* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 24.11.2015 Pronounced on: 22.02.2016 + CONT CAS (CRL.) 9/2014 COURT ON ITS OWN MOTION Through: None. ..... Petitioner versus DEEPAK KHOSLA Through: ..... Respondent Mr. Salman Khurshid, Sr. Adv. with Ms.Sanchita Ain, Mr. Ajay Marwah & Ms. Srishti Singh, Advs. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR NAJMI WAZIRI, J. 1. After 26 judges of the Delhi High Court had recused themselves from hearing this and another criminal contempt petition (Cont Cas Crl. 12/2014), the Hon‟ble Chief Justice has constituted this Special Division Bench to adjudicate upon the two pending petitions against the respondent, Deepak Khosla - an advocate, who has appeared before the Court. Background/ Issue of Show Cause Notice 2. On 05.09.2014, in LPA No. 583/2014, the respondent, made certain unwarranted averments in his pleadings and in his oral submissions Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 1 of 41 before a Division Bench of this Court comprising of Hon‟ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon‟ble Mr. Justice J.R. Midha. Taking a prima facie view that the respondent‟s submissions constituted criminal contempt and tended to scandalise and lower the authority/prestige of the court, the Court took suo moto cognizance of the same under Section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and issued a show cause notice, vide order dated 8.9.2014, as to why the respondent should not be punished for contempt. The said order reads: “1. By a common judgment and order made today, this Court has disposed of LPA Nos. 550/2104 (sic) and 583/2014 on the ground that they are not maintainable. 2. During the course of proceedings – as well as oral hearing, which was held on 05-09-2014, the Court had noticed that Mr. Deepak Khosla, who argued the appeal (LPA 583/2014) made averments in the appeal which tends to scandalize or lower the authority or prestige of the court, as they directly attribute malice to the learned Single Judge. The averments made are as follows: "That by means of the order impugned herein, the learned Single Judge, acting in a fit of pique, acted in sheer and malicious retaliation against the contents of the letter and email referred to in the para below, and in further retaliation against the application filed by the appellant's client, Mr. R P Khosla, seeking referral to a larger Bench under Chapter II Section 2 of the Delhi High Court rules, to decide whether the allegations of discrimination/bias/prejudice of the learned single judge should be decided by the learned single judge, or by the larger bench. That is further to his conduct brought up. in LPA No. 550 of 2014, where he, without any preceding query to the appellant relating to his registration as an advocate under the Advocates Act 1961, has directed the Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 2 of 41 Secretary of the Bar Council of India to obtain from the Bar Council of Karnataka a copy of his application for registration as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961. In addition, he has passed other directions also, which also are impugned therein, as they both suffer from two common vices : bias, and lack of jurisdiction. 8. That as regards rampant discrimination on the part of the learned Single Judge, the appellant had met Hon‟ble the Chief Justice on 13-08-2014 in follow-up of his email dated 14-07-2014 {Annexure -1) and during the course of the audience, had explained to her the difficulties in appearing for the Court of the learned Single Judge in the absence of there being an incontrovertible record of what transpires in his Court, such as through audio recording, or any other system Hon'ble the Chief Justice may devise. 9. That during the same hearing, he had handed over a note setting out as many as around 26 incidents that, to the mind of the appellant, reflected conduct that was not acceptable, both by the standards of judicial discipline laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as well as by many other criteria. 10. That Hon'ble the Chief Justice had informed the appellant to place on (sic) his grievances formally in a letter to be submitted in writing. Accordingly, this had been done, and the said letter had been filed with her PPS / Secretary at 1:10 pm of 20-08-2014. Leave is craved to produce a copy of this confidential representation during the hearing of the present appeal, if deemed essential by this Hon'ble court. 11. That as there is no change in circumstances between 2013 [when the Ld. Single Judge started hearing the matters] and to the, not even in his knowledge of the order dated 24-4-2012, it is clear that the volte face done Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 3 of 41 by him in his [mis] the reading of the order dated 24-42012 is the fact that his conduct was brought to the attention of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 12. Furthermore, his malice in passing the order is selfevident from the following sequence of events that transpired in this court today: a] when the hearing started, though the appellant before him attempted to start the hearing, the appellant herein respectfully interjected, bringing to the attention of the Hon‟ble Court that owing to this previous refusal to adjudicate an Order 39 Rule 4 application, as the same listed for today, and was required to be dealt with, as his stay order granted by him on 24-7-2040 (sic) had been passed pursuant to a patent fraud, a fraud already certified by the Hon‟ble Chairman of the Hon‟ble Company Law Board' vide its order dated 8-8-2014. b] It was further submitted that on page 56 of that application's paper book was an application under Chapter II Section 2 requesting referral to a larger bench as to whether the learned single judge would decide allegations of discrimination raised formally against him, or whether it would be a different bench. c] It is further submitted that the appellant was not agreeable to appear before this Court unless there was an incontrovertible records of what transpired in the hearing, such as through audio recording of proceedings. It was submitted to the court that the court had taken the stand that it will only accept what transpires in a hearing provided the order of the day says so, but this position having been taken notwithstanding, this court would frequently refuse to set out the important developments that occurred during the hearing, thereby making it impossible for the appellant's group to the justice, since none of their objections would be recorded, including objections as to the manner of conduct of the proceedings, or the statements made and made by the other side, etc. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 4 of 41 d] It was further submitted that this aspect had been brought to the attention of Hon'ble the Chief Justice in writing, and that the appellant had brought a copy of that letter, which he would be only too happy to share with the court, so that it may verify the issues raised on the administrative side. e] The court was pleased to show complete disinterest act of using the letter filed with Hon'ble Chief Justice(sic). f] However, it started the using the application at page 56. After silence of around 10 minutes, the court unilaterally started dictating the impugned order. (sic). g] The appellant's prayer to record in the order his submission, namely, that this Court should not deal with any part of the matter until the matter was referred to larger bench, unless the application seeking such referral was dismissed, was ignored. h] The appellant‟s prayer to record in the order the submission, namely, that the argument being raised by the opposite side had already been raised by them before the Hon‟ble Company Law Board, and dealt with and dismissed vide order dated 1-10-2013, and which order had not been challenged by the opposite side, also was ignored. i] The appellant‟s offer of the Court perusing that order dated 1-10-2013 also was ignored. j) When the order‟s first part had been dictated, the appellant pointed out that he was appearing not only for himself, but also as Advocate for the co respondent, and therefore, even if the court did not wish to hear arguments raised by him while appearing for himself, the Court may hear arguments on the application filed by that correspondence (sic). It is at that juncture that the court started dictating the rest of the order. k] When the action is dictating his order, (sic) the opposite party had the gall to pray that the interim order dated 24-7-2014 to continue. The learned ingle judge readily granted that prayer, to the shock of the appellant, and Ld. Single Judge did not budge in his stance even Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 5 of 41 when the appellant pointed out that surely his conscience would not allow extending the interim relief in view of the certification dated 8-8-2014 issued by the Hon'ble Company Law Board, certifying that a fraud had been played on his court, and that application for recall on account of the fraud was pending before him since Middle August 2014, an application for variation of the injunction also was pending, both due for disposal today, they not having been disposed off earlier, because the learned single judge had refused to adjudicate them earlier. l] When the appellant urged learned single judge to record the submissions in the order, the request was ignored. m) There were many other aspects of malicious conduct, which are not being enumerated further hearing, but in respect to which the appellate reserves all his rights to further elaborate, as affidavits are being collected from the persons present during the hearing. 