*

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on 24.11.2015
Pronounced on : 22.02.2016

+

CONT. CAS (CRL.) 12/2014 & CRL. M.A. 11975-77/2015
COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION
Through: None.

..... Petitioner

versus
DEEPAK KHOSLA
Through:

..... Respondent
Mr. Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv. with
Ms.Sanchita Ain, Mr. Ajay Marwah,
& Ms. Srishti Singh, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
NAJMI WAZIRI, J.
1. After 26 judges of the Delhi High Court had recused themselves from
hearing this and another criminal contempt petition (Cont Cas (Crl.)
9/2014) the Hon‟ble Chief Justice has constituted this Special Division
Bench to adjudicate upon the two pending petitions against the
respondent, Deepak Khosla - an advocate, who has appeared before the
Court.
Background/ Issue of Show Cause Notice
2. On 11.10.2013, while arguing certain applications in LPA 16/2012, the
respondent referred to the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 1 of 58

 Sanjiv Khanna and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.V. Easwar, as „Dedh Bench‟
(Hindustani equivalent of one-and-half Bench). Recording this
expression, the order dated 11.10.2013, noted that it would take a view
on this expression at the time of final disposal of CM No. 2392/2013.
3. By a detailed order dated 28.03.2014, the Bench comprising of the
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kailash Gambhir and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.V.
Easwar, directed initiation of suo moto contempt proceedings against
the respondent. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced as
under:
“Suo motu contempt proceedings:
13. On 11.10.2013 this Bench was hearing certain
miscellaneous applications filed by the applicant
Mr. Deepak Khosla seeking, inter alia, early
hearing of CM No.2392/2013 (application for
“clarification”). While hearing arguments in that
behalf, he made a reference to “dedh Bench” (i.e.,
Hindi equivalent of one-and-a-half Bench) while
describing the Division Bench consisting of Sanjeev
Khanna, J., and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.). In the
order passed by this Bench on that day, it was noted
as follows: “Addressing arguments on these applications, Mr.
Deepak Khosla, who appears in person, submits
that the order dated 24th April, 2012 passed by the
Division Bench comprising of Hon‟ble Mr. Justice
Sanjeev Khanna and Hon‟ble Mr. Justice R. V.
Easwar can be described as Dedh Bench order
(One and half) and this is quite apparent from the
fact that in the order dated 24th April, 2012 Justice
R. V. Easwar has not given his own comments. Mr.
Deepak Khosla also submits that the judgment has
been authored by Justice Sanjeev Khanna and the
same has been just co-signed by Justice R.V.
Easwar but Justice R.V. Easwar has not responded

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 2 of 58

 since May, 2013 to certain aspects of the law which
had crept into the order dated 24th September,
2012 and this leads him to believe that Justice R.V.
Easwar has not subscribed to some of the views in
the said order. Mr. Deepak Khosla further submits
that in his previous applications, he has already
spelled out grievance to this effect.
The present Special Bench has assembled today
for hearing these applications. While addressing
arguments on these applications, Mr. Deepak
Khosla has raised the aforesaid contentions.
This Court will take a view on the said plea raised
by Mr. Deepak Khosla of describing the Division
Bench as “Dedh Bench‟ at the time of final
disposal of CM APPL. No.2392/2013 and other
applications which are listed for hearing on 22nd
November, 2013.”
Since in our view the applicant has
committed contempt of court in describing the
Division Bench consisting of Sanjeev Khanna, J.,
and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.) as “Dedh Bench” –
a prima facie contemptuous remark calculated to
denigrate the dignity of this court – we issue showcause notice to Mr. Deepak Khosla, the applicant
herein, as to why proceedings should not be
initiated against him for committing contempt of
court.
14. Mr. Deepak Khosla shall file his reply to the
show-cause notice of contempt within 15 days.
Relist the contempt proceedings as “Court of its
own motion” on 25.04.2014.”
4. The case was numbered as Cont. Case (C) 229/2014. On 25.04.2014,
after the dismissal of certain other applications by this Bench, the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 3 of 58

 respondent impudently remarked that in view of the “beautiful
orders” passed, the Bench should recuse itself from dealing with his
matters henceforth. In view of this, the Bench ordered that this
unwarranted expression shall also be dealt with during the contempt
proceedings that had already been initiated against the respondent. The
relevant portion of the order has been reproduced as under:
“After dismissal of the applications moved by
the appellant, the appellant audaciously stated that
the kind of „beautiful orders‟ this court has passed
today, this Bench should recuse itself to further deal
with his matters.
Mr. Deepak Khosla further states that he
would be filing a formal application to make a
request to this Bench to recuse from dealing with
his matters. The appellant has every liberty to move
an application, which he so wishes, but certainly the
kind of expressions he is in habit of using and his
entire tone and tenor for the court are highly
disparaging and contemptuous in nature. Earlier
also, the appellant had the audacity to address the
Division Bench as a „dedh bench‟ and for which suo
moto contempt proceedings were initiated against
him. Today again, the expressions used by him are
highly derogatory and this conduct of the appellant
using the aforesaid unwarranted expressions,
during the course of judicial proceedings, shall be
taken into consideration at the time of taking final
view in the said contempt petition.
It is ordered
accordingly.”
5. The respondent chose not to reply to the contempt notice, despite being
granted repeated opportunities to do so. On 22.08.2014, none appeared
on behalf of the respondent and therefore his right to file his reply was

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 4 of 58

 closed. The matter was adjourned to 20.11.2014 on which day he
expressed difficulty to appear in the post lunch session. Hence, at his
request, the case was adjourned for final hearing to 27.11.2014.
However, even on 27.11.2014, an adjournment was sought by the
respondent.
6. On 28.11.2014, it was noticed by the Court that the case had been
incorrectly listed under the category of civil contempt proceedings. It
was ordered to be treated and listed as a criminal contempt case and
was renumbered as Cont. Case (Crl) 12/2014. Consequently, the
respondent was granted a fresh opportunity to file his reply in view of
the re-categorization of the matter as a criminal proceeding. The said
order reads as under:
“Before we begin hearing the present contempt proceeding, Mr.
Deepak Khosla, the alleged contemnor, who appears in person,
submits that vide order dated 28th March, 2014 this Court had
directed the Registry to list this contempt proceeding under the
category of civil contempt and not as a criminal contempt,
therefore, direction should be issued for listing this matter
before the learned Single Judge dealing with the civil contempt
cases.
We have heard Mr. Deepak Khosla. The contempt proceedings
were directed against the respondent because of certain
expressions used by him during the course of hearing of CM
No.16860/2013 and CM No. 2392/2013 in LPA 16/2012 and
therefore, the said contempt proceedings directed against the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 5 of 58

 petitioner are manifestly in the nature of Criminal Contempt
and not as a Civil Contempt. We may also observe here that the
said expressions were used by Mr. Deepak Khosla in the face
of the Court, therefore, the same will not fall under Section
2(b) but under Section 2(c) of The Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. We accordingly, rectify the said mistake which crept in
the order dated 28th March, 2014 and hereby direct for
initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the
respondent- Mr. Deepak Khosla. The Registry is, accordingly
directed to register these proceedings under the category of
Criminal Contempt, read with Article 215 of the Constitution of
India. We also grant a fresh opportunity to Mr. Deepak Khosla
to file his reply within a period of six weeks.
List on 16.01.2015.”
Preliminary Objections
7. On 19.03.2015, Mr. Deepak Khosla appeared before a bench
comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kailash Gambhir, and raised the
following preliminary objections:
“A. Under Section 14(2) of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, the Court which had initiated the
contempt proceedings cannot try him for the suo
moto contempt proceedings rather it should be
heard and decided by any other roster bench.
B. He cannot be proceeded solely by the Contempt
of Courts Act in the absence of rules framed by this
Court and any decision by the Court in the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 6 of 58

 contempt case in the absence of the rules would be
in violation of the fundamental rights of the
respondent as have been granted under Article 21
of the Constitution of India.
C. This contempt proceedings can continue only
after the disposal of CM No. 17483/2013 which was
filed by him in LPA No. 16/2012 wherein he gave
necessary clarifications with regard to the said
expression of „Dedh Bench‟ and the same has yet
not been decided by this Court.
D. The respondent being a practising Advocate, has
to be tried for contempt proceedings by a Full
Bench of this Court in terms of Volume V, Chapter
3, Part B Rule 2(1) of the High Court Rules.”
8. These preliminary issues have already been dealt with in detail by the
Court vide order dated 29.05.2015 and do not require any further
discussion. Relevant portion has been quoted hereunder:
“25. Dealing with the first preliminary objection, it is
beyond doubt that on 11th October, 2013 while
addressing arguments on CM Nos. 16860/2013 and
2392/2013 for modification/ clarification of order dated
24th April, 2012, the respondent had used the expression
„Dedh Bench‟ which was referred to the Division Bench
comprising of Sanjiv Khanna, J and R.V. Easwar, J. (as
he then was). The said expression used by the respondent,
for one of the member of the Division Bench, was in his
CONT. CASE (CRL.) No.12/2014 Page 14 of 39 presence
and on the very face of the court. The Court in such a
situation, being a Court of Record, could have held the
respondent guilty of contempt and awarded an instant
punishment on the same very day. The other option was to
give him a fair opportunity and know his stand as to why
he had used such kind of expression for a Sitting Judge
that too in his presence and on the face of the court. The
Court thought of adopting the second course. In fact, the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 7 of 58

