REPORT BY THE WORKPLACE SAFETY COMMITTEE OF INSHORE FISHERIES LIMITED On the Sinking Of the “MV POSEIDON PRINCESS” Prepared for: Mr. Adam B. Hanlon Department of Labour and Advanced Education Occupational Health and Safety Division 10 Starrs Road Yarmouth, NS B5A 2T1 Brief History of the “MV Poseidon Princess” The “MV Poseidon Princess” was built at Shelburne Marine Limited in 1988 for Capt. Raymond King, of Meteghan N.S. Built of steel, the vessel’s particulars were: 146.93 Gross Tonnes, 110.20 Net/Registered Tonnes, length 18.87 meters, breadth 6.68 meters, and depth 3.37 meters, Brake power 701KW. After the vessel was built, Capt. King fished out of ports in western Nova Scotia that year finishing the year in North Sydney. Later in 1989 the vessel fished out of Burnt Islands Newfoundland, and in the spring the vessel returned to some eastern ports of Nova Scotia. In January of 1990, Capt. Glenn King ( Raymond son), took over the vessel and fished it out of Newfoundland. In late 2000, Clearwater bought the vessel and was fished by Capt. Glen Simpson and Capt. Keith Lohnes until 2001 fishing for Pollock and Redfish out of Eastern Nova Scotia. The “MV Poseidon Princess” was again sold to Geoffroy d’Entremont and converted to a inshore scallop dragger. Geoffroy’s son Steven soon became Captain, and fished South West Nova Scotia grounds until being sold again to Inshore Fisheries Limited in 2007. It was reconverted to groundfish dragging and began fishing with Capt. Martin d’Entremont at the helm in 2008. The Sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” The sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” can be best described by Capt. Martin d’Entremont in his statement to Mr. Neil Armstrong, acting for the Insurers. Universal Marine Consultants (Atlantic) Limited Neil Armstrong - Marine Surveyor 52 Capistrano Dr, Dartmouth, NS B2X 3N8 Phone (902) 835-2283 Fax (902) 835-6154 Cell (902) 221-2284 https://www.facebook.com/universalmarine.ca STATEMENT OF MARTIN My name is. Martin d?Entremont I reside in West Pubnico, NS. I am the captain of the FV which is owned by Inshore Fisheries. I hold a Fishing Master Class Certificate. On Wednesday January 28th at approximately 2345 hours we left our home port of West Pubnico, NS aboard the to go fishing on Georges Bank, approximately 100 miles off of Pubnico Point, NS. There were three of us crew aboard the vessel including myself, Oscar d?Entremont and Lee d?Entremont as well as one fisheries observer, David Murphy. We arrived at our fishing grounds that night and we fished up to Friday, January 30th until approximately 1600 hours that afternoon. After that fishing trip we had approximately 114,000 of fish aboard the vessel packed in ice and we intended to head back to port where'we would offload our catch the I following morning. In the past we have had up to 127,000 of fish aboard the vessel. Before leaving our fishing grounds, myself and Lee were in the engine room and checked things over as well as changed the fuel filters and greased the propeller shaft. We did not see any problems in the engine room when we were there. I went into the wheelhouse and radioed out to a captain I know well from another fishing boat, Brian Beliveau aboard the BLAIR FRANCIS and told them where we were located and that we were on our way back to port. Lee took over at the helm after an hour or so and I went down into the forecastle to sleep in my bunk for a bit. At some point while I was "sleeping, Oscar took a turn at the helm to relieve Lee. I believe that Oscar took over the helm around midnight (January Shortly after he took over at thehelm, he yelled down for. me to get out of bed and said the boat was listing noticeably to port. As soon as I got out of my bunk remarked on the list as well and I immediately went into the wheelhouse without getting dressed and took over at the helm. Once i took over the wheel I brought the stem around into the wind and put the engine in neutral to see if the boat would level up to even-keel. When I did this it did not make any difference and the list was in fact getting worse so I knew something was seriously wrong. I yelled for everyone to get Into the wheelhouse and to put on their immersion suits. I As soon as they were in the wheelhouse and putting on their suitscalled out on the VHF to Brian aboard the BLAIR again to teli them we were in distress and provided our coordinates. I then put out two May Day calls on the VHF radio before I used the emergency distress function on our DSC radio. The boat was now listing so badly that I actually had to hold on to the radio to keep from falling down to the port side of the wheelhouse. Once I realized that the distress function had engaged we all got out of the wheelhouse and tried to get to the life raft. The life raft was fitted en the shelter deck behind the wheelhouse on the port side" and when we went out on the shelter deck, the beat was so far on its side that the life raft was already under water and we could not reach it. At some pointthe'fish from the starboard side Stabilize-r flew