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OPERATIONAL TARGET ANALYSIS

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ALJAZEERA



National Intelligence Agency

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IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

(MOIS)

OPERATIONAL TARGET ANALYSIS

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OPERATIONAL TARGET ANALYSIS

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or *Vezerat-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (VEVAK)*, is the successor agency to the SAVAK that existed in the times of the Shah of Iran in the pre-1979 period. After the Islamic revolution in 1979 SAVAK was briefly known by the acronym SAVAMA, but after a reorganisation of the security structures the present Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) was created in 1984 as the foreign intelligence service of Iran.
- 1.2 The Islamic government's keen desire at that time to gain an upper hand over leftist guerrilla organisations even led to a relaxation of their previously unrelenting pursuit of military intelligence personnel. Key religious leaders, including then Speaker of the National Assembly (Majlis), Mr Hashemi-RAFSANJANI, insisted on recalling former agents to help eliminate domestic opposition.
- 1.3 Consequently, some intelligence officers and low-ranking SAVAK and army intelligence officers were asked to return to government service because of their specialised knowledge of eg the Iranian Leftist movements. Some former SAVAK intelligence collection operations were also turned over to MOIS during this time, despite the fact that the ideological/religious underpinnings of the new agency were radically different from its imperial predecessor.
- 1.4 With a large budget and extensive organisation, the MOIS is one of the most powerful ministries in the Iranian Government. In terms of the constitution MOIS is responsible for the collection and assessment of information and more importantly the suppressing of conspiracies that could endanger the country. MOIS operatives are either attached diplomats in Iranian embassies and Consulate Offices or as representatives of the Ministry of Guidance and propaganda. Non-official covers include Iran Air, students, merchants, mechanics, shopkeepers, bank clerks and members of Iranian opposition groups.
- 1.5 The MOIS has traditionally operated under the guidance of the *Velayat-e Faqih* ("Islamic Rule") apparatus of the religious leadership of Ayatollah Ali Hoseini KHAMANEI, but was under the direct control of President KHATAMI when he first became president in 1997. This has now changed and the MOIS has found it increasingly part of the power play between the political and clerical authorities. The latter have assumed direct control and the Minister of Intelligence and Security, Ali YOUNESI now reports directly to Ayatollah KHAMANEI and not to President KHATAMI.
- 1.6 During May 1998 the Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali KHAMENEI, ordered the then former Iranian Minister of Intelligence, Ayatollah Najaf ABADI, to "revive the export of the Iranian revolution". Senior Iranian intelligence officials consequently decided:
 - To increase the activities of the Iranian foundations and cultural associations abroad, eg the Mustadafin Foundation, and
 - That Iranian embassies across the world should more vigorously pursue the establishment of cultural centres.

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During an address to officials of Iran's Intelligence Ministry on 27 August 2000, it was once again stressed that the intelligence officials must take into account the viewpoints of Imam KHOMEINI and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali KHAMANEI as the criteria for their activities.

2. DRIVING FORCES OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- 2.1 The basis of Iran's foreign policy is described in Article 152 of the Iranian Constitution as the "Preservation of independence...its territorial integrity, and the defence of the rights of all Muslims". It is based on the former Supreme Religious Leader, Ayatollah KHOMENI's concept of the *Velayat-e-Faqih* (the Supreme Religious Guardian), or the right of clerics to rule over the Islamic community. This implies enforcing absolute authority over the populace, and extending this authority to all Muslims, eg "exporting the revolution" to support their co-religious supporters abroad.
- 2.2 According to the Iranian interpretation Muslims throughout the world constitute a single community – the *Ummah* – that must be ruled by a single government. The mullahs of Iran assert that by virtue of the 1979 revolution that they have acquired the status of "guardians" of all Muslims throughout the world. While this is a key principle a shift has occurred and Iran increasingly tend to be more pragmatic. It has long been willing to sacrifice some of its revolutionary / religious ideals to realise its national interests, which are increasingly dominant. It has curtailed its relations with Islamic movements which intend to overthrow governments (although Iran has kept its lines / networks open) and has shown a preference for working with other governments.
- 2.3 According to Pres KHATAMI these "driving forces" entail three elements, namely:
- A "dialog between civilizations" on the international level
 - Détente with neighbouring states
 - The establishment and broadening of international contacts via the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).
- 2.4 The *Teheran Times* reported on 19 May 2004 that Intelligence Minister Ali YUNESI criticised the BUSH administration's regional policies, labelling US Middle East policy as a complete failure. YUNESI alleged that US officials make flawed decisions about the Middle East: "This is due to their excessive pride in their military power, which has led to military approaches being given priority over political and security approaches."
[www.janes.com dd. 19 May 2004]
- 2.5 Iran's endeavours to become a nuclear power is severely influencing its relations with the international community. At the end of November 2004 Iran agreed with the UN to a full freeze of all nuclear enrichment activities that could make uranium for atomic weapons. This made Iran for the time being temporary safe from UN sanctions. This however creates the possibility that Iran could endeavour to obtain highly enriched uranium from other sources in covert ways.

Iran on 2006/01/10 ended a two-year voluntary suspension of nuclear research work by breaking seals on nuclear facilities that had been put in place by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. In Vienna, an IAEA spokeswoman confirmed that a seal at the nuclear enrichment facility near Natanz had been broken. On 10 January 2006 the European Union expressed its "grave concern" at Iran's resumption of research work on nuclear fuel, saying the move was in breach of Teheran's international commitments.

"We are very disappointed that Iran has not listened to international appeals ... this makes the situation very grave," Cristina GALLACH, spokeswoman for E.U. foreign policy chief Javier SOLANA, told Deutsche Presse-Agentur, dpa. GALLACH said the Iranian decision marked a

"violation" of the Paris agreement by Teheran to suspend nuclear activities since the new steps were "clearly related to enrichment. She added that E.U. governments were consulting each other as well as the United States and Russia on further steps.

A meeting of Britain, France and Germany - as well as Solana - could be held in Berlin later this week. The three European nations have been leading international efforts to seek out a diplomatic solution to the nuclear problem with Iran. Source : Sapa-dpa /fws : Date : 10 Jan 2006 14:08 in NIA Daily News Brief: 2006/01/11.

SA Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana DLAMINI-ZUMA, on 11 January 2006 told Ms Condoleezza RICE, US Secretary of State, that nuclear discussions with Iran should continue. In response to an Iranian call for a stronger role for South Africa in the nuclear talks, the US envoy said her government was in contact with Iran and the EU. DLAMINI-ZUMA said that South Africa would support a decision on the issue by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Source: SABC, dd. 12 January 2006; Pretoria News, p5 dd. 12 January 2006 in NIA Daily News Brief: 2006/01/12.

3. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

3.1 Africa is not high on Iran's list of foreign policy priorities. Iranian policy on Africa focuses on the expansion of Islam in East and West Africa, as well as promoting its economic interests in Southern Africa. Pres KHATAMI's economic policy focuses on the increased development and export of Iran's natural gas reserves. Iranian embassy activities in African countries, like Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, the DRC, Zimbabwe and South Africa, reflect its normal modus operandi in the form of involvement in the spread of the "Islamic revolution". Iran uses its embassies to establish "cultural contact" with host countries by, eg opening cultural centres and accrediting "cultural attaches".

