese appreciation of this situation accounts for continued Japanese optimism on the outcome of negotiations. (C Tokyo 2118, 4 Apr 52)

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Comment: The South Koreans, sensitive to any slight in their international relations, remain particularly touchy as regards any manifestation of Japanese superiority. While not probable, it is a remote possibility that the South Korean Government, enraged at being outmaneuvered by the Japanese, might withdraw indefinitely from the negotiations.

WESTERN EUROPE

by American forces in England: The British Government has suggested a new and more comprehensive agreement for financing the construction of airfields in England for the use of the American air force. In an endeavor to maintain the concept of USAF-RAF partnership and to maximize dollar receipts in 1952 and 1953, the British desire a "rephasing" of their financial participation in the program.

Under the present agreements Britain was to share equally in the cost of the 1951 slice, and the US was to be responsible for the entire cost of the 1952 slice. These, together with the proposed 1953 program, may reach the together with the proposed 1953 program, but no payments have yet equivalent of 280 million dollars, but no payments have yet been made. The British have now offered in effect to pay 20 percent of all costs up to a total contribution of 49 million dollars. (TS London 4234, 25 Mar; S London 4372, 1 Apr 52)

Comment: This offer represents a distinct policy change from two previous British suggestions that the United States assume the whole capital cost as well as responsibility for the subsequent maintenance of the airfields. The American Embassy believes the UK might agree to contribute American Embassy believes the total cost, provided a method as much as 25 percent of the total cost, provided a method can be worked out to maximize British dollar receipts in 1952 and 1953.

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FAR EAST

5. Front line Chinese Communist division prepares for action in eastern Korea: A recent message, passed from the 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment to its parent 7th Artillery Division, indicated that the 21st had been attached to the artillery group of the 203rd Chinese Communist Infantry Division in eastern Korea. The message indicated that the regiment was moving forward together with the mortar and artillery elements of the 203rd's artillery group. The forward displacement of the command post of the 203rd Division was also suggested.

The Far East Command stated that "the placing of a complete CCF artillery regiment of an independent artillery division under control of an infantry division suggests that the latter division may be assigned a task where the utilization and complete control of a large amount of artillery is required." (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 477, 8 Apr 52)

Comment: The 68th Chinese Communist Army, of which the 203rd Division is a component, occupies the eastern-most portion of the Chinese-held front. Recent reports have indicated that it was about to be relieved by a sister army--the 67th--which has deployed into this sector.

While this activity cannot be interpreted definitively, a flurry of recent reports have indicated an impending "offensive." The bulk of information suggests that such action would take place in the eastern sector.

There continues to be a lack of firm indication of Communist intentions to launch a "general offensive" along the entire front. It is entirely possible, however, that a limited objective of ensive of some size might be launched in eastern Korea by Chinese and North Korean forces.

Chinese Communist 40th Army may be preparing for combat: A recent message, probably passed on the 2nd Chinese Communist Artillery Division's net, reported that "today personnel of the artillery unit of the 40th Army arrived (and inspected?) my battalion. They were introduced to us by the 115th Division,"

The Far East Command commented that an inspection of an artillery unit, currently in support of the 39th Chinese

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Communist Army, by another major unit--the 40th Army--may indicate an impending relief of the 39th. More ominously, the suggested presence of the 40th Army in the immediate rear of the 39th, poses a considerable offensive threat in this sector. (SUEDE CINCFE, SIB 478, 9 Apr 52)

Comment: A number of reports have recently been received indicating the possibility of a renewed Communist general offensive. The bulk of them have pointed to the eastern sector as the focus for such an operation. This is the first indication received of a significant strengthening of enemy forces deployed in the west.

7.	Information program on atom bomb probably conducted by
	Chinese Communists in Korea: On 4 April a message
	directs that "should Army
	distribute any material that has the powers of the atom bomb,
	immediately notify us to pick them up so that they may be
_	returned to the education unit." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
	4 Apr 52)

Comment: It is probable that this message refers to literature and propaganda on atomic weapons which will be used to educate Chinese Communist troops in Korea.

It is noteworthy that a Chinese Communist propaganda broadcast on 30 March charged that since the United States has allegedly tested BW and CW agents in Korea, the use of atomic weapons would be a logical step.

8. Chinese Communists believed training 2,500 pilots a year: An Air Force analysis of intelligence relating to the training of Chinese pilots indicates that there were 2,800 graduated pilots in the Chinese Communist Air Force as of 1 January 1952, and the training effort in China should produce 2,500 pilots annually.

The number of aircraft employed in primary, basic and advanced stages of training are 93, 63 and 44, respectively. The relatively small number of advanced trainers suggests that some of this training is done in the Soviet Union, or that part of the conventional fighter regiments of the CCAF are actually advanced training units. (SUEDE US Air Force SRTS Cont 2-30803, 4 Apr 52)

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Comment: Expansion of Communist air schools and training activity has been pronounced in the past six months. However, recent performance in the Korean air war of MIG-15 pilots believed to be Chinese shows that they are less proficient than Russian pilots.

9. Message refers to unknown Sino-Soviet enterprise in Manchuria: A message from Moscow to Mukden referred to a shipment of goods sent to the "Daldok works" on a contract concluded with the "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding Joint Stock Company." (SUEDE AFSA-261 Weekly Intelligence Notes 14-52, 2 Apr 52)

Comment: Nothing is known of this "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding Joint Stock Company." The only large shippard in Manchuria is Daldok in Dairen, which was a Sino-Soviet trust until early 1951 when it was returned to full Chinese ownership. The Chinese Changchun Railway is the only other Sino-Soviet economic organization presently identified in Manchuria.

Chinese Communists change weather cipher: On 1 April the Chinese Communists changed the cipher used by the Peiping collective weather broadcasts. A preliminary study of the alteration indicates that a larger supply of cipher books has been distributed. This increase was necessitated, in part, by the establishment of new stations. Changes were to be expected, since they previously occurred in April and September 1951. (SUEDE AFSA-271 WIB 15-52, 1 Apr 52)

Comment: Changes in major Chinese meteorological ciphers were reported in November 1950 prior to Chinese entry into the Korean war, and in April 1951 prior to the Communist spring offensive.

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Unidentified Chinese artillery unit in Korea awaits orders: On 6 April an unidentified Chinese Communist artillery unit in Korea was ordered to report daily on the enemy situation and battle results, "to dispatch a crew to select new positions and then proceed with the camouflage to prevent detection." The message concluded with "after discussions are completed at our place relative to your situation, we shall advise you by wire of our decision." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2244, 16 Apr 52)

Comment: This is another of the many recent intercepted Chinese Communist messages which have indicated an expectancy of imminent change. Its nature remains unidentified.

6. North Korean unit reports suspected BW drop: An unidentified North Korean unit in the Wonsan area reported on 14 April that "enemy planes" dropped flour mixed with arsenic. The statement concluded that "we are not sure whether it is the bacterial weapon or not." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-201422, 15 Apr 52)

Comment: This is the first enemy report of a suspected BW drop in the past three or more weeks. It is possible that this report might revive the lagging BW campaign in Korea, but it seems more likely that this is just a residual effect of the now-subsiding campaign.

7. Size and equipment of Chinese Communist artillery regiment in eastem Korea presented: The 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment, attached for operations to the 203rd Chinese Communist Infantry Division, reported on 15 April that "at present our regiment has 2,305 men."

The armament of the 21st is indicated in a 13 April message from its parent 7th Artillery Division to the divisional supply installation which stated that from 1 to 10 April the "21st Artillery Regiment (fired) 204 rounds of Soviet 122 (mm) howitzer ammunition." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2253, K-2254, 16 Apr 52)

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Comment: The 21st Chinese Communist Artillery Regiment was attached for operations to the 203rd Infantry Division in early April. It may be noted that the 21st, together with the other elements of the 7th Artillery Division, received 120 gas masks in late March.

8. Organization of North Korean eastern coastal security corps given: A North Korean message on 15 April mentions

"...the 3rd, 17th (probably the 7th), 37th Division and the 24th Brigade loaded the rice on the vehicles on the 13th."

The message continues that rice for the 3rd Division was unloaded at a major supply depot southwest of Wonsan. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10817, 16 Apr 52)

Comment: This message confirms the general location and organization of the North Korean VII Corps in the Wonsan area. The unloading of the 3rd Division's rice at a supply depot responsible for supplying North Korean combat corps at the front may indicate that this division is south of the Wonsan area, possibly in a reserve capacity.

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FAR EAST

9. Communists continue to strengthen antiaircraft defenses in eastern Korea: The North Korean 21st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment is to establish an ammunition depot in the Wonsan-Hamhung area by 10 May, according to a "top secret" North Korean message of 5 May.

The order says that the depot should be "secure from strafing by enemy planes," adding that the "rear area department started transporting ammunition on the 4th of May. . ."

The North Korean 23rd AAA Regiment, also building an ammunition depot in the area, apparently is to relinquish this function to the 21st because that unit is ordered to "take in their tasks." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 3255, 6 May 52)

Comment: A buildup in enemy antiaircraft defenses in eastern Korea has been underway for the past month. Recent messages have stressed the importance of protecting the lines of communication in this area and of ensuring the flow of supplies to the front.

