I National [menu Defence nationals Fire Risk Assessment CFAD Bedford Compiled by: WGagnon mpliancc Of?cer. CFFM 5 Reviewed by: Mr. Ga?tan Morinville Acting Canadian Forces Fire Marshal June 2015 Canada M?f? . 4 . . - Art;- At the request of the CFB Halifax Commander, the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal (CFFM) conducted an assessment to ensure that CFAD Bedford has an appropriate level of ?re protection given the many changes to infrastructure have occurred since the last Fire Risk Assessment in 2003. 1. This report identi?es the ?ndings of the Fire Risk Assessment and provides possible courses of action (COA) associated with the level of Fire protection at CFAD Bedford. 2. The Assessment Team concluded that the probability of a ?re occurring at CFAD Bedford is Occasional: ?afire will likely occur sometime? and that the severity of a ?re was determined to be Catastrophic: ?may cause death of personnel, severe loss of operational capability, destruction of property or severe environmental damage The overall risk is therefore assessed as HIGH and consequently requires mitigating measures. The main factors contributing to the assumed risk are as follows: i. The ?re break and vegetation control associated with the explosives area is not maintained as required by Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual, Volume 2 Storage and Facility Operations. ii. The lightning protection system is not maintained as required by C-09-005- Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual; The water supply system for ?re protection is inadequate and not maintained in accordance with the National Fire Code of Canada. 3. Several of the above de?ciencies identi?ed by the Assessment Team are all considered non- compliant to the National Fire Code of Canada (NFCC) or Safety Manuals and consequently contravene the Canada Labour Code (CLC) and Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (COSHR). 4. Priority shall be given to rectify the non-compliances to the Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual regulation and National Fire Code of Canada. 4 Background 4 Approach .. 4 OBSERVATIONS ANALYSIS 5 Fire Prevention 5 Incident Analysis .. 5 Public Education .. 6 Orders/Policies/Regulation .. 6 Periodic Inspection of Hazards .. 7 Intervention 8 Elapsed Time .. 8 Response Personnel .. 9 Fire Fighting Equipment .. 9 Water Supply .. 9 Risk Analysis 10 Speci?c characteristics and measures to alleviate them .. 10 Self-Protection Measures .. 14 Early Fire Detection and Noti?cation Systems .. 14 Classi?cation of Risks .. 15 Gap 17 Assumed Risk .. 17 CONCLUSION AND OPTIONS 18 .-. 22 ANNEX A CLASSIFICATION OF RISKS A1 ANNEX ANNEX CFAD BEDFORD STATISTICS 2004-2014 .. C5 1. The Canadian Forces Fire Marshal (CFFM) has conducted a Fire Risk Assessment at the Canadian Forces Ammunition Depot (CAFD) Bedford. To meet this request, a team was formed consisting of Mr. Martin Gravel and Benoit Gagnon, CFF Compliance Review Of?cers, and Major Rick Dunning, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Command Fire Marshal, herein identi?ed as the Assessment Team. The on-site assessment was conducted from 25-26 June 2015. 2. CFAD Bedford frequently referred to as the "Bedford Magazine", is a major Canadian Armed Forces property occupying the entire northern shore of Bedford Basin. It houses all of the weaponry for MARLANT vessels and East Coast bases with the exception of CFB Gagetown. The location also has a Missile Maintenance Facility and a loadingjetty. 3. The Fire Risk Assessment was requested by the CF Halifax Commander to ensure that CFAD Bedford has an appropriate level of ?re protection given the many changes to infrastructure since the last Fire Risk Assessment in 2003. The aim of the assessment is to review the level of ?re risk in terms of severity and probability and to develop suitable options and recommendations, as needed. 4. CF Halifax Fire Department (FD) currently operates a 24/7 staffed ?re station at CFAD Bedford with minimum staf?ng of ?ve ?re?ghters. A dedicated Fire Inspector works day shift and oversees all ?re prevention activities at CFAD Bedford and eight remote locations, totalling 34 buildings. Algit?i?aatfll? 5. This assessment utilizes the risk-based approach as detailed in the Realty Asset Management Manual (RAMM) Chapter 10. This approach provides a consistent means of evaluating identi?ed hazards, with the aim of eliminating them or reducing the associated risk to an acceptable level. This is achieved through the evaluation of the four ?elds that comprise the CFF Fire Risk Management Model. These ?elds include Fire Prevention, Risks Analysis, Intervention, and Assumed Risk. 6. A brief description of these four ?elds can be found in the sub-section entitled Observations Analysis. Complete and detailed reference of this risk management model is available in the Fire Marshal Directive (F MD) 1007. 7. Prevention brings together factors intended to ensure that a ?re does not occur. These factors are: a? K. ii. iv. Incident Analysis: By acquiring sound knowledge of the conditions responsible for ?res, the most effective measures for eliminating those conditions can be developed. Incident evaluation and analysis thus incorporate all actions needed for determining the locations, causes, and circumstances of ?res. This involves utilising the main dimensions of the ?re risks management model. Public Education: Making the public the personnel) aware of the main causes of ?re, including human activity, as an important means of prevention. Orders/Policies/Regulations: Regulatory action is another aspect of ?re prevention. The application of proven safety standards is one of the most effective ways to reduce the deaths, injuries, and property loss caused by ?re. Periodic Inspection of Risks: Periodic risk inspection is an essential complement to the regulatory work. An appropriate inspection program is also a required counterpart to some public awareness measures. 8. The assessment team studied the records of incidents from 2004 to 2014. Over that period, the ?re department responded to 213 emergencies and 1205 non-emergency events hot works, hazardous operation stand by). Closer look revealed that 18 (38) of the emergencies were responded during silent hours. Annex details all incidents for the aforementioned period. 