Court File No.: 08-18-406 CVC
IN THE NUNAVUT COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN
PADMA SURAMALA
Plaintiff
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT
As represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Defendant

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
1.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1, 2, 4–11, 23, 27, 29, 38, and
65 of the Amended Statement of Claim (the “Claim”).

2.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 3, 12-22, 24-26, 28, 30-37,
and 39-64 of the Claim.

The Parties and Background
3.

The Defendant, The Government of Nunavut as represented by the Department of Justice
(the “GN”), is a territorial government established under the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28.

4.

The Plaintiff, Padma Suramala, is a former employee of the GN. At the time of her
termination, Ms. Suramala was employed as Chief Coroner.

5.

Ms. Suramala was terminated by the GN on April 25, 2018 as a result of evidence which
implicated her in various financial irregularities uncovered at the YWCA Agvvik and as a

 -2result of her deliberate, premeditated and wanton disregard for the laws of the Territory of
Nunavut.
Just Cause to Terminate the Plaintiff
Financial and Employment Irregularities
6.

On or about May 5, 2017 an anonymous package was delivered to two (2) Deputy Ministers
within the GN, the Canadian Broadcast Corporation (the “CBC”), and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (the “RCMP”). The documents contained in the anonymous package
outlined financial irregularities at the YWCA Agvvik in the City of Iqaluit (the “YWCA”).
The GN provides approximately $2,000,000.00 per annum to the YWCA and allegations
of financial irregularities thereat are of obvious concern to the GN.

7.

As a result, both an internal and external audit of the documents was undertaken by the
GN. With respect to the internal review, the GN assigned Jessen Demalo, a Senior Auditor
within the Department of Finance, to conduct the audit. Ms. Demalo is a Certified Fraud
Examiner. In the course of her audit, Ms. Demalo identified an issue with various
“consulting fee” payments made by the YWCA to six (6) persons listed as employees of
the YWCA. Ms. Suramala was one of those persons listed as an employee who was seen
to be receiving the “consulting fee” payments from the YWCA.

8.

In reviewing the YWCA’s accounting records, it became apparent to Ms. Demalo that Ms.
Suramala was receiving payments from the YWCA both in the form of the consulting fee
payments and also as a recurrent employee of the YWCA.

 -39.

With respect to the consulting fees, Ms. Demalo’s review of the YWCA’s accounting
records indicated that Ms. Suramala had been paid $24,154.00 in payments predominantly
classified as either “Professional Fees” or “Consulting Fees” between November 1, 2013
and March 31, 2017. The payments ranged from a low of $100.00 on March 31, 2017 to a
high of $4,840.00 on June 10, 2014. There was a total of thirteen (13) payments over the
forty-one (41) month period with an average value of $1,858.00. All of the payments had
the status of “cashed” at the time that Ms. Demalo reviewed the documents.

10.

Ms. Demalo e-mailed Ms. Suramala on January 31, 2018 to inquire about these consulting
fee payments that were listed as made to Ms. Suramala and as having been cashed at the
bank by the recipient. Ms. Suramala replied on the same date to indicate that she had never
provided any consulting services to the YWCA and that she only worked at the YWCA
part-time, once per week for a minimum of two (2) hours.

11.

Ms. Demalo responded that afternoon to confirm that the $24,154.00 in payments she was
inquiring about were in addition to the separate payroll payments made to Ms. Suramala
as an employee of the YWCA. In this e-mail correspondence, Ms. Demalo provided a list
of the payments made out to Ms. Suramala and advised her that they had all been cashed.

12.

In an e-mail response dated February 2, 2018, Ms. Suramala acknowledged to Ms. Demalo
that she did receive certain of the payments from 2014 and that they were “for girls club”.
Ms. Suramala goes on to indicate that the other payments were the repayment of a personal
debt from an employee of the YWCA to Ms. Suramala as a result of monies Ms. Suramala
lent to that employee in that employee’s personal capacity. Ms. Suramala indicated that the
personal debt was accrued in India for alleged dental work received by that employee’s

 -4partner and other personal matters. Ms. Suramala has, at different times, provided varying
total amounts for the alleged personal debt; however, no amount ever alleged by Ms.
Suramala was more than $15,000.00.
13.

