1  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY rt                                                                                                                       Deshmane and  Ladda(PS) CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION CRIMINAL  APPEAL No. 572  of 2015 ig h Salman Salim Khan, Age about  49 yrs, Occ.­Actor, Resident of 111A, Galaxy Apartments, H B.J. Road, Bandra (West),  Mumbai­400 050.     ..APPELLANT. ba y (Orig. Accused) Versus. B om The State of Maharashtra,   (Through:­ Bandra Police Station)  ..RESPONDENT.  WITH  CRIMINAL  APPLICATION No. 1041 of 2015 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 572 of 2015        1 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:43 ::: 2  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       C ou …........... Mr Amit Desai, Senior Counsel with Mr Anand Desai,  Mr   Nirav   Shah,   Mr   Munaf   Virjee,   Ms   Chandrima  Mitra,   Ms   Manasi   Vyas,   Mr   Nausher   Kohli,   Mr  Niranjan Mundargi, Mr Gopala K. Shenoy, Mr Manhar  Saini i/by DSK Legal for the Appellant. ig h Mr   S.K.Shinde,   Public   Prosecutor   with     Mrs   P.H.  Kantharia,   Mr.Deepak   Thakare   and   Mr   S.H.   Yadav,  APP for the Respondent­State.  …........... H     CORAM : A.R.JOSHI, J.       DATED  : 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th DECEMBER, 2015              ba y ORAL  JUDGMENT: B om th  DICTATION ON 7    DECEMBER, 2015    : 1. Present   Criminal   Appeal   is   preferred   by   the  appellant/accused challenging the judgment and order  of conviction dated 6.5.2015.  Said order of conviction  was   passed   by   the   Sessions   Court   at   Bombay   in  Sessions   Case   No.240   of   2013.     By   the   impugned  judgment   and   order   the   appellant/accused   was         2 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:43 ::: 3  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       convicted for various offences and sentenced to suffer  C ou respective imprisonments and was also directed to pay  fine.   Following is the operative part of the judgment  and order : B om ba y H ig h “1.  Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   convicted   u/s.235(2)   of   the     Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable   u/s.304  II   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   and   sentenced   to   suffer   Rigorous Imprisonment for a   period of   five   (5)   years   and   to   pay   fine   of   Rs.25,000/  (Rupees   Twenty     Five   Thousand   only),   in   default   to   suffer   Rigorous Imprisonment for a   period of   six (6) months. 2.  Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   also convicted u/s.235(2) of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable u/s.338 of the Indian Penal   Code   and   sentenced   to   suffer   Simple   Imprisonment for  a   period   of   one   (1)     year     and     to     pay     fine     of   Rs.500/   (Rupees   Five  Hundred only),   in default to suffer Simple Imprisonment   for a period of one (1) month. 3.  Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   also convicted u/s.235(2) of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable u/s.337 of  the Indian Penal          3 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:43 ::: 4  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou Code   and   sentenced   to   suffer   Simple   Imprisonment for  a period of three (3)   months   and   to   pay   fine   of   Rs.500/ (Rupees Five  Hundred only), in default   to   suffer   Simple   Imprisonment   for   a   period of  one (1) month. rt                                                                                                                       H ig h 4.   Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   also convicted u/s.235(2) of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable u/s.134 r/w.  Sec.187 of the   Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and sentenced   to suffer Simple  Imprisonment   for   a   period   of   two   (2)   months   and   to   pay   fine   of  Rs.500/   (Rupees   Five   Hundred       only),       in       default       to   suffer       Simple     Imprisonment   for   a   period of fifteen (15) days. B om ba y 5.  Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   also convicted u/s.235(2) of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable   u/s.185   of   the       Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   and   sentenced   to   suffer   Simple  Imprisonment   for   a   period   of   six   (6)   months   and   to   pay   fine   of  Rs.2,000/   (Rupees   Two   Thousand   only),  in   default   to   suffer       Simple     Imprisonment   for   a   period of one (1) month. 6.    Accused   Salman   Salim   Khan   is   also convicted u/s.235(2) of   the Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   offence   punishable   u/s.3(1)   r/w.     181   of   the   Motor  Vehicles Act, 1988 and sentenced          4 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 5  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou to suffer Simple  Imprisonment   for   a   period   of   two   (2)   months   and   to   pay   fine   of  Rs.500/   (Rupees   Five   Hundred       only),       in       default       to   suffer       Simple     Imprisonment   for   a   period of seven (7) days. rt                                                                                                                       7.  All   the   substantive   sentences   shall run concurrently. ig h 8.  The accused is on bail.  He shall   surrender his bail bonds. H 9.  Set     off     be     given     to     the   accused   u/s.428   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   for   the   period   undergone by him in the prison. 10.  The   seized   articles   be   destroyed   after appeal period is over. B om ba y 11.  Unmarked   articles,   if   any,   be   destroyed after appeal period  is over.  12.  The vehicle was returned to the   accused   Salman   Khan   on   Supurtnama   (bond).   The   Supurtnama   (Bond)   be   cancelled after appeal period.”  2. Reportedly, the fine amounts are already paid  and   the   present   appellant/accused   is   granted   bail  during pendency of appeal. 3. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of         5 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 6  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       conviction,   present   appeal   is   preferred   on   various  C ou grounds.     Those   grounds   have   been   dealt   with  hereunder at the appropriate place. 4. Present   appellant   was   granted   bail   during  ig h pendency of the appeal and by consent of the parties  the hearing of the appeal was expedited by this Court  vide order dated 8.5.2015 (Coram : A.M. Thipsay, J.).  H Under this premise, present appeal was taken for final  hearing and the rival arguments were heard at length.  ba y It is specifically mentioned that though the appeal is  challenging   the   conviction   for   the   main   offence  B om punishable under Section 304 Part II of IPC, various  other aspects were also argued as to the involvement  of   the   appellant   as   a   driver   of   the   motor   vehicle  involved in the incident and whether he was under the  influence of alcohol or whether it was pure and simple  accident due to bursting of the tyre of the vehicle.  As         6 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 7  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       such,   considering   the   scope   of   the   matter   and  C ou considering   the   conviction   of   the   appellant   awarded  by   the   Sessions   Court   after   examination   of   27  witnesses,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant  argued   the   matter   since   30.7.2015.     Initially   the  ig h matter  was  started for  arguments on  30.7.2015 and  was   taken   on   5.8.2015,   6.8.2015   and   7.8.2015.  H Thereafter it so happened that various objections were  raised on behalf of the appellant as to the manner in  ba y which the paper book of the appeal was prepared  and  as such time was consumed in between and after the  B om final  paper­book in four volumes is prepared by the  office   of   the   Court.   The   appeal   was   then   taken   for  arguments from 21.9.2015 and the hearing lasted till  4.12.2015. 5. It is the case of prosecution that the present  appellant, a famous film star of Hindi cinemas drove         7 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 8  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   motor   vehicle   Toyota   Land   Cruiser   (Registration  C ou No.MH 01­DA­32) (hereinafter referred to as “the said  car”.)     He   drove   the   said   car   on   the   night   between  27.9.2002 and 28.9.2002.  Specifically it is the case of  the prosecution that at early hours of 28.9.2002, he  ig h drove   the   said   car   in   high   speed   and   in   rash   and  negligent   manner   and   that   time   he   was   under   the  H influence of alcohol.  It is the case of prosecution that  on the night of 27.9.2002 at about 9:30 p.m. or so the  ba y appellant took out the said car.  He was accompanied  by his friend one Kamal Khan (not examined in the  B om present   matter)   and   his   police   bodyguard   one  Ravindra   Himmatrao   Patil   (since   deceased).  According   to   the   case   of   prosecution   the  appellant/accused  was   driving   the   said  car   from   his  house at Galaxy Apartments Bandra and firstly visited  Rain Bar.  In the Rain Bar the appellant and his friend  Kamal Khan went inside and his bodyguard Ravindra         8 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 9  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Patil   remained   outside.     It   is   also   the   case   of  C ou prosecution that brother of the appellant one Sohail  Khan also visited Rain Bar at the relevant time and the  bodyguard   of   Sohail   Khan   was   present   outside   the  Rain Bar.   Name of said bodyguard of Sohail Khan is  6. ig h Balu Laxman Muthe (PW­6). It  is the  prosecution's case  that  at  Rain Bar  H various   eatables   and   drinks   were   served   to   the  appellant and his friend and others.  This service was  ba y given by one waiter by name Malay Bag (PW­5), who  was   then   on   duty   at   Rain   Bar.   After   consuming   the  B om food and drinks which included alcohol (Bacardi), a  White Rum and some cocktails, the appellant and his  friend left Rain Bar and then visited hotel JW Marriott.  Again   according   to   the   case   of   prosecution   the  appellant/accused   was   driving   the   said   car   and   his  bodyguard   Ravindra   Patil   sat   by   the   side   of   driver's         9 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 10  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       seat in the front and the friend Kamal Khan sat at the  C ou rear seat.  At hotel JW Marriott the appellant/accused  and  his  friend  went  inside  and again  Ravindra  Patil  remained outside. According to the case of prosecution at about  ig h 7. 2:15   a.m.   or  so  on  28.9.2002 the  appellant  and his  friend   Kamal   Khan   came   out   of   hotel   JW   Marriott.  H Again   the   appellant   sat   on   the   driver   seat   and   his  bodyguard Ravindra Patil sat by his side on the frond  ba y seat and Kamal Khan sat at the rear and they started  coming   back   to   the   house   of   the   appellant   via   St.  B om Andrews Road and Hill Road.  It is also specific case of  the   prosecution   that   at   that   time   the   appellant   was  under the influence of alcohol and was driving the car  at very high speed of about 90 to 100 km. per hour.  Ravindra Patil, the bodyguard, cautioned him to lower  down   the   speed   but   the   appellant   did   not   pay   any         10 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 11  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       heed. Consequently the appellant lost his control over  C ou the car while negotiating the right turn at the junction  of   St.   Andrews   Road   and   Hill   Road.     The   appellant  dashed   the   said   car   on   the   shutters   of   American  Laundry which is situate at the junction.  Said impact  ig h resulted in the death of one person by name Nurulla  and injuries to four persons who are PW­2, PW­3, PW­ H 4   and   PW­11.     The   deceased   and   the   injured   were  sleeping on the platform in front of American Laundry.  ba y Due to the impact   there was a loud noise and there  was a sort of commotion that followed.  Many people  B om gathered on the spot after hearing the noise and they  saw the appellant coming out from the car.  They also  saw   that   few   persons   were   below   the   car   and  apparently   under   the   tyre.     They   noticed   that   one  person was seriously injured and he subsequently died  and four persons sustained injuries. Out of them two  persons   received   grievous   injuries   and   two   persons         11 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 12  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       8. C ou received simple injuries. It is also the case of prosecution that the mob  which was gathered on the spot after the incident was  rather furious and apparently there was manhandling  ig h of   the   inmates   of   the   car   including   Ravindra   Patil,  police   bodyguard   of   the   appellant.     Said   bodyguard  sensing   the   seriousness   of   the   situation   showed   his  H police   identity   card   and   proclaimed   that   he   was   a  police officer.  As such, he pacified the people who had  ba y gathered there who were angry and aggressive.   It is  also the case of the prosecution that the appellant and  B om his friend Kamal Khan ran away from the spot without  giving any help to the persons involved in the incident.  In the meantime intimation was given to Bandra Police  and within few minutes the police persons arrived at  the spot and took charge of the situation. The incident  of   impact   of   the   car   on   the   shutters   of   American         12 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 13  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Laundry   happened   around   2:45   a.m.   on   28.9.2002.  C ou When   the   police   persons   arrived   on   the   spot   the  bodyguard Ravindra Patil was also present there.   A  crane   was   called   and   the   car   was   lifted   and   taken  aside.  The injured persons were rescued from beneath  ig h the   car   and   taken   to   Bhabha   Hospital   for   medical  treatment   and  examination.   One  person  was  found  H dead.  Subsequently he was identified as one Nurulla.  Dead body of Nurulla was taken to Bhabha hospital  ba y and   some   blood   samples   from   the   dead   body   were  collected for analysis. B om 9. The   statements   of   injured   persons   were  recorded during investigation.   However prior to that  the spot panchnama (Exhibit­28) was conducted  after  the   spot   was   shown   by   Ravindra   Patil.     The   spot  panchnama was conducted under the supervision and  directions of   police inspector Rajendra Kadam (PW­        13 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 14  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       26).   PW­1 one Sambha Gavda was one of the panch  C ou witnesses.     Various   articles   were   collected   from   the  spot   like   broken   glass   pieces,   piece   of   shutter   of  American   Express   Laundry,   blood   stained   soil   etc..  The   documents   concerning   the   car   like   RTO   and  ig h insurance papers were also collected.   Key of the car  was also taken charge of by the police.  Ravindra   Patil,   the   bodyguard   of   the  H 10. appellant was enquired at Bandra Police Station.   He  ba y lodged   his   complaint.     It   was   later   on   marked   as  Exhibit­P­1 during the recording of the evidence before  B om the Metropolitan Magistrate Court when the case was  first   tried   there   when   the   main   offence   against   the  present   appellant/accused   was   punishable   under  Section 304A of IPC.  It so happened that initially on  lodging of the FIR the main charge was for the offence  under   Section   304A   of   IPC.   However   various         14 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 15  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       subsequent events occurred and there was  application  C ou of   applying   section   304   Part   II   of   IPC.     The   events  which took place from lodging of the FIR in the matter  till case was committed to the Court of Sessions, shall  be   detailed   hereunder   at   the   appropriate   place.  ig h During investigation,   police took steps to search the  appellant   by   visiting   his   house   but   he   could   not   be  H found.     Subsequently   the   appellant/accused   was  arrested in the morning of 28.9.2002.   According to  ba y prosecution,   initially   the   appellant   was   taken   to  Bhabha hospital for taking his blood sample as it was  B om the case of prosecution that the appellant was under  the   influence   of   alcohol   and   driving  the   car  in   rash  and   negligent   manner   and   thereby   caused   the  incident, killing one person and injuring four persons.  Though   according   to   the   prosecution   the   appellant  was taken first to Bhabha hospital for extracting blood  for alcohol test, it is also the case of prosecution that         15 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 16  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the blood could not be extracted at Bhabha hospital  C ou for   want   of   proper   equipments   and   facility.     This  aspect   shall   also   be   dealt   with   hereunder   as   to  whether   this   fact   has   been   established   by   the  prosecution by any cognate evidence and it is also to  ig h be ascertained whether this case of prosecution can be  accepted   in   the   light   of   the   factual   position   that  H Bhabha   hospital   does   have   ICU   unit   and   also  admittedly   the   blood   of   the   deceased   Nurulla   was  ba y extracted there for testing.   The fact remains that as  the blood could not be extracted at Bhabha hospital,  B om the appellant was taken to JJ Hospital in the afternoon  of   28.9.2002   at   about   1:30   p.m.   or   so.     His   blood  samples   were   collected   at   JJ   Hospital   by   one     Dr.  Shashikant Pawar (PW­20).  Said blood samples along  with   requisite   forms   A   &   B   as   per   the   Bombay  Prohibition   (Medical   Examination   and   Blood   Test)  Rules,   1959   were   given   in   the   custody   of   police         16 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 17  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       constable   and   they   were   taken   to   Bandra   Police  C ou Station.  It is also the case of prosecution that though  the blood samples were collected and received from JJ  Hospital   in   the   afternoon   of   28.9.2002   they   were  immediately not sent to the Chemical Analyzer's office  ig h at   Kalina,   Santacruz   as   the   CA   office   was   closed.  Consequently   the   blood   samples   were   sent   to   the  H office   of   CA   on   30.9.2002.   Admittedly   samples  remained in the custody of the police in the meantime.  ba y They were kept in the chamber of PI Shengal (PW­27).  The condition in which the blood samples were kept  B om was a crucial aspect and much emphasis was placed  on this by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant  as   to   the   storage   of   said   biological   evidence.     This  aspect shall also be dealt with in detail when minutely  the   arguments   advanced   on   behalf   of   the   appellant  will   be   considered   for   analyzing   the   case   of  prosecution as to drunken driving and causing death         17 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 18  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       11. C ou and injuries. As   mentioned   above,   the   blood   samples  reached the CA office on Monday i.e. 30.9.2002  and  on the next day i.e. on 1.10.2002 the analysis report  ig h was   received   by   the   police.     According   to   the   said  report  (Exh.81) the blood contained 0.062% w/v of  ethyl   alcohol   i.e.   weight   by   volume   62   mg   per  H thousand ml.  Initially   the   investigation   was   conducted   by  ba y 12. PW­26   one   Rajendra   Kadam,   then   working   as   PSI  B om Bandra   Police   Station.     Subsequent   investigation  from   1.10.2002   was   conducted   by   Sr.   P.I.   Kisan  Shengal   (PW­27).     However,   he   is   also   the   police  officer   who   visited   the   spot   immediately   after   the  incident   as   he   was   informed   by   PSI   Kadam   over  telephone regarding the incident. 13. During   investigation,   statements   of   various         18 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:44 ::: 19  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       witnesses were recorded.  The motor vehicle involved  C ou in   the   incident   was   also   inspected  by   Motor  Vehicle  Inspector   (PW­19)   Rajendra   Sadashiv   Keskar.  According   to   him   he   inspected   the   vehicle   on  29.9.2002   at   about   9:30   a.m.   and   gave   his   report  ig h which is at Exh.84.   It is the specific evidence of this  witness appearing in notes of evidence in paragraph­3  H of   his   evidence   recorded   before   the   Sessions   Court.  There is certain variance in the substantive evidence of  ba y this witness.  This is because of some answers given by  him in his cross­examination.  This variance is as to on  B om which date or dates he examined the vehicle.   Again  this   aspect   was   much   emphasized   by   the   learned  Senior Counsel for the appellant and the same shall be  dealt hereunder at the appropriate place. 14. During investigation Sr. P.I. Shengal (PW­27)  visited  Rain   Bar and recorded the statements of the         19 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 20  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       waiter   Malay   Bag   (PW­5)   and   manager   Rizwan  C ou Rakhangi   (PW­9).     Certain   bills   from   the   Rain   Bar  were   collected   during   the     investigation   in   order   to  establish   that   the   drinks   containing   alcohol   were  ordered   and   consumed   by   the   appellant   and   his  ig h friends who were accompanying him and were with  him in Rain Bar.  PW­27 Kisan Shengal also visited the  H hotel   JW   Marriott   and   recorded     statements   of   one  Kalpesh Verma (PW­12).   He was then working as a  ba y parking assistant at JW Marriott hotel.   PW­27 Kisan  Shengal also collected the parking tag from the hotel.  B om At this juncture   it is also necessary to point out that  said parking tag was not seized and apparently there  was no panchnama drawn for alleged seizure of the  parking   tag   and   this   factual   position   has   been  substantiated by evidence of PW­27. 15. During   investigation,   enquiries   were   made         20 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 21  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       with   RTO   Tardeo   and   also   Andheri   RTO   seeking  C ou information on whether driving licence was obtained  by the appellant.   It was reported back by said RTO  offices  that   the   appellant  was  not  given  any driving  license   by   said   offices.     At   this   juncture   it   must   be  ig h mentioned that even it is not the case of the appellant  that he had a valid motor driving license in his name  16. H as on the date of the incident. During   investigation,   statements   of   some   of  ba y the witnesses were also recorded under Section 164 of  Cr.P.C.,   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court  B om No.12,   Bandra.     Statement   of   one   Kamal   Khan,   a  friend   of   the   appellant,   was   also   recorded   under  Section 161 of Cr.P.C. on 4.10.2002.  At this juncture it  must be mentioned that this Kamal Khan was all along  accompanying   the   appellant   on   that   night   between  27.9.2002   and   28.9.2002   i.e.   from   9:30   p.m.   on         21 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 22  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       27.9.2002 till the happening of the incident at about  C ou 2:45 a.m. on 28.9.2002. Again at this juncture it must  be mentioned that though said Kamal Khan was the  important eye witness and all along present in the car  and   was   accompanying   the   appellant   and   his  ig h bodyguard Ravindra Patil, said Kamal Khan   was not  examined   even   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate  H Court when the matter was before the M.M. Court or  before   the   Sessions   Court   when   the   matter   was  ba y committed  to it.   This aspect   shall also be dealt  in  detail   as   at   the   fag   end   of   the   arguments   in     this  B om appeal, an application was preferred on behalf of the  appellant   under   Section   391   of   Cr.P.C..     By   said  application  request was made to the Court to call said  Kamal   Khan   as   a   court   witness   mentioning   that   his  substantive   evidence   before   the   Court   would   throw  light on the factual position, more so when the first  informant Ravindra Patil was not available for cross­        22 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 23  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       examination before Sessions Court when the Sessions  C ou Case was tried. The evidence of Ravindra Patil before  the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   recorded   in   the  year 2007 was accepted by the Sessions Court under  Section 33 of the Evidence Act.   The said application  ig h under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. is dismissed by this Court.  This   aspect   shall   also   be   dealt   in   detail   while  appellant. On   1.10.2002   supplementary   statement   of  ba y 17. H appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the  Ravindra   Patil   (since   deceased)   bodyguard   of   the  B om appellant, was recorded.   It must be mentioned that  for the first time the prosecution came with a case that  the   appellant   had   consumed   alcohol   during   the  incident on 28.9.2002.   Apparently this theory of the  appellant   consuming   alcohol   came   in   the  supplementary   statement   of   Ravindra   Patil   recorded         23 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 24  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       on 1.10.2002   and it is admittedly not present in the  C ou first   information   report   which   was   immediately  recorded after the incident of 28.9.2002.   Of course  this aspect needs careful scrutiny when the defence of  the appellant is that he was not under the influence of  ig h alcohol and moreover he was not driving the said car.  This   aspect   shall   also   be   dealt   in   detail   at   the  18. H appropriate place.   On 7.10.2002 Section 304 Part II of IPC was  ba y added by the investigating agency.   This information  was provided to the concerned Magistrate Court which  B om was then dealing with the remand application of the  appellant/accused.  Earlier the appellant was released  on   bail   on   his   production   before   the   Metropolitan  Magistrate Court and subsequently when Section 304  Part   II   of   IPC   was   added   he   again   voluntarily  surrendered to the police on 7.10.2002 and then was         24 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 25  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       19. C ou released on bail.  After completion of investigation charge­sheet  was  filed   before   12th  Metropolitan  Magistrate   Court,  Bandra  on  21.10.2002.   On  31.1.2003 the  case was  ig h committed to the Court of Sessions as the offence then  applied   under   Section   304   Part   II   of   IPC   was  exclusively   triable   by   the   Court   of   Sessions.     The  H appellant/accused   filed   Misc.   Application  No.463/2003   before   the   Sessions   Court   contending  ba y that the provisions of Section 304 Part II of IPC cannot  be attracted on the facts and circumstances of the case  B om alleged against him.  Said  application was heard and  rejected   by   the   Sessions   Court.     The   Sessions   Court  framed the charges against the appellant/accused for  the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   304   Part   II,  308,   279,   337,   338,   427   of   IPC   and   under   Section  134(a) & (b) read with Section 187 read with Sections         25 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 26  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       181   and   185   of   M.V.Act,   1988.     In   fact   the   offence  C ou under Section 66(i)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act  was also framed. 20. The appellant/accused pleaded not guilty to  ig h the   charges.     However,   he   did   prefer   Criminal   Writ  Petition   No.2467   of   2003   before   this   Court.     Said  petition was apparently under Section 482 of Cr.P.C..  H It   was   allowed   by   this   Court   and   the     order   of   the  Sessions Court to the extent of framing charge under  ba y Section 304 Part II of IPC was quashed and set aside.  This   order   was   challenged   by   the   State   before   the  B om Apex   Court   by   filing   Criminal   Appeal   No.1508   of  2003. 21. The Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the order of  this Court as well as the order of the trial Court and  kept the issue of framing of the charge under Section  304   Part   II   of   IPC,   open   and   to   be   decided   at   the         26 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 27  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       appropriate   stage   by   the   learned   Metropolitan  C ou Magistrate   Court   as   by   that   time   it   was   the   factual  position   that   the   learned   Metropolitan   Magistrate  Court,   Bandra   had   already   framed   fresh   charges  including   the   main   charge   for   the   offence   under  ig h Section   304A  of IPC.    This was the  action  taken  by  M.M. Court in consonance with the order of this Court  H quashing the charge for the offence under Section 304  Part   II   of   IPC.     The   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   felt   it  ba y appropriate   to   set   aside   the   finding   in   regard   to  sufficiency or otherwise of the material to frame the  B om charge for the offence punishable under Section 304  Part II of IPC.  The Apex Court thought it appropriate  that said issue would be left open to be decided by the  Court   trying   the   offence   under   Section   304A   of   IPC  and to alter or change any such charge at appropriate  stage   based   on   the   evidence   produced   by   the  prosecution.         27 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 28  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 22. rt                                                                                                                       Under   the   above   premise,   the   matter   was  C ou taken   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   at  Bandra   and   almost   17   witnesses   were   examined.  Without much going into the details as to the evidence  of   those   witnesses,   suffice   it   to   say   that   after   the  ig h examination   of   17   witnesses   and   admittedly   when  only   the   investigating  officers  were   to be  examined,  H the prosecution thought it fit to file an application for  adding the charge under Section 304 Part II of IPC.  ba y Accordingly   said   application   was   made   and  entertained by the Metropolitan Magistrate Court and  B om allowed.  In the result, the case was committed to the  Court of Sessions   and it was held by the Magistrate  that the material then brought on record does indicate  that it is a case of framing of charge under Section 304  Part II of IPC.  The matter reached the Sessions Court  on about 31.1.2013 and it was numbered as Sessions  Case   No.204   of   2013   and   only   after   hearing   and         28 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 29  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       recording   evidence   of   27   prosecution   witnesses   and  C ou one   defence   witness,   the   Sessions   Court   passed   the  order of conviction which is impugned in the present  appeal. When the matter was thus committed to the  ig h 23. Court of Sessions and when the charge was framed, a  plea was taken on behalf of the appellant for discharge  H under Section 227 of Cr.P.C.  which was rejected by the  Sessions   Court.     Thereafter     detailed   charge   was  ba y framed on 24.7.2013.  For the sake of ready reference  said detailed charge is reproduced hereunder as it is of  B om much significance inasmuch as there is no charge for  the   offence   under   Section   66(i)(b)   of   Bombay  Prohibition Act.  Heads of charge reads as under : “That   on 28/09/2002  at  about  2:45   a.m., near American Express Cleaners,   St. Andrews Road and Ramdas Nayak   Marg   (Hill   Road),   Bandra   (West),   Mumbai – 400 050:­        29 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 30  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc ig h C ou Firstly  :  committed culpable homicide   not   amounting   to   murder   by   causing   death  of Nurulla  Mehboob  Shaikh  by   driving   your   Toyata   Land   Cruiser   bearing No. MH­01­DA­32, in rash or   negligent   manner   and   in   drunken   condition, with the knowledge that by   the   driving   of   supra   car   in   supra   manner and condition, you were likely   to cause death and thereby committed   an offence punishable under Sec. 304   Part   II   of   IPC,   and   within   the   cognizance of this Court; rt                                                                                                                       B om ba y H Secondly  :­  by driving said car rashly   or   negligently   so   as   to   endanger   human life or personal safety of others   caused   hurt   to   Kalim   Mohd   Pathan   and Munna Malai Khan, aged 24 & 29   respectively and thereby committed an   offence   punishable   under   section   337   I.P.C., and within the cognizance of this   Court; Thirdly   :­ by the said act of driving   car   rashly   or   negligently   as   to   endanger   human   life   or   the   personal   safety   of  others,  caused  grievous   hurt   to   Abdul   Rauf   Shaikh   aged   18   years   and one Muslim Niyamat Shaikh aged   17 years and thereby caused an offence   punishable under section 338 of I.P.C.,   and   within   the   cognizance   of   this   Court. Fourthly   :  while driving the said car          30 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 31  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou in public place you were not holding a   valid   driving   licence   and   thereby   committed   an   offence   U/s.   3(1)   of   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   and   punishable   U/s.   181   of   said   Act   and   within the cognizance of this Court. rt                                                                                                                       H ig h Fifthly   :­  That at the aforesaid date,   time   and   place   you   did   not   take   reasonable steps to secure medical aid   to   the   victim   persons   by   conveying   them to nearest medical practitioner or   hospital and thereby committed offence   U/s. 134 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,   P/U/S.   187   of   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988 and within the cognizance of this   court. B om ba y Sixthly   :­   failed to give information   about   the   incident   /   report   /   circumstances   of   the   occurrence   of   incident to the police and thereby you   committed   offence   punishable   U/S.   187  of  Motor   Vehicles Act, 1988  and   within the cognizance of this court. Seventhly   :­   That you had in your   blood,   alcohol   exceeding   30   mg.   