3. This Court is of opinion that the above averments prima facie constitute criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) (i) of the Act. This Court takes cognizance of the offence under Section 15(1) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. Mr. Deepak Khosla is required to show-cause why he should not be punished for committing such criminal contempt. Mr Deepak Khosla may file an affidavit in support of his defence. List on 16.09.2014, before the roster bench. This Court directs the Registr to issue the following show cause notice personally to Mr. Deepak Khosla in accordance with Section 17 of the Contempt of Court, 1971:“SHOW CAUSE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 15(1) OF THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971, TO MR. DEEPAK KHOSLA, S/O R.P. KHOSLA Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 6 of 41 Whereas during the course of proceedings- as well as oral hearing, which was held on 05-09-2014, you, Mr. Deepak Khosla,- who argued the appeal (LPA 583/2014) made averments in the appeal which tends to scandalize or lower the authority or prestige of the court. These directly attribute malice and tend to prima facie scandalize, lower the authority or tends to lower the authority of the court, The averments made are as follows: "That by means of the order impugned herein, the learned Single Judge, acting in a fit of pique, acted in sheer and malicious retaliation against the contents of the letter and email referred to in the para below, and in further retaliation against the application filed by the appellant's client, Mr. R P Khosla, seeking referral to a larger Bench under Chapter II Section 2 of the Delhi High Court rules, to decide whether the allegations of discrimination/bias/prejudice of the learned single judge should be decided by the learned single judge, or by the larger bench. That is further to his conduct brought up. in LPA No. 550 of 2014, where he, without any preceding query to the appellant relating to his registration as an advocate under the Advocates Act 1961, has directed the Secretary of the Bar Council of India to obtain from the Bar Council of Karnataka a copy of his application for registration as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961. In addition, he has passed other directions also, which also are impugned therein, as they both suffer from two common vices : bias, and lack of jurisdiction. 8. That as regards rampant discrimination on the part of the learned Single Judge, the appellant had met Hon‟ble the Chief Justice on 13-08-2014 in follow-up of his email dated 14-07-2014 {Annexure -1) and during the course of the audience, had explained to her the difficulties in appearing for the Court of the learned Single Judge in the absence of there being an incontrovertible record of what transpires in his Court, such as through audio Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 7 of 41 recording, or any other system Hon'ble the Chief Justice may devise. 9. That during the same hearing, he had handed over a note setting out as many as around 26 incidents that, to the mind of the appellant, reflected conduct that was not acceptable, both by the standards of judicial discipline laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as well as by many other criteria. 10. That Hon'ble the Chief Justice had informed the appellant to place on (sic) his grievances formally in a letter to be submitted in writing. Accordingly, this had been done, and the said letter had been filed with her PPS / Secretary at 1:10 pm of 20-08-2014. Leave is craved to produce a copy of this confidential representation during the hearing of the present appeal, if deemed essential by this Hon'ble court. 11. That as there is no change in circumstances between 2013 [when the Ld. Single Judge started hearing the matters] and to the, not even in his knowledge of the order dated 24-4-2012, it is clear that the volte face done by him in his [mis] the reading of the order dated 24-42012 is the fact that his conduct was brought to the attention of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 12. Furthermore, his malice in passing the order is selfevident from the following sequence of events that transpired in this court today: a] when the hearing started, though the appellant before him attempted to start the hearing, the appellant herein respectfully interjected, bringing to the attention of the Hon‟ble Court that owing to this previous refusal to adjudicate an Order 39 Rule 4 application, as the same listed for today, and was required to be dealt with, as his stay order granted by him on 24-7-2040 (sic) had been passed pursuant to a patent fraud, a fraud already Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 8 of 41 certified by the Hon‟ble Chairman of the Hon‟ble Company Law Board' vide its order dated 8-8-2014. b] It was further submitted that on page 56 of that application's paper book was an application under Chapter II Section 2 requesting referral to a larger bench as to whether the learned single judge would decide allegations of discrimination raised formally against him, or whether it would be a different bench. c] It is further submitted that the appellant was not agreeable to appear before this Court unless there was an incontrovertible records of what transpired in the hearing, such as through audio recording of proceedings. It was submitted to the court that the court had taken the stand that it will only accept what transpires in a hearing provided the order of the day says so, but this position having been taken notwithstanding, this court would frequently refuse to set out the important developments that occurred during the hearing, thereby making it impossible for the appellant's group to the justice, since none of their objections would be recorded, including objections as to the manner of conduct of the proceedings, or the statements made and made by the other side, etc. d] It was further submitted that this aspect had been brought to the attention of Hon'ble the Chief Justice in writing, and that the appellant had brought a copy of that letter, which he would be only too happy to share with the court, so that it may verify the issues raised on the administrative side. e] The court was pleased to show complete disinterest act of using the letter filed with Hon'ble Chief Justice(sic). f] However, it started the using the application at page 56. After silence of around 10 minutes, the court unilaterally started dictating the impugned order. (sic). g] The appellant's prayer to record in the order his submission, namely, that this Court should not deal with any part of the matter until the matter was referred to Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 9 of 41 larger bench, unless the application seeking such referral was dismissed, was ignored. h] The appellant‟s prayer to record in the order the submission, namely, that the argument being raised by the opposite side had already been raised by them before the Hon‟ble Company Law Board, and dealt with and dismissed vide order dated 1-10-2013, and which order had not been challenged by the opposite side, also was ignored. i] The appellant‟s offer of the Court perusing