9. It is worth noting that no major ?res have occurred at CFAD Bedford during the aforementioned period. Consequently, it is fair to state that the CFAD Bedford has maintained a low ?re occurrence during that period. It is well known that National Defence has an excellent ?re prevention program overall, resulting in low ?re occurrences. However, major ?res resulting in loss of life and signi?cant material losses do occur. CA NADA 9H0 cFFM-Dsll'c 10. The CF Halifax FD provides ?re prevention and emergency equipment training to the regular employees. Making the work force aware of the main causes of ?re, including human activity, is an important means of prevention. Also, as emergency equipment is the ?rst line of defence against ?re, personnel must be trained in their proper use. This is amongst the highest priorities of a ?re prevention program. During normal daytime operation, a total of approximately 50 full time person work at CFAD Bedford. Approximately eight of the full time workers are CAF military members with the remainder being DND civilian employees. 1 1. The CFAD Fire Inspector oversees this requirement and records showed that the Public Education program meets all the requirements. 12. CFAD Bedford is regulated under Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual and the Realty Asset Management Manual (RAMM) Chapter 10. Emergency ?re response for the infrastructure at CF AD Bedford is required to be provided in accordance with DAOD 4007-2, Structural Fire Response, and a number of Fire Marshal Directive (FMD) for operational and training requirements. As an employer of civilian members, the CFAD Bedford is also required to comply with the requirements of the Treasury Board Secretariat and Canada Labour Code. 13. Personnel are also subject to Fire Orders that details action in the event of a ?re or other emergency. The Fire Orders also contain emergency response procedures Speci?c to each hazard present. 14. The Assessment Team noted that according to the Fire Orders, during a ?re emergency event at CFAD Bedford, the Senior Fire Of?cer acts as the Incident Commander and all other support personnel of the CFAD Command Team is to report to the Command Post. However there is no recall procedure for either the Command Team staff or any ammunition SME (Ammunition Technician) for after-hours emergencies. Further discussions with CFAD Personnel con?rmed that only one person can be recall and that there is no Ammo tech on-call in case of an emergency during silent hours. 15. Furthermore, no standard operating procedure (SOP) was provided to the Assessment Team regarding the response to an alarm or ?re in a Magazine Storage Building (Mag). The current practice is that the Fire?ghters respond directly to the scene without ?rst gathering any information on the type and quantity of explosives present. The FD response vehicle carries a binder containing the Net Explosive Quantities (NEQ) for each Magazine which was not up-to- date at the time of the visit. 16. Consideration should be given to create or review procedures to ensure the safety of emergency personnel. Similar locations within DND have established procedure that can be adapted to CFAD Bedford. 17. The DAOD 4007-0, Fire Protection Services and the RAMM, Chapter 10 both de?ne the requirement to provide the ?re prevention and life safety services, including inspections of infrastructures. As stated before, CFAD Bedford is supported by a Fire Inspector. 18. Twenty building ?les were examined by the Assessment Team to assess the state of the ?re inspections and outstanding de?ciencies that may impact the overall ?re risk. The RAMM requires that all High and Medium hazard industrial occupancy building (including; ammunition storage buildings, ammunition maintenance facilities, ammunition transit facilities, torpedo fueling facilities, and vehiCle maintenance facilities) be inspected on a quarterly basis (four inspections per year). Of the twenty building ?les examined, the following was noted: i. The CF 81?s (inspection report) were completed and ?led adequately; ii. Four ?les had CF 80?s (Initial Fire Prevention Inspection Report) outdated by over a year; Fire Warden (FW) Reports are not completed for Magazines; and Fire Warden Reports are not sent to ?re inspector by building FWs. iv. 19. Although the ?ling system was very well done and easily accessible, some ?les still contain buildings that have been demolished. It is also noted that the dual ?ling system (electronic/hard copy) creates some confusion as inspections are not always ?led in both systems. 20. CFB Halifax has a program that ensures that the ?re protection systems in place are inspected, tested and maintained. All major ITM activities (annuals, semi-annuals, quarterlies) are conducted under the Atlantic Inspection, Testing and Maintenance (ITM) contract by a third party contractor while tests are conducted by FD personnel. 21. Based on a cursory review of the ITM reports, all activities carried out by the third party contractor are properly carried out and documented as required by the applicable Codes and Standards. However the test reports are not adequately detailed to con?rm that all mandated activities are conducted. Furthermore the manual pull stations on the magazines are not tested on a basis. CFFM-oswc 47.. 22. The concept of Intervention usually combines the commonly best-known elements of ?re safety or, at the very least, the most visible and factual aspects. These elements are as follows: Elapsed Time: The elapsed time is de?ned as the duration between ignition and the moment when ?re?ghters apply the extinguishing agent. DAOD 4007-2, Structural Fire Response requires that "under normal circumstances, emergency operations should commence within 10 minutes of receiving an alarm to a structural fire. Emergency operations are all functions performed at the scene including rescue, ?re suppression, emergency medical care and special operations. Response Personnel: Response personnel refer to the number, preparedness, and organization of the ?re?ghters and members of the Fire Department on the ?re scene. DAOD 4007-2, Structural Fire Response requires that one supervisor and four ?re?ghters shall be available. Fire Fighting Equipment: The level of effectiveness of ?re?ghting interventions depends on the type and condition of the different equipment used by ?re?ghters. DAOD 4007-2, Structural Fire Response requires at least one ?re apparatus designed to combat infrastructure ?re. Water Supply: Water availability and the reliability of supply have a direct influence on the effectiveness of the intervention. The water ?ow required to extinguish a ?re depends on the type of building. It is also essential for the Wing/Base to have a maintenance and veri?cation program for its network. 