CACV3249
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN
Between:
CAROLYN STROM
Appellant (Appellant)
and
THE SASKATCHEWAN REGISTERED NURSES' ASSOCIATION
Respondent(Responden0
and
SASKATCHEWAN UNION OF NURSES , BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL
LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION and CANADIAN CONSTITUTION FOUNDATION
Intervenors (Intervenors)

FACTUM ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENOR
BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION

Delivered by:

Greg D. Fingas
Gerrand Rath Johnson LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
700- 1914 Hamilton Street
Regina, SK S4P 3N6

 INDEX
Page No.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

VI.
VII.

INTRODUCTION
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
SUMMARY OF FACTS
POINTS IN ISSUE
ARGUMENT
A. General Principles
B. Lower Court’s Standard of Review
C. Onus to Justify Infringement of Charter Review
D. Standing of a Profession
E. Monopoly on Criticism
F. Professional and Personal Roles
G. Social Media Context
REMEDY SOUGHT
LIST OF AUTHORITIES

IF 1
IF 2
IF 3
IF 3
IF 4
IF 4
IF 4
IF 4
IF 5
IF 7
IF 8
IF 10
IF 11
IF 13

 IF 1

I.
1.

INTRODUCTION
This is the Factum of the Intervenor, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
(" BCCLA") .

2.

This appeal addresses several procedural and substantive issues arising out of the
decision of the

Discipline Committee of the Saskatchewan

Registered

Nurses'

Association dated October 18, 2016 (the "Discipline Decision"). The Appellant's
application for judicial review of the Discipline Decision was dismissed in Strom v

Saskatchewan Registered Nurses ' Association, 2018 SKQB 110 (the "QB Decision").
3.

The BCCLA was granted leave to intervene to comment on the guarantee of freedom of
expression in section 2(b) the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"), a
ground of appeal summarized at paragraph 24.iv-v of the Appellant's factum . Freedom of
expression is "one of the highest constitutional values": RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola

Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002) 1 SCR 156 [Tab 1], at para 32. The Supreme
Court of Canada has consistently reiterated the fundamental importance of this right. It "is
. 'fundamental' because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity
of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the
individual": Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), (1989) 1 SCR 927, 968 . It is the
"the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"': Irwin Toy
at 968, quoting Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 327 (1937) .
4.

In brief, the BCCLA's submissions are as follows:
a)

The onus lies on a regulatory tribunal to justify an infringement of Charter
freedoms pursuant to section 1 of the Charter under the circumstances of any
professional discipline.

b)

When reviewing an administrative decision that justifies a Charter infringement,
the reviewing court must be satisfied that the decision proportionately balances
the statutory objectives with the Charter protections at stake, such that the

Charter protections are affected as little as reasonably possible in light of the
applicable statutory objectives . A proportionate balance in this case required
consideration of the following principles:

i. While the protection of the standing of a profession has been recognized
as a valid objective for section 1 purposes ( Whatcott v. Saskatchewan

Association of Licensed Practical Nurses, 2008 SKCA 6, ("Whatcott")

 IF 2

[Tab 3], leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 114, at paras. 6061 ), it should not be given undue weight and should be narrowly
construed.
ii.

Consideration ought to be given to the detrimental effect on the standing
of a profession where genuine complaints are suppressed through
disciplinary processes. A profession 's interest in its reputational standing
does not extend to a right to claim a monopoly on criticism of the
profession : Mooney v. Canadian Society for Immigration Consultants,
20 11 FC 496 [Tab 4] ("Mooney") at para . 114.

iii. Freedom of expression should not be limited by professional discipline
where the impugned expression arises in a personal capacity rather than
a professional one, absent evidence of reprehensible conduct on the part
of the member: Eggertson v. Alberta Teachers' Assn. , 2002 ABCA 262
("Eggertson") [Tab 5] at paras. 29-31 .

iv. Freedom of expression should also be analyzed based upon the context
in which the expression is carried out A personal social media account is
an informal forum for discussion where professional standards limiting
freedom of expression should be applied only with extreme caution.
Individual social media participation should not be subject to close
regulatory scrutiny merely because of a professional body's warnings to
its members regarding the use of social media.
v. In light of the above , limitations on freedom of expression based on
personal social media commentary should not be applied absent either:
1.