All of the funds used to repay this alleged personal debt, and the remainder of the
$24,154.00 total, were drawn from YWCA accounts, and not any employee’s personal
account. Ms. Suramala was unable to produce an explanation for this when asked, nor could
she substantiate the remaining funds that were paid to her other than to say that she never
signed any corresponding invoice.

14.

All thirteen (13) payments made to Ms. Suramala for consulting or professional fees were
paid pursuant to an invoice that was created in Ms. Suramala’s name. All of the instruments
used for payment were cashed. Ms. Suramala alleges that she never signed any invoices.
Ms. Suramala acknowledges that she received some, if not all, of the payments.

15.

Ms. Suramala did not deny her continuing status as an employee of the YWCA to Ms.
Demalo. In fact, she provided Ms. Demalo with recent T4 Statements of Remuneration
Paid which were issued to her for taxation purposes as a result of that employment.

16.

At various times and to different people, specifically since the investigation into the
YWCA finances commenced, Ms. Suramala has indicated in writing that her rate of pay as
an employee of YWCA was $19.00 per hour, $25.00 per hour, or $40.00 per hour for
certain tasks.

17.

At various times and to different people, specifically since the investigation into the
YWCA finances commenced, Ms. Suramala has indicated in writing that she received no

 -5payments of any kind outside of her regular employment income paid at an hourly rate.
However, she has also indicated that the fees she received as “consulting fees” or
“professional fees” on the YWCA’s general ledger were for work done with a ‘Setting the
Stage for Girls’ initiative of the YWCA. At other times she has said these transactions
were repayment of a personal loan owed to Ms. Suramala.
18.

At various times, and to different people, Ms. Suramala indicated that the value of the loan
that she made to the employee of the YWCA was for $10,000.00, $11,000.00, $11,640.00,
and $15,000.00.

19.

Prior to her correspondence with Ms. Demalo, noted above, Ms. Suramala had already been
asked about her work activities with the YWCA by Deputy Minister William MacKay. On
October 3, 2017, Mr. MacKay indicated to the Plaintiff that it had come to his attention
that she was a part-time employee at the YWCA. Ms. Suramala confirmed previous
employment at the YWCA and indicated that she gave the money that she earned in that
position to “kids who are staying at the shelter buying treats and gifts for Christmas or
sponsoring meals at soup kitchen for homeless people”.

20.

Mr. MacKay responded by asking if she had received approval for the outside activity
pursuant to GN policy. Ms. Suramala indicated she had gotten approval in the past while
in different positions and departments. Ms. Suramala concludes this correspondence by
indicating that she had major abdominal surgery in 2014 and that she “never worked
anywhere thereafter” and that she was so busy during 2016 and 2017 as Chief Coroner that
there was no way she could divert her time to anything else.

 -621.

In the same correspondence, and though not prompted in any way, Ms. Suramala went on
to indicate that she did not have ownership in a numbered company that she was alleged
by another to own and which, according to her e-mail, received $33,000.00 in consulting
fee payments.

22.

On October 13, 2017, Mr. MacKay e-mailed Ms. Suramala to express confusion, vis-a-vis
her earlier e-mail, due to a recent YWCA paystub he had received which indicated that she
had worked there after 2014. Ms. Suramala replied with an e-mail attaching a “disclosure
of outside activity” form and, contrary her to earlier e-mail, indicated that she had been an
employee of the YWCA in 2017.

23.

Contrary to paragraph 50 of the Claim, Ms. Suramala failed to properly report her
employment with the YWCA. This was contrary to GN policy.

24.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that the foregoing illustrates, at a minimum, a sustained
pattern of dishonest behaviour by Ms. Suramala, attempts by her to minimize her failure to
report her outside activities by lying to the Deputy Minister, a failure to question large
payments from a charitable organization for which she did little or no work and for which
she denies generating invoices, and a failure to take issue with the fact that a personal loan,
was being repaid by a not-for-profit organization rather than the person to whom the loan
was allegedly made.

25.