23. The actual provision of service at CFAD Bedford has been present at this location following the last Fire Risk Assessment conducted in 2003. 24. The current emergency response at CFAD Bedford is provided by CFB Halifax ?re?ghters stationed at Bedford on a 24/7 basis. The CFAD Bedford ?re station is located in the Service Area. This provision of service meets the requirements of DAOD 4007-2. cFFM-oalrc 25. Four separate platoons with six ?re?ghters per platoon are assigned to CFAD Bedford. The minimum staf?ng currently being maintained is ?ve ?re?ghters on a 24/7 basis. The minimum staf?ng at CFAD meets the requirement of DAOD 4007-2. 26. Additional ?re?ghting resources for major incidents are dispatched from the main CFB Halifax Dockyard Fire Station. Furthermore, there is a mutual aid agreement in place with Halifax Regional Municipality Fire Service 27. is the municipal ?re department serving the entire Halifax region. A meeting between the Assessment Team and the Fire Chief was arranged as part of the Fire Risk Assessment visit: i. The HRM is a composite ?re department employing 467 full-time and 550 part-time (volunteer) ?re?ghters working out of 52 ?re stations. The immediate surroundings of CFAD Bedford are protected by three stations staffed with full?time personnel. First due station to CFAD Bedford is Station 12 located 6 km for the main gate. Station 12 is staffed with six ?re?ghters and is a designated Hazmat response team. Two other stations are within 10 km of CFAD Bedford both staffed with four full time ?re?ghters supplemented by volunteer ?re?ghters. In 2014, the three HRMF stations closest to CFAD Bedford responded respectively to 464 (station 8), 356 (station 9) and 711 (station 12) incidents per year, including medical calls. ii. personnel have received some site familiarization at CFAD Bedford and participated in a few exercises. They are however not fully aware of the operations nor the speci?c layout of the Depot. Protocols for HRMF when responding to CFAD Bedford is that they must at all time work under the supervision and direction of CFAD Bedford FD staff. .: . g. .a 28. The Fire Station houses one triple combination pump and one support vehicle. The equipment meets the minimal requirement for structural ?re?ghting under DAOD 4007-2. 29. The underground water distribution system at CFAD Bedford is fed by three independent supplies: 1. feed from the Municipality of Burnside; CFFM-DSIFC 10 ii. feed from the Municipality of Bedford; and feed from the on-site pump house and underground reservoir. 30. There is a signi?cant issue with the water storage reservoir and ?re pumps. Beyond the fact that it is not automated meaning that the system requires to be activated manually at the pump house. This system, when manually activated by the team, never increased the water pressure or the ?ow in the water distribution system. 31. After multiple veri?cations of section valves on the site, the issue was left to the Fire department to be resolved. Follow up veri?cation were to be conducted by the FD to identify the source of the problem and take corrective action. 32. Risk analysis contributes to the objective decisions that are made to determine the level of acceptability of some risks and to the establishment of the measures to be taken to reduce the occurrence or impact of certain types of ?res. More speci?cally, risk analysis involves considerations such as: i. Speci?c characteristics of certain risks and the measures taken to alleviate them, ii. Self-protection measures and systems, Measures and systems for early ?re detection and noti?cation of ?re protection services, and Classi?cation of risks33. Fire risk planning involves classifying ?re risks and hazards according to the main uses and characteristics of buildings or any other hazard to assess. It also depends on the comprehensive understanding of the environment in which hazards are found. The analysis therefore must account for the speci?c characteristics of certain hazard and the effects of measures taken by the various authorities to alleviate them. 34. There are two main types of structure on this site, ammunition storage magazines and working facilities such as maintenance shops and administrative of?ces. 0 There are various types of ammunition storage magazines located within the explosives area. The newer style magazines are earth covered bunker like facilities constructed of heavy reinforced concrete with an upward blast walls. The older style magazines still used are concrete/brick buildings with blast wall surrounding. All electrical appliances cPFM-nsli'c 11 and devices are designed and installed for hazardous locations. The older magazines are not provided with any automatic suppression or detection systems. A single ?re alarm manual station is provided outside each storage magazine. 0 The newest generation of magazines (seven units) to be commissioned by the end of the year, as per Mr. Cooke from the Directorate Construction Project Delivery (East) (DCPD-E) are equipped with automatic sprinkler protection and automatic ?re alarm detection systems. 0 Workshops and Administration of?ces are located in the service area, with the exception of the Missile Maintenance Facility and the Ammunition Transfer Building which are located in the restricted area. 0 CF AD Bedford also has vacant buildings that are still energized. Some presents issues such as structural integrity or health hazards. 35. The lightning protection system required by Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual, Volume 2, is tested annually by CF Halifax Construction Engineering section. Thirty three buildings are equipped with lightning protection. The 2014 test results show deterioration over the years and a signi?cant increase of failures. The table below depicts the percentage of failure per building of the lightning protection equipment. Percentage Ioflfailures per Number of buildings bu1ld1ng 75-100 14 50-74 12 1-49 2 No issue 5 36. Canadian Joint Operations Command ?Ammunition and Explosives Safety Inspection CFAD Bedford? report dated October 2013 provided to the Assessment Team shows that the issue has been well documented over the years and still has not been addressed. 