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Communist unit reports use of BW again in Korea: An unidentified North Korean naval unit reported in a 5 May message that "on the second of May, at night (they?) dropped bacteria weapons at Chongpyong (near Hamhung in northeastern Korea). The prevention disease committee killed it." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 3254, 6 May 52)

Comment: The last intercepted enemy report of an alleged United States drop of BW occurred on 14 April. Since that time, the Communist all-out propaganda campaign has lost much of its intensity. The bulk of recent Communisti commentary on the subject has dealt with the findings of various committees and the accumulation of "evidence."

It is possible that this report, plus other similar ones, will renew the vigor of the BW propaganda theme.

Chinese Communists assessing transportation capabilities in Korea: The Chinese Communist 7th Artillery Division received an "urgent wire from Army rear" on 3 May demanding a "detailed report" on the vehicle situation in Korea. The wire asked for the information to be broken down by manufacture and mileage of the vehicles. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2656, 5 May 52)

Comment: This message may mean only that the Chinese Communists have instituted a regular reporting system as a maintenance requirement.

In view of other reports of increased Communist activity, however, this urgent wire may indicate a desire to assess truck transportation capabilities for a future operation.

Manchuria-based aircraft adopt new system of indicating fuel level: A new and more precise system of indicating a plane's fuel level has been used on the Russian-language ground-controlled intercept net on the Korea-Manchuria border since 20 March. The new system uses the numbers three, four and five, with an immediate landing ordered if an airplane's fuel level drops below three. Previously only general terms, such as "watch your fuel," were used. (SUEDE AFSA JCAFE-30, 2 May 52)

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8 May 52

Comment: The attention the enemy ground controller is paying to the fuel supply of combat aircraft suggests that the Communists have been losing planes which have run out of fuel. Simplified instruments and inexperienced pilots may be responsible for this problem.

8 May 52

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TOP SECRET SUEDE

FAR EAST

Communist units renew charges of BW attacks in North Korea: "They dropped spiders and ants over Songjin city... today," a North Korean coastal security station in north-eastern Korea reported on 6 May. The message continues that the alleged drop area has been isolated and is being investigated by "the plague prevention work committee." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/12019, 6 May 52)

Comment: In February and March, reports of BW attacks sent by many Communist units in North Korea were used in propaganda charges against the United States. During the past few weeks, Communist propaganda has made little reference to specific BW incidents, although some enemy units reported such attacks as late as mid-April.

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TOP SECRET SUEDE

9 May 52

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APPROVÉD FOR RELÉASE DATE: 18-Mar-2010

9 May 52 CIB

FAR EAST

1. Communist units renew charges of BW attacks in North Korea:

US Army Korea "They dropped spiders and ants over Songjin 5, 6 May 52 city...today," a North Korean coastal security station in northeastern Korea reported on 6 May. The message continues that the alleged drop area has been isolated and is being investigated by "the plague prevention work committee."

Farther south in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, another North Korean unit on 5 May reported that "on the second of May, at night, they dropped bacteria weapons at Chongpyong."

Comment: In February and March, reports of BW attacks sent by many Communist units in North Korea were used in propaganda charges against the United States. During the past few weeks, Communist propaganda has made little reference to specific BW incidents, although some enemy units reported such attacks as late as mid-April.

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TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 24-Mar-2010

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FAR EAST

American BW drop reported by Chinese unit: A Chinese Communist rocket launcher artillery unit reported on 6 May that "an enemy plane (was observed) dropping propaganda leaflets and germicidal bombs." The message continued that "the germs were spread over an area 150 meters wide and 600 meters long" and that the "42nd Army (in combat in west central Korea) was dispatching personnel to take some specimens." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2757, 11 May 52)

Comment: Various North Korean units reported the alleged use of biological warfare by the United States earlier in May. It is entirely possible that these messages may be used to continue the momentum of the Communist BW propaganda campaign.

On 5 May an unidentified Chinese Communist artillery unit:
On 5 May an unidentified Chinese Communist unit, possibly an anti-tank artillery battalion, was ordered to "pull out one platoon each, consisting of 20 men, from the fourth company and the anti-aircraft company to proceed to...where they will assist in the chopping and gathering of lumber." The message added that "this wood will be utilized in the repairing of installations." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2759, 11 May 52)

Comment: This is further evidence that the Communists are repairing and building semi-permanent facilities. While not a conclusive indication of enemy intentions, it would appear doubtful that combat personnel would be diverted by the unit commander to lumbering operations to repair defensive installations if he were aware of a pending major offensive.

The Chinese artillery division inactive since late April:
The Chinese Communist 2nd Artillery Division, relieved from combat in mid-April, instructed "all regiments" on 27 April that "beginning 28 April, Division station will cease contact with all stations."

According to the Far East Command, the 2nd Artillery Division net had not reappeared as of 9 May. FECOM believes that this net being closed for an indefinite period indicates

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13 May 52

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that "no active operations were envisaged for the unit in the immediate future." (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 499, 9 May; CCM-1109, 27 Apr 52)

Comment: When combat elements of the 2nd Artillery Division were relieved in west central Korea by elements of the 1st Artillery Division between 20 and 24 April, it was speculated that the 2nd Artillery might remain in combat. It now appears that the division has been withdrawn from the front.

Record number of Chinese jet divisions believed based on Korean border: Analysis of messages passed on the Chinese Communist ground-controlled intercept net during April indicates that four Chinese Communist MIG-15 divisions are based on Manchurian fields near the Yalu River. They are the 4th Division probably at Antung, the 6th and 17th at Tatungkou, and the 12th at Takushan. (SUEDE USA-38 AP 741, 9 May 52)

<u>Comment:</u> Four Chinese jet divisions are the largest number noted in this area, and they represent a doubling of strength since February.

In addition to these four divisions, with an average of 50 planes each, there are believed to be one Korean and three Soviet MIG-15 units, of unknown strength, in the Antung area.

6. Soviet jet unit indicated at Mukden: Several messages in early May reported flights of as many as 34 "allied" MIG-15's on round-robin flights at Mukden. Russian flight leaders were mentioned. (SUEDE USA-38 AP 741, 9 May; Air Force Roundup 92, 12 May 52)

Comment: These messages provide the first indication of a Soviet MIG-15 unit at Mukden. Soviet MIG's are also based at Antung, Anshan and Tungfeng. The ones at Antung and Anshan have flown combat missions over Korea, but the function of the units at Tungfeng and Mukden is not yet determined.

7. Chinese admit "mishandling of policy" in san-fan campaign: A 15 April message from Chinese "volunteer" headquarters in Korea deals with "cases of suicide and

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13 May 52


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self-mutilation resulting from mishandling of policy and extortion of evidence" during the san-fan campaign among "volunteer" forces.

The report has been sent to "all party committees" with the explicit aim of preventing the recurrence of such incidents. (SUEDE Chinese Communist Military Identifications Bulletin No. 69, CC/CAP-217, 7 May 52)

Comment: An intercepted message of early February revealed the establishment of a "quota" of major and minor offenders to be discovered in each "volunteer" unit during the campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy. Moreover, all units were urged to exceed the established quotas.

The 15 April report confirms that this misuse of the quota system, in particular encouraging fabrication of evidence, has resulted as expected in new expressions of corruption, waste, and bureaucracy.



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13 May 52

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FAR EAST

- Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom (page 3). 1.
- Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea (page 3).
- Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to 3. Formosa (page 4)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 6. Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE

- 7. Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-Cominformists (page 6).
- Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity 8. proposal (page 7).
- East Germans draft law for establishment of national army (page 8). 9.

France taking initiative on concessions to Saar (page 8). 10.

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FAR EAST

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Ι.	Chinese	take	initia	<u>ative</u>	from	North	Koreans	at	Panmunjom:
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Chinese Communists have taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in conducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Namil is now merely their spokesman. Chinese Communist delegates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers.

The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese 'volunteers' along with that of all non-Korean UN troops.

The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will impel some favorable "change in American plans."

Comment: Peiping's views are presumed to determine the North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to continue its commitment.

Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its 'volunteers' in Korea at least until all UN forces are withdrawn.

2. Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea:

25X1	The Far East Air Force reports that it has reason to believe the enemy may now be using airborne intercept radar in the Korean area.
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The Far East Air Force comments that heretofore the Communists have been severely handicapped in night operations due to their non-employment of this type of radar. If the enemy chooses to employ planes equipped with such radar, he will have a capability not considered available to date in the Korean theatre.

25X1 25X1	25X1	Comment: Peiping is probably aware that many Chinese prisoners, particularly those who once served in the Nationalist armies, have asked to be sent to Formosa and that the Taipei government is urging such a transfer. The claim may be introduced at any time into Peiping's propaganda about Korea and alleged American plans for "aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt to block any plans for a transfer.	25.
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		6.	Iranian Nationa	Bank ref	uses loan to go	overnment:		
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	SEV		ļ		Prime Minis	ter Mossadeq i	nfor med Ambas	sador
	25X	1			Hender son or	n 22 May that N	asser, Acting C	over-
					nor of the Ira	anian National I	Bank, had refus	ed to
					advance fund	s to help the go	vernment meet	ite
			monthly payroll	. The Pr	ime Minister	pag furioug at b	Jaccar and inci-	etod
•	ì		that he be repla	ced even ti	houghhis rome	vas turious at t	tabbet anu libi o public confide	sieu
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Mossadeq, who claimed that Britain and the United States had brought pressure on Nasser to refuse the loan in order to cause the government's downfall, insisted that the bank could afford to lend the money. The American Ambassador reported that the British Embassy had confirmed his opinion that it had not put pressure on Nasser. He commented that Mossadeq would undoubtedly create additional opposition if he were to remove Nasser, since the latter is widely respected.