4. SOUTH AFRICA AND IRAN'S BILATERAL INTERESTS

4.1 South Africa's interests / involvement in Iran is multifold. It is motivated by political, economic, geo-political and intelligence links as well as the Iranian multinational initiative of a "Dialogue between Civilizations". In specific terms these reasons are as follows:

- Iran maintained relations with both the Apartheid government and the former Liberation Movements.
- Iran serves as an excellent land bridge between the Indian Ocean littoral and the growing markets of Central Asia.
- It is a leading member in the Islamic world and plays an important role in the *Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)*.
- Iran's "Dialogue between Civilization" is geared to *inter alia* create greater cooperation between Africa and Iran.
- It is a major oil producing country and a key supplier of oil to South Africa.
- Iran and South Africa regularly work together in multilateral fora such as the UN and NAM while cooperation in terms of NEPAD has also been enhanced. Iran has acknowledged the commitment of the SA Government to develop NEPAD and has declared its willingness to participate actively in all NEPAD activities. It furthermore has created a NEPAD Desk in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that has the responsibility for direct interaction with the NEPAD Secretariat.

4.2 From Iran's side its relations with South Africa are perceived to be "good and suitable". The key focus areas:

- The expansion of bilateral ties.
- Advancing the concept of "Dialogue between Civilizations".
- Cooperation to counter US dominance, particularly given Iran's inclusion in a group of countries, labelled by the US as the "axis of evil". The other countries are/were North Korea and previously also Iraq.

5. IRAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

- 5.1 Prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, South Africa and Iran maintained formal relations at the level of Consulate General and had good relations in fields of trade, science, technology, defence, medicine, energy and mining. After the revolution Iran severed all relations with South Africa in February 1979 and imposed a total trade boycott against South Africa. It only re-established contact with South Africa in 1994 when international trade and economic sanctions were lifted against South Africa.
- 5.2 The main focus of South Africa's bilateral relations with Iran is based on trade and investment. South Africa's principal import from Iran is crude oil, which represents approximately 96% of all of South Africa's imports from Iran and about 40% of all South Africa's oil needs. Due to these facts the trade balance is heavily in favour of Iran.
- 5.3 Relations between Iran and South Africa are "regulated" by the **Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission**, which was established in 1995. The development of relations centred on this Commission. Iran's relations with Africa developed through the **Iran-Africa Co-operation Forum**, which also play a crucial role in the formulation of Iran's relations with South Africa. Visits by delegations of both Iran and South Africa also play an important role and take place on a regular basis. The next Iran-Africa Co-operation Forum is to be held in Iran in 2005.
- 5.4 During the 7th Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission, that took place from 21-22 July 2003, progress was reviewed in the mutual relations. Two working groups facilitated this process namely, the Political and Social Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working Group. The following agreements / memoranda of Understanding (MOU) were signed:
- MOU on Standards
 - MOU between PetroSA and the National Petrochemical Company of Iran
 - Draft Agreement on Extradition
 - Draft Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
 - MOU on co-operation in Women' Affairs.
 - MOU on Combating of Illicit Drug Trafficking
 - Programme of Cooperation (POC) on Health
 - Programme of Cooperation (POC) on Culture
- 5.5 According to a Memorandum of Understanding between SA and Iran that was to be signed in July 2003, the SA national oil company PetroSA and the Iranian National Oil Company were to work together on a "gas-to-liquid" project. Iran and South Africa were working together on joint feasibility studies in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors. The Understanding further covers trade, science, cultural, political and social sectors. (Business Day – 16/07/2003)

5.6.1 OTHER AGREEMENTS/MOUs CONCLUDED SINCE 1995

- The Joint Co-operation Agreement (15 August 1995)
- MOU on co-operation in the fields of mining and minerals (19 Sept 1995)
- Trade Agreement (01 October 1996)
- Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (03 Nov 1997)
- Avoidance of double taxation Agreement (03 Nov 1997)
- Agreement regarding merchant shipping and related maritime matters (11 April 1999)
- Agreement on Scientific and Technological Co-operation (31 May 2000)
- MOU on Tourism Co-operation (22 August 2000)
- MOU on Sport Co-operation (22 August 2000)
- Terms of Reference Memorandum on Agricultural Co-operation (22 August 2000)
- MOU on Health Co-operation (05 February 2002). Teams were being set up in the health and pharmaceutical sectors to oversee the development of new products. (Business Day – 16/07/2003)

5.7 It has further been reported that a delegation of the SA Department of Science and Technology visited Iran early 2004. The purpose was to develop project proposals in the field on nanotechnology. Progress has also been made with cooperation regarding laser and biotechnology. A certain [REDACTED] at the CSIR served as the nodal point in SA regarding nanotechnology. [REDACTED] at the CSIR, is also involved). Deputy Director Moeketsi MODISENYANE of the Department of Foreign Affairs facilitated the visit. (24/06/2004).

5.8 Iran's export of the Islamic revolution to South Africa focuses on the following:

- Iran wants to increase its influence abroad by exporting Shiite Islam and recruiting students for studies at Iranian institutions and simultaneously wants to counter the Sunni influence in South and Southern Africa
- Using students that previously underwent religious training or military training in Lebanon for covert collection and espionage activities. South African students also received religious training in Iran.
- Front companies to disguise revolutionary Islamic activities are being utilised by these students to radically influence the Islam communities in many African countries. A front company, the Ah-lul Bait Foundation, an Iranian NGO, is also active in the Western Cape.

5.9 The following SA companies are active were active in Iran in 2003:

COMPANY	FIELD OF ACTIVITY
Bateman	Mining
Bayer DSA Chemicals	Chemicals
Ernest & Young	Consultants
Global Railway	Railway parts
Hall & Longmore (Pty)	Steel construction
Klein Karoo Co-op	Ostrich farming
MINTEK	Manganese
PETROSA	Petroleum
SASA	Sugar
SAMTEM (Pty) Ltd	Ferro alloys
SASOL	Gas-to-liquid process
Standard Bank	Financing

6. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The *Teheran Times* reported on 19 May 2004 that Intelligence Minister Ali YUNESI has stated that Iran is one of the safest countries in the Middle East. YUNESI said that the operational policies of the Intelligence Ministry have been institutionalised and are no longer liable to change when personnel shift. In discussing his ministry's activities YUNESI commented, "Its policies are in accordance with law and it is accountable to the people, high-ranking officials and the Majlis". YUNESI added that the Ministry of Intelligence is proud of its role in contributing to the nation's progress by providing domestic security.

The Iranian intelligence community comprises of the following structures:

6.1 The National Security Supreme Council (NSSC)

The Council serves as the Supreme Body of Intelligence and Security of Iran. It controls and coordinates the activities of the all intelligence structures in Iran and has the following objectives:

- Preservation of Iran's sovereignty
- Defence of the national identity
- Management and consolidation of internal and foreign policy
- Coordination and control of the intelligence and security service.

6.1.1 The NSSC comprises of the:

- President
- Speaker of Parliament (Majlis)
- Minister of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
- Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Minister of Interior
- Head of the Judiciary
- Chief of Staff of Armed Forces
- Head of Plan and Budget
- Two representatives of the Supreme Leader (Spiritual Leader Ali KHAMENEI).

6.1.2 A number of sub-committees operate within the framework of the Council and deal with matters such as internal security, defence, economic affairs, social affairs and intelligence affairs. Each of the committees serves in a liaison and coordination capacity between the Council and the relevant professional organisations.

6.2 The Ministry of Islamic Guidance

6.2.1 This Ministry is responsible for the dissemination of the principles of the Iranian Revolution inside and outside the country and for intelligence collection. The Ministry operates abroad through Islamic Mosques and Islam Centres run by the Ministry's envoys from Iran. It is especially active in Africa where there are large Muslim communities and a small number of Iranian Embassies. Ministry envoys send Muslims from their countries of residence for courses in Iran when returning, guide their activities within their own communities.

6.3 The Ministry of Interior

6.3.1 The Ministry of Interior is responsible for order and security in the country and is/was in command of the Police, the Gendarmerie and the Komiteh. It is tasked with:

- Law and order and other security matters in rural areas;

- Security of airports, harbours and national strategic key points, as well as traffic control;
- Safeguarding moral and religious values of the Iranian society.

