The airstrikes on the Daman building complex,
including the Tajoura Detention Centre, 2 July 2019

United Nations Support Mission in Libya
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

1

 The airstrikes targeting the Daman building complex, including the Tajoura Detention
Centre, Libya on 2 July 2019
1. Introduction
1.
Published jointly by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 1, this report
focuses on two airstrikes that targeted the Daman building complex in Tajoura, on 2 July 2019. It
is based on information collected, verified and analyzed by UNSMIL.
2.
Tajoura is a town in north western Libya, in the Tripoli district. The Daman building
complex, which is located in a former industrial zone, comprises various facilities belonging to
the Government of National Accord (GNA) 2. The complex is also the headquarters of the local
Daman Brigade, a pro-GNA armed group from Tajoura affiliated with the Ministry of Interior. At
the time of the airstrikes, according to the Department of Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM),
the Tajoura Detention Centre was holding around 616 migrants and refugees 3, with the section of
the hangar directly hit holding some 126 persons.
2. Methodology
3.
UNSMIL was informed of the airstrikes by Libyan civilians and security interlocutors in
the immediate aftermath of the incident. UN personnel conducted three missions to the Daman
building complex between 3 and 6 July 2019 to establish the facts and circumstances of the
incident, based on a standard of proof of “reasonable grounds to believe”. UNSMIL documented
witness statements and conducted a technical assessment of the type of munitions used in the
attack. The team that conducted the missions consisted of analysts, human rights officers and
experts on arms and ammunition. It interviewed 25 migrants and refugees (including eight
women and four children) at the detention centre, some of whom had been detained for almost
two years, as well as officials from the Tajoura branch of the DCIM, including its Director, the
Head of the detention centre, an official from the Tajoura Arrest and Investigation Department,
and a Ministry of Justice Legal Adviser. Following the airstrikes, UNSMIL was provided with
numerous photographs by different sources and video recordings by DCIM from the Tajoura
complex.
4.
UNSMIL examined the two explosion scenes, which consisted of the Tajoura detention
centre (comprised of a large hangar) and a vehicle repair workshop and maintenance facility
belonging to the Daman Brigade. On 19 August 2019, UNSMIL travelled to the Gathering and
Departure Facility, in Tripoli, where most of the survivors were relocated, to interview them, but
1 The mandate of UNSMIL, most recently extended by the United Nations Security Council on 12 September 2019 (Resolution 2486),
maintaining human rights monitoring and reporting. The resolution expressed “grave concern… at the situation faced by migrants, refugees and
internally displaced people” and reiterated “concern at the smuggling of migrants and refugees and human trafficking through Libya”.
2 These facilities include: components of the Ministry of Interior, namely the Tajoura Security Directorate and the Tajoura branch of the
Department for Combating Illegal Migration, including the Tajoura Detention Centre, the Judicial Police in Tajoura; the Tajoura Prison
(operational) under the Ministry of Justice; and the Juvenile Rehabilitation Centre (non-operational) under the Ministry of Social Affairs.
3 This report refers to “migrants and refugees” to cover the categories of migrant, refugee or asylum seeker, as well as any person who is not a
citizen, national or habitual resident of Libya (including stateless persons), as well as trafficked persons, smuggled migrants, and other categories,
unless specified otherwise. See UNSMIL/OHCHR, Desperate and dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in
Libya, p. 8.