The GN further pleads that, and the fact is, that the foregoing provided a reasonable and
probable foundation upon which to conclude that the Plaintiff was a knowing participant
in fraudulent activity involving the YWCA or was wilfully blind to same.

 -726.

The foregoing, her repeated dishonest conduct with respect to explaining the various
reasons she was provided with $24,154.00 that she never questioned, and the fact that she
lied to the Deputy Minister about the status of her employment, how much she earned in
that employment, and the like, are each on their own, and taken in conjunction,
fundamental breaches of the employment relationship for which a just cause termination is
warranted. However, these were not the only fundamental breaches of trust to occur and
which lead to the decision to terminate her employment.

Passing-Off a False Court Order
27.

In or about 2016, Ms. Suramala, in the execution of her functions as Chief Coroner, began
seizing original hospital records, including patient records, in order to conduct
investigations. Prior to this, the generally accepted practice was for coroners to accept
copies of hospital records in the conduct of their investigations and for the original records
to remain at the hospital. In response to her new requests for original records, and in
accordance with Coroners Act, the staff at the hospital asked Ms. Suramala, or her
designate, for a warrant executed by a justice of the peace prior to delivering the records
as requested.

28.

The relevant sections of the Coroners Act read as follows:
Powers of coroner 11. (1) A coroner who believes that it is necessary for the
purposes of conducting an investigation or inquest may
(a) enter and inspect any place where the deceased was, or where the
coroner believes the deceased was, before his or her death;

 -8(b) secure the scene or area where the coroner believes the death to have
occurred for a period not exceeding 48 hours or for a longer period that the
Chief Coroner may authorize;
(c) where authorized by a warrant issued under subsection 13(1), seize
anything that the coroner believes is material to the investigation; and
(d) order the exhumation of a body where authorized to do so by the Chief
Coroner or the Minister.
Warrant to seize evidence
13. (1) Where on an ex parte application a justice of the peace is satisfied by
information on oath that there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that
there is in a building, receptacle or place anything that will afford evidence in
respect of the circumstances of the death, the justice of the peace may issue a
warrant authorizing a coroner or a police officer to search for and seize any
such thing.
(emphasis added)
29.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that a plain reading of the aforementioned relevant sections
of the Coroners Act indicates that in order for a coroner, which includes the Chief Coroner,
to seize any piece of evidence, the coroner must first obtain a warrant from a justice of the
peace.

 -930.

Ms. Suramala was opposed to having to obtain a warrant pursuant to the law and this issue
became a frequent source of frustration for Ms. Suramala. Ultimately, this matter became
a frequent topic of conversation between Ms. Suramala, Mr. MacKay, and other members
of the GN.

31.

Ms. Suramala went so far as to seek legislative change to the Coroner’s Act for the express
purpose of broadening the powers of the Chief Coroner.

32.

In spite of the foregoing, on January 30, 2018, a member of Ms. Suramala’s staff entered
Qikiqtani General Hospital (“QGH”) with a warrant or document that had been drafted and
signed by Ms. Suramala and which was meant to appear as though it was a warrant and
seized original medical records. The staff member acted on Ms. Suramala’s instructions.

33.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that at all relevant times Ms. Suramala was aware that the
Coroners Act did not grant her the power to seize original documents without a warrant
executed by a justice of the peace. This had been a topic of conversation for approximately
two (2) years as of this time. In fact, Ms. Suramala had been specifically advised by legal
counsel to the Chief Coroner that she could not seize medical records without a warrant
from a Justice of the Peace, nor could she draft her own orders for that purpose.

34.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that Ms. Suramala’s actions were a flagrant violation of the
Nunavut Coroner’s Act. Ms. Suramala or one of her staff members crafted an unlawful
order, presented it to hospital staff and indicated to them, or allowed them to believe, that
it was a valid court order, and seized original health records. The GN pleads, and the fact
is, that this was a deliberate, premeditated and wanton violation of the laws of the Territory
of Nunavut and an otherwise grossly dishonest act.

 -1035.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that this was a gross breach of trust and left the GN in the
position where it could not trust Ms. Suramala to respect the laws of the Territory in the
execution of the duties of Chief Coroner.

36.