6.4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

6.4.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperates in the collection of intelligence through its diplomatic activities in foreign countries. Foreign Affairs officials (diplomats) also have the responsibility of contact with revolutionary Islamic movements and organisations. The Department/Directorate of Investigation and Studies (known as Department 220) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is exclusively involved in intelligence activities and operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Its tasks are the:

- Spotting and running of human sources;
- Collection of political information;
- Preparation and execution of operations that are mainly directed at the elimination of hostile anti-Iranian elements abroad;
- Assistance to elements that are engaged in subversive and terrorist activities.

6.5 Military Intelligence

6.5.1 The Military Intelligence Service developed considerably during the Iran-Iraq war and it consists of two operational intelligence arms, namely collection of positive intelligence and counter intelligence. Military Intelligence collection focus on:

- Collecting military intelligence inside and outside the country;
- Infiltration operations inside and outside the country;
- COMINT operations abroad, as well as air and marine operations in the Persian Gulf;
- Interception of international information (radio) (SIGINT).
- Liaison with other Iranian intelligence structures and technical assistance.

6.5.2 The counter intelligence arm is responsible for the prevention of coups, subversion and foreign espionage. It operates internally and externally with agents and collaborators in every sector of the Iranian Army as well as in Iranian Embassies abroad.

6.6 The Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran)

6.6.1 The Revolutionary Guard Corps is the main foreign intelligence arm of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security. It has two departments with specific functions, namely:

- **The Special Operations Department**
It is responsible for special operations abroad, including assassinations of Iranian dissidents

The Chief Information Department

It is responsible for

- Maintaining contact with foreign Islamic groups;
- Rendering assistance to Muslims and Muslim countries;
- Preparing, training and running Shiite military personnel and non-Iranian volunteers for various operational missions in the Middle East.

6.7 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)

- 6.7.1 The MOIS is the main professional intelligence body in Iran and was established in 1984. It has extensive powers, especially after constitutional reforms in 1988, which rendered extra functions to this Ministry.
- 6.7.2 In the monitoring of Iranian intelligence activities internationally and locally, it became evident that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is utilized to spread radical objectives. It was reported during 1998 that MOIS was focusing more aggressively on South Africa than ever before, with the anticipated purpose to establish a base from which it can direct its activities into the rest of Africa. Iran's activities since then exploited South Africa's open-door policy; abused lenient border control measures and freedom of religion; abused diplomatic immunity; and uncontrolled liaison/contact to further the cause of Iran.
- 6.7.3 In 2001 it was reported by LS 825 that the MOIS's activities abroad declined/eroded in status to that of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (*Pasdaran*). It however works in close cooperation with the Revolutionary Guard and members assist in providing weapons for actions abroad.

7. STRUCTURE OF THE MOIS

- 7.1 The exact structure of the MOIS is unknown. It is however known that it consists of four Main Directorates or Branches (numbered from 12-15). They are:

DIRECTORATE 12: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Responsibility:

- * To orientate all organisations in Iran, including political parties, cultural organisations, enterprises and other Ministries.
- * The falsification of papers and documentation related to the MOIS.

The Department of Counter Revolution is part of this Directorate, which controls the activities of the Mujaheddin.

DIRECTORATE 13: ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

Responsibility:

- * Follow-up work and the planning of attacks on opposition elements abroad. It coordinates its activities with Branch 15. The Branch 13 representative/member usually resorts under the command of the Branch 15 member
- * The falsification of non-Iranian papers and documents, eg Iraqi bank notes.

DIRECTORATE 14: COUNTER ESPIONAGE

Responsibility:

- * The monitoring of foreigners and students recruited for studies in Iran
- * The running of double agents against primarily Western services. (Remark: The MOIS utilises volunteers to observe other intelligence operatives.)
- * The foiling of subversive actions mainly in Iran.

DIRECTORATE 15: FOREIGN¹² INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
Responsibility:

* HUMINT collection activities abroad for the:

- Procurement of sensitive technology
- Connection with foreign intelligence services
- Execution of subversive actions abroad.

It is divided along functional and international geographical areas. The following Departments fall under Directorate 15:

Department 112 - Analysis of chemical and nuclear armaments information and other technical and scientific matters.

Department 113 - Analysis of information on matters regarding enterprises. (These two departments were formerly known as Directorate 11).

Department 151 - Iraq

Department 152 - Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Syria.

Department 153 - Afghanistan, Algeria, Far East, India, Pakistan and Turkey.

Department 154 - North America and Europe

Department 155 - Special Operations. (Has specially trained teams and works closely with the Revolutionary Committees)

Department 156 - Recruitment of MOIS members for Directorate 15

Department 157 - United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Barhain

Department 158 - Saudi Arabia

DIRECTORATE 17: OVERSIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC ORGANISATIONS

DIRECTORATE 19: HUMAN RESOURCES

DEPARTMENT INTERNAL SECURITY

Responsibility:

It functions separately from the other Directorates and is directly responsible to the Minister. It has officers in all MOIS Departments doing clandestine surveillance on colleagues.

UNIVERSITY OF IMAN BAJR

Responsibility:

Training. A four-year training course is presented covering intelligence studies, tradecraft, language training, Islamic science, history and sociology.

8. MAIN FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MOIS

- 8.1 The espionage threat posed by Iran should be seen within the framework of its attempts to consolidate its strategic position in the Middle East and the Russian Caucasus region through eg bilateral cooperation with Russian, India and Saudi Arabia. Attempts to get

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access to foreign technology for reverse engineering to strengthen its economy, forms part of this endeavour. Iranian visiting delegations to military and technology research projects in other countries should therefore be viewed with suspicion. The main responsibilities/tasks of the MOIS are to:

- ◆ Defend the Iranian Government by imposing the "Islamic Rule" in Iran. This implies enforcing absolute authority over the populace.
- ◆ Extend this absolute authority to all Muslims by "exporting the Iranian revolution". This is inter alia done by assisting in the expansion of the Iranian revolutionary ideals through the infiltration and influencing of local communities in foreign countries.
- ◆ Support and enhance Iran's foreign policy.
- ◆ Monitor foreign citizens residing (or studying) in Iran.
- ◆ Monitor and collect information on dissident elements abroad with the aim to suppress them.
- ◆ Monitor and collect on Israeli interests and targets.
- ◆ Monitor and collect on American presence, interests and targets.
- ◆ Assist in the procurement of technology and military hardware.
- ◆ Collect information in modern science and technology.
- ◆ Collect information on foreign countries.
- ◆ Collect information on foreign intelligence services through cooperation with friendly services.
- ◆ Collect information on drug trafficking.
- ◆ Collect information to support international terrorist operations through liaison with these groups and Islamic fundamentalist movements.

9. PRIORITIES AND TARGETS

9.1 MOIS priorities include:

- ◆ Iranian opposition groups (primarily the Mujahedin e Khalq Organisation (MKO). This includes kidnappings and assassinations ("liquidations") abroad – even in Europe.
- ◆ Iraqi oppositionists.
- ◆ Shia clerics.
- ◆ Israel as strategic and ideological threat, mainly due to the economic cooperation that existed between Israel and the Shah in the 1970s
- ◆ Jewish institutions and interests, including Israeli officials
- ◆ Support for Palestinian activities
- ◆ Support for and cooperation with the Hamas, Hizbollah (in Lebanon) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

10. INTELLIGENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MOIS AND THE SA INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

10.1 Intelligence cooperation

In the area of intelligence exchange, the undertaking is to cooperate on the following:

- Organized crime including narcotics, people smuggling, arms trafficking, violent crimes such as robberies, money laundering and contravention of exchange control regulations.
- Control of the Private Security firms and related issues such as mercenary activities and support to conflict areas.
- Cooperation in countering international terrorism.