that order dated 1-10-2013 also was ignored. j) When the order‟s first part had been dictated, the appellant pointed out that he was appearing not only for himself, but also as Advocate for the co respondent, and therefore, even if the court did not wish to hear arguments raised by him while appearing for himself, the Court may hear arguments on the application filed by that correspondence (sic). It is at that juncture that the court started dictating the rest of the order. k] When the action is dictating his order, (sic) the opposite party had the gall to pray that the interim order dated 24-7-2014 to continue. The learned ingle judge readily granted that prayer, to the shock of the appellant, and Ld. Single Judge did not budge in his stance even when the appellant pointed out that surely his conscience would not allow extending the interim relief in view of the certification dated 8-8-2014 issued by the Hon'ble Company Law Board, certifying that a fraud had been played on his court, and that application for recall on account of the fraud was pending before him since Middle August 2014, an application for variation of the injunction also was pending, both due for disposal today, they not having been disposed off earlier, because the learned single judge had refused to adjudicate them earlier. l] When the appellant urged learned single judge to record the submissions in the order, the request was ignored. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 10 of 41 m) There were many other aspects of malicious conduct, which are not being enumerated further hearing, but in respect to which the appellate reserves all his rights to further elaborate, as affidavits are being collected from the persons present during the hearing. And whereas this Court is of opinion that the above averments prima facie constitute criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c)(1) of the Act. Therefore you, Mr. Deepak Khosla are hereby charged with committing contempt under Section 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act,1971 for making the above averments; you are required to show-cause why you should not be punished for committing such criminal contempt by making such averments.” Order dasti under signature of court master.” 3. When the case was listed before the roster bench on 16.09.2014, the respondent sought extension of time to file his affidavit-in-defence. He was granted eight weeks to do so but he did not file any. The case was next listed on 11.12.2014, but he defaulted in appearance. Neither was there any representation on his behalf. His right to file the affidavit was closed and bailable warrants in the sum of Rs.10,000/- were issued against him, returnable on 17.12.2014. According the the Station House Officer, Tilak Marg Police Station, the warrant had been executed upon the respondent. Yet the respondent failed to appear on 17.12.2014. Hence non-bailable warrants were issued against him for securing his presence on 13th January 2015. However the very next day i.e. 18th December 2014, the respondent appeared in person and applied for cancellation of the Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 11 of 41 non-bailable warrants against him. The warrants were cancelled. The other requests for further enlargement of time and postponement of the case four months later, to sometime in April, were rejected as they were without merit. Preliminary Objections 4. On the next scheduled date of 13.01.2015 the respondent again chose not to appear. His proxy counsel stated that he had gone to Calcutta. On the following date of hearing on 23rd February 2015 he told the Court that he was unable to address arguments due to a toothache. Meanwhile, on 19th March 2015, in another case of criminal contempt against him (Cont. Case (Crl) 12/2014), Deepak Khosla had appeared before a Division Bench comprising of Hon‟ble Justice Kailash Gambhir and Hon‟ble Justice I.S. Mehta, and raised the following four preliminary objections: “A. Under Section 14(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Court which had initiated the contempt proceedings cannot try him for the suo moto contempt proceedings rather it should be heard and decided by any other roster bench. B. He cannot be proceeded solely by the Contempt of Courts Act in the absence of rules framed by this Court and any decision by the Court in the contempt case in the absence of the rules would be in violation of the fundamental rights of the respondent as have been granted under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. C. This contempt proceedings can continue only after the disposal of CM No. 17483/2013 which was filed by him in LPA No. 16/2012 wherein he gave necessary clarifications with regard to the said Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 12 of 41 expression of „Dedh Bench‟ and the same has yet not been decided by this Court. D. The respondent being a practising Advocate, has to be tried for contempt proceedings by a Full Bench of this Court in terms of Volume V, Chapter 3, Part B Rule 2(1) of the High Court Rules.” On 23rd March, 2015 the respondent appeared in person and stated that he wished to raise the same preliminary objections in this case too which he had raised in Cont. Cas. (Crl) 12/2014. However, he did not file any written objections nor did he articulate what these objections were during the course of the hearing. 5. While dealing with these objections, by an order on 29th May, 2015, the Court held that the respondent‟s objection under section 14(2) of the Act, while valid in the Cont. Case (Crl) 12/2014, would not be available to the respondent in the present case, since these proceedings were initiated by a different Bench. However, in view of the order dated 29.05.2015 in Cont. Case (Crl) 12/2014, the Court held that it would be just and proper for both cases to be jointly listed before the Bench, constituted by Hon‟ble the Chief Justice. The order, inter alia, reads as under: “3. In so far as the first preliminary objection is concerned, the same may not be available to him, as already the contempt proceedings were directed by the Division Bench comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. R. Midha, who took cognizance against the respondent under Section 17 of the Contempt of Court ,1971 taking a prima facie view that the expressions and behaviour of Mr.Deepak Khosla, tends to scandalize or lower the authority or Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 13 of 41 prestige of the Court as they directly attribute malice to the learned Single Judge. The ground for placing the present contempt proceedings before the other Bench in terms of Section 14(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 thus will not be available to the respondent herein, however we feel that since by a separate order passed by this Court in other contempt proceedings being Cont. Case (Crl.) No. 12/2014 for being placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for assigning the same to the appropriate Bench, we deem it just and proper to place this matter as well before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for assigning it to the same Bench that would be assigned the other contempt case so that the same Bench can take an overall view of conduct of this respondent. 4. So far as the second preliminary objection is concerned, the same being restricted to the other case, thus the same is not available to him in the present case. For the third and forth preliminary objections, we refer to our view taken in the other contempt matter. 5. In view of the above, we direct the Registry to place this Criminal Contempt before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for necessary orders. It is ordered accordingly.” 