 Court took a view that an appropriate decision on this
aspect shall be taken at the time of deciding CM No.
16860/2013 and 2392/2013 in LPA 16/2012 filed by the
respondent. Accordingly, when the said two applications
were decided by the Bench by an order dated 28th March,
2014, this Court directed initiation of suo motu contempt
proceedings against the respondent for using such kind of
expressions for a member of the Bench, particularly R.V.
Easwer, J. (as he then was) who had decided LPA No.
16/2012 vide order dated 24th April, 2012.
26. Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India
declare the Supreme Court and High Courts of the
country as a Court of Record having all the powers of
such a court including power to punish for its contempt.
These Articles are reproduced as under:- CONT. CASE
(CRL.) No.12/2014 Page 15 of 39 “Article 129. Supreme
Court to be a court of record The Supreme Court shall be
a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a
court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Article 215. High Courts to be courts of record Every
High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all
the powers of such a court including the power to punish
for contempt of itself.”
27. One of the earliest cases wherein this extra-ordinary
and special power of the High Court to institute
proceedings for contempt of court and to punish the
contemnors wherever necessary was the case of Sukhdev
Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges of The Pepsu
High Court reported in [1954]1SCR454 wherein the
Court held as under:- “ In 1950 came the Constitution of
India and article 215 states that - "Every High Court
shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers
such a court including the power to punish for contempt
of itself." Here again, whatever this is a fresh conferral of
power or a continuation of existing powers hardly matters
because whichever way it is viewed the jurisdiction is a
special one and so is outside the purview of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 8 of 58

 repealed by Act XXXII of 1952. Section 3 of the new Act is
similar to section 2 of the old and, far from conferring a
new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the old Act, the
existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High
Court and further assumes the existence of a special
practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court
shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority
"in accordance with the same procedure and practice."
These words are new and would be inappropriate if the
Criminal Procedure Code applied. In any case, so far as
contempt of a High Court itself is concerned, as distinct
from one of a subordinate court, the Constitution vests
these rights in every High Court, so no Act of a
legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it
afresh by virtue of its own authority. It is true section 5
expands the ambit of the authority beyond what was till
then considered to be possible but it does not confer a
new jurisdiction. It merely widen the scope of an existing
jurisdiction of a very special kind. On reflection it will be
apparent that the Code could not be called in aid in such
cases, for if the Code applies it must apply in its entirety
and in that event how could such proceedings be
instituted ? The maximum punishment is now limited to
six months' simple imprisonment or a fine of Rs. 2,000 or
both because of the 1952 Act. Therefore, under the second
schedule to the Code contempt would be triable by a
Magistrate and not by a High Court and the procedure
would have to be a summons procedure. That would take
away the right of a High Court to deal with the matter
summarily and punish, a right which was well established
by the case law up to 1945 and which no subsequent
legislation has attempted to remove. So also section 556
could not apply, nor would the rule which prohibits a
judge from importing his own knowledge of the facts into
the case. We hold therefore that the Code of Criminal
Procedure does not apply in matters of contempt triable
by the High Court. The High Court can deal with it
summarily and adopt its own procedure. All that is

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 9 of 58

 necessary is that the procedure is fair and that the
contemner is made aware of the charge against him and
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
This rule was laid down by the Privy Council re Pollard
L.R. 2 P.C. 106 at 120. and was followed in India and in
Burma re Vallabhdas (I.L.R. 27 Bom. 394.) and Ebrahim
Mamoojee Parekh v. King Emperor I.L.R. 4 Rang. 257at
259-261.). In our view that is still the law. If the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not apply, then there is no other
power which we can exercise. The Constitution gives
every High Court the right and the power to punish a
contempt of itself. If we were to order a transfer to
another court in this case we would be depriving Pepsu
High Court of the right which is so vested in it. We have
no more power to do that than has a legislature. As for
transfer from one Judge to another, there again there is
no original jurisdiction which we can exercise. It is not a
fundamental right and so article 32 has no application
and there is no other law to which recourse can be had.
This petition is therefore incompetent and must be
dismissed. We wish however to add that though we have
no power to order a transfer in an original petition of this
kind we consider it desirable on general principles of
justice that a judge who has been personally attacked
should not as far as possible hear a contempt matter
which, to that extent, concerns him personally. It is
otherwise when the attack is not directed against him
personally. We do not lay down any general because
there may be cases where that is impossible, as for
example in a court where there is only one judge or two
and both are attacked. Other cases may also arise where
it is more convenient and proper for the judge to deal
with the matter himself, as for example in a contempt in
facie curio. All we can say is that this must be left to the
good sense of the judges themselves who, we are
confident, will comport themselves with that dispassionate
dignity and decorum which befits their high office and
will bear in mind the often quoted maxim that justice must

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 10 of 58

 not only be done but must be seen to be done by all
concerned and most particularly by an accused person
who should always be given, as far as that is humanly
possible, a feeling of confidence that he will receive a
fair, just and impartial trial by judges who have no
personal interest or concern in his case.” 28. In another
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the case of Pritam Pal v High Court of Madhya
Pradesh reported in 1992 SCR (2) 864, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court while dealing with the case of the
appellant who made some serious allegations against two
Judges of the High Court who dealt with his writ petition,
took cognizance of his contemptuous conduct, notice was
issued against him as to why he should not be punished
for committing contempt of court. In the said matter also,
the appellant had raised various preliminary objections,
one of them being that the procedure followed by the
High Court was contrary to rules framed under it.
Dealing with this preliminary objection, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in the following para held as under:“Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was held
that the High Court has inherent power to deal with a
contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own
procedure, provided that it gives a fair and reasonable
opportunity to the contemner to defend himself. But the
procedure has now been prescribed by Section 15 of the
Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 14, List
III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though
the contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
High Court can be regulated by legislation by
appropriate Legislature under Entry 77 of List I and
Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the Parliament
has enacted the Act 1971, the contempt jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the High Court is given a
constitutional foundation by declaring to be `Courts of
Record' under Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution
and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court
and the High Court cannot be taken away by any

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 11 of 58

 legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact,
Section 22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this
Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts.
It necessarily follows that the constitutional jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and the High Court under Articles
129 and 215 cannot be curtailed by anything in the Act of
1971.” 29. Reiterating the said principle that jurisdiction
contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution
of India is inalienable and the same cannot be taken away
or whittled down by any legislative enactment
subordinate to the Constitution, the Apex Court in the
case of T. Sudhakar Prasad v Govt of A.P reported in
(2001) 1 SCC 516 held as under:“Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India declare
Supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of
Record having all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles
do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the
Supreme Court and the High Courts. They merely
recognise a pre-existing situation that the Supreme Court
and the High Courts are courts of record and by virtue of
being courts of record have inherent jurisdiction to
punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power
to punish for contempt is summary. It is not governed or
limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles
of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by
Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken
away or whittled down by any legislative enactment
subordinate to the Constitution. The provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not
in derogation of Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution.
The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot be
used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction
contemplated by the said two Articles.” 30. Another
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court which has bearing
in the facts of the instant case is that of Dr. L.P. Misra vs.
State of U.P. reported in AIR 1998 SC 3337. In the facts

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 12 of 58

 of this case, the alleged contemnors had committed
contempt in the face of the Court and taking a note of the
contumacious conduct of the appellants therein, the Court
exercised its powers under Article 215 of the Constitution
of India and held them guilty of committing contempt and
sentenced them with imprisonment for one month and fine
of Rs. 1000/- each. The said order was assailed before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and one of the grounds raised by
the appellant was that the Court did not follow the
procedure as prescribed under Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before passing the order of
contempt on the same day i.e. without even issuing show
cause notice to explain their alleged contemptuous
conduct. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court while recognizing
the power of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction as
a Court of record, under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India, held that such jurisdiction has to be in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law. For ready
reference, the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:“9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after
going through the materials placed on record, we are of
the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned
order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law.
It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and
jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be
exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law. It is in these circumstances, the impugned order
cannot be sustained.” 31. In the case of Pallav Sheth vs.
Custodian & Ors., reported in AIR 2001 SC 2763, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the
powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts under the
Constitution of India and under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 for taking action for contempt of subordinate
courts. The following paras would be relevant to the
controversy in hand:-

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 13 of 58

 “31. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High
Courts are Courts of Record and the Constitution has
given them the powers to punish for contempt. The
decisions of this Court clearly show that this power
cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under
Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute can there be any
legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that
the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of
the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under
Article 129 and/or Article 215 there can be little doubt
that such law would not be regarded as having been
validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing
for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be
regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a
period of limitation for initiating proceedings for
contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which
abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under
Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.
32. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or
existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power
or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in
accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature it
would stand to reason that the power under Article 129
and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance
with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of
apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be
construed harmoniously.
33. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides
for what is not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in
Section 12 the maximum punishment which can be
imposed; procedure to be followed where contempt is in
the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or
cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is
provided by Sections 14 and 15; the procedure to be
followed after taking cognizance is provided by Section
17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal
contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and
determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges;