- Corruption, trans-national trends and practices in the respective countries, specific cases of mutual interest.
 - Issues of concern and best practices in the area of immigration and border security issues.
 - Trends and effective management of issues arising from external conflicts.
 - Security of economic initiatives and projects of mutual interest.
 - Areas of Research and Development and Information Communication Technology.
 - The sharing of information on stability with regard to global energy resources, with special reference to the oil resources of the Middle East (risks, threats and opportunities) (IM22: 2004/07/21)
- 10.1.1 On 07/07/2004 the Liaison officer of CI13 reported that the SASS DG was to lead a delegation to Iran. The MOIS representative wanted to know the names and the seniority of the delegation from the SASS representative who was present at the liaison meeting.

10.2 Priorities regarding South Africa

10.2.1 Iran regards South Africa as a partner in international forums where Iran needs to brake out of its political isolation. In its Dialogue Against Nations initiative, Iran has engaged a number of South African academics to assist them in promoting the reformist views of the Iranian President. Although the available information on the Iranian intelligence requirements in South Africa is dated, it is suspected that some/most of the known broad intelligence requirements remained unchanged, namely:

- ◆ Political issues like the RSA's policy towards Iran.
 - ◆ The influence of radical Islam in South Africa.
 - ◆ Activities of Western countries in South Africa.
 - ◆ The South African media, including the print media, radio and television as well as the names of members of publishing houses, news editors, and journalists who report on the Middle East. (DIR: CI20: 03/03/2003)
 - ◆ The CI structures of NIA (DIR: CI20: 03/03/2003)
 - ◆ Nuclear technology.
 - ◆ South African mining industry.
 - ◆ Armament industry.
- Procedures to upgrade the C130 aeroplane. Iran has 85 C130 aeroplanes in service.
 - Helicopter blade upgrade from metal to composite. The technology to manufacture helicopter blades from composites is a leading edge technology. This technology is one of the unique features of the Rooivalk helicopter.
 - The manufacturing of turbine blades. This technology to manufacture turbine blades is a leading edge technology.
 - Kentron's abilities in the design, development, testing and evaluation of missile systems.
 - The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor.

10.2.2 The following interests were reported by the NCC on 16/05/2005 for a scheduled visit to the NCC from 21-24 May 2005:

- ◆ Satellite interception
- ◆ Thuraya interception
- ◆ Microwave link interception

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- ◆ Reconnaissance UAV
- ◆ Radio Monitoring and radio location system in U/V/UHF ranges
- ◆ Signal analysis and Data decoding
- ◆ Passive GSM monitoring
- ◆ Deciphering (secure mails, A5.2 * Algorithm)
- ◆ Tactical jamming
- ◆ Training

Other issues raised by the Deputy Minister are:

- ◆ RSA advice on how to deal with uranium enrichment programme
- ◆ Electronic warfare: Does SA have a defensive capability?
- ◆ Area of forensic science

The following companies were visited:

- ➔ Grintek Ewation
- ➔ Vastek

At Grintek the following information was conveyed to the Iranian delegation:

- * Electronic warfare systems and products for the global defence market (excluding self-protection Electronic Warfare). The focus was information warfare and information management in terms of ground based, shipborne and airborne SIGINT systems.
- * Security systems for the professional and corporate markets.
- * Turnkey logistic support solutions
- * Spectrum monitoring

At Vastek the following information was conveyed to the delegation:

- * Value Added Services Technologies that design and manufacture network based recording solutions for the worlds' recording markets for government and commercial applications in terms of:
 - Active Lawful Interception
 - Passive Unrestricted Monitoring

10.2.3 The Iranian company, Qods Aviation Industries Co, visited SA from 01 – 06 June 2005. The Iranian delegation consisted of the following individuals:

- * [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] at the University of Tehran)
- * [REDACTED] (He also attended the initial meeting on 2004/12/08.
- * [REDACTED] - Aeronautic Department Manager

They visited Advanced Technical Engineering (ATE) who is involved in the development/production of the VULTURE Tactical UAV System for delivery to the South African Army Artillery. Qods Aviation Industries Co, approached ATE (South Africa) to explore opportunities of collaboration on the commercial application of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The meeting was a continuation of an initial meeting, which took place on 08 December 2004 with Iran, based upon an invitation by the South African Minister of Defence, encouraging the industries of both countries to seek common ground.

ATE gave a presentation on the ¹⁶ VULTURE Tactical UAV System and also held a viewing session on the hardware.

The Iranian delegation provided a brochure on their range of UAV technology which include:

- * A UAV Surveillance System designed for reconnaissance and surveillance.
- * A Aerial Target System designed for surface-to-air armament training systems.
- * A remote control training model aircraft.
- * An UAV designed for target training of anti-aircraft gunnery systems.

It was agreed that the parties would explore collaboration in the field of UAVs that will include *inter alia* the following areas:

- * Automatic Recovery
- * Engineering Support
- * Target Drones
- * Upgrading of existing UAVs
- * Radar Seekers
- * Remotely Piloted Helicopters (RPH)
- * Flight Navigation Systems
- * Payloads (Day/Night Optical Sensors)
- * Training.

The CEO of ATE, Mr DE BEER, stated that Qods Aviation Industries Co indicated to him that they have already visited Denel and that they intended to depart on 2005-06-06.

Remark: Since Iran is internationally regarded as a country of proliferation concern, cooperation between Iranian entities and the South African defence industry should be carefully considered, especially in view of the risk of international sanctions against the industry when it becomes known that they are negotiating contracts on non-proliferation and arms controlled technologies with such a country.

10.2.4 In October 2005 it was reported by a covert source that an Iranian delegation headed by Mr ROWHANI together with a member of the Iranian Embassy (Attaché: Science and Technology) met with President MBEKI. The nature of the discussions was a request from the Iranian Government to the SA Government to assist Iran with their nuclear program and to provide technical advice and technology. The Iranians do want to procure nuclear technology from South Africa but the details are not known. In September 2005 the Iranian Ambassador Mr GHANEZADEH and Attaché POURNAJAF, visited President MBEKI again on this issue.

10.2.5 On 07 November 2005 it was reported by the SA media that Iran was talking to South Africa about assistance with its nuclear programme in a bid to solve a prolonged international dispute over its atomic ambitions. "We are in the process of negotiating on the modalities of this participation," Javad VAIDI, an official from Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told state television. He said that South Africa had suggested supplying Iran with uranium oxide concentrate that the Islamic republic would then convert into uranium hexafluoride gas at its plant in the central city of Isfahan. [SAPA, dd. 7 November 2005].

10.3 Possible Targets in South Africa

10.3.1 Deducing from the existing cooperation agreements, stated intelligence needs, personal profile information and the visits brought to SA arms industry companies, there could be a possibility that the MOIS could have access to:

- DENEL
- ATE
- GRINTEK
- VASTEK
- National Communication Centre (NCC)
- SASS
- NIA
- The South African media
- Department of Minerals and Energy
- Department of Science and Technology
- Department of Foreign Affairs
- Department of Home Affairs
- The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
- The pharmaceutical sector
- The chemical industry
- NEPAD structures

10.3.2 According to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, Iranian procurement activities indicate the establishment of small trading (import/export) companies in Europe headed by a director of Iranian origin. These small European companies are then utilised to disguise the actual end-user of non-proliferation controlled goods. They furthermore act as intermediaries between suppliers in Europe and end-users in Iran, possible also for the procurement of dual-use and/or non-proliferation controlled technologies.

Comment: The advanced level of SA's technologies in the aerospace industry, especially in the missile guidance field has increasingly become a focal point. Iran is lacking experience in this field and it is foreseen that these industries will be targeted for procurement purposes.