Per   100 ml. i.e. .062% mg and that you   were under the influence of alcohol to   that   extent   so   as   to   incapable   of   exercising   proper   control   over   supra   vehicle   and   thereby   you   committed   offence punishable U/s. 185 of Motor   Vehicles Act, 1988. I hereby direct that you be tried by          31 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 32  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc this Court on the aforesaid charges. 24. ig h C ou NOTE:     I   have   not   framed   charge   of   the offence punishable U/s. 427 of IPC   because   for   committing   mischief   contemplated   by   Sec.   427   of   Cr.P.C.   intention is required.  This was held in   Brij Mohan Kishansing Pardeshi Vs.   State   of   Maharashtra,   2006,   Cri.L.J. 1614.” rt                                                                                                                       The appellant/accused pleaded not guilty to  H the   said   charge   and   claimed   to   be   tried.   Total   27  prosecution witnesses were examined. After recording  ba y of   the   statement   of   the   appellant/accused   under  Section 313 of Cr.P.C., one defence witness by name  B om Ashok Singh (DW­1) was examined on behalf of the  defence.   According to the defence this Ashok Singh  was driving the vehicle from  JW Marriot hotel till the  spot of incident and again according to the defence  he  was so driving in place of earlier driver by name Altaf. 25. During   pendency   of   the   trial   and   after         32 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 33  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       framing   of   the   charge,   a   question   arose   before   the  C ou Sessions   Court   as   to   whether   the   evidence   earlier  recorded   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court,  when   the   charge   was   mainly   for   the   offence  punishable under Section 304A of IPC, is to be treated  ig h as an evidence in the sessions case after the committal.  That   time   rival   arguments   were   heard.     Import   of  H section   323   of   Cr.P.C.   and   the   provisions   of   Chapter  XVIII  and  the  provisions   of Sections 225 to 235 of  ba y Cr.P.C. were discussed and considered.   Consequently  the   Sessions   Court   passed   a   detailed   order   on  B om 5.12.2013   ordering   fresh   trial   against   the   accused  thereby   not   accepting   the   evidence   of   the   earlier  recorded   prosecution   witnesses   i.e.   17   witnesses  recorded   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court.  This   order   is  apparently  not  challenged  by  both  the  parties  and  under this premise, total 27 prosecution  witnesses   were   examined   and   one   defence   witness         33 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:45 ::: 34  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       was examined before the Sessions Court.  Considering  C ou the   substantive   evidence   sufficient   to   establish   the  guilt of the appellant/accused for the charges framed  against   him   and   considering   the   effect   of   defence  witness   and   rejecting   the   evidence   of   the   defence  ig h witness   even   on   preponderance   of   probabilities,   the  trial Court convicted the appellant/accused for all the  judgment. H charges as mentioned earlier at the threshold of this    During   the   arguments   various   issues   were  ba y 26. raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant.  B om Broadly the argument is based on three propositions : (a)    Firstly, that the appellant was not driving the  vehicle; (b)    Secondly, he was not drunk and was not under  the influence of alcohol at the time of incident;  and        34 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 35  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       (c)    Thirdly, it was pure and simple accident as left  C ou side front tyre of the car burst   thus the car  was beyond the control of the driver and met  with an accident. Apart   from   the   above   three   broad  ig h 27. propositions, it is also argued that there  is incorrect  application of penal section 304 Part II of IPC and also  H that the evidence before M.M. Court of one Ravindra  Patil (since deceased) should not have been taken help  ba y of   by   the   Sessions   Court   under   Section   33   of   the  Evidence Act.  It was so argued on the factual position  B om that   the   evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   was   recorded  before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   when   the   main  charge was under Section 304A of IPC and before the  Sessions  Court   the   main   charge   was  for   the   offence  under Section 304 Part II of IPC and by the time the  matter   reached   the   Sessions   Court   or   even   much         35 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 36  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       earlier in the year 2007 said Ravindra Patil died and  C ou was   not   available   for   cross­examination   before   the  Sessions   Court.   His   evidence   recorded   before   the  Metropolitan Magistrate was accepted as a substantive  28. ig h evidence under Section 33 of the Evidence Act. In order to appreciate the broad submissions  on behalf of the defence, the effect of the prosecution  H evidence is required to be summarized.   Broadly, the  following position of examination of witnesses vis­a­ ba y vis the effect of their evidence can be chalked out. [A]  WITNESSES   ON   THE   POINT   THAT   THE   B om APPELLANT/ACCUSED   WAS   DRIVING   THE   CAR / COMING OUT OF THE CAR : PW­2  injured   witness   one   Muslim   Niyamat   Shaikh  who sustained grievous injury; PW­3  injured   witness   Mannu   Khan   who   received  injuries on his right leg.   At this juncture it must be         36 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 37  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       mentioned that the injuries sustained by this witness  C ou are grievous injuries inasmuch as there was a fracture  of proximal phalynx of his right leg as apparent from  his medical certificate Exh.152. ig h PW­4  injured   witness   Mohd.   Kalim   Iqbal   Patra   who  received simple injuries to his right leg and left hand. H PW­11  injured   witness   Mohd   Abdulla   Shaikh   who  received grievous injury and sustained  abrasion. Apart   from   the   above   witnesses,   important  ba y 29. witness to the prosecution on this aspect of driving is  B om the   police   bodyguard   i.e.   Ravindra   Patil.     He   was  examined before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court on  different dates and specifically on 5.1.2006, 2.2.2006,  6.2.2006   and   thereafter   on   16.3.2006.     He   is   the  person   who   lodged   First   Information   Report   and  initially the main offence under Section 304A of IPC  was   registered.     He   was   examined   before   the         37 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 38  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Metropolitan Magistrate Court when the main charge  C ou was under Section 304A of IPC and not under Section  304   Part   II   of   IPC.     His   evidence   was   subsequently  accepted   by   the  Sessions  Court   under  Section  33  of  30. ig h the Evidence Act as mentioned earlier. Apart   from   the   above   witnesses,   there   are  other witnesses concerning the driving of the said car  H by the appellant.  Though these are not the witnesses  who actually saw the appellant driving the car   they  ba y are concerning the circumstances which according to  the   prosecution   establishes     that   the   only   inference  B om that can be drawn is that the appellant was driving the  vehicle and no other person.  Said witnesses are – PW­ 8   one   Ramsare   Ramdeo  Pande  who  visited  the   spot  after   hearing   of   the   noise   of   the   impact,   PW­12  Kalpesh   Verma   working   as   parking   assistant   at   JW  Marriott   Hotel   and   apparently   saw   the   appellant         38 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 39  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       driver seat of the car.   [B]  C ou coming   out   of   JW   Marriott   hotel  and   sitting  on   the  WITNESSES   ON   THE   ASPECT   OF   CONSUMPTION   OF   ALCOHOL   BY   THE   ig h APPELLANT/ACCUSED : PW­3  injured Mannu Khan. According to this witness  the appellant/accused was drunk during the incident  H and due to drunkenness he fell down on the ground  ba y twice and again woke up and ran away. PW­5 Malay Bag, the waiter working in Rain Bar and  B om Restaurant. PW­9  Rizwan Ali Rakhani, the Manager of Rain Bar  and Restaurant. 31. On   this   aspect   of   drunkenness   of   the  appellant,   according   to   the   prosecution,   their   other  important witness is Ravindra Patil, the bodyguard of         39 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 40  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   appellant.     According   to   the   prosecution,   apart  C ou from the point of appellant driving the car, this witness  is also on the point of consumption of alcohol by the  appellant.  According to this witness in his substantive  evidence before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court he  ig h has stated that the appellant/accused was under the  influence of alcohol. There is another set of witnesses examined by  H 32. the prosecution and their evidence relate to the case of  ba y prosecution as to the appellant/accused was under the  influence   of   alcohol   during   the   incident.     The   said  B om witnesses are : PW­20  Dr. Shashikant Pawar, Medical Officer from JJ  Hospital.   He  extracted  the   blood   from   the  appellant  for alcohol test on 28.9.2002 at around 2:30 p.m. and  sent the blood sample to the CA office through police  constable.        40 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 41  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       PW­18  one   Dattatraya   Balshankar,     is   the   Assistant  C ou Chemical   Examiner   from   the   office   of   CA  at   Kalina.  He   analyzed   the   blood   sample   sent   by   the  Investigating Officer and gave his report (Exh.81) and  that the blood sample contained 0.062 mg of alcohol  ig h w/v. PW­21  is   one   Sharad   Borade,   a   Police   Naik   then  H attached   to   Bandra   police   station,   who   carried   the  blood samples from Bandra Police Station to the office  ba y of CA. B om PW­22  is then PSI attached to Bandra Police Station  who brought the appellant/accused with other police  staff to JJ Hospital for clinical examination and also  for drawing blood sample for alcohol test. [C]    WITNESSES ON THE ASPECT OF BURSTING    OF TYRE OF THE CAR: PW­19 Rajendra Keskar who is the RTO Inspector who         41 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 42  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       inspected   the   vehicle   i.e.   the   car   involved   in   the  C ou incident   and   gave   inspection   report   (Exh.84).     This  witness stated that the tyres of the vehicle were found  in   good   condition   and   only   stated   that   the  left   side  ig h front tyre was deflated. PW­1  is the panch witness Sambha Gowda regarding  spot of incident.   According to him, as mentioned in  H his substantive evidence, the left side tyre of the car  was found punctured. It is also so mentioned in the  ba y spot panchnama (Exh.28). B om PW­8  Ramsare Pande stated that the left side tyre of  the car was found burst. PW­13 Amin Shaikh stated that the tyre of the car was  found burst. PW­26  Rajendra   Kadam,   investigating   officer   stated  that the vehicle involved in the accident had burst tyre         42 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 43  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and it was not in a position to be driven.  He further  C ou stated that the front left side tyre of the car was burst. PW­27  Kisan Shengal stated that it was not possible  for him to send the front side left tyre of the car to the  cause of burst. Again on this aspect of bursting / puncture of  H 33. ig h forensic  laboratory for ascertaining the accident  and  the left side front tyre of the car there is mention in  ba y the spot panchnama (Exh.28) mentioning that the tyre  was   punctured.     As   against   this,   the   FIR   given   by  B om Ravindra Patil mentions the word burst. 34. Apart   from   the   above,   on   this   issue   of  bursting/puncture   of   tyre   DW­1   one   Ashok   Singh,   a  defence witness, is also of much significance. He was  examined   on   behalf   of   the   appellant/accused   to  establish the defence firstly that the appellant was not  driving   the   vehicle   and   secondly   that   the   incident         43 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 44  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       occurred because of the bursting of the left side front  C ou tyre  of the car prior to car reaching the spot of the  incident. [D]  WITNESSES   ON   SPEED   OF   THE   CAR   AND   ROUTE   TAKEN   BY   IT   TILL   REACHING   THE     ig h SPOT OF INCIDENT : The speed of the car is also one of the significant  H factors in the present case.  So also the route taken by  ba y the vehicle is also a significant factor.   Ravindra   Patil   is   the   prosecution   witness   who  mentioned that the car was being driven at the speed  B om of 90­100 km per hour.   The factual position is that there were no break  marks on the spot and there is no mention in the spot  panchnama to that effect. 35. The damage to the car is also not so extensive         44 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 45  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       as   it   is   apparent   from   the   vehicle   inspection   report  C ou (Exh.84) prepared by RTO Inspector PW­19 Rajendra  Keskar so as to establish that the impact happened at  90­100 km/ph. So far as the route taken by the car, it is an  ig h 36. admitted position and substantiated by the evidence of  Investigating   Officer   and   mainly   PW­27   Mr.   Shengal  H i.e. the FIR at two places the route by which the car  was driven is mentioned as from “St. Andrews Road”  ba y to   “Hill   Road”.     However,   it   is   also   an   admitted  position   that   the   initial   words   were   “Manuel  B om Gonsalves” and these words are cancelled by slanting  marks and above these words “St. Andrews” is written.  It   is   significant   that   though   this   factual   position   is  admitted by PW­27 there is no explanation as to why  this   alteration   was   made   though   it  was   the   defence  that the vehicle took the route via Manuel Gonsalves         45 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 46  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       road and the vehicle came to the Hill Road by taking  St. Andrews Road.   37. C ou right turn from Manuel Gonsalves road and not from  Another argument on behalf of the appellant  ig h was as to whether on given facts Section 304 Part II of  IPC is applicable or not.  This aspect also shall be dealt  in detail at the appropriate place as in fact it is the  H appreciation of the material available before the trial  Court as to acceptance or otherwise of knowledge of  ba y the accused or whether simplicitor fact situation that  driving in a drunken condition can be accepted as a  B om knowledge that such driving is likely to cause death of  human   being   if   the   vehicle   meets   with   an   accident.  On this aspect two authorities are taken shelter of, in  fact   by   both   the   sides.     First   one   is   in   the   case   of  Alister   Anthony   Pareira   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   (2012)   2  SCC   648    and   second  one   in   the   case   of         46 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 47  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       State vs Sanjiv Nanda (2012) 8 SCC 450.  The ratio  C ou of   these   authorities     including   the   rival   arguments  shall be dealt in detail when dealing with this aspect  of applicability or otherwise of Section 304 Part II of  38. ig h IPC to the present matter. Apart   from   the   broad   and   other   ancillary  points argued on behalf of the appellant there are still  H other   points   argued   such   as   whether   the   death   of  Nurulla was on account of the incident or whether it  ba y was by falling of a car when being lifted with the help  B om of a crane.   39. After having broad analysis of the arguments  on   behalf   of   the   appellant   and   the   different  circumstances to be examined in the present case, the  broad   arguments   on   behalf   of   the   prosecution   are  required   to   be   mentioned   so   that   the   scope   of   the  present appeal can be ascertained.  Broadly there is an         47 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 48  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       argument   on   behalf   of   the   State   by   learned   Public  C ou Prosecutor on three main defences raised on behalf of  the appellant i.e. who was driving, secondly whether  the   appellant/accused   was   under   the   influence   of  alcohol and thirdly whether it was a pure and simple  ig h accident.   It   is   also   much   argued   on   behalf   of   the  prosecution   that   the   recourse   to   Section   33   of   the  H Evidence Act was rightly taken by the Sessions Court  while accepting the testimony of Ravindra Patil which  ba y was   recorded   in   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court  and it  is further canvassed that the questions which  B om arise   were   substantially   the   same   before   the  proceeding at Metropolitan Magistrate Court level and  in   the   Sessions   Case.     This   is   so   argued   on   the  applicability of Section 33 of the Evidence Act still in  the   light   of   the   factual   position   that   before   the  Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   the   main   charge   was  under   Section   304A   of   IPC   and   the   main   charge         48 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:46 ::: 49  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       before the Sessions Court was under Section 304 Part  40. C ou II of IPC.   Apart   from   the   above,   it   is   also   argued   on  behalf of  the  State  that the  theory of left side front  ig h door of the car was in jammed condition and therefore  could   not   be  opened during  the  incident, cannot  be  accepted.     Moreover,   it   is   submitted   that   also   the  H theory of bursting of the left side front tyre prior to the  incident  is also required to be  discarded more so in  ba y view of the report of the RTO Inspector (Exh.84). It is  also submitted that the speed of the car was 90­100  B om kms   per   hour   as   stated   by   Ravindra   Patil   in   his  evidence before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court. 41. Apart   from   the   above,   the   main   thrust   of  arguments on behalf of the State was on the conduct  of the accused immediately after the incident and also  conduct   on   the   part   of   the   defence   witness   Ashok         49 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 50  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Singh   who   allegedly   was   driving   the   vehicle   from  C ou hotel JW Marriott till the spot of incident.   It is also  argued   much   that   the   minor   contradictions   and  omissions   or   even   improvements   by   the   prosecution  witnesses and mainly by the injured cannot be taken  ig h as   a   mitigating   circumstance   to   the   case   of   the  prosecution.     Various   authorities   were   cited,   which  H shall be dealt in detail while analyzing the argument  of the learned Public Prosecutor in order to ascertain  ba y whether the prosecution has reached that standard of  proof required to establish the guilt of the appellant  B om for   the   offences   charged   and   mainly   the   offence  charged under Section 304 Part II of IPC. 42. It   must   be   mentioned   that   during   the  arguments   learned   Public   Prosecutor   did   not   argue  much on the collection of the hotel bills from hotel JW  Mariott and it was so taken by the learned Counsel for         50 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 51  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   appellant   that   this   aspect   of   collection   of  C ou documentary evidence as to consumption of alcohol by  the   appellant,   has   been   given   go   bye   by   the  prosecution.   Though  it   is   so,   as   not   much   emphasis  was   placed   by   the   prosecution   on   this   documentary  ig h evidence of bills, this aspect is nevertheless being dealt  critically at appropriate place.  This is more so when in  H the present matter there is an argument on behalf of  the appellant that the investigating agency was bent  ba y upon   to   collect   the   material   against   the  appellant/accused in order to establish the charge of  B om drunkenness apart from the charge that he was driving  the vehicle and it was the argument on behalf of the  appellant that it was definitely an attempt on the part  of the investigating agency to fabricate the said bills so  as to suit their case of consumption of alcohol by the  appellant.        51 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 52  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 43. rt                                                                                                                       During   the   arguments,   learned   Public  C ou Prosecutor   also   submitted   that   the   theory   of   the  appellant   that   one   Ashok   Singh   was   driving   the  vehicle can be negated in view of absence of any such  case put to any of the prosecution witnesses and more  ig h so   when   PW­7   Fransis   Fernandez   does   not   mention  regarding   the   presence   of   Ashok   Singh   on   the   spot.  H The defence evidence of DW­1 Ashok Singh was also  assailed  by   the   prosecution  on   various  aspects  more  ba y particularly that DW­1 does not mention at which spot  the left side front tyre of the car burst when the car  B om was on the Hill Road.  Also DW­1 did not mention at  what time he reached JW Marriott hotel to relieve the  earlier driver one Mr. Altaf.   Also much is argued on  the conduct of said DW­1 in not explaining to anybody  either to media or to the police or even to the Court  during the course of the trial that he was driving the  vehicle and not the appellant/accused.        52 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 53  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 44. rt                                                                                                                       Now   having   the   broad   analysis   the  C ou substantive evidence before the Sessions Court vis­a­ vis the arguments on behalf of the appellant and the  State,   a   detailed   analysis   of   the   evidence   and   its  acceptability and the trustworthiness of the witnesses  ig h is required to be done on the broad three aspects as to  who   was   driving,   whether   the   appellant   was   drunk  H and   whether   it   was   an   accident.     So   also   the   other  allied   submissions   are   also   required   to   be   dealt   in  ba y detail. B om 45. ASPECT OF DRIVING : Admittedly in the said incident one person by  name Nurulla died and four persons i.e. PW­2, PW­3,  PW­4   and   PW­11   sustained   injuries.     It   is   also   an  admitted position that the post mortem report of the  deceased   Nurulla     is   accepted.     So   also   the   injury  certificates   of   PW­2,   PW­3,   PW­4   and   PW­11   were         53 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 54  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accepted   by   the   defence   and   they   were   accordingly  C ou marked   as   exhibits.     The   post   mortem   report   is  Exh.149/20.   Coming to the substantive evidence of  PW­2   Muslim   Shaikh   according   to   him   the   incident  took place at about 2:45 a.m. and he and other injured  ig h witnesses   and   deceased   Nurulla   were   sleeping   near  American   Laundry   and   he   heard   a   noise   and   found  H himself beneath the car.  The wheel of the car passed  over his left leg.  The bakery people helped to remove  ba y him   from   beneath     the   car   and   many   people   had  gathered   on   the   spot.     He   further   stated   that   the  B om people   gathered   were   saying   that   Salman   Khan   got  down   from   the   car.     According   to   this   witness   one  person   also   got   down   from   the   left   side   of   the   car  saying that he was a police.  According to this witness,  the   people   caught   hold   of   the   accused,   but,  subsequently   released   him.     Other   injured   and  deceased Nurulla were also found beneath the car and         54 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 55  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       then the police appeared and brought him to Bhabha  C ou hospital.     It   is   significant   to   note   that   this   witness  further   stated   that   he   was   at   Bhabha   hospital   for   a  period of two and half months and in the hospital he  knew that Nurulla had expired.  Thereafter according  ig h to him Bandra police recorded his statement.  Again it  is   significant   to   note   that   at   the   end   of   his  H examination­in­chief   this   witness   has   stated   that   he  saw accused getting down from the right side of the  ba y car.   Specifically he does not mention anything about  the accused getting down from the car from the front  B om right or rear right.  This substantive evidence of PW­2  was assailed on behalf of the appellant/accused and it  was   brought   on   record   that   earlier   this   witness   had  stated before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court when  his  evidence   was   then   recorded   that   he   did   not   see  anybody getting down from the car.  During the cross­ examination it has been brought on record that after         55 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 56  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       two and half months he had gone to Bandra and his  C ou only   one   statement   was   recorded.     By   pointing   this  out,   cross­examination   appearing   in   para­3   of   the  notes of evidence in the paper book page PW­2/4 it is  submitted on behalf of the appellant that this witness  ig h was   not   available   to   the   police   immediately   as  according   to   him   he   had   left   Bombay.     His   further  H cross­examination also revealed that his statement was  not shown to him by the police and he did not read  ba y the statement at any time.  In the cross­examination it  has been brought on record that the doctor asked him  B om about the incident but he was in pain and was not in a  position   to   speak.     According   to   this   witness   he  returned to Mumbai on 26.4.2014 from U.P. And prior  to that he had not been to Mumbai.  He further stated  that   he   was   not   present   in   Mumbai   on   20.12.2006.  However, subsequently changed his version and stated  that his statement was recorded in Bandra Court on         56 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 57  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       20.12.2006.   Then again he stated that his evidence  C ou was   recorded   in   Bandra   Court   on   that   date.     But  according   to   him   the   oath   was   not   administered   to  him   at   that   time.     Moreover   during   his   cross­ examination   it   is   brought   on   record   that   before   the  ig h Metropolitan Magistrate Court he had not mentioned  that accused had got down from the car.   As such by  H taking   recourse   to   Section   145   of   the   Evidence   Act,  this   witness   was     cross­examined   on   behalf   of   the  ba y defence during the trial before the Sessions Court vis­ a­vis  his  earlier statement recorded before the M.M.  B om Court, Bandra during the initial trial when the offence  was for Section 304A of IPC. 46. The final effect of the statement of this PW­2  even accepting his omission, goes to show that he saw  the accused coming out of the car from a right side  door.  Two things are possible from his statement, one         57 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 58  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       is   admitted   position   that   he   sustained   injuries   as  C ou depicted   in   his   medical   examination   papers   and  secondly that he was under the car when the impact  occurred.   Other injured and deceased Nurulla were  also  under  the car and the incident was at  the  wee  ig h hours   of   2:45   a.m.   on   28.9.2002.     He   was   in   the  hospital   and   was   in   pain   and   unable   to   talk   to   the  H doctor although according to him he mentioned before  the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   that   he   saw   the  ba y accused coming out from the car from the right side. It  is   not   so   appearing   in   his   statement.     In   fact   the  B om evidence of this witness as to the accused coming out  of   the   car   from   the   right   side   may   not   be   of   much  significance for the simple reason that this position of  the appellant coming out of the car from the driver's  seat is accepted and it is so accepted while answering  the question under Section 313 of Cr.P.C..  Though  on  this aspect the learned Public Prosecutor had argued         58 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 59  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       that   this   answer  is  required  to  be  taken  against  the  C ou appellant,   needless   to   mention   that   this   answer   is  required to be construed in juxtaposition of the other  explanation   given   by   the   appellant/accused   in   his  statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C..  This aspect as  ig h to the compulsive circumstances for the appellant to  come out of the vehicle from the front right side  door,  H are required to be construed in detail hereunder at the  appropriate  stage and it is regarding defence  placed  ba y before   the   Court   by   way   of   factual   position   and  admissions given by the prosecution witnesses that the  B om left side front door of the car was jammed and was not  in a condition to be opened.   Thus rendering even a  person sitting by the left side of the driver to come out  of the vehicle from the driver's seat.   47. Now   coming   to   the   substantive   evidence   of  PW­3   one   Mannu   Khan   and   who   is   apparently   an         59 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 60  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       important witness of the prosecution, it must be said  C ou that said Mannu Khan had also sustained injuries to  his left foot and there was a fracture to the proximal  phalynx. Substantive evidence of this witness in chief  is regarding the happenings of the event at about 2:30  ig h a.m. to 2:45 a.m. on 28.9.2002 and that time he was  sitting on the platform of the American Laundry. He  H suddenly     heard   a  noise   and  found  himself  beneath  the car.  The said car was on his person. According to  ba y him, he and other injured and also deceased Nurulla  were found beneath the said car and when he opened  B om the   eyes   he   found   that   all   were   crying   and   many  people had gathered there and the people pushed the  said car and rescued him from beneath the car.  In the  substantive   evidence   in   the   chief   he   specifically  mentioned that the accused got down from the drivers  seat and one bodyguard also got down from the said  car.  This witness also talked of a third person who got         60 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 61  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       down   from  the  back  portion   of  the  car.     He  further  C ou stated that the bakery people caught hold of accused  on the road.  Now the crucial evidence of this witness  in the chief which was vehemently assailed on behalf  ig h of the appellant, is to the effect as follows : H “Salman   was   so   drunk     that   he   fell   down.   Salman   Khan   stood   but   he   again   fell   down   and   again   he   stood   and ran away from the spot.” According   to   the   case   of   the   prosecution,  ba y 48. statement of this witness was recorded under section  B om 164 of Cr.P.C. on 5th  October, 2002. But, still it is the  factual position that he was not examined before the  M.M.Court at Bandra and his evidence was recorded  for   the   first   time   before   the   Sessions   Court   on  6.5.2014. During the cross­examination, it is brought  on record, as is appearing in paragraph 6 in the notes  of   evidence,   that   one   day   prior   to   recording   of   his         61 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 62  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       evidence   he   was   called   by   the   police   to   come   to  C ou Bandra Court. First, he went to Bandra police station  and thereafter to Bandra Court, where his statement  under   section   164   of   Cr.P.C.   was   recorded.   It   is   his  specific   evidence   in   the   cross­examination   that   the  ig h police had shown one statement  to Bandra Court and  stated   that   it   was   his   statement.     