A direct connection to professional roles or duties, or

2.

Reprehensible conduct by the member within the meaning set
out in other case law governing professional regulation.

5.

These submissions are expanded upon below.

II.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

6.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section 7(2)(a) of The Court of
Appeal Act, 2000 , SS 2000 , c C-42 .1.

7.

The standard of review of the QB Decision is correctness. This Court does not owe any
deference to the QB Decision either in terms of the standard of review applied to the

 IF 3

Discipline Decision or the application of that standard. If the lower court applied the
wrong standard, then this Court may assess the Discipline Decision in light of the correct
standard. If the lower court applied the proper standard , then this Court must assess
whether the lower court correctly applied that standard

Canadian Union of Public

Employees, Local 59 v City of Saskatoon, 2014 SKCA 14 [Tab 6] at para . 21 and 22.

Ill.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

8.

The BCCLA does not generally take issue with the facts as set out in the Discipline
Decision and QB Decision.

9.

In brief, the Appellant Strom posted a media article on her personal Facebook page,
together with her own comments about the nursing care received by her father.

10.

The Discipline Committee concluded that the comments posted by Strom constituted
professional misconduct, notwithstanding the agreement of all parties that such a finding
limited Strom's freedom of expression . The BCCLA's interest in this appeal relate s to the
factors that ought to be considered by a regulator before making a finding of professional
misconduct that limits freedom of expression and, in particular personal expression.

IV.

POINTS IN ISSUE

11 .

The BCCLA's submissions address the following points:
a)

Did the lower court apply the correct standard of review and apply it correctly?

b)

What onus lies upon a regulatory body to explain and justify a breach of the
Charter guarantee of freedom of expression?

c)

What significance ought to be ascribed to the standing of a profession as a
consideration in restricting freedom of expression?

d)

To what extent is a proportional Charter analysis compatible with a monopoly on
criticism of a self-regulated profession?

e)

How does the context of personal expression (as distinct from professional
expression) impact upon the appropriate Charter analysis?

f)

How shou ld a proportional ana lysis of personal expression treat commentary on
matters of public interest on social media?

 IF 4

V.

ARGUMENT

A.

General Principles

12.

It was acknowledged by all parties that the Appellant Strom's expression at issue in the
Discipline Decision was protected by section 2(b) of the Charter. Discipline Decision at
para . 45. Accordingly , discipline in the present circumstances- and in analogous ones can only be permitted if justified based upon the application of section 1 of the Charter.

13.

The general principles applicable in these circumstances were discussed by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Whatcott, and clarified in Dore v. Barreau du Quebec,
(2012] 1 SCR 395 ("Dare") (Tab 7] and Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western
University, [2018]2 SCR 293 ("Trinity Western") (Tab 8].

14.

The BCCLA's intervention focuses upon the application of these principles to the
circumstances of this case and comparable cases.

B.

Lower Court's Standard of Review

15.

The standard of review that a lower court must apply to a discipline decision is generally
one of reasonableness. This standard requires intervention where the conclusion
reached by the tribunal is not reasonably open to the tribunal : Groia v Law Society of
Upper Canada , 2018 SCC 27 [Tab 9] at para . 122-125, 127.

16.

This Court's review of the lower court's determination respecting section 1 of the Charter
must be based upon the principle that the Discipline Committee was obliged to conduct a
proportional balancing of factors in the interest of ensuring that Charter rights be "affected
as little as reasonably possible": Trinity Western at para. 79-80.

17.

Consideration of the factors discussed below is necessary to arrive at a proportional
balancing of the interests at stake in this matter. To the extent the Discipline Decision
failed to consider and weigh these factors, it reached a decision that was not open to it
and therefore could not withstand judicial review. The BCCLA agrees with and adopts the
submissions at para. 8-14 of the factum of the Intervenor Canadian Constitution
Foundation as to the need for a robust review of administrative decisions that implicate
limitations upon Charter freedoms .