37. In order to prevent a lightning strike from inadvertently initiating explosives, it is imperative that the lightning protection system be maintained in optimal condition. 38. Given the sensitive nature of the commodity (ammunition) being stored and handled at Bedford, the condition of the exterior grounds plays an important role in the probability and severity of a ?re occurrences. CANADA 9ND crrm-nau?c 12 39. The majority of the Depot and surroundings is heavily forested. Forest type is de?ned as a mixture of hardwood and coniferous type trees. There is a signi?cant amount of dead trees and broken branches lying on the ground within the forested section of the depot which increases the ?re index and potential for ?re spread. 40. According to the Forest Protection Division of the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources, the Bedford Ammunitions Depot is mostly deciduous and mixed wood with some areas of coniferous trees. Section containing conifers has limbs very close to the ground. There are also some dead trees that have fallen. 41. In general, the area is largely made up of a deciduous forest type. During times of normal Fire Hazard, deciduous stands are at the lower end of exhibited ?re behaviour when compared to other forest types. Wild?res in these stands are limited to surface ?re. Spring ?res are the main concern as rates of spread and ?re intensity decrease greatly once green?up occurs (the trees leaf out). 42. There are areas of coniferous stands on the depot. These stands often burn very hot and can transition into the crowns of trees easily when there are low branches or other ladder fuels present. Fires in these forest types can burn as surface ?re, intermittent crown ?re, and continuous crown ?re. Fires in this forest type can also spread very fast. Because of the associated ?re behavior in this stand type wild?res can be dif?cult to control. These stands appear to be surrounded by deciduous or mixed wood stands which mean that ?re behavior (intensity and rate of spread) will decrease once it Spreads to another stand. 43. The area also contains mixed wood stands. Mixed wood exhibits ?re behavior between what is expected in the deciduous and coniferous stand types. Fire behavior will increase as the percent of conifers increase. 44. Protection against the above described exposures is provided through policy driven speci?c requirements associated with the provision of ?re breaks around the Explosive Area and strict requirements for controlling vegetation. The Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual, Volume 2, Section 5, requires: VE GE TA TION CONTROL 10. Undergrowth and ?ammable vegetation is to be cleared and kept shorter than 10 cm within a 30 in radius of any building containing Ground ivy or similar vegetation used to bind soil on barricades and earth- covered structures is not to be permitted to grow in excess point more than50 cm beyond the line at which the inclined earth meets the normal ground plane. I l. Herbicides may be used for the control of vegetation within the perimeter of an facilitychlorate-free, biodegradable type. CHM-naive 13 12. Fire breaks are to be established and maintained within the explosives area and around the entire perimeter of on facility. The following minimum ?re break widths are to be observed: a. Perimeter: 30 (this distance may be partially be inside and outside facility fences). b. Internal roads: 5 either side. (2. Internal sections: 30 m. 13. Leaves, grass and brush cuttings are to be removed from the explosives area. The burning of vegetation for any reason within the perimeter of an facility is prohibited. 45. The current state of maintenance is limited to grass cutting of some areas. Vegetation control and ?re break maintenance is non-existent. CFAD Bedford does not meet the requirements of the Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual. This issue was also reported in the 2003 Fire Risk Assessment. Pictures below show some of the areas of concern: 0 Vegetation within 30m of building containing Ammunitions and Explosives in excess of the height limit. V: . . if"? 4 arance requirem ent and into 46. The risk associated with Brush or Forest ?res is present in and around CFAD Bedford. Between 2004 and 2014, the CFAD FD responded to ?ve wildland ?res. Furthermore, based on the information provided by the HRM FS, 20 brush/grass or wildland ?res were reported in 2014 in the area directly adjacent to the CFAD Bedford. 47. An accurate assessment of risk levels must take into account the presence automatic ?re protection systems, particularly in buildings that present the highest level of risks. It must also take account of the measures taken, such as those involving the organization of ?re protection brigades or the running of awareness programs for building occupants. Fixed ?re-extinguishing systems, which include automatic sprinkler systems, commence ?re suppression prior to the arrival of ?re?ghters. 48. Fixed automated ?re suppression systems can be linked directly to fire departments, thereby giving immediate noti?cation upon activation and allow the emergency response service to respond quickly to the ?re scene. The effectiveness with which these systems reduce the impact of a ?re on a building and thus the building?s risks level is fully acknowledged. 49. There are 10 buildings at CFAD Bedford that are protected with automatic sprinklers, including the seven new magazines that will be commissioned by the end of the year. 50. The addition of automated ?re suppression systems in the main buildings, would positively impact the overall ?Fire Effect Severity51. Smoke and ?re detection systems complement the work of automatic ?re prevention systems by warning building occupants to immediately evacuate. These systems can be linked directly to municipal ?re departments, thereby allowing the emergency response service to respond quickly 15 to the ?re scene. For this reason, DND standards and other safety codes now require that they be installed in most new buildings. The ?re risk analysis must, however, take full account of the data on the functioning and effectiveness of early detection and noti?cation systems to assess their impact on the level of risks. It is also necessary to be certain of the positive impact these systems have on ?re departments? response time. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to determine the effectiveness of these systems to minimise the consequences of a ?re. 52. Nine (9) buildings on site are equipped with a ?re alarm system but very few have automatic detection. The majority of the ?re alarm systems, mainly within the Explosives Area, are limited to a single manual station with no detection or signalling devices. 53. Fire risk is de?ned as the expected loss from a ?re and is discussed under the following two components: the probability for ?re to occur, and the severity of the ?re. The probability for ?re is considered under such factors as the quantity and type of materials and sources of ignition. The severity of a ?re is determined by factors such as the risk to life, the value of material in the ?re area, the likelihood of the ?re spreading, and the loss to operations. A high severity is not a high risk if it is unlikely to happen. Conversely, ?res that could readily occur will not be a high risk if little or no damage is caused. 54. Probability Estimations, Fire Effect Severity categories are detailed in Annex A - Classi?cation of Risks section. 55. The Assessment Team also reviewed the 2003 Fire Risk Assessment to compare de?ciencies, improvements and decision or action taken from this report. 56. The review conducted in 2003 presented options to reduce the risks based on the premises that ??re must not be allowed to develop beyond its initial stage and must be controlled and suppressed in its early stage and recommended that the following action be implemented i. Maintain an aggressive ?re prevention program; ii. Provide a dedicated ?re department uniquely assigned to the depot whenever ammunition is being handled or when special activities such as construction, hot work, loading/unloading ships, are performed at the (or) The other option is to provide a 24/ 7 fire department dedicated response. This option entails having the CFAD Bedford?re department working 24/7 at the depot seven days a week; Install state of the art ?re detection and suppression systems in all buildings; and iv. Establish and maintain vegetation control and firebreaks throughout the depot. CFFM-DSIFC 16 SEVERITY Catastrophic Critical Signi?cant Negligible Level 1 Level - 2 Level - 3 Level 4 PROBABILITY Frequent . 2.1. mfg; Level A 3A High Probable - f. a 'l :3 Level 2B - Medth 43 Low Occasional Ir .7 Level .v Medium? 4C Low Remote/Seldom - 4D=Low Level 2" .1, Improbable/Unlikely 3 Low 4E Low Level 57. Four options presented in the 2003 RA in order to reduce the risk index to a ?Low or Medium?. The option to: ?Provide a 24/7?re department dedicated response. This option entails having the CFAD Bedford Fire Department work 24 hours per day 7 days a week. Establish and maintain vegetation control and ?rebreaks throughout the depot. Continue delivering an aggressive ?re prevention program. was selected to reduce the risk index. 58. Actions taken from the RA option are re?ected in the ?re protection and prevention side. However the vegetation issue was not addressed or not kept in line, hence not achieving the reduction of the risk related to this important issue. 59. Taking into consideration the CF AD Bedford ?re statistics, the ?re statistics, and the above hazard assessments, the overall probability of a ?re occurring at the Depot is set at Occasional. Based on the historical ?re statistics, a ?re will likely occur ?some time?. 60. Considering the potential for loss of millions of dollars in ammunition, the potential net explosive quantity present, and the probability of loss of life, the ?re effect severity is set at Catastrophic. 61. Combining the Probability being Occasional and Severity at Catastrophic the Risk level identify in the table below is set at High: 62. This high-risk level is mainly in?uenced by the following: i. The absence of ?re break and adequate vegetation control; ii. The absence of ?re detection systems in the older storage magazines; The limited presence of automated ?re suppression systems; iv. The major impairment of the lightning protection system; v. The major impairment of the water supply system; 63. The purpose of the model is to reduce the ?re risk for a given situation in terms of severity and probability, leaving a protection gap deemed acceptable to Commanders regarding the occurrence of ?res and their impacts. The gap between prevention and the actual outbreak of ?re can vary in size and is determined on the basis of a consideration of all the factors. This gap is represented in the model as the level of ?re risk that remains after the discrepancy between the estimated risks and the concrete or anticipated effects of all the measures deployed to deal with those risks is taken into account. 64. The Gap in this present Risk Assessment is widely linked to preventive maintenance on buildings, vegetation control and the water supply system, all of which are issues that can feasibly be corrected. 65. Some other minor issues with regard to ?re inspection requirements, and access to I resources (SMEs) can be corrected at little or no cost. 17 66. It is also noted that the Assessment team acknowledges the 7 new Magazines and their increased ?re protection over the older ?100? series. However at this time, the new Magazines are not commissioned and there is no speci?c plan for the future of the older Mags since the demolition or decommissioning was not part of the construction project. 67. Creating an action plan for the outdated structures including decommissioning, de-energizing and demolition strategy would alleviate the risk and issues related to these buildings Vegetation control and Fire Protection improvements). cPFM-oalrc 18 68. The risk of a ?re for the Ammunition Depot at Bedford is de?ned as the combination of the severity impact of a ?re and the overall probability occurrence of a ?re. 69. The Assessment Team establishes the probability of a ?re occurring at CFAD Bedford at Occasional (?re is likely to occur sometime) and the severity of a ?re at Catastrophic. Therefore the overall ?re risk is set at High. Consequently, the risk must be reduced to an acceptable level. 