According   to   this  H witness, after perusing the said statement, Magistrate  asked him some questions and this witness told as per  ba y the   contents   of   the   statement     and   thereafter   his  signature was obtained on the statement. He further  B om disclosed   in   the   cross­examination   that   he   was   not  knowing in which language statement was recorded.  He could not even answer whether the statement was  in handwritten or in type written form.  He specifically  answered that he signed on the papers where he was  asked to sign and further answered that he was not  knowing   whether   the   statement   contained   the         62 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 63  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       information known to him or not.   All this material,  C ou which   is   brought   on   record   during   his   cross­ examination, goes to show that he was called by the  police   and   before   the   Magistrate   he   was   questioned  and an earlier prepared statement was endorsed. The  ig h question   remains,   whether   this   witness   has   given   a  truthful account either in his examination­in­chief or  H in   his   cross­examination.     This   is   more   so,   as   the  crucial   evidence   in   the   examination­in­chief   of   this  ba y witness,   as   reproduced   earlier   to   the   effect   that   the  accused was drunk and fell twice and then ran away, is  B om in fact an omission and this omission has been brought  on   record   during   his   cross­examination   and  subsequently by asking to the officer. Moreover, it is  pertinent   to   note   that   in   the   cross­examination   this  witness   has   stated   in   what   manner   his   statement  under section 164 of Cr.P.C. was recorded. If still an  allowance is required to be given to this witness, who         63 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:47 ::: 64  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       apparently,   according   to   the   prosecution   is   a   rustic  C ou witness and not an educated person, but still it is a  factual position that there was a scope available to the  prosecution   to   counter   check   the   truthfulness   or  otherwise of the answers given by this witness during  ig h his cross­examination and this could have been done  by examination of the concerned M.M. Court. It is an  H admitted   position   that   a   summons   to   the   said  Magistrate was also prayed for by the prosecution vide  ba y letter  Exh.87  which is dated 15.12.2014. As such, a  step   was   taken   by   the   prosecution   to   call   the  B om concerned Magistrate before the Court and to find out  the truth or veracity in the evidence of PW 3. On said  application, apparently, no orders were passed by the  trial Court and one Constable Mane was allowed to be  called but   he was also not  examined as he  was not  available and, therefore, the factual position remains  that the substantive evidence of said PW 3, the major         64 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 65  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       part   of   his   testimony   as   to   the   falling   down   of   the  C ou accused twice and then running away is an omission  and   only   after   12   years   of   the   incident   does   the  witness give his testimony before the Sessions Court.  At the cost of repetition, it must be mentioned that he  ig h was   not   examined   before   the   M.M.Court   when   the  main charge was under section 304­A of IPC. Further,  H in   the   cross­examination,  he   has   answered  and   it   is  appearing in paragraph 7 in the notes of evidence that  ba y he could not move from the place till the time the car  was   lifted.   Definitely,   the   circumstances   after   that  B om incident   were   such   that   all   the   injured   and   even  deceased Nurulla were under the said vehicle and it  was the wee hours of 2:45 a.m. in the morning and  the   injured   witnesses   could   realise   coming   of   the  vehicle   on   their   persons   only   when   the   impact  occurred and when they sustained injuries. During the  arguments,   the   learned   Public   Prosecutor   submitted         65 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 66  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       that said PW 3 is, in fact, a natural witness and had  C ou seen   the   incident   and   in   fact   also   seen   the   accused  driving the car.  In order to substantiate his argument,  the   learned  Public  Prosecutor stated that  said PW 3  was   the   person   who   received   minor   injuries   and   he  ig h had all the opportunities to see how the incident had  occurred. So far as injuries of this witness and their  H nature is concerned, the medical certificate Exh.150 is  of   much   importance.   It   shows   that   this   injured   was  ba y referred to emergency operation and his x­ray shows a  fracture of proximal phalanx of greater toe, right side.  B om In the column under the description of the injuries, it  is mentioned as “grievous”. Definitely, any fracture is  taken as “grievous injury” as per section 320 of IPC  which   defines “grievous hurt”. The injury described,  seventhly in Section 320 is :­ “fracture or dislocation  of a bone or tooth”. This kind of injury is designated as  “grievous”.  Much is argued on behalf of the State that         66 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 67  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   degree   of   gravity   of   injury   may   differ   and   the  C ou fracture   of  a proximal phalanx of a toe may not be  that grievous or serious enough than the fracture of  any other bone of the body. For the time being, if it is  accepted,   still   the   other   circumstances   under   which  ig h this   witness   has   sustained   injury,   cannot   be   over  looked more so in the light of the major omission as  49. H detailed earlier.  Now   coming   to   PW   4   injured   Mohd.Kalim  ba y Iqbal Pathan, he had simple injury on his right leg and  left   hand.   His   injuries   are   admitted   which   are  B om described   in   medical   certificate   Exh.151.   Clinically  there was no fracture and he had the abrasion on fore  arm and left elbow. He has superficial infused wound,  which is skin deep and having length of 1.5 cm on the  left hand and thumb and had minor abrasion on right  foot   and   right   elbow.   This   witness   has   seen   the         67 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 68  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accused coming out of the  car from the right side.  He  C ou stated that he signed the statement under section 164  of Cr.P.C. recorded before the Magistrate as told by the  police   and   the   Magistrate.   He   also   gave   the   same  circumstances   as   to   the   timing   and   how   he   learnt  ig h regarding   the   impact.   He   was   sleeping   in   front   of  American   Laundry.   PW   3   Mannu   was   also   sleeping  H near him. He heard a noise and saw one vehicle over  his person. He was beneath the car and other injured  ba y including PW 3 and also deceased Nurulla were also  found beneath the car. After hearing the noise, bakery  B om people came to the spot and they helped to remove  the  injured from beneath the car. According to him,  many people were telling that accused got down from  the car. Also, according to this witness, accused, then  ran away from the spot after seeing the crowd. One  police   guard   was  also   present   in   the   car.   Then,  this  witness   was   brought   down   to   Bhabha   hospital   for         68 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 69  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       treatment. Again, it is significant to note that at the  C ou end   of   his   examination­in­chief   again   this   witness  mentions to the effect that “the accused is the same  person who got down from the right side of the car”.  At the cost of repetition, it can be mentioned that it is  ig h the own defence of the accused that he himself came  from the front side driver's seat in order to get out of  H the car after the incident. So the fact that this witness  told   that   the   accused   came   out   of   the   car   from   the  ba y right side is not of much significance, when all these  witnesses say that they saw the accused coming out of  B om the car only after the incident and not that anybody  saw   the   accused   actually   driving   the   vehicle   and  bringing the said vehicle to the spot. During the cross­ examination, this witness has stated that he signed on  the statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. because of  the police and the Magistrate. This reference is to the  statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C.   In fact, he is         69 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 70  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       also   the   witness   who   answered   during   the   cross­ C ou examination   that   he   heard   a  big   noise  and  was  not  knowing   what   had  happened   and   his  left   hand   was  stuck in the bumper of the vehicle and he was unable  to make movement. He further answered that due to  ig h darkness   he   was   not   knowing   whether   the   vehicle  climbed the stairs or not. The cumulative effect of this  H witness goes to show that he sustained injuries and,  apparently, he knew that the accused came out of the  ba y car from the right side. In any event, this substantive  evidence of PW 4 may not be of much significance so  B om far as the case of the prosecution is concerned as to  driving and that also under the influence of alcohol by  the appellant. However, during the cross­examination  still another admission is taken from this witness and  this witness in paragraph 8 in his notes of evidence  states to the following effect:         70 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 71  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou “It   did   not   happen   that   two   persons   ran   away   from   the   car.   The   second   person ran away from the spot after   Salman. Two persons were there in the   car. I cannot say whether two persons   ran away from the car.”  rt                                                                                                                       By pointing out this admission, it is strongly  ig h 50. argued   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   this   is   the  witness who talked of four persons present in the said  H car during the incident and it is further argued that  the   theory   of   four   persons   in   the   car   is   not   later  ba y developed but it is put to the witnesses and also to this  witness PW 4. Of course, this aspect of three persons  B om or   four   persons   in   the   car   shall   be   dealt   in   detail  afterwards   while   dealing   with   the   arguments  advanced on behalf of the defence.  51. Now, the last injured witness examined is PW  11 Mohd. Abdulla. He also sustained grievous injury  to his right leg as injury certificate is also accepted by         71 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 72  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the defence and which is at Exh.155. He had fractured  C ou tibia fibula of 8x3 cms, middle third right side. This  patient was also referred for operation. Apart from the  fracture he had abrasion on the left forearm.   Again  this witness gave the same account as to the time and  ig h how the incident had occurred when he was sleeping  along   with   other   injured   persons   near   American  H Laundry.   According to him, at about 2:30 a.m. some  heavy   object   had   passed   over   his   leg.   He   tried   to  ba y rescue himself but could not succeed. His right leg was  fractured. All the injured cried for help. Bakery men  B om and  taxi driver rescued them by removing them from  beneath   the   car.     According   to   this   witness,   bakery  men   and   taxi   driver   were   telling   that   accident   was  caused by the accused.  He had specifically answered  that   he   had   seen   the   accused   only   after   he   was  rescued. He further stated that two persons were with  him i.e. with the accused but he does not know who         72 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 73  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       they were. This witness, due to his severe injuries, was  C ou hospitalized in Bhaba Hospital for one and half month.  Though   in   the   examination­in­chief   this   witness   has  stated   that   bakery   men   and   taxi   driver   were   saying  that accident was caused by the accused and though  ig h according   to   him,   he   stated   to   that   effect   while  recording his statement by the police, this part of his  H evidence   is   brought   on   record   during   his   cross­ examination as an omission and he could not assign  ba y any   reason   how   that   part   of   his   evidence   is   not  appearing in his statement. His evidence to this effect  B om is,   in   fact,     insignificant   that   bakery   men   and   taxi  driver   were   telling   that   the   accused   caused   the  accident. Even this statement is also an omission when  his evidence was recorded before the Sessions Court.  In fact, accepting this statement also it is to be treated  as     hear­say   as   the   same   was   not   to   his   personal  knowledge and moreover the value is diminished by         73 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 74  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       52. C ou way of omission.  The   cumulative   effect   of   these   injured  witnesses PW 2, 3, 4 and 11, as detailed above was  referred in the course of arguments on behalf of the  ig h appellant and it is submitted that definitely an attempt  has   been   made   by   the   Investigating   agency   through  these   witnesses   to   show   that   they   had   seen   the  H accused coming out of the car and then to presume  that he was the person driving the car. Placing reliance  ba y on the testimonies of these witnesses, as mentioned in  examination­in­chief, learned Public Prosecutor stated  B om that those are the injured witnesses and the testimony  of   injured   witnesses   assumes   much   importance  inasmuch   as   they   are   the   natural   witnesses   to   the  incident. Of course, there cannot be a different view as  to the importance of an injured witness, so far as how  the injuries have been sustained by them and by what         74 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 75  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       means. Of course, this importance is heightened when  C ou the   questions   are   regarding   an   assault   and   a   fight  between   the   persons   and   under   such   circumstances  the   evidence   of   an   injured   person   assumes   much  importance. Moreover, sustaining of an injury is also a  ig h fact leading to the conclusion that he was one of the  parties to the incident of assault. In the instant case,  H however,   there   is   no   dispute   that   these   witnesses  sustained injuries in the incident, but the question is  ba y as  to  who  was responsible. Said question  cannot  be  answered   by   the   factual   position   that   they   received  B om injuries in this incident. 53. Again   on   the   above   aspect,   learned   Senior  Counsel   for   the   appellant   stated   that   the   natural  conduct of any injured in an accident is required to be  considered. Specifically when the incident occurred in  the   circumstances   as  in   the   present   case   as  running         75 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 76  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       over by a car at the wee hours, the natural conduct  C ou would be to save oneself or to get rescued from the  situation as early as possible and not that the person  would   give   much   importance   to   the   allied   facts.  Moreover,   PW  11,  the   last   injured,   examined   before  ig h the Court only mentioned that people were telling that  the   accused   caused   an   accident.   As   such,   in   fact,  H whatever he had   heard was told by him but that is  also apparently hit by the aspect of hear­say.  Apart   from   the   above,   it   is   brought   to   the  ba y 54. notice of this Court during the argument on behalf of  B om the   appellant   that   there   is   inter   se   variance   in   the  substantive   evidence   of   these   witnesses.   PW   3   says,  which is in fact an omission, that the accused was so  drunk  that  he  fell twice  and then stood up and ran  away.     However,     PW   2   and   4   did   not   mention  anything   to   that   effect.   In   fact,   out   of   these   four         76 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 77  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       witnesses   except   PW   3   nobody   speaks   about   the  C ou drunkenness   of   the   appellant­accused   much   less   his  falling down on the spot twice and then running away. 55. During   the   arguments,   learned   Public  ig h Prosecutor for the State stated that these witnesses do  not talk of four persons travelling in the car or coming  out of the car after the incident.   The learned Chief  H Prosecutor wanted to suggest that non mentioning by  these witnesses about four persons is required to be  ba y taken as a mitigating circumstance to the defence of  the accused. However, a distinction is required to be  B om drawn between said witnesses remaining silent about  a   particular   fact   and   the   said   witnesses   specifically  answering   something   that   they   did   not   notice   four  persons but only noticed three persons. These are two  different   things.   Remaining   silent   may   have   two  implications, either he has seen but has not told and         77 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 78  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       secondly that he had not seen at all. When a witness  C ou answers that he did not see four persons,  then there is  more   positive   effect   that   the   witness   has   seen   only  three persons and only three were travelling. In any  way,     these   witnesses   remaining   silent   about   how  ig h many   persons   were   travelling   in   the   car,   cannot   be  taken as a mitigating circumstance to the defence of  H the accused as argued on behalf of the State. For that  purposes the other material evidence is required to be  ba y dealt   with   appropriately.   Of   course,   it   is   a   factual  position that these witnesses are also silent as to what  B om the   police   guard   i.e.   Ravindra   Patil   and   also   Kamal  Khan were doing during the incident. If they are silent  on these two persons and if the argument of the State  is to be accepted then it must be said that these two  persons were also not on the spot. However, the case  of   the   prosecution   is   contrary   to   this   and   admitted  even by the accused that the police guard   Ravindra         78 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:48 ::: 79  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Patil and also Kamal Khan were the persons travelling  incident of 28.9.2002.  56. C ou in   the   car   since   9:30   p.m.   on   27.9.2002   up   to   the  By pointing out the evidence and the answers  ig h given   by   the   witnesses,   discussed   above,   it   is  submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the  investigation is not fair in the present case and there is  H a   exaggeration   brought   before   the   Court   through  them,     mainly   from   the   evidence   of   PW   3.   The  ba y following authorities are cited on the aspect that the  investigation   should   be   fair   and   what   are   the  B om consequences of a tainted investigation.  1]  (2010) 12 SCC 254 (Babubhai V. State of Gujarat & Ors) 2] (2002) 6 SCC 81 (Krishna Mochi & Ors vs. State of Bihar) 3] AIR 1973 SC 2773 (Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh)        79 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 80  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc In support of the arguments on behalf of the  C ou 57. rt                                                                                                                       State the learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on  the following authorities:­ ig h 1]  (1983) 3  SCC 217     [Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs.State  of   Gujarat]   :  It   is   on   the   aspect   of  discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses  H whether fatal to the case of the prosecution  when they are not going to the root of the  ba y matter; 2]   (2010) 10 SCC 259   [Abdul   Sayeed   Vs.   State   of   Madhya  B om Pradesh]   :  This   authority   is   on   the  appreciation   of   the   evidence   of   the   injured  witnesses   as   natural   witnesses   and   more  credence be given to their testimonies; 3]    (2003) SCC (Cri) 121    [Mohar &  Anr vs.  State  of  U.P.] :Again  this authority is on the appreciation of the  evidence   of   an   injured   witnesses   and   the         80 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 81  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       minor discrepancies; 4] C ou analysis of their evidence though there are  (2015) 1 SCC 323     [State of Karnataka vs. Suvarnamma &  Anr] : This authority is also on the minor  discrepancies in the evidence which may not  Needless   to   mention   that   in   the   ratios  H 58. ig h be fatal to the case of the prosecution; propounded   by   the   superior   Courts   on   the   fact  ba y situation of a case, is not squarely binding when the  facts   of   a   case   at   hand   are   different   and   can   be  B om distinguished. 59. Also it is to be ascertained whether the minor  contradictions   and   discrepancies   may   attain   much  importance as to discredit a particular witness and if  the contradictions and discrepancies are not going to  the   root   of   the   matter   then   the   evidence   of   such  witness may not be thrown away.  Bearing in mind the         81 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 82  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       ratio of the authorities cited above, in the opinion of  C ou this Court the omissions in the present case definitely  cannot be considered as minor and not going to the  root,   specifically   for   the   simple   reason   that   the  evidence of PW 3 Mannukhan who is apparently the  ig h main witness out of the four injured, according to the  case of the prosecution giving the detailed account as  H to  the   involvement  of the  appellant  that  also in  the  drunken state. At the cost of repetition, again, it must  ba y be mentioned that the evidence of said PW 3 as to the  drunkenness of the appellant to such an extent as to  B om falling down twice and then running away is, in fact,  an omission and for the first time after 12 years this  witness   is   coming   before   the   Court,   telling   so.  Otherwise also this evidence of PW 3 is to be viewed  in   juxtaposition   of   the   case   of   the     prosecution   as  depicted in the FIR and as per the evidence of police  guard Ravindra Patil.  Of course, it is to be ascertained         82 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 83  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and   analysed   by   this   Court,   whether   the   Sessions  C ou Court was right in accepting the evidence of Ravindra  Patil under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. Still  for   the   sake   of   argument   at   least   at   this   stage   said  evidence is acceptable without there being any cross­ ig h examination,  still the concept of drunkenness of the  appellant is not mentioned in the FIR and this is an  H admitted   position.   The   FIR   is   silent   regarding  drunkenness. It only speaks regarding driving at high  ba y speed.   If the evidence of PW 3, the injured, is to be  construed as to such heavy drinking and falling twice  B om on   the   spot   by   the   appellant,   then,   definitely   this  aspect must not have been lost sight of by Ravindra  Patil while he gave his FIR and this concept of alcohol  which   came   in   the   investigation   papers   only   on  1.10.2002, would have come in the case immediately  on   lodging   of   the   FIR.   Again   this   aspect   as   to  drunkenness   shall   also   be   critically   examined         83 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 84  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       henceforth at appropriate place when that argument  C ou shall   be   dealt   with,   considering   the   evidence   of   the  prosecution  witnesses and the evidence of the other  material as to the drawing of the blood sample and  60. ig h the report of Chemical Analyser. In view of the above,   it cannot be said that  the   evidence   of   these   injured   PW  2,  3,  4   and   11   is  H devoid of any discrepancies going to the root of the  matter. Moreover, the effect of their evidence can be  ba y construed   at   the   end   after   analyzing   the   entire  evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the different  B om aspects   which   are   required   to   be   dealt   in   detail  considering the arguments on behalf of the appellant.  61. Apart from the above injured witnesses, the  substantive evidence of the other witnesses i.e. PW 8  Ramasare Pande and PW 12 Kalpesh Sarju Verma is  required to be examined concerning the aspect of the         84 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 85  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       appellant driving the vehicle during the incident. PW 8  C ou was   examined   by   the   prosecution   in   order   to   show  that   the   appellant­accused   was   driving   the   vehicle  during   the   incident.     As   such     the   substantive  evidence, recorded before the Sessions Court,  goes to  ig h show   that   according   to   him,   he   saw   the   accused  getting down from the right front side of the car and  H one police person was also present in the car and he  told   his   name   as   Patil.   This   is   a   witness   who   is   a  ba y resident on the first floor of Pande Dairy and his dairy  is situated in the vicinity of scene of the incident. So  B om far as actual incident is concerned at about 2:45 a.m.  on 28.9.2002 when he heard a big noise, he woke up  and came down from the first floor. He saw the people  making hue and cry as   somebody was killed. People  were running towards American Bakery and American  Express   Laundry.   He   also   went   there   and   saw   the  white coloured car rammed in the American Express         85 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 86  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Laundry.  He remembers last two digits of registration  C ou number of the vehicle as “32”. According to him, many  people gathered there. One person   was found dead  and   two   persons   were   injured   and   they   were  unconscious and two more persons were also injured.  ig h He   was   knowing   the   injured   persons   as   they   were  working   in   the   bakery.     Only   significance   of   his  H evidence is that he saw the accused getting down from  the   right   side of the car and one  police person was  ba y also present there.  However, it is still curious to note  that this witness in fact in examination­in­chief itself  om further went on to say the following: B “Two persons were also present in the   car in addition to Salman and police   constable Patil but I do not know who   were those two persons.” 62. Much reliance was placed by learned Senior  Counsel on this answer of this witness in examination­        86 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 87  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       in­chief.   This   is   in   consonance   with   the   theory  C ou propounded   by   the   appellant   that   there   were   four  persons in the car so as to probablize his defence that  his driver was there and who drove the car.   This is  more  so  as  admittedly according to the prosecution,  ig h Ravindra   Patil,   the   appellant­accused   and   also   his  friend Kamal Khan were definitely in the car. Now this  H PW 8 had given a story that he saw two more persons  in the car in addition to the accused and Police guard  ba y Patil.   Apparently,   this   answer   in   the   examination­in­ chief itself is required to be construed and in the light  B om of this answer the earlier answer of this witness that  he saw the accused getting down from the right front  side of the car is to be critically examined in the light  of other material. It is accused's own defence that he  got down from the driver's side after the incident to  come out of the car. As such the effect of the testimony  of PW 8, in fact, goes to show the probability of the         87 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 88  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       case of the defence, argued on behalf of the appellant.  C ou On   this  argument, learned  Public  Prosecutor for  the  State stated that this answer of the witness PW 8 in his  examination­in­chief is required to be construed,   as  an   attempt   by   the   defence   to   interfere   with   the  ig h prosecution witnesses. Without there being any other  material   to   support   this   submission   it   is   difficult   to  H accept this argument and only because  the witness of  the   prosecution   in   examination­in­chief   itself   had  ba y given   some   answer   which   apparently   supports   the  theory of the accused it cannot always be said that this  B om witness   has   already   been   won   over.   Moreover,   after  examination   of  this witness  in   chief and also  in   the  cross­examination   there   was   an   opportunity   for   the  prosecution to re­examine him to get clarification on  this anomaly or the abnormal answer given by him.  But this has not been done by the prosecution. In fact,  there   is   nothing   brought   before   the   Court   that   the         88 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 89  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       prosecution   wants   to   disown   this   witness.   Then,  C ou consequently, the evidence of this witness is required  to be construed as per the plain meaning which can be  ascertained from his evidence. One more thing of significance, so far as the  ig h 63. evidence   of   PW   8   is   concerned,   is   required   to   be  mentioned.   Now,   another   answer   is   given   by   this  H witness in his cross­examination and the said evidence  is coming in paragraph no.4 of his notes of evidence  ba y at the end and it is to the following effect: B om “Left   front   door   of   the   car   was   so   touched to the shutter to the American   Bakery, it could not be opened and it   was jammed in the shutter. People were   trying to pull the car and people were   succeeded opening the right front side   of the door. There was hue and cry on   the   spot.   People   who  gathered   on   the   spot, were in angry mood. People pelted   the stones on the car.” 64. Again, it must be mentioned that this answer         89 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 90  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       taken   in   the   cross­examination   is   probablizing   the  C ou theory of the appellant­accused that the left side front  door of the car was jammed and so he could not come  out of the car but came out from the front right side  door.    Even on this answer in the cross­examination  ig h the   prosecution   should   have   sought   further  clarification from the witness on re­examination.  But  H again he has not been disowned and the said material  remains on the record. Not only this evidence but still  ba y at the end of paragraph 5 in the cross­examination this  B om witness has answered to the following effect: “I do not know where two people sitting in   the   car,   besides   Salman   and   police   constable Patil, had gone.” 65. This is, in fact, the reiteration of the theory of  the appellant of four persons present in the car though  this answer may not directly show that fourth person  was   the   driver.   But   the   answer   does   mention   that         90 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 91  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       according   to   this   witness   there   were   four   persons  C ou including the appellant and Ravindra Patil. Apart from  above,   still   one   more   answer   in   paragraph   6   of   his  notes of evidence is to the effect :­ This   is   again   the   apparent   defence   of   the  H 66. ig h “The   left   front   tyre   of   the   car   was   found burst.” appellant that the loss of control over the car was due  ba y to bursting of left  front tyre. Even after this answer  also there could have been remedial steps taken by the  B om prosecution   to   clarify   the   position   or   to   disown   the  witness   by   putting   him   questions   in   the   nature   of  cross­examination saying that apparently  he has been  won over by the accused. But again this has not been  done   and   only   during   the   arguments   in   the   present  appeal  the   learned Public Prosecutor  stated that  the  evidence of this witness so far as these answers given,         91 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 92  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       is   required   to   be   critically   examined   and   not   to   be  67. C ou taken as a help to the defence of the appellant.  Now   coming   to   the   substantive   evidence   of  PW   7   again   there   is   argument   on   behalf   of   the  ig h prosecution that this witness is a partisan witness and  in   fact   in   stead   of   supporting   the   case   of   the  prosecution   he   has   assisted   the   appellant­accused   in  H propounding the  theory  of  the  defence.   This is  the  argument at this appellate stage and   it is difficult to  ba y understand. If it was the evidence of this witness then  why was he examined.  Apparently, he was examined  there   was   some   conversation   between   him   and   the  accused to the following effect: B om for   the   reason   that   he   was present  on  the  spot  and  “Salman   recognized   me   and   told   me,   Commander save me” 68. Earlier   in   examination­in­chief   itself   this         92 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 93  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       witness has stated that at the time of the incident he  C ou was sleeping in his house and he knows the accused  since   his   childhood   and   the   accused   calls   him     by  name “Commander”. After hearing the noise, he got  up   and   then   came   to   the   spot.   