C. Onus to Justify Infringement of Charter Right

18.

The Discipline Decision recognized Whatcott in particu lar as a binding authority .
However, its section 1 analysis distinguished the precedent based solely on the question

 IF 5

of whether an individual was known to belong to a particular profession: Discipline
Decision at para. 49.
19.

The identification of factual differences between a given case and another authority in
which a Charter breach was not justified cannot serve on its own as a valid rationale for
limiting Charter rights. A decision that infringes Charter rights in reliance upon section 1
must provide a reviewing court with a basis to evaluate the analysis conducted, not
merely state a conclusion: Canadian Centre for Bio-Ethical Reform v. South Coast British
Columbia Transportation Authority, 2018 BCCA 344 [Tab 10] at para. 50-51.

20.

Nor does the fact that Charter-protected activities may be interpreted as breaching an
established guideline serve as a valid basis for failing to engage in a full analysis as to
whether a Charter breach is justified.

21.

Each step of a regulatory process, including the interpretation, application and
enforcement of regulatory requirements, must be carried out with a view toward avoiding
undue infringement upon freedom of expression see e.g. Alberta v AUPE, 2014 ABCA
197 [Tab 11], leave to appeal refused [2014] S.C.CA No. 387 (QL), at para. 63.

22.

At all times, an actor seeking to justify a Charter violation under section 1 - including a
regulatory body - bears the onus to proffer a valid justification for limiting a person's
fundamental freedoms

In order to be constitutionally valid, a regulatory tribunal's

analysis must engage in a proper section 1 analysis of the facts before it: Whatcott at
para. 55 This includes a proportional balancing of the factors in assessing the right at
stake and the proposed limitation upon it to ensure that any violation is limited to what is
reasonably necessary to achieve the actor's purpose Trinity Western at para. 80; Baars

v. Children's Aid Society of Hamilton, 2018 ONSC 1487 [Tab 12] at para. 179.

D.

Standing of a Profession

23

The necessary first step in a section 1 analysis is to identify a valid objective for the
proposed infringement upon a Charter right, which objective is then considered in relation
to the deleterious effects of the infringement

24.

The protection of the standing of a profession and its members may represent a valid
objective for the purposes of this test: Whatcott at para. 60-61. However, the significance
of this particular objective varies based on the connection (or lack thereof) between the
expression sought to be restricted, and the standing of the profession

 IF 6

25.

The BCCLA takes the position that the infringement of Charter rights based solely on the
objective of upholding the standing of the profession or reputation of other members
should be approached with particular caution. To the extent members of a profession are
subject to discipline for failing to err on the side of suppressing honestly-held concerns
about the system in which they work, the result would be detrimental both to the
members so disciplined, and to the regulatory system as a whole.

26.

Indeed, he advocacy for systemic improvements as a means of achieving the goals of a
profession is a key form of expression that ought not to be silenced. See by way of
analogy Canada Without Poverty v. AG Canada, 2018 ONSC 4147 [Tab 13] at para 3942 In that case, Morgan J. concluded that a limitation on political speech imposed by the

Income Tax Act on registered charities could not be justified, particularly as the limitation
in issue was based on no purpose other than limiting freedom of expression for its own
sake: para. 62.
27.

As Abella J. held in Dare at para. 66 and 69, the standard to be applied in assessing the
reasonableness of professional discipline must be grounded in public interests and
expectations, which are to be considered alongside the individual member's freedom of
expression:
We are, in other words, balancing the fundamental importance of open, and even
forceful, criticism of our public institutions with the need to ensure civility in the
profession. Disciplinary bodies must therefore demonstrate that they have given
due regard to the importance of the expressive rights at issue, both in light of an
individual lawyer's right to expression and the public's interest in open
discussion. As with all disciplinary decisions, this balancing is a fact-dependent
and discretionary exercise.

A reprimand for a lawyer does not automatically flow from criticizing a judge or
the judicial system. As discussed, such criticism, even when it is expressed
robustly, can be constructive. However in the context of disciplinary hearings,
such criticism will be measured against the public's reasonable expectations of a
lawyer's professionalism ...
28.