6. Accordingly, this matter was placed before Hon‟ble the Chief Justice, who has constituted this Division Bench. On 12.08.2015, the respondent appeared before us and it was recorded that: “On 16.9.2014, the respondent was granted eight weeks' time to file his reply to the show-cause notice. He defaulted in doing so. Accordingly, his right to file the same was closed on llth December, 2014. The case was thereafter listed on 17.12.2014 when he failed to appear. On 18.12.2014, the respondent's request for enlargement of time to file the reply was rejected. Subsequently, on the next three Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 14 of 41 dates, respondent had sought adjournments which were granted. On 29th May, 2015, after hearing the primary objections raised by the respondent, the case was referred to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a new Bench. Accordingly, this Bench had issued Court notice to the respondent on 17th July, 2015. It is a matter of record that there is no reply of the respondent to the show-cause notice apropos the Court's prima facie view that the respondent has committed criminal contempt of Court. At this stage, the Court would notice the order dated 13.1.2015 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Cont. Cas(C) No. 165/2008 in which the following directions were passed: "(i) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from personally appearing and addressing any court in any matter in the Delhi High Court, the District Courts of Delhi, the Company Law Board either as a litigant in person or as an attorney/authorised representative or as an Advocate for a period of one year from today; and (ii) Mr. Deepak Khosla is further prohibited from personally appearing before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted or to be constituted by the Court in the personal litigation of Mr. Deepak Khosla for a period of one yearfrom today; and (iii) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing any application or petition in the Delhi High Court till he furnishes to the Registry the proof of deposit or payment, as the case may be, of the costs imposed by the various orders mentioned hereinabove; and (iv) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing any proceedings in the Delhi High Court or the District Courts of Delhi as an advocate unless the same is filed jointly with an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Delhi. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 15 of 41 (v) Mr. Deepak Khosla is at liberty to engage an advocate to represent and appear for him in his personal litigation. Mr. Deepak Khosla seeks time to address the Court. Renotify on 19.8.2015.” Defence 7. The Court notes that despite having been granted numerous opportunities, the respondent has chosen to not file a reply to the show-cause notice. Accordingly, his right to file a reply was closed on 11.12.2014. Records reflect that after his right to file a reply was closed, he filed an application seeking (i) recall of the order dated 17.12.2014, whereby this Court had issued non-bailable warrants against him due to his absence in the contempt proceedings (ii) enlargement of the time to file reply at least till 31.03.2015, to the contempt notice and (iii) change of the next scheduled date of the contempt proceedings from 13.01.2015 to some date in April, 2015. However, during the hearing of this application on 18.12.2014, the respondent orally prayed that only the non-bailable warrants directed against him be cancelled. It was so allowed. The other two prayers, i.e., prayers ii) and iii), were rejected as the court found no merit in the same. The respondent has filed no pleadings in defence. He has also not tendered any written apology. The near perfunctory offer of apology appears more for the sake of form lacking substance and sincerity. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 16 of 41 8. In the absence of any reply or submission to rebut the show cause notice, the same would be taken as having been proved. The language used against the learned Single Judge in his averments, reproduced above, is clearly scandalous and has remained on the record of the Court till date, without the respondent seeking to have it withdrawn or an apology being offered to that effect. The record and conduct of the respondent would show that at every stage he was contesting the contempt notice on procedural grounds. Neither was any sense of remorse expressed by the respondent nor was any apology offered to the Court at any stage, despite more than a year having passed since the appeal was filed and the contempt notice was issued. 9. On 24.11.2015, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, stated that i) the respondent was extending an apology; ii) there was no intention to cause any affront to the dignity of the Court and iii) in the interest of the process of administration of justice it is requisite that a sense of harmony be maintained between the Bar and the Bench. He also submitted that sometimes because of poverty of articulation, the language used by a counsel could get him into trouble, hence while adjudicating the case the Court may keep in consideration such unwitting errors or handicap of counsel. Analysis 10.In Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. and Apu Banik (AIR 2007 SC 2688), the Supreme Court observed as follows: Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 17 of 41 “1. "Judge bashing" and using derogatory and contemptuous language against Judges has become a favourite pastime of some people. These statements tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Courts and can not be permitted because, for functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Its strength is the faith and confidence of the people in that institution. That cannot be permitted to be undermined because that will be against the public interest. 2. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. Judge bashing is not and cannot be a substitute for constructive criticism. ... 12. There is guarantee of the Constitution of India that there will be freedom of speech and writing, but reasonable restriction can be imposed. It will be of relevance to compare the various suggestions as prevalent in America and India. It is worthwhile to note that all utterances against a Judge or concerning a pending case do not in America amount to contempt of Court. In Article 19 the expression "reasonable restrictions" is used which is almost at par with the American phraseology "inherent tendency" or "reasonable tendency". The Supreme Court of America in Bridges v California (1911) 86 Law Ed. 192 said: What finally emerges from the clear and present danger cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished. The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt of Court. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 18 of 41 not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of Court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of Court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. To similar effect were the observations of Lord Morris in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers 1974 AC 273 . It was observed that when unjustifiable interference is suppressed it is not because those charged with the responsibilities of administration of justice are concerned for their own dignity, it is because the very structure of ordered life is at risk if the recognised Courts of the Land are so flouted and their authority wanes and is supplanted. 13. There is no doubt that the Court like any other institution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. No Court can claim to be always right although it does not spare any effort to be right according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the Judges. They do not think themselves to be in possession of all truth to hold that wherever others differ from them are in error. No one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility than a Judge. But because of his training and the assistance he gets from learned Counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than others. While fair and temperate criticism of the Court even if strong, may not be actionable, but attributing improper motives or tending to bring Judges or Courts into hatred and contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts is serious contempt of which notice must be and will be taken. Respect is expected not only from those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but also from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in their criticism by indulging in vilification of the institution of Court, administration of justice and the instruments through which the administration acts, Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 19 of 41 should take heed for they will act at their own peril. To similar effect were the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J., (as the learned judge was then) in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1971]1SCR512 . 