As   the   people   were  ig h shouting   for   help,   he   came   near   American   Cleaners  shop. He saw the accused surrounded by mob and one  H person was possessing rod in his hand, he pulled that  person back, also another person who was also having  ba y rod in his hand. At that time, according to this witness,  the accused recognized this witness from the mob and  B om uttered   the   words   “Commander   save   me”.   The  substantive evidence of this witness is required to be  construed in the natural way as he has told. His entire  evidence does not suggest in any way either driving of  the said car by the appellant­accused or the appellant  was   drunk   at   the   relevant   time.   When   this   was   the  factual position brought to the notice of learned Public         93 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:49 ::: 94  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Prosecutor, he tried to argue that the very words of the  C ou appellant­accused   “Commander   save   me”   imply   that  the appellant­accused has done something wrong and  in fact had committed something objectionable so as  to   get   himself   freed   from   the   clutches   of   the   angry  ig h mob.   In   the   considered   view   of   this   Court,   this  argument   if to be accepted, then it would be a wild  H imagination and putting the view of the prosecution in  the mouth of the witness.  Counter   to   this   argument,   learned   Senior  ba y 69. Counsel for the appellant stated that clear evidence of  B om PW 7 goes to show that appellant­accused was in need  of help, true and he was rather in distress but by no  stretch of imagination it can be said that this was on  account of he himself driving and causing the incident.  By   pointing   out   the   other   circumstances   as   to   the  angry mood of the mob and the two persons having         94 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 95  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       rods   in   hand   and   they   were   pulled   by   PW   7,   it   is  C ou further   argued   that   the   request   for   saving   himself  came from  the appellant, on account of a particular  incident and to save himself from the fury of the mob  as the people have spotted him coming out of the car.  ig h The     request   for   saving   came   from   the   appellant­ accused. During the cross­examination this PW 7 had  H specifically answered that he did not find the accused  smelling   of   alcohol   during   the   period   when   he   was  ba y with   him.     He   further   stated   that   the   accused   was  looking normal and was able to walk normally. This  B om answer is required to be viewed in juxtaposition of the  substantive evidence of PW 3 injured witness as to the  accused was so drunk, he fell twice on the ground and  then ran way. So also this evidence is to be viewed in  the   factual   position   that   the   FIR   is   silent   about  consumption   of   alcohol   and   the   theory   of   alcohol  comes   only   after   1.10.2002.   Also   this   evidence   is         95 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 96  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       required   to   be   viewed   in   juxtaposition   of   the   other  C ou evidence of PW 9 Rakhangi, the Manger from the Rain  Bar.     Evidence   of   that   witness   shall   be   critically  examined later on when dealing with the allegations  of   consumption   of   alcohol   at   the   Rain   Bar   and  70. ig h collection of bills by the police during investigation.  Again   it   is   curious   to   note   that   even   this  H witness   is   not   disowned   by   the   prosecution.   In   the  cross­examination  though  this  witness has stated, as  ba y mentioned   earlier,   no   questions   were   put   to   this  witness   in   the   nature   of   cross­examination   by   the  B om prosecution,   more   so   when   specific   substantive  evidence of this witness in his last paragraph of the  cross­examination shows to the following effect:­ “There were 10 to 12 speed breakers   on St Andrews Road in front of Holy   Family Hospital at the relevant time.   At   the   relevant   time   road   repairs   in   front of American Bakery and rubbles          96 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 97  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 71. C ou were   lying   in   front   of   American   Bakery.” rt                                                                                                                       Again this evidence is apparently supportive  to the defence of the accused that there was bursting  ig h of the tyre.  Moreover, the answer given by the witness  as to 10 to 12 speed breakers on St. Andrews Road has  much significance than what it appears, for the reason  H that the case of the prosecution was that the appellant  was   driving   the   car   at   the   speed   of   90   to   100  ba y kilometers per hour and he had taken the route to his  home and come on the Hill Road from St. Andrews  B om Road.  It is admitted position that  St.Andrews Road is  in   front   of   the   American   Bakery   and   there   is   Holy  Family Hospital. Some guidelines regarding existence  of speed breakers, also brought to the notice of this  Court,   by the prosecution. These guidelines mention  various   places,   including   hospital,   where   speed         97 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 98  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       breakers were required to be installed.   As such, this  C ou situation probablizes the defence that the car was not  at the high speed, or if at all in high speed, had not  come from the St.Andrews Road. The defence of the  accused   is   that   the   car   came   on   Hill   Road   from  ig h 'Michael Gonsalvez Road'. In any event, the cumulative  effect  of  the  substantive  evidence of PW 7 does not  H further   the   case   of   the   prosecution   on   any   count,  either on the driving the car or on the consumption of  ba y alcohol. In spite of this situation, this witness is not  disowned by the prosecution.  B om 72. When   the   aforesaid   was   the   effect   of  substantive   evidence   of   PW   7,   an   attempt   has   been  made on behalf of the prosecution by taking shelter of  the answer given by PW 7 in his cross­examination in  paragraph 4. It is to the following effect. “Salman and two others were present          98 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 99  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       73. C ou there” By taking shelter of this answer, it is stated on  behalf of the prosecution that this witness is silent on  the   presence   of   fourth   person   in   the   car.     However,  ig h definitely,   this   witness   was   not   for   the   purpose   of  establishing that how many persons were in the car.  Moreover, there is no positive evidence of this witness  H that he saw only three persons in the car and not four.  What   he   answered   in   the   cross­examination   is   that  ba y 'Salman and two others were present there'.   In fact,  this answer does not suggest that the accused and two  B om others were present in the car. “Present there” means  “present   on   the   spot”.   As   earlier   discussed   by   this  Court there is a subtle difference between the silence  of a witness on a particular aspect and positive answer  given by him and as such the silence of this witness as  to   the   fourth   person   without   there   being   anything         99 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 100  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       brought on record to ask him the questions regarding  C ou the   fourth   person,   this   answer   cannot   be   taken   to  further   the   case   of   the   prosecution   that   there   were  only three persons in the car. At the most, it can be  said that this is not a witness from whom it could be  ig h established   that   the   appellant   was   driving   the   car.  Moreover, his other answers in the cross­examination  74. H were contrary to the case of the prosecution. Now, one more witness who is relevant in the  ba y case   of     the   prosecution   as   to   who   was   driving   the  vehicle   from   JW   Marriott   Hotel   to   the   scene   of   the  B om incident is PW 12 Kalpesh Verma who is working as a  parking   assistant   at   JW   Marriott   Hotel   and   saw   the  appellant   coming   out   of   the   hotel   and   sat   on   the  driver's seat of the car.   In   fact, the evidence of this  witness is required to be critically examined and still if  it   accepted   and   of   course   which   is   an   admitted         100 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 101  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       position   that   at   some   point   of   time   the   appellant­ C ou accused was sitting on the driver's seat of the car when  the car was halted in front of JW Marriott Hotel, still it  is a different thing that a person sitting on a driver's  seat drove away the car himself.  Moreover, this aspect  ig h also  touches the  another circumstance  regarding the  valet parking in the said hotel JW Marriott.  This can  H be dealt in detail. At this stage, it is to be mentioned  that the parking tag allegedly   given to the appellant  ba y for valet parking is not   produced before the Court,  much   less   it   was   taken   charge   of   under   any  B om panchnama.   th  DICTATION ON 8    DECEMBER, 2015     : 75. The   substantive   evidence   of   PW­12   Kalpesh  Verma goes to show that during October, 2002 he was  serving   in   JW   Marriot   Hotel,   Juhu   as   a   parking  assistant. He used to park the owner driven car in the         101 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 102  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       porch area and basement of the hotel.   According to  C ou him he was on duty on 28.9.2002.   He also gave his  duty hours on that day from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m..  According to him his colleague Yogesh had parked the  Toyota   Land   Cruiser   vehicle   in   valet   parking.     The  ig h reference   to  the  Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle  is with  respect   to   the   car   involved     in   the   present     matter.  H Further evidence of said PW­12 discloses that he saw  the appellant/accused coming out from the hotel.  He  ba y told his colleague Yogesh to give the key as PW­12 was  to   take   out   the   vehicle   from   valet   parking.     Said  B om vehicle   was  parked   in   the   porch   of  the   hotel.     Said  witness   then   took   the   vehicle   in   reverse   condition.  Thereafter   according   to   this   witness   the  appellant/accused   came   and   sat   on   the   driver   seat.  Two   persons   were   also   with   Salman.     This   witness  identified   one   of   them   as   Kamal   Khan   who   was   a  Singer.  According to this witness, the third person was         102 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 103  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   bodyguard   of   the   accused.     When   this   witness  C ou handed   over   the   car   to   the   accused   he   saw   the  bodyguard standing near the door of the driver seat.  When this witness tried to close the door, the accused  asked him as to how many colleagues were there and  ig h on   knowing   that   there   were   4­5   colleagues   of   this  witness,   a   tip   of   Rs.500/­   was   given   to   him   by   the  H accused.  This witness then closed the door and went  for keeping the money in the box.  When this witness  ba y returned to the hotel, he did not see the car.  This was  the   substantive   evidence   much   emphasized   by   the  B om learned   Public   Prosecutor   for   the   State   mentioning  that   this   witness   has   seen   the   appellant/accused  sitting on the driver seat and then within short time  this witness saw the car leaving the porch. By pointing  out this it is submitted on behalf of the State that this  is  the   witness   who   saw  Salman   Khan   sitting   on   the  driver seat and then the door of the car was closed.         103 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 104  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       This witness has seen only three persons including the  C ou accused, further pointed out by the prosecution from  his   examination­in­chief.     As   mentioned   earlier   the  substantive evidence of this witness in chief does not  take   us   further   than   the   position   that   he   saw   the  ig h accused  sitting on the  driver seat and the door was  closed.     At   this   juncture   this   witness   went   in   the  H interior of the hotel to keep the tip money in the box  available in the desk.  Learned Public Prosecutor tries  ba y to argue that once this witness has seen the accused  sitting on the driver seat and after some time when he  B om saw that the car had already left, logically it is to be  accepted that the accused drove away the car from JW  Marriott   hotel.     This     argument   is   required   to   be  critically examined in the light of the factual position  and   also   in   order   to   see   whether   there   is   any  corroboration   to   what   the   witness   had   stated   and  mainly on the point as to the valet parking.  Of course,         104 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 105  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   aspect   of   the   valet   parking   shall   be   separately  C ou dealt with but suffice it to say at this juncture that said  parking tag has not been produced before the Court  though during recording of the evidence of said PW­12  the Investigating Officer Shri Shengal (PW­27) tried to  ig h search   the   tag   in   the   muddemal   articles   and   after  searching he could not find the tag and ultimately it  H was not produced before the Court.  Even there is no  panchnama   for   seizure   of   the   said   tag   from   the  ba y custody of the JW Marriott hotel establishment.   The  main   question   remains   as   to   who   had   seen   the  B om appellant/accused coming to JW Marriott and giving  the   car   for   valet   parking,   on   the   premise   that   the  appellant/accused was himself driving and it was the  car not driven by the driver but was owner driven at  that particular time.   Substantive evidence of PW­12  does   not   show   that   he   saw   the   appellant/accused  coming to JW Marriott hotel driving the car himself.         105 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 106  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       The   person   who   could   have   thrown   light   on   this   is  C ou definitely   one   Yogesh   who   had   parked   the   car   as  stated by said PW­12.   But, admittedly said Yogesh is  not   examined   in   the   present   case.     Also   there   is  nothing to show whether this person by name Yogesh  ig h was   interrogated   by   the   police.     According   to   this  witness  PW­12,  the  key   of  the  vehicle  was  given   by  H Yogesh   and   then   the   car   was   brought   in   reverse  condition which was parked in the porch.  During the  ba y cross­examination   it   is   brought   on   record   that   there  was a security cabin and one guard was deployed in  B om the said cabin and the cabin was installed on the left  side of the porch.  Definitely additional evidence could  have been gathered in order to substantiate what has  been seen by said PW­12 and what is to be implied  from   his   evidence   as   suggested   by   the   prosecution.  Again admittedly this security guard or anybody from  that cabin is not examined.  A passing reference is also         106 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 107  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       required to be made so far as this witness is concerned  C ou as to whether he had noticed anything like drunken  condition   of   the   appellant/accused.     Though   this  aspect can also be dealt in detail while coming to the  aspect   of   consumption   of   alcohol   at   this   juncture   it  ig h may   be   mentioned   that   this   PW­12   is   silent   on   the  condition of the appellant/accused when he came out  76. H of JW Marriott hotel. Apart   from   the   above,   certain   answers   are  ba y obtained from this witness (PW­12) during the cross  examination and this part of the evidence is appearing  B om in   paragraph­11   of   the   notes   of   evidence   of   this  witness.     The   substantive   evidence   of   this   witness  reads thus : “ I did not   see at what time and in   what manner the Land Cruzer left the   J.W. Marriot Hotel.   Kamal Khan sat   in the back portion of the car behind   Salman   Khan.     Nobody   sat   near   Kamal   Khan   on   the   left   side   in   the          107 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 108  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 77. ig h C ou back portion of the car.   Police asked   me   during   recording   my   statement   where   Kamal   Khan   sat.     I   was   remembering at the time of giving my   statement   that   on   which   portion   of   the back seat Kamal Khan was sitting   and   he   sat   behind   Salman   Khan.   Kamal Khan sat in the back portion of   the car on the left side.”   rt                                                                                                                       By pointing out this admission given by this  H witness,   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant  submitted that the seat arrangement as stated by this  ba y witness suggest that the appellant/accused was sitting  on the left side of the front seat i.e. towards the left  side   of   the   driver's   seat   as   Kamal   Khan   was   sitting  B om behind him in the back portion on the left side.  Even  after   this   material   extracted   from   his   cross­ examination no attempt has been made on behalf of  the   prosecution   to   get   clarification   for   the   anomaly  created in the answers, one given in the examination­ in­chief   and   another   at   the   end   of   the   cross­        108 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:50 ::: 109  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       examination.    Without  confronting  this  witness  with  C ou the questions  in the nature of cross­examination, now  it cannot be accepted on behalf of the State as argued  that   apparently   this   witness   has   deviated   from   his  earlier   statement   to   the   police   and   has   partially  ig h supported   the   defence.     The   foundation   for  appreciating this argument has not been created while  H recording   the   evidence   of   this   witness   by   the  prosecution.  Lastly, it is argued on behalf of the appellant  ba y 78. that   the   testimony of this PW­12 is doubtful for the  B om reason   that   he   had   specifically   mentioned   that   on  28.9.2002   he   was   on   duty   from   7:00   p.m.   to   7:00  a.m..   As such, it is further argued that this witness  wants to tell that he joined the duty on 28.9.2002 at  7:00 p.m..  Of course, there is no explanation taken by  the prosecution on his statement that on 28.9.2002 his         109 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 110  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       duty   hours   were   from   7:00   p.m.   to   7:00   a.m..   It   is  C ou argued   on   behalf   of   the   State   that   allowance   is  required   to   be   given   in   favour   of   this   witness  as   to  making an apparent mistake for giving the duty hours.  Otherwise also it is argued that it may be treated as a  ig h typographical   error.     One   thing   is   certain   that   the  witness had given the statement before the police and  H also he deposed before the Court and mentioned his  duty hours for 28.9.2002.   Giving some allowance to  ba y this witness as to making an error in the duty hours  either on 28.9.2002 or on 27.9.2002, on that count it  B om is not to be said that this witness was not on duty on  that  night  but as mentioned earlier the  effect  of his  evidence does not in any way lead this Court to imply  that the appellant/accused drove the car and left JW  Marriott hotel on that night. 79. Moreover, the contradiction arising from the         110 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 111  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       statement given in evidence in chief as compared to  C ou the   one   given   in   the   cross­examination   as   to   the  seating position of the accused, creates a substantial  doubt   in   respect   of   whether   the   accused   drove   the  vehicle.  This doubt is further enhanced as admittedly,  ig h this   witness   was   not   present   when   the   vehicle   was  driven away ultimately. H THEORY OF CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL As mentioned in earlier part of this judgment,  ba y 80. the substantive evidence of mainly two witnesses i.e.  PW­5   Malay   Bag   and   PW­9   Rizwan   Rakhangi   is  B om required   to   be   critically   examined   and   then   the  evidence of PW­20 Dr. Shashikant Pawar, the Medical  Officer from JJ Hospital and PW­18 Assistant Chemical  Analyzer Dattatray Balashankar from the CA office is  required to be discussed hereunder.  Of course, again a  passing reference is required to be made regarding the         111 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 112  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       evidence   of   PW­3   Mannu   Khan.     His   evidence   is  C ou critically examined earlier on the aspect as to who was  driving the vehicle.   Without going into much details  suffice it to say that said PW­3 has stated that he had  seen the appellant/accused falling on the ground on  ig h the spot of incident twice then again standing up and  running away from the spot and according to PW­3 it  81. H was due to consumption of alcohol by the appellant. Coming to the substantive evidence of PW­5  ba y Malay Bag it is seen that he was working in the Rain  Bar  Restaurant  as a waiter and was on  duty on the  B om night  of  27.9.2002.   There  was rush in  the bar and  according   to   him   about   200­250   customers   were  present.   According to him, the area of the bar was  admeasuring about 20 ft. X 20 ft..   According to this  witness,   the   appellant/accused   and   his   friends   were  standing at the bar counter.   It is brought on record         112 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 113  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       from the evidence that if all the tables and chairs are  C ou fully   occupied   by   other   customers,   the   remaining  customers used to stand at the counter to be served  then   and   there.     According   to   this   witness   he   kept  Bacardi White Rum and cocktail on the counter and  ig h also served some eatables.  According to him at about  1:10 a.m. the accused and his friends left the bar. This  H witness   further   deposed   that   the   accused   was   the  regular visitor to the bar and on that relevant night he  ba y was having many friends with him and the drinks and  food was ordered for all of them. B om 82. The   evidence   of   the   above   witness   PW­5   is  also   required   to   be   examined   in   the   light   of   the  evidence   given   by   PW­9   Rizwan   Rakhangi,   the  Manager   of   the   Rain   Bar.     According   to   this   PW­9  when he was working in the Rain Bar as Manager at  about   11:00   p.m.   he   saw   the   accused,   his   brother         113 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 114  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Sohail   Khan   and   their   friends   visited   the   bar.  C ou According   to  this  witness,  the  accused  was standing  near the table.   That time some marketing event was  going on in the restaurant and the tables were already  occupied when the accused and his friends arrived in  ig h the   bar.     Also   according   to   this   witness   as   the  restaurant   was   full,   the   accused,   his   brother   Sohail  H Khan and  others were standing in front of the service  counter and the drinks and snacks were provided on  ba y the   said   standing   bar   counter.     According   to   this  witness   he   had   seen   the   accused   possessing   white  B om coloured   glass  and  at  about   1:15  a.m.  left  the   Rain  Bar. 83. Now   the   substantive   evidence   of   PW­5   and  PW­9,   as   mentioned   above,   go   to   show   that   the  appellant/accused visited the Rain Bar on the night of  27.9.2002 and left at early hours of 28.9.2002.  Drinks         114 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 115  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and eatables were ordered and they were consumed.  C ou By pointing out this evidence, during the arguments  learned Public Prosecutor stated that this evidence is  required to be construed along with the circumstances  then prevalent and mainly the circumstance that  the  ig h accused  was having a white coloured glass in hand.  During the cross­examination it is brought on record  H that   the   accused   was   drinking   clear   liquid   and   the  clear liquid looked like water.   Even it is brought on  ba y record   that   the   Bacardi   Rum   looks   like   water.     By  specifically pointing out this it is argued on behalf of  B om the State that it is to be accepted that the accused was  drinking Bacardi Rum.  This is more so, further argued  that   visit   of   the   appellant/accused   was   to   the   bar  where   the   liquors   were   being   supplied   to   the  customers.  It is further argued that according to PW­5  the accused was the regular customer of the bar.   As  such it is argued that the cumulative effect of PW­5         115 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 116  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and PW­9 is required to be accepted on the fact that  84. C ou the accused had consumed alcohol in the said bar.    Counter to these arguments, learned Senior  Counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that  ig h always it cannot be conclusively presumed that every  person visiting the bar necessarily consumes alcohol.  Apart   from the circumstances narrated by PW­5 and  H PW­9 there   must be some other circumstance either  by   way   of   bills   for   consuming   alcohol   or   by   direct  ba y evidence of a waiter showing that he supplied Bacardi  rum and said Bacardi rum was in fact consumed by  B om the   appellant/accused.     Admittedly   there   is   no   such  direct   evidence  of PW­5 or for that  matter of  PW­9.  According   to   PW­5,   he   served   the   drinks   and   the  eatables   on   the   bar   counter   and   according   to   him  those   were   for   the   entire   group   consisting   of   the  accused, his friend Kamal Khan and others.          116 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 117  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 85. rt                                                                                                                       Now apart from the above evidence there is  C ou another material brought on record by the prosecution  by way of four bills which are marked as Exhibit­50A,  50B, 50C and 50D during recording of evidence before  the   Sessions   Court.     At   this   juncture   it   is   to   be  ig h mentioned that the trial Court had marked these bills  as   Exhibits   and   accepted   their     evidential   value   in  H order to establish that these bills were for the drinks  and   eatables   ordered   and   consumed   by   the   accused  ba y and   his   friends.     In   fact   these   bills   were   collected  subsequently   by   the   officer   and   there   is   substantive  B om evidence of PW­9 on this aspect and this evidence of  PW­9 and the factual position as to the accused and  his friends not occupying any tables, render these bills  devoid of any substance.  On the contrary,  production  of such bills before the trial Court is in fact possibly an  attempt   to   create   documents   to   suit   the   case   of  prosecution.     The   reason   for   this   is   based   on   the         117 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 118  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       following   material   brought   on   record.     Substantive  C ou evidence   of   PW­9   during   cross­examination   goes   to  show   that   the   bills   were   being   generated   on   a  computer system and the name of the customer is not  generated in the bill.  Even also name of a person who  ig h pays the amount also does not reflect in the bill.  It is  further the evidence of PW­9 that if the customer is  H standing near the bar counter then there is no table  number   mentioned   or   reflected   in   the   bill.     Table  ba y number is being mentioned only in case of a customer  sitting at a table.  Also code number of the captain or  B om steward is generated in the bill when such captain or  steward serves the order.  Further substantive evidence  of PW­9 is reproduced hereunder in order to see under  which  circumstances said bills were collected by the  police: “Prior to recording of my statement,   police had visited the restaurant and   told   us   to   give   the   bills   of   date          118 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 119  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 86. ig h C ou 27.9.2002.  The police had inspected   the   bills   by   which   the   alcohol   was   ordered by the customers.  Police had   given   me   the   four   bills,   out   of   the   bills,   which   were   inspected   by   the   police.   Police took out the bills and   asked   me   to   sign.     I   thought   what   police   did  was  the   correct  regarding   the bills.” rt                                                                                                                       In the light of this evidence, the bills which  are Exhibit­50A to 50D are carefully examined.   Said  H respective bills give the table numbers as under : 38,  40, 30 and 18.  All the bills give the cover (number of  ba y persons)   as   one.     The   bills   give   the   captain   code  number respectively as 02, 02, 02 and 48.   First two  B om bills Exhibit­50A & 50B are only for food, and third  and fourth bills Exhibit­50C and Exhibit­50D are for  liquor.     The   total   of   these   bills   is   Rs.6376/­.     The  glaring   anomaly   is   regarding   the   mentioning   of   the  table   numbers   in   the   bills.     Four   different   table  numbers are given as mentioned above. However, the  cover for which the bill is mentioned as one.   So by         119 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 120  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       plain reading of the bills it can be construed  that each  C ou bill   is   for   one   person   only   and   each   bill   is   for   the  person sitting on a particular table number.   Another  glaring   circumstance   that   said   bills   show   the   date  27.9.2002 but according to PW­9, the accused and his  ig h friends   left   Rain   Bar   at   about   1:10   a.m.   i.e.   on  28.9.2002.  There is no explanation forthcoming from  H the   prosecution   that   the   payment   for   the   bills   was  made   when   it   was   prior   to   12:00   mid   night   of  ba y 27.9.2002 and   then the persons overstayed and left  the bar at 1:00 a.m. or so.  There is no explanation by  B om the prosecution by adducing evidence to show that as  per rule Rain Bar took its last order prior to midnight  and permitted its patrons to remain in the bar even  beyond   midnight.     Otherwise   logically   it   is   to   be  accepted that when a person finishes his drinking and  eating and when he has to go out of the bar then he  makes   the   payment.     If   this   logical   circumstance   is         120 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 121  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accepted then there is anomaly that said bills have a  C ou date as 27.9.2002 and not 28.9.2002.  Moreover these  bills are not taken under panchnama as admitted by  the police officer and also stated by PW­9. Apart   from   the   above   there   is   still   glaring  ig h 87. defect in the said bills.   There is an endorsement in  handwriting on the bill which is marked Exhibit­50A.  H This endorsement at the top of the bill reads thus :  “They were total eight of us including Salman, Sohail   ba y and friend”.  And at the end, there is an endorsement  B om on the said bill “Total 6376. Bill paid by Sohail Khan”. 88. Admittedly   according   to   the   case   of  prosecution   these   were   the   duplicate   bills   obtained  from the computer system of the hotel and as such it  was necessary on the part of the investigating agency  to establish these bills as per the procedure laid down  by Section 65B of the Evidence Act.   On this aspect         121 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 122  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       ratio of the following authority is taken shelter of on  C ou behalf of the appellant : (2014) 10 SCC 473 – Anvar   P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer and others.   Sections 65A, 65B  and   62   deal   with   the   proof   of   the   electronic   record  and   as   to   the   primary   and   secondary   evidence   and  ig h admissibility of the same.  Apparently as per the case  of prosecution Exhibits­50A to 50D are the  secondary  H evidence of the original bills either generated in the  computer system and given to a customer or obtained,  ba y returned back from the customer after the payment.  As   per   Section   65­B   (4)   it   is   mandatory   pre­ B om requirement to obtain a certificate.   The observations  of the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder : “Electronic   record   produced   for   the   inspection of the court is documentary   evidence   Under   Section   3   of   the   Evidence   Act,   1872   (the   Evidence   Act).   Any   documentary   evidence   by   way of an electronic record under the   Evidence  Act,  in  view  of   Sections  59   and   65­A,   can   be   proved   only   in          122 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 123  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc ig h C ou accordance   with   the   procedure   prescribed Under Section 65­B of the   Evidence   Act.   The   purpose   of   these   provisions   is   to   sanctify   secondary   evidence in electronic form generated   by a computer. The very admissibility   of electronic record which is called as   “computer   output”,   depends   on   the   satisfaction   of   the   four   conditions   prescribed   under   Section   65­B(2)   of   the Evidence Act.   (Paras 7 and 14) rt                                                                                                                       H Under   Section   65­B(4)   of   the   Evidence Act, if it is desired to give a   statement   in   any   proceedings   pertaining to an electronic record, it is   permissible   provided   the   following   conditions are satisfied: B om ba y (a) There must be a certificate which   should   identify   the   electronic   record   containing the statement; (b)   The   certificate   must   describe   the   manner in which the electronic record   was produced; (c)   The   certificate   must   furnish   the   particulars   of   the   device   involved   in   the production of that record; (d) The certificate must deal with the   applicable   conditions   mentioned   under Section 65­B(2) of the Evidence   Act; and        123 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:51 ::: 124  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 89. C ou (e) The certificate must be signed by a   person occupying a responsible official   position in relation to the operation of   the relevant device.   (Para 15) rt                                                                                                                       Considering the  legal position as mentioned  above and also the factual position in the present case  ig h as to production and acceptance of the bills Exhibits­ 50A to 50D before the trial Court it must be said that  H the trial Court has not done that analysis whether this  secondary   evidence   can   be   accepted.     Trial   Court  ba y simply   accepted   the   correctness   and   genuineness   of  the bills in order to come to the conclusion regarding  B om the drunkenness of the appellant.   In fact there is no  discussion on this relevant sections of 65A, 65B and  65C of the Evidence Act while dealing with the said  bills. 90. By pointing out the above, it is submitted on  behalf   of   the   appellant   that   it   was   definitely   an  attempt   on   the   part   of   the   investigating   agency   to         124 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 125  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       fabricate the bills and to get them before the Court to  C ou support  their  case  of consumption  of alcohol  by  the  appellant.   Definitely collecting any material like the  bills   in   the   present   matter   during   investigation   and  creating   any   document,   are   two   different   things.  ig h Latter one is definitely highly objectionable and leads  to the  conclusion of fabrication  of document  and as  H such it destroys the case of prosecution if there is an  element of fabrication of the document.  In the present  ba y matter the endorsement at the top and bottom of the  bill   Exhibit­50A   have   not   been   explained   by   any  B om witness, even  by PW­9 as to why and how a customer  will write on a bill or even a copy of the bill that the  bill   is   for   himself   and   his   friends   and   how   the  endorsement   as   it   is   appearing   at   the   end   of   bill  Exhibit­50A   will   occur   that   anybody   will   write   the  total of the bills and make an endorsement as to who  had paid the bills.  Definitely the bills Exhibits 50A to         125 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 126  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       50D were  subsequently procured from the computer  C ou system and then the Investigating Officer had got the  said   endorsement   done   but   still   there   is   nothing   on  record   as   to   who   and   how   said   endorsements   were  taken.  Said endorsement are original and they are in  ig h ink   whereas   all   the   bills   are   printed   and   they   are  computer printouts.  As such for these detailed reasons  H it is required to be mentioned that there is no cognate  material   before   the   Court   from   PW­5   and   PW­9   to  ba y establish that on that night the appellant/accused had  consumed   alcoholic   beverage.   Moreover,   the  B om cumulative effect of the substantive evidence of PW­5  and PW­9 goes to show that when a customer is served  at   the   counter/bar,   the   bill   generated   has   no   table  number.     A   bill   has   a   table   number   only   when   a  customer   is   served   at   a   table.     Further,   from   the  evidence of PW­5 and PW­9 it is ascertained that the  accused   and   his   friends   were   served   at   the         126 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 127  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       bar/counter.     Then   in   light   of   such   facts,   the  C ou prosecution   has   failed  to   explain   how   the   bills   with  table numbers (that too four different table numbers)  indicate or prove that the accused was drunk. Further,  91. ig h the prosecution has not disowned these witnesses. When the above position was noticed by the  learned Public Prosecutor during the arguments as to  H the   evidential   value   of   the   bills,   he   conceded   the  position and did not argue on the proof of the bills by  ba y way of taking shelter of the bills to substantiate the  case of drinking.  Though this conceding position was  B om taken by the State, still it is argued on behalf of the  appellant   that   mere   conceding   will   not   serve   the  purpose once it is established that a positive attempt  has been made by the investigating agency to fabricate  the bills and produce them before the Court to be used  as evidence  to further the charge of drunkenness.  Of         127 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 128  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       course   this   submission   has   much   weight   and   is  C ou required to be dealt in the light of the further material  by   way   of   evidence   of   PW­20   the   doctor   from   JJ  Hospital and PW­18 Assistant Chemical Analyzer. 92. ig h EXTRACTION OF BLOOD & ITS CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: PW­20   had   drawn   the   blood   sample   of   the  H appellant/accused   at   JJ   Hospital   and   then  subsequently   the   sample   was   sent   to   the   Chemical  ba y Analyzer   and   the   analysis   was   done   by   PW­18.  However   prior   to   going   to   PW­20,   evidence   of   one  more witness PW­22 is required to be construed.  Said  B om PW­22 is Vijay Salunke, then PSI attached to Bandra  Police   Station. On  28.9.2002 he  was on  duty at the  police station.  Investigating Officer Shri Shengal (PW­ 27) directed him to take the accused along with police  staff to JJ Hospital for medical examination.  On that  afternoon   he   took   the   accused   to   JJ   Hospital   along         128 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 129  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       with the report and requested for taking blood sample  C ou for alcohol test.  He identified the report as Exhibit­97.  According to him the Medical Officer had taken blood  sample   from   the   accused   and   it   was   delivered   to   a  constable.     Admittedly   this   constable   who   took   the  ig h delivery   is   not   examined   before   the   Court.     After  taking delivery of the samples said PW­22 returned to  H the   police   station   along   with   the   accused   and   the  constable.     Said   constable   delivered   said   envelope  ba y containing   blood   sample   into   the   possession   of   PI  Shengal   (PW­27).     During   cross­examination   this  B om witness   had   stated   that   the   blood   sample   was   not  given in his custody by the Medical Officer and also  this witness could not tell the name of the constable to  whom the blood sample was delivered.     As against  this   evidence   of   PW­22,   it   is   case   of   PW­27  Investigating Officer that he asked PI Suryawanshi to  take   the   accused   to   JJ   Hospital   whereas   PW­22   is         129 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 130  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       silent about the presence of PI Suryawanshi at the JJ  93. C ou Hospital along with the appellant/accused. Now coming to PW­20 Dr. Shashikant Pawar  in his evidence according to him extracted the blood  ig h sample from the appellant/accused.  He talked of PSI  Salunkhe   (PW­22)   and   one   constable   PC   No.2985  coming   to   JJ   Hospital   along   with   the  H appellant/accused.  According to this witness he took  the   history   from   the   accused   about   alcohol  ba y consumption   but   it   was   denied.     Then   he   made  examination of the breath and noticed that the breath  B om was smelling of alcohol.   Pupils of the accused were  slightly dilated and his gait was normal.   His speech  was found coherent.   This witness asked the accused  for   verbal   consent   for   extracting   the   blood.     He  obtained left thumb impression of the accused on his  register,   so   also   obtained   signature   and   then         130 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 131  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       proceeded   for   collecting   the   blood   sample.     It   is  C ou significant   to   note   that   this   witness   has   in   one  sentence   gave the procedure  as to how he collected  the   blood.     His   words   are  “I   extracted   the   blood.   (Witness   is  deposing after going through the Casualty   ig h Register).  After taking blood sample, I directed my office   ward boy to seal the blood sample in my presence.  The   H bottle   was   sealed   as   per   the   standard   procedure   maintained by the hospital.  There were two containers   ba y called phials.  One phial was having oxalate preservative   and   other   phial   was   plain”.     After   this   the   witness  B om further   deposed   that   “Bottles(phials)   were   capped   by   white   colour   bandage   (sticking   plaster).     The   seal   of   lakh was put on the upper and lower end of both the   phials.   The labelling of EPR number about, date, time   and PC number was done and it was wrapped around   the two phials.  I also put my signature on the label.”          131 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 132  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 94. rt                                                                                                                       According to this witness, the signature of the  C ou accused   was   obtained   on   the   EPR   register   and   also  signature of PSI Salunkhe as well as signature of one  PC­27451   was   obtained   on   the   EPR   register.     This  witness also filled two forms “A” and “B” for sending to  ig h C.A. Kalina after filling the contents of the said forms.  According to this witness, he obtained the initials and  H thumb impressions of the accused and also of police  persons   on   the   form   “A”   and   form   “B”.     He   made  ba y entries   in   the   EPR   register   regarding   collection   of  blood   and  also filled OPD forms.   The  OPD  form  is  B om Exhibit­98 produced before  the trial Court and form  “A” and form “B” are Exhibit­101 and Exhibit­102. 95. This witness (PW­20) was cross­examined at  length   and   mainly   on   the   procedure   as   to   in   what  manner the blood sample  for alcohol test is required  to   have   been  taken   and  what   precautions  are  to  be         132 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 133  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       taken  for preserving the  blood sample  till it  reaches  C ou the   laboratory   for   testing.     During   the   cross­ examination it is brought on record that on the OPD  form   there   was   no   thumb   impression   of   the  appellant/accused obtained and only a circle is drawn  ig h in   place   of   the   thumb   impression.     Even   another  discrepancy is also brought on record regarding non­ H appearance of the word “alcohol” on the back portion  of the OPD form when according to the witness back  ba y portion of the OPD form was filled when the entries  were   made   in   the   EPR   register   by   inserting   carbon  B om paper.  Substantive evidence of this witness appearing  in paragraph­6 in the notes of evidence is reproduced  hereunder for the sake of ready reference in order to  throw light as to how the entire process of collection  of blood was so casually done by the Medical Officer  attached to J.J. Hospital.  Said evidence reads thus : “There   is   no   signature   of   Salman          133 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 134  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc ba y H ig h C ou Khan as well as his thumb impression   obtained on OPD form / case paper   (Exh.98).   It is true there is a circle   made   on   Exh.98   for   obtaining   the   thumb impression of the patient and   also the signature.  It was my duty to   obtain the thumb impression as well   as   signature   on   the   OPD   form   (Exh.98).     Back   portion   of   Exh.98   about   the   examination   of   Salman   Khan   is   a   carbon   copy.     “for   blood   collection”  word  though  appeared  in   the register might have not imprinted   on the back portion of the OPD form   therefore   I   have   written   in   my   handwriting   the   word   “for   blood   collection”.     Case   paper   is   checked   from the register word by word and   thereafter   signature   is   made   on   the   case paper.”   rt                                                                                                                       B om 96. At the above juncture the EPR register Exh.99  was shown to the witness along with the backside of  the OPD form Exh.98 and the witness answered to the  following effect: “It   is   true   there   appears   to   be   gap   between the word “gait” and “speech   coherent” seen in the back portion of   the  Exh.98,  but  there   appears  to  be   no   gap   seen   in   between   the   word          134 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 135  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou “gait”   and   “speech   coherent”   in   the   EPR register entry (Exh.99).  It is true   by   placing   carbon   between   register   and   the   case   paper   and   the   words   “gait”   and   “speech   coherent”   are   written   simultaneously,   then   there   should not be gap found between the   words in the copy (Exh.98).” rt                                                                                                                       Further   this   witness   has   answered   that     on  ig h 97. the   case   paper   Exh.98   there   is   no   mention   that   the  H consent of the patient, the accused was obtained prior  to his clinical examination or extraction of the blood.  ba y According to this witness the consent of the patient is  mandatory   to   be   obtained   prior   to   his   examination  B om and   in   fact   it   is   the   requirement   of   law.     Further  regarding   not   having   the   word   “alcohol”   at   the  backside of the OPD form, the evidence of this witness  in the cross­examination is of much importance which  reads thus : “It   is   true   in   case   paper   Exh.98   the   important   factor   in   clinical          135 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 136  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou examination   was   breath   smell   alcohol.  I carefully wrote the clinical   observation   in   my   case   paper.     It   is   true in back portion of Exh.98, there   is   no   mention   that   breath   smells   alcohol.     It   is   correct   to   say   that   besides smell of alcohol there can be   other smells found from the mouth.”   rt                                                                                                                       Further this witness has answered : ig h .  B om ba y H “It is true from the case paper Exh.98   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   patient   Salman   Khan   was   smelling   alcohol.   According   to   me   the   word   “alcohol”   was not printed on the back portion   of Exh.98.  I cannot say why the word   alcohol was not imprint on the back   portion of  Exh.98.    I  had  compared   the entries mentioned in Exh.98 with   the entries mentioned in EPR register.   It   is   true   that   while   verifying   the   entries in the back portion of Exh.98   with EPR register, I made entry with   ball   pen   on   back   portion   of   Exh.98   which was not imprint while writing.” 98. By pointing out these answers of PW­20 it is  strongly   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that  there is manipulation and insertion of word “alcohol”         136 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 137  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       in the OPD papers and apparently such word “alcohol”  C ou could not have been also present in the original EPR  register.   The fact remains that PW­20 has not given  any   explanation   as   to   why   the   word   “alcohol”   is  missing from the backside of the OPD paper which is  99. ig h Exhibit­98. By pointing out the main glaring defect thus  H suggestive of fabrication, the learned Senior Counsel  for   the   appellant   made   various   submissions   that  ba y according   to   PW­20   the   thumb   impression   and  signature of the accused was taken on the EPR register  B om but   was   not   proved   by   sending   the   signature   and  thumb   impression   for   forensic   expert   /   handwriting  expert.   On this aspect, learned Public Prosecutor for  the   State   stated   that   it   is   not   a   case   of   the  appellant/accused that his blood was not drawn at JJ  Hospital.  Definitely it is not a case that the blood was         137 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 138  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       not drawn at JJ Hospital but still it is argued on behalf  C ou of the appellant that the mandatory requirements or at  least the important procedural aspects are required to  be followed when a person is asked to give his blood  for the purpose of a particular test when apparently  ig h such examination may be used against him in a Court.  It   is   further   argued   that   in   fact   asking   for   the  H extraction   of   the   blood   for   alcohol   consumption   is  asking   a   person   to   procure   the   material   which  ba y ultimately may be used against him and if this is the  ratio behind it then consent of the person is required  B om to   be   obtained.     The   submission   on   behalf   of   the  appellant   was   that   though   the   blood   was   collected  there was no apparent consent given by him and more  so   his   thumb   impression   or   signature   were   not  appearing   on   the   OPD   paper   which   is   Exhibit­98.  Further   more   the   cross­examination   of   PW­20   in  paragraph­20   is   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   Court         138 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:52 ::: 139  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       during argument that according to this witness there  C ou was   no   specimen   seal   of   lakh   sent   to   the   CA.     By  pointing this out, it is stated that form “B” which is  Exhibit­102 bears the facsimile of lakh  and there is no  explanation   as   to   how   this   facsimile   of   lakh   is  ig h appearing   in   Exhibit­102.     In   fact   sending   of   such  facsimile of lakh seal on form “B” is a counter check in  H order   to   rule   out   tampering   of   the   sample   and   to  ensure the authenticity that the same sample which is  ba y extracted by the Medical officer reaches the chemical  analysis laboratory.   B om 100. Form “B” and for that matter form “A” are the  requirements   as   per   the   rules   under   the  Bombay  Prohibition   (Medical   Examination   and   Blood   Test)  Rules and as such said form “B” is to be filled by the  doctor / medical officer extracting the blood for the  alcohol   test   and   said   form   is   addressed   to   the         139 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 140  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Chemical   Analyzer   to   Government   of   Maharashtra.  C ou One   of   the   aspects   to   access   the   authenticity   is   the  facsimile of lakh seal which is to be impressed on form  “B”, in this case on Exhibit­102 and the same seal with  lakh   is   required   to   be   affixed   on   the   blood   sample  ig h phial / bottle which is to be sent to CA.   At the CA  office, the concerned Analyst examines the facsimile of  H lakh seal from form “B” and after comparing it with  lakh seal of the sample bottle / phial he ascertains the  ba y authenticity   by   visual   inspection   that   both   the   seals  are same and there is no tampering.  Further more it is  B om brought to the notice of the Court that form “A”, which  is Exhibit­101, in the present case bear the signature  of one police constable PC­27451 and according to the  case   of   prosecution   he   was   the   constable   who   took  said blood samples and form “A” and form “B” from JJ  Hospital.     However,   this   constable   No.27451   is   not  examined in the case. Apparently from the signature         140 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 141  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       appearing   on   Exhibit­101   form   “A”   said   PC­27451   is  C ou the   same   constable   by   name   Mane   but   significantly  enough   the   number   of   another   police   constable   is  mentioned on both these forms “A” and “B” i.e. 101  and 102 and the said constable's PC number is 2985  101. ig h from Bandra police station.   According   to   the   case   of   prosecution   along  H with PSI Salunkhe this constable No.2985 was sent to  JJ   Hospital   along   with   the   appellant/accused   for  ba y extraction of blood.   Neither this constable  No.2985  nor   any   constable   No.27451   were   examined   in   the  B om present   case.     Apparently   this   was   one   of   the   links  required to have been established when the matter is  concerning biological evidence.   102. During the arguments it is argued that in case  of   appreciation   of   biological   evidence   a   chain   of  custody is required to be established and if it is not         141 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 142  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       established   then   the   biological   evidence   is   not  C ou trustworthy   and   is   required   to   be   discarded   as  apparently   it   is   the   evidence   as   that   of   an   expert  witness.   Following authorities are cited on behalf of  ig h the appellant : H [I]  MANU/MH/1360/2014  [Manoj Mahadev Gawade Vs. The State of  Maharashtra] [II]  2012 SCC OnLine Del 3375 [Vinay Kumar Vs. State ] ba y [III] 212(2014)DLT99 [State through Reference Vs. Ram Singh &  Ors. AND Pawan Kumar Gupta Vs. State] B om 103. Another   factual   position   is   brought   to   the  notice of this Court as apparent from the substantive  evidence of PW­20 Dr. Pawar.   This witness agrees in  the cross­examination that as per the contents of form­ A and form­B, the two phials and said forms were kept  in one sealed envelope.   This witness talks of single         142 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 143  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       sealed   envelope   containing   form­A   and   form­B   and  C ou two phials of blood.   As against this the substantive  evidence of the police head constable Sharad Borade  (PW­21)  (No.2019) say that the  investigating officer  Rajendra   Kadam   (PW­26)   called   him   and   gave   two  ig h sealed envelopes and asked him to deliver them to the  office of the CA.  As per Exhibit­80 there is mention of  H one sealed phial  so also as per the CA report there is  mention of one phial but as per the evidence of PW­20  ba y he sent two phials with form­A and form­B.   Much is  also argued about the sealing of the phials at the J.J.  B om Hospital   and   admittedly   according   to   PW­20   doctor  the   ward   boy   sealed   the   sample   bottles.     Though   it  was so the sealing process was told by PW­20 and not  by the ward boy as the ward boy was not examined.  By pointing out this, it is submitted that the evidence  of doctor PW­20 on the aspect of sealing is hear­say  and   in   fact   this   hear­say   is   on   the   material   aspect         143 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 144  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       which   goes   to   the   root   of   the   matter   touching   the  C ou authenticity of the blood sample which reached the CA  office.     Considering   this   evidence   of   PW­20   and   the  anomaly   in   the   OPD   form   and   absence   of   word  “alcohol”   and   absence   of   the   thumb   impression   and  ig h signature on OPD form, in the opinion of this Court no  requisite and necessary care as required, was taken by  H PW­20   while   taking   blood   sample.     There   are   other  aspects also which lead to the reasonable doubt as to  ba y authenticity   of   the   sample   and   those   aspects   are  regarding what was received at the CA office and what  B om happened to the form­B (Exh.102), whether it reached  back   to   the   police   station   through   PW­21   Head  Constable   Borade   or   whether   it   remained   with   CA  office. Also there is anomaly as to how this Exhibit­ 102 form­B came in the custody of police when it was  produced before the Court  initially when the matter  was before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court.  These         144 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 145  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       other anomalies and the subsequent evidence mainly  C ou that of PW­18 is now required to be discussed which  again   goes   to   the   root   of   the   matter   as   to   whether  what was sent to the CA was the same sample which  was extracted at JJ Hospital and whether there was  ig h any   authentic   labeling   and   sealing   of   the   sample.  Moreover, the discrepancy as to the total quantity of  H the blood is also required to be discussed when it was  6 ml extracted at JJ Hospital, 3 ml in each phial, and  ba y total four mls received at the CA office.  104. In   view   of   the   above,   now   the   evidence   of  B om PW­18   is   of   much   importance.    PW   18   Dattatraya  Khobrajirao Bhalshankar was working as an Assistant  Chemical  Analyser  at  Forensic  Science   Laboratory  at  Kalina, Santacruz. As per his evidence he had received  one case from Bandra Police Station on 30.9.2002. He  received   one   bottle   along   with   letter   from   Bandra         145 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 146  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Police Station. It was the blood extracted from the JJ  C ou hospital.   He   received   the   letter   from   Bandra   Police  Station   along   with   the   sealed   envelope.   Senior  Inspector of Bandra Police Station, Shri Shengal (PW  27)   had   given   a   forwarding   letter   dated   30.9.2002,  ig h addressed   to   the   Chemical   Analyser   at   Kalina,  Santacruz ascertained whether Form “A” and “B” were  H attached with the letter. Also he ascertained whether  blood   phial   was   sealed   or   not.   According   to   him,   it  ba y was found sealed and seal was found intact. He put  the number on the letter as AL­171/02.   B om 105. He   also   made   noting   on   the   letter   to   the  following effect “One sealed phial, seal intact as per  copy sent (blood in two phials)”. This witness talked  of Form B which is Exh. 102. before the trial Court. It  is significant to note that he talks of blood sample, in  singular, though subsequently he mentioned that while         146 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 147  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       writing   his   endorsement   he   had   mentioned   in   the  C ou bracket   (blood   in   two   phials).   According   to   this  witness, he affixed the two labels which were found  on the phials and put them on the Form­ “B” at the  bottom. In fact, these are the sticking plasters which  ig h were prepared according to PW no. 20, giving the EPR  number, date and time and PC number and also bear  H the signature of PW 20. According to this witness, PW  18, he removed the labels from the blood bottle and  ba y affixed on the letter Form­ “B”. Thereafter, he kept the  blood phials in the refrigerator. Further the evidence  B om of this witness shows that on 1.10.2002 he analysed  the   blood   phials.   He   used   the   “Modified   Diffusion  Oxidation   Method”   for   analyzing   the   blood.  Accordingly, he prepared the report as to his findings.  He identified the said report as Exh.81 which is having  same ML Case No. AL­171­2002. The contents of the  said report are very significant. He also made a noting         147 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 148  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       on the report there is specific mention of one sealed  C ou phial received from Police Naik No. 20419.   This CA  report is addressed to the Medical Officer, Sir JJ Group  of   Hospital,   Mumbai.   Opening   words   of   this   report  ig h reads as under :­ ba y H “Your   letter   No.   JJH/VA/191/202   dated   28.9.2002   forwarding   of   EPR   containing   blood   of   Shri   Salman   Salim   Khan   bearing   certificate   No.   EPR/5452/Label/   Salman   Salim   Khan   received   here   on   30.9.2002,   with messenger Shri   PN No.   20419   of one sealed EPR, seals intact as per   copy sent.” B om 106. The said CA report is in fact  a printed format  where the variables are the letter number, date, name  of  the   person, date  of  receipt, EPR number  and the  name of the messenger and the quantity of the article.  The final result of the test of the blood is as under:  “The blood contained 0.062 per cent   W/v of ethyl alcohol (Sixty Two mg).”        148 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 149  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc On the next page of the report the method of  C ou 107. rt                                                                                                                       data and actual date and reasons leading to the result  of   blood   analysis   were   mentioned.   The   method   of  analysis   is:   Modified   Diffusion   Oxidation   Method,  ig h Analytical Chemistry, 1959. In the said report there is  a printed format material regarding reference for the  H said   Modified   Diffusion   Oxidation   Method   and   the  said   reference   is   of    MODI   ­     A   TEXT   BOOK   OF   ba y MEDICAL   JURISPRUDENCE   AND   TOXICOLOGY,   1977.  What is significant in the said report on page no.2 is  B om the quantity of blood received and measured. It is 4  ML.   This   information   is   given   in   paragraph   no.   3.  Paragraph no. 4 of the report says that “preservative  used” ­ “Oxalate on the forwarding letter and not on  blood   phial.”   In   paragraph   no.   5   it   is   mentioned  “Morpholine  test  –  positive.   There  is  special  note  at  the end of this report and which   is also in a printed         149 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 150  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       usual   format   to   the   effect   “the   blood   sample   was  C ou stored in refrigerator from the time it was received in  the Laboratory, till it was taken for analysis.” 108.  By pointing out these specific contents of the  ig h CA report Exh.81, various points were raised on behalf  of the appellant by learned Senior Counsel.   So also  the   attention   of   this   Court   is   drawn   towards   the  H specific   evidence   of   PW   18   that   he   removed   the  sticking   plasters   from   the   sample   bottle   containing  ba y blood received along with Form­B Exh.102 and pasted  them at the bottom of said Form. There is no specific  B om evidence   on   which   day   he   did   this   procedure.  Apparently, he did this prior to taking of the sample  for   analysis.     Admittedly,   the   analysis   was   done   on  1.10.2002 and the removing the sticking plasters from  the   sample   sent   through   the   police   station   and  received   from  the   constable,  was  done   prior   to  that         150 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 151  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and definitely on the receipt of the sample by the CA  C ou office.  On this aspect, now coming to the substantive  evidence of PW No. 21 Sharad Borade, it can be seen  that   when   he   was   on   duty   on   30.9.2002   at   Bandra  Police   Station,   I.O.   Rajendra   Kadam   called   him   and  ig h gave two sealed envelopes. One envelope was having  two bottles and one envelope was having a letter.  The  H said envelopes were given to him by Rajendra Kadam  for carrying to the CA Office, Kalina. He then handed  ba y over the envelopes to the Laboratory. He identified the  forwarding letter given by the police at Exh.80 as he  B om made an endorsement at the back of said letter to the  effect   that   he   delivered   forwarding   letter   from   the  police station along with Form “A” and “B” to the CA  office.     This   Sharad   Borade   is   Head   Constable   No.  20419.   He   identified   his   endorsement   as   mentioned  above, as Exh.80­A. In fact, it is surprising to note that  Exh.80 is a letter addressed by PI Shengal to Chemical         151 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 152  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Analyser,   Kalina   Santacruz.   However,   the  C ou acknowledgement or a sort of endorsement made by  PW 21 i.e. the Constable who carried the sample and  the letters to CA, is appearing on the back of the same  letter and, in fact, he got back that letter to the Police  ig h Station   that   is   what   is   his   evidence   at   the   end   of  paragraph   1   in   the   notes   of   evidence.   His   evidence  H reads thus : B om ba y “Now I am shown Exh.80. I say that   letter   is   the   same.   I   also   made   endorsement on the back of the letter   (Exh.80) that I received the letter of   police   station   along   with   Form   “A”   and   Form   “B”   and   also   I   deposited   two sealed bottles of blood of accused.   The   endorsement   is   at   Exh.80­A.   I   also signed below the endorsement.  I   also   obtained   the   acknowledgement   from   Kalina   Laboratory   about   delivering   the   bottles.   I   handed   over   the   letter   along   with   the   acknowledgement to the Investigating   Officer   about   delivering   the   bottles   and the letter to Laboratory, Kalina.”         