2

 was denied entry by the armed group controlling access to the facility. UNSMIL regrets the
obstruction of its work, which occurred despite assurances provided by the GNA Deputy
Minister of Interior for Migration, on 6 July 2019, that United Nations entities would be granted
access to the site. UNSMIL was eventually able to visit the facility, but only on 3 November
2019. It was then informed that around 110 migrants and refugees at the facility, formerly held at
the Tajoura Detention Centre, were not yet registered with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and were awaiting UNHCR action to be relocated
abroad.
3. Background
5.
Based on the site visits, interviews conducted and the evidence obtained, UNSMIL
confirms that between 23:28 and 23:39 on 2 July 2019, a foreign aircraft conducted an attack on
the Daman complex in Tajoura, which struck two buildings in the complex. The first explosion
occurred in a vehicle repair workshop and maintenance facility approximately 105 meters
eastwards of the detention centre. According to DCIM officials, the vehicle repair workshop and
maintenance facility were overseen by the Daman Brigade and used to provide services to all
GNA security agencies in Tajoura. DCIM officials stated that the workshop had no connection to
the detention centre. The second explosion took place 10 minutes later and struck a section of the
large hangar housing the detention centre holding migrants and refugees. According to witnesses
interviewed by UNSMIL, both explosions were followed by the sound of a fighter jet. Witnesses
reported that they heard the sound of a drone overhead after the second explosion.
6.
DCIM reported that at least 53 migrants and refugees were killed in the attack, namely 47
men and six boys. Those killed were reportedly citizens of Algeria, Chad, Bangladesh, Morocco,
Niger and Tunisia. DCIM also stated that 87 male migrants and refugees were injured. Injured
migrants and refugees were transferred to four different hospitals in Tripoli, namely the Tripoli
University Hospital, Mitiga Hospital, Abu Slim Hospital, and the National Heart Center (also
called Tajoura Heart Hospital). Fifteen of those injured were returned to detention following
treatment. The management of DCIM was not able to provide the names of the victims, and
UNSMIL did not receive death certificates for any of those killed.
7.
Following the attacks, 380 migrants and refugees remained inside the Tajoura detention
centre, including 25 women and 15 children under the age of 12. Forty-one women were
detained in the facility at the time of the airstrikes, and whilst there were no casualties among
them, female migrants and refugees interviewed in connection to the incident showed signs of
trauma and anxiety. Migrants and refugees interviewed by UNSMIL confirmed they feared
reprisals and, therefore, did not provide names of victims during interviews.
8.
According to DCIM officials in Tajoura, all the casualties at the detention centre were
caused by the airstrikes. Migrants and refugees interviewed by UNSMIL alleged that three
fatalities occurred through gunfire.
4. Incident

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 4.1.

Airstrike on the vehicle repair workshop and maintenance facility

9.
On 2 July 2019, the first airstrike hit the vehicle repair workshop and maintenance
facility at 23:28. This was confirmed by DCIM, as well as video footage from a surveillance
camera on site. The airstrike damaged the structure. According to DCIM officials, the same
facility had been hit by an airstrike on 7 May 2019, resulting in the destruction of a vehicle.
Interlocutors of the Daman Brigade stated that combat vehicles and ammunition had been moved
out of the Daman complex in mid-April to avoid airstrikes.
4.2.

Technical examination of the workshop explosion scene

10.
Based on its investigation, UNSMIL assesses that the vehicle repair workshop and
maintenance facility, located 105 meters to the east of the detention centre, were hit by an airdelivered bomb. The facility is a one-story structure with a concrete roof reinforced with rebar
(metal). The explosion occurred on the roof of the eastern wing of the structure where it left a
hole estimated 2.5-3 meters in diameter. While debris remained visible at the time of the visit, it
was apparent that efforts had been made to clear up the area inside the building as earth-moving
equipment was in use in the vicinity of the structure. There were no signs of a secondary
explosion.
11.
From the damage and the lack of any crater on the floor of the building, it appeared that
the bomb had detonated on impact with the roof. Daman Brigade interlocutors stated that the
explosion had destroyed a pickup vehicle parked for repairs under the impact site and that the
remains had been removed from the site in the morning of 3 July. UNSMIL observed some
rounds of 23 mm ammunition on the floor of the building. Interlocutors reported that this was old
ammunition left at the start of the conflict. Imagery retrieved by UNSMIL confirms that a pickup
vehicle, equipped with a twin machine gun or machine cannon, was probably inside the
workshop at the time of the explosion.4 Other destroyed military-type equipment was visible on
site, which was likely destroyed earlier and, according to Daman Brigade interlocutors, also
dated to the onset of the conflict.
4.3.