14. There is an abundance of empirical decisions upon particular instances of conduct which has been held to constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few. Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C. J, has laid down in Reg v. Gray 1900(2) QB 36 at 40 as follows: Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. ... 16. The view was echoed by this Court in Re. D.C. Saxena v. CJI 1996CriLJ3274 In the same volume of Halsbury's Laws of England at para 27 it is stated thus: "Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a Court or a Judge into contempt or to lower its authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court." 17. The above proposition has been approved and followed by Lord Atkin in Andrew Paul Terence Ambrad v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago AIR 1936 PC 141. It was observed as follows: No wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercised the ordinary right of criticism in good faith in private or public the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is public way, the wrong headed are permitted to err therein, provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impart the administration of Justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 20 of 41 virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men: Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v. Butterworth 1963(1) QB 696 after making reference to Req. v. Odham's Press Ltd ex parte A.G. 1957(1) QB 73 said: "whether or not there was an intention to interfere with the administration of justice is relevant to penalty not to quit". This makes it clear that an intention to interfere with the proper administration of justice is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt of court and it is enough if the action complained of is inherently likely so to interfere. In Morris v. Crown Office 1970(1) All E.R. 1079 ,Lord Denning M.R. said: that the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who do it strike at the very foundations of our society. In the same case, Lord Justice Solmon spoke: The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented. Frank Further, J. in Offutt v. U.S. 1954(348) U.S. 11 expressed his view as follows: It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage. In Jennison v. Baker 1972(1) All E.R. 997 at page 1006 it is stated: The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope. 18. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench in Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries 19807CriLJ684 citing those two Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 21 of 41 decisions in the cases of Offutt and Jennison (supra) stated thus: ...It may be necessary to punish as a contempt a cause of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public and the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. 19. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment In Re. S. Mulgaokar [1978]3SCR162 while giving broad guidelines in taking punitive action in the matter of contempt of Court has stated: ...If the Court considers the attack on the judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream 20. In the case of Brahma Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh 1954CriLJ238 this Court after referring to various decisions of the foreign countries as well as of the Privy Council stated thus: Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 22 of 41 It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmative that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way to interfere with the proper administration of law. ... 22. Though certain imputations against the Judge may be only libelous against that particular individual, it may at times amount to contempt also depending upon the gravity of the allegations. In Brahma Prakash Sharma's case (supra) this Court held that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeler in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished separately as contempt. The same view has been taken in Perspective Publications (P) Ltd v. The State of Maharashtra 1971CriLJ268 and C.K. Daphtary and Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors. 1971CriLJ844 . Therefore, apart from the fact that a particular statement is libelous, it can constitute criminal contempt if the imputation is such that the same is capable of lowering the authority of the Court. The gravity of the aforesaid statement is that the same would scandalize the court. 23. The right to criticize an opinion of a court, to take issue with it upon its conclusions as to a legal Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 23 of 41 proposition, or question its conception of the facts, so long as such criticisms are made in good faith and are in ordinarily decent and respectful language and are not designed to willfully or maliciously misrepresent the position of the Court, or tend to bring it into disrespect, or lessen the respect due to the authority to which a Court is entitled, cannot be questioned. The right of free speech is one of the greatest guarantee to liberty in a free country like ours, even though that right is frequently and in many instances outrageously abused. If any considerable portion of a community is led to believe that either because of gross ignorance of the law or because of a wrong reason, it cannot rely upon the courts to administer justice that portion of the community, upon some occasion, is very likely to come to the conclusion that it is better not to take any chances on the courts failing to do their duty. 24. Judiciary is the bed rock and handmaid of democracy. If people lose faith in justice parted by a Court of law, the entire democratic set up would crumble down. In this background, observations of Lord Denning M.R. in Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lennon (1968) 3 All E.R. 304 are relevant: "Justice must be rooted in confidence, and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking - the Judge is based." 25. Considered in the light of the aforesaid position in law, a bare reading of the statements makes it clear that those amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity, honesty and judicial competence and impartiality of judges. It is offensive and intimidating. The contemnor by making such scandalising statements and invective remarks has interfered and seriously shaken the system of administration of justice by bringing it down to disrespect and disrepute. It impairs confidence of the people in the Court. Once door is opened to this kind of allegations, aspersions and imputations, it may provide a handle to the disgruntled litigants to malign the Judges, leading to Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 24 of 41 character assassination. A good name is better than good riches. Immediately comes to one's mind Shakespeare's Othello, Act II, Scene 3, 167: Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord is the immediate jewel of their souls; who steals my purse, steals trash; its something, nothing; 'T was mine, its his, and has been slate to thousands; But he that filches from me my good name, Robs me of that which not enriches him And makes me poor indeed. 26. Majesty of Law continues to hold its head high notwithstanding such scurrilous attacks made by persons who feel the law Courts will absorb anything and every thing, including attacks on their honesty, integrity and impartiality. But it has to be borne in mind that such divinity and magnanimity is not its weakness but its strength. It generally ignores irresponsible statements which are anything but legitimate criticism. It is to be noted that what is permissible is legitimate criticism and not illegitimate insinuation. No Court can brook with equanimity something which may have tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Some people find judiciary a soft target because it has neither the power of the purse nor the sword, which other wings of democracy possess. It needs no reiteration that on judiciary millions pin their hopes, for protecting their life, liberty, property and the like. Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what rest of us (the people) seek to avoid, make decisions, said David Panicky in his book "Judges". Judges are mere mortals, but they are asked to perform a function which is truly divine. 