10.3.3 Information further indicates that Iran's ballistic missile development and production programs fall under the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). The AIO utilises the following covering names to obtain relevant materials and equipment:

- AIO, Commercial & Export Promotion Deputy.
- Helal Co.
- Sanam Industrial Co.
- Sazmane Sanaye Hava & Faza (SSHF)
- Shian Co. (CI30 DIR: 06/11/2002)

11. ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

11.1 During the 7th Iran-South Africa Joint Bilateral Commission, that took place from 21-22 July 2003, progress was reviewed in the mutual relations. Two working groups facilitated this process namely, the Political and Social Working Group and the Economic and Technical Working Group. According to a Memorandum of Understanding between SA and Iran that was to be signed in July 2003, the SA national oil company PetroSA and the Iranian National Oil Company were to work together on a "gas-to-liquid" project. Iran and South Africa were working together on joint feasibility studies in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors. The Understanding further covers trade, science, cultural, political and social sectors. (Business Day – 16/07/2003)

11.2 An suspect intelligence member, 18 [REDACTED] stationed in Cape Town at a cover structure has been identified during 1998. In addition, several suspected Iranian intelligence members or agents have been identified. They include [REDACTED] a suspected intelligence cover structure in Cape Town, [REDACTED] a businessman in Pretoria and [REDACTED] who, according to information was appointed by the Supreme Religious Leader in Iran to stay in South Africa.

11.3 According to sensitive information obtained by CI20, cover structures of the MOIS in SA are receiving funds from Iran via the Iranian Embassy in Pretoria. Suspected MOIS members under non-official cover structures in South Africa, are involved in handling and channelling the mentioned funds. The specific utilisation of these unspecified funds is as yet unknown. (DIR: CI20: 24/03/2003).
Remark: The mentioned suspected MOIS members are probably [REDACTED]

11.4 [REDACTED]
See Profile.

According to the MOSSAD (09/2002 and 11/2002), a MOIS operative is by the name of [REDACTED] is stationed in the RSA. His is allegedly involved in the oil refinery business and the carpet trade. No further information is available. He could however thus far not be traced or identified.

In a NIA Liaison Report dated May 2004 it was stated that the former LS 885 representative [REDACTED] requested the SASS DDG, Mr SOKUPA to arrange a meeting with the NCC to discuss matters of cooperation.

Comment: It is strange that [REDACTED] asked SASS to facilitate a meeting with the NCC as it is a domestic instance. SASS organised a visit by an Iranian technical delegation to DENEL and GRINTEK in 2003 without the knowledge of NIA. It seems as when they could not succeed in convincing NIA in organising a meeting with a domestic company, they try SASS to organise such a meeting (with proven success).

Concerns were brought to the attention of the Head FIS Liaison: CI13 as the NCC produces a very specialized and tailor-made product for the South African Intelligence Community.

11.5 **Suspects**

An undeclared intelligence member, [REDACTED] stationed in Cape Town at a cover structure has been identified during 1998. In addition, several suspected Iranian intelligence members or agents have been identified. They include [REDACTED] a suspected intelligence cover structure in Cape Town, [REDACTED] a businessman in Pretoria and [REDACTED] who, according to information was appointed by the Supreme Religious Leader in Iran to stay in South Africa.

[REDACTED]
See Profile in annexure.

Former DFA Chief Director Middle East Mr SALOOJEE, raised concern that a person by the name of [REDACTED] visited the Department of Foreign Affairs on an occasion. He was the former driver of a former South African Ambassador, Mr Zola MABUDE in Iran. SALOOJEE met him in Iran when he (SALOOJEE) visited the SA Mission in Iran. Currently [REDACTED] is working in South Africa in the pharmaceutical industry

(HIV tests) with a business visa. When meeting Mr SALOOJEE, he was however more interested in the situation in South Africa. [REDACTED] also indicated that he has 700 000 US Dollar to invest into his business.

Remark: It seems strange that a former Embassy VIP-driver could have 700 000 US Dollar to his avail to invest.

Mr MABUDE was later recalled and is now the SA High Commissioner in Swaziland. Mr SALOOJEE was recently appointed as SA Ambassador in Iran and has left for Iran at the end of April 2004.

The information received for October 2004 states that a NIA member, who was at that stage the SASS HoS in Iran, still has contact with this [REDACTED] here in SA. [REDACTED] informed the NIA contact that he is staying in Sandton Johannesburg and that he brought his family to South Africa. He has a business in the pharmaceutical sector and wants to sell his products to SA government officials.

Operation Akira was registered on him at the end of December 2004. The termination of the project was approved in October 2005 (a final status report was compiled and approved on 2005/10/18) as no espionage related information could be obtained to sustain any further suspicion and/or investigation.

At the time of Mr Zola MABUDE's return to South Africa, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both resigned from their posts at the SA Embassy in Iran. The [REDACTED]

The reason of the resignation of both was unclear. Instead of providing any reasons, [REDACTED] just stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Friends of [REDACTED] - former MOIS rep) Two friends of the declared MOIS representative in South Africa are doing an English language course in Johannesburg. Information obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is different to the information obtained from the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) Immigration at the Johannesburg International Airport from travel records. According to DFA information [REDACTED] is the surname and [REDACTED] is the first name. He applied for a work permit in South Africa. At Immigration at the Johannesburg International Airport it is indicated that he is on holiday in SA. The fact that [REDACTED] did not provide the name of school, which the two Iranian are currently attending, is suspicious.

A white female was also seen dropping two men off at the Iranian Embassy on two different occasions. According to SASS, during September 2004 (date not given) SASS operational members identified a white female dropping two men at the Iranian Embassy on two different occasions. According to the SASS operational members, the white female was driving a [REDACTED] with two different personalised registration numbers. The following are the details of the car registration, which was used by the person as obtained from obtained from the Traffic Department:

- [REDACTED] According to the Traffic Department the registration [REDACTED] does not exist on the NATIS computer system and is most probably false.
- [REDACTED] This registration number exists on the NATIS computer system and the identity of a female person was obtained and the particulars are as follows:
 - Surname : [REDACTED]
 - First name : [REDACTED]

> Date of birth : 20 [REDACTED]

According to information obtained from the travel record the person is using two different passport numbers when she travel abroad. The following are the details of her passport:

- > Passport Nos : [REDACTED]
- > Nationality : [REDACTED]
- > Granted South African citizenship with ID No [REDACTED]

The residential address of [REDACTED] s as follows:

[REDACTED]
Tel: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

OR

[REDACTED]

Information received from Travel record revealed the personal particulars of the spouse. They both travelled together to [REDACTED]. His name is [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] and he is also a [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

See Profile in annexure. A request was forwarded to SASS by the CI31 investigator for assistance with the investigation of [REDACTED] a suspicious Iranian carpet dealer in [REDACTED] Pretoria. It was proposed to SASS that a joint operation should be started with the investigation of [REDACTED]. The latter has regular contact with the Iranian Embassy.

[REDACTED]

See Profile in annexure.

[REDACTED]

See Profile in annexure.

[REDACTED]

See Profile in annexure.

[REDACTED]

See Profile in annexure.

[REDACTED]

The Cultural Section of the Iranian Embassy in Pretoria, in cooperation with the Department of Religious Studies and Arabic at the University of South Africa (UNISA), hosted a symposium focusing on "The Legacy of Imam Khomeini in the modern world" at UNISA on 04 June 2005.