152 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 153  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 109. rt                                                                                                                       In   fact,   there   could   not   have   been   any  C ou endorsement   mentioning   that   he   handed   over   Form  “A”   and   “B”   as   those   Forms   were   kept   in   sealed  envelopes as per the evidence of PW 20 Dr Shashikant  Pawar from Sir JJ Hospital.  There was nothing for the  ig h Constable Borade to know that he was taking Form “A”  and “B” and giving such endorsement on Exh.80. What  H he was given is the sealed envelope containing letters  and another envelope containing two bottles (phials).  ba y Another   anomalous   thing     is   that   the   said   Exh.80  should form part of the record of the Forensic Science  B om Laboratory, as it was addressed to the Laboratory and  on   the   back   of   it   there   could   not   have   been   any  endorsement by the carrier i.e. PW 21.   In fact, this  anomalous   situation   has   not   been   explained   by   the  prosecution.   Exhibit   80   which   was   produced   before  the Sessions Court is in fact the original letter and not  the office copy. This fact is ascertained from the record         153 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:53 ::: 154  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       of proceeding of the trial Court. Had it been the office  C ou copy, then, PW 21 taking it back to the police station  along   with   his   endorsement   as   to   “delivery”   to   the  office   of   CA,   would   have   been   probable   and  acceptable. But the original letter addressed to the CA  ig h for   no  official  purpose   should  go  back  to the  police  station   but   it   should  remain  with the  CA  office  and  H during   recording   of   the   evidence   should   come   from  the   custody   of   the   Chemical   Analyser.   Initially,   this  ba y letter was produced before the M.M. Court when the  trial was for the main offence under section 304­A of  B om IPC.   Then, it was apparently marked as P­19, which  has   now become Exh.80 in the Sessions Court trial.  The   anomaly     in   the   prosecution   evidence   does   not  stop here, but this witness PW 21 further went on to  say   now   during   cross­examination   that   he   brought  back   the   Form   “B”   which   is   Exh.102   to   the   Police  Station and this happened on 30.9.2002. His evidence         154 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 155  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       C ou to that effect reads thus : B om ba y H ig h “Exhibit   102   shown   to   the   witness.   The   receiving   clerk   put   an   endorsement   about   receipt     of   the   bottle   and   also   my   buckle   number   was   mentioned   in   the   endorsement,   (B.No.   80429).   Buckle   number   was   mentioned  in  the  endorsement   made   by   him   and   the   same   Form   was   returned to me. I then submitted the   same Form to the Police Station. I do   not know when the labels were put on   Exh.102.  The labels were not put on   Exh.102   in   my   presence.   I   do   not   know how the labels were affixed on   Exh.102.     handed   over   Exh.102   to   Inspector   Kadam.   I   do   not   know   whether there were labels on Exh.102,   when I delivered the letter to Kadam.   During five minutes, the endorsement   “one   sealed   phial   seal   intact   as   per   copy sent (blood in two phials)” was   not   made   in   my   presence   by   the   receiving clerk on Exh.102.”  110.   In fact, this substantive evidence of PW 21  contradict the case of PW 18 as discussed above, as  according to PW 18 he removed the sticking plasters         155 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 156  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       from the sealed bottle and pasted them at the bottom  C ou of   Exh.102   –   Form­   “B”.   If   PW   21   had   taken   back  Form­   “B”   (Exh.102)   on   30.9.2002   itself   after  delivering   the   samples   to   the   receiving   clerk   at   the  laboratory,   then,   this   Form­B   could   not   have   been  ig h available   before   PW   18   so   as   to   put   the   sticking  plasters on it prior to taking the sample for analysis.  By   pointing   out   the   above,   the   evidence   as  H 111. brought before the Sessions Court, it is submitted on  ba y behalf of the appellant that there was manipulation in  the   blood   sample   and   what   was   extracted   at   Sir   JJ  B om Hospital   had  not   reached  the   CA  office.  In  order  to  further this argument, the following factual position is  brought to the notice of this Court during arguments  and  it   is  appearing  from  the   evidence.  According  to  PW 20 Dr Shashikant Pawar from Sir JJ Hospital one  sealed   envelope   was   given   but   at   the   police   station         156 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 157  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       two sealed envelopes were given to PW 21. According  C ou to   PW   21   Borade,   he   gave   two   envelopes   to   the  Laboratory. It is significant to note that the receiving  clerk  from  the  CA office  is  not  examined, otherwise  this discrepancy as to whether, in fact, PW 21 got back  ig h the   original     Exh.102   from   the   CA   office,   or   it   still  remained   with   the   CA,   till   the   sample   and   the   said  H Form­B   Exh.102   reaches   the   hands   of   PW   18   could  have been clarified. This is, in fact, a missing link in  ba y the biological evidence which is required to have been  established by the prosecution while placing reliance  B om on   the   test   report   Exh.81.   Further   more,   a   striking  variance   as   to   the   factual   position,   how   the   sealing  was done is brought to the notice of this Court and it  is observed that the sealing of the blood sample was  done by the ward boy at JJ Hospital.   Initially, white  bandage was tied on the phials, then the lakh seal was  applied   on   the   top   and   bottom   and   then   thereafter         157 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 158  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       sticking   plaster   was   wrapped   and   on   which   the  C ou relevant   information   regarding   EPR   number,   date,  time,   etc.   was   mentioned.   According   to   PW   18,   he  removed the labels i.e. the sticking plaster and fixed  them   on   the   Form   “B”   (Exh.102).   Prior   to   that   he  ig h talked of a Tixo tape,  which according to him was the  tape with which sealing was done on the phials.  PW  H 18 does not talk  of red wax seal but he talked of Tixo  tape.   Now,   the   specific   evidence   of   PW   20   on   this  ba y aspect is appearing in paragraph no. 2 of his notes of  evidence  to the following effect:­ B om “Bottles   (phials)   were   capped   by   white   colour   bandage   (sticking   plaster). The seal of lakh was put on   the upper and lower end of both the   phials.   The   labeling   of   EPR   number   about date, time and PC number and   it   was   wrapped   around   the   two   phials”.  112. As   against   this,   according   to   PW   18   in         158 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 159  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       paragraph no. 13 of his evidence  had stated that the  C ou constable brought two bottles which were wrapped by  Tixo tape. PW 18 talked of constable directly giving  him a sample bottle whereas said PC PW 21 talked of  delivery of bottle to the receiving clerk. The Receiving  ig h Clerk   is   not   examined   by   the   prosecution.   Now,  according to PW 20 Dr Pawar,   he collected blood in  H two phials each containing 3 ml. and in  one phial he  added oxalate preservative and other phial was plain.  ba y According   to   PW   18   Dattatraya   Bhalshankar,   in   his  cross­examination he admitted that he received 4 ml.  B om of blood for analysis which he measured by taking the  quantity   from   both   the   phials   and   he   measured  apparently by the same pipette. (Glan apparatus used  in laboratory for chemical analysis). This is significant  for the reason that one phial, according to doctor, was  containing   Oxalate   in   the   blood   and   another   phial  contained   plain   blood.   In   fact,   greater   care   should         159 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 160  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       have been taken by the analyst PW 18. His evidence is  C ou to be accepted as that of an expert's evidence and in  order   to   place   reliance   on   the   same   so   as   to   its  authenticity,   in fact, the handling of the sample and  the stages through which the sample passed from the  ig h stage   of   taking   of   the   blood   at   Sir   JJ   Hospital   and  reaching the CA office was of an immense importance.  H Even for this reason Form “B” or for that matter the  Rules   under   the     Bombay   Prohibition     (Medical  ba y Examination and Blood Test) Rules, 1959 contemplate  a   special   procedure   in   order   to   ascertain   the  B om authenticity that  what  is extracted at  the hospital is  reaching   the   laboratory.     In   the   Form­B   (Exh.   102)  there is buckle number of the constable PC No. 2985  from   Bandra  Police  station,   mentioned  as a  carrier.  This constable is not examined. In fact, the Format of  Form  “B” also mention that the messenger could also  be from Sir JJ Hospital. But, apparently, this mode is         160 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 161  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       not chosen by the doctor PW 20 and the sample was  C ou given   in   the   custody   of   the   constable.     It   being   a  biological sample and apparently immediately on the  day of the receipt of the sample i.e. 28.9.2002 it was  not   delivered   to   the   office   of   Chemical   Analyser,  ig h utmost care was necessary to have been taken by the  Investigating   Agency   when   the   sample   is   routed  113. H through the police. On the above aspect, again a glaring anomaly  ba y is required to be considered.  Though it is the case of  the prosecution that on 28.9.2002 and 29.9.2002, the  B om CA office was closed  as these were the days falling on  Saturday   and   Sunday   and   though   the   sample   could  not have been sent immediately to the CA, the sample  was   required   to   have   been   placed   in   a   secured  condition so as to rule out any possibility of internal  fermentation of the blood sample. Otherwise the final         161 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 162  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       results   would   not   be   accurate.     Otherwise   also,   as  C ou argued on behalf of the appellant, a special messenger  could have been sent and the office of the   CA could  have been requested to accept the biological sample  even on the office closure days. But this procedure is  ig h not adopted.   In fact, it is unfortunate, if it is a fact,  that the office of CA will entirely remain close for not  H accepting any emergent samples, in case of exigencies.  But, apparently, it is seen from the material on record  ba y and   what   is   produced   before   the   Court   by   the  Investigating Agency that the sample was not sent on  B om 28.9.2002 but it was sent on 1.10.2002 that also with  the above referred anomalies as to number of phials  and more particularly the quantity.  114. Again the anomaly does not stop here. There  is the evidence of the IO PW 27 that the sample was  kept   in   his   anti­chamber   in   refrigerator,   from         162 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 163  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       28.9.2002 till it was given to PW 21 Borade.  Nothing  C ou is brought  on record by the prosecution that in fact  such arrangement of having a refrigerator at the anti  chamber   of  a police  officer  at  Bandra  Police  Station  was   officially   done.   Even   if   such   arrangement   is  ig h unofficially done, then also there is nothing on record  to show that there was such refrigerator kept.   It is  H another question whether any such refrigerator can be  kept   in   the   anti   chamber   of   a   police   officer   at   the  ba y police station and if it is required to be done for some  official purpose, then there should be an official record  B om to   that   effect.   However,   the   investigating   agency  wanted   to   believe   that   the   said   sample   was   kept   in  refrigerator with   the police station from evening of  28.9.2002 till morning of 1.10.2002.  115. Apart from the above, still, another anomaly  as to whether there  was any preservative in the blood         163 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 164  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       sample. The substantive evidence of PW 20 a doctor  C ou from JJ hospital shows that he added 'Oxalate' in one  of the phials containing 3 cc of blood. Another phial  was not having any additive but having only the plain  blood   3   cc.   Even   the   CA   report   mention   regarding  ig h presence of 'Oxalate' in one phial and it is, in fact, the  factual   position   that   the   Oxalate   is   being   used   as  H anticoagulant   and   not   as   a   preservative.   This   is  specifically accepted by the expert PW 18. He further  ba y stated that preservative is required to be added in the  blood sample in order to rule out the possibility of the  B om generation   of   any   other   alcoholic   substances   in   the  sample   itself   due   to   its   degeneration.   Needless   to  mention   that   the   effect   of   an   'anticoagulant'   is  different than the effect of a 'preservative'. The usually  used   preservative   even   according   to   PW   18   and  according to the  Chemistry so far as analysis of blood  for   alcohol   is   Sodium   Fluoride   (NaF).   It   is,   in   fact,         164 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 165  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       astonishing to see that the expert witness PW 18 was  C ou not in a position to give correct chemical formula of  Sodium  Fluoride and he mentions the  formula as Na 2  SO4.     Na2SO4  is   actually   'Sodium   Sulphate'   and  formulae for Sodium Fluoride is 'NaF'. A common man  ig h may forget about niceties of Chemistry but the expert  from the Forensic Science Laboratory giving this type  H of   evidence   before   the   Court   depicts   some   other  picture. Lack of knowledge on the part of an expert  ba y may   not   always   be   disastrous   in   case   of   analysis   of  minor things. But here what was to be established by  B om the prosecution was the drunkenness and percentage  of the alcohol in the blood sample of the appellant. On  all these anomalies, it is tried to be argued on behalf  of the State that though the CA is giving his evidence  as   an   expert,   he   need   not   know   all   the   chemical  reactions or formulas, he may not be in a position to  give the details as to how a particular analysis can be         165 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 166  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       done. But it is to be seen whether he has  followed the  116. C ou procedure which was prescribed under the law.  According to the prosecution, the CA report  Exh.81 is required to be accepted as to containing the  ig h alcohol twice the limit than that is permitted by law.  To further this argument, it is submitted on behalf of  the   State   that   even   the   Rules   4   and   5   under   the  H Bombay Prohibition  (Medical Examination and Blood  Test) Rules, 1959  do not mandate that the said rules  ba y are mandatory but they are directory. On this aspect,  various authorities are cited on behalf of the appellant  B om and   it   is   submitted   that   though   the   rules   are   not  mandatory,   the   procedural   aspect   is   required   to   be  strictly followed.   Though the rules say, for example,  that minimum 5 ml of the blood is necessary to be sent  to   the   laboratory,   in   some   cases,   if   less   quantity   is  received then this anomaly, itself, will not negate the         166 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 167  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       effect of the tests report. Following are the authorities  C ou on the procedure to be followed in drawing of a blood  sample for 'alcohol' and substantial compliance of Rule  4 as per Section 129­A of the Bombay Prohibition Act.  (1) 1979 Bom C.R. 419 ig h       [Shravan Ganpat v. The State of Maharashtra] (2)  1979 Bom.C.R. 263 H [Ashok   Hariba   More   vs.   The   State   of   Maharashtra] : This authority deals with Rule 4  (2)   of   the   Bombay   Prohibition   (Medical  ba y Examination   and   Blood   Test   )Rules,   1959   and  specify that sample of blood shall be forwarded  for test either by Post or with a special messenger  (3) 1977 U.C.R. (Bom.) 532 [Tulsiram Gangaram Raykar Vs. The State of  Maharashtra] B om and shall be accompanied by Form “B”.  (4)  1967 Mh.L.J. 13 [Bankatlal V. State]        167 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 168  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc (5) AIR 1967 Guj 219, (1967) 8 GLR 31. (6) 1980 Bom.C.R. 947   C ou [Karansingh   Balubha   Vs.   State   of Gujarat) rt                                                                                                                       [Suresh   Shankar   Chavan   Vs.   The   State   of   Maharashtra] ig h (7)  AIR 1980 SC 1314 [State of Rajasthan Vs. Daulat Ram) H (8)  AIR 1967 Bombay 218 [Narayan Krishnaji Marulkar & Anr Vs. State] ba y (9)  1986 (3) Bom.C.R. 341 (Aurangabad Bench) B om [The   State   of   Maharashtra   Vs.   Raghunath   Madhavrao Marathe] 117. From   the   above   authorities   it   is   not   certain  that Rule 4 is mandatory but, of course, there cannot  be any compromise  on the aspect when a particular  procedure is to be applied and which goes to the root  of   the   matter,   then   fulfillment   of   that   procedure   is  required to be established by material on record. Here         168 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:54 ::: 169  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the main anomaly is not that when 5 ml of blood   is  C ou necessary for the tests and 4 ml is received by PW 18  Bhalshankar, but the anomaly is what is sent by the  doctor is 6 ml and what is received by the CA is 4 ml.  Moreover, there is anomaly regarding how the sample  ig h was   received   by   the   CA   PW   18.   At   the   cost   of  repetition, it must be mentioned that he received the  H sample   from   one   Constable.   However,   the   police  constable PW 21 is silent on the aspect and he talked  ba y of giving sample to the receiving clerk. By pointing out  this, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that if it  B om is required  to be accepted that both these witnesses  are   right   on   this  aspect,   then,  some   other   constable  must   have   reached the  CA with the  sample  because  PW 21 was not the constable who gave the sample to  PW   18.   In   fact,   this   controversy   could   have   been  resolved by  examining the    receiving clerk from the  office of CA but he is not produced before the Court in         169 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 170  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       order   to   establish   the   link   and   to   suggest   that   the  C ou constable PW 21 is not giving the correct evidence but  he gave the sample to PW 18 directly. However, the  fact  remains  that  whatever evidence  adduced before  the Court is required to be viewed with the anomalies  118. ig h which are pointed out above. Again   on   the   above   aspect   as   to   the  H drunkenness and testing of the blood of the appellant  for alcohol content, it is again significant to note that  ba y except   Dr   Pawar   PW   20,   no   other   witness   of   the  prosecution is saying that the accused was smelling of  B om alcohol.   Even   Ravindra   Patil   did   not   mention   this  while giving his FIR that the  accused was drunk and  drove the vehicle. PW no. 20 Dr Pawar in his report  and in his evidence before the Court did mention to  the following effect :­ “I noticed breath was smelling alcohol.”        170 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 171  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 119. rt                                                                                                                       This answer was in reference to the clinical  C ou examination   of   the   appellant­accused.   But   this  evidence is required to be viewed in juxtaposition of  the   factual   position   discussed   earlier   regarding   the  word “alcohol” not appearing at the back of the OPD  EPR register.   One more aspect on this alcohol consumption  H 120. ig h paper Exh.98 though apparently it is appearing on the  and the tests and the precautions to be  taken while  ba y taking the sample and the carrying out the analysis, is  required to be mentioned. It is argued on behalf of the  B om State   that   the   rules   under   the   Bombay   Prohibition  (Medical   Examination   and   Blood   Tests)   Rules,   1959  cannot be applicable in the present case as there is no  charge   in   the   present   case   for   the   offence   under  section   66   (1)   (b)   of   the   Bombay   Prohibition   Act,  1949.     On   this  aspect,   it   is   to  be   seen   that  initially         171 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 172  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       when   the   matter   was   before   the   M.M.Court,   main  C ou charge   was   under   section   304­A   of   IPC,   the   charge  under section 66 (1)(b) under the Bombay Prohibition  Act was also framed.  Secondly, the procedure adopted  by PW 18 Dr Pawar from Sir JJ Hospital was regrading  ig h sending   of   Form   “A”   and   Form     “B”   along   with   the  sample   presupposes   that   there   should   have   been  H compliance of the said rules.  Thirdly, when the matter  was before the Sessions Court after the committal and  ba y when the charge was framed initially, the charge was  framed   under   section   66   (1)(b)   of   the   Bombay  B om Prohibition Act also. But when the matter came before  this Court challenging the applicability of Section 304  Part II of IPC, this Court took a view  that section 304  Part II of IPC is not applicable. But, consequently, the  said order was challenged before  the  Apex Court  as  detailed earlier and the matter again came back and  was heard before the M.M. Court. Ultimately, before         172 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 173  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   M.M.   Court   present   PW   18   and   20   were   also  C ou examined. This charge under section 66 (1)(b) of the  Bombay Prohibition Act was already framed. Then it  so happened that  after 17 witnesses the matter was  again sent back to the Sessions Court on committal. At  ig h this stage, the charge under section 66 (1)(b) was not  framed.   There   was   no   explanation   from   the  H prosecution as to why this charge under section 66 (1) (b) though earlier framed when the appellant­accused  ba y was tried before the M.M.Court, not so framed before  the Sessions Court.  In any event, the argument by the  B om State that for non framing of a charge under section  66 (1)(b) under the Prohibition Act, the Rules under  the   Bombay   Prohibition   (Medical   Examination   and  Blood Test) Rules, 1959 are of no significance, cannot  sustain. The question is whether the investigation was  proceeding   in   a   particular   direction   for   proving   a  charge u/s 66 (1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act.         173 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 174  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Then   in   that   event   it   was   incumbent   upon   the  C ou prosecution to follow the procedure.  In any event, this  is the aspect which is required to be considered and in  fact it must be held that this goes to the root of the  matter   as   to   the   consumption   of   alcohol   by   the  ig h appellant and it must be said that the evidence of the  prosecution had not reached that standard of proof for  H establishing   that   the   blood   collected   from   the  appellant­accused   was   having   that   percentage   as  ba y mentioned in Exh.81.  121. On above aspect itself, another circumstance  B om is   required   to   be   mentioned   as   to   initially   the  appellant was sent to Bhaba Hospital according to the  Investigating   Agency.   However,   no   document   was  produced before the Court as to report from the Bhaba  Hospital   that   the   facility   of   taking   the   blood   is   not  available   or   the   requisite   equipments   are   not   there.         174 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 175  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       This   stand of the Investigating Agency is required to  C ou be examined in view of the factual position that the  blood   of   a   deceased   Nurulla   was   taken   at   Bhaba  Hospital for analysis. Of course, it is the argument on  behalf of the State that the procedure for taking blood  ig h of   a   deceased   and   the   procedure   of   blood   to   be  extracted from a living being and that also for analysis  H of   alcohol,   are   different   and   require   different  expertize, then also there should have been a report  ba y before the Court that the said facility was not available  at   Bhaba   Hospital   and   the   blood   could   not   be  B om extracted there for that purpose. Of course, this is one  of the circumstances argued on behalf of the appellant  in order to show the quality of the investigation for  showing the procedural lapses.   122. This   aspect   was   also   dealt   with   before   the  Sessions   Court.   However,   apparently   the   Sessions         175 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 176  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Court came with a different analysis saying that the  C ou judicial notice could have been taken that if the blood  is extracted from a person then always there should be  a sticking plaster on his arm or on the part from where  the   blood   is   extracted.     By   no   stretch   of   any  ig h imagination   can it be said that this is a concept for  taking   a   judicial   notice.   However,   exactly   that   has  H been done by the trial Court. In any event, the factual  position as referred to above indicate as resulted in the  ba y above finding of this Court as to non­establishment of  the fact of consumption of alcohol by the appellant­ B om accused. TYRE BURSTING : 123. Now, coming to the third major aspect as to  whether   it   was   a   pure   and   simple   accident   due   to  bursting   of   the   left   front   side   tyre   of   the   car   and  whether   the   said   defence   raised   on   behalf   of   the         176 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 177  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       appellant­accused is probable or not.   On this aspect,  C ou the major substantive evidence is that of PW 19 Arjun  Kesker,   the   RTO   Inspector   and   also   that   of   defence  witness Ashok Singh. PW 19 is the RTO Inspector who  inspected   the   vehicle   involved   in   the   accident   and  ig h gave his report at Exh.84.  At the cost of repetition, it  is   to   be   mentioned   that   at   about   9:30   a.m.   he   had  H inspected the vehicle on 29.9.2002. Then the vehicle  was standing in front of Bandra Police Station. Firstly,  ba y he   checked   the   vehicle     from   all   the   angles   from  outside and recorded damages, scratches found on the  B om vehicle.   Externally   he   noticed   that   the   damage   was  caused to the left side and front bumper was found  missing. He also noticed left head light as well as side  light was broken. The electrical wires of the bulb were  found outside. He noticed scratches on the wind shield  glass. Right side mirror was also found broken. Now  the specific observations of this witness are coming in         177 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 178  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       paragraph  no. 5 of  his  evidence   before  the  Sessions  C ou Court. He also went beneath the car in order to see  whether   any   damage   was   caused   to   the   car   from  below. He also opened the  bonnet which was bent. He  checked   oil,   coolant   and   also   checked   mechanical  ig h defects, electrical connections and noticed and found  all   intact.   The   result   of   this   examination   apparently  H lead to the conclusion that there was no much damage  except   the   front   left   side   damage   and   loss   of   the  ba y bumper from the front side. This fact is important in  the light of the case of the prosecution that during the  B om incident the vehicle was being driven at the speed of  90 to 100 km per hour. This is also important and to  be viewed in juxtaposition of the situation   as stated  by PW 7 and PW 15 that there were speed breakers on  the St.Andrews Road near Holy Family Hospital.  This  is   again   more   significant   when   it   is   the   case   of   the  prosecution   that   the   vehicle   took   the   rout   from         178 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 179  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       J.W.Marriott Hotel till the house of the appellant via  C ou St.Andrews   Road   and   Hill   Road.     Apparently,   the  accident occurred at the junction of St. Andrews Road  and Hill Road. As such, considering installation of the  speed   breakers   as   stated   by   the   witnesses   and  ig h considering the speed, alleged to be 90 to 100 km per  hour,   and   considering   the   damage   which   is   now  H observed,   it   is   difficult   to   assess   as   to   whether   the  things had happened as depicted by the case  of the  ba y prosecution.     The   effect   of   a   speed   breaker   can   be  understood   by   the   condition   of   the   vehicle   when  B om running in at speed of 90 to 100 km per hour and if  with this speed the vehicle collides with any stationery  object like in this case it collided with   the shutter of  American Laundry then the result of impact would be  very disastrous so far as damage of the vehicle. This is  more so when apparently there are no break marks on  the spot and nothing to that effect is appearing in the         179 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 180  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       panchnama, or there is no evidence of any witnesses  C ou as to finding of break marks on the road or anything  to   suggest   that   the   vehicle   may   have   slowed   down.  With this basic understanding, the evidence of PW 19  is to be analyzed.  Also it is to be seen in the light of  ig h the evidence of the other witnesses as to the puncture  or bursting of the left side front tyre.  Again, it is to be  H seen   that   this   RTO   Inspector   PW   19   has   not   stated  anything   regarding   the   left   side   door   whether   in  ba y damaged condition or inoperable in any manner. This  witness   further   say   that   he   opened   the   driver's   side  B om door   for   checking   the   vehicle.   He   tried   to   start   the  engine by inserting the key of the ignition. The engine  started   after   inserting   the   key   for   ignition.   He   also  checked   whether   hand   break   was   functioning.   After  checking   various   other   parameters   regarding   engine  and     hydraulic   connection   for   power   steering   and  noticing   that   everything   was   intact,   he   checked   the         180 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 181  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       electrical   signal   and   found   them   in   order.   He   also  C ou found the gear box in order. Then, according to him,  he took the vehicle for test drive.   At this time, this  witness  was  questioned,   still in  the examination­in­ chief that instead of finding less air in the left front  ig h side wheel, whether he was in a position to drive the  car. To this he answered that he was in a position to  H drive the car in spite of the less air in the left front  tyre.  At this juncture, it must be mentioned that there  ba y are various witnesses who deposed as to finding the  left front tyre either punctured or burst. Without going  B om much into details of the answers by these witnesses,  suffice it to say that PW 1 in  para 7 stated “left tyre of  the car was found punctured”.  PW 8 in para no. 6 has  stated, “the left front tyre of the car was found burst.”  PW 13 in paragraph no. 3 stated “the tyre of the car  was   found   burst”.   PW   26   the   police   officer   had  specifically stated and agreed that the vehicle involved         181 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 182  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       in   the   accident   was   towed   from   the   spot   of   the  C ou accident as it was not in a position to be driven. The  same   police   officer   further   stated   that   the   left   front  tyre   of   the   car   was   burst.       The   last   prosecution  following effect:­ ig h witness   PW   27   Police   Officer   Shengal   stated   to   the  ba y H “It was not possible for me to send the   front left tyre to the Forensic Lab for   ascertaining   the   extent   and   cause   of   the burst.” 124.  By the above, this witness accepted that the  B om tyre was burst but he did not take  any measures to  find out the cause, much less to ascertain whether it  was due to the   impact of the incident or because of  the bursting the incident occurred i.e. whether it is the  final result of the incident occurred, or it is the cause  for the incident.”  125. Now coming  back to the evidence of PW 19,         182 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 183  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       during the course of cross­examination he had given  C ou altogether   a   different   story   as   to   on   which   day   he  examined   the   vehicle   and   which   day   he   gave   the  report at Exh.84.   According to this witness, he came  to know about the incident when he received the call  ig h on 29.9.2002.  He enquired with the police about the  incident but they could not tell him about the incident.  H He had asked the police about the   papers as to how  the incident took place but the police told him that the  ba y papers   were   not   ready.   He   demanded   the   CR  registered   from   police   but   copy   of   FIR   was   not  B om available.   