Comment: Nasser's refusal to grant the loan, which would total about ten million dollars, is undoubtedly due to his concern for the bank's stability. It may also reflect the growing lack of confidence throughout Iran in the Prime Minister.

WESTERN EUROPE

	A dissatisfied official of the pro-Cominform
	Communist Party in Trieste has indicated th
	it may be necessary for elements of the part
	to break away from the leadership of Vittorio
Vidali. The office	cial states that Vidali has been controlling the party
through a special	junta established about 1 April 1952. This group is
"Sacruicing old co	omrades for new members who automatically obey

Comment: Vidali's party has been losing members steadily for more than a year. In addition, considerable dissension recently was generated among party officials when reports reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free Territory to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy. Large elements of the party desire for various reasons to maintain the present line calling for an independent Trieste.

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
8.	Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal:
25X1	Reporting the views of both East and West Germans on the Soviet unity proposals, American observers in Bonn state that the proposals have apparently elicited no more support in East Germany than they have in the West.

East Zone residents interviewed in West Berlin believe that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and should be rejected. Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on the Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh approval among East Zone respondents. Among West Germans, however, Soviet concession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line would make the proposal acceptable to better than half of those interviewed, including not only those of neutralist inclinations, but also those who have previously supported the West.

Comment: There has never been any evidence of substantial East German support of the Soviet proposals; there have, on the other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity Party functionaries for fear that their party might be sacrificed for unity.

The one reported declaration by the East German radio in March that the USSR was willing to reopen the Oder-Neisse question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the border was final.

The latest Soviet note on a German peace treaty serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there be agreement on free all-German elections prior to a four-power conference; it also did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note of 10 April.



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9.	East German	ns draft law	for establish	nent of nation	al army:	
25X1			German Co	vornmont has	the Eas	t
	}		establishme	ent of a nation	drafted a law for the al army. United State	es
	action was t	aken in anti	cipation of the	signing of the	elberg believe this e contractual agreeme	nt
	West German soon be form ported by a g	contingents ally unveiled overnmental	on the need for all suggest the same of the suggest the same of th	office, an according to the 24 Ale army. This	reported allocation eleration in recruiting orce to counteract rt Police units may s probability is supculminate in the esta	
	includes 14,00 pace with the	00 to 16,000 growth of a	The paramil officers, can West German	ANCHIE ha area	a force of 52,000 which anded at least to keep e.	ch o
	national army	would not p	The formal e preclude contin	establishment luation of the	of an East German unity campaign.	
10.	France taking	initiative o	n concessions	to Saar:		
25X1	The commissi consideration.	on will file	of a mixed co	ecided on the ommission to	and the Saar Govern- immediate formation revise the 1950 con- -Saar relations, ne French Assembly's	3
	said to favor '' as an autonom	'substantial ous state do	Concessions "	provided at-	t Saarbruecken is engthening the Saar onomic interests.	
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Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy, particularly in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare, and labor relations.

Comment: France and Germany have been keeping the Saar issue in abeyance until the signing of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a new French approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany.

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FAR EAST

Two-month supply level scheduled for North Korean unit: A 13 June message from a unit that may be the supply component of the 10th North Korean Mechanized Division, near Pyongyang, stated that "the guarantee of the service of supply of the army unit in the rainy season. . . wheat flour for 14 days and nights, and subsidiary foods for 40 days and nights. . . (had been received). . .from the General Service of Supply Bureau." Another 12 June message from the same unit indicated that "provisions for 60 days and nights will be provided by June 30." (SUEDE ROK Int Grp M Korea, SK-K-205 and SK-K-211, 13 June 52)

Comment: A similar supply level was decreed recently for Chinese Communist units in the battle line, and there is evidence that at least some units have already achieved this level.

Regardless of whether this stockpiling was undertaken in anticipation of summer rains and floods, it is evident that a substantial improvement in enemy logistical capabilities will have been effected when this program is completed.

Communists remain concerned with BW in Korea: An unident-5. ified Chinese Communist artillery regiment on 12 June informed its subordinate elements that "an investigating committee. . . is coming to Korea to investigate the releasing of germs and insects by enemy planes and artillery. Request that men be found who can verify the releasing of germs. . ."

On 13 June another Chinese artillery regimental commander stated in a message that "Army called my regiment tonight and ordered all chairmen and assistant chairmen of the anti-plague commission to attend the meeting." The sender continued that "the topic of the meeting will be anti-plague project and establishment of anti-plague program for the summer and autumn seasons." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-3837 and K-3838, 14 June 52)

Comment: The enemy is continuing to accumulate data to support has charges that the UN used biological warfare weapons in Korea. It is noteworthy that Malik on 16 June requested a UN Security Council meeting to discuss these same charges.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: 18-Mar-2010

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6. Possible North Korean 10th Mechanized Division command conference held: "The conference of the commanders of the units under my control shall be convened on the 17th and on the 18th," states a 14 June North Korean message, possibly sent by the commander of the 10th Mechanized Division.

In this regard, messages sent on the same communication system on 11 and 13 June suggest that possibly subordinate elements of the 10th were participating in joint reconnaissance training activities with elements of the North Korean 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions, stationed in the Pyongyang area. A related 12 June message indicates that another subordinate unit(is "making preparations to participate in...to be carried out from June 15..." (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Grp Korea, BLT-252, 13 June; ROK Int Grp M Korea, SK-K-217, 13 June; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-K-224, 14 June; ROK Int Grp M Korea, SK-K-236, 14 June 52)

Comment: The recently mechanized North Korean 10th Division has been receiving equipment and personnel, and has been in training since its conversion from an infantry unit. These messages suggest that the unit has reached a fairly advanced state of preparedness for combat.

17 June 52

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FAR EAST

Chinese dig atom bomb shelters in Korea: A badly garbled message from an unidentified Chinese Communist unit in Korea on 13 June reported that "construction of atom bomb defenses" began on 13 June. The message mentioned additional repairs on artillery and air defenses and preventive measures being taken to guard against damage from rain. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-3874, 16 June 52)

Comment: This message probably is a progress report on the May message, sent over a Chinese 8th Artillery Division net which outlines a seven-point defense program. It referred to air defense, with emphasis on camouflage and defenses against the atom bomb.

A 4 April Chinese message indicated that literature about the atom bomb was to be distributed, and on 30 March a Chinese propaganda broadcast stated that it would be a "logical step" for the United States, following the alleged BW-CW campaign, to use the atom bomb.

North Korean mechanized unit visited by Supreme Headquarters:
An 11 June message, probably from an element of the 10th North
Korean Mechanized Division, stated that "Supreme Headquarters
Tank (Headquarters Officers?) of the Supreme Headquarters are...
and are going out to the battalions for the (plans?) of the
units (for?) this month on 10 June..." The message reported
construction activity of elements in the division, including
the "(caves for?) the tanks received..." (SUEDE ROK Int
Grp M Korea, SK-K-169, 13 June 52)

Comment: Although garbled and badly translated, this message suggests the existence of a special armored staff or command at North Korean Headquarters, charged with armored affairs.

Armor continues to arrive in North Korea: "This is to report that 12 tanks out of the 24 tanks were unloaded from cars at Sunchon (south of the Chongchon River)...on June 11th, and arrived at the (unit?)...the remaining 12 tanks are expected to be unloaded from cars tonight," reported possibly the supply unit of the 10th North Korean Mechanized Division on 12 June. (SUEDE ROK Int Grp M, SK-K-207, 13 June 52)

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18 June 52

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Comment: The North Koreans received at least 43 tanks and 22 self-propelled guns in late April. On 5 June a shipment of 16 self-propelled guns arrived.

The Far East Command estimated in early May that the North Koreans had only 384 tanks and 134 self-propelled guns, indicating that they were 59 tanks and 29 self-propelled guns short of the number of alloted armored vehicles.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

DIA AND DOS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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FAR EAST

Japanese press reaction favorable to treaty with India:
Ambassador Murphy reports that Japanese metropolitan papers
and prefectural dailies both reacted favorably to the treaty
with India. Papers in Osaka, a major export trade center,
viewed the treaty as an "extraordinary" gesture of friendship and contrasted its generous terms with the multi-lateral
San Francisco treaty. One prefectural paper foresaw an opportunity for a new "third force" built around Japan and India.

The Ambassador concludes that India gained great popular support by the treaty terms and Japan obtained a model treaty to be employed in negotiations with other Asian nations, although development of either potential will prove difficult.

Comment: The treaty, originally proposed by India in December 1951 was signed on 9 June, and contains many articles based on the San Francisco treaty. Reportedly, however, it contains no provisions on territorial adjustments or reparations. Both of these factors appeal to the Japanese as well as the symbolism of friendship on the part of an important Asian nation.

5. 25X1X Communists agree to continue stalling at Panmunjom: A
that he was informed of an 8 and 9 June meeting between Soviet,
Chinese and North Korean leaders on the cease-fire and the
military situation by a North Korean prepresentative at the
meeting. Allegedly all parties agreed to "continue stalling
tactics at Panmunjom."