This misconduct, on its own and certainly when taken in conjunction with her deceit
regarding the YWCA, amounted to just cause for her dismissal.

No Defamation
37.

Contrary to paragraph fifty-three (53) of the Claim, the GN never copied the Director of
Corrections on correspondence pertaining to Ms. Suramala’s suspension pending
investigation. The Director of Corrections was inadvertently listed as carbon copied in the
letter referenced by the Plaintiff. This was a typo and the Director of Corrections never
received a copy of that correspondence.

38.

Mr. MacKay advised Ms. Suramala in an email dated February 6, 2018, in response to a
query from her, that cc was a typo and the “Director of Corrections did not receive a copy
of the letter and we will keep this matter in the strictest confidence”.

39.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that the Plaintiff was at all material times aware that the
Director of Corrections never received a copy of the letter. The Plaintiff’s claim of
defamation as a result of same has been brought in spite of that knowledge. This allegation
is spurious and wholly without merit.

40.

In any event, the Defendant states and the fact is that the Director of Corrections is a senior
level employee of the GN and it would not have been defamatory had a copy of the letter

 -11been sent to him in any event. It is further plead that the contents of the suspension letter
were true.
41.

The GN further pleads that the Plaintiff’s concern about the alleged improper publication
of her suspension letter to a single member of senior management within the GN is at odds
with her decision to provide copies of the Claim to the media and provide exposure to her
suspension and ultimate termination that it otherwise would not have had but for said
dissemination to the media.

Spurious, Duplicate and Non-Existent Heads of Damage
42.

The GN pleads, and the fact is, that “interference of her work”, as plead at subparagraph
3(e), is not a cause of action known to law and should be dismissed outright.

43.

The Plaintiff has plead “intentional infliction of mental distress” twice at subparagraphs
3(d) and 3(e). The GN pleads that at least one instantiation of that cause of action has been
improperly plead and the duplication is improper and ought to be dismissed outright.

44.

Insofar as the Plaintiff’s claims for a breach of “the duty of good faith and fair dealing”
and breach of “duty of care and fair dealings” refer to the same cause of action, the GN
pleads that one ought to be dismissed outright. Insofar as the alleged cause of action of
“duty of care and fair dealings” is not a cause of action, which the GN pleads it is not, then
it too ought to be dismissed outright.

45.

With respect to the various causes of action pled by the Plaintiff, the Defendant states that
at all times the GN acted in good faith and in accordance with all applicable legislation in
its dealings with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s misconduct was investigated, she was placed

 -12on a paid suspension during this time, and we she was terminated as a result of her gross
misconduct as described above. Irrespective of the timing of an e-mail further outlining the
reasons for the Plaintiff’s suspension, the Plaintiff was, at all times, aware of the reasons
for her suspension and why she was being investigated. The YWCA investigation had been
outstanding and a repeated source of conversation at the relevant time. Further, Ms.
Suramala was suspended immediately after passing-off her self-made document as a court
order.
46.

At no time was the Plaintiff harassed, intimidated, or the like and the GN further states that
the Plaintiff has failed to plead material facts capable of supporting those causes of action.

47.

At no time did the Defendant undertake any act, behaviour, or the like capable of
negligently, or through intent, causing the Plaintiff to suffer mental distress and the GN
puts the Plaintiff to the strict proof thereof. The GN further pleads that any mental distress,
or the like, she may have suffered was, and is, and all times a result of her own actions as
described above and otherwise.

48.

The GN has committed no separate actionable wrong capable of supporting an award of
aggravated or punitive damages or any actionable wrong whatsoever.

49.

The GN pleads that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any measure of special damages.

50.

Contrary to paragraph 58 of the Claim, Ms. Suramala was provided with the level of due
process required in the circumstance. Ms. Suramala had the legislated right to grieve her
termination and she chose not to avail herself of that opportunity despite being advised of
said right by several members of the GN.

 -13Alleged Unlawful Interference with Work
51.

As stated above, the alleged unlawful interference with the Plaintiff’s duties is not a proper
cause of action and as such ought to be dismissed, ab initio. Further and in the alternative,
at no time did the GN ever unlawfully interfere with the Plaintiff in the execution of her
duties, nor did the GN ever violate the Coroner’s Act, or aid in the violation of the
Coroner’s Act, in any manner whatsoever.