70. The primary recommendation is to reduce the overall ?re risk to Medium. Immediate actions must be taken to address the following de?ciencies, which will impact both the Severity and Probability of a ?re: i. Implement and maintain the vegetation control IAW Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual; ii. Repair and maintain in optimal condition the lightning protection system IAW C-09- Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual; Implement a Fire Warden Program for all the Magazines and ensure the reporting of the inspection to the Fire Prevention Bureau IAW RAMM Chap. 10 and Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, Chapter 17. Repair and maintain the water supply system to ensure that the required water is provided; iv. 71. It is also recommended to ensure constant availability of a Subject Matter Expert in Ammunition and Explosives to ensure safety of Emergency Responder in Case of ?re IAW C-09- Chap 5 section 4 of the Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual: ?The standing orders are to contain specific procedures and instructions to be followed during both working and silent hours for the prevention and ?ghting of fires within the perimeter or in the vicinity of the facility. 72. Upon implementation of the corrective actions. Results will not only eliminate the non- compliances to the codes and regulations but will also reduce the risk level up to a probability of Remote/Seldom and the severity of Critical therefore setting the overall ?re risk level to Medium. Potential impact on the Fire Risk Level by addressing the issues SEVERITY Catastrophic Critical Signi?cant Negligible Level 1 Level - 2 Level - 3 Level 4 PROBABILITY Frequent . 4A Level A 3A Medium E333: 213 High SB - Medium 4B Low amassing] 1 IC High 2c :Hi_gh 3c - Medium 4c Low Remote/Seldom a . - 7 - Level - h. I 3D Mal?! 4D Low Improfggfiughkely stated in the Introduction, the main objective of the ?re risk assessment was to ensure that CFAD Bedford has an appropriate level of ?re protection given the many changes to infrastructure have occurred since the last Fire Risk Assessment in 2003. As described above, the current minimum response strength of the ?re department at Bedford is ?ve ?re?ghters on a 24/7 basis. 74. Prior to considering any modi?cation in ?re department response, all above noted de?ciencies must be addressed. Some options listed below will entail having the nearby municipal ?re department, respond to CFAD Bedford. I n. 75. No dedicated ?re department response from CFAD Bedford. would provide primary response to all emergencies during both operational hours and silent hours. Under this option, additional risk would be assumed as a dedicated response would not be provided, even during high risk periods when ammunition is handled/loaded/unloaded. 76. All de?ciencies listed at para 70 shall be addressed and corrected. 77. The elimination of all dedicated ?re department response capability would require the following mitigating measures: i. Automatic sprinkler protection shall be provided in all buildings at CFAD Bedford. Automatic suppression would be the only means of ensuring that a ?re could be quickly detected and controlled. CANADA DND 20 ii. iv. vi. Conduct regular training and familiarization with the A good working relationship and practiced response procedures with would alleviate the increased risk of a delayed response. Even with regular training, the cannot be expected to sustainably maintain a high level of familiarization with the speci?c hazards associated with ?ghting a ?re at an Ammunition facility. The HRMF will be relying heavily on the availability of an ammunition safety technician to advise on the content of each building and Ammunition Safety related issues. A 24/7 on-site Duty Ammo Safety Of?cer Program should be implemented. Maintain the dedicated Fire Inspector position at CFAD. Increase the frequency of ?re protection and life safety inspections in all buildings at CFAD Bedford that contain ammunition to CF81 inspection reports shall be produced and submitted for every inspection. Implement a Close?Up Inspection Program for all operational buildings. A close- up inspection of all buildings is to be carried out at the end of each workday to ensure building occupants are eliminating common ?re hazards and performing a proper close-up before departing. The inspections should be done after the building occupants have secured the building for the day. The close-up inspections should be carried out by designated building occupants that are familiar with the various operations and hazardous areas. response would require a robust support plan to be created and implemented at all levels. From procedure in case of emergency to an overall review of the hazardous operation conducted at CFAD. :Nia? 78. Reduce the current full time 24/7 FD presence to ?ve days a week during regular working hours, with minimum duty strength of ?ve ?re ?ghters. This level of presence would also be required whenever ammunition is being handled or special activities are taking place outside the normal working hours. Maintaining a dedicated response during operational hours would provide immediate and quick response and facilitate the ability to continue providing FD standby response for loading and unloading of ammunition at the jetty and other hazardous operations. The primary reSponse during week nights and weekends (silent hours) would be provided by the RMFD along with the Dockyard DND ?re?ghters. 79. All de?ciencies listed at para 70 shall be addressed and corrected. 