The North Koreans argued at the meeting that they could never give in on the POW issue. The argument was opposed by both the Chinese and the Russians.

The Chinese criticized North Korean emphasis on the Koje incidents saying that the BW issuewas a "more effective long-term propaganda line."

The Soviet representative stated that his country was "determined" to take the Korean problem to an "International Conference table."

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25 June 52

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001100010001-9

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November. Political integration would mollify the Gaullists, however, and could reverse the bitter opposition of some to the EDC, thus making ratification certain.

Defense Minister Pleven has recently pledged that the Pinay government will push vigorously for political integration to embrace both the Schuman Plan and the EDC, but the French Government has no illusions that Britain would surrender its sovereignty to a supranational authority.

20,	Swiss reportedly ship arms to Rumania: A report from Vienna the latter part of Way report.
	of an unknown quantity of machine pistols to Rumania from
	Haemerli, a Swiss export firm.
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Comment: The US Military Attache in Bern reported recently that in the last few months Swiss exports of war materiel have increased rapidly and are now of considerable magnitude. There is no record, however, that significant exports have been made to Iron Curtain countries.

The US Air Force has discounted recent reports that the Oerlikon 8-cm guided missile was being used against UN air-

Swiss Communists stressing BW charges: The American Minister in Switzerland has requested the State Department to send him documentary evidence against the Communist biological warfare charges. A Swiss Communist organization has been holding meetings in Bern, accusing the United States of using BW in Korea. At its latest meeting on 20 June there was a capacity audience of 100 people.

25X1

Comment: Reports indicate the Communists are having limited success with their campaign in Switzerland. The non-nist-front Peace Partisans' BW charges, particularly in view of the fact that the Chinese Communists rejected the first proposal in March 1952 for an investigation of the charges by the International Red Cross.

That the Communist BW campaign appears to be relatively late in getting under way in Switzerland may be attributed to the internal dissensions which have beset the Communist Party

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Approved For Release 2004/09/08/FEIA RDP91T01472R000200110001-8

Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8013, 16 July 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

Military Operations I.

Army

Employing five tanks in the role of artillery, delivering 25-minute preparatory fire, two small Chinese Communist groups attacked elements of the ROK 6th Division two miles southeast of Kumsong on the east central front. The enemy withdrew following the three-hour engagement. After this engagement four more Chinese groups attacked another ROK outpost with the support of 1,224 rounds of mortar and artillery. The enemy was again repulsed. Elsewhere along the front, small probes and patrol clashes characterized the action. Across the entire front, the enemy employed 4,027 rounds of artillery and mortar.

<u>Navy</u>

UN carrier-based aircraft flew 213 sorties against enemy troop and supply installations in the northeastern Tanchon area and in western Hwanghae province. Naval surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded enemy shorelines on the east and west coast.

UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 562 combat sorties in a total of 880 effective sorties flown. Of the 14 medium bomber missions flown during the period, 12 were against a railroad marshalling yard near the Chinese border in northwestern Korea. Yesterday 175 UN fighter-bombers attacked an area east of Pyongyang containing a cement factory, a locomotive repair shop, a transformer yard, and various barracks and buildings. Considerable damage to these installations was reported.

Military Intelligence II.

Air

Far East Air Force reports that in enemy MIG encounters during the week ending 13 July, the pattern of aggressiveness remained substantially unchanged: MIG pilots appeared willing to initiate attacks only when the prospects of escaping damage were heavily in their favor. Although MIG's were airborne on ll July during the UN raid on Pyongyang, they did not attempt to interfere. Enemy night interception effort remained ineffective, as no damage resulted to friendly aircraft.

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UN aerial observers reported on 15 July that bomb craters on the lightplane air strip near Hoeyang behind the central battle front have been filled in. (The Communists nave shown considerable facility in constructing and maintaining small air strips, suitable for light planes, throughout Korea. It is probable that these strips, when used, are for liaison craft and/or reconnaissance flights.)

III. General Situation

Political Political

The executive committee of the Liberal Party has announced that Syngman Rhee and Yi Pom-sok will be nominated for president and vice president respectively at the party's convention scheduled to open 19 July. The US Embassy comments that if Rhee endorses Yi as a running mate, the latter's election would be a "shoo in." (Rhee continues to maintain that he is "not disposed" to run. Several sources have indicated that the president is reluctant to accept Yi as vice president, preferring instead Ham Tae-yong, the elderly nondescript chairman of the ROK Board of Audits.)

The ROK National Assembly on 15 July completed voting on the government-proposed bill for election of a president and a vice president. Some of the amendments put forward by the opposition were voted down, but the provision that "all officials who announce their candidacy" for office would resign their government jobs was upheld. Candidates for president, vice president and assemblymen were specifically exempted. The law is expected to be promulgated on 17 July with elections scheduled for early August. (The provision requiring resignation of officials prior to running for office was ineffectually aimed at the current Home Minister Yi Pom-sok, who will probably run for vice president.)

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Propaganda

Peiping and Pyongyang radios were stressing on 15 July all the customary allegations on American atrocities to prove that the "adventurist policy" of employing "so-called military pressure" can never attain the UN's objectives. A new Communist line with suggested propaganda overtones is the report in the American press that Communist China is conditionally accepting the Geneva Conventions banning germ warfare.

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
8038, 14 August 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

Army

On 13 August, the fight for Hill 122 (Bunker Hill), southeast of Punji in the western sector continued. A reinforced Chinese battalion, supported by a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire, twice attacked elements of the US 1st Marine Division in an attempt to retake the hill. The five-hour and one-hour enemy attacks failed. Elsewhere along the front, patrol clashes and probes were reported.

Navy

Naval air operations were suspended on August 13 as the task forces engaged in resupply. UN naval surface vessels bombarded the enemy coast in the vicinity of Songjin, Tanchon, and Wonsan in the east and Choda in the west. Enemy troop and supply installations were destroyed and transportation was hindered.

<u>Ar</u>

UN land-based aircraft flew 916 effective sorties, of which 561 were combat. Of the 207 close-support sorties flown, 168 were in the US I Corps sector in the west with the bulk of these being flown by Marine Corps aviation. Medium bombers flew 25 sorties against an enemy supply area south of Sariwon in the west. During the morning of 13 August, the pilots of a flight of UN conventional aircraft observed 6 MIG-15's in the Chinnampo region. No contact was reported.

II. Military Intelligence

No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

III. General Situation

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<u>Political</u>

Ambassador Muccio, commenting on the whereabouts of the remaining three National Assemblymen in hiding since the orisis, reports that Om Sang-sop

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appeared in the Assembly Hall on 13 August for the first time. O Wi-yong has also emerged from hiding, but is reported to have "gone to the country." Kim Yong-sen still remains unaccounted for.

A Nationalist Chinese news service reports that Kim Hong-il, the South Korean Ambassador in Taipei, revealed on 14 August that Korea, Nationalist China, and the Philippines have been exchanging opinions on the possibility of forming an anti-Communist defensive alliance. Nothing concrete has resulted from the negotiations. (These three countries have exchanged opinions on an anti-Communist alliance in the past with negligible results).

Propaganda

Radio Pyongyang broadcast on 9 August that six members of the "International Committee of Scientists" went to Korea on 28 July to investigate "the actual state of affairs concerning the germ warfare being carried out by the American imperialist aggressors in Korea and China." The mission left Korea on 5 August. The six "scientists" are from Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, the USSR, and Brazil. (Undoubtedly the report of these scientists will be added to the mountain of "proof" on US employment of germ warfare).

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Approved For Release 2004/09/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000200110001-8

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
8056, 5 September 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

ATTIY

After two very minor probes on 4 September, the US 1st Marine Division outpost on Bunker Hill in western Korea was subjected to an attack by two Chinese companies in the early hours of 5 September. This Chinese probe, supported by 2,250 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, was repulsed after a fight of nearly 2 hours. Other Marine outposts to the north and east of Bunker Hill received minor enemy probes during the period. Small enemy probes took place in the 1st Commonwealth and US 3rd Marine Division sectors in the west and in the ROK 2nd and US 25th Division areas in central and eastern Korea.

Navy

UN naval aircraft on the Korean west coast flew 97 reported sorties on 4 September with the total flight tally incomplete. Air activity by carrier-based planes on the Korean east coast ceased as Task Force 77 engaged in replenishing operations. Enemy targets were bombarded by naval surface vessels in the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon on the east coast, and in the Amgak area on the west coast.

<u>Air</u>

On 4 September land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 853 effective sorties of which 565 were combat. Installations in Sonchon, located in MIG alley, were attacked by 279 of the fighters. During the period, 110 MIG's were observed and 73 encountered by UN aircraft. A total of 13 MIG's were reported destroyed and 7 damaged. The UN lost four Sabres with one other suffering minor damage. There were only four bomber missions flown on the night of 4-5 September. Three of the aircraft flew leaflet and close support missions while the remaining aircraft bombed Hwangju, a town located on the main supply route between Pyongyang and Haeju.

II. Military Intelligence

No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

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III. General Situation

Economic

The US Army representative on the US-ROK Combined Economic Board believes that the won-dollar exchange rate should, "as an opening wedge," be changed from 6,000 won to one US dollar to 18,000 to 1 beginning 1 October. Army representatives point out that American and foreign nationals are receiving 24,000 to 1 in the open market and the exchange rate based on the present world market price of rice would be about 45,000 to 1. They add that the present rate is unrealistic and works against fair treatment for US troops. (The Republic of Korea, in negotiating the economic agreement which established the board, was adamant in demanding the retention of the current 6,000 to 1 rate. Although the rate is unrealistic, the US Ambassador feels that because the board has just started to operate and the US payment of \$35,000,000 was made only recently, the US should wait a few months for these arrangements to have some effect.)