The main speakers of the mentioned event were:

- Professor Yasien MOHAMMED - University of Cape Town
- Professor Yusuf DADOO - UNISA

SECRET

Shaheed MATHEE - 21 University of Cape Town
 F SEEDAT (X4) - Magistrate in Durban
 Moulana Aftab HAIDER - Ahl-ul Bait Foundation of SA
 Moulana Seyed Adbadallah HOSEINI - Director Islamic centre JHB
 Zakiyah Fareed - Researcher of Media Review Network (MRN)

Ghorbanali POURMAJAN VARJOVI the Cultural Attaché at the Iranian Embassy, [REDACTED] was involved in the planning and coordination of the symposium. REMARK: According to CI20 [REDACTED]

IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES AT IRANIAN SYMPOSIUM ON 04 JUNE 2005

- [REDACTED] - 2000 Chrysler Jeep Cherokee Sport (Green)
 Owner: [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] - 2001 Renault Clio 1.4 RXE (White)
 Owner: Jean-Marie LEBON [Attache (Press) - French Embassy]
- [REDACTED] - 2002 Kia Spectra 1.6 Exec M/T (Purplish Blue)
 Owner: Unknown (Was previously allocated to Mohammad Reza ZARE who was replaced by Mohammad ZAMANI - Admin Officer at the Iranian Embassy on 13/09/2004)
- [REDACTED] - 1998 Toyota Camry 220 SEI (Verdite)
 Owner: Unknown. Vehicle belongs to the Iranian Embassy
- [REDACTED] - Unknown
 Owner: Unknown. Vehicle does not appear on the DFA Vehicle Database.
- [REDACTED] - 1994 Toyota Camry (Gold)
 Owner: Unknown (Was previously allocated to Mohammad Hossein Zeraatgar GOHARDANI who was replaced by Ali Reza YAZDI - Attaché at the Iranian Embassy on 06/11/2004).
- [REDACTED] - 1996 Toyota Corolla AE 110 (Green)
 Owner: Akbar Khosravi NEZHAD (Attaché - Scientific and Cultural at the Iranian Embassy)
- [REDACTED] - 2002 Volvo S40 (Silver)
 Owner: Touraj JALALI (former Counsellor at the Iranian Embassy)
- [REDACTED] - 1998 Toyota Camry 200SI (White)
 Owner: Mohammad Hossein LATIFI (3rd Counsellor at the Iranian Embassy)
- [REDACTED] - 2003 Mazda Etude (Silver)
 Owner: Unknown. Vehicle belongs to the Iranian Embassy

Comment: It is suspicious that vehicles are still used that was registered to diplomatic personnel who were replaced in 2004. Especially noteworthy is that a vehicle was used that was allocated [REDACTED]

12. MODUS OPERANDI

Information obtained gives insight into the Iranian espionage threat against South Africa. It proves that these espionage activities are much broader than only espionage. Links between Iranian intelligence members and local extremist organisations and possible terrorist cells/groups were confirmed.

12.1 Cover as Foreign Affairs official

Assessing the modus operandi of Iranian intelligence officials it is observed that internationally the modus operandi of the Iranian intelligence community is to place MOIS personnel in Iranian embassies and consulates in senior diplomatic positions or as representatives of the Ministry of Guidance and Propaganda. MOIS officers appointed in diplomatic positions make use of different posts in an embassy or consulate, responsible for a variety of different functions. These posts include:

- Counsellor posts
- Cultural posts
- Educational posts
- Economic posts
- Press affairs (Communication).

The post of Political or Economic Attaché is utilised, depending on the region where the intelligence member is posted. The posts of Cultural Attaché and Ambassador, which are traditional cover slots of the Iranian intelligence community, have been utilised in South Africa.

The establishment of cultural ties with the host country opens the way for the establishment of Cultural Centres in the host country. MOIS members are then placed as Cultural Attachés in Embassies. Diplomatic cover gives the undeclared member freedom of movement to liaise extensively with organisations and cultural centres in the Muslim community of the host country.

Intelligence stations abroad operate independently from the Iranian Foreign Ministry. The MOIS members placed at these stations are not accountable to the Ambassador, but report directly to the MOIS in Iran. (01/08/2001).

A MOIS member being placed abroad under the cover of a Foreign Affairs official has the responsibility to make contact with an already established Hizbollah or Hamas cell in a target country, or to recruit members for a cell. This cell then receives training after which the targeting of an identified target, usually an American or Israeli target, starts. The subsequent act of sabotage / terrorism / assassination is carried out by members of the cell, giving the MOIS member deniability. The MOIS member selected for these type of task, usually has experience in handling Hizbollah or Hamas groups.

12.2 Non-official and deep cover

Non-official covers include Iran Air (the official airline of Iran), the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL). Collaborators in these organisations are regularly used for intelligence activities. Shipping companies are used for the transport of arms, however without the direct involvement of intelligence officers. Collaborators are utilized instead.

The cover of students, merchants, shopkeepers and bank clerks is also used for traveling overseas while making use of false names and false passports. The MOIS has frequently relied on the foreign branches of Iranian state-controlled banks to place intelligence agents abroad and to finance terrorist operations.

In South Africa, available information on certain Iranian individuals and some companies indicates that the MOIS utilises influential Iranian individuals, Muslim centres and businesses, to establish or expand a radical Islamic base within the broad community. Muslim organisations are utilised for logistical purposes (eg the arrangement of money, visas and safe houses). Collaborators and agents (local persons, mainly Muslims) are utilised to assist the intelligence operator in preparing attacks and providing logistical support. Once a volunteer has successfully been tested, he becomes a collaborator.

Links between suspected Iranian intelligence members and influential Iranian representatives in the Iranian émigré community have been determined. Especially individuals in religious cultural affairs and the Persian carpet trade are used as deep cover for intelligence activities. Visiting delegations are often exploited for intelligence purposes by including intelligence members who utilise these visits for contacting these individuals.

Muslim centres are also utilised for talent spotting and recruitment for religious training in Iran. Non-official representatives form part of this process. Training in Iran provides MOIS with the opportunity to do some talent-spotting to identify more militant students for further training in inter alia assassinations, sabotage and terrorism. These students are, on completion of their studies, sent back to their countries of origin where they are utilised for intelligence purposes.

According to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, Iranian procurement activities of sensitive proliferation materials relating to WMD, indicate the establishment of small trading (import/export) companies in Europe headed by a director of Iranian origin. These small European companies are then utilised to disguise the actual end-user of non-proliferation controlled goods. They furthermore act as intermediaries between suppliers in Europe and end-users in Iran, possible also for the procurement of dual-use and/or non-proliferation controlled technologies.

Comment: The advanced level of SA's technologies in the aerospace industry, especially in the missile guidance field has increasingly become a focal point. Iran is lacking experience in this field and it is foreseen that these industries will be targeted for procurement purposes.

12.3 Double agent operations

The MOIS makes regular use of double agents because this is seen as the first step of penetrating a foreign intelligence service. Iranian diplomats are encouraged to respond to foreign diplomats' proposals for cooperation. Such a relationship is then usually continued under MOIS control. All contacts with foreign diplomats must be reported.

12.4 Utilisation of the Diplomatic Bag

Both the Ministries of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Committees make use of the diplomatic bag to send arms to the Iranian Embassies abroad. These arms are then stored in the Embassy with the full knowledge of the Ambassador.

12.5 Meeting Places

The Embassy

The undeclared intelligence member in an Embassy mostly operates from within the Embassy and will preferably meet contacts inside the Embassy. Friendly, safe environments like Mosques or specially prepared safe houses are also used. A principle agent or a cut-out are sometimes used to meet an agent on his behalf.

Public places

However, public places like restaurants and parks were also utilised in the past. Sometimes meetings take place while walking through a public park or driving in a safe car as part of counter measures.

Third country

A third country is sometimes used to meet an agent. When the MOIS is unable to open an office in a country, it will try to run agents directly from Iran using a third country for agent-handling. Third country handling of agents forms part of the modus operandi utilised by Iranian intelligence members internationally. These third countries will be countries that Iranians can easily travel to.