Airstrike on the detention centre

12.
The second airstrike struck the Tajoura hangar housing the migrants and refugees at 23:39
on 2 July 2019. This was confirmed by representatives of Tajoura DCIM as well as video footage
from a surveillance camera on site. Three sections of the hangar were affected by the airstrike.
The second section from the southern end of the building – the section for men and boys –
sustained a direct hit and was completely destroyed, while the sections to its north and south
sustained light damage.
13.
According to migrants, refugees, and DCIM representatives interviewed by UNSMIL,
126 migrants and refugees were detained inside the section hit by the airstrike. Migrants and
refugees indicated that they were not allowed to leave following the initial airstrike and that
some who had done so were forced to return to the hangar that was later hit by the airstrike.
Moreover, migrants and refugees stated they were locked inside the hangar during the attack and
4 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/reader-center/libya-migrant-center-airstrike-reporting.html

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 that some in another section managed to escape after opening the doors. DCIM officials
confirmed to UNSMIL that the door of the section impacted by the airstrike was kept locked to
prevent migrants and refugees from escaping following the first airstrike, stating they had not
expected a second airstrike to take place.
14.
UNSMIL observed a large amount of rubble in the section of the hangar that was directly
hit, as well as a significant amount of blood on a damaged partition separating the different
sections of the hangar during its first visit on 3 July to the Detention Centre following the
airstrikes. DCIM reported that ambulance staff had already taken away all the injured and killed
to different hospitals in Tripoli and that the rubble had been searched for hidden bodies and body
parts. Security personnel on the ground reported to have collected many body parts. UNSMIL
personnel entered the blast crater and the smell of human flesh was palpable. According to a
respected international humanitarian organization that arrived at the Detention Centre one hour
after the airstrike, there were “bodies everywhere, and body parts sticking out from under the
rubble. Blood [was] all around”.5 Photos viewed online taken in the immediate aftermath of the
airstrike depict extensive destruction and blood.6 During UNSMIL’s second visit to the Detention
Centre, on 6 July, it was evident that the area had been extensively searched and some of the
rubble removed outside of the hangar.
15.
The surveillance camera footage shows some migrants, refugees, and DCIM personnel
moving outside the hangar between the first and the second strike. The footage also shows
migrants and refugees, and possibly DCIM personnel, carrying what appears to be a fire
extinguisher towards the site of the first explosion. At least one DCIM guard is seen moving
about the complex with a gun. Following the second explosion, the footage shows migrants and
refugees attempting to open from the outside a door in the remainder of the collapsed wall.
16.
In addition to the migrants and refugees killed and injured in the incident, 96 migrants
and refugees allegedly went missing after the incident, according to DCIM. Neither the Head of
Tajoura DCIM nor migrants and refugees could confirm this number to UNSMIL or provide
information on the whereabouts of the missing.
17.
Most migrants and refugees held at the detention centre during the incident were
relocated to the Gathering and Departure Facility in central Tripoli in the days following the
attack. On 6 July, UNSMIL was also informed by DCIM that it had returned 15 migrants and
refugees to Tajoura detention centre who had been injured in the attack and had received
treatment at a hospital.
4.4.

Technical examination of Detention Centre explosion scene

5 MSF published a firsthand account of the airstrikes as follows . https://www.msf.org/first-hand-account-fatal-airstrike-tajoura-detention-centrelibya
See also photos taken in the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes https://twitter.com/saracreta/status/1146184814841737217
According to an initial short Ministry of Health statement issued on 3 July the death toll was 33 deaths, with more than 60 injuries, see
https://www.facebook.com/179576752131176/posts/2323693921052771?d=n&sfns=mo .
UNSMIL would note that this short statement provided initial information and followed the visit of the Head of the Crisis Committee in the
Ministry of Health and the Under Secretary for Migration, Ministry of Interior. The death toll continued to rise in the following days
6 https://twitter.com/saracreta/status/1146184814841737217