Propaganda

Radio Peiping on 4 September quoted an article by Alan Winnington of the London <u>Daily Worker</u> in which the correspondent accused American top negotiator General Harrison with threatening an extension of bacterial warfare against North Korea. While the article emphasized this, the propaganda point was hinged on a five-word quote, "disease and dislocation of homes," which Harrison may have employed in connection with the devastation created by bombing. (The Communist negotiators at Panmunjom have never brought up the question of bacterial warfare during the negotiations. It is possibly of propaganda significance that the Communists have gone to such lengths to associate the UN negotiators with threatening BW.

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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9308, 15 September 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

Army

Action continued heavy over the weekend in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea. The focus of fighting was "Finger Ridge" near Yulsa which the Chinese captured over a week ago. Early Sunday morning ROK elements succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill, only to be driven back themselves by a fierce Chinese counterattack later in the morning. The South Koreans attacked again before noon on Sunday, but were stopped just short of the crest. At 1100 hours the Chinese unleashed a heavy mortar and artillery barrage and at present hold the position. During Sunday's engagement, the Chinese used nearly 15,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire. Elsewhere along the front there were minor enemy probes and patrol clashes.

Navy

Carrier-based aircraft on both the east and west coasts flew 317 sorties on 13 September and 301 sorties on the following day against enemy transportation and supply installations, a cement factory, and an unidentified enemy freighter. Surface vessels bombarded enemy troops and gun emplacements between Songjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Chodo and the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast.

Air

land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 813 sorties on 13 September of which 493 were combat. Only eight enemy MIG's were observed airborne and two were encountered, with no damage to either UN or enemy aircraft. Some 200 enemy jets were observed by F-86 pilots on Antung, Tatungkou and Takushan airfields. The 5 bomber sorties flown on the night of 13 September engaged in photo reconnaissance and leaflet drop missions.

On 14 September 373 combat out of a total of 629 effective sorties were flown. A total of 96 MIG's was observed in the Yalu River area of which 41 were encountered. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged. One UN Sabre was destroyed and another damaged during the encounters. There were 16 effective bomber sorties on the night of 14-15 September, 14 of which attacked a supply center at Sopo near Pyongyang.

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II. Military Intelligence

No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours.

III. General Situation

Political

American Charge Lightner reports that the Korean press and officials during the past week have engaged in an inspired campaign to convince the Korean people that (a) the flow of UN aid goods has been reduced, with a consequent acceleration of inflation; (b) the transfer of the Korean problem to the UN and continuation of the truce negotiations are detrimental to Korean unification and the free world's stand against Communism; and (c) US-UN economic and military aid to South Korea is insufficient. (In line with this criticism, Assembly Vice Speaker Yun Chi-yong on 10 September blamed the US for the loss of China to the Communists, and expressed fear that the UNGA discussion might result in a similar error. He asserted that the US should give more attention to Korea than Japan, and called for a five billion dollar loan, assistance in arming two million South Koreans, and inclusion of the ROK in a Pacific defense pact.)

Propaganda

Radio Peiping on 14 September announced the conclusion of the work of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China. The Commission "confirmed" that American armed forces have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea and China. Committee members included scientists from Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Brazil, as well as from the USSR.

On 13 September Radio Peiping announced that the US Air Force from 26 August to 11 September flew a total of 740 sorties over Northeast China. The Chinese people are quoted as being "extremely indignant."

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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9312, 19 September 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

Army

The western front in Korea erupted during the night of 18 September. In the US 3rd Division sector north of Kangso-ri, two Chinese companies attacked US outposts late in the evening. Communications with the beleaguered unit were broken and a patrol was sent out to re-establish contact, but was forced back by heavy fire. At the same time all along the 3rd Division front, there was heavy artillery and mortar fire.

To the northeast, the Chinese launched another push to take "Old Baldy." An enemy battalion, supported by artillery, mortar and tank fire, closed to hand-to-hand combat and forced the withdrawal of defending US 2nd Division infantrymen from the left side of the hill. A US counterattack this morning was meeting heavy resistance. Action continued in both the US 2nd and 3rd Division sectors at the close of the report period.

In the east central sector, the Chinese again attempted to drive the ROK Capital Division from "Finger Ridge" near Yulsa. Two determined attacks in company strength were launched during the night of 18 September, but were repulsed by the South Koreans.

Navy

Naval air sorties on 18 September totaled 294. Targets from Nanam to Yangdok on the east coast were attacked while on the west coast, aircraft from the British carrier Ocean strafed installations in the Chinnampo-Eaeju area. Surface units maintained the blockede and bombarded supply and troop installations on both Korean coasts.

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Iand-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 964 effective sorties on 18 September of which 591 were combat. In a daylight raid, 24 light bombers attacked a railroad bridge near Yangdok in central Korea. During the period, 32 MIG's were observed and 9 encountered in the Chongchon-Yalu River area. There was no damage to UN aircraft while one MIG was reportedly damaged. During the night, 16 effective medium bomber missions were flown; 12 of which bombed a supply center just north of Pyongyang.

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II. Military Intelligence

Air

On 16 September UN pilots observed two enemy aircraft taking off from Antung airfield which trailed white smoke similar to "JATO" — jet—assisted take—off. The silver—colored aircraft climbed rapidly from 3,000 to 8,000 feet. Far East Air Force comments that while the Communists are believed to have developed JATO there has been no confirmation of its use in the Korean air war. It is concluded that the details of the above report are insufficient to confirm this sighting as JATO.

III. General Situation

Propaganda:

2. 线带电路设置

The US Embassy in Stockholm reports that in a press conference sponsored by the International Scientific Commission, most of the newspapermen — some of them Communists — were visibly or outspokenly critical of the Commission's "findings" concerning the UN's use of BW in the Korean war. The Embassy believes that the presentation of the "evidence" of germ warfare by the Swedish member of the Commission was a complete flop.

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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9315, 23 September 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I. Military Operations

Army

The heaviest fighting along the front on 22 September occurred in the eastern sector where North Koreans attacked outpost positions of the ROK 8th Division at Hill 812. The enemy company withdrew after a seven-hour fight. Later in the day, the North Koreans, reinforced to battalion strength, again attacked and temporarily secured the objective. ROK companies counterattacked and ejected the enemy early in the evening. A total of 7,900 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during these encounters. Elsewhere along the front the action was characterized by patrol and probing action.

Navy

UN naval aircraft flew 80 sorties on 22 September with the total tally incomplete. Air targets, primarily transportation facilities, on the Korean west coast were in the vicinity of Hanchon and Haeju. No report was received regarding east coast air activity of Task Force 77. Surface vessels bombarded enemy troop and supply installations between Chongjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Cho Island on the west coast.

<u>Air</u>

On 22 September, land-based aircraft flew 825 effective sorties of which 486 were combat. In a daylight raid 208 fighter-bombers attacked supply and troop installations near the enemy front line in the east and east central zones. During the report period, UN fighter pilots observed 19 MIG's and encountered 9 in the Chongchon-Yalu River area. In the encounters five MIG's were damaged with no damage to friendly aircraft. During the night, Far East Bomber Command mounted 14 effective sorties. A supply area in Sopo, near Pyongyang, was bombed by 10 of the aircraft.

II. Military Intelligence

<u>Air</u>

On three occasions UN pilots have observed an F-84 Thunderjet which the Communists apparently have recovered and made operational. The first two sightings occurred on 18 and 19 September near the front line in the US I Corps

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sector. The third observation took place on 20 September in "MIG Alley." In two of the three observations, the UN pilots stated the plane had the standard US Air Force star insignia on the fuselage and wings. The Directorate of Intelligence, Far East Air Force, comments that a sufficient number of F-84's have been lost in enemy territory to enable the Communists to recover and make operational this type of aircraft. (This is the first report of the enemy using an F-84. There have been a number of previous occasions when hostile F-80's were reported.)

III. General Situation

Political

The South Korean Office of Public Information announced on 19 September that a delegation representing pro-Rhee Koreans in Japan had arrived in Pusan to discuss several "problems" with the ROK Government. The delegation submitted a petition which, inter alia, sought permission for the representatives of these Koreans to attend the now suspended Korean-Japanese talks, the granting of loans by the Bank of Korea to Koreans in Japan, and the improvement of relations between the Korean diplomatic mission in Japan and the residents there. (This right-wing group controls less than 30 percent of the 800,000 Koreans in Japan, who are predominantly North Korean sympathizers.)

Propaganda

A 21 September Peiping broadcast stated that the "International Scientific Committee" presented "incontrovertible evidence" that the UN has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea. The harangue said the US "had the nerve" to repeat its call for an impartial investigation even after the findings of this unbiased group. (Newsmen, including leftists, indicated that a recent Committee press conference, held in Stockholm to present proof of the BW allegations, was a

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FAR EAST

North Korean unit receives large shipments of infantry weapons: A North Korean unit, subordinate to the V Corps, sent two messages on 20 July listing the amounts of weapons and equipment which it had received. The shipments included: 132 light and 8 heavy machine guns, 12 45mm antitank guns, 214 rifles and some 929 boxes of "light ammunition." (CANOE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT 255 and ALT 252, 21 July 52)

Comment: This is the first time in over a year that North Korean units have received such a large shipment of basic infantry equipment.