The use of disciplinary processes to suppress good-faith discussions of public policy even where these may include criticism of other professionals - is thus antithetical to the
public interest role of a regulator

29

The use of professional discipline for this purpose serves to favour the private interest of
regulatory bodies in avoiding criticism over the public interest in transparency. But even
this benefit may prove illusory to the extent the entire profession then bears the
reputational costs of being perceived to impose a code of silence upon its members.

 IF 7

30.

In this respect, the Discipline Decision makes specific reference to the possibility that the
Appellant might have attempted to pursue a separate "whistle-blower" defence, but
dismisses this possibility based on her failing to follow what it viewed to be the proper
channels for reporting: Discipline Decision at para 40-41.

31.

It is not clear what role this alternative line of analysis may have played in the outcome of
the Discipline Decision. However, the alternative defences that might be theoretically
available to a member accused of professional misconduct should not be treated as a
basis for dispensing with the proportionality analysis necessary to justify a breach of
Charter freedoms.

E.

Monopoly on Criticism

32.

An individual's freedom to offer open criticism of public institutions should not be
overridden merely by a desire to suppress that criticism: Dare at para. 66.

33

Indeed, it is questionable whether a limitation of expression on issues of administration
and policy is even rationally connected to the goal of ensuring respect for the status and
standing of a profession, let alone proportional to the purpose.

34.

In this respect, see Mooney as to the dangers of allowing a professional regulatory body
to monopolize debate about issues affecting a profession:
The Letter is obviously composed by people who want to see improved
protection of the public from unconscionable and unqualified immigration
consultants and improved regulation of the profession There can be legitimate
disagreement about the best way to fulfill and further the regulator's mandate and
governing principles, but the present officers of CSIC do not have a monopoly on
that discussion. In disciplining Mr. Mooney in this way, they are attempting to
prevent CSIC members from advancing opinion on how CSIC can better fulfill its
mandate and governing principles if that opinion does not accord with their own.
In my view, this is not a legitimate use of CSIC's Rules of Professional
Conduct..

35

See to a similar effect Waddell v. Weeneebayko Area Health Authority, 2018 ONSC 4535
[Tab 14] at para. 21-22. There, Swinton J. distinguished between concerns with respect
to the sharing of confidential patient information, which might properly form the subject
matter of a professional complaint, and comments on issues of health care in the
community whose curtailment could not be justified (there through an injunction
application).

 IF 8

F.

Professional and Personal Roles

36.

Prior cases that have upheld professional discipline in the face of the Charter guarantee
of freedom of expression have generally involved fact scenarios in which the impugned
speech results in specific harm by calling into question the member's suitability to
perform work. See in this respect Kempling v. British Columbia College of Teachers,
2005 BCCA 327, leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.CA 381 [Tab 15], at para. 79; Ross

v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825 [Tab 16] at para. 100.
37.

In cases such as these, any perceived limitations on expression are best seen as
ancillary to the more fundamental issue of the member's ability to meet the standards of a
profession without discrimination based on the matters discussed in the member's
expression. The impugned statements serve primarily as evidence of a basis for concern
about the public interest in the member's proper and unbiased performance of work
within the profession

38.

Another line of cases has involved discipline for the on-duty conduct of professionals.
These cases conclude that the standing of a profession may be substantially affected by
expression (a) which is made in a professional capacity, and/or (b) which abusively or
offensively calls into question the suitability of the member or of other members of the
profession to carry on work in the public interest

See in this respect Histed v. Law

Society of Manitoba, 2007 MBCA 150 at para. 75, leave to appeal refused 2008 S.C.CA
No. 67 [Tab 17]; Dare at para. 69-70.
39.

These particular circumstances may result in a finding that limitations on free expression
are justified. The BCCLA submits, however, that infringement upon an individual's
freedom of expression will rarely be justified on a proper proportional analysis where
professional discipline arises out of expression that does not relate to the member's
professional workplace, whether in its origin or its effect

40

The distinction between conduct in a professional context and other conduct by a
licensed professional has given rise to the requirement for a regulatory tribunal to find
"reprehensible" behaviour in order to justify professional discipline for non-professional
conduct: Ratsoy v. Architectural Institute of British Columbia, 1980 Canlll 662 (BC SC)
[Tab 18] at para. 12, recently adopted with approval by the Alberta Court of Appeal in

Erdmann v. Complaints Inquiry Committee, 2013 ABCA 147 at para. 28, leave to appeal
refused [2013] S C.CA No. 230.
41.