80. The delayed response from during silent hours would necessitate the following mitigating measures: i. ii. iv. vi. vii. Install automatic ?re detection in all ammunition storage buildings (magazines). The automatic ?re detection would initiate a quicker response from both the on- site FD during operational hours and the during silent hours. Conduct regular training and familiarization with the A good working relationship and practiced response procedures with would alleviate the increased risk of a delayed response during silent hours. Even with regular training, the cannot be expected to sustainably maintain a high level of familiarization with the speci?c hazards associated with ?ghting a ?re at an Ammunition facility. The will be relying heavily on the availability of an ammunition safety technician to advise on the content of each building and Ammunition Safety related issues. A 24/7 on-site Duty Ammo Safety Of?cer Program should be implemented. Maintain the dedicated Fire Inspector position at CFAD. Increase the frequency of ?re protection and life safety inspections of all buildings that contain ammunition to CF81 inspection reports shall be produced and submitted for every inspection. Implement a Close-Up Inspection Program for all operational buildings. A close- up inspection of all buildings is to be carried out at the end of each workday to ensure building occupants are eliminating common fire hazards and performing a proper close-up before departing. The inspections should be done after the building occupants have secured the building for the day. The close-up inspections should be carried out by designated building occupants that are familiar with the various operations and hazardous areas. response during silent hours would require a robust support plan to be created and implemented at all levels. From procedure in case of emergency to an overall review of the hazardous operation conducted at CFAD. 81. Maintain status quo with a 24/7 on-site ?re department response dedicated to Bedford. 21 CFFM-ualrc 82. All de?ciencies listed at para 70 shall be addressed and corrected. 83. The probability of a ?re occurring at CFAD Bedford is set at Occasional (?re is likely to occur sometime) and the effected severity of a ?re is set at Catastrophic. Failure to control and extinguish a ?re in its early stage would have severe consequences on the mission with high likelihood that personnel would suffer injury or death. Therefore the overall ?re risk is set at High. Consequently, the risk must be reduced to an acceptable level. 84. To reduce the overall ?re risk to an acceptable level (Medium) one of the options presented must be implemented. Though all three options are acceptable from a fire protection standpoint, it is highly recommended that a comparative cost/bene?t analysis be performed on the options before selecting one. 22 cFFM-uswc 1. ire risk is de?ned as the expected loss from a ?re and is discussed under the following two components: the probability for ?re to occur, and the severity of the ?re. The probability for ?re is considered under such factors as the quantity and type of materials and sources of ignition. Probability Estimations are found at Table A-1. The severity of a ?re is determined by factors such as the risk to life, the value of material in the ?re area, the likelihood of the ?re spreading, and the loss to operations. A high severity is not a high risk if it is unlikely to happen. Conversely, ?res that could readily occur will not be a high risk if little or no damage is caused. Fire Effect Severity categories are listed in Table A-2. 2. A ?re risk assessment will identify both the probability and the severity allowing speci?c action to be taken to reduce one or both factors. These hazards are collated and complied in a matrix in order assign a risk index using Table A-3 that provides a qualitative ranking of effect probability and if possible, expresses the effect probability as potential occurrences based on historical records for the Base/Wing, or on national records. Table then displays the acceptability of this risk and determines the need for remedial action. 3. According to DAOD 4007-1: Fire Reporting and Investigating, ?re is de?ned as: any instance of destructive or uncontrolled burning, including explosion of combustible solids, liquids or gases. Whenever there is an injury, loss of life, or monetary loss of property or equipment, ?re includes the following situations: 0 an electrical discharge; 0 a pressure vessel or ammunition explosion; 0 an overheat condition; and a wildland ?re including harvestable products. 4. The probabilities of a ?re occurrence are estimated using the qualitative terms shown in Table A-1. Frequent Fire will likely occur frequently. Probable Fire will occur several times. Occasional Fire will likely occur some time. Remote Fire unlikely but possible to occur. Improbable E?igery unlikely to occur. It can be assumed that it may not Table A-1: Probabilig Estimation Canadian Forces Iiire. Marshal CFAI) Betllin'tl Fire Risk Assessment .lune ZUIS cum-99176 5. Table A-2 lists the categories of effect severity and their de?ning criteria used for the assessment. Catastrophic May cause death of personnel, severe loss of operational capability, destruction of property or severe environmental damage. Critical May cause serious injury or illness, serious loss of operational capability, serious damage to property or environment. Signi?cant May cause minor injury or illness, substantial loss of operational capability, substantial damage to property or the environment. Negligible May cause less than minor injury requiring ?rst aid, or less than minor damage to property or environment. Table A-2: Fire Effect Severitv 6. The level of risk for each hazard is evaluated by combining the ?re hazard severity and the probability of occurrence using categories in Table A-3. SEVERITY PROBABILITY Frequent Level A Probable Level Occasional Level Remote/Seldom Level Improbable/Unlikely Level Catastrophic Level 1 Critical Signi?cant Negligible Level - 2 Level - 3 Level 4 3A High 79?" 23 High . . I i I I 4D??ng 2E Low: I 3E #7 Low if': Low Canadian liorees l?il'e [\z?larshzil A l) Bed l'o rd Fire Risk Assessment ?.lune 2(lI5 Table Risk Categories 7? The acceptability of the risk is evaluated using the criteria shown in Table A-4. Unacceptable - risk reduction must occur immediately normally unacceptable - risk reduction should occur may be acceptable - risk reduction may be necessary Acceptable - risk reduction may be desirable Table A-4: Risk Acceptance Criteria Canadian Forces Iiirc lV-"larshal I-?irc Risk -- June 2015 cFFM-nswc racewcowa Canada Labour Code (CLC). Canada Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (COHS), Part XVII. Realty Asset Management Manual (RAMM), Chapter 10. DAOD 4007?0, Fire Protection Services. DAOD 4007-1, Fire Reporting and Investigating. DAOD 4007-2, Structural Fire Response. National Fire Code of Canada (N FCC), 2010 Edition. Fire-?ghting Involving Ammunition and Explosives. Ammunition and Explosives Safety Manual, Volume 2 Storage and Facility Operations. Canadian l?orccs I?irc Marshal CFAI) Bcdlord liirc Risk Assessment June 20 5.. CFFM-DBIFC AMMO HOT WORKSTAND BYS: 84 DATE INCIDENT BUILDING IF SMR AFTER HRS. 03-FEB-04 BLOWN TRANSFORMER NEAR BM153 17-FEB-04 