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 14 of 58

 Section 19 gives the right of appeal from any order or
decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity
of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as
being violative or in conflict with any provisions of the
Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in the
Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), where it
did not express any opinion on the question whether
maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding
on the Court, no doubt has been expressed about the
validity of any provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its
constitutional power this Court has, on the other hand,
applied the provisions of the Act while exercising
jurisdiction under Article 129 or 125 of the Constitution.
In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (supra) it recognised that
the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of
punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta
Mishra's case was decided on the interpretation of
Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, there was no right of
appeal if the Court did not take action or initiate
contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram
Rajkumar's case (supra) the Court did not hold that
Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to
the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt
proceedings (was within time and limitation had to be
calculated) as for the purpose of limitation date of filing
was relevant and furthermore that was a case of
continuing wrong. In Kartick Chandra Das case (supra)
the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be
applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in
connection with an appeal filed under Section 19 of the
Limitation Act. A three-Judge Bench in Dr L.P.Misra's
case (supra) observed that the procedure provided by the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the
Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20
is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under
Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 15 of 58

 the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of
punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of
limitation can also be provided.”
32. We may also usefully refer to the decision of the Apex
Court in Leila David v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.
reported in AIR 2010 SC 862 wherein the Court dealt
with the contemptuous conduct of one of the writ
petitioners who had thrown a footwear at the Judges and
after recording the entire incident which had occurred in
the sight of the Hon‟ble Judges and the other persons
present in Court including the then Law Officers, the
Court held that such behaviour of the writ petitioner is
contemptuous in the face of the Court. The Court further
held that since the writ petitioner stood by what she had
done in Court and in the light of such admission, the
resort to of summary procedure cannot be faulted and the
Court held her guilty of criminal contempt and inflicted
punishment of three months imprisonment on them.
33. The said course of action which was directed at the
instance of one of the Judges of the Bench, did not meet
the approval of the other learned Judge, who by a
separate order, observed that the writ petitioner could not
have been punished for contempt without due compliance
with the provisions of Section 14(1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. His Lordship was also of
the view that the Court‟s power under Article 142 was not
meant to circumvent the statutory requirements. This
difference of opinion by one of the learned Judges of the
same Bench led to the constitution of Bench of three
Judges by Hon‟ble the Chief Justice to deal with the case
of the alleged contemnors therein.
34. The then Attorney General who appeared before the
Bench supported the view taken by his Lordship Dr.
Justice Arijit Pasayat and submitted that Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, did not preclude the Court
from deciding the contempt matter summarily when such
contempt was committed in the face of the Court. The
learned Attorney General submitted that while Section 14

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 16 of 58

 provides a procedure to be normally followed so as to
give the contemnors an opportunity of showing cause
against the action proposed to be taken, in cases of
instant nature where the incident had taken place within
the precincts of the Court room and within the sight of all
present therein, including the Hon'ble Judges who
constituted the Bench, there could be little justification in
going through the procedure prescribed in Section 14 in
order to establish that the alleged contemnors had, in
fact, committed contempt of Court.
35. The Full Bench agreeing with the view of his Lordship
Dr. Justice Arijit Pasayat and with the submissions
canvassed by the learned Attorney General, upheld the
sentence as was imposed upon on the said contemnors
and they were directed to be taken into custody forthwith
to serve out the remaining sentence. The relevant paras of
the said judgment are as follows:“17. As far as the suo motu proceedings for contempt are
concerned, we are of the view that Dr. Justice Arijit
Pasayat was well within his jurisdiction in passing a
summary order, having regard to the provisions of
Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India.
Although, Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of
criminal contempt in the face of the court, it does not
preclude the court from taking recourse to summary
proceedings when a deliberate and wilful contumacious
incident takes place in front of their eyes and the public at
large, including Senior Law Officers, such as the Attorney
General for India who was then the Solicitor General of
India. While, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Ganguly, it is
a statutory requirement and a salutary principle that a
person should not be condemned unheard, particularly in
a case relating to contempt of Court involving a summary
procedure, and should be given an opportunity of
showing cause against the action proposed to be taken
against him/her, there are exceptional circumstances in
which such a procedure may be discarded as being

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 17 of 58

 redundant. The incident which took place in the court
room presided over by Dr. Justice Pasayat was within the
confines of the court room and was witnessed by a large
number of people and the throwing of the footwear was
also admitted by Dr. Sarita Parikh, who without
expressing any regret for her conduct stood by what she
had done and was supported by the other contemnors. In
the light of such admission, the summary procedure
followed by Dr. Justice Pasayat cannot be faulted.
18. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, deals
with contempt in the face of the Supreme Court or the
High Court. The expression "Contempt in the face of the
Supreme Court" has been interpreted to mean an incident
taking place within the sight of the learned Judges and
others present at the time of the incident, who had
witnessed such incident. In re: Nand Lal Balwani [(1999)
2 SCC 743], it was held that where an Advocate shouted
slogans and hurled a shoe towards the Court causing
interference with judicial proceedings and did not even
tender an apology, he would be liable for contempt in the
face of the Court. It was observed by the Bench of three
Judges which heard the matter that law does not give a
lawyer, unsatisfied with the result of any litigation,
licence to permit himself the liberty of causing disrespect
to the Court or attempting, in any manner, to lower the
dignity of the Court. It was also observed that Courts
could not be intimidated into passing favourable orders.
Consequently, on account of his contumacious conduct,
this Court sentenced the contemnor to suffer four months
simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. In
another decision of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v.
Union of India and another [(1988) 3 SCC 255], a
petition filed by an experienced advocate of this Court by
way of a public interest litigation was couched in
unsavory language and an intentional attempt was made
to indulge in mudslinging against the advocates, the
Supreme Court and other constitutional institutions.
Many of the allegations made by him were likely to lower

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 18 of 58

 the prestige of the Supreme Court. It was also alleged that
the Supreme Court had become a constitutional liability
without having control over the illegal acts of the
Government. This Court held that the pleadings in the
writ petition gave the impression that they were clearly
intended to denigrate the Supreme Court in the esteem of
the people of India. In the facts of the case, the petitioner
therein was prima facie held to be guilty of contempt of
Court.
19. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt
contemplates issuance of notice and an opportunity to the
contemnors to answer the charges in the notice to satisfy
the principles of natural justice. However, where an
incident of the instant nature takes place within the
presence and sight of the learned Judges, the same
amounts to contempt in the face of the Court and is
required to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself.
This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of the Courts
to be maintained. When an object, such as footwear, is
thrown at the Presiding Officer in a Court proceeding,
the object is not to merely scandalize or humiliate the
Judge, but to scandalize the institution itself and thereby
lower its dignity in the eyes of the public. In the instant
case, after being given an opportunity to explain their
conduct, not only have the contemnors shown no remorse
for their unseemly behaviour, but they have gone even
further by filing a fresh writ petition in which apart from
repeating the scandalous remarks made earlier, certain
new dimensions in the use of unseemly and intemperate
language have been resorted to further denigrate and
scandalize and over-awe the Court. This is one of such
cases where no leniency can be shown as the contemnors
have taken the liberal attitude shown to them by the Court
as licence for indulging in indecorous behaviour and
making scandalous allegations not only against the
judiciary, but those holding the highest positions in the
country. The writ proceedings have been taken in gross
abuse of the process of Court, with the deliberate and

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 19 of 58

 wilful intention of lowering the image and dignity not only
of the Court and the judiciary, but to vilify the highest
constitutional functionaries.
20. In such circumstances, while agreeing with the
procedure adopted by Dr. Justice Pasayat in the facts of
this case, we are not inclined to interfere with the
sentence which has been imposed on the contemnors. The
order dated 20th March, 2009, granting bail to the
contemnors is hereby recalled. The Secretary General is
directed to take the contemnors into custody forthwith
and to arrange to have them sent to the appropriate jail to
serve out the sentence.”
36. In a recent decision of Ram Niranjan Roy v State of
Bihar, 2014(4)SCALE428, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
while dealing with the appellant who appeared in person
and taking note of his condescending behaviour in the
High Court, was directed to be taken into custody by the
Court Officer and was sent to jail for punishment for one
day. Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, he
had approached the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and one of
the contentions raised by the appellant was that no
opportunity was given to him as contemplated under
Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court after referring to many of its
previous decisions, in the following paras, held as under:“Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the
High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or
humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If
the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong
hand, that may result in scandalizing the institution
thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The
courts exist for the people. The courts cherish the faith
reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of that
faith, contempts committed in the face of the court need a
strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High
Court was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit
tendering apology nor did he orally tell the High Court
that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender apology.