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 18.
Based on its investigation, including examination of the munitions found at the site,
UNSMIL assesses that the Tajoura detention centre was hit by an air-delivered bomb. The
detention centre is a hangar structure with light masonry walls and a thin metal/fibre roof. The
floor of the building had a thin concrete base with sand underneath it. The entry point of the
bomb appears to have been in the centre of the hangar. The impact site was located at ground
level, in the middle of the second section of the hangar from a southern direction. The bomb
entered the building through the roof and most likely exploded on contact with the ground. The
crater measurements were 4.2 meters in diameter and approximately 2.6 – 2.8 meters in depth.
On one side of the building, the roof was totally destroyed. One large fragment of the bomb was
recovered from the crater, whilst other components found may be of the bomb’s tail assembly. At
the time of the UNSMIL visit on 3 July 2019, a Libyan forensic investigation, led by the
Ministry of Interior, was being conducted at the site of the explosion. UNSMIL officially
requested to be informed of the outcome of the investigation. At the time of finalization of this
report, this information had yet to be received.
19.
The ordnance used appeared similar in explosive content to that employed in the airstrike
on the vehicle repair workshop and maintenance facility. Due to the soil conditions at the site, it
was difficult to estimate the explosive content of the ordnance used. However, military experts of
the UNSMIL team assessed that it had a Net Explosive Content (NEC) in the range of
approximately 50 to 100 kg (TNT equivalent), with the overall weight of the bomb significantly
higher, suggesting a bomb of at least 250 kg.
20.
The entry points of the bombs at both buildings – approximately the centre of the
structures - suggest that the ordnance used was guided. There is however, insufficient evidence to
determine the type of guidance system used. Guided bombs of the type indicated in this incident
have so far not been known to be in the possession of the Libyan armed forces, LNA or armed
groups in Libya.
4.5.

Alleged shootings at the detention centre

21.
According to several witnesses interviewed, the Head of the detention centre entered the
hangar between the first and the second airstrike and shot dead three male migrants and refugees
who were trying to open the doors and escape from the building. Interviewees did not provide
the names of the victims or any other details, noting their fear of reprisals by Tajoura DCIM
personnel. Migrants and refugees also stated they had heard gunshots fired at migrants and
refugees who tried to escape from the complex. The surveillance camera footage shows at least
one DCIM guard handling what appears to be an assault rifle outside the hangar between the two
attacks. The surveillance camera footage, however, does not confirm whether shots were fired in
any direction or at migrants and refugees between the two airstrikes.
22.
UNSMIL raised the allegations with the Director of Tajoura DCIM, who rejected them.
While confirming that DCIM security personnel were equipped with guns, including at least
three AK-47 assault rifles, he stated that no DCIM security personnel had used guns to attack or
shoot any migrants and refugees at the detention centre. Other officials also denied these
allegations, as did other credible independent sources.
6

 5. Detention conditions and treatment in detention
23.
Migrants and refugees interviewed by UNSMIL reported that prior to the airstrikes; they
were routinely subjected to torture and other ill-treatment by personnel at the Tajoura detention
centre. They indicated having been beaten with various objects (such as water pipes, metal bars,
rifle butts and sticks), forced into uncomfortable positions (such as squatting for prolonged
periods), punched and kicked. UNSMIL monitors observed the serious consequences of the
squalid conditions of detention of migrants and refugees on their physical and mental health,
particularly as many had already suffered from traumatic experiences. The accounts of torture
and ill-treatment and the conditions observed at the Tajoura detention centre were consistent with
the findings described in the report published by UNSMIL and OHCHR in December 2018,
entitled ‘Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and
refugees in Libya’7.
24.
Migrants and refugees also stated that a number of them were forced to work in the
vehicle repair workshop, especially those with experience in vehicle maintenance. UNSMIL was
not able to ascertain the exact number of persons who may have been forced to work there. In
interviews conducted by UNSMIL in May 2019, two migrants and refugees had stated that at
least four migrants and refugees at the Tajoura detention centre were taken to the workshop and
ordered to repair damaged cars, load, clean weapons, and ammunition after the outbreak of
hostilities around Tripoli on 4 April 2019.
25.
On 6 July 2019, migrants and refugees remaining at the Tajoura detention centre started a
hunger strike, refusing daily food. They stated that the centre was not a safe location and
complained about forced labour. Some migrants and refugees reported being forced to work
inside the facility, including cleaning, cooking, offloading heavy items, and washing the vehicles
of DCIM officials. They also reported that some of them were taken out of the detention facility
to work in the port offloading military items.
26.
As previously noted, DCIM officials stated that the total number of migrants and refugees
at the Tajoura detention centre following the airstrikes was 380. They indicated that all had made
requests to be relocated to a safe third country due to fears around the current conflict. At the
time of the attack, many were registered with UNHCR and awaiting the intervention of the latter
on their behalf, including relocation from Libya. Following the attack, DCIM officials requested
the International Office for Migration (IOM) to provide food for the migrants and refugees due to
scarce resources.
27.
On 9 July 2019, all migrants and refugees were released from the Tajoura detention
centre on the orders of DCIM, and 316 made their way spontaneously to the Gathering and
Departure Facility in central Tripoli, whilst approximately 100 remained at the detention centre
awaiting transportation to the GDF.
28.
On 1 August, GNA announced the closure of three detention centres for migrants and
refugees in Libya, including the Tajoura detention centre. However, at the date of release of this
report, the centre remained open, holding 200 migrants and refugees. As of 5 December, 60
7 UNSMIL, Desperate and dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya, p. 44.