27. What is contempt of Court has been stated in lucid terms by Oswald in Classic "Book on Contempt of Court". It is said: Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 25 of 41 To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and demonstration of law into disrespect and disregard or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during the litigation. Contempt in the legal acceptance of the term, primarily signifies disrespect to that which is entitled to legal regard, but as a wrong purely moral or affecting an object not possessing a legal status, it has in the eye of the law no existence. In its origin all legal contempt will be found to consist in an offence more or less direct against the sovereign himself as the fountainhead of law and justice or against his palace where justice was administered. This clearly appears from old cases. 28. Lord Diplock, speaking for the Judicial Committee in Chokolingo v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1981) 1 All E.R. 244, summarized the position thus: Scandalising the Court is a convenient way of describing a publication which, although it does not relate to any specific case either part of pending or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as a whole which is calculated to undermine the authority of the Courts and public confidence in the administration of justice. Thus, before coming to the conclusion as to whether or not the publication amounts to a contempt, what will have to be seen is, whether the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith or whether it is something directed to the personal character of a Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court. A finding, one way of the other, will determine whether or nor the act complained of amounted to contempt. 29. Mahajan, J in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose AIR1953SC75 , observed as follows: Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 26 of 41 No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the Courts of law the sermon of divine detachment. But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the Judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court.... It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that the Judges in the highest Court of the land act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined.... We would like to observe that it is not the practice of this Court to issue such rules except in very grave and serious cases and it is never oversensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger of grave mischief being done in the matter of administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored and viewed with placid equanimity.... 11.In the Nirmala J. Jhala V. State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301, the Supreme Court held: “A subordinate judicial officer works mostly in a charged atmosphere. He is under a psychological pressure— contestants and lawyers breathing down his neck. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. ... Judge bashing” has become a favourite pastime of some people. There is growing tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which they desire. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary, to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. Judiciary should not be reduced to the position of flies in the hands of wanton boys. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 27 of 41 ... The subordinate judiciary works in the supervision of the High Court and it faces problems at the hands of unscrupulous litigants and lawyers, and for them “Judge bashing” becomes a favourable pastime. In case the High Court does not protect honest judicial officers, the survival of the judicial system would itself be in danger.” 12.In In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, observed as follows: “...No one expects a lawyer to be subservient to the Court while presenting his case and not to put forward his arguments merely because the Court is against him. In fact, that is the moment when he is expected to put forth his best effort to persuade the Court. However, if, in spite of it, the lawyer finds that the court is against him, he is not expected to be discourteous to the court or to fling hot words or epithets or use disrespectful, derogatory or threatening language or exhibit temper which has the effect of overbearing the court. Cases are won and lost in the court daily. One or the other side is bound to lose. The remedy of the losing lawyer or the litigant is to prefer an appeal against the decision and not to indulge in a running battle of words with the court. That is the least that is expected of a lawyer. Silence on some occasions is also an argument. The lawyer is not entitled to indulge in unbecoming conduct either by showing his temper or using unbecoming language. ... Such act tend to overawe the court and to prevent it form performing its duty to administer justice. Such conduct brings the authority of the court and the administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice. ... Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 28 of 41 The Court will be failing in its duty to protect the administration of justice from attempts to denigrate and lower the authority of the judicial officers entrusted with the sacred task of delivering justice. A failure on the part of this Court to punish the offender on an occasion such as this would thus be a failure to perform one of its essential duties solemnly entrusted to it by the Constitution and the people. For all these reasons, we unhesitatingly reject the said so called apology tendered by the contemner.” 13.In a matter pertaining to Mr. „G‟, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, [1955] 1 SCR 490, it was held: “...He (a legal practitioner) is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action.” 14.In L.M. Das v. Advocate General, Orissa [1957]1SCR167, the Supreme Court observed :“At the same time, a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the court in which he is appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the Court itself into disrepute. ... Scandalising the Court in such manner is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.” Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 29 of 41 15.The Bar Council of India under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961, has prescribed Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette to be observed by Advocates – the relevant part of which has been reproduced herein: “An Advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and normal for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his nonprofessional capacity may still be improper for an advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client, and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned contain cannons of conduct and etiquette adopted as general guides; yet specific mention thereof shall not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative though not specifically mentioned. Section I—Duty to the Court 1. An advocate shall, during the presentation of his case and while otherwise acting before a Court, conduct himself with dignity and self-respect. He shall not be servile and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judicial officer, it shall be his right and duty to submit his grievance to proper authorities. 2. An advocate shall maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, bearing in mind that the dignity of the judicial office is essential for the survival of a free community. 3. ... 4. An advocate shall use his best efforts to restrain and prevent his client from restoring to sharp or unfair practices or from doing anything in relation to the Court, opposing counsel or parties which the advocate himself ought not to do. An advocate shall refuse to represent the client who persists in such improper conduct. He shall not consider himself a mere mouthpiece of the client, and Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 30 of 41 shall exercise his own judgment in the use of restrained language in correspondence, avoiding scurrilous attacks in pleadings, and using intemperate language during arguments in Court. ...” (Emphasis supplied) 16.The Court is of the view that, in this case, the nature of the language used was quite explicit and unambiguous. The unwarranted imputations were not said in the heat of the moment. It is evident that it was brought on record after due contemplation, surely the respondent knew what he meant by it. They tend to overawe/embarrass/ threaten and inhibit the Court. The respondent is a lawyer licensed to practice law and an officer of the Court and it is presumed that he understands the full import of the language used in pleadings and submissions made before the Court. Advocates are required to conduct themselves at all times as gentlemen; this conduct assumes greater significance in a court of law when he/she stands to assist the Court. Unlike the contemnor in Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and ors. and Apu Banik, (supra), who sought shelter from the contempt proceedings under the nebulous umbrella of illiteracy, the present respondent is an advocate who has practiced in this Court. The deliberate objectionable language used by him cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the respondent has not sought shelter on the ground of illiteracy, except to the limited extent that his counsel submitted that the language in question could well be attributed to a poor choice of words. 