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 20 of 58

 Even in this Court he has not tendered apology.
Therefore, since the contempt was gross and it was
committed in the face of the High Court, learned Judges
had to take immediate action to maintain honour and
dignity of the High Court. There was no question of
giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence.
This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be
rejected.”
37. From the cornucopia of various decisions given by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the decisions cited above,
there remains no doubt that Articles 129 and 215 of the
constitution of India declare Supreme Court and High
Court to be a Court of Record having all the powers of
such a court that includes the power to punish for
contempt of court. The contempt jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and the High Court is given a
constitutional foundation by declaring to be „Courts of
Record‟ under Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution
and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court
and the High Court cannot be taken away by any
legislation short of constitutional amendment and its
power to punish for the Contempt of Court are
independent of the statutory law of contempt enacted by
the Parliament. These judgments have also recognized the
supremacy of these Courts with regard to their
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt as well as
to award punishment and to this extent, powers of these
Courts are absolute and supreme and no provision of
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or any other statute can
abrogate or stultify the contempt jurisdiction vested with
the Supreme Court and High Courts under Article 129
and 215 of the Constitution.
38. Insofar as the procedure for holding any person guilty
of contempt and on the quantum of punishment to be
awarded for Contempt of Court whether suo motu or
otherwise, necessarily the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 are the only guide, as there is no other
legislation enacted by the Parliament providing a

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 21 of 58

 separate procedure or punishment for contempt of the
Supreme Court and High Courts under Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution.
39. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
are in addition and not in derogation of Articles 129 and
215 of the Constitution and provisions of this Act cannot
be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of
jurisdiction contemplated by the said two Articles.
40. Another legal principle which clearly emerges from
the above discussion is that so far as any person who
commits contempt in the face of the Court and, if the
Court instantly takes cognizance of the contemptuous
conduct of such a person, and holds the person guilty of
contempt, then in such a case, the grant of opportunity or
issuance of show cause notice before committing the
person for contempt may not be necessary. This is what
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has observed in Ram
Niranjan‟s case (supra) saying that when a contempt is
committed in the face of this High Court or the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate the Judge,
instant action may be necessary and if the Courts do not
deal with such contempt with strong hands that may result
in scandalizing the institution thereby lowering its dignity
in the eyes of the public. It further held that to prevent
erosion of the faith of the people, contempt committed in
the face of the court needs an ascetic treatment and the
learned Judges have to take the immediate action to
maintain honour and dignity of the Court. Thus, there is
no limit or fetters on the power of the High Court to hold
any person guilty of contempt and to punish him
instantaneously if the contempt committed is in the face of
the Court and in the opinion of the Court, if the same is of
a serious nature warranting immediate action without
even giving an opportunity to the alleged contemnor to
put forth his defence.
41. Certainly, it would be for the Court to take such a
view depending upon the facts of each case. This course
of action is also in the fortitude of section 14 of the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 22 of 58

 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The only difference is that
in Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
wherever it appears to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court or this
court, upon its own view, that if a person has been guilty
of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the
Court may cause such person to be detained in custody,
and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the
same day, or as early as possible. But when the High
Court exercises its power contemplated under Article 215
of the Constitution, then it may award the punishment in
terms of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
42. Now adverting back to the facts of the present case,
this Court did not hold the respondent guilty of contempt
for using the said expression „Dedh Bench‟ on the same
day and therefore, there was no instant action taken by
the Court to take cognizance of the alleged contumacious
conduct of the respondent. The Court rather held that at
the time of deciding CM Nos. CM Nos. 16365/2013,
16366/2013 and 16367/2013 on 11th October, 2013 the
Court will take a view on such kind of expressions used by
the respondent during the course of addressing final
arguments. It is only vide order dated 28th March, 2014,
suo motu contempt proceedings were initiated against the
respondent.
43. Resorting to the procedure prescribed under Section
14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the respondent
was given an opportunity to file the reply to the contempt
notice and as already stated above, he failed to file any
reply despite grant of several opportunities. We cannot be
oblivious to Section 14(2) of Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 especially when an oral prayer has been made by
the respondent to have the present contempt proceedings
to be tried against him by some Bench other than the
Bench in whose presence, the offence is alleged to have
been committed. For better appreciation, Section 14 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is reproduced
hereunder:-

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 23 of 58

 “14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the
Supreme Court or a High Court.— (1) When it is alleged,
or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon
its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt
committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may
cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any
time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as
early as possible thereafter, shall— —(1) When it is
alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High
Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of
contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court
may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at
any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day,
or as early as possible thereafter, shall—" (a) cause him
to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is
charged; (b) afford him an opportunity to make his
defence to the charge; (c) after taking such evidence as
may be necessary or as may be offered by such person
and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after
adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and
(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of
such person as may be just. (2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with
contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally
or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by
some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose
presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been
committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is
practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper
administration of justice the application should be
allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together
with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief
Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as
respects the trial thereof. (3) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law, in any trial of a person
charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is
held, in pursuance of a direction given under subsection
(2), by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 24 of 58

 presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been
committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or
Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is
alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness
and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under
sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in the case.
(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court
may direct that a person charged with contempt under
this section shall be detained in such custody as it may
specify: Provided that he shall be released on bail, if a
bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient
is executed with or without sureties conditioned that the
person charged shall attend at the time and place
mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend
until otherwise directed by the Court: Provided further
that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail
from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond
without sureties for his attendance as aforesaid.”
44. It is a cardinal principle of law that justice should not
only be done but also seem to have been done. Although it
is not the wish or prerogative of a litigant as to which
Bench will decide his case as this is a prerogative of the
Chief Justice of a High Court to decide the Bench and
accordingly place any matter before a particular bench.
Although, wherever any contempt is committed in the face
of the Court, then the same Court may be in a better
position to take a view on the misconduct of such person.
However, at the same time, the litigant facing a contempt,
if carries any such feeling that any particular Judge or
Bench has a bias towards him then certainly he can
exercise his right under Section 14(2) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 to be tried against by a Judge other than
the Judge in whose presence or hearing, the alleged
contempt has been committed. This however will depend
on the facts of each case and the nature of misconduct
subject to the exception that is , if the offence committed
by a contemnor is of a serious nature warranting an

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 25 of 58

 instant action by the Court then this course of action may
not be available to him.
45. Thus so far as the first objection is concerned, we are
in agreement with the contention raised by the Petitioner.
However at the same time we are of the view, that it is not
for the litigant to decide which bench shall take
cognizance unless and until there appears to be a
reasonable apprehension of bias. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, we deem it appropriate to place this matter
before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice for placing it before the
appropriate bench.
46. Coming to the second objection raised by the
respondent that he cannot be proceeded under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in the absence of rules
framed by this Court and any decision by this Court in a
contempt case in the absence of rules would be in
violation of the Fundamental Rights of the respondent
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Pertinently, the Contempt of Courts Act, was brought on
the statute book in the year 1971 and the purpose of this
enactment was to keep the administration of justice pure
and unsullied. This piece of legislation is quite
comprehensive in nature and provides inbuilt mechanism
to protect personal liberty and fundamental rights of the
citizen. This is evident from the very dawn of the statute
which starts as „An Act to define and limit the powers of
certain courts in punishing Contempts of Courts and to
regulate their procedure in relation thereto.‟
47. On bare perusal of various sections of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 one can notice that the same are
procedural in nature. The heading of Section 14 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is “Procedure where
contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High
Court”. The heading of Section 17 of the Contempt of
Courts Act 1971, is also along these lines, which is
“Procedure after cognizance”. It is because of the inbuilt
mechanism of the statute perhaps it was never felt that in
the absence of the rules, the provisions of the Act cannot

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 26 of 58

 be invoked, enforced and implemented. We are not
suggesting here that the rules should not be framed but
certainly the statute has strided well in the absence of the
rules for the past about 34 years. We thus find no force in
the objection raised by the respondent that in the absence
of the rules, action against him cannot be taken under the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. We also
cannot lose sight of the fact that the contempt proceedings
have also been directed against the respondent under
Article 215 of the Constitution and as already discussed
above, the powers of the High Court under Article 215 of
the Constitution to punish in contempt for itself are
supreme and absolute. 48. It is also an undeniable fact
that the respondent has been given due opportunity of
hearing to defend himself in the said contempt
proceedings and therefore, the respondent cannot
complain denial of adequate opportunity or violation of
principles of natural justice. In this background his rights
as are guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India have been duly taken care of.
49. Moving onto the other objection raised by the
respondent that CM No. 17483/2013 was filed by him in
LPA No. 16/2012 wherein he made the necessary
clarification with regard to the use of said expression
“Dedh Bench” and if that CM is allowed, then the very
foundation and substratum of this contempt proceedings
would collapse in heat. This objection raised by the
respondent is also not tenable. The said application
purported to have been filed by the respondent was not
pressed by the respondent at any stage of the proceedings
and now at the stage of final hearing of the contempt
proceedings, we cannot allow him to take shelter under
the said CM. In any event of the matter, the respondent
was granted number of opportunities to file replies to the
contempt proceedings but he failed to do so which means
that the respondent did not prefer to offer any explanation
to the use of the said expression “Dedh Bench” while
addressing his arguments in support of his pending