7

 persons of concern, who had been held at the Tajoura detention centre had either been evacuated
or resettled abroad by UNHCR.

6. Reactions to the attacks by Libyan authorities and the international community
6.1 Libyan authorities
29.
During a press conference on 3 July 2019, the LNA spokesperson, Mr. Ahmad Mismari,
reported that the LNA air force had conducted air strikes in the Tripoli area on 2 July and had
targeted the Daman Brigade site because the latter had received ammunition supplies.8 Mr.
Mismari added that in the night between 2 to 3 July, the LNA air force had attacked a legitimate
target in Tajoura following intelligence gathering on the ground. He stated that LNA was not
responsible for the second explosion that hit the detention centre, which he termed as a crime
carried out by terrorist groups. He expressed hope that an independent investigation would be
conducted into the incident.
30.
The statements of the LNA spokesperson were preceded by reports on pro-LNA social
media that LNA fighter planes had carried out airstrikes against an ammunition depot of armed
groups in Tajoura, blaming these groups for using migrants and refugees as human shields. Other
posts on pro-LNA social media claimed that the Tajoura detention centre had been hit by “mortar
fired from militias.”
31.
On 3 July 2019, GNA issued a statement condemning the attack and accusing the LNA of
having targeted the Tajoura detention centre.9 The statement described the attack as a war crime
involving direct, purposeful and precise targeting. The statement called upon the United Nations
to investigate the incident, welcoming the call by the African Union for an independent
investigation.
6.2 United Nations Security Council
32.
On 3 July, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary Di
Carlo, briefed the Security Council on the air strikes on Tajoura Detention Centre. On 5 July
2019, Members States of the Security Council in a Presidential Statement condemned the attack
on the detention centre and stressed the need for all parties to urgently de-escalate the situation
and to commit to a ceasefire. 10 They expressed deep concern over the worsening humanitarian
situation in Libya and called on the parties to allow full access for humanitarian agencies. They
further underlined that they remained concerned about the conditions in detention centres across
Libya, and emphasized the responsibility of the Government of Libya in this respect. The
Security Council also called for full respect for the arms embargo by all Member States, in line
with its resolution 1970 (2011). On 6 November, the ICC Prosecutor referred to the attack on
Tajoura Detention Centre in her briefing to the UN Security Council.11
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=neknSRTBcao
9 https://www.facebook.com/LibyanGovernment/photos/a.509963192457125/2284434691676624/?type=3&theater
10 https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13873.doc.htm
11https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=191106-stat-icc-otp-UNSC-libya

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 6.3 United Nations Secretary-General
33.
On 4 July 2019, the United Nations Secretary-General condemned the attack on the
Tajoura detention centre and called for an independent investigation of the circumstances of the
incident to ensure that the perpetrators were brought to justice. 12 OHCHR13, UNSMIL14 and
UNHCR jointly with and IOM15 also issued statements condemning or expressing shock about
the attack on the detention centre.
7. Applicable law
34.
A number of armed conflicts involving multiple parties exist in Libya. The incident
examined in this report took place in the context of the most recent ongoing round of hostilities
that begun with the LNA “march on Tripoli”. These recent hostilities mainly took place in the
context of a non-international armed conflict opposing on one side GNA, its affiliated armed
groups and supportive third States and LNA on the other side. In addition, a number of airstrikes
appear to have been conducted by foreign aircraft in support of LNA against GNA and its
affiliated armed groups. This raises the question of whether, in addition to the non-international
armed conflict, a parallel situation of international armed conflict may also exist between third
States supporting the LNA and the GNA.
7.1 International humanitarian law
35.
International humanitarian law binds all parties to an armed conflict. Libya is a party to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to Additional Protocols I and II of 1977. It is also a
party to a range of other international humanitarian law instruments concerning means and
methods of warfare. In relation to non-international armed conflicts, the provisions of Protocol
II, together with the provisions of the common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (“Common
Article 3”), are of particular significance. All parties to the conflict are also bound by the
provisions of customary international humanitarian law.
36.
The fundamental rules on the conduct of hostilities, found in international customary
humanitarian law, are equally applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts
and are the most relevant to the analysis of the incident examined in this report. They include the
principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attacks and against the effects of
attacks.