Attempted poisoning of North Korean troops revealed:
The commander of an artillery battalion, possibly subordinate to the 8th North Korean Division, informed his superior on 20 July that "in the troop area arsenic was put into the well." There was no "damage," but the commander stated that a search for the culprits was under way. (CANOE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-260, 21 July 52)

Comment: Communications intelligence recently revealed that ten North Korean soldiers died from poisoned food obtained from civilians. This first incident also occurred on the east coast but farther north in the V Corps area.

It is possible that these poisonings were perpetrated by North Korean civilians. These messages may, however, indicate ground work for further propaganda blasts charging the United Nations with using BW and CW warfare.

Enemy reportedly concentrates on defense of Manchurian border: Communications passed between 14 and 20 July on the Russian GCI net at Antung indicate that enemy planes continue to be more active in protecting the Manchurian border than in defending Pyongyang. When UN bombers raided Pyongyang on 10 July, 23 Communist planes were airborne. Instead of protecting Pyongyang, they concentrated on patrolling the Antung area. (CANOE Air Force Roundup 141, 22 July 52)

Comment: Russian-manned jet units in Manchuria have pursued an erratic policy in intercepting UN bombers in recent weeks. While failing to disrupt UN attacks on the

24 July 52

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power plants in late June and on Pyongyang on 10 July, they made a determined effort on 4 July to break up the attack on a North Korean military academy near Sakchu in northwest Korea.

24 July 52

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FAR EAST

North Koreans expect use of BW by United Nations: On 17 August the North Korean 21st Brigade notified a battalion commander of a Chinese Communist intelligence report that on 13 August the US Army shipped "creatures for experiment" from a Seoul suburb to Taegu.

On the same day, the Chinese report continued, another American Army unit transported five tons of "experimental material," probably dead rats, from Taegu to an unspecified air base. The sender cautions that all units should be on the watch for the "anticipated" enemy use of bacteriological warfare. (CANOE 15RSM/2253 Korea; 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-765, 17 Aug 52)

Comment: On several occasions during the Korean war, the Communist device of passing this type of intelligence to subordinate units has been a sufficient cue for return reports which are then used as "proof" of Communist propaganda charges.

21 Aug 52

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Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T04146A001200300001-6 SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

19 September 1952

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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GENERAL

1. Peiping's reaction to Moscow talks: Chinese Communist comment to date on the announced results of the Sino-Soviet talks reveals sensitivity to possible charges that Peiping was outmaneuvered by its ally.

Official Chinese Communist releases argue that the two agreements are to the "practical interest" of China. From Peiping's point of view, the reasons cited for extending the Port Arthur agreement — the threat posed by Japan and the possible expansion of the Korean war — are valid.

Peiping's assertion that the USSR "is prepared to shoulder all responsibilities beneficial to peace" in the Far East hints at the possibility that a larger Soviet military guarantee resulted from the talks.

Peiping's position in Chinese eyes would be greatly improved by announcement of agreements on further Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow and Peiping may still be working out the details of such agreements. (Factual data from: C Hong Kong 729, 18 Sept; R FBIS Peiping, 17 Sept 52)

2. Communist bacteriological warfare campaign being revived:
Soviet propaganda media publicized Peiping's 15 September
announcement that the International Scientific Commission has
"concluded its work and confirmed that the armed forces of
the United States have waged bacteriological warfare against
Korea and northeast China."

The Peiping radio on 14 September broadcast the scientists' statement made at a press conference held on 31 August, and subsequently began to broadcast "confessions" of recently-captured American officers and contents of the commission's report. This report consists of 19 chapters and 46 appendices

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19 Sept 52


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containing 300,000 words, and has been published in English, French, Russian and Chinese.

Embassy officials in Stockholm reported that the presentation of the "evidence of germ warfare in Korea" at a press conference given by Dr. Andrea Andree, a member of the investigating commission, was a "complete flop." (R Stockholm 341, 17 Sept; R FBIS Moscow, 17 Sept; R Moscow 509, 17 Sept 52)

Comment: The report of this investigating commission is among the most serious efforts to date to substantiate the familiar BW charges. The release of this material seems timed to coincide with the Asian Peace Conference, where the BW issue most likely will be discussed. The document may be presented at that time as "authoritative scientific proof" of Communist charges.



25X6

SOVIET UNION

French delegation visits Soviet Union: According to the French Communist press, a sixteen-member delegation from the Franco-Soviet Friendship Association left Paris on 11 August for a visit to the Soviet Union. This was the second such French group to go to the Soviet Union in a month and a half.

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19 Sept 52

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001200300001-6

SECRET Security Information

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
9902, 13 October 1952

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

Military Operations:

Army

Heavy fighting raged on 11 October for positions on Hill 395 in the 9th ROK Division sector on the central front. Chinese Communists, attacking in battalion strength, succeeded in effecting a 100-yard penetration of ROK positions in the late afternoon. UN troops contained the penetration and fighting continued with the enemy in possession of positions on the crest of the hill in the early morning of 12 October. In the third ROK Division sector on the east central front, the South Koreans repulsed attacks after severe fighting.

On 12 October heavy fighting continued in the 9th ROK Division section for hill positions. The 30th ROK regiment attacked through positions of the 29th regiment and succeeded in reaching the forward slope of Hill 395. Friendly elements were continuing the attack at the close of the report period. Elsewhere scattered probes and patrol clashes occurred.

Navy

No report was received regarding naval air activity for 12 October. On the previous day carrier-based planes flew 75 sorties against North Korean transportation and supply targets in the vicinity of Tanchon, Iwon and Wonsan on the east coast and between Chinnampo and Ongjin on the west coast. Naval surface vessels on 11 and 12 October bombarded enemy gun positions and supply routes in the Songjin and Chaho areas in the east and at Cho Island and Ongjin in the west.

Air

On 11 October a total of 945 effective sorties by land-based planes was flown of which 554 were combat. UN pilots observed 95 enemy MIG's and encountered 45, all in the Yalu-Chongchon River area. Six MIG's were destroyed, and seven damaged with a loss of one UN F-86. During the night Far East Bomber Command mounted 16 effective sorties, attacking ground installations at Pongchongol in north central Korea and Taegumi on the east coast and furnishing close support for the US IX Corps. On the following day, 1,407 sorties by land-based planes were flown, including 991 combat. During these sorties 147 MIG's were observed and 69 encountered. UN pilots destroyed four MIG's and damaged four others. One UN F-51 was destroyed and one F-86 was damaged during the air battles. A total of 29 bomber missions was flown, 26 of the aircraft attacking troop concentrations on Haeju Peninsula.

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SECRET Security Information

General Situation:

Political

The Central Executive Committee of the South Korean pro-government Liberal Party addressed a letter on 10 October to General Mark Clark bitterly protesting the employment of Japanese stevedores and barges in South Korean ports.

Propaganda

The principal North Korean delegate to the Asian Peace Conference in Peiping informed that body, according to Radio Pyongyang on 9 October, of the "concrete steps for putting an end to the Korean war." The actions advocated were the return of all POW's, an immediate cessation of US germ warfare and indiscriminate bombing, punishment of war criminals, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea after a truce is reached. (The addition of the BW, bombing, and war criminal punishment lines is the first introduction of these elements as conditions for the successful conclusion of the war.)

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19 Sept 52

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TOP SECRET CANOE

FAR EAST

9 Dec 52 CIB

1. North Koreans lay groundwork for renewal of BW charges:

US Army Korea Two recent North Korean military messages 29 Nov, 7 Dec 52 may indicate a revival of the Orbit's BW propaganda campaign. The first message, on 29 November, was a report of "insects" which appeared on 20 November and "which have been positively identified as being unusual." The sender added that there had been "no cases of illness" and that preventive measures were being taken.

A second message, on 6 December, located "quantities of insects that carry bacteria" in the North Korean sector of the front lines and attributed their spread to the "barbarous United States empire." Preventive measures against smallpox and typhus, both endemic in North Korea, were stressed in the message.

Comment: Similar "discoveries" by enemy field units in early 1952 provided the basis for a major Communist propaganda theme of 1952--American use of BW in Korea. The primary purpose of that campaign was to further the "hate America" theme with a secondary aim of improving sanitation and controlling disease in North Korea.

The timing of this effort may be intended to coincide with the scheduled consideration of Communist BW charges in the UN.

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CONFIDENTIAL

USSR SURVEY 11 DECEMBER 1952

TWO CAMPS

BW

KOREAN WAR

a comprehensive guide on PDF Compression

Moscow continues its concentration on the U.N. debate of the Korean question. Vishinsky's denunciation of the Indian proposal on 24 November is followed by a temporary increase in comment while the amendments to the Soviet proposal, also introduced on 24 November, occasion renewed attention to the positive feature of the Soviet stand. However, anticipating the adoption of the Indian resolution, Moscow reduces the volume of attention related to the U.N. as well as to other aspects of the Korean war even before the 4 December Assembly vote. Peking comment in general coincides with the Moscow position.