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 27 of 58

 applications. Mere filing of an application by the
respondent is thus hardly of any consequence.
50. So far as the objection D is concerned, since we have
already directed that the matter be placed before Hon‟ble
the Chief Justice in terms of Section 14 (2) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for assigning the same to
the appropriate Bench, therefore, we deem it fit that the
Hon‟ble Chief Justice may take a view on this objection
raised by the respondent herein.”
Accordingly, this matter was placed before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice,
who has constituted this Division Bench. There is no occasion for us to
take a different view from the aforesaid conclusion.
9. An issue raised by the respondent is that this contempt proceeding
could only continue after the disposal of CM No. 17483/2013, which
was filed by him in LPA No. 16/2012, wherein he gave necessary
clarifications with regard to the said expression of ‘Dedh Bench’. The
court is of the view that the substratum of contempt proceedings is the
charge of contempt itself. The noticee may respond to the charge of
contempt by way of an affidavit-in-defence or otherwise argue against
the charge but he cannot seek to stall the contempt proceedings on the
ground that an allegedly connected issue in another proceeding needs
to be adjudicated first. The criminal contempt proceedings try the
charge of contempt before it uninfluenced by the outcome of an
application pending in some civil appeal.
10.If the respondent wanted to rely on the averments in the pending
application, i.e., CM No. 17483/2013, in his defence against the
charge, he ought to have filed the same in these proceedings. It is not
for this Court to search for that application and then adjudicate the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 28 of 58

 matter. Choosing not to file a reply in defence of the charge of
contempt will be deemed to be foreclosure of this right amounting to
admission of the charge and/or no defence against the charge. The
Court will only consider whether the charge before it constitutes
contempt of court, de hors any other pending proceedings. In defence,
the noticee/respondent has not sought a plea of truth either. On the
contrary, he has sought to offer a perfunctory apology, at the
penultimate stage of proceedings. The respondent’s contention that if
the pending CM is allowed, this contempt proceeding would be
rendered redundant is based on aspirational conjuncture. The charge of
criminal contempt has to be answered in the here and now. The
respondent cannot be allowed to use the CM as a shield to stall or avoid
these proceedings. The respondent has failed to provide any
explanation let alone justification regarding the use of the pejorative
and insulting term ‘Dedh Bench‟ against the Hon’ble Division Bench.
11.The last preliminary issue challenges the authority of this Bench to
entertain this contempt proceeding insofar as the respondent claims that
being a practicing advocate, a matter pertaining to his alleged contempt
of court shall be heard before a Full Bench only. It would be apt to
reproduce Rule 2(1) of the High Court Rules (Volume V, Chapter 3,
Part B):
“JURISDICTION OF A SINGLE JUDGE AND OF
BENCHES OF THE HIGH COURT
2. (i) Bench in cases of misconduct of Advocates – Every
case for professional or other misconduct against an
Advocate shall be laid before the Honourable the Chief
Justice or a Judge nominated in this behalf for an order
under Section 10(2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act,

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 29 of 58

 1926, as to whether it be rejected summarily or whether
an inquiry be held. If an inquiry is ordered, the case
shall, after receipt of the findings of the Tribunal or the
District Judge, be heard by a Bench of three Judges.”
A perusal of the above rule would show that the expression used
therein is “misconduct”. In Noratanmal Chourariavs M.R. Murli &
Anr., (2004) 5 SCC 689], the Hon‟ble Supreme Court delved into the
meaning of the expression “misconduct”. It would be proper to
reproduce the observations herein under:
“Misconduct has not been defined in the Advocates Act,
1961. Misconduct, inter alia, envisages breach of
discipline, although it would not be possible to lay down
exhaustively as to what would constitute conduct and
indiscipline, which, however, is wide enough to include
wrongful omission or commission whether done or
omitted to be done intentionally or unintentionally. It
means, "improper behaviour intentional wrong doing or
deliberate violation of a rule of standard or behaviour":
Misconduct is said to be a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, where no
discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it is
a violation of definite law.
In Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Its
Workmen reported in (1969) 2 LLJ 755, Shah, J. stated
that misconduct spreads over a wide and hazy spectrum
of industrial activity; the most seriously subversive
conducts rendering an employee wholly unfit for
employment to mere technical default covered thereby.
This Court in State of Punjab and Others vs. Ram Singh
Ex. Constable, reported in 1992 (4) SCC 54, noticed:"5. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, sixth Edition at Page 999 thus:"A Transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty,

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 30 of 58

 unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or
wrong behaviour, it synonyms are misdemeanor,
misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety,
mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or
carelessness".
Misconduct in offence has been defined as :"Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation
to the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term
embraces acts which the office holder had no right to
perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in
the face of an affirmative duty to act".
P.RamanathAiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987
at Page 821 defines 'misconduct thus:"The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and
not a mere error of judgment, Misconduct is not
necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral
turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and
has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter
and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard
to the scope of the Act or statute which is being
construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or
improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means
a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity
may demand and carelessness, negligence and
unskillfulness are transgressions of some established,
but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is
necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of
definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under
an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act;
carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act and is
necessarily indefinite.
Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful
behaviour or neglect by a public official, by which the
right of party have been affected."

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 31 of 58

 Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though
not capable of precise of definition, on reflection
receives its conotation from the context, the delinquency
in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the
nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it
must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful
behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act a
transgression of established and definite rule of action
or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment,
carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty;
the act complained of bears forbidden quality or
character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference
to the subject-manner and the context wherein the term
occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and
the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is
a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict
discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the
service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law
and order."
12.In the present case, the alleged act of criminal contempt was committed
by an advocate during the course of hearing. The respondent is being
tried under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the charge upon him
is that of criminal contempt and not of misconduct under the Advocates
Act,1961. Although the act in question could well be classified under
the broader ambit of misconduct also, it does not preclude the trial and
punishment of the same as a case of criminal contempt. Hence, this
objection too is untenable and is accordingly rejected.
Defence
13.In the present case, the respondent was granted several extensions of
time to file his reply/affidavit in defence on 25.04.2014, 30.05.2014
and 28.11.2014. However, he chose not to file his reply and his right

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 32 of 58

 to do so was finally closed on 30.01.2015. There is no scope for the
respondent to claim that his fundamental rights, enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution, have been denied to him. The principles
of natural justice have been upheld insofar as the respondent was
afforded several opportunities to file his reply to the contempt petition.
14.On 24.11.2015, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent, stated that i) the respondent was extending an apology, ii)
there was no intention to cause any affront to the dignity of the Court
and iii) in the interest of the process of administration of justice it is
requisite that a sense of harmony be maintained between the Bar and
the Bench. He also submits that sometimes the language used by a
counsel can get him into trouble and the Court may bear that in mind
such unwitting errors or handicap in proper expression by counsel,
while adjudicating the case.
Analysis
15.In Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. and Apu Banik (AIR 2007
SC 2688), the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“1. "Judge bashing" and using derogatory and
contemptuous language against Judges has become a
favourite pastime of some people. These statements tend
to scandalize and lower the authority of the Courts and
can not be permitted because, for functioning of
democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense justice
without fear and favour is paramount. Its strength is the
faith and confidence of the people in that institution. That
cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will
be against the public interest.

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 33 of 58

 2. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies
in the hands of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and
cannot be a substitute for constructive criticism.
...
12. There is guarantee of the Constitution of India that
there will be freedom of speech and writing, but
reasonable restriction can be imposed. It will be of
relevance to compare the various suggestions as
prevalent in America and India. It is worthwhile to note
that all utterances against a Judge or concerning a
pending case do not in America amount to contempt of
Court. In Article 19 the expression "reasonable
restrictions" is used which is almost at par with the
American phraseology "inherent tendency" or
"reasonable tendency". The Supreme Court of America in
Bridges v California (1911) 86 Law Ed. 192 said:
What finally emerges from the clear and present
danger cases is a working principle that the
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished.
The vehemence of the language used is not alone the
measure of the power to punish for contempt of Court.
The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.
The stream of administration of justice has to remain
unpolluted so that purity of Court's atmosphere may give
vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial
firmament are, therefore required to be well taken care of
to maintain the sublimity of Court's environment; so also
to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the
satisfaction of all concerned. To similar effect were the
observations of Lord Morris in Attorney General v.
Times Newspapers 1974 AC 273 . It was observed that
when unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 34 of 58

 because those charged with the responsibilities of
administration of justice are concerned for their own
dignity, it is because the very structure of ordered life is
at risk if the recognised Courts of the Land are so flouted
and their authority wanes and is supplanted.
13. There is no doubt that the Court like any other
institution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism.
No Court can claim to be always right although it does
not spare any effort to be right according to the best of
the ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They
do not think themselves to be in possession of all truth to
hold that wherever others differ from them are in error.
No one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility
than a Judge. But because of his training and the
assistance he gets from learned Counsel he is apt to avoid
mistakes more than others. While fair and temperate
criticism of the Court even if strong, may not be
actionable, but attributing improper motives or tending to
bring Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or
obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of
Courts is serious contempt of which notice must be and
will be taken. Respect is expected not only from those to
whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but also
from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in
their criticism by indulging in vilification of the
institution of Court, administration of justice and the
instruments through which the administration acts,
should take heed for they will act at their own peril. To
similar effect were the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J.,
(as the learned judge was then) in R.C. Cooper v. Union
of India [1971]1SCR512 .
14. There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon
particular instances of conduct which has been held to
constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few.
Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C. J, has laid down in Reg v.
Gray 1900(2) QB 36 at 40 as follows:

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 35 of 58

 Any act done or writing published calculated to
bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt,
or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court.
...
16. The view was echoed by this Court in Re. D.C.
Saxena v. CJI 1996CriLJ3274 In the same volume of
Halsbury's Laws of England at para 27 it is stated thus:
"Any act done or writing published which is calculated to
bring a Court or a Judge into contempt or to lower its
authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or
the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court."
17. The above proposition has been approved and
followed by Lord Atkin in Andrew Paul Terence Ambrad
v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago AIR
1936 PC 141. It was observed as follows:
No wrong is committed by any member of the public
who exercised the ordinary right of criticism in good
faith in private or public the public act done in the
seat of justice. The path of criticism is public way,
the wrong headed are permitted to err therein,
provided that members of the public abstain from
imputing improper motives to those taking part in
the administration of justice and are genuinely
exercising a right of criticism and not acting in
malice or attempting to impart the administration of
Justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered
virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and
respectful even though outspoken comments of
ordinary men:
Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v.
Butterworth 1963(1) QB 696 after making reference to
Req. v. Odham's Press Ltd ex parte A.G. 1957(1) QB 73
said: "whether or not there was an intention to interfere
with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty
not to quit". This makes it clear that an intention to