12 https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-07-03/statement-attributable-the-spokesman-for-the-secretary-general-libya
13 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24784&LangID=E
14 https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-condemns-strongest-terms-attack-tajoura-causing-dozens-civilian-fatalities-and-calls
15 https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d1c836c4/unhcr-iom-condemn-attack-tajoura-call-immediate-investigation-responsible.html

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 37.
The principle of distinction states that parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish
between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military
objectives and must not be directed against civilians or civilian objects.16 In order for an object or
building to be considered a military objective, it must meet two cumulative criteria, namely that
(1) by its “nature, location, purpose or use [it] make[s] an effective contribution to military
action” and, (2) its “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offer[s] a definite military advantage.”17
38.
The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks that are expected to cause incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. .18 Finally, the principle of
precautions in attack requires all parties to take all feasible measures to avoid, and in any event
to minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. This
includes: verifying that the target is a military objective and that the attack respects the
proportionality requirement; choosing weapons and timing for the attack with a view to avoiding
or minimizing civilian casualties; issuing advance warnings when feasible; and suspending an
attack if it becomes apparent that it does not respect the principle of proportionality.19
7.2 International human rights law
39.
In addition, to international humanitarian law, international human rights law also forms
part of the applicable legal framework. As such, Libya must respect its obligations under
international human rights law with respect to individuals within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction. In addition, non-state actors that have effective control of a territory and exercise
government-like functions must respect applicable human rights norms.
40.
Libya is a party to eight of the nine core United Nations human rights treaties, namely the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of Child, the International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It is also a party to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Accordingly, Libya is bound to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction. This includes
the right to afford an effective remedy to those whose rights have been violated (including the
provision of reparations) and the responsibility of the State to investigate and bring to justice
perpetrators of human rights violations. Libya is also bound by relevant rules of international
human rights law, which form a part of customary international law.
16

1977 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, Article 13(2); ICRC Customary International
Humanitarian Law Study, Rules 1 and 7.
17 Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2). ICRC, Database on customary international humanitarian law, Rule 9.
18 Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5) and 57(2). ICRC, Database on customary international humanitarian law,
Rule 14
19 Additional Protocol I, Article 57. ICRC, Database on customary international humanitarian law, Rules 15-21.

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 7.3 International criminal law
41.
International criminal law provides the means of enforcement at the international level
for egregious violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law, which are recognized as attracting individual criminal liability. Libya is not
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, pursuant to the Rome
Statute, the Security Council referred the situation of Libya to the Prosecutor of the Court in
resolution 1970 (2011). The Court in consequence possesses jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide as defined in the Rome Statute committed in Libya. A detailed
listing of acts constituting war crimes under the Rome Statute is contained in Article 8 of the
Statute. In the context of non-international armed conflict, these comprise serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the laws and
customs of international law applicable in non-international armed conflict. In the context of
international armed conflict, these comprise grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.
42.
A web of amnesties, immunities and defences continues to pose significant barriers to
accountability in Libya.20 Efforts by authorities undertaken since 2011 to remedy inadequacies of
the legal framework remain incomplete and include insufficient or inappropriate criminalization
of offences, in particular torture, enforced disappearance, arbitrary deprivation of life, rape and
other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery; failure to criminalize war crimes and
crimes against humanity; lack of codification of modes of liability, including superior
responsibility; failure to exclude the defence of superior orders for manifestly unlawful orders;
and expansive or overbroad application of amnesties, immunities and limitations preventing the
investigation and prosecution of crimes under international law, in particular crimes committed
during and after the 2011 conflict and crimes committed by public officials in the performance of
their duties.
8. Findings
43.
The Daman building complex includes installations and sites of the Ministries of Interior
(including the local DCIM branch and its detention centre, which have been located at the
complex for several years), Justice, and Social Affairs. The Daman complex also houses the
headquarters of the Daman Brigade and contains other military objects directly contributing to
the current hostilities, such as weapons systems, munitions and military vehicles. Personnel of
the Daman Brigade, which controls the complex, are administratively part of the Ministry of
Interior and carry service numbers and service ranks. At the same time, the Daman Brigade
maintains its de facto command structure, making it a hybrid security actor. The Daman Brigade
forms part of the fighting forces of GNA and actively participates in the current hostilities in
Tripoli.
44.
While it appears that the airstrikes of 2 July 2019 were conducted by aircraft belonging to
a foreign State, it remains unclear whether these air assets were under the command of the LNA