over as that stabilizer felt to the port side-and crashed. very close to us. Around this time the life raft hydrostatic releaSe engaged and the'life raf-t floated to the surface near us. I wave swept me off. the boat so I swam to the liferaft and deployed - Lee and Oscar came along next and they got into- it first and then helped me get inside as i was completely exhausted at this point. Dave Murphy, thefisheries observer was not able to get to the life raft and the waves crashing intothe sinking boat forced him. into the water. We yelled back and forth with him for Sometime but. he eventually stopped responding and We lost track of where he was. The sinking boat eventually went under water and we .had no lights 50 we sat and waited for help. The and the BLAIR were the first two boats to arrive onthe scene. The crew of the retrieved us from the life raft and then managed to spot Dave Murphy, who was barely conscious at this time, with the help of a Coast Guard Helicopter. The crew of the BLAIR had to get. Dave from the water and the coast Guard heii-co-pter dropped down paramedics to assist. The hoist and basket on the Coast Guard Helicopter malfunctioned after they dropped off paramedics aboard the BLAIR and they were unable to air lift Dave back to land. I I The took the three of us crew in to Shelbum?e, NS and the BLAIR took Dave in to Dennis Point, West Pubnico where he was then taken to hospital by ambulance. I affirm that the foregoing is a truestatement of the facts of this incident to the best of my recollection. S?mm ol Martin d?Entremont Witness Captain Signed-at Louie/?L .szjuihmon ill. 5 1410c;ka - . . cot: INSLGAQ 4/754 Possible Causes for the Sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” As a result of the sinking, many questions remain as to the causes. As a workplace committee, we do not have to expertise to explore fully the possible causes of the sinking. However the committee has the witness statements and our Captain and crew to guide our investigation. We will look at the likely causes of any sinking. A) Icing or striking ice floe or iceberg. At the time of the sinking the air temperature was above zero degree C, and there were no reports of icebergs or ice floes. B) Load Shifting. At the time of the sinking, the “MV Poseidon Princess” had approximately 114,000lbs of iced fish aboard. There was very little room left for the load to shift. C) Overloading. At the time of the sinking, there was approximately 114,000lbs of iced fish aboard, well short of the full load of 127,000lbs that was landed previously. A picture of the “MV Poseidon Princess” with the full load is included. D) Weather. At the time of the sinking the vessel the weather was clear with winds from the ENE of about 25 knots. They had been steaming in for about 6 hours, with no issues reported. E) Catastrophic mechanical or structural failure. During the trip the vessel experienced no safety issues whatsoever, the vessel had been well maintained and was in compliance with all Transport Canada Inspections and approvals. Including an approved stability booklet, in 2014. After many questions to the many people involved the incident, the Workplace Safety Committee of Inshore Fisheries Limited, found that no alarms or warnings had been sounded. The fish hold alarm was working because earlier in the trip, there was water coming from the shaft stuffing box, and the alarm had gone off a couple of times. The stuffing box was tightened and the water leak was stopped. The vessel was steaming smoothly for about 6 hours prior to the sinking; the weather was clear and the sea state was moderate. There was no icing, ice bergs or ice floes in the immediate area. The vessel was well below its maximum carrying capacity, and there was only 1 pen in the middle of the vessel that was empty, the cargo couldn’t have shifted enough weight to capsize the vessel. Because of the improbability of the cause of the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” being, ice or icing related, having a cargo shifting, overloading, or being weather related, and the fact of the rapid turn of events in the vessels sinking, the Workplace safety Committee of Inshore Fisheries Limited believes that the cause of the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” being a catastrophic mechanical or Structural failure. Keys to the Successful Rescue of the men of the “MV Poseidon Princess” During the many hours of discussion with the Captain and crew about the incident a few key areas were identified as being critical in the successful rescue of the crew of the “MV Poseidon Princess”. A) Immersion suits stored in view, at the main door of the wheelhouse. Because of the rapid capsizing and sinking of the vessel, after the initial call to the wheelhouse, there was no time to retrieve an immersion suit from a locker or bunk. As well as the vessel was capsizing walking becomes very difficult and sometimes impossible. B) Training. The Captain and Crew’s training kicked in and they executed the life saving procedures correctly under intense pressure. As well, the