17. The court is of the view that the averments in the appeal, attributes malice and tends to scandalize and lower the authority and prestige Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 31 of 41 of the Court. It also prejudices and interferes with the administration of justice. Therefore the Court finds the respondent guilty of criminal contempt of Court. Validity of Apology 18.In High Court on its own Motion vs. S.G. Kudle, Advocate, decided on 05.03.2008, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, through a Division Bench comprising Justice Bilal Nazki and Justice S.A Bobde (as he then was) held that: “Law is settled that if somebody accused of contempt wants to place himself before the mercy of the court he should do so at the first instance and if it is sought at a later stage he must show repentance and it must be clear to the court that the contemnor was repenting and he had made an apology by genuine change of heart.” 19.On 12.08.2015, the respondent had sought time to address the Court effectively on merits. On 24.11.2015, an apology was offered through counsel. But clearly, the respondent has been contesting the notice right from the beginning till the end and except from the last date, when an offer of apology was made through his counsel, the respondent has shown no remorse or given any indication of having misgivings about the scandalous submission made by him, against an Hon‟ble Judge of this Court. The apology was made at the last minute, without any element of contrition or remorse and cannot be taken into consideration. In light of the aforesaid contentions, the Court rejects the respondent‟s apology offered through counsel. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 32 of 41 Previous Conduct of Respondent 20.The respondent‟s conduct shows a belligerent and aggressive attitude. The recusal of almost 2/3rd of the strength of Judges of this Court, from hearing his matters, is a testimony to the fact that the respondent has had numerous confrontations with this Court and seeks to challenge the authority of the Court or otherwise mock and hold in ridicule the office of the judges. While such conduct by an ordinary citizen would be scandalous and contemptuous, it assumes far graver ramifications when an advocate is involved. 21.A lawyer is an officer of the Court and is expected to conduct himself in a manner that behoves his privileged position in Court. It is expected that lawyers augment the process of justice, instead of acting in a manner which tends to obstruct the functioning of the court. 22.In Cont. Cas. (C) 165/2008, Montreaux Resorts P. Ltd. & Ors. vs Sonia Khosla, a learned Single Judge of this Court, while dealing with the conduct of the respondent herein, observed that: 1. Little did the framing fathers of the Constitution and the legislators visualize that the privilege and liberty granted to an individual to approach the court of law and to appear for himself and for others either as an attorney or as an advocate could and would be misused and abused to such an extent as has been done by this one individual Mr. Deepak Khosla. 2. 32 learned Judges of this High Court (including former and sitting judges), judges of the subordinate courts, the Company Law Board and the Arbitral Tribunal comprising of former judges of this Court Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 33 of 41 and a former judge of the Supreme Court have recused themselves since 2008 from hearing the cases in which either Mr. Deepak Khosla is a party or appearing as an attorney or as an advocate. 3. Various judicial orders imposing costs and even initiating contempt proceedings both civil and criminal have not deterred him from continuing with his conduct. 4. The Courts in India are perceived as temples of justice and the Judges as its priests. The legal profession is considered world over as a very honourable profession. The members of the profession hold a special place in the society. They are looked upon by others as leaders, advisors, mentors, guides etc. One individual by his conduct has attempted to pollute the stream of administration of justice and the very purity of the Courts' atmosphere. 5. Mr. Deepak Khosla started appearing in a litigation first as an authorised representative of his wife and father and of a company but later on during the pendency of the litigation has gone on to study law and has joined the legal profession. 6. Members of the legal profession are required to maintain higher standards of behaviour and conduct than an ordinary citizen. 7. Despite entering the legal profession and donning the robes of a member of the legal profession the behaviour and conduct of Mr. Deepak Khosla has not changed. 8. By Order dated 24.04.2012 the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 16/2012 held that the High Court has inherent power distinct and separate from power of contempt to injunct/sanction vexatious or frivolous litigation, vexatious/habitual litigants, contumelious litigant and issue appropriate directions, including prohibiting the said litigant from appearing and arguing matters in person and for others and from initiating or filing proceedings, except with permission of the Court. The Division Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 34 of 41 Bench further directed that the Order dated 04.01.2012, passed by a learned Single Judge, would be treated as a Show Cause Notice. The order of the Division Bench has been upheld by the Supreme Court by order dated 19.09.2012 in SLP(C) No. 15004/2012. The court further found that: 67. The conduct of Mr. Deepak Khosla, before the learned Judges of this Court as also before the judicial officers of the subordinate court and the Company Law Board and the Arbitral Tribunal, referred to hereinabove, when viewed in the light of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in various judicial pronouncements, some of which have been extracted hereinabove, clearly poses a real and imminent threat to the purity of the Court proceedings. 68. Over and above the orders that may be passed by the Court on the suo moto Civil and Criminal Contempt proceedings that have been initiated and the action that the Bar Council, in exercise of its disciplinary powers under the Advocates Act, 1961, may take against Mr. Deepak Khosla, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.K. ANAND (SUPRA) and the order dated 24.04.2012 of the Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 16/2012, his conduct calls for measures to regulate the Courts proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the Courts to save the purity of the Court proceedings from being polluted in any way. 69. Apart from the above, during the proceedings what has come to light is that Mr. Deepak Khosla has got himself enrolled with the Bar Council of Karnataka. He on 21.08.2014 had made a statement before this court which was recorded in the order of the said date that he predominantly practises in Delhi but was enrolled with the Bar Council of Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 35 of 41 Karnataka (Enrolment No. KAR 1280/2013). He had stated that though there were certain matter in contemplation to be filed in the State of Karnataka, however no matter had been filed till that date (i.e. 21.08.2014) in the State of Karnataka. ... 