In this respect, a distinction has been -and ought to be- drawn between a person being
known to be a member of a profession but commenting in a personal capacity and a

 IF 9

professional commenting in a professional capacity. See in particular Nova Scotia

Barristers' Society v. Morgan, 2010 NSBS 1 [Tab 19], where the Hearing Committee
expressly identified the respondent's comments at issue as offensive and contrary to the
professional conduct guidelines governing lawyers, but held that they did not constitute
professional misconduct since they were made in his personal capacity.
42.

Fundamentally, an individual's profession should not be taken to require silence in the
face of concerns about personal matters, especially family or private matters, even where
those concerns intersect with the individual's fellow professionals.

43.

In Eggerlson, the appellant had been found guilty of unprofessional conduct for making
comments critical of her children's teachers from the previous year. The Alberta Court of
Appeal held that decision to be unreasonable, holding as follows at para. 29-31:
In our view, it was unreasonable for the Committee and the PCAC to adopt a
literal interpretation of s. 13 in these circumstances. That interpretation effectively
deprived the appellant of her parental right under the School Act, the orders and
regulations made pursuant to it, and the regulations of the C.B.E. to participate
fully in the education of her children. It is a handicap not shared by parents who
are not also teachers. In short, an interpretation and application of s. 13 which
deprives parents of their right to participate fully in their children's education
simply because they are also teachers and members of the ATA is unreasonable
and cannot be sustained.
We do not say that s. 13 has no application to teachers who happen to also be
parents and who may feel they have reason to speak critically of their children's
teachers. It is a question of context In this case, the critical comments were
made on occasions which were exclusively devoted to issues of the educational
well-being of the appellant's children. The appellant's comments were directed to
the subject-matter of the meetings, that is, they were in respect of her children's
academic progress. The comments were not intemperate The individuals in
whose presence the comments were made shared the appellant's concern for
the children's progress. They were not disinterested members of the public.
The PCAC implied a parent -teacher may only criticize his or her child's present
or former teacher by following the procedure fixed by s. 13. That would place
parents who are also teachers at a disadvantage in communicating with their
children's teachers and discourage the free and candid exchange of information
and ideas between parents and teachers which is recognized by the School Act
and the C B. E. as a vital part of the education process.

44.

The authorities cited above recognize that in extreme cases supported by a complete
proportionality analysis, non-professional speech may give rise to valid professional
discipline. However, they also recognize that a strong presumption should be applied both by regulatory tribunals and courts reviewing their decisions - to the effect that
personal expression will not be treated as routinely calling for the use of disciplinary
sanctions on a proper proportionality analysis

 IF 10

45.

In light of all of the above, professional discipline that limits freedom of expression based
on personal social media commentary should not be applied absent either a direct
connection to professional roles or duties, or reprehensible conduct by the member within
the meaning set out in other case law governing professional regulation.

G.

Social Media Context

46.

Finally, the Discipline Decision discusses an expectation that members will consider
themselves bound to follow a restrictive approach to all posting on social media
platforms: para. 56-57. The BCCLA takes the position that such an expectation is not
reasonable in light of the ubiquity of social media as a developing forum for discussions
of personal and public importance and ought not to be a relevant factor in a section
proportionality analysis.

47.

Whether they make or receive communications on social media, users are aware that
social media is a means to facilitate the sharing of information and news among family,
friends and acquaintances, much like a discussion over a cup of coffee. In that regard,
cases have applied basic knowledge of specific online media as a matter of either judicial
notice or expert evidence. See e.g. Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686 [Tab 20] at
para. 80-83, cited with approval in Law Society of Saskatchewan v Siekawitch, 2016
SKQB 345 at para. 19; R. v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35 [Tab 21] in a criminal law context, and
Bag/ow v. Smith, 2015 ONSC 1175 [Tab 22] ("Bag/ow") in a defamation context

48.