Target country visits

An alternative option is to send intelligence officers to a country where MOIS agents operate for a meeting. They will then visit the country on an official visit for a short period, conduct the necessary briefing and debriefing or recruitment and then return to Iran.

Iran

Agents are sometimes send back to Iran for briefing and debriefing. This is usually done to reinforce an agent's motivation and morale.

12.6 Assassinations

The MOIS is not afraid to carry out assassinations of dissidents abroad as it is seen as part of its responsibility to promote the Iranian Revolution. From 1989 to 2002 the MOIS was directly responsible for 24 assassinations in Europe and Turkey. These assassinations were carried out with the approval of the President and the Supreme Leader, who is in charge of the promotion of the Islamic Revolution. According to an assessment by the BSIS in October 2002, it is unlikely that Iran will attempt assassinations of its dissident groups outside Iran or Iraq at this stage.

MOIS members placed abroad play a key role in the collection of information on potential targets for assassination. Although most assassinations were in the past carried out by MOIS officers or Iranian citizens trained by the MOIS, the latter also makes use of third parties to carry out these assassinations.. The arrest of Lebanese following the killing of Kurds in Berlin, Germany in September 1992 and the recruitment of Algerian immigrants by the MOIS in Europe, clearly indicates the modus operandi of the MOIS to ensure greater deniability.

12.7 Profile of intelligence member

12.7.1 The Iranian intelligence member is highly motivated and difficult to recruit. He is usually a courteous (polite), tolerant (understanding) and persuasive (believable, convincing) person with the necessary skills to handle or deal with agents. He applies counter-surveillance measures throughout/constantly.

13. FRONT STRUCTURES

13.1 Iranian foundations such as the Mustadafin & Janbazan Foundations are instrumental in exporting the Iranian revolution. The latter has powerful religious allies and large budgets. The Foundation Head usually travel on a diplomatic passport and forms a close link to the cultural centres in a host country. In South Africa the following organisations have been identified as suspect front structures of the MOIS:

13.1.1 THE AHL-UL BAIT FOUNDATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (AFOSA) ("FAMILY OF THE PROPHET")

It forms part of the Tehran-based Ahl-al-Bait. It is especially active in looking after the well-being of the Shia Muslim community in the Cape Peninsula.

Address : 2 De Wet Road, Ottery
 Postal address : PO Box 729, Cape Town, 8000
 Tel : (021) 704 1580

Fax : (021) 704 1581
 Bank account : [REDACTED]
 Business : To serve as spritual home for Shia Muslims in the RSA
 Personnel : [REDACTED]
 Note : A company by the name of *Gester G Pre-Paid Migration* is registered with the same address as that of AFOSA.

Background

The Ahl-ul Bait Foundation of South Africa (AFOSA) is part of an internatiuonal Teheran-based organisation, called Ahl-ul Bait ("Family of the Prophet"), which was established in 1990. The Ahl-ul Bait falls under the authority of Hojjat ul-Islam ali TASHKIRI, who is the Head of the Iranian Organisation of Culture and Islamic Relations (OCIR). TASHKIRI was a conservative Iranian cleric who reported directly to the Ayatollah KHAMENEI (Supreme spiritual leader of Iran and the Shia Muslims).

Although the Ahl-ul Bait Foundation describes itself as an academic research body for the studying of Shia Islam, the Ahl-ul Bait Foundation is internationally involved in:

- Promoting Shi'ism and increasing Shia influence in traditional Sunni communities.
- The dissemination of Iranian propaganda.
- Promoting the concept of the Iranain revolution.

The Ahl-ul Bait is especially active amongst poorer communities and will usually establish cultural centres or Muslim schools and will liaise with the Iranian Cutural Attaché, if the country has diplomatic ties with Iran. The Ahl-ul Bait also works in union with the MOIS to collect information, do talent-spotting and to radicalise Muslim communities. In Africa the Ahl-ul Bait has established itself in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

[REDACTED] and established the AFOSA with Iranian money with the aim to convert South Africans, especially the African population, to the Shi doctrine of Islam, as opposed to the orthodox Sunni doctrine. He started with religious classes at the Al-Jamia Usmania Mosque in Bonteheuwel. Until now [REDACTED] and the Ahl-ul-Bait Foundation have been active in promoting Shiism in the Western Cape through inter alia the distribution of Iranian propaganda material.

AFOSA has classes each evening till 22:30 during which the Quran is studied and prayers being said. [REDACTED] leads these classes and are usually attended by 100-120 people. It is rumoured that he is the spiritual leader to local activists. According to unconfirmed information students are recruited at Ahl-ul Bait for training in militant Islam in Iran and Afghanistan.

(REMARK: [REDACTED] has apparently received military training in Pakistan/Afghanistan and the Telegani Centre (Iran) and fought in the Iran/Iraq war during the 1980s). MOIS targets both Shiite and Sunni communities in foreign countries and uses foundations, eg Ahl-ul Bait to promote Iranian influence. It is therefore a suspected Iranian intelligence cover structure).

13.1.2 SILK ROAD INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS AND DISTRIBUTORS

It is a publishing and distribution house for Middle Eastern literature.

Registration no : 91/14198/23
 Address : 143 Long Market Street, Cape Town, 8000.
 Postal address : PO Box 2281, Cape Town, 8000

Tel : (021) 424 3650
 Fax : (021) 424 5842
 Business : Retailer of Islamic literature and Persian carpets, including the import of these items

Personnel :

Background

Silk Road was established in Cape Town in June 1991 [REDACTED] who had the majority stake in the company. Silk Road is part of a global Islamic movement that seeks to implement Islam as an ideology alternative to Western ideology. It has branches in the UK (London), Benin, The Netherlands, Dubai, Lebanon (Beirut) and also in other countries with extensive Muslim communities.

[REDACTED] is an Iranian who was tasked by the Iranian Ministry of Culture to set up the office in Cape Town for the dissemination of pro-Iranian literature and to provide assistance to pro-Iranian groups in the RSA. In January 1993 [REDACTED] returned to Iran and was replaced by [REDACTED] another Iranian national as Director of Silk Road. [REDACTED] had previous experience in publishing in [REDACTED] while he also did a stint as [REDACTED]

Silk Road has the motto of "Read globally, act locally" and has the broad aim to see the growth of Islam knowledge in local communities through the following:

- The establishment of links between Muslims in South Africa. This involves links with the Iranian diplomatic representatives. [REDACTED] had close links to the Iranian Embassy (Iranian Interest Section in Johannesburg) and had also contact with the Islamic Centre for Africa in Durban, the World Assembly of the Ahl-ul Bait in Rylands in the Cape, and The Islamic College of South Africa (ICOSA), which frequently uses material of Silk Road for research purposes.
- The import and distribution of Islamic literature. Silk Road offers a small but qualitative range of reading material. It sells directly to the public as well as to booksellers and opens accounts for customers with very easy repayment terms. Its Islamic literature is in English, Farsi or Arabic while stocks of tape cassetts and videos (Quaranic recitals, music, films), picture postcards, posters, art prints, art books and authentic hand-woven Persian carperts and kilms are available.
- The commemoration of local and global Islamic occations, events and personalities. Silk Road works with local Muslim organisations in hosting activities on religious Islamic events, eg
 - * 24 November that commemorates the birthday of H Fatima, the prophet's daughter and the exemplar to Muslim woman.
 - * International Qaris (those fluent in the recital of the Quran).
 - * Islamic Expos
- The promotion of media activities. Silk Road is the local distributor of international Islamic newspapers like Crescent International, Al-Alam, Teheran Times, and Kayhan International. Other literature includes journals like Noor Al-Islam, Echo of Islam, At-Tauhid, Mahjuba (for woman), etc.