live saving equipment was properly configured and maintained. In addition, the other fishermen who came to the rescue showed extreme professionalism and know-how, a credit to their training. C) Experience. The Captain and crew of the “MV Poseidon Princess” had many years of experience and had discussed many times safety protocols and procedures with the management of Inshore Fisheries Limited. D) Decision to Put Immersion Suits right away. When the Captain and crew together saw what was happening they quickly decided to don their Immersion suits, they could always remove them later if the situation resolved itself. E) Composure under pressure. The Captain and crew of the “MV Poseidon Princess” showed tremendous composure under the most intense of situations. Their cool heads enabled them to use their training and common sense to deal with the situation. Areas of Concern During the incident the Captain and the Fisheries observer had switched immersion suits in the confusion. The immersion suits were the same so that was not a problem in this case. In a case of switching two suits, with the people being of different stature could be problematic in a serious situation. There were statements attributed to the Captain that his immersion suit was not floating him properly. The suit has been tested by Spartan Industrial Marine on March 3rd, 2015, and found it to pass inspection. We believe that because of the immediacy of the situation, the Captain did not have enough time to inflate the flotation pillow attached to the back of the immersion suit. As well, the Captain is not a strong swimmer and he could have felt that the suit was not buoyant enough at the time. Recommendations 1) Immersion Suits be stored in one area near a main exit. In the case of the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” it is the view of the Committee that the successful rescue of the crew of the vessel was in part due to the storage of the immersion suits near the wheelhouse outside door. 2) Immersion suits be Mandatory safety equipment in a commercial fishing vessel. In the case of the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess”, there is no doubt that the immersion suits were a critical factor in the safe rescue of the crew of the “MV Poseidon Princess”. As written in the “Small fishing Vessel Inspection Regulations” it is only mandatory to provide immersion suits in lieu of a second life raft. After investigating all aspects of the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” the Workplace Safety Committee of Inshore Fisheries Limited strongly recommends that immersion suits be 100% mandatory on small fishing vessels. In the case of the “MV Poseidon Princess” at the rapid rate of sinking it would have been unlikely to be able to get in the second life raft without jumping into the water. The Committee also strongly recommends that regardless of Transport Canada regulations fishers should themselves take it upon themselves to purchase their own immersion suit. As well, they should at least have a yearly test of the suit for fit and equipment function, condition and have a commercial inspection before the inspection expiry. 3) Immersion Suits be distinctly personalized. Each person on a vessel should be allocated a properly fitted (tested by the individual) immersion suit. Each person should personalize his or her immersion suit with a separate color, tag, or other readily identifiable marking that can be identified even in low light or no light conditions. Conclusion After the Committee’s investigation, with all the questions, interviews and information being studied, we conclude that the “MV Poseidon Princess” was lost due to a catastrophic mechanical or structural failure. The specific cause for the sinking of the “MV Poseidon Princess” probably will never be ascertained, however further investigation may lead to a more probable cause Afterthought Having gone through a very traumatic ordeal, it was soon very obvious that the men involved, both rescued persons as well as rescuers, were left with some emotional scars. The Management of Inshore Fisheries Limited convened a session with a Critical Response Stress Debriefing team. They met with a group of impacted individuals for 4 hours. The response was overwhelmingly positive of the outcomes. All of the participants were happy to be a part of the process and helped a lot with dealing with the lingering traumatic effects of the incident. Thanks The Workplace Safety Committee of Inshore Fisheries Limited wishes to state for the record our overwhelming gratitude to Captain Kevin Garland and his crew of the “Atlantic Destiny” and to Captain Brian Belliveau and his crew of the “Chief Blair Francis”, their efforts made a difference. As well, we again thank all the Fishermen, Coast Guard, and on shore personnel who made it possible to rescue the crew of the “MV Poseidon Princess”. Workplace Safety Committee of Inshore Fisheries Limited PO Box 118 Middle West Pubnico Yarmouth County, NS B0W 2M0 Shawn d’Entremont Chairman Marc d’Entremont Dale d’Eon Lise Stoddard