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 36 of 58

 interfere with the proper administration of justice is an
essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court
and it is enough if the action complained of is inherently
likely so to interfere. In Morris v. Crown Office 1970(1)
All E.R. 1079 ,Lord Denning M.R. said: that the course of
justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those
who do it strike at the very foundations of our society. In
the same case, Lord Justice Solmon spoke:
The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to
give our courts the power effectively to protect the
rights of the public by ensuring that the
administration of justice shall not be obstructed or
prevented.
Frank Further, J. in Offutt v. U.S. 1954(348) U.S. 11
expressed his view as follows:
It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active
manifestation against obstruction and outrage.
In Jennison v. Baker 1972(1) All E.R. 997 at page 1006
it is stated:
The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while
those who defy it go free, and those who seek its
protection lose hope.
18. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench in
Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh
Khair Industries 19807CriLJ684 citing those two
decisions in the cases of Offutt and Jennison (supra)
stated thus:
...It may be necessary to punish as a contempt a
cause of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery
of the judicial process and which thus extends its
pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action
and affects the interest of the public in the
administration of justice. The public have an
interest, an abiding and a real interest, and vital

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 37 of 58

 stake in the effective and orderly administration of
justice, because unless justice is so administered,
there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing.
The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of
the public in the due administration of justice and,
so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for
contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity
of the Court against insult or injury as the
expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest
but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public
and the administration of justice shall not be
prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with.
19. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment In Re. S.
Mulgaokar [1978]3SCR162 while giving broad
guidelines in taking punitive action in the matter of
contempt of Court has stated:
...If the Court considers the attack on the judge or judges
scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond
condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the
name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow
on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law
by fouling its source and stream
20. In the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh 1954CriLJ238 this Court
after referring to various decisions of the foreign
countries as well as of the Privy Council stated thus:
It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create
an apprehension in the minds of the people
regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the
Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants
from placing complete reliance upon the Court's
administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in
the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well
established that it is not necessary to prove
affirmative that there has been an actual

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 38 of 58

 interference with the administration of justice by
reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if
it is likely or tends in any way to interfere with the
proper administration of law.
...
22. Though certain imputations against the Judge may be
only libelous against that particular individual, it may at
times amount to contempt also depending upon the
gravity of the allegations. In Brahma Prakash Sharma's
case (supra) this Court held that a defamatory attack on a
Judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and
it would be open to him to proceed against the libeler in a
proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the
publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to
interfere with the due course of justice or proper
administration of law by such Court, it can be punished
separately as contempt. The same view has been taken in
Perspective Publications (P) Ltd v. The State of
Maharashtra 1971CriLJ268 and C.K. Daphtary and
Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors. 1971CriLJ844 . Therefore,
apart from the fact that a particular statement is libelous,
it can constitute criminal contempt if the imputation is
such that the same is capable of lowering the authority of
the Court. The gravity of the aforesaid statement is that
the same would scandalize the court.
23. The right to criticize an opinion of a court, to take
issue with it upon its conclusions as to a legal
proposition, or question its conception of the facts, so
long as such criticisms are made in good faith and are in
ordinarily decent and respectful language and are not
designed to willfully or maliciously misrepresent the
position of the Court, or tend to bring it into disrespect,
or lessen the respect due to the authority to which a
Court is entitled, cannot be questioned. The right of free
speech is one of the greatest guarantee to liberty in a free
country like ours, even though that right is frequently and
in many instances outrageously abused. If any

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 39 of 58

 considerable portion of a community is led to believe that
either because of gross ignorance of the law or because
of a wrong reason, it cannot rely upon the courts to
administer justice that portion of the community, upon
some occasion, is very likely to come to the conclusion
that it is better not to take any chances on the courts
failing to do their duty.
24. Judiciary is the bed rock and handmaid of
democracy. If people lose faith in justice parted by a
Court of law, the entire democratic set up would crumble
down. In this background, observations of Lord Denning
M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lennon (1968) 3
All E.R. 304 are relevant: "Justice must be rooted in
confidence, and confidence is destroyed when right
minded people go away thinking - the Judge is based."
25. Considered in the light of the aforesaid position in
law, a bare reading of the statements makes it clear that
those amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity,
honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of
judges. It is offensive and intimidating. The contemnor by
making such scandalising statements and invective
remarks has interfered and seriously shaken the system of
administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect
and disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people in the
Court. Once door is opened to this kind of allegations,
aspersions and imputations, it may provide a handle to
the disgruntled litigants to malign the Judges, leading to
character assassination. A good name is better than good
riches. Immediately comes to one's mind Shakespeare's
Othello, Act II, Scene 3, 167:
Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord is the
immediate jewel of their souls; who steals my purse,
steals trash; its something, nothing; 'T was mine, its
his, and has been slate to thousands; But he that
filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 40 of 58

 And makes me poor indeed.
26. Majesty of Law continues to hold its head high
notwithstanding such scurrilous attacks made by persons
who feel the law Courts will absorb anything and every
thing, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and
impartiality. But it has to be borne in mind that such
divinity and magnanimity is not its weakness but its
strength. It generally ignores irresponsible statements
which are anything but legitimate criticism. It is to be
noted that what is permissible is legitimate criticism and
not illegitimate insinuation. No Court can brook with
equanimity something which may have tendency to
interfere with the administration of justice. Some people
find judiciary a soft target because it has neither the
power of the purse nor the sword, which other wings of
democracy possess. It needs no reiteration that on
judiciary millions pin their hopes, for protecting their life,
liberty, property and the like. Judges do not have an easy
job. They repeatedly do what rest of us (the people) seek
to avoid, make decisions, said David Panicky in his book
"Judges". Judges are mere mortals, but they are asked to
perform a function which is truly divine.
27. What is contempt of Court has been stated in lucid
terms by Oswald in Classic "Book on Contempt of
Court". It is said:
To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to
be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the
authority and demonstration of law into disrespect
and disregard or to interfere with or prejudice
parties, litigant or their witnesses during the
litigation.
Contempt in the legal acceptance of the term,
primarily signifies disrespect to that which is entitled
to legal regard, but as a wrong purely moral or
affecting an object not possessing a legal status, it
has in the eye of the law no existence. In its origin

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 41 of 58

 all legal contempt will be found to consist in an
offence more or less direct against the sovereign
himself as the fountainhead of law and justice or
against his palace where justice was administered.
This clearly appears from old cases.
28. Lord Diplock, speaking for the Judicial Committee in
Chokolingo v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
(1981) 1 All E.R. 244, summarized the position thus:
Scandalising the Court is a convenient way of
describing a publication which, although it does not
relate to any specific case either part of pending or
any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the
judiciary as a whole which is calculated to
undermine the authority of the Courts and public
confidence in the administration of justice. Thus,
before coming to the conclusion as to whether or not
the publication amounts to a contempt, what will
have to be seen is, whether the criticism is fair,
temperate and made in good faith or whether it is
something directed to the personal character of a
Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court. A
finding, one way of the other, will determine whether
or nor the act complained of amounted to contempt.
29. Mahajan, J in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda
Bose AIR1953SC75 , observed as follows:
No objection could have been taken to the article
had it merely preached to the Courts of law the
sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded
to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not
only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide
criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the
dignity and prestige of this Court.... It is obvious that
if an impression is created in the minds of the public
that the Judges in the highest Court of the land act
on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the
confidence of the whole community in the

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 42 of 58

 administration of justice is bound to be undermined
and no greater mischief than that can possibly be
imagined.... We would like to observe that it is not
the practice of this Court to issue such rules except
in very grave and serious cases and it is never oversensitive to public criticism; but when there is
danger of grave mischief being done in the matter of
administration of justice, the animadversion cannot
be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity....
16.In the Nirmala J. Jhala V. State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301, the
Supreme Court held:
“A subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged
atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure—
contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. If the
fact that he renders a decision which is resented by a
litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it
will sound the death knell of the institution.
...
Judge bashing” has become a favourite pastime of some
people. There is growing tendency of maligning the
reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements
who fail to secure an order which they desire. For
functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary, to
dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount.
Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in
the hands of wanton boys.
...
The subordinate judiciary works in the supervision of the
High Court and it faces problems at the hands of
unscrupulous litigants and lawyers, and for them “Judge
bashing” becomes a favourable pastime. In case the High
Court does not protect honest judicial officers, the
survival of the judicial system would itself be in danger.”
17.The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in a matter titled In re: Vinay Chandra
Mishra (AIR 1995 SC 2348), observed as follows:

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 43 of 58

 “... No one expects a lawyer to be subservient to the
Court while presenting his case and not to put forward his
arguments merely because the Court is against him. In
fact, that is the moment when he is expected to put forth
his best effort to persuade the Court. However, if, in spite
of it, the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he is
not expected to be discourteous to the court or to fling hot
words or epithets or use disrespectful, derogatory or
threatening language or exhibit temper which has the
effect of overbearing the court. Cases are won and lost in
the court daily. One or the other side is bound to lose. The
remedy of the losing lawyer or the litigant is to prefer an
appeal against the decision and not to indulge in a
running battle of words with the court. That is the least
that is expected of a lawyer. Silence on some occasions is
also an argument. The lawyer is not entitled to indulge in
unbecoming conduct either by showing his temper or
using unbecoming language.
...
Such act tend to overawe the court and to prevent it form
performing its duty to administer justice. Such conduct
brings the authority of the court and the administration of
justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and
erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by shaking the
confidence of the people in the ability of the court to
deliver free and fair justice.
...
The Court will be failing in its duty to protect the
administration of justice from attempts to denigrate and
lower the authority of the judicial officers entrusted with
the sacred task of delivering justice. A failure on the part
of this Court to punish the offender on an occasion such
as this would thus be a failure to perform one of its
essential duties solemnly entrusted to it by the
Constitution and the people. For all these reasons, we
unhesitatingly reject the said so called apology tendered
by the contemner.”