The promotion of local publishing. Whenever Muslim writing is offered to Western publishers, it is not published. Silk Road invites manuscripts on Islamic and African issues and publishes, distribute and sell it to local and international outlets. Silk Road also acts as editor giving advice and recommendations for improvement. It has published 5 books of Achmad CASSIEM (Qibla leader and IUC Chairperson):

- * Iqraa: Freedom from Ignorance (1992);
- * Ramadan: Month of high intensity Training (1992);
- * The intellectual roots of the oppressed and Islam's triumph over Apartheid (1992);
- * Quest for Unity (1992);
- * The Begging Bowl (1993).

Remark: CASSIEM's books sold well because Muslims welcome his ideology and that he was seen as Allah's blessing to Muslims in South Africa.

Silk Road also regularly published a newsletter, Al-Hujjat, in which extremist viewpoints were expressed that popularised the notion of an Islamic revolution, based on the Iranian example. This newsletter was published monthly on behalf of AFOSA.

Silk Road employed 2 salaried staff in November 2000 and owned one vehicle. In August 1996 [REDACTED] arrived from Teheran to replace [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] and shareholder in the company, with the only other shareholder being a certain [REDACTED]

Though continuous investigations the following have been confirmed:

- A company with the same name as Silk Roads and also run by Iranians was uncocered as a front for the MOIS in Canada during the late 1980s.
- [REDACTED] is a member of the Iranian Organisation of Culture and Islamic Relations (OCIR). **Comment:** The OCIR resorts under the Iranian Ministry of Culture and its primary tsak is to direct and control the dissemination of pro-Iranian and Shia propaganda in foreign countries including the building of Mosques, Cultural Centres, Schools, etc.
- There was direct contact between [REDACTED] and
 - * [REDACTED]
 - * [REDACTED]
 - * M H BORIJAN-YAZDI (former Iranian Cultural Attaché in the RSA)
 - * Ismail COLLIER (senior Qibla and IUC member)
 - * MAHDAVI (former Iranian Ambassador to the RSA)

13.1.3 PERSIAN WORLD

Registration no : 95/50912/23
 Address : Three branches: 8 High Street, Bellville / 101st George Street, Cape Town, / Shop 36, Kenilworth Centre, 90 Chichester Road, Claremont.
 Postal address : PO Box 1873, Cape Town, 8000
 Tel : (021) 914 0777
 (021) 424 1414
 (021) 674 9997
 Business : The import and retail of Persian carpets and handicraft
 Personnel : [REDACTED]

Background

The mother company, Persian World, is situated in Teheran. [REDACTED] with whom [REDACTED] had contact (11/2000). [REDACTED] established Persian World in South Africa in November 1995 [REDACTED] and the only other [REDACTED] of the company. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Namibia, Botswana and Gauteng on several occasions. He had plans to open carpet shops, similar to Persian World in these areas. Persian World is, as far as could be established, a legitimate business. The suspect activities of [REDACTED] however attracted intelligence attention. He had been abroad for extensive periods.

In 1997 an unidentified person at Persian World provided [REDACTED] (member of Qibla PAGAD [REDACTED] with contact telephone numbers [REDACTED] on 01/11/2000 that [REDACTED] was taking over Persian World again. (Remark: It seems that the person was under the impression that [REDACTED] was not the owner of Persian World for some time).

13.1.4 PARS IMPORT AND EXPORT

Registration no : 93/15545/23
 Address : The Homestead, Kommetjie Road, Sunnyside, Fish Hoek
 Postal address : PO Box 22006, Fish Hoek, 7975
 Tel : (021) 930 8233
 Business : The import and export of Persian carpets. Imports are said to be from Iran and the UK, while exports are done to Zimbabwe and North Africa.
 Personnel : [REDACTED]

Background

Shortly after assuming the post of [REDACTED] proceeded to register Pars in June 1993. Originally Pars functioned from the same offices as Silk Road, but was later relocated to Fish Hoek. Currently the shareholders in Pars are [REDACTED] and a certain [REDACTED] the person managing Pars was reported to be another Iranian national by the name of [REDACTED]

According to unconfirmed information:

- Pars channels Iranian funds to Qibla (including the Mustadafin Foundation) and Pagad.
- [REDACTED] have direct contact with:

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13.1.5 MEANA – MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA NEWS AGENCY

Registration no : 95/17994/23
 Address : Old Mutual Building, Durban Road, Bellville
 Postal address : PO Box 2376, Bellville, 7535
 Tel : (021) 215 901
 Fax : (021) 215 902

SECRET

Business : News Agency
 Personnel : [REDACTED]

Background

[REDACTED] established the MEANA in Cape Town in May 1995 to provide objective coverage of Muslim affairs internationally. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (currently involved with Radio 786) are involved with the MEANA, with [REDACTED] being a [REDACTED]

13.1.6 IRNA – Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency

13.1.7 IRIB – Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Company

13.1.8 Information further indicates that Iran's ballistic missile development and production programs fall under the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO). The AIO utilises the following covering names to obtain relevant materials and equipment:

- AIO, Commercial & Export Promotion Deputy.
- Helal Co.
- Sanam Industrial Co.
- Sazmane Sanaye Hava & Faza (SSHF)
- Shian Co. (CI30 DIR: 06/11/2002)

13.1.9 IRANIAN GUESTHOUSE

71 Tyrwitt
 Rosebank
 Johannesburg

14. TRAINING

- 14.1. In August 1995 five MOIS members received training in the latest spy techniques under the auspices of the Russian Interior Ministry. It entailed modern techniques of espionage and counter espionage, investigation and psychological warfare.
- 14.2. According to unconfirmed information received in 11/2002 some Muslim Communities under the guise of Self-Defence Units receive paramilitary training in order to keep them ready to assist Muslims all over the world with their fight against the West.
- 14.3. The Zakariya Park Madressa in Zakariya Park in Johannesburg, has regular training sessions for South African Muslim students and foreigners in order to keep them ready for a possible Jihad against USA aggression in the Middle East.
- 14.4. In Port Elizabeth [REDACTED] is also facilitating training on a farm near Port Elizabeth. It is known that a lot of Pakistani citizens are attending these training sessions. The exact location of the farm is not known. **REMARK:** [REDACTED] was in the past detained by the Sri Lanka government for alleged extremist activities. [REDACTED] was responsible for establishing and funding Madressas in Sri Lanka. He was later released on a lack of evidence against him. He is currently in Port Elizabeth in the Malaba area.
- 14.5. In Kwazulu Natal [REDACTED] is running a special training camp for Muslim students. [REDACTED] stems from the Darool Vloom Madressa in Newcastle but was born in Cape Town. He is known to have links with the Taliban of Afghanistan and is a known

Mujahedin fighter. [REDACTED] is known for ³⁰ extremist views and is not scared to make militant statements.

15. **CONCLUSION**

- 15.1 A comprehensive threat assessment indicating the espionage threat posed by Iran can only be compiled once all available information (albeit dated in some instances) is assessed. The extent of Iranian intelligence involvement in South Africa, referring to the access and activities of suspect Iranian intelligence members and loyal supporters of the MOIS, via the official and non-official cover Iranian nationals and Iranian diplomats allegedly have, needs to be established.
- 15.2 Alleged links between identified Iranian nationals and extremist groups active in destabilising the Western Cape is an issue of concern. Indications that alleged front companies of the Iranian intelligence community are involved in pro-Iranian propaganda which is supportive of these extremist groupings (involved in anti-constitutional activities) and serves to morally support them, is another issue of concern that should be confirmed as a matter of urgency.

It is foreseen that close cooperation between this Desk, analysts at Chief Directorate IM22 and specific provincial offices will have to be established to ensure that all relevant Iranian intelligence links are investigated and assessed.



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