20 Accountability for serious crimes under International Law in Libya: an assessment of the Criminal Justice System, International Commission
of Jurists, 2019, page. 11.

11

 or were operated under the command of that foreign State in support of the LNA 21. In any event
the party under whose command the aircraft was operating is bound by international
humanitarian law. The first airstrike struck a vehicle repair workshop and maintenance facility
that very likely included an armed pickup vehicle at the time of the attack. Beyond small
amounts of 23 mm ammunition possibly belonging to the vehicle, UNSMIL did not find
evidence of other ammunition located at the site.
45.
The second airstrike struck the Tajoura detention centre, causing the death of at least 53
migrants and refugees and injuring at least 87. UNSMIL is not able to verify the precise number
of those killed and injured, due to the fact that bodies and body parts were strewn widely
following the airstrike, and the authorities have not provided a list of those injured and killed.
The above figures were triangulated with DCIM, UN and humanitarian agencies present on the
ground, including those present in the Daman complex in the immediate aftermath of the
airstrikes. The above figures are also consistent with the numbers of migrants and refugees
present in the section of the hangar that was directly hit.
46.
The Tajoura detention centre is a civilian object, albeit located in a complex which
includes other objects that may have constituted military objectives at the time of the attack,
including the headquarters of the Daman Brigade and a workshop and maintenance facility. The
precise location of the detention centre within the Daman complex was well known, and
UNSMIL had additionally provided its coordinates to the parties to the internal armed conflict,
including to the LNA Crisis Committee, on 5 May 2019. The airstrike which hit the detention
centre, therefore, raises significant concerns as to compliance with the principles on the conduct
of hostilities, in particular whether all feasible measures had been taken to avoid or minimize
incidental loss of civilian life, notably precautions to adequately verify whether the specific
buidings targeted in the complex were indeed lawful military objectives, and if the attack
respected the principle of proportionality.
47.
The Daman Brigade led by Adel Dridir, which controls the Daman complex, is bound by
international humanitarian law. The Brigade made insufficient efforts to protect the civilian
detainees under their control by locating the detention facility in a complex housing their
headquarters and other military objectives, which put detained migrants and refugees in grave
danger.

21 Both airstrikes delivered similar airdropped bombs. The UN Panel of Experts in its Tajoura report: S/2019/914 (page 126, paragraph 14)
established that: “until now, the only night operational capability for the delivery of explosive ordnance by the HAF [Haftar Armed Forces] was
the Wing Loong unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), and possibly the IOMAX Archangel. The HAF is not operating any assets under its sole
control with a night operational capability to accurately and precisely deliver HE A/C bombs of the type used in this incident. The attack on
Tajoura shows some of the hallmarks of the use of precision guided munitions (PGM), as the odds of two unguided ‘dumb’ aircraft bombs both
hitting the roofs of buildings, in what is a relatively under developed area in terms of low spatial density infrastructure, would be very low.
15.The Panel also has independent evidence from a reliable confidential source that an unknown number of Mirage 2000-9 fighter ground attack
(FGA) were using Al Khadim airbase, and Jufra as operating bases at that time. The HAF does not possess such aircraft types. A full maintenance
and weapons support team would also need to be provided by the supplying Member State, as the HAF has neither the training, equipment or
explosive ordnance types to support the operation of such an aircraft type. The Mirage 2000-9 has a fully night operational capable airframe, with
the capability to also deliver PGM”).
16. Therefore, the Panel finds it highly probable that the air strike was conducted using PGM at night by a modern FGA aircraft owned and
operated by a Member State, acting in direct support of the HAF. The Panel reserves identification of this Member State until further physical
evidence or imagery emerges to increase attribution confidence levels, and continues to investigate the circumstances of the air strikes” (internal
footnotes omitted).