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 44 of 58

 18.In a matter pertaining to Mr. „G‟, a Senior Advocate of the
Supreme Court, [1955] 1 SCR 490, it was held:
“...He (a legal practitioner) is bound to conduct himself
in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession
to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if
he departs from the high standards which that profession
has set for itself and demands of him in professional
matters, he is liable to disciplinary action.”
19.In L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa [1957] 1 SCR167, the
Supreme Court observed :“At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of
the Court and owes a duty to the court in which he is
appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of
the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court
itself into disrepute.
...
Scandalising the Court in such manner is really polluting
the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant
indulged in was not a matter between an individual
member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service;
it brought into disrepute the whole administration of
justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the
appellant was highly reprehensible.”

20.The Bar Council of India under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act,
1961, has prescribed Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette
to be observed by Advocates – the relevant part of which has been
reproduced herein:
“An Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a
manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a
privileged member of the community, and a gentleman,
bearing in mind that what may be lawful and normal for a
person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 45 of 58

 of the Bar in his nonprofessional capacity may still be
improper for an advocate. Without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing obligation, an advocate shall
fearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and in his
conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both
in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned
contain cannons of conduct and etiquette adopted as
general guides; yet specific mention thereof shall not be
construed as a denial of the existence of others equally
imperative though not specifically mentioned. Section I—
Duty to the Court
1. An advocate shall, during the presentation of his
case and while otherwise acting before a Court,
conduct himself with dignity and self-respect. He
shall not be servile and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judicial
officer, it shall be his right and duty to submit his
grievance to proper authorities.
2. An advocate shall maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, bearing in mind that the dignity
of the judicial office is essential for the survival of a
free community.
3. ...
4. An advocate shall use his best efforts to restrain
and prevent his client from restoring to sharp or
unfair practices or from doing anything in relation
to the Court, opposing counsel or parties which the
advocate himself ought not to do. An advocate shall
refuse to represent the client who persists in such
improper conduct. He shall not consider himself a
mere mouthpiece of the client, and shall exercise his
own judgment in the use of restrained language in
correspondence, avoiding scurrilous attacks in

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 46 of 58

 pleadings, and using intemperate language during
arguments in Court. ...”
(Emphasis supplied)
21.A lawyer is an officer of the Court and is expected to conduct himself
in a manner that behoves his privileged position in Court. Advocates
are required to conduct themselves at all time as gentlemen; this
conduct assumes greater significance in a court of law when he/she
stands to assist the Court. It is expected that they would stand to
augment the process of justice instead of acting in a manner which
tends to obstruct the functioning of the court and the administration of
justice.
22.Unlike the contemnor in Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. and
Apu Banik, (supra), who sought shelter from the contempt proceedings
under the nebulous umbrella of illiteracy, the present respondent is an
advocate who has been practicing in this Court. The objectionable
language used by him, thus cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the
respondent has not sought shelter on the ground of illiteracy, except to
the limited extent that his counsel pled that the language in question
could well be attributed to a poor choice of words. In the respondent’s
written submissions dated 25.3.2015, his statement quoted below do
not show any limitation or inhibition in his articulation of contentions:
“4. As regards Article 215 not conferring upon this
Hon‟ble Court any additional power that what has
been conferred upon it by the Contempt of Courts Act,
much less “unbridled and limitless” power, the
Respondent, as directed by this Hon‟ble Court, is
placing on record the following 4 judgments which he
is placing reliance on, which settle the proposition

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 47 of 58

 that Article 215 is no magic wand in the hands of the
Court to usurp unbridled and limitless power in the
guise of the ephemeral concept of “inherent powers”
merely because it is a “Court of Record”and/or a
“superior”court:
…
5. The very murmur or whisper of “unbridled and
limitless” power is unthinkable for a codified society,
where there is none- not even the Supreme Court of
India- who is an imperium in imperio.
6. This being so, it becomes even more disconcerting
when such murmurings emanate (self-servingly) from
a “superior”court.
23.The Court is of the view that the nature of the language used was quite
explicit and unambiguous and that it is evident that the respondent
knew what he meant by it. A Division Bench comprises of two Judges
and for an advocate to call it a „Dedh Bench‟ is to mock at the Court
and to affront its dignity. This expression clearly seeks to doubt the
capacity of the Hon’ble Judges. It is a glaring instance of ‘judge
bashing’. Ex facie, it constitutes a deliberate attempt to embarrass the
two Hon’ble Judges constituting the Division Bench and to denigrate
the prestige of the Bench. To compound his offensive behaviour he
subsequently laced his contempt with sarcasm before another Bench
when seeking its recusal from the case by stating that it had passed
„beautiful orders‟. This act has been sought to be justified by the
respondent, by referral to his averments in CM No. 17483/2013.
However, when an act of contempt is so evident, such as use of
pejorative or insulting words such as ‘Dedh Bench‟ against a Division
Bench, no further proof is required for establishing the charge.

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 48 of 58

 24.The court is of the view that the statementS made by the respondent,
tend to scandalize and lower the authority and prestige of the Court. It
also prejudices and interferes with the administration of justice. The
Court thus finds the respondent guilty of criminal contempt of Court.
Validity of Apology
25.In High Court on its own Motion vs. S.G. Kudle, Advocate, decided on
05.03.2008, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay

through a

Division Bench comprising Justice Bilal Nazki and Justice S.A Bobde
(as he then was) held that:
“Law is settled that if somebody accused of contempt
wants to place himself before the mercy of the court
he should do so at the first instance and if it is
sought at a later stage he must show repentance and
it must be clear to the court that the contemnor was
repenting and he had made an apology by genuine
change of heart.”
26.On 12.08.2015, the respondent had sought time to address the Court
effectively on merits. On 24.11.2015, an apology was offered through
counsel. But clearly, the respondent has been contesting the notice
right from the beginning till the end and except from the last date,
when an offer of apology was made through his counsel, the
respondent has shown no remorse or given any indication of having
misgivings about the contemptuous statements made by him. It has
never been the contemnor‟s case that the offensive words were merely
a slip of the tongue for which he was contrite and that there has been a
change of heart on his part in his attitude towards the court. He has

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 49 of 58

 continued to persevere and persist with his stand that he was justified in
using the language he did.
27.The perfunctory and qualified offer of apology was made at the last
minute, without any element of contrition or remorse and without a
sense of misgiving, and thus cannot be taken into consideration. In
light of the aforesaid contentions, the Court rejects the respondent‟s
apology, offered through counsel.
Previous Conduct of Respondent
28.The respondent‟s conduct shows a belligerent and aggressive attitude.
The recusal of almost 2/3rd of the strength of Judges of this Court, from
hearing his matters, is testimony to the fact that the respondent has had
numerous confrontations with this Court and seeks to challenge the
authority of the Court or otherwise mock and hold in ridicule the office
of the judges. While such conduct by an ordinary citizen would be
highly scandalous and contemptuous, it assumes a far graver
ramification when a lawyer is involved.
29.In Cont. Cas (C) 165/2008, Montreaux Resorts P. Ltd. & Ors. Vs.
Sonia Khosla., a learned single judge of this Court, while dealing with
the conduct of the respondent herein, observed that:
1. Little did the framing fathers of the Constitution
and the legislators visualize that the privilege and
liberty granted to an individual to approach the
court of law and to appear for himself and for others
either as an attorney or as an advocate could and
would be misused and abused to such an extent as
has been done by this one individual Mr. Deepak
Khosla.