Police   told   him   that   the   documents   were  being prepared. He further stated that he did not see  the case papers.  Now, a very different story is given by  this   witness   during   cross­examination   which   is  appearing in paragraph 12 of his notes of evidence to  the following effect:        183 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:55 ::: 184  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc During   further   cross­examination,   he   also  H 126. ig h C ou “It is true that I came to know that on   the   morning   of   28.9.2002   that   an   accident had occurred. I also made a   call to the control room on 29.9.2002   as   to   whether   an   inspection   of   the   vehicle involved in the accident  is to   be carried or not. I had inspected the   vehicle   on   the   same   day   of   the   occurrence   of   the   incident.   Control   room   gave   information   to   me   about   the incident on 28.9.2002.” rt                                                                                                                       answered that he knew one police officer Imtiaz. He  ba y was   Inspector   working   with   him   and   was   senior   to  him.     According   to   this   witness,   Imtiyaz   also  B om accompanied to Bandra Police Station. Imtiyaz came  with   him   as   he   was   residing   near   Bandra   Police  station.     According   to   this   witness,   it   happened   on  28.9.2002   at   about   9:00   to   9:30   a.m.   This   witness  further   answered  that   the  officer  who  gave   him  the  key for inspection of that vehicle  was standing with  Imtiaz and Imtiaz had also seen the vehicle. According         184 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 185  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       to this witness, Imtiaz told him whether he checked a  C ou particular   thing   in   the   vehicle   or   not.   This   witness  returned the key to the officer within 20 minutes from  the moment key was given to him. On the next day of  this   inspection   he   visited   Bandra   Police   Station   at  ig h about 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and remained there for  half an hour. Apparently, then he prepared the report.  H In fact, this is totally in variance to his earlier story  given   in   paragraph   no.3   in   his   examination­in­chief  ba y that   he   inspected   the   vehicle   at   9:30   a.m.   on  29.9.2002.     Admittedly,   this   witness   has   not   been  B om declared hostile and   is not put the questions in the  nature of cross­examination by the learned Prosecutor  during   the   trial.   The   variance   in   the   substantive  evidence of this witness has not been explained by the  prosecution by taking answers from him. As such this  witness   was   also   not   disowned   by   the   prosecution.  This   raises   a   reasonable   doubt   whether   in   fact   the         185 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 186  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       inspection of the vehicle was done by him as stated.  C ou More so by driving the vehicle when it was admittedly  immobilized   and   was   required   to   have   been   taken  from the spot of the incident to the police station by  towing.   Considering   these   circumstances   and   the  ig h evidence of the other witnesses mentioned above, it is  difficult to accept that the left side front tyre of the  H vehicle was not punctured or burst. Now the question  remains whether the bursting of the tyre was prior to  ba y the incident or it was the  bursting due to the impact  of  the   car  on the platform in front  of the American  B om Bakery.  th th  DICTATION ON 9    AND 10       DECEMBER, 2015:     127. In   view   of   the   above   observations   it   is  ascertained that the vehicle involved in the accident  had a punctured / burst tyre and in fact this position  has been depicted by various witnesses as discussed in         186 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 187  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       detail   above.     Though   on  this  count  the  substantive  C ou evidence of PW­19 and also the documentary evidence  of vehicle examination report states otherwise, it must  be said that the report (Exhibit­84) apparently is not  in   the   form   prescribed   for   the   road   traffic   accident  ig h report.   In order to ascertain now as to the cause of  such   bursting   of   a   tyre   whether   it   was   the   bursting  H prior to the incident or whether the tyre burst because  of   the   incident   and   impact   of   the   vehicle   on   the  ba y shutter   of   American   Express   Laundry   and   while  climbing   the   platform,   it   was   incumbent   upon   the  B om investigating   agency   to   call   for   the   report   from   the  Forensic Science Experts.  In fact apparently as per the  evidence   of   PW­27   Police   Officer   Shengal   in  paragraph­30 of his evidence had specifically stated to  the following effect : “I   had   called   the   Forensic   team   for   examination of the vehicle.   I do not          187 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 188  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou recollect   their   names   or   expertise   today.   I do not know whether finger   prints were obtained from the car.   I   had taken the finger prints of accused.   I had sent the same to the finger print   experts.   I had not given direction to   ascertain   the   finger   prints   of   the   accused on the steering.” rt                                                                                                                       If these steps were taken by the investigating  ig h 128. agency   calling   for   the   Forensic   Science   team   for  H inspection   of   the   vehicle   then   definitely   it   was  required to ascertain the cause of bursting of the left  ba y side   front   tyre.     In   this   context   the   defence   of   the  accused is required to be seen.   Needless to mention  B om that in a criminal trial it is the duty of the prosecution  to establish its own case and there is no obligation by  law on the accused to prove his innocence and even if  he   chooses   to   record   any   defence   witness   then   the  burden of establishing the defence can be discharged  by the material which need not be satisfying the test of  evidence beyond reasonable doubt.  It is  well settled         188 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 189  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       that   the   defence   can   establish   its   case   if   at   all   the  C ou defence chooses to, by way of giving evidence which  satisfy the standard of preponderance of probability. In  fact   with   this   understanding   the   entire   evidence   of  defence witness DW­1 Ashok Singh is required to be  ig h viewed.   In paragraph­3 a specific case is pleaded by  DW­1 and which is reproduced hereunder : B om ba y H “I   then   took   the   vehicle   on   Linking   Road,   then   on   Gonsalves   Road   and   took the right  turn for going to Hill   Road.  Our vehicle came on Hill Road.   Our   vehicle   proceeded   at   some   distance on hill Road, then the front   left tyre of our vehicle burst, thereby   our   vehicle   pulled   towards   the   left   side.  I tried to turn my steering wheel   but it had become hard to turn.  I also   tried to apply the brakes, but by then   the   vehicle  had   climbed   the   stairs  of   the   Laundry.   Our   vehicle   then   stopped.”  129. By   placing   this   defence   material   before   the  Court through DW­1, it is tried to establish on behalf         189 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 190  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       of   the   appellant/accused   during   the   trial,   that   the  C ou vehicle was being driven by DW­1 as he was the fourth  person in the vehicle and after proceeding on the Hill  Road by taking a turn from Gonsalves road, the left  front tyre of the vehicle burst.  Of course, in a running  ig h vehicle when one of the tyres burst then the vehicle is  pulled towards the side on which the tyre is burst.  In  H fact this is the science and action of a moving vehicle  is   governed   by   the   laws   of   physics.       The   turning  ba y radius   of   a   vehicle   depends   upon   the   speed   of   the  vehicle and also the weight of the vehicle.  As such the  B om theory   putforth   before   the   Court   during   the   trial  through DW­1 was that the left side front tyre burst  and due to which the vehicle pulled towards the left  and   then   was   uncontrollable   thus   resulting   in   the  accident.     During   the   arguments   on   behalf   of   the  State, counter to this defence evidence, learned Public  Prosecutor stated that no where in the examination­in­        190 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 191  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       chief DW­1 had stated that exactly at which point on  C ou the road the left front tyre burst. Again in support of  this   submission   alleging   that   the   false   theory   being  propounded by the defence, learned Public Prosecutor  further   drew   attention   of   this   Court   towards   the  ig h answer   given   by   Ravindra   Patil   during   his   cross­ examination.  Of course the admissibility or otherwise  H of  substantive  evidence  of  Ravindra  Patil  which was  recorded before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court, is  ba y yet   to   be   scrutinized   hereafter,   but,   for   the   sake   of  argument  the answer given by Ravindra Patil to the  B om suggestion can be analyzed.  The substantive evidence  of Ravindra Patil which is appearing in the notes of  evidence during his cross­examination reads thus : “It is true that front left side tyre of   the   incident   motor   car   was   burst   at   the   place   of   the   incident.     It   is   true   that left side of the incident motor car   was pressed. It is true that there was   no condition of the incident motor car          191 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 192  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       130. C ou to open the left side door.”  By   pointing   the   first   answer   as   to   the   tyre  burst at the place of the incident, it is tried to argue  that this answer is required to be taken as the burst is  ig h due to the incident. If this is the meaning to be given  to   the   answer   then   there   must   be   some   supporting  material   required   to   have   been   brought   before   the  H Court during the investigation and in fact   there was  an opportunity for the investigating agency to get this  ba y material   by   way   of   sending   the   said   tyre   for   the  forensic   examination   as   to   whether   some   outside  B om foreign pointed object got inserted in the tyre or the  tyre has burst because of the impact and the pressure  of some hard object like a cement platform. Without  this   forensic   material   though   the   forensic   team   was  called to inspect the vehicle specially, it is difficult to  accept the submission on behalf of the State that the         192 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 193  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       answer given by Ravindra Patil is to be construed as  C ou the bursting of the tyre was due to the impact. If there  are   two   views   possible,   needless   to   mention   that   a  view   which   supports   the   accused   is   required   to   be  considered still considering the onus on the defence to  131. ig h establish its case on preponderance of probabilities. In the considered view of this Court on this  H aspect   of   bursting   of   tyre   it   is   not   conclusively  established   by   the   State   that   the   bursting   was   only  ba y because   of   the   impact   of   the   vehicle   either   on   the  cement platform in front of the bakery or due to any  B om other object before that.     Moreover there is another  check for substantiating this conclusion is that except  the   damage   to   the   left   front   show   of   the   car   and  missing of the bumper from the front side and some  destruction of some electrical lights, the RTO officer  (PW­19) did not find any damage to the vehicle from         193 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 194  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       beneath.  In fact according to him the vehicle was in a  C ou running condition and he had taken a test drive also.  As such, the arguments on behalf of the defence as to  the   bursting   of   tyre   cannot   be   thrown   away   only  because no accurate details are given by DW­1 in his  ig h examination­in­chief as to at exactly which point  on  the   Hill   road   the  tyre  burst.    In  fact  this  mitigating  H circumstance to the case of prosecution is to be viewed  apart   from   the   other   material   which   is   earlier  ba y discussed and also yet to be discussed in later part of  this judgment. B om SECTION 33 OF EVIDENCE ACT : 132. Now   the   important   aspect   of   the   matter   is  required to be dealt with and that is the acceptability  of the evidence of Ravindra Patil under Section 33 of  the Evidence Act.   In fact this is the crucial aspect as  apart   from   this   testimony   of   Ravindra   Patil,   the         194 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 195  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       prosecution   case   rests   only   on   the   substantive  C ou evidence of the injured eye witnesses concerning the  driving of the vehicle and eye witnesses from the Rain  Bar   on   the   aspect   of   drunkenness.     As   such,   the  substantive   evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   is   of   utmost  ig h importance and in fact he is the first informant in the  matter as he lodged his complaint within two hours of  H occurrence  of the incident.   The situation for taking  recourse to Section 33 of the Evidence Act occurred  ba y because   of   the   specific   circumstances   in   the   present  case.     As   detailed   earlier   in   the   beginning   of   this  B om judgment,   the   matter   was   before   the   Metropolitan  Magistrate Court and 17 prosecution witnesses were  examined.  Ravindra Patil was in fact PW­1 as he is the  first informant,  admittedly when the main charge was  for   the   offence   under   Section   304A   of   IPC.  Consequently     there   was   no   charge   of   culpable  homicide   not   amounting   to   murder,   specifically   a         195 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 196  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       charge   under   Section   304   Part   II   of   IPC   i.e.  C ou requirement   of   knowledge,   though   there   is   no  intention,   that   a   person   may   die   due   to   the   act  committed by the person.   Firstly   the   provisions   of   Section   33   of   the  ig h 133. Evidence Act can be seen which reads thus : B om ba y H “33.  Relevancy   of   certain   evidence   for proving, in subsequent proceeding,   the   truth   of   facts   therein   stated.— Evidence given by  a witness in a judicial   proceeding,   or   before   any   person   authorized by law to take it, is relevant for   the   purpose   of   proving,   in   a   subsequent   judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of   the same judicial proceeding, the truth of   the facts which it states, when the witness   is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable   of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way   by   the   adverse   party,   or   if   his   presence   cannot be obtained without an amount of   delay   or   expense   which,   under   the   circumstances   of   the   case,   the   Court   considers unreasonable:  Provided—   that   the   proceeding   was   between   the same parties or their representatives in   interest;         196 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 197  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou   that the adverse party in the first   proceeding had the right and opportunity   to cross­examine;  rt                                                                                                                          that   the   questions   in   issue   were   substantially the same in the first as in the   second proceeding.  134. ig h Explanation.—A criminal  trial or inquiry   shall be deemed to be a proceeding between   the prosecutor and the accused within the   meaning of this section.” A broad proposition can be formulated from  H the   above   definition   firstly   that   the   evidence   of   a  witness   in   earlier   proceedings   must   be   in   a   judicial  ba y proceeding or before any person authorized by law to  take it. Secondly, said evidence can be considered as  B om relevant for proving in subsequent judicial proceeding  or in a later stage of the same proceeding when said  witness  is  dead  or   not  found  or   incapable   of  giving  evidence or is kept out of way by the adverse party or  if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount  of delay or expense.          197 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:56 ::: 198  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 135. rt                                                                                                                       In the present case the evidence of Ravindra  C ou Patil   was   recorded   during   the   trial   before   the  Metropolitan Magistrate Court.  By pointing this out, it  is   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   State   that   this   is   the  evidence recorded in a judicial proceeding.  Of course,  ig h a   different   view   is   canvassed   on   behalf   of   the  appellant   that  though  the  proceeding was initially  a  H judicial   proceeding,   what   was   recorded   during   that  proceeding   subsequently   loses   its   character   as  ba y recording   in   any   judicial   proceeding   when   the   said  proceeding was required to have been stopped at the  B om Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   level   as   there   was   a  committal order passed and further proceeding after  the   committal  order  is   in  fact  a  denovo  proceeding.  This   aspect   was   also   to   be   dealt   accordingly.     The  important   requirement   for   accepting   the   evidence  from the earlier judicial proceeding in the later part of  the   proceeding   or   in   the   subsequent   judicial         198 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 199  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       proceeding   is   that   the   question   in   issue   must   be  C ou substantially   the   same   in   the   first   as   in   the   second  proceeding.   Much was argued by rival sides on this  proviso   whether   the   issues   involved   in   both   the  matters,   firstly   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate  ig h Court   and   secondly   before   the   Sessions   Court   were  substantially   the   same.     Here   the   question   is   the  H substantial similarity of the issues and not the material  required   for   establishment   of   the   issues.     The   issue  ba y before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   was  definitely   whether   there   was   an   offence   committed  B om under Section 304A of IPC whereas the issue before  the   Sessions   Court   was   commission   of   the   offence  under Section 304 Part II of IPC.   The provisions of  Section 304A and Section 304 Part II of IPC can be  reproduced with advantage : “304A. Causing death by negligence.— Whoever causes the death of any person by          199 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 200  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou doing   any   rash   or   negligent   act   not   amounting to culpable homicide, shall be   punished   with   imprisonment   of   either   description for a term which may extend to   two years, or with fine, or with both.” rt                                                                                                                       CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE ig h Punishment – Imprisonment for 2 years,  or fine, or both – Cognizable – Bailable –  Triable by Magistrate of the first class –  non­compoundable.” B om ba y H “304.   Punishment   for   culpable   homicide not amounting to murder.— Whoever   commits   culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to   murder   shall   be   punished   with   imprisonment   for   life,   or   imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term which may extend to ten years, and   shall   also   be   liable   to   fine,   if   the   act   by   which the death is caused is done with the   intention   of   causing   death,   or   of   causing   such   bodily   injury   as   is   likely   to   cause   death,    or   with   imprisonment   of   either   description for a term, which may extend   to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if   the act is done with the knowledge that it   is   likely   to  cause  death,  but  without   any   intention to cause death, or to cause such   bodily injury as is likely to cause death. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE        200 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 201  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc Para I : ­­­­ 136. C ou Para II : Punishment – Imprisonment for   10 years, or fine, or both – Cognizable –   Non­bailable – Triable by Court of Session   – Non­compoundable.” rt                                                                                                                       By   plain   reading   of   these   Sections,   as  ig h reproduced above, Section 304A completely excludes  the culpable homicide whereas section 304 either Part  H I or Part II postulate that it is a culpable homicide not  amounting   to   murder.   In   other   words,   Section   304  ba y contemplates that though the act is not a murder but  it must be a culpable homicide whereas section 304A  B om says   what   is   not   culpable   homicide   and   done   in   a  particular   manner   as   mentioned   in   the   section,   is  punishable   under   Section   304A   of   IPC.     This   is   the  difference between the two sections.  This issue which  was required to have been decided by the trial Court  and   which   goes   to   the   root   of   the   matter   that   the  questions in issue were substantially the same in the         201 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 202  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       first   as   in   the   second   matter.     The   meaning   of  C ou 'substantially   the   same'   cannot   be   taken   as   fulfilled  when   the   basic   ingredients   of   the   offences   are  different.     In   other   words   coming   to   this   case,   the  basic ingredient of the offence under Section 304A of  ig h IPC was rash and negligent act causing death but this  act is not at all a culpable homicide so the import of  H Section 304 is limited to the extent of rashness and  negligence   and   then   causing   the   death.     Something  ba y more   is   necessary   for   the   act   to   be   termed   as   a  culpable homicide and culpable homicide is defined in  B om Section 299 of IPC.  Moreover, the distinction between  these two sections lies in the penal effect, in the sense  for   the   offence   under   Section   304A   of   IPC   the  maximum punishment is upto two years or with fine  or both.  As such it is a lighter offence than compared  to section 304 IPC.   Even apart from the punishment  the offence under Section 304A is bailable and triable         202 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 203  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       by the Magistrate of First Class whereas the offence  C ou under Section 304 Part II, as in this case, attracts the  maximum  punishment  for imprisonment  of  10 years  or   with   fine   or   with   both   and   it   is   a   non­bailable  offence.     The   ingredients   to   satisfy   the   respective  ig h offences   are   wholly   different.     The   nature   of   these  offences are in fact different and it cannot be said that  H the questions in issue are substantially the same when  the   issues   were   tried   before   the   Metropolitan  ba y Magistrate Court and the issues were tried before the  Sessions   Court   more   particularly   when   one   is   not   a  B om culpable   homicide   at   all   while   the   other   is   culpable  homicide,   although   not   amounting   to   murder.     As  such, if this proviso to section 33 of the Evidence Act is  not satisfied then the result is required to be accepted  that no recourse to Section 33 of the Evidence Act can  be taken for reading the evidence of Ravindra Patil in  the Sessions Court trial.        203 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 204  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 137. rt                                                                                                                       More so the above aspect can be viewed in  C ou different   perspective.     It   so   happened   that   after  committal   the   question   arose   before   the   Sessions  Court for recording of the evidence and whether the  evidence   recorded   before   the   M.M.   Court   could   be  ig h taken   as   an   evidence   and   the   sessions   case   can  proceed on this.  Earlier in the preliminary paragraphs  H of this judgment this aspect has been dealt in detail as  to   in   what   manner   the   Sessions   Court   directed   the  ba y denovo trial thus not accepting the evidence of all 17  prosecution witnesses.   If by operation of law and by  B om committal   proceedings   the   earlier   evidence   recorded  before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   cannot   be  considered   as   a   valid   evidence   to   establish   the   case  against the accused, then it is difficult to accept that  how   part   of   that   evidence   can   be   accepted   under  different provision if the mandate of Section 33 of the  Evidence   Act   is   not   fully   complied.     Moreover   it   is         204 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 205  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       significant   to   note   that   said   Ravindra   Patil   died   on  C ou 3.10.2007 and prior to that he was examined before  the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court.   The   last   witness  before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   was  examined  on or about 25.2.2011 i.e. witness No.17.  ig h In fact much prior to the year 2011, Ravindra Patil had  already   expired.     However   admittedly   this   position  H was not brought to the notice of the Sessions Court  when   the   sessions   trial   commenced   and   almost   24  ba y prosecution   witnesses   were   examined.     Still   it   is  pertinent to note in the present sessions case that the  B om usual procedure of recording of the evidence has not  been   followed.         Of   course,   there   cannot   be   any  straight jacket formula as to examination of witnesses  in a particular manner but when the witness is a first  informant   and   when   the   entire   case   of   prosecution  rests on his evidence then it is the first thing for the  prosecution to bring him before the Court if available         205 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 206  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and then to proceed further with the matter, more so  C ou when  it  is  sessions trial.   In  fact  Ravindra Patil was  then a Constable working in the Bombay Police Force  and   at   some   point   of   time   he   was   dismissed   from  service   and   was   not   available   before   Metropolitan  ig h Magistrate Court for giving evidence after his earlier  evidence was recorded.  But still it is not explained by  H the   prosecution   as   to   on   which   date   did   it   learn  regarding the death of Ravindra Patil.   Subsequently  ba y his   brother   PW­25   Kailas   was   examined   by   the  prosecution on 7.3.2015 and through him the death  B om certificate   (Exhibit­140)   of   Ravindra   Patil   was  produced on record. It is also pertinent to   note that  even till recording of 24 witnesses before the Sessions  Court,   not   for   a   single   time   did   the   Sessions   Court  enquire as to   the whereabouts of the first informant  and why so far he was not examined. If the death of  Ravindra Patil was not known to the police and also         206 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 207  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       to the Court then the first endeavour to be made by  C ou the prosecution was to examine Ravindra Patil or to  search   for   him   and   then   report   to   the   Court   his  unavailability due to his death.  Whatever it might be,  but the fact remains that said Ravindra Patil died on  ig h 3.10.2007   when   the   matter   was   still   with   the  Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court.   The   application   for  H taking his evidence on record under Section 33 of the  Evidence   Act   was   filed   by   the   prosecution   (below  ba y Exhibit­131). It may not be of specific importance but  the   timing   of   said   application   (Exhibit­131),   by   the  B om prosecution for taking evidence  of Ravindra Patil on  record   in   the   Sessions   Court,   is   crucial   i.e   after  recording   of   evidence   of   24   witnesses   although  Ravindra Patil was named as the first witness in the  witness list.  The appellant/accused filed his reply vide  Exhibit­136   and   the   order   was   passed   by   the   Court  allowing the reading of the evidence of Ravindra Patil         207 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 208  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       in the sessions case but reserving its admissibility till  138. C ou the final decision of the sessions case. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant  strongly takes exception to this procedure adopted by  ig h the Sessions Court contending that   had the decision  of admissibility decided at the  very threshold of the  sessions case and although not at the starting of the  H trial,   but   even   at   the   time   of   passing  the   orders   on  Exhibit­131,   then   also   there   would   have   been   an  ba y opportunity   for   the   appellant/accused   to   take   an  appropriate   stand   and   either   to   re­call   earlier  B om witnesses   and   to   take   appropriate   steps   for   putting  forth the  defence. However, this opportunity was lost  because of the adjudication by the Sessions Court at  the time of final judgment, accepting the admissibility  of the evidence and relying on the same that also for  the purpose of decision on the main charge of Section         208 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 209  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       304   Part   II   of   IPC   when   admittedly   the   evidence  C ou earlier recorded was at the time of the main charge  under   Section   304A   of   IPC   before   the   Magistrate  Court. In   the   considered   view   of   this   Court   the  ig h 139. mandate of Section 33 of Evidence Act is not fulfilled  and evidence of Ravindra Patil cannot be taken as an  H evidence   in   the  Sessions trial.   In  any event  though  this   Court   has   come   to   the   conclusion   as   to   the  ba y erroneous   allowing   of   the   application   under   Section  33 of the Evidence Act by the trial Court, still if the  B om evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   is   to   be   considered,   still  alternatively   the   effect   of   the   evidence   of   Ravindra  Patil   can   be   discussed   in   order   to   see   whether   the  prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable  doubt. 140. Following authority is placed before the Court         209 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 210  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       wipes earlier evidence, as under : [I]  AIR 1963 SC 1531 C ou on behalf of the appellant on the aspect that retrial  [Ukha Kolhe Vs. State of Maharashtra] 141. Numerous   authorities   are   also   cited   on   the  ig h aspect   as   to   the   applicability   of   the   evidence   under  Section 33 of the Evidence Act, as under : H [I]   (1962) 3 SCR 328 [Payare   Lal   vs.   State   of   Punjab]:  This  authority   is   on   the   aspect   that   one   who   hear  ba y has   to   decide.   Paragraph­6   of   this   authority  B om reads thus : “6.  There is no controversy that the   general   principle   of   law   is   that   a   Judge or Magistrate can decide a case   only   on   evidence   taken   by   him.   Section 350 of the Code is a statutory   departure   from   this   principle.   That   section so far as material was at the   date S. Jagjit Singh decided the case   in these terms :  “350.   Whenever   any   Magistrate,   after   having   heard          210 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 211  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc H ig h C ou and recorded the whole or any   part   of   the   evidence   in   an   inquiry   or   a   trial,   ceases   to   exercise   jurisdiction   therein,   and   is   succeeded   by   another   Magistrate   who   has   and   who   exercises   such   jurisdictions,   the   Magistrate   so   succeeding   may   act on the evidence so recorded   by   his   predecessor,   or   partly   recorded by his predecessor and   partly recorded by himself or he   may   resummon   the   witnesses   and recommence the inquiry or   trial.”  rt                                                                                                                       B om ba y It   is   only   if   this   provision   was   available to S. Jagjit Singh that the   course   taken   by   him   can   be   supported.”  [II]  (1992) 1 SCC 279 [R.S.   Nayak   vs.   A.R.   Antulay   &   others]:  This  authority is on the effect on the case on transfer.  In this case of R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, though  the matter was earlier heard before the Judge of  the   Bombay   High   Court,   that   also   on   the  directions   of   the   Apex   Court,   subsequently   the         211 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 212  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       matter was transferred from the High Court to the  C ou Special  Court designated to try the  cases under  the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act.     