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 48.
The failure by the Daman Brigade to remove the detainees from the vicinity of a potential
military objective or to remove military objects from the vicinity of the detention centre despite a
previous strike against the Daman complex in May 2019, which injured two migrants 22, likely
amounts to a violation by the Daman Brigade and GNA of their obligation to take all feasible
measures to protect civilians under their control from the effects of attack. This failure in no way
absolves the party responsible for the airstrike from its own obligations under international
humanitarian law of distinction, taking precautions in attack and proportionality of attack.
49.
In addition, the guards prevented detainees from fleeing the building following the first
airstrikes thereby preventing them to seek shelter. There are grounds to believe that migrants and
refugees could have been saved, and their right to life protected, had they not been prevented
from exiting following the first airstrike. UNSMIL collected accounts from migrants and
refugees indicating that DCIM personnel had shot and killed migrants and refugees attempting to
escape, although this was disputed by other credible and reliable sources, indicating the need for
further investigation.
50.
UNSMIL documented accounts that some migrants and refugees were required to work at
the maintenance facility repairing vehicles, cleaning and loading weapons and ammunition,
although it is not known how many migrants and refugees were involved. Depending on the
precise facts, such work may have constituted forced labour, in violation of Libya’s international
human rights obligations under article 8(3) (a) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,23 and potentially forced conscription.24 Furthermore, allegations of torture
received are consistent with previous findings at the Tajoura detention centre.
9. Recommendations
51.
To the parties to the conflict, particularly the GNA and the LNA, as well as any other
parties to the conflict and any relevant third States supporting either party to the conflict:





Conduct independent, impartial and thorough investigations into the airstrikes on the
Daman complex, in particular into the related alleged violations of international human
rights and international humanitarian law, including violations of the right to life, with a
view to ensuring swift prosecution of those responsible; and make the findings public,.
Grant adequate reparations to the victims or their families, and take all appropriate
measures to prevent the recurrence of such violations.
Fulfil their respective obligations under international humanitarian law, particularly those
regarding the protection of civilians, the principles of distinction, precautions in attack
and against the effect of attacks, and proportionality in attack, as well as the facilitation of

22 https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/5/5cd317644/move-refugees-tripoli-harms-way-urges-unhcr.html

23 Article 8(3) provides “1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be
held in servitude. 3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”. See also UN Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules), rule 97, provides “Prison labour must not be of an afflictive nature. 2. Prisoners shall not be held in
slavery or servitude”.
24 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions prohibit the recruitment of children. This prohibition is also found in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Convention on the Worst Forms of
Child Labour. Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, “conscripting or enlisting children” into armed forces or groups constitutes a
war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts. See also https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/reader-center/libya-migrantcenter-airstrike-reporting.html

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 immediate, free and unimpeded access for humanitarian personnel to all persons in need
of assistance, in accordance with applicable international law.
To the responsible Libyan authorities:







Conduct an independent, impartial and thorough investigation into allegations that three
migrants and refugees were shot dead by DCIM at the Tajoura detention centre.
Close all Migration Detention Centres, ensuring that released migrants and refugees
promptly receive protection and assistance, giving urgent priority to closing detention
centres located on or next to compounds controlled by parties to the conflict.
Take immediate steps to ensure that migrants and refugees are not held in the vicinity of
potential military objectives.
Amend Law No. 6 (1987), amended by Law No. 2 (2004), and Law No. 19 (2010) in
order to decriminalize irregular migration.
Enact laws that criminalize war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined under
international humanitarian law and international criminal law, and take necessary steps to
ensure that allegations of such crimes are promptly investigated and tried.

To the international community






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Continue to advocate with the Libyan authorities for the closure of all Migration
Detention Centres, with urgent priority to closing such centres located on or next to
compounds controlled by parties to the conflict, and ensure that released migrants and
refugees promptly receive necessary protection and assistance.
Continue to advocate for improved access for the United Nations, humanitarian NGOs
and other relevant actors to provide life-saving assistance and monitoring of all places of
detention. All efforts to protect and assist migrants and refugees should be made in full
respect of their human rights, including the principle of non-refoulement, regardless of
their status or nationality.
Ensure full compliance with the arms embargo, in line with UN Security Council
resolution 1970 (2011).