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 50 of 58

 2. 32 learned Judges of this High Court (including
former and sitting judges), judges of the subordinate
courts, the Company Law Board and the Arbitral
Tribunal comprising of former judges of this Court
and a former judge of the Supreme Court have
recused themselves since 2008 from hearing the
cases in which either Mr. Deepak Khosla is a party
or appearing as an attorney or as an advocate.
3. Various judicial orders imposing costs and even
initiating contempt proceedings both civil and
criminal have not deterred him from continuing with
his conduct.
4. The Courts in India are perceived as temples of
justice and the Judges as its priests. The legal
profession is considered world over as a very
honourable profession. The members of the
profession hold a special place in the society. They
are looked upon by others as leaders, advisors,
mentors, guides etc. One individual by his conduct
has attempted to pollute the stream of administration
of justice and the very purity of the Courts'
atmosphere.
5. Mr. Deepak Khosla started appearing in a
litigation first as an authorised representative of his
wife and father and of a company but later on during
the pendency of the litigation has gone on to study
law and has joined the legal profession.
6. Members of the legal profession are required to
maintain higher standards of behaviour and conduct
than an ordinary citizen.
7. Despite entering the legal profession and donning
the robes of a member of the legal profession the
behaviour and conduct of Mr. Deepak Khosla has
not changed.
8. By Order dated 24.04.2012 the Division Bench of
this Court in LPA No. 16/2012 held that the High
Court has inherent power distinct and separate from
power of contempt to injunct/sanction vexatious or

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 51 of 58

 frivolous litigation, vexatious/habitual litigants,
contumelious litigant and issue appropriate
directions, including prohibiting the said litigant
from appearing and arguing matters in person and
for others and from initiating or filing proceedings,
except with permission of the Court. The Division
Bench further directed that the Order dated
04.01.2012, passed by a learned Single Judge, would
be treated as a Show Cause Notice. The order of the
Division Bench has been upheld by the Supreme
Court by order dated 19.09.2012 in SLP(C) No.
15004/2012.
The court further found that:
67. The conduct of Mr. Deepak Khosla, before the
learned Judges of this Court as also before the
judicial officers of the subordinate court and the
Company Law Board and the Arbitral Tribunal,
referred to hereinabove, when viewed in the light of
the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in
various judicial pronouncements, some of which
have been extracted hereinabove, clearly poses a
real and imminent threat to the purity of the Court
proceedings.
68. Over and above the orders that may be passed by
the Court on the suo moto Civil and Criminal
Contempt proceedings that have been initiated and
the action that the Bar Council, in exercise of its
disciplinary powers under the Advocates Act, 1961,
may take against Mr. Deepak Khosla, in light of the
decision of the Supreme Court in R.K. ANAND
(SUPRA) and the order dated 24.04.2012 of the
Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 16/2012, his
conduct calls for measures to regulate the Courts
proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly
functioning of the Courts to save the purity of the
Court proceedings from being polluted in any way.
69. Apart from the above, during the proceedings
what has come to light is that Mr. Deepak Khosla

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 52 of 58

 has got himself enrolled with the Bar Council of
Karnataka. He on 21.08.2014 had made a statement
before this court which was recorded in the order of
the said date that he predominantly practises in
Delhi but was enrolled with the Bar Council of
Karnataka (Enrolment No. KAR 1280/2013). He had
stated that though there were certain matter in
contemplation to be filed in the State of Karnataka,
however no matter had been filed till that date (i.e.
21.08.2014) in the State of Karnataka.
...
74. The Record of enrolment of Mr. Deepak Khosla
(KAR/1280/13) forward by Bar Council of
Karnataka through the Bar Council of India shows
that he has been enrolled by the Bar Council of
Karnataka on 30.07.2013 and he as per his
statement has been predominantly practicing in
Delhi. As per his own statement, till 21.08.2014 he
has not filed any case within the jurisdiction of the
State Bar Council of Karnataka though as per his
statement certain matter were in contemplation of
being filed in that state.
75. Record also reveals that costs have been
imposed on Mr. Deepak Khosla for filing frivolous
applications, protracting litigation, abusing the
process of courts etc. which costs have remained
unpaid. The imposition of costs and pre-emptory
orders being passed by the courts have not deterred
Mr. Deepak Khosla from filing further applications.
In view of the above, the learned single judge, was pleased to dispose
of the matter with the following directions:
(i)
Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from
personally appearing and addressing any court in
any matter in the Delhi High Court, the District
Courts of Delhi, the Company Law Board either as a

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 53 of 58

 litigant in person or as an attorney/authorised
representative or as an Advocate for a period of one
year from (13.01.2015); and
(ii)
Mr. Deepak Khosla is further prohibited
from personally appearing before the Arbitral
Tribunal constituted or to be constituted by the
Court in the personal litigation of Mr. Deepak
Khosla for a period of one year from (13.01.2015);
and
(iii)
Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing
any application or petition in the Delhi High Court
till he furnishes to the Registry the proof of deposit
or payment, as the case may be, of the costs imposed
by the various orders mentioned hereinabove; and
(iv)
Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing
any proceedings in the Delhi High Court or the
District Courts of Delhi as an advocate unless the
same is filed jointly with an Advocate enrolled with
the Bar Council of Delhi.
(v)
Mr. Deepak Khosla is at liberty to engage an
advocate to represent and appear for him in his
personal litigation.
30. The conduct of the respondent has shown that he has an incorrigible
tendency to take-on the superior judiciary - in particular the judges of
the Delhi High Court and to cast aspersions on both, their ability and
integrity.

Such act is unpardonable. Making disparaging statements

against the judges of the High Court is striking at the very institution of
the High Court and the judiciary as a whole.

If such nefarious

activities are not dealt with firmly, it would inexorably lead to

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 54 of 58

 subjecting the institution of the judiciary to ridicule, to reducing
people‟s confidence in the Courts, thus severely impairing the
administration of justice.

Punishment
31.In Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. and Apu Banik (supra), it
was sternly observed by the Supreme Court as follows:
“30. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
anyone who intends to tarnish the image of judiciary should
not be allowed to go unpunished. By attacking the reputation
of Judges, the ultimate victim is the institution. The day the
consumers of justice loose (sic) faith in the institution that
would be the darkest day for mankind. The importance of
judiciary needs no reiteration.”
32.The institution of the judiciary has to be safeguarded from covert and
insidious assaults from any quarter. Mocking at the Court or using
scandalous language against it or addressing the Court in a consistently
abrasive manner shows disrespect towards the Court, tends to
scandalise the Court and is a clear interference with the administration
of justice. The polluters of the judicial firmament will require to „be
well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of the Court‟s
environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the
satisfaction of all concerned.”1 Conduct of lawyers, including use of
language which gives the impression that the court in not in control of
1

Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. Apu Banik (supra)

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 55 of 58

 its affairs in the administration of justice, is to be sternly dealt with.
The aforesaid language/expressions used in the charge in the showcause notice is unambiguous and a direct assault upon the personal
dignity of the judge and the prestige of the court. The language used by
the respondent does not reflect any constraint in articulation of
contentions. Therefore, the plea that the respondent could have erred in
the choice of expression because of constraint in articulation is
untenable.
33.We are of the view that if such repeated assaults on judges of the High
Court are not dealt with sternly, the mischief of such language and
conduct could fester irredeemable damage to the prestige and dignity of
the High Court. The Courts are bound to protect their dignity and
prestige. Individual judges collectively comprise a High Court. A
contemptuous act before one Bench of the High Court is an act of
contempt against the High Court itself. People’s faith in justice and the
justice delivery system sustains the institution of the Courts. If
confidence of right minded people is destroyed or the faith of the
people is besmirched by the impression that the Court is in any manner
incapacitated, the institution of Courts will crumble. Weakening of the
institution of judiciary is akin to weakening one of the three essential
pillars of the Indian Republic. Assault on the judiciary is no less than
an act of constitutional sacrilege. No Constitutional court will tolerate
such nefarious activity.
34.The conduct of the respondent/contemnor has been persistently
incorrigible. The record shows that he contested the contempt notice on
procedural grounds at every stage. Neither has any sense of remorse

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 56 of 58

 been exhibited by the contemnor regarding the contemptuous
expression nor was any proper apology offered despite more than a
year having passed since the contempt was committed. The
contemnor‟s conduct has been consistently aggressive and combative
towards the Courts. The court has found him guilty of having
committed criminal contempt of court. It is to be kept in mind that the
contemnor has also been convicted today in another criminal contempt
case i.e. Con.Cas.(Crl) 9/2014 for imputing malicious conduct against
an Hon‟ble Judge of this Court, including allegations of discrimination,
bias and prejudice. Therefore, the respondent‟s offer of apology at the
last moment through counsel, perhaps to escape any punishment, is
obviously insincere, without any sense of remorse or change of heart or
after due reflection upon his conduct. For the sake of preserving the
dignity of the institution, the Court would need to punish the
contemnor howsoever unpleasant the decision may be.
35. In the circumstances, the Court sentences the respondent contemnor
Deepak Khosla to one month imprisonment along with a fine of
Rs.2000/-. The fine shall be deposited within a week from today,
failing which the imprisonment shall extend by another month. This
sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence in Con.Cas.(Crl)
9/2014.
36.We had considered prohibiting the contemnor from further appearance
before this Court or subordinate court and Tribunals in Delhi for some
period of time after his having served the prison sentence, but we
restrain ourselves from doing so. We feel that appropriate orders in this
regard should, in the facts of this case, be taken by the Bar Council

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 57 of 58

 concerned. Hence a copy of this order be sent to the Bar Council of
Delhi and the Bar Council of Karnataka, for them to take appropriate
measures apropos the contemnor, Mr.Deepak Khosla.
37.The petition is disposed off in the above terms.

NAJMI WAZIRI, J

ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J
FEBRUARY 22, 2016

Cont. Cas.(Crl.) 12/2014

Page 58 of 58