Indian Proposal is American Trick to Prevent Peace: Moscow broadcasts continue to attack the Indian proposal after it was categorically rejected by Vishinsky on 24 November. In addition to the original charge that the proposal adhered to the "notorious American resolution," broadcasts allege that the proposal (1) does not insure the solution of the PCW problem, (2) delays the repatriation of all PCWs, (3) makes no provision for immediate cease-fire, and (4) is unrealistic in that the mediator called for in the India-proposed commission would be appointed by the U.N. Since the U.N. considers itself part of the Korean war, "how then can it act as arbitor or judge in this dispute?" This reference to the United Nations as a belligerent in the Korean fighting is in contrast to the usual singling out of the United States as the enemy. It may be an indication of Moscow's efforts to fully explain its rejection of the Indian proposal.

In a further attempt to explain the Soviet rejection, Moscow reveals that—in view of the more independent attitude of the Arab-Asian delegates at this session—the United States was forced to resort to trickery to gain Arab-Asian support.

The Soviet amendment calling for an immediate cease-fire and settlement of the POW question by two-thirds vote in the proposed Korean commission is stressed in what seems to be an attempt to exploit the belief that "the peoples of India and other Asian nations would be concerned if their delegates voted against an armistice in Korea."

Moscow further seeks to bolster Soviet rejection of the Indian resolution by broadcasting the official statements of Chou En-lai and Pak Hun Yong.

New BW Confessions Ignored by Moscow: Pyongyang on 4 December reports the confessions of two more American officers who admitted their part in the alleged use of bacterial warfare by American forces in Korea. One is a member of the Air Force, as were the other confessers, while the second is identified only as a member of a "chemical unit." Although details as to place and time of the use of BW are not mentioned, the charges presumably refer to recent developments inasmuch as one of the officers arrived in the Far East on 7 July 1952. Neither Moscow nor Peking has reported these confessions.

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Peking however on 8 December broadcasts as part of its present series of messages from U.S. prisoners, one addressed to the people of South Carolina by Lt. Floyd O'Neal, which repeated his confession of participation in the alleged use of bacterial warfare. O'Neal also refers to the American bombing of North Korean civilians and cities and appeals to the residents of South Carolina to support peace in Korea.

Intended Use of Asiatic Troops Reported: Having previously ignored speculation—which arose during the U.S. election campaign—over the use of Asian troops to fight Asians, Moscow notes a Tokyo press report that 8,000 Japanese volunteers are already in Korea and that the National Security Corps will soon be dispatched to Korea. Moscow also repeats charges that Assistant Secretary of State Allison sought new mercenaries during his visit to Japan. Krainov reports that negotiations are now in progress in Washington between the representative of Chiang and David Bruce, acting Secretary of State, for the use of Kuomintang troops in Korea.

These charges are grouped with other reports concerning the expanding South Korean army and the American intention to force Korean and Chinese prisoners to serve in the Chiang and Rhee armies. Although Moscow reports of the use and intended use of Japanese and Kuomintang troops have appeared throughout the year in news stories, it is unusual for them to be reported in commentary form. But the present commentary does not present detailed argumentation; only passing reference is made to General Eisenhower's trip to Korea.

Anti-Aircraft Capabilities. PCW Outrages Reported: Moscow continues to report the increased anti-aircraft capabilities of the Communist forces in North Korea. A Borzenko dispatch to PRAVDA reports that travel over Korean roads is now safe even in the daytime because "Korean anti-aircraft units are now so good that American flying fortresses are keeping well out of range." This and other Korean strength references have not yet been broadcast to Korea. Moscow has also revealed more PCW outrages, with 1400 Communist prisoners killed in atomic experiments in 1951 and hundreds more killed by more conventional weapons such as flamethrowers, machine guns and grenades.

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SUMMARY

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GENERAL

	CENETAL	
1.	Communist literature on BW distributed in Vienna:	
25X1A	Several publications summarizing "evidence" on the American use of biological warfare are being distributed at a BW exhibition currently being held in Vienna under the sponsorship of the Chinese and Austrian peace councils.	
	Comment: There is no evidence that the recent revival of Communist charges of American use of biological warfare foreshadows another concerted Communist propaganda campaign of proportions similar to the one earlier this year. The current accusations seem designed to up-date such charges in order to document Soviet arguments on the subject in current international forums.	
•	25X1 FAR EAST	•
2.	major Korean political crisis in January:	
25X1A	25X1 Rhee undoubtedly faces another major political battle with opposition Assemblymen during January. The forthcoming political crisis, which will probably be similar to last spring's, will involve the appointment of a prime minister by Rhee and elections for the upper house of the National Assembly.	25X1
	25X1 Rhee's choice for prime minister, either Paek Tu-chin or Yi Ki-pong, will not be acceptable to the Assembly while the creation of the upper house will meet with "blast-furnace resistance" by the legislators, who realize that a second house would limit their powers.	
	Comment: American officials in Korea believe that Rhee's recent public threats against the Assembly are the opening moves in another attempt to curb its powers. With the Assembly apparently as intractable as Rhee, there is little likelihood that it would be susceptible to Phoe's requests	

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FAR EAST SURVEY 27 FEBRUARY 1953

BW AND THE KOREAN WAR

New life has been infused into the quiescent bacteriological warfare campaign by charges made on 20 February that germ-warfare activity over Korea and Northeast China continues unabated, and by the release of the "confessions" of two field-grade American Marine officers attesting to their direction of various phases of the campaign. The following considerations derive from this latest development:

- a. The present revival is in many ways reminiscent of the short-term spurt of mid-September 1952 occasioned by the issuance of the International Scientific Commission's detailed brief on American BW criminality and the confessions of Lieutenants Kniss and O'Neal. However, essential differences in content and methods of exploitation suggest that the present phase may have a more specific scope and direction.
- b. Although the new confessions go into considerable detail concerning names, places, dates and policy implementation, they lack the precise attention to minutiae and the insight into American psychology which endowed the Kniss-O'Neal revelations with the veneer of extreme objectivity.
- c. Other elements which seem primarily intended to buttress fundamental Communist propaganda lines further detract from the credibility of the charges.
- d. Although the revival of mid-September 1952 did not have the expected bearing on U.N. sessions and other major events that immediately followed because of its extremely short-term duration, there are firm indications that the present resurgence is related to the resumption of the U.N. sessions.

Germ Warfare over Northeast China, Korea Continues Unabated: A major revival of the EW campaign seems in the offing as a result of new charges that American planes during the last quarter of 1952 have repeatedly waged germ warfare over Northeast China, and the release of the purported confessions of two field-grade Marine officers attesting to their direction of various phases of the biological warfare operations. The confessions, that of First Marine Division Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Schwable and of Ordnance Officer Major Roy Bley, have been widely broadcast.

The pattern of simultaneous exploitation of various new elements is in many ways reminiscent of that noted in the short-term revival of the BW campaign after the 14 September 1952 issuance of the International Scientific Commission's detailed brief on American germ-warfare criminality and the "confessions" of Lieutenants Kniss and O'Neal. Then as now there was an

accompanying rash of peripheral allusions to BW not related to the major new items of evidence. In the present instance, Peking has reported that:

- a. Research operations in West Germany have led to an epidemic of typhus among the German people;
- b. General VanFleet during his tenure in Tokyo admitted to a member of the Belgian mission that bacteriological warfare operations were taking place in Korea;
- c. American support operations in Japan for the BW campaign are an open secret in Tokyo, where corpses of infected persons are used to develop more virulent strains.

Absence of Precise Detail Affects (bjectivity: Although the "confessions" go into considerable detail concerning names, places, dates, code designations, specialized jargon, and considerations concerning policy implementation, they lack the attention to minutiae and the insight into normal American psychology which endowed the Kniss and O'Neal confessions with a veneer of objectivity.

Some of the difference may be laid to the basic dissimilarities between actions at the working level and at levels concerned primarily with giving and interpreting orders. Since Schwable and Bley were allegedly concerned with the implementation of directives from higher authority but not with the actual operations of dissemination, the extent to which they could discuss operations in precise detail is probably limited; conversely, since Kniss and O'Neal were not privy to the high-policy decisions which put the operations into effect, their confessions might necessarily be limited to the recital of minute details concerning the actual operation.

Although such considerations may have been taken into account in the attempt to create the illusion of truth, the studied avoidance of other elements that would have logically appeared at the command level would seem to indicate (a) a faulty knowledge of American psychology, or (b) the sacrifice of objectivity in the interest of exploiting basic Communist lines.

<u>Credibility Impaired by Attempt to Support Communist Lines</u>: The following elements provide the major indices of this possibly unintentional distortion:

- a. The stress upon the fact that the Americans knew the campaign was ineffectual.
- b. The frequent allusions to the officers' distaste for germ-warfare operations, and their realization that it was morally reprehensible.
- c. The implication that no attempt was ever made to provide a rationale for the use of biological weapons other than the fact that it was ordered by the highest levels—the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- d. The unrealistic insistence that there had been no slackening of the campaign or a reassessment of its value despite the clamor raised by the Communist charges, and the general world-wide acceptance of their reliability.
- e. The inordinate stress upon the fact that maximum security was maintained at all times to prevent non-involved military personnel from learning of the campaign.

