t*yw suPERroR ii[li.illldirfi'ffi COLUMBIA Criminal Division - fitony'brancn couRr "r UNrrEDsrATEsorAMERrcA l0ll llAg -l p I, l0 : 1! 1-#"|} o. 2otz czz2o4zt Hon. Judge StuartNash Trial date: March ll,2013 v. DAVII} ROBINSON Mr' David Robinson, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the united states constitution, superior cogrt Rules of criminal Procedure 12 and 47-I, Miranda v. Arizona,3g4 u.s. 436 (rg66),and related case law, respectfully moves this court to suppress all statements made by Mr. Robinson in connection with this matter, including the statsments allegedly made to MpD on May l r,2012 and November 27,2012' counsel requests a hearing on this motion. ln support of this motion, counsel states the following: I' Mr' Robinson is charged by indictment with one count carrying a pistol without a license, one count of possession of an unregistered firearm, and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition' These charges stem fiom allegations that Mr. Robinson possessed a handgun on or about January 2' 3,2orz. Trial is presently set for upon information and belie( Mr. Robinson was unlawfully seized and arested on May 17,2012-t Folowing this unlawful seizure, Mr. Robinson was questioned by MpD detectives for several hours while at the police station on I March rr,2or3. May ll,2olz. During the counsel has limited information about the circumstances ofthis arest and thus reserves the right to supplement this motion upon receiving additional disclosures by the govemment. several-hour interrogation, Mr. Robinson stated that in January of 2012 he shot Howard Sampler. Mr. Robinson explained that he fired the gun only after Mr. Sampler threatened his life, brandished a gun, and physically assaulted him. Mr. Robinson explained that he feared for his life and did not have any intention of shooting Mr. Sampler; however, when his life was threatened, he stated that he closed his eyes and shot several times in self-defense until he saw that Mr. Sampler no longer had a gun in his hands. On NovembEURr 27,2012, Mr. Robinson was again questioned by the same detectives regarding the circumstances of the shooting of Howard Sampler. During the second inte,rrogation, the detectives repeatedly referenced the statements made during the first intenogation and confronted Mr. Robinson with evidence gathered during the course of the police investigation. 3. The statements made by Mr. Robinson to MPD detectives on May 11,2012 and Novenrber 27,2012 are fruits of the illegal seizure of Mr. Robinson on May 11,2012, Thus, any staternents allegedly made by Mr. Robinson after his initial seizure - both in May of 2012 and November of 2012 -must be suppressed as fnrits of the illegal state action. 4. The Court should regardless suppress any statements allegedly made by Mr. Robinson because they were elicited by the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Both sets of statements made by Mr. Robinson were in response to custodial intemogation. Because IvIr. Robinson did not voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently waive his rights as required by Miranda on either occasion, such statements should be suppressed. Moreover, the statements allegedly made by Mr. Robinson were involuntary and were thus taken in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the united states constitution' For this reason' the court should suppress the use of these alleged statements for all pulposes at trial. I. THE STATEMENTS IUADE MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS FRUITS OF AII ILLEGAL SEIZURE Probable cause is a necessary prerequisite to u's' a[ arrests. Sqg @, ++z 200 (1979)' where the government acts without a warrant, it bears the burden its conduct. Marcolm v. united states ,332 ofjusti$ing A.zdgt7,grg(D.C. lg75). "[o]therwise there would be little incentive for law enforcement agencies to bother with the formality of a warrant; moreover' the evidence comprising probable cause is pecuriarly within the knowledge and conhol of the police." Brown y. united states, 5g0 A.2d r00g, 1013 (D.C. l9g1) (citing Malcolm' 332 A'2dat 918)- upon information and belief, the officers who arrested Mr. Robinson on May that ll,zolzlacked probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed or Mr' Robinson had committed it.2 The officers had not and had no personal knowledge statements elicited on May they must be suppressed at ,,. Mr. Robinson commit any crime of Mr. Robinson committing any crime. Because the two ll,2ol2 tail- seen and Novemb er27,2l02are tuits ofthat illegal seizure, see wong sun v. united states, 371 u.s. 47t,4gg(1963). MR. ROBINSON'S STATEMENTS WERE OBTAINED IN YIOLATION OF HIS Frr,TH AMENDMENT RrcrrTs AS SET roRiH N@ The supreme court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 3g4 u.s. 436 (1g66),that before the government may use a defendant's statetnents obtained during custodial interrogation, it must 2 counsel has not been ll'2012 i""Hil: - provid{ yim any discovery related to the arrest of Mr. Robinson on May and thus is unaware of the circumstances of the arrest, whether a warrant had been and - if a warrant had been secured _ *fr"tfre o, noi?ere were any deficierrcies in the (l) show that: the police adequately warned the defendant of his right to remain silent and to the presence of counsel; and rights. See Q) the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those Miranda v. Adzona, 3g4 u.s. 436,442;see also @ ,477 A.zd 720 (D.C.1984); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). A' Both sets of statements Made by Mr. Robinson were Made while Mr. Robinson was in Custody A custodial intemogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived significant way." Mir"anda v. Arizona" 384 ofhis freedom of action in any u.s. at 444. Mr. Robinson was unquestionably in custody for Miranda purposes at &e time of his statements to the officers on May 11, 2012, as he was handcuffed, arested, and hansported to the small interrogation room where two detectives questioned him. similarly, Mr. Robinson was in custody during the Novemb q 27,2012 interrogation' Despite the fact that Mr. Robinson was not shackled, the circumstances of the questioning were in many ways identical to the first intemogation. The same two detectives questioned him for several hours in the exact same setting - a room which had a door that could not be unlocked without a code. Mormver, the detectives spoke and acted in a manner deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating response. see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 u.s. 291 300 ( I 9s0)' ' An incriminating response is "any response whether inculpatory or exculpatory 'thattheprosecution may seek to introduce at tial., Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.5 (emphasis original)' Mr' Robinson's alleged statements were not only elicited while in custody, but were the result of interrogation. B' Mr' Robinso"--w1! Not Properly Warned and Did Not Intelligentty, trfuowingty, and Voluntarily Waive IIis Fifth Amendment Rights If an individual makes a statement in response to interrogation undertaken after the reading of rights, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonsfrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda, 384 u.s. at 475, Furttrer, there is a presumption against waiver- North carolina v. Butler, 441 u.s. 369,373 (rg7g). A valid waiver depends upon a finding that under the totality of the circumstances (which include the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant) the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Id. at 37+75. In order to determine the validity of a waiver, the court must make two inquiries: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waivermust have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences ofthe decision to abandon it. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,421(1936). The totality of circumstances indicates that Mr. Robinson did not execute a valid waiver during either interrogation. During the first interrogation, Mr. Robinson was surprised by several armed police officers, who tansported him to police custody and held him for several hours of questioning. Mr. Robinson was in the intrinsically coercive environment ofpolice custody with trvo detectives in a small interrogation room that was locked. During that interrdew, the detectives did not ensure that Mr. Robinson understood the nature of the rishts being abandoned; indeed, the detective undermined and misrepresented the rights at issue by claiming that Mr. Robinson would not be provided a lawyer during the interrogation. Just as importantly, when asking Mr. Robinson the questions enumerated in the standard PD47 waivsr form, the lead detective omitted the only question dealing with the right to counsel: ..are you willing to answer questions without a lau4ter?" Because the detective skipped this question, Mr. Robinson never explicitly or implicitly waived his right to counsel. After the detectives secured a full, detailed statement from Mr. Robinson, the same two detectives essentially conducted the same interrogation on Novernbsr2t,2012. During this subsequent interrogation, Mr. Robinson was never read any of his rights and thus could not have executed a valid waiver. Moreover, the defective Miranda rights from the May interrogation rendered any waiver during this second interrogation ineffective. See Seibert, 542 U.S. 600. Under these circumstances, Mr. Robinson would have been unable to waive his rights in any meaningful sense. Because the government cannot meet its burden of showing that Mr. Robinson executed a valid waiver of tis Mirandaightsbefore being subjected to custodial interrogation, his statements must be suppressed. UI. MR ROBINSON'S STATEMENTS SHOI'LD BE SUPPRESSED FOR ALL AT TRIAL BECAUSE THEY WERE II\TVOLT'NTARY PURPOSES Mr. Robinson's statsrnents cannot be used at trial unless the government can show that the statements were a product of Mr. Robinson's rational intellect and free will. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). Mr. Robinson has a constitutional right to a fair hearing on this matter at which the government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of the statements by a preponderance of the evidence. see Lego v. Twomev, 404 u.s. 477,4gg (1g72); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 369,377 (1964). The test for voluntariness is whether the statements were a "product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice." schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 u.s. 21g,225-26 (1973). courts should examine the totality of the cacumstances of the interrogation and in the process, appraise the "diverse pressures which sap or sustain [a defendant's] powers of resistance and self- control'.. " Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see also Jackson v. United States, 404 A'2d911,924 (D'C' 1979). The Supreme Court has emphasized that an evaluation of the admissibility of statements of younger defendants requires special caution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. t,45 (1967). In this case, there are no facts to support a finding that Mr. Robinson's staternents were the product of rational intellect and free will. The coercivenature of police custody supports a at Mr. finding that his statement was not voluntarily gven. Officers engaged in actions directed repeatedly Robinson which were designed to elicit an incriminating response. The detectives at times, and confronted asked the same questions, asked questions while yelling and cursing Mr' on Robinson with potentially incriminating evidence. Importantly, during the interrogation of statements Novenrber ZT,ZOlZ,many of Mr. Robinson's answers were simple affirmations coercive actions that the detective repeated from the first interrogation. These deliberately resulted in Mr. Robinson making a staternent. Because there is no evidence that Mr. Robinson's statements were volwrtary, they should inadmissible' See be suppressed for all purposes, including impeachment, and should be held Mincey,437 U.S. at 398 appear WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and for any other reason that may to the Court at a hearing on this Motion, Mr. Robinson requests that this Motion be granted. Counsel reserves the right to supplernent this motion' submitted, BarNo.998229 Tei Counsel for David Robinson PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE 633 Indiana Avenue, NW Washingtoru DC 20004 T: (202)8242s37 F: (202) 8242637 qrcq by email, upoa |,ffioffi#f :,Tf#ltffi F 1x, wvod, ry amal, trpoa Mr. -*: -':"o Sfrct, ,.*f tnp,gFf :rd:yr,Uffi;TffiA:.ffi tsl:g IrIW, Washinglon" D.C. iort_ 2oj3o, ttris skeyofeaw[ ": ".i i,,.1'.a: :. -r,:: .:i, ,, I .r,-|?i:j.jJ,. -jt' ii..i -j::r.::7 -::rt'j a a:.,. j: .r-;.'-rr. :..;i. ,I ,::. :,,. i.n ,, 111- , ;:r , .:. ",:: .t,r,i .. t !i, ': !@. ,, , -rr..;j,.-i I