HAZMAT SPILL BM142 26-FEB-04 ELECTRICAL SHORT, WIRING BM153 09-MARCH-04 HAZMAT SPILL X-AREA 12-MARCH-04 MEDICAL BM 1 44 ELECTRICAL SHORT BM212 23-MAR-04 FALSE ALARM BM169 FALSE ALARM BM83 08-APRIL-04 FALSE ALARM BM83 19-APRIL-04 SPRINKLER ALARM BM239 07-MAY-04 MEDICAL BM200 20-JUNE-04 FUEL SPILL X-AREA 07-J ULY-04 MEDICAL ADMIN 08-JULY-04 SPRINKLER ALARM BM239 AMMO HOT WORK STAND BYS: 104 DATE INCIDENT LOCATION AFTER HRS. FLOOD SEWER SYS. UXO X-AREA UXO X-AREA 03-MARCH-05 UXO BIP RENT POINT 07-MARCH-05 UXO X-AREA 07-MARCH-05 UXO BIP X-AREA UXO BIP X-AREA 14-MARCH-05 UXO BIP X-AREA 22-MARCH-05 HAZMAT BM130 29-MARCH-05 FALSE RENT POINT 18-APRIL-05 GRASS FIRE OLD RAIL SIDING 29-APRIL-05 FALSE BM81 04-MAY-05 FALSE - BM212 I SMELL OF FUMES BM190 18-MAY-05 FALSE BM174 Canadian Forces l-?irc [Vlarsl'lal FA Bed lb rd Fire Risk Assessment ~1me ZOIS CFFM-nawc FALSE BM212 28-SEPT-OS HAZMAT BM212 04-OCT-05 UXO OLD RAIL SIDING 15-NOV-05 UXO RENT POINT 22-NOV-05 UXO RENT POINT UXO SIDING UXO RENT POINT 08-DEC-05 UXO BIP RENT POINT 09-DEC-OS HAZMAT HYD. LEAK BM190 09-DEC-05 HAXMAT BM100 -05 UXO 14-DEC-05 UXO RENT POINT 15-DEC-05 UXO RENT POINT 2006 AMMO HOT WORK STAND BYS: 149 DATE INCIDENT LOCATION IFSMR AFTER HRS. 09-JAN-06 UXO X-AREA 20-FEB-06 HAZMAT BM190 FALSE BM81 03 -MAY-06 UXO 09-MAY-06 MEDICAL ADMIN HAZMAT BM212 MEDICAL BM212 01-NOV06 POLE ARCHING BM153 I 1-DEC-06 HAZMAT BM241 2007 AMMO HOT WORKSTAND BY: I44 02-JAN-07 POWER POLE FIRE BM203 17-FEB-07 WATER PIPE BREAK BM100 17-APRIL07 MEDICAL BMI 55 ALARM SHIP AT JETTY OVERTURNED BACKHOE CF AD AREA 01-MAY-07 UXO X-AREA FIRE EX. BM239 1 MEDICAL CFAD I 6-MAY-07 UXO CFAD 2007-3330 MEDICAL ADMIN 2007-3331 25 -MAY-07 UXO ANDERSON LAKE 19-JUNE-07 POWER POLE X-AREA 01-JULY-07 UXO X-AREA 04-IULY-07 UXO 27-] ULY-07 FALSE ALARM BM80 POWER POLE ARCING BM155 Canadian Forces Fire Marshal Bcdford Fire Risk Assessment .Iunc 20l5 cram-name 07-SEPT-O7 MEDICAL BMZOO 17-SEPT-07 FALSE BM183 14-Nov-07 UXO BM212 14-NOV-07 MEDICAL BMZOO 19-Nov-07 UXO X-AREA 24-NOV-07 FALSE BM127 27-NOV-07 MEDICAL BM200 2007-8306 28-NOV-07 HYD. SPILL BM73 1 9-JAN-07 UXO X-AREA INVESTIGATION OF ODOR BM154 POWER POLE ARCH BMISS UXO X-AREA 2008 AMMO HOT WORK STAND PS: I 05 DATE INCIDENT LOCATION IF SMAR AFTER HRS. 17-JAN-08 UXO X-AREA 05-MAR-08 MEDICAL BM159 12-APRIL-08 FALSE BM162 PULL STATION FALSE BM49 28-MAY-08 UXO 28-MAY-08 HYDRALIC LEAK BM247 29-MAY-08 WIRE ARCING ON POLE X-AREA 2008-3504 30-MAY-08 ALARM BOX NEAR BM190 16-] REPORT OF BRUSH FIRE AREA MUTUAL AID BOAT OVERTURNED BASIN 21-JULY-08 EVAC ALARM X-AREA 30-JULY-08 HAZMAT OIL SPILL BM169 08-SEPT-08 SPRINKLER ALARM BM239 POWER POLE ARCH X-AREA 27-DEC-08 SPRINKLER ALARM BM203 27-DEC-08 PULL STATION BM212 2009 AMMO HOT WORKSTAND BYS "106 BLDG ALARM BM227 BLDG ALARM BM203 SPRINKLER ALARM BM203 16-JAN-09 STEAM LEAK BM200 1 1-FEB-09 FORKLIFT SMOKE JETTY NN 18-FEB-09 MEDICAL JETTY NN 18-MARCH-09 TRUCK WIRES ARCING BM207 HAZMAT SPILL JETTY 09-MAY-09 UXO RENT POINT 02-.1 ULY-09 UNKNOWN CONTAINER ADMIN 2009-4523 Canadian Forces Fire Marshal Fire Risk Assessment Juno 20l5 10-JULY-09 BRUSH FIRE ANDERSON LAKE 13-AUG-09 FALSE BM153 30-AUG-09 SMELL OF SMOKE BM169 30-AUG-09 POWER POLE TRANSFORMER 58 30-AUG-09 POWER POLE TRANSFORMER 55 21 -OCT-09 ELECTRICAL SWITCH BM156 BLDG ALARM BM159 10-DEC-09 OIL SPILL X-AREA 14-DEC-09 UXO X-AREA 19-DEC-O9 WFE ALARM BM159 2009-8713 19-DEC-09 WFE ALARM BM159 2009-8712 21-DEC-09 HAZMAT JETTY 2009-9689 POWER POLE ARCING X-AREA 2010 AMMO HOT WORK STAND BYS ..93 11-JAN-10 POLE TRANSFORMER JETTY AREA 24-FEB-10 FALSE BM84 28-FEB-10 FALSE BM24 08-MAR-10 GRASS FIRE BM84 BLDG ALARM BM212 21-MAY-10 UXO X-AREA 27-MAY-10 HIGH TEMP ALARM BM153 20-JUNE-10 POWER POLE ARCHING BM 1 53 2010-7443 12-AUG-10 MEDICAL RENT PT. 18-AUG-10 UXO X-AREA 0 FIRE EX BM154 2010-6009 0 FIRE EX MVA 78 2010-7201 21-DEC-10 MVA BM178 2010-7201 2011 AMMO HOT WORK STAND 1 MEDICAL ADMIN SMELL OF SMOKE BM212 06-FEB-1 1 SPRINKLER ALARM BM212 FUEL TRUCK FIRE MUTUAL #7 HWY FIRE EX BM102 2011-6622 BM247 2011-6867 WATER FLOW BM239 201 1-7975 SMELL OF SMOKE BM212 FALSE BM212 FALSE BMIOO 2011-3650 1 l-AUG-ll FUEL LEAK BM203 12-AUG-1 1 FALSE BM203 OVERTURNED BOAT BASIN 2011-4228 1 MVA 55 2011-5678 Canadian Forces Fire Marshal Cl: A Bed ['ord Fire Risk Assessment June ZOIS. CPFM-nawc 27-SEPT-11 TRUCK FIRE MUTUAL AID #7 HWY 2011-6241 23-Nov-11 HAZMAT BM155 2011-7740. 13-DEC-1 1 HAZMAT BM247 201 1-7956 2012 AMMO HOT WORK STAND 17-JAN-12 POWER POLE ARCHING 19 2012-293 26-JAN-12 ACID LEAK BM239 2012-495 17-FEB-12 MEDICAL BM159 2012-936 UXO X-AREA 2012-1405 9-MAR-12 FUEL SPILL X-AREA 2012-1406 17-MAR-12 CAR FIRE (MUTUAL AID) #7 HY MEDICAL ADMIN 2012-1750 BRUSH FIRE SIDING BM40 2012-2367 01-MAY-12 FALSE BM239 2012-2794 18-MAY-12 MEDICAL BM120 2012-3280 FIRE EX BM164 2012?3783 FIRE EX BM233 2012-3832 UXO X-AREA 30-JUN-12 FALSE ALARM BM203 2012-4606 UXO X-AREA 2012-5224 26-JULY-12 UXO FALSE X-AREA 2012-5369 21-AUG-12 MEDICAL ADMIN 2012-5913 07-SEPT-12 FUEL SPILL X-AREA 2012-6481 JETTY NN CFAD JETTY 2012-7256 BLDG ALARM BM154 2012-7407 2013 AMMO HOT WORK STAND BYS ..103 23-JAN-13 MVA MUTUAL AID #7 HWY 27-JAN-13 STEAM LEAK BM203 FALSE BM203 2013-505 FALSE BM239 2103?524 FALSE BM203 2013-525 19-FEB-13 INVESTIGATION JETTY 2013-1108 FUEL LEAK X-AREA 2013-1818 GLYCOL LEAK BM239 2013-1867 23-MAY-13 MEDICAL BM247 2013-2834 27-.1 FIRST AID BM200 2013-3683 MUTUAL AID, FIRE BURN SIDE 7-JULY-13 HIGH TEMP ALARM BM153 2013-3916 JETTY NN CFAD JETTY 2013-4000 1-Sept-2013 FALSE BM212 2013-5252 23-SEPT-13 MEDICAL BM156 2013-5677 10-OCT-13 FALSE BM239 21 13-6043 Canadian Forces Fire Marshal Bcd?xu'd Fire Risk Assessment June 2015 11-OCT-13 DIESEL FUMES BM239 2013-6067 31-OCT-13 MEDICAL BM200 2013-6417 2- NONV-13 FALSE BM239 2013-7002 2014 AMMAO HOTWORK STAND 01-JAN-14 ALARM CFAD JETTY 08-JAN-14 ALARM PANEL BM203 2014-253 FIRE PANEL X-AREA 2014-252 18-FEB-14 2014-936 FIRE PANEL BM212 2014-1427 05-JUNE-14 SHIP FIRE BASIN 2014?2903 05-JULY-14 SPRINKLER BM212 2014-3500 PUMP HOUSE BM192 FIRE PANEL BM212 2014-4306 18-AUG-14 LIGHTING STRIKES X-AREA 1 4 SPRINKLER BM212 19-SEPT-14 SPRINKLER BM212 FIRE PANEL BM102 - 23 UXO BASIN 2014-5094 FIRE PANEL BM114 FIRE PANEL BM183 25-SEPT-14 SHIPBOARD CFAD IETTY FIRE ALARM NEW BUNKERS 2014- FIRE EX BM239 2014-5410 10-OCT-14 FIRE EX BM154 2014-5413 FIRE PANEL BM144 26-Nov-14 FIRE PANEL BM156 27-DEC-14 SPRINKLER BM212 Canadian Forces Fire Marshal (TAD Bcdl?ord Fire Risk June 2015