COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. Forcillo, 2016 ONCA 606
DATE: 20160729
DOCKET: M46749 (C62370)
Gillese J.A. (In Chambers)
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
James Forcillo
Appellant/Applicant

Michael Lacy and Bryan Badali, for the appellant
Susan Reid, for the respondent
Heard: July 28, 2016
ENDORSEMENT

 Page: 2

[1]

James Forcillo (the “Appellant”) was working as a Toronto Police Service

officer on July 27, 2013, when he shot and killed Sammy Yatim. After a trial by
judge and jury, he was acquitted of second degree murder but convicted of
attempted murder. On July 28, 2016, he was sentenced to six years in the
penitentiary. He brings this application for release from custody pending the
determination of his appeal from conviction and sentence, pursuant to s. 679(3)
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[2]

Section 679(3) provides:
(3) In the case of an appeal referred to in paragraph (1) (a) or (c),
the judge of the court of appeal may order that the appellant be
released pending the determination of his appeal if the appellant
establishes that

[3]

(a)

the appeal or application for leave to appeal is not frivolous;

(b)

he will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the
terms of the order; and

(c)

his detention is not necessary in the public interest.

The Crown opposes the application on two grounds. First, it contends that

the appeal is frivolous. Second, it submits that detention in this serious case is
required in the public interest.
ANALYSIS

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[4]

In my view, this application turns on the third ground, namely, whether the

Appellant’s detention is necessary in the public interest. Accordingly, I will deal
with ss. 679(3)(a) and (b) in brief compass.
S. 679(3)(a) – Is the Appeal Frivolous?
[5]

In my view, it cannot be seriously contended that this appeal is frivolous. A

frivolous appeal, within the meaning of s. 679(3)(a), is one that does not raise
arguable issues: R. v. Manasseri, 2013 ONCA 647, 312 C.C.C. (3d) 132, at para.
38.
[6]

I will deal with the merits of the appeal more fully below. It is sufficient at

this stage to say that the grounds of appeal that have been raised are stronger
than merely not being frivolous.
S. 679(3)(b) – Will the Appellant Surrender into Custody?
[7]

The Crown concedes that there is no real risk that the Appellant will not

surrender into custody in accordance with the terms of the order.
S. 679(3)(c) – Is the Appellant’s Detention Necessary in the Public Interest?
[8]

Thus, the real question on this Application is whether the Appellant’s

detention is necessary in the public interest.
[9]

The public interest criterion has two components: public safety and public

confidence in the administration of justice.

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Public Safety
[10]

Public safety is concerned with the risk that the Appellant, if released,

would commit further offences by posing a risk to others or to the administration
of justice: R. v. Farinacci (1993), 86 C.C.C. (3d) 32 (Ont. C.A.). There is no
suggestion that the Appellant would re-offend if released and the Crown
concedes this. He does not pose a risk to the public safety.
Public Confidence in the Administration of Justice
[11]

Determining whether detention is required based on public confidence in

the administration of justice requires the court to balance the conflicting principles
of reviewability and enforceability. That is, the public interest criterion requires a
judicial assessment of the need to review the conviction (reviewability) and the
need to respect the general rule of immediate enforceability of judgments
(enforceability): Farinacci, at para. 43.
[12]

In performing this assessment, the court must consider the seriousness of

the offence for which the Appellant has been convicted and assess the merits of
the appeal.
[13]

The Appellant has been convicted of a very serious offence: attempted

murder. He faces the prospect of a lengthy period of incarceration: six years.
[14]

It must be remembered that this court’s role in assessing the merits is not

to decide the appeal. My role is limited to assessing whether the merits of appeal

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are sufficiently strong to shift the balance in favour of release. On my
assessment, the merits of the appeal shift the balance in favour of reviewability.
Public confidence in the administration of justice requires that judgments be
reviewed and that errors, if any, be corrected: see Farinacci, at para. 43.
[15]

In making my assessment of the merits of the appeal, I took into

consideration that, to the best understanding of both parties, there has never
been a case such as this. The Appellant fired nine shots. The evidence shows
that Mr. Yatim died as a result of one of the first three shots. The second degree
murder charge related to the first three shots. The Appellant was acquitted of that
charge. That is, the jury found that the killing of Mr. Yatim was justified. However,
the Appellant was convicted of attempted murder in respect of the second volley
of shots (the other six). There is strength to the Appellant’s grounds of appeal
related to whether the indictment improperly charged a single transaction as two
counts and whether the verdicts are inconsistent. Having found this of sufficient
weight, I need not express a view on the strength of the other main category of
grounds of appeal.
[16]

I have also taken into consideration the Appellant’s assurances that he will

perfect his appeal and set it down for hearing in a timely fashion. To assist with
this, I have asked Justice Doherty to case manage this appeal and he has
agreed.

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[17]

I would impose, as a condition of release, a surrender date of November 9,

2016, and direct that the parties attend before Justice Doherty before that date to
advise on the status of the appeal. They may address a variation in the surrender
date during that attendance.
[18]

By imposing this early surrender date, the public will see that meaningful

steps have been taken to ensure that the appeal is heard as expeditiously as
possible. This, too, is a factor going to the enforceability component of the public
confidence in the administration of justice criterion.
CONCLUSION
[19]

The Appellant has been on a release order, without incident, since August

20, 2013. Apart from this application, each time the issue of bail has been before
the courts, including after the Appellant’s conviction for attempted murder, the
Crown has consented to bail being granted.
[20]

The Appellant’s release, pending the determination of his appeal, poses no

risk to the public as there is no risk that he would commit further offences. For
the reasons given, despite the seriousness of the offence for which the Appellant
stands convicted, in my view, fully informed members of the community will
objectively understand and accept that it is not contrary to the public interest that
he be released.
DISPOSITION

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[21]

For these reasons, the application is granted. I have addressed the matter

of the surrender date. I am in the courthouse and available to sign the release
order. If the parties are unable to resolve the matter of the other conditions of
release, I may be spoken to.

“E.E. Gillese J.A.”