Because Communist media have consistently maintained that the campaign served no purpose and completely failed to affect Sino-North Korean battle capabilities, Peking apparently felt called upon to have the confessions stress that the results of the campaign had not been "worth a damn." The parallel insistence that all the officers called upon to put the Joint Chiefs! directive into action realized its moral impermissibility echoes Communist contentions given wide currency during the height of the denunciatory campaign and is rendered especially suspect by the failure of the confessions to make any allusion to an attempt to rationalize the need for such a weapon. Thus, while Peking attempts to lend added conviction to its indictment of American high-level bestiality by noting a recognition of that depravity even among American officers, it implies that those who originally formulated the policy were so infected that they were unconscious of the effect it would have on the subordinate personnel and the need to find a plausible excuse for its implementation.

In this Peking seems to have become a victim of its own dichotomous view of the world, in which the Americans act without deviation in accordance with the unalloyed black picture of them presented to the world. In this case Peking was either unaware of the lack of credibility involved in making Americans talk like Communists, or was willing to sacrifice this contribution to objectivity in its disinclination to suggest that any mitigating considerations impelled the Americans to use such a weapon.

Similarly in attempting to picture the Americans as beasts unrestrained and unrepentent in the face of world opprobrium, the fliers are made to provide no indication that the world-wide attention and credibility accorded the campaign caused a slackening or re-evaluation of the BW program. To prevent any distortion of the picture of the Americans unregenerated depravity, Peking seems little concerned that had the charges been true, the tremendous clamor raised by the campaign should have given the Americans pause, at least until the hue and cry had subsided. To intimate, too, that the campaign is being maintained without respite to this very moment in the face of categorical U.S. and U.N. denials that BW was ever perpetrated seems to indicate that the Communists ascribe to the Americans their own willingness to accume the psychological burden of being caught in an obvious fabrication.

The repeated allusions to the maximum security that was maintained at all times to prevent public realization that germ weapons were being used seem primarily intended to explain the fact that the troops in Korea generally have no knowledge of the campaign. The weakness of this contention is apparent in view of the parallel allegations that support operations for the campaign in Tokyo and in Germany are an "open secret" with little attempt at concealment.

Present Phase Seems Related to U.N. Sessions: The simultaneous release of the International Scientific Commission's report and the Kniss-O'Neal confessions on 14 September 1952 evoked speculation that the revival of the campaign at that time had a possible bearing on three approaching events: the opening of the Asian Peace Conference in Peking on 2 October, the scheduled reconvening of the U.N. on 14 October, and the 25 October anniversary of Chinese participation in the war. The extremely short-term nature of that phase of the campaign-within 10 days allusions had dropped to barely one percent of all items from Peking-seemed effectively to gainsay the existence of any such relationship. Therefore it seems possible that the expansion of the campaign at that moment was intended to place the report "on the record" rather than to create a peg for further exploitation in connection with a specific event. In the present case, the indications seem considerably firmer that the present revival of the campaign is specifically linked to the resumption of the U.N. sessions. The following elements appear pertinent:

- a. Peking and Moscow know that BW will be discussed at this session in connection with the U.S.-sponsored probe of the charges. The new charges and confessions may be intended to burden the Americans with new contentions to refute while providing them with little time to prepare a comprehensive rebuttal.
- b. Both PRAVDA and the Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY have called for immediate U.N. action to halt the "monstrous American crimes," and have woven the various "evidences" of American inhumanity into a summary indictment of the United States as a basis for the demand that the U.S. be forced to sign the Geneva Convention outlawing EW.
- c. Moscow has given considerable publicity to the new confessions; in contrast Soviet broadcasts have consistently deemphasized those of Kniss and O'Neal.
- d. Accompanying Moscow comment has been extremely pointed and widely broadcast. In contrast, the ISC report was given only piece-meal distribution by both Peking and Moscow after the original announcement, and seemed primarily intended to place the information "on the record" for subsequent use rather than to provide a propaganda device to dissipate the doubts of the skeptical.

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NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Report Reviews Atrocity Charges: Pyongyang's own contribution to the upsurge in atrocity charges appears in the form of a "Fifth Communique on Atrocities Commuted by the American Aggressors and the Syngman Rhee Gang." The communique, also broadcast by Moscow and Peking, reviews the record of U.S. atrocities, listing them in the following categories: destruction of urban and rural areas through bombing; use of weapons for wholesale massacre; i.e., poison gas and BW; and the destruction of cultural and social installations, again through wanton bombing. A long compilation of alleged incidents is used to document each charge. Although no appeal is made to the U.N. for condemnation of these atrocities, Pyongyang once again calls for a "people's trial" of the responsible criminals.

Appeal to Korean Residents Warns of Rhee-Yoshida Agreement: Concern over the possibility of Japanese participation in the Korean struggle, both actively and through the coercion of Korean residents in Japan, is voiced in an appeal from the Committee for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland addressed to Korean residents in Japan. The message elaborates on the charges voiced at the time of the January visit of Syngman Rhee to Tokyo, alleging that a secret agreement was made at that time calling for the dispatch of Japanese mercenaries to Korea and the "forcible repatriation" of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan, with Rhee in return promising Japan the right to fish in Korean waters, to deprive Koreans domiciled in Japan of their property, and to claim property in South Korea.

The committee calls upon the Koreans in Japan to oppose their "forcible repatriation" as well as Japanese intervention in the war and to establish a "firm understanding" with the peace-loving Japanese people. Use of the term "forcible repatriation" in connection with a civilian population is in direct contrast with Peking's insistence in its comment on the return of Japanese civilians now in China that "repatriation" only applies to prisoners.

KPA Relies on Red Army Tactics and Experience: Pyongyang devotes considerable attention to the 35th anniversary of the Soviet Red Army, emphasizing the dependence of the Korean People's Army on advanced Soviet-Stalinist military science and experience, a stress also noted in allusions to the fifth anniversary of the Korean People's Army on 8 February. Particular attention is paid to the Stalingrad phase of the Second World War. Moscow, too, has recently directed a series of commentaries on the Stalingrad campaign to the Korean audience, apparently to provide encouragement and inspiration in the face of anticipated U.N. offensive action.

This greater stress on adoption of Soviet military tactics is coupled with familiar reference to the Soviet peace policy. The MINJU CHOSUN, however, adds editorially the warning that "if anyone takes the Soviet peace policy as a sign of Soviet weakness or a lack of confidence in its might, he is committing a grave mistake, for the Soviet people cannot be frightened by armed threat, and if called upon to do so, the Soviet armed forces will attack any and all aggressors." There is no explicit coupling of this threat with the Korean war, however.

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KPA Anniversary Comment Slights Recent Air Operations: Continuing attention to the anniversary of the KPA includes attention to the air force, omitted in previous comment. Detailed exploits and heroization are used to describe North Korean air action during the opening phases of the war in 1950, but present air activity is given only superficial mention. Pyongyang also fails to mention Chinese participation in the air war, as has been true in reviews of ground action. The failure to elaborate on present air action and to mention Chinese participation may well indicate Pyongyang's sensitivity to failure of the air force to provide adequate protection against continued American bombing.

Greater Vigilance Is Needed to Combat Enemy Infiltration: Pyongyang continues to prod the North Korean population into greater vigilance, placing increasing emphasis on the dangers of infiltration by spies and saboteurs behind the lines. Reports of the capture of enemy agents generally attribute their apprehension to the vigilance of civil defense units and particularly of women participants in these units, reflecting an apparent continued lack of adequate security personnel to cope with the danger. The MINJU CHOSUN inveighs against "laxity and looseness" among the population which makes possible the enemy effort to utilize "malcontents" in its espionage and subversion.

Other criticism involves political propaganda workers who fail to arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism, public health workers who possess an "irresponsible attitude" toward the anti-epidemic drive now in progress, and cadres of the Ministry of Commerce with "formal and bureaucratic" attitudes who have failed to follow instructions and have compromised on disagreeable aspects of their work.

New Currency Will Increase Distress: The new currency reform in South Korea is cited as proof of the reports of the desperate straits of South Korean economic life. Pyongyang predicts that the new "hwan" will "intensify economic disorder" and indeed has already resulted in increased black-market activity, price rises, and a new police terror designed to impose confidence in the new currency. Other comment on South Korean life reports opposition to conscription, the "demoralization" of South Korean troops, and the popular and effective activity of the South Korean partisans.



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SOUTH KOREA

Pusan Urges Public Confidence in New Currency: Pusan broadcasts explaining the new currency reform stress the Government intention to alleviate the effects of inflation on the South Korean economy and call for the trust and confidence of the people in the new "hwan." The prevalence of hoarding, misunderstanding, lack of public knowledge, and of attempts by merchants and black marketeers to take advantage of the interim period is acknowledged; however, Government action against these difficulties is promised and the establishment of relief stations and distribution of rice is announced. Pusan broadcasts indicate disagreement in the National Assembly over the technique of President Rhee in decreeing the change-over, but Assembly approval on 21 February is reported.

Rhee Asks Blockade, Mainland Attack: Syngman Rhee in two recent statements on 13 and 22 February has called respectively for a blockade of China and the use of Chiang Kai-shek troops in a campaign to recover the China mainland. Rhee claims that a blockade of China would not provoke the Soviets nor lead to a world war, and intimates that President Eisenhower is decided upon such a blockade and "will not change his mind." In his statement of 22 February President Rhee diplomatically reports that a general feeling exists that Nationalist troops should be used to recover the mainland and he reveals that he suggested that U.S. air support be provided to make this possible.