

Automated NOC Detection



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TOP SECRET STRAP 2 Challenge

 SDC 2009 – Challenged the Network Analysis community to automate the detection of Network Operations Centres



Phase 1: Intelligent Router Configuration File Parsing


- Routers have numerous services running on them that help identify the NOC IP ranges:
 - SSH
 - TELNET/VTY
 - SNMP
 - SYSLOG
 - DNS
 - TACACS
 - RADIUS
- Access to these services tends to be locked down by the use of Access Control Lists (ACLs)
- Configuration files provide details of how services are configured.






TOP SECRET STRAP 2 NOCTURNAL SURGE


- GCHQ response to challenge.
- Early Prototype that looks at only:
 - ACLs for SSH/TELNET
 - ACLs for VTY

















GCHQ / CSEC NAC Joint tradecraft development

- During March 2011 GCHQ Analysts visited CSEC to look at the using PENTAHO for tradecraft modelling working with CSEC NAC and CSEC/H3 software developers to see if could model NOCTURNAL SURGE in PENTAHO and then implement in OLYMPIA.
- Only possible to attempt because:
 - GCHQ NAC use PENTAHO
 - CSEC NAC/H3 use PENTAHO
 - CSEC NAC have implemented GCHQ NAC TIDAL SURGE Database Schema (DSD also have this..)
- GCHQ approach based on AS
- CSEC approach based on Country



Pentaho - NOC Auto Detection









Phase 2: Intelligent use of Metadata

- We do not always get full configuration files to parse.
- Services between routers and NOCs run on IP/TCP/UDP
- We do create 5-TUPLE metadata from our collection
 - GCHQ have prototype database 5-Alive
 - CSEC have database HYPERION



TOP SECRET STRAP 2 SNMP Protocol







SNMP Protocol in 5-Alive





Further drill down on activity for identified IP

17	udp	DNS (Domain Name System)	63226	53	2011-05-12	07:30:00	2011-05-12	08:00:00
17	udp	Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP	52096	69	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP	58912	69	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Trivial File Transfer Protocol TFTP	53438	69	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Network Time Protocol NTP	52096	123	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Network Time Protocol NTP	58912	123	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Network Time Protocol NTP	53438	123	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service	53438	138	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service	58912	138	2011-05-13	10:15:00	2011-05-13	10:45:00
17	udp	NetBIOS NetBIOS Datagram Service	52096	138	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00
17	udp	Simple Network Management Protocol SNMP	52096	161	2011-05-13	10:00:00	2011-05-13	10:30:00





Phase 3: Intelligent use of TELNET traffic

- Again we do not always get full configuration files. Phase 1 is based on full (or as near to full) configuration files
- GCHQ NAC collect TELNET Sessions into TERMINAL SURGE
 - Collection based on TCP Port 23 (TELNET)
 - Other protocols use TCP Port 23 (YMSG)
- Interaction with Routers over TCP Port 23 maybe nefarious:
 - Scanning
 - Password guessing
- Need to separate legitimate use from nefarious activity
- Look for signs of legitimate use.
 - Successful login
 - Follow on commands



From TCP Port 23 (Echo)





To TCP Port 23

```
舅 Untitled - Notepad
 File Edit Format View Help
 .....pu6TXXV
terminal width 512
show ip route isis
show controller E1 0/1/0 brief
show interfaces description
show ip route static
show interfaces | include Tunnel
show ipv6 route static
show controller E1 0/1/0 | inc Description:
show ipv6 route eigrp
show bfd neighbors
show ip route rip
 show ipv6 neighbors
 show ip arp
 show ip route local
 show interface FastEthernet0/1 | inc Description:
 show ip route bap
```



Intelligent analysis of TELNET traffic

- The fact that login was successful for both examples means the following:
 - From TCP Port 23





- To IP address is Network Management Terminal (in the NOC?)
- To TCP Port 23







 From IP address is Network Management Terminal (in the NOC?)



Phase 4: Bulk Port Scanning

- We know the key services/servers running in the NOC
- Utilise HACIENDA, GCHQ's bulk port scanning capability to identify what IPs have these service ports open – additional logic to build up confidence required.



Fusion of sources

- Aim is to bring all sources that help identify NOC IP ranges together with associated confidence.
- Different techniques provide different results due to the nature of passive access (international v's in-country for instance)
- Different techniques have different levels of reliability therefore looking to develop aggregation with overlay of smart intelligence.
- Solution can work on not just ISP NOCs but also Mobile OMCs.




And then....enabling CNE on NOCs

- We now have IP ranges need selectors of NOC Staff to enable QUANTUM INSERT attack against them.
- Use of GCHQ TDI capability to identify selectors coming out of IP ranges and/or identification of proxy/NAT within NOC range.




NOC IP range search in MUTANT BROTH





NOC IP range – Target identifiers for QUANTUM INSERT

Source IP	User-Agei			Non	Source		Identifier	Identifier	Event Count (%)
80,84,19,9		Date	Time	Routine Source	IP:HHFP	Source IP Geo	Type	Value	
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	Vicinities (Market III)	C	300/06	-				(4 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	17/05/11	00:02:54		80.84.19.9: d23bad41	50,83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LLM	Yahoo-B-Cookie		(4 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X								(2 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	17/05/11	00:02:59		80.84,19.9; d23bad41	50.83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LLM	Yahoo-B-Cookie		(0 %)
	Mozilla/4.0 (co								(1 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	17/05/11	00:02:59		80.84.19.9;d23bad41	50,83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Yahoo-B-Cookie		6 (16 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (W								(4 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	17/05/11	00:05:37		80.84.19.9:5eec974d	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		2 (14 %)
	Mozilla/5.0						Cookie		(0 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X	17/05/11	00:16:18		80.84.19.9:7d9134a5	50.83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		4 (28 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (X						Cookie		2 (18 %)
	Mozilla/5.0 (W	17/05/11	00:17:58		80.84.19.9:77387b02	50,83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		(3 %)
							Cookie		
		17/05/11	00:23:35		80.84.19.9:e4a90e3f	50,83;4,33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		
							Cookie		
		17/05/11	00:28:05		80.84.19.9:7d9134a5	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		
							Cookie		
		17/05/11	00:37:34		80.84.19.9:b36815d3	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		
			17-35-3-4-4-7-45				Cookie		
		17/05/11	00:39:55		80.84.19.9:f12897e0	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		
		11,00,11	00.03.00		0010411919111209100	00,00,4,00,0000000,72,17	Cookie		
		17/05/11	00:47:56		00 04 19 9 477-4721	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PREFID-		
		17/03/11	00,47,36		00.04.1979;477(4721	30,03,4,33,BN000EL0;BE; /LHV	Cookie		
		17/05/11	00.54.00		00.04.40.0 (00)	50.00 V.00 PDU0051 0.05 TV.	1531050050		
		17/05/11	00:54:38		00.84.19.9: 0Z3D3041	50.83;4.33;BRUSSELS;BE;7LHV	Google-PKEFID-		





Real-time picture of QI