52.

The Plaintiff was repeatedly told in writing, and otherwise, that it was her decision to
publish whatever material she saw fit in the course of her duties. The Plaintiff would often
seek the advice of other members of the GN, including Mr. MacKay. In such circumstances
Mr. MacKay, and the other members of the GN, would provide their opinions and
recommendations. However, at no time did anyone interfere with a decision of the Plaintiff
in the conduct of her duties, including whether to publish specific material.

53.

Contrary to the allegations in paragraphs 21-22, the Deputy Minister of Justice did not
“prevent” the Plaintiff from performing her duties by refusing to adopt various
recommendations put forward in a report commissioned by Ms. Suramala. Mr. MacKay,
along with his staff, made a proper and sensible determination regarding the merits of the
report that was submitted. They were under no obligation to follow the Plaintiff’s wishes
in this regard. The Defendant further states that failing to do so is not a proper cause of
action.

54.

Contrary to paragraphs 24-26 of the Claim, at no time did Mr. MacKay unlawfully assist
the Ottawa Police Service (“OPS”) in a violation of the Coroner’s Act, nor did the OPS
violate the Coroner’s Act. The GN pleads, and the fact is, that it is standard practice,

 -14reasonable, and coheres with common sense for a coroner to wait until the conclusion of
an active police investigation before entering a potential crime scene. Police forces,
including the RCMP and OPS, have a valid interest in maintaining the integrity of a
potential crime scene for future prosecutions, and the like.
55.

The GN pleads that the Plaintiff is correct that the Coroner’s Act mandates coroner’s
investigations in certain circumstances. However, the Coroner’s Act does not statutorily
mandate that a coroner receive immediate, unfettered access to a potential crime scene that
may interfere with an active criminal or general police investigation.

56.

Contrary to the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of the Claim, at no time did Mr.
MacKay ever reject a finding made by the Plaintiff. While Mr. MacKay may have asked
the Plaintiff questions regarding various conclusions she came to during her tenure, at no
time did he reject or override any of her findings. In fact, Mr. MacKay had no authority to
do so.

General
57.

The Defendant pleads, and the fact is, that the Plaintiff’s claims are wholly without merit
on their face; the amounts claimed are remote, exorbitant and manufactured; and that the
entirety of the action should be dismissed.

58.

In the event the Plaintiff establishes that she was wrongfully dismissed, which is expressly
denied, the Defendant further pleads that the Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate her damages
and that income earned during any reasonable notice period, or the like, should be deducted
from any damages awarded in lieu of notice.

 -1559.

The Defendant agrees that the trial of this action be held in the City of Iqaluit, in the
Territory of Nunavut.

60.

The Defendant asks that this action be dismissed with costs to it on a substantial indemnity
basis.

October 19, 2018

EMOND HARNDEN LLP
Glebe Chambers
707 Bank Street
Ottawa ON K1S 3V1
Jock Climie (Law Society of Nunavut
#2017015)
jclimie@ehlaw.ca

Tel:
Fax:

(613) 563-7660
(613) 563-8001

Lawyers for the Defendant
TO:

MICHAEL H. PENNER
Barrister & Solicitor
PO Box 1102, 2475 Kalla St.
Iqaluit, Nunavut X0A 1H0
Tel:
Fax:

888-979-5777
866-387-9580

Lawyers for the Plaintiff
RCP-E 18A (July 1, 2007)

 08-18-406 CVC A.D. 2018
IN THE NUNAVUT COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN
PADMA SURAMALA
Plaintiff
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT
As represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Defendant

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE
EMOND HARNDEN LLP
707 Bank Street
Ottawa ON K1S 3V1
Jock Climie (Law Society of Nunavut #2017015)
jclimie@ehlaw.ca

Tel:
Fax:

(613) 563-7660
(613) 563-8001

Lawyers for the Defendant
Nunavut Address for Service
Government of Nunavut
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 1000, Station 540
Iqualuit (Nunavut) X0A 0H0