Bag/ow is of particular note in identifying the attributes of online discussion fora that

require the relaxation of expectations that apply to other media. At para. 170, Polowin J.
cited the following from Eady J. in Smith v. ADVFN Pic & Ors [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB):
This has been explained in the material before me and is, in any event,
nowadays a matter of general knowledge. Particular characteristics which I
should have in mind are that they are read by relatively few people, most of
whom will share an interest in the subject-matter; they are rather like
contributions to a casual conversation (the analogy sometimes being drawn with
people chatting in a bar) which people simply note before moving on; they are
often uninhibited, casual and ill thought out; those who participate know this and
expect a certain amount of repartee or "give and take".
49.

A defensible analysis of an infringement upon free expression in the social medial context
must thus recognize the distinction between the standards of formality and restraint
expected in workplace communications between regulated professionals, and those of
"people chatting in a bar".

50.

The need to avoid undue limitations upon individual speech in social media is particularly
strong in the case of speech regarding the operation of public institutions, which is at the

 IF 11

core of the section 2(b) protection : Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General},
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [Tab 23] at p. 1336.
51 .

The BCCLA takes the position that notifications sent to members of a profession
regarding their use of personal social media (such as those relied upon in the Discipline
Decision) shou ld not be taken as displacing an individual's ability to engage in personal
expression in a medium common ly used for the casual, informal discussion of issues of
public importance.

52 .

To the contrary, the reality that social media platforms are predominantly a venue for
casual conversation rather than professional discourse ought to militate against their
being policed strictly by professional regulatory bodies, or treated as a basis for
professional discipline absent either a direct connection to professional roles or duties, or
reprehensible conduct by the member within the meaning set out in other case law
governing professional regulation.

IV.

REMEDY SOUGHT

53.

Freedom of expression is recognized as one of the most fundamental rights in Canadian
society. Professional discipline that limits freedom of expression based on personal social
media commentary shou ld not be applied absent either a direct connection to
professional roles or duties, or reprehensible conduct by the member within the meaning
set out in other case law governing professional regulation.

54.

The BCCLA seeks that the above principles be taken into account in this Honourable
Court's determination of this appeal.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Dated at Regina, Saskatchewan this '21~+' day of June, 2019.
Gerrand Rath Johnson LLP

Per Gr~PingS
~~
Solicitor for the Intervenor
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association

 IF 12

This document was delivered by:
Gerrand Rath Johnson LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
#700 , 1914 Hamilton Street
Regina, SK S4P 3N6
Lawyer in Charge of File:
Telephone No.:
Facsimile No. :
File No.:

Greg D. Fingas
(306) 522 -3030
(305) 522-3555
614410.001 GOF

 IF 13

VII

List of Authorities

Tab

Authority

1
2
3
4
5

Alberta v AUPE, 2014 ABCA 197
Baars v. Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton, 2018 ONSC 1487
Baglow v. Smith, 2015 ONSC 1175
Canada Without Poverty v. AG Canada, 2018 ONSC 4147
Canadian Centre for Bio-Ethical Reform v. South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority,
2018 BCCA 344
Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 59 v City of Saskatoon, 2014 SKCA 14
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 SCR 395
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326
Eggertson v. Alberta Teachers’ Assn., 2002 ABCA 262
Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27
Histed v. Law Society of Manitoba, 2007 MBCA 150
Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 968
Kempling v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2005 BCCA 327
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] 2 SCR 293
Mooney v. Canadian Society for Immigration Consultants, 2011 FC 496
Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society v. Morgan, 2010 NSBS 1
Pritchard v. Van Nes, 2016 BCSC 686
R. v. Elliott, 2016 ONCJ 35
Ratsoy v. Architectural Institute of British Columbia, 1980 CanLII 662 (BC SC)
Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825
RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 SCR 156
Waddell v. Weeneebayko Area Health Authority, 2018 ONSC 4535
Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Association of Licensed Practical Nurses, 2008 SKCA 6

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23