SLP 32420/2015

1

ITEM NO.21

COURT NO.4

SECTION XIV

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

I N D I A

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.32420/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 20/08/2015
in LPA No. 75/2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi)
IFCI LTD, (INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION
OF INDIAN LTD.)

Petitioner(s)

VERSUS
S.P. SHARMA

Respondent(s)

(With appln. (s) for exemption from filing c/c of the impugned
judgment)
Date : 04/07/2016 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN
For Petitioner(s)

Dr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Rajeev Dhavan, Sr. Adv.
Gautam Awasthi, AOR
Ayush Choudhary, Adv.
Abhinav Mani Tripathi, Adv.

For Respondent(s)

Mr. Ankur Chhibber, Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Gautam, AOR

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Let the matter be listed on 1st August, 2016, so that
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner can come with the precedents that the word 'lapse'
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN KUMAR
Date: 2016.07.04
16:44:38 IST
Reason:

does not convey any stigma.
Be it stated, on a perusal of the counter affidavit
filed before the High Court in the writ petition, there have
been

enumeration

of

nature

of

the

lapses.

In

such

a

SLP 32420/2015

2

situation, we think, a question may arise whether the stand
taken in the counter affidavit can be looked into for the
purposes of understanding the word 'stigma' in the context of
lapse.
Call on the date fixed.

(Chetan Kumar)
Court Master

(H.S. Parasher)
Court Master

$~2
*

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%

Date of Decision : August 20, 2015

+

LPA 75/2014
S.P.SHARMA
Represented by:

..... Appellant
Mr.Ankur Chhibber, Advocate with
Mr.Prashant Sivarajan, Advocate
versus

IFCI LTD. & ANR.
Represented by:

..... Respondents
Mr.Dinkar Singh, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)
1.

The order by which, while still on probation, appellant’s service was

terminated reads as under:“No.HR/PF/S-325/2012-100907

September 11, 2012

To
Mr.S.P.Sharma,
Vice President
IFCI Ltd.
IFCI Tower,
61, Nehru Place,
New Delhi-110019
Subject: Termination

LPA No.75/2014

Page 1 of 5

 Owing to the lapses committed by you in the handling of the
Jupiter Bioscience Ltd. case, the Competent Authority has decided to
terminate your contract of employment with immediate effect. The
payment of dues including the Notice Pay will be settled in due
course.
(Michael Mili)
Sr.Associate Vice President
Human Resources”
2.

Two issues were raised by the appellant before the learned Single

Judge.

The first pertaining to his deemed confirmation.

The second

pertaining to the language of the order/letter terminating his service; and the
issue was whether on the face of the letter the termination is stigmatic and
since it was not preceded by any inquiry, the termination was illegal.
3.

The appellant has lost on both counts before the learned Single Judge,

and in respect of the second issue decided concerning whether the letter
terminating appellant’s service is stigmatic, we find a contradiction in the
impugned decision wherein after holding that the termination order is nonstigmatic the learned Single Judge has issued a direction that a fresh order of
termination simplictor would be issued to the appellant.
4.

Learned counsel for the appellant, though in the appeal grounds have

been urged regarding appellant’s contention of deemed confirmation, gives
up said grounds and restricts argument in the appeal to whether the language
of the letter/order terminating appellant’s services casts a stigma.
5.

Learned counsel for the respondents wants to cite judgments where

Courts have strived to draw a distinction between past acts of
misdemeanours constituting the motive or the foundation to an order of
terminating the services of a probationer in the context of the argument
advanced that though the order on its face is non-stigmatic, the actual reason

LPA No.75/2014

Page 2 of 5

 for service being terminated is a finding of guilt for a misdemeanour
allegedly committed. We are not noting said decision because in the instant
case the only issue which arises is whether the letter terminating the service
of the appellant is stigmatic.
6.

The letter gives the reason for terminating the service of the appellant,

and we note the language of the reason : ‘owing to the lapses committed by
you in the handling of the Jupiter Bioscience Ltd. case’.
7.

Is an allegation of committing lapses, as the reason for terminating the

services, one which casts a stigma?
8.

We need not list the decisions which give the reason why an order

terminating the service of a probationer, if stigmatic, is a penal order. We
simply note that the legal principle is that where the order affects the
reputation of the employee it would hinder future prospects of a job and
therefore would be penal.

A stigma is a mark of disgrace and hence

stigmatic would mean ‘of or relating to a stigma’.
9.

Law treats reputation as a property. Law also treats reputation as an

honour and if understood as an honour it signifies the estimation which a
person receives from society. Reputation is also treated in law as dignity for
the reason a person’s dignity depends on whether others in the community
give him the deference that is his desert as a full member of the society.
10.

An imputation which disparages a person in his profession, calling,

trade or business is bound to be stigmatic, and therefore any imputation
which is disparaging in the way of a person’s occupation would be stigmatic.
11.

The

test

whether

an

imputation

against

a

person

is

disparaging/stigmatic would be : whether the words used tend to lower the
person in the estimation of right thinking members of the society. In the

LPA No.75/2014

Page 3 of 5

 context of defamation/liable in the decision reported as (1970) 1 ALLER
1094 Drummond-Jackson Vs. British Medical Association, imputation of
incompetence in the conduct of one’s business was held capable of being
defamatory even though such an imputation does no expose such a person to
hatred, ridicule or contempt or cause others to shun or avoid him.
12.

Tested on the anvil of the legal norms and principles aforenoted, an

imputation against a person in a letter of termination of service that the
reason for service being terminated is the lapses committed by the person,
would mean that in his occupation, the person is labelled as a negligent
person while discharging duties for the reason a lapse is an act of omission
and could be either deliberate or negligent. Such a person would obviously
face the penal consequence of not being able to get a job for the reason the
prospective future employer would like to know the reason for cessation of a
past service. If informed that it was on account of the allegation of being
negligent in discharge of duties and the language used is that the service is
being terminated owing to the lapses committed, the consequences would be
adverse against the employee.
13.

Learned counsel for the respondent states that there are decisions

where a letter terminating the service of a probationer giving reason that the
work was not found to be satisfactory have been held to be non-stigmatic
and sought time to cite the same.
14.

There is no reason to adjourn hearing today to enable learned counsel

to cite said decisions because the Bench agrees that terminating the service
of a probationer giving reason that the work was not found to be satisfactory
is non-stigmatic because it would not prejudice the mind of a future
prospective employer.

LPA No.75/2014

The reason is that one may not measure up to

Page 4 of 5

 somebody’s expectations of efficiency but would do so in the eyes or
estimation of somebody else. Terminating the service of a probationer on
ground of work not found to be satisfactory would not be at par where the
termination is with the reason that it is on account of lapses committed by
the employee while discharging duties. An act of negligence alleged against
a person is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of fact and law. Quality of
work output of a person is a matter of opinion.
15.

We allow the appeal and quash the letter dated September 11, 2012.

The appellant would be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.
It would be open to the respondents to charge-sheet the appellant and hold
an inquiry and thereafter pass such orders as are permissible to be passed.
16.

No costs.

(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE

(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
AUGUST 20, 2015
mamta

LPA No.75/2014

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