74. The Record of enrolment of Mr. Deepak Khosla (KAR/1280/13) forward by Bar Council of Karnataka through the Bar Council of India shows that he has been enrolled by the Bar Council of Karnataka on 30.07.2013 and he as per his statement has been predominantly practicing in Delhi. As per his own statement, till 21.08.2014 he has not filed any case within the jurisdiction of the State Bar Council of Karnataka though as per his statement certain matter were in contemplation of being filed in that state. 75. Record also reveals that costs have been imposed on Mr. Deepak Khosla for filing frivolous applications, protracting litigation, abusing the process of courts etc. which costs have remained unpaid. The imposition of costs and pre-emptory orders being passed by the courts have not deterred Mr. Deepak Khosla from filing further applications. The case was disposed-off with the following directions: (i) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from personally appearing and addressing any court in any matter in the Delhi High Court, the District Courts of Delhi, the Company Law Board either as a litigant in person or as an attorney/authorised representative or as an Advocate for a period of one year from (13.01.2015); and Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 36 of 41 (ii) Mr. Deepak Khosla is further prohibited from personally appearing before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted or to be constituted by the Court in the personal litigation of Mr. Deepak Khosla for a period of one year from (13.01.2015); and (iii) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing any application or petition in the Delhi High Court till he furnishes to the Registry the proof of deposit or payment, as the case may be, of the costs imposed by the various orders mentioned hereinabove; and (iv) Mr. Deepak Khosla is prohibited from filing any proceedings in the Delhi High Court or the District Courts of Delhi as an advocate unless the same is filed jointly with an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Delhi. (v) Mr. Deepak Khosla is at liberty to engage an advocate to represent and appear for him in his personal litigation. 23. The conduct of the respondent has shown that he has an incorrigible tendency to take-on the superior judiciary - in particular the judges of the Delhi High Court and to cast aspersions on both, their ability and integrity. Such act is unpardonable. Making scandalous submissions against the judges of the High Court is striking at the very institution of the High Court and the judiciary as a whole. If such nefarious activities are not dealt with firmly, it would inexorably lead to subjecting the institution of the judiciary to ridicule, to reducing peoples confidence in the Courts, thus severely impairing the administration of justice. Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 37 of 41 Punishment 24.In Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. and Apu Banik (supra), it was sternly observed by the Supreme Court as follows: “30. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that anyone who intends to tarnish the image of judiciary should not be allowed to go unpunished. By attacking the reputation of Judges, the ultimate victim is the institution. The day the consumers of justice loose (sic) faith in the institution that would be the darkest day for mankind. The importance of judiciary needs no reiteration.” 25.The institution of the judiciary has to be safeguarded from covert and insidious assaults from any quarter. Mocking at the Court or using scandalous language against it or addressing the Court in an abrasive manner or in such tone and tenor which shows disrespect towards the Court tends to scandalize and lower the prestige of the Court and is an interference with the administration of justice. Conduct of advocates, including use of language which gives the impression that the court in not in control of its affairs in the administration of justice, is to be sternly dealt with. The Respondent has imputed malicious conduct against an Hon‟ble Judge of this Court, including allegations of discrimination, bias and prejudice. The language/expressions used by the contemnor in the appeal and as noted in the show-cause notice is unambiguous and a direct assault upon the personal dignity of the judge and the prestige of the Court. The statements of the respondent in his written arguments do Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 38 of 41 not reflect any constrain in articulation of contentions. Therefore, the plea that the respondent could have erred in the choice of expression because of limitation in articulation is untenable. 26.We are of the view that if such repeated verbal assaults on judges of the High Court are not dealt with sternly, the mischief of such language and conduct could fester irredeemable damage to the prestige and dignity of the High Court. Individual judges collectively comprise a High Court. A contemptuous act before one Bench of the High Court is an act of contempt against the High Court itself. People’s faith in justice and the justice delivery system sustains the institution of the Courts. If confidence of right minded people is destroyed or faith of the people is besmirched by the impression that the judge is biased, the institution of the Courts will crumble. The purity of the High Court is essential as a forum for the protection of the rights of the public. Any act which leads to impairment of the pristine integrity of the High Court has to be immediately arrested and effectively reversed. Weakening of the judiciary is akin to weakening one of the three essential pillars of the Indian Republic. Assault on the judiciary is no less than an act of constitutional sacrilege. No constitutional court will tolerate such nefarious acts. The Courts are bound to protect their dignity and prestige. 27.The conduct of the respondent/contemnor has been persistently incorrigible. The record shows that he contested the contempt notice on procedural grounds at every stage. Neither any sense of remorse regarding the offensive language used in the appeal nor any apology Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 39 of 41 at any stage was offered despite more than a year having passed since the time of the objectionable material being put on record and the contempt notice being issued. 28.His conduct has been aggressive and combative towards the Courts. Especially by his contention that if CM No. 17483/2013 dated 25.10.2013 in LPA No. 16/2012 “was allowed, the very foundation and substratum of these proceedings would collapse on itself, in a heap.” The court has found him guilty of having committed criminal contempt of court. The contemnor has also been convicted today in another criminal contempt case i.e. Con.Cas.(Crl) 12/2014 for calling an Hon‟ble Division Bench as „Dedh Bench‟. Therefore, the respondent‟s offer of apology at the last moment through counsel, perhaps to escape any punishment, is obviously insincere, without any sense of remorse or change of heart or after due reflection upon his conduct. The fire which the contemnor‟s contemptuous act kindles constitutes an imminent threat to the administration of justice.The polluters of the judicial firmament will require to „be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of the Court‟s environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned.”1 For the sake of preserving the dignity of the institution, the Court would need to punish the contemnor, howsoever unpleasant the decision may be. 29. In the circumstances, the Court sentences the respondent contemnor Deepak Khosla to one month imprisonment along with a fine of 1 Haridas Das v. Smt. Usha Banik and Ors. Apu Banik (supra) Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 40 of 41 Rs.2000/-. The fine shall be deposited within a week from today, failing which the imprisonment shall extend by another month. 30.We had considered prohibiting the contemnor from further appearance before this court or subordinate court and Tribunals in Delhi for some period of time after his having served the prison sentence, but we restrain ourselves from doing so. We feel that appropriate orders in this regard should, in the facts of this case, be taken by the Bar Council concerned. Hence a copy of this order be sent to the Bar Council of Delhi and the Bar Council of Karnataka, for them to take appropriate measures apropos the contemnor Mr. Deepak Khosla. 31.The petition is disposed off in the above terms. NAJMI WAZIRI, J ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J FEBRUARY 22, 2016 Cont.Cas(Crl.)9/2014 Page 41 of 41