Under   those  circumstances   the   earlier   recorded   evidence   of  almost   57 witnesses before   the   High  Court  was  H ordered. ig h not taken into consideration and denovo trial was  ba y [III]  2008(5) Bom. C.R. 367 [Padam Chandra Singhi & Ors. Vs. Praful B.   Desai (Dr.) & Ors.] :  This authority is on the  aspect as to use of Section 33 of the Evidence  B om Act.  It is held that recourse to this section to be  taken   only   in   exceptional   circumstances   and  when the condition in the said section by way  of provisos are fully complied.  It is observed in  the said authority in paragraphs­15 and 16   as  under :        212 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:57 ::: 213  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc B om ba y H ig h C ou “15. The depositions are in general   admissible only after proof that the   persons who made them cannot be   produced  before   the  Court  to  give   evidence. It is only in cases where   the   production   of   the   primary   evidence   is   beyond   the   party's   power   that   secondary   evidence   of   oral testimony is admissible. 16. It is an elementary right of a   litigant in civil suit that a witness,   who   is   to   testify   against   him,   should give his evidence before the   Court  trying the case, the adverse   party gets an opportunity to cross­ examine at the same time so that   the   Court   has   the   opportunity   of   seeing   the   witness   and   observing   his demeanour and can, thus, form   a better opinion as to his reliability   rather than reading a statement or   deposition given by that witness in   a previous judicial proceeding or in   an early stage of the same judicial   proceeding.” rt                                                                                                                       [IV] 1945 [Vol.XLVIII] 284 PRIVY COUNCIL [Chainchal   Sikngh   vs.   Emperor]:  The  observations of the Privy Council in the above  authority, while dealing with Section 33 of the         213 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 214  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       C ou Evidence Act, reads thus :  B om ba y H ig h “Where it is desired to have recourse   to this section on the ground that a   witness   is   incapable   of   giving   evidence, that fact must be proved,   and   proved   strictly.   It   is   an   elementary   right   of   an   accused   person  or   a   litigant   in  a   civil   suit   that   a   witness   who   is   to   testify   against him should give his evidence   before   the   Court   trying   the   case   which  then  has the  opportunity  of   seeing the witness and observing his   demeanour   and   can   thus   form   a   better   opinion   as   to   his   reliability   than   is   possible   from   reading   a   statement   or   deposition.   It   is   necessary   that   provision   should   be   made for exceptional cases where it   is   impossible   for   the   witness   to   be   before the Court, and it is only by a   statutory provision that this can be   achieved.   But   the   Court   must   be   careful to see that the conditions on   which   the   statute   permits   previous   evidence given by the witness to be   read are strictly proved.” [V]  (1988) 2 SCC 602 [A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak   & Anr.]:  This is  another   authority   and   it   relates   to   earlier         214 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 215  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       authority  (R.S. Nayak  v. A.R.  Antulay  &  Ors.,  C ou (1992) 1 SCC 279). Again this authority speaks  that earlier evidence not to be accepted when  the Forum is changed. ig h [VI]  (2014) 10 SCC 494 [J.V. Baharuni & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat &   H Anr.]:  This authority postulates that whenever  there   is   an   order   of   denovo   trial,   earlier  ba y evidence is erased.   Of course the ratio of this  authority is applicable when specifically there is  a case of denovo trial.  But the principle behind  B om the   ratio   remains   the   same   that   when   the  Forum  is changed the  earlier evidence  cannot  be   taken   shelter   of   unless   it   is   expressly  provided by the law. [VII]  2011(3) UC 1941 [Nitinbhai   Saevatilal   Shah   &   Anr.   Vs.          215 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 216  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Manubhai   Manjibhai   Panchal   &   Anr.]   :  In  C ou this case the reference is made to the decision  in Payare Lal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC  690.     The   view   endorsed   in   the   Payare   Lal's  case is mentioned in paragraph­16 of this case  ig h which reads thus : ba y H “16.  The cardinal principal of   law in criminal trial is that it   is a right of an accused that his   case   should   be   decided   by   a   Judge   who   has   heard   the   whole of it.  …..”  [VIII]  AIR 1964 SC 1673 [The State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sabir Ali &   Anr.] :  The ratio in this authority is that the  B om trial   conducted   by   a   Court   having   no  jurisdiction is void. [IX]  AIR 1928 CALCUTTA 183 [Budhu Tatua Vs. Emperor] : This authority is  also   on   the   ratio   that   where   part   of   the  evidence in a case is recorded by a Magistrate         216 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 217  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       who   has   no   jurisdiction,   and   part   of   the  C ou evidence by a Magistrate who has jurisdiction,  conviction is illegal and retrial is necessary. [X]  AIR 1926 Lah 582 [Buta   Singh   vs.   Emperor]:  The   ratio   of   this  ig h authority   is   that   after   committal   of   a   case,  earlier evidence is not to be looked into by the  H Court to which the case is committed. ba y [XI]  (1976) 1 SCC 889 [State   of   Gujarat   vs.   Haidarali   Kalubhai]   :   This authority distinguishes Section 304A and  B om Section 304 Part II of IPC.  The observations in  paragraph­10 of this authority reads thus : “10.   Section   304­A   by   its   own   definition   totally   excludes   the   ingredients   of   Section   299   or   Section 300 I.P.C. Doing an act   with the intent to kill a person   or knowledge that doing of an   act   was   likely   to   cause   a   person's death are ingredients   of   the   offence   of   culpable          217 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 218  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou homicide.   When   intent   or   knowledge   as   described   above   is   the   direct   motivating   force   of   the   act   complained   of,   Section   304­A   has   to   make   room for the graver and more   serious   charge   of   culpable   homicide. ….”  rt                                                                                                                       ig h [XII]  1994 Supp (2) SCC 67 [Balwant Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.] [XIII]  (2008) 14 SCC 479 [Mahadev   Prasad   Kaushik   vs.   State   of   Uttar   H Pradesh   &   Anr.]   :  Both   these   authorities  distinguish Section 304A and 304 Part II of IPC.  ba y The ratio of these authorities is Section 304A of  IPC applies to the offences outside the range of  B om Sections 299 and 300 of IPC.  142. One authority is also cited on behalf of the  State   as   to   under   which   circumstances   recourse   to  Section   33   of   the   Evidence   Act   can   be   taken,   as  under : [I]  (1881) ILR 7 Cal 42        218 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 219  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc [Rochia Mohata vs. Unknown] C ou From   the   said   authority,   following  rt                                                                                                                       observations   were   brought   to   the   notice   of  this Court by learned Public Prosecutor : B om ba y H ig h “The question whether the proviso to   Section   33   is   applicable,   that   is,   whether   the   questions   at   issue   are   substantially the same, depends upon   whether   the   same   evidence   is   applicable,   although   different   consequences   may   follow   from   the   same act.   Now, here the act was the   stroke   of   a   sword     which,   though   it   did   not  immediately  cause  the  death   of the deceased person, yet conducted   to   bring   about   that   result   subsequently.     In   consequence   of   the   person having died, the gravity of the   offence   became   presumptively   increased;   but   the   evidence   to   prove   the   act   with   which   the   accused   was   charged remained precisely the same.   We therefore think that this evidence   was  properly admitted under  Section   33.” EFFECT OF RAVINDRA PATIL'S EVIDENCE : 143. Ravindra Patil's evidence was recorded before         219 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 220  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court   specifically   on  C ou 5.1.2006,   2.2.2006   and   6.6.2006.     Thereafter   the  matter was adjourned to 7.2.2006 when the witness  was   under   cross­examination.   Subsequently   it   so  happened that he did not remain present before the  ig h Court and apparently NBW was directed to be issued  against him and he was taken in custody and then his  H evidence was lastly recorded on 16.3.2006 and he was  re­examined  by the learned Prosecutor. On 28.9.2002  ba y according   to   this   witness   he   was   attached   to  Protection Branch and was deputed as bodyguard for  B om the accused. He joined his duty at about 8:00 p.m. on  27.9.2002.     On  that  night  at   9:30  p.m.  the  accused  and   Kamal   Khan   came   outside   their   room   at   their  residence and told that they were to go for a party at  Rain Hotel, Juhu.   Ravindra Patil further stated that  Toyota Land Cruiser car bearing No. MH 01 DA 32 was  driven by the appellant/accused and they three went         220 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 221  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       to Rain Bar Hotel.  He was asked to wait outside and  C ou the accused and Kamal Khan went inside.   That time  bodyguard of Sohail Khan met Ravindra Patil outside  the   hotel   and   the   said   bodyguard   told   that   Sohail  Khan   had   also   come   there.     According   to   Ravindra  ig h Patil at 1:30 a.m. the accused and Kamal Khan came  out   of   the   Rain   Bar.     Then   the   accused   sat   on   the  H driver's seat of Toyota Land Cruiser.  Ravindra Patil sat  by his side in the front seat and Kamal Khan sat at the  ba y rear seat.  Then they went to JW Marriott hotel.  Also  Kamal   Khan   went   inside   and   Ravindra   Patil   waited  B om outside.   They came out of the hotel at 2:15 a.m. i.e.  early hours of 28.9.2002.   The appellant/accused sat  at the steering wheel of the Land Cruiser and again  Ravindra Patil took seat by the side of the driver's seat.  Ravindra   Patil   then   asked   the   accused   whether   he  would   drive   the   car,   the   accused   neglected   his  question and then they drove the car and came on the         221 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 222  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       St.   Andrews   road.     According   to   the   further  C ou substantive   evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil,   the   accused  was drunk and was driving his motor car at a speed of  90   –   100   km   per   hour.     According   to   this   witness  before coming to the junction of Hill Road he told the  ig h accused  to  lower  the   speed  of  the   motor  car  as the  right turn was ahead.  Again according to this witness,  H the   accused   neglected   him.     The   accused   could   not  control the motor car while taking the right turn and  ba y went on the foot path.   The people were sleeping on  the   foot   path.    The   motor   car   ran   over  the   persons  B om sleeping on the foot path and climbed the three stairs  and   dashed   into   the   shutter   of   the   shop,   namely,  American Express.   The motor car broke the shutter  and   went   inside   about   3   and   ½   feet.     There   were  shouts   of   the   people   and   as   such   people   gathered  there.     Further   this   witness   stated   that   due   to   the  incident, the people who had gathered there became         222 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 223  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       furious and they started manhandling the inmates of  C ou the car.  Said Ravindra Patil disclosed his identity as a  police   officer   and   thus   pacified   the   mob.     Ravindra  Patil further stated that the accused and Kamal Khan  ran away.  He went to the motor car and looked below  ig h it.     He   saw   one   person   seriously   injured   having  multiple   injuries below the motor car.   He also saw  H four injured persons below the car who were trying to  come   out.     Then   he   phoned   the   control   room   and  ba y within five minutes, Bandra police reached there.  The  police rescued the injured persons and the body of the  B om deceased person was sent to Bhabha hospital.     Then  Ravindra   Patil   showed   the   place   of   incident   to   the  police and then went to Bandra police station to lodge  the complaint. According to this witness the incident  had  taken  place due to high speed and the  accused  was drunk and was driving and could not control the  vehicle while taking the turn.  The FIR was marked as         223 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 224  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Exhibit­P1   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate   Court  C ou and   it   was   so   taken   on   record   in   the   Sessions  Case  also.  It is a factual position that various improvements  were brought on record and those improvements were  on   the   vital   aspect   firstly   as   to   the   drunkenness,  ig h secondly   as   to   Ravindra   Patil   cautioning   the  appellant/accused   to   lower   the   speed   and   initially  H Ravindra   Patil   asking   the   accused   whether     he   will  drive the car.  These are the improvements brought on  ba y record   during   the   cross­examination   and   the  important improvement in fact going to the basis of  B om the case of the prosecution as to drunken driving, is  that the accused was drunk.  In fact it is an admitted  position that even in the first information report there  is no whisper as to the appellant/accused being drunk  during   the   incident.     The   entire   FIR   is   regarding  driving by the appellant and the speed of the car as to  90 – 100 km. per hour.        224 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 225  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 144. rt                                                                                                                       By   pointing   out   the   above   mainly   the  C ou omission   on   the   fact   of   alcohol   consumption   by   the  appellant it is submitted by learned Senior Counsel for  the   appellant   that   something   had   happened   in  between   lodging   of   the   FIR   on   28.9.2002   and  ig h 1.10.2002.     The   date   1.10.2002   is   significant   as   on  that   date   the   supplementary   statement   of   Ravindra  H Patil   was   recorded.     There   was   nothing   brought   on  record as to what was the occasion for supplementary  ba y statement   when  the  FIR was lodged and the  matter  was proceeded.   In fact what was inserted by way of  B om supplementary   statement   is   the   element   of  consumption of alcohol.  Even during the arguments it  is   stated   that   there   are   other   improvements   also  though might not be of much importance but to the  effect that Ravindra Patil called the control room and  he showed the spot.   Also during the arguments it is  pointed out that on the aspect as to the speed of the         225 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 226  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       car.     The   following   answers   given   by   Ravindra   Patil  C ou during his cross­examination can be reproduced with  advantage : B om ba y H ig h “I cannot say the name of the road on   which   the   incident   car   driven   from   Hotel J.W. Marriot to the place of the   incident.  I am also unable to tell how   many   turns   towards   the   left   side   or   right side were taken by the incident   car   during   the   journey   from   hotel   J.W.   Marriot   to   the   place   of   the   incident.   The distance between J.W.   Marriot     Hotel   to   the   place   of   the   incident   is   about   7   k.m.   to   8   k.m.   The   incident  motor   car  did   not  stop   from   hotel   Marriot   to   the   place   of   incident, once started.   It is true that   vehicle travelling by the speed of 90 to   100   per   kilometer   per   hour   will   require  8 to 10 minutes to pass the   distance   of   7   to   8   kilometers.     We   started   from   hotel   Mariot   at   about   2:15 a.m. on the incident night.  It is   true   that   the   incident   is   shown   to   have taken place at 2:45 a.m. on the   incident night.”  145. By     pointing   out   the   above   substantive  evidence of Ravindra Patil it is submitted on behalf of         226 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 227  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the appellant that if the speed of the car as depicted  C ou by the witness is taken as 90 to 100 kms per hour then  the distance of maximum 8 kms can be covered by 7  to 8 minutes.  If still giving some allowance as to the  exact speed whether correctly mentioned or not and  ig h allowance to the exact distance between J.W Marriot  and   the   place   of   the   incident,   still   it   is   difficult   to  H perceive that a car will take half an hour to reach the  spot of incident.    If the timings are accepted and in  ba y fact   are   required   to   be   accepted   because   of   the  documentary   evidence   then   the   car   had   taken   30  B om minutes non stop from JW Marriott hotel to the place  of the incident and that is the distance of about 7 to 8  kms., so definitely it can be ascertained that the speed  of the car was not as told by the witness as 90 to 100  kms   per   hour.     At   the   cost   of   repetition   it   must   be  mentioned that even this aspect has been dealt with  earlier when the damage to the car was ascertained         227 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:58 ::: 228  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       vis­a­vis the speed of the car and mentioning of PW­7  146. C ou that there were speed beakers on St. Andrews road.   Apart from the above there is another strange  factual   position   which   is   required   to   be   mentioned  ig h inasmuch   as   after   giving   evidence   before   the  Metropolitan Magistrate Court on 5.1.2006 and when  the witness answered that his further statement was  H recorded by the police on 1.10.2002, a question was  put   by   the   learned  Prosecutor   to  the   witness   to  the  ba y effect : B om  “What did you say before the police?” 147. The question was objected to by the learned  defence   counsel,   being   not   admissible.     However  apparently   said   question   was   allowed   by   the   trial  Court   by   giving   a   reason   that   the   question   is   not   a  leading one.   It must be mentioned that whatever a  witness states before the police is hit by section 161 of         228 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 229  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Cr.P.C. and only that statement can be considered as  C ou provided   under   Section   162   of   Cr.P.C..     In   fact   with  that   understanding   of   the   basic   criminal   law   the  defence   counsel   has   raised   the   objection   but  unfortunately that has been overruled by the Sessions  ig h Court as the Sessions Court lost sight of this situation  as   to   the   statement   before   the   police   and   the  H significance of it.  So it could not have gone on record  what   a   witness   stated   to   the   police   but   the   learned  ba y Judge   took   it   as   not   a   leading   question   and   then  allowed the answer.   Still the strange situation does  the witness answered that : “I have stated before the police what I   remembered   after   the   lodging   the   complaint with Bandra Police.” B om not stop there.   After allowance by the sessions court  148. Apparently   it   so   happened   that   with   this  answer also the learned prosecutor was not satisfied         229 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 230  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and asked further question which was again objected  C ou by the Counsel for the defence and subject to objection  the question was allowed.  The question and answer is  reproduced hereunder : ig h “Ques.   What do you remember after   filing your complaint ? ba y H Ans.    Mr.   Ashok   Singh   is   in   employment   as   a   driver   with   the   accused Salman Khan.   He works as   driver with the accused Salman Khan.   He works as driver in day duty.  The   accused   drives   his   motor   car   in   the   night.” 149. In   fact   for   the   first   time   before   the  B om Metropolitan Magistrate Court apparently the name of  said Ashok  Singh has appeared when Ravindra Patil  gave   his   answer   to   the   question   as   to   what   he  remembered   after   filing   of   the   complaint.     Again  apparently   that   time   there   was   no   answer   coming  from   the   witness   possibly   regarding   drunkenness  though   it   was   the   case   of   the   prosecution.   Even         230 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 231  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       thereafter,   the   episode   of   question   and   answer  C ou continued and the learned prosecutor went on asking  questions   as   to   what   the   witness   said   next   but   the  witness   also   gave   answers   and   talked   of   something  else but not about the 'drunkenness'.  The last answer  ig h of   the   witness   prior   to   the   prosecutor   asking  permission to put the leading question to this witness,  H was   to   the   question   'whether   you   stated   anything  more'   and   then   the   answer   was   'nothing   more   than  ba y what is stated above'.  At this juncture, permission was  asked to put the leading question to this   witness by  B om the  prosecution.   The Metropolitan Magistrate Court  then placed a note on record to the following effect : “Heard   Spl.   P.P.   According   to   him,   such   question can be put when the witness has   not   supported   on   material   point   and   before   declaring   him   hostile   after   taking   his answer.  (Considering both the sides, I   am   of   the   opinion   that   such   leading   question can be asked with the permission   of   the   Court.   Hence,   objection   is   over          231 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 232  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       150. C ou ruled.)”  Even still the leading questions were asked.  The   last   answer   of   this   witness   was   that   “My   supplementary statement was recorded as per my say.” By   pointing   out   the   above   conduct   of   the  ig h 151. witness   Ravindra   Patil   it   is   strongly   submitted   on  H behalf of the appellant that it is in fact an unnatural  conduct   on   the   part   of   Ravindra   Patil   to   say   so,  ba y mentioning the things which he did not mention while  giving his First Information Report or while giving his  B om supplementary statement.  This witness has improved  on the material aspect firstly as to the 'drunkenness' of  the accused and secondly as to this witness cautioning  the accused to drive slowly.  It is further argued that it  is   more   strange   that   from   this   witness   the   name   of  Ashok Singh came on record and that also with the  explanation that he was the driver in the employment         232 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 233  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       with   the   accused   and   works   as   a   driver   in   the   day  C ou duty.     At   this   juncture   it   must   be   said   that   the  substantive   evidence   of   PW­27   officer   Shengal   does  indicate   the   presence   of   Ashok   Singh   at   the   police  station apparently immediately after the incident and  ig h Ashok   Singh   was   present   till   the   arrival   of   the  appellant/accused at the police station.  But still it is a  H factual position that the investigating officer has not  recorded   the   statement   of   Ashok   Singh   though   his  ba y presence   at   the   police   station   was   accepted   at   the  early hours of 28.9.2002.   B om 152. Again at this juncture it is to be mentioned  that there is interpolation in the contents of the First  Information Report regarding the route taken by the  car while coming to the Hill Road.  The earlier written  words as to “Manuel Gonsalves” are deleted and the  words “St. Andrews” have been inserted.  This is done         233 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 234  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       at   two   places  where  this  reference   is  coming   in  the  C ou FIR.   At the cost of repetition, it must be mentioned  that   there   is   no   explanation   from   the   investigating  agency   or   by   the   Investigating   Officer  or   the   officer  who recorded the FIR as to how the change of name in  ig h the   route   has   appeared   in   the   First   Information  Report.     This   circumstance   is   to   be   viewed   in  H juxtaposition with the defence of the accused that the  vehicle   had   taken   the   route   from   Manuel   Gonsalves  ba y road   and  then   came   to   Hill   Road.    Even   this  is   the  substantive   evidence   of   DW­1   as   detailed   earlier   in  B om paragraph­3   of   his   evidence   before   the   Sessions  Court : “3.  I then took the vehicle on Linking   Road,   then   on   Gonsalves   Road   and   took the right turn for going to Hill   Road.  Our vehicle came on Hill Road.   Our   vehicle   proceeded   at   some   distance on hill Road, then the front   left tyre of our vehicle burst, thereby   our   vehicle   pulled   towards   the   left          234 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 235  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 153. C ou side.  I tried to turn my steering wheel   but it had become hard to turn.  I also   tried to apply the brakes, but by then   the vehicle had climbed the stairs of   the   Laundry.   Our   vehicle   then   stopped.”  rt                                                                                                                       Considering   all   the   above   aspects   as   to  ig h changing   the   route   of   the   vehicle   from   Manuel  Gonsalves road to St. Andrews road while coming to  H the Hill Road, non mentioning about drunkenness of  the appellant in the First Information Report and the  ba y story of drunkenness coming only on 1.10.2002 and in  fact on the same day receipt of the report from CA and  B om mainly   considering   that   the   cross­examination   of  Ravindra   Patil   was   only   before   the   Metropolitan  Magistrates   Court   and   when   the   charge   was   under  Section 304A of IPC, it is to be held that the evidence  of Ravindra Patil is of very weak type. Though subject  to   the   argument   as   to   applicability   or   otherwise   of  Section 33 of the Evidence Act, his evidence is to be         235 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 236  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accepted on the factum of driving of the vehicle then  C ou considering the type of this witness, an independent  corroboration   is   required   to   support   what   he   stated  before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court. Needless   to   mention   that   in   criminal   trials  ig h 154. when a particular fact is established before the Court  through   ocular   evidence   there   are   three   types   of  H witnesses. As endorsed by the Apex Court in number  of decisions, said three types are (1) wholly reliable  ba y witness, (2) partially reliable witness, and (3) wholly  unreliable   witness.     It   is   a   cardinal   principle   of  B om criminal   jurisprudence   that   so   far   as   the   wholly  reliable witness is concerned, if the Court accepts his  version and accepts the truthfulness depending on the  circumstances   then   the   conviction   on   the   sole  testimony can be possible.  In other words the wholly  reliable witness can be the basis for conviction of an         236 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 237  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accused but when it comes to partially reliable witness  C ou then independent   corroboration is needed and if the  witness is wholly unreliable then there is no question  of   asking   for   corroboration   to   the   version   of   said  witness.  In the opinion of this Court Ravindra Patil is  ig h a   witness   who   cannot   be   considered   as   a   wholly  reliable   witness   for   various   anomalies   and  H improvements brought on record and the conduct of  this witness shown before the Court during the trial  ba y for the offence under Section 304A of IPC.  Still if he is  considered as a partially reliable witness then there is  B om definitely a need for independent corroboration and in  the considered view of this Court on the actual driving  of the vehicle by the appellant/accused apart from this  witness   there   is   no   other   witness   saying   that   the  appellant/accused was in fact driving the vehicle.  This  is   more   so   as   this   Court   has   earlier   analyzed   the  substantive evidence of PW­2, PW­3, PW­4, PW­11 and         237 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 238  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       also   the   parking   assistant   at   JW   Marriott   PW­12  C ou Kalpesh   Verma.     Again   this   circumstance   is   to   be  viewed   in   juxtaposition   of   the   evidence   of   other  witnesses i.e. PW­7 and PW­8 as to mentioning of four  ig h persons in the car. DEFENCE WITNESS ASHOK SINGH : Now coming to the evidence of DW­1 Ashok  H 155. Singh much is argued and it is submitted on behalf of  ba y the State that the testimony of this witness is required  to be discarded in toto as he is a got up witness and in  B om fact his conduct is such that he is not giving the truth  but has been brought before the Court after 13 years  of the incident and that also before the Sessions Court  for the first time.   Certain basic arguments advanced  on behalf of the State to discredit this witness can be  narrated as under :        238 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 239  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 156. rt                                                                                                                         It   is   argued   that   this   witness   has   not  C ou mentioned exactly at which spot the tyre of the vehicle  burst when the vehicle was on the Hill Road.  He also  did   not   specifically   mention   as   to   at   what   time   he  reached   JW   Marriott   hotel   in   order   to   replace   the  ig h earlier driver Altaf.   Even he is a person who did not  immediately disclose   that he was driving the vehicle  H and   more   so  when  the   case  was  lodged  against  the  appellant/accused i.e. his master and that also for the  ba y serious offence of killing one person and injuring four  persons.   It is further stated that all this conduct of  B om DW­1 renders himself as a wholly un­reliable witness  and got up witness and his evidence does not inspire  confidence. 157. Counter to above arguments, various aspects  were   placed   before   the   Court   and   learned   Senior  Counsel   argued   at   length   mentioning   under   what         239 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 240  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       circumstances DW­1 came before the Court only after  C ou 13 years.  It is argued on behalf of the appellant that  the   natural   tendency   of   any   human   being   is   not   to  own   any   criminal   act.       It   is   rather   the   attempt   of  everybody to avoid any allegations of criminal act and  ig h not   to   get   oneself   involved   in   it   of   his   own.     By  pointing   out   this   it   is   submitted   on   behalf   of   the  H appellant that in fact though it is an exceptional case  that a defence witness is coming before the Court and  ba y accepting   the   blame   on   himself   but   the   evidence   of  this witness is to be treated equally as the treatment  B om being   given   to   the   prosecution   witnesses.     In  elaborating this argument it is submitted on behalf of  the appellant that always the defence witness may not  be   looked   with   same   premeditated   mind   and   his  evidence is to be analyzed as that of other witnesses.  Moreover   further   argument   that   as   per   the   cardinal  principle of criminal law the defence is required to be         240 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 241  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       established   by   placing   certain   facts   which   are  C ou acceptable   on   preponderance   of   probabilities.     In  support of these submissions following authorities are  cited before the Court : ig h [I]  (2002) 2 SCC 426   [State of Haryana vs. Ram Singh] [II]  (1976) 4 SCC 233   [Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey vs. State of Orissa] H [III]  1971(3) SCC 235 [Des Raj Vs. The State of Punjab] Further   it   is   argued   on   the   conduct   of   this  ba y 158. DW­1 as to not approaching any Court for saying that  B om he was driving the vehicle and not the accused.   The  substantive evidence of this witness goes to show that  he  was  a  driver in the employment of father of the  appellant and since 1990 he was working with Salim  Khan, the father of the accused.   There were no fix  duty   hours   for   him   but   whenever   his   services   were  required he was being called.  In the year 2002, there         241 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 242  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       were   two   other   drivers   working   along   with   him   by  C ou name Altaf and Dutta.  On the night of 27.9.2002 he  was sleeping in his house.   He received a phone call  from   Altaf   at   about   1:30   a.m.   to   1:45   a.m.   on  28.9.2002.     Altaf   told   him   to   come   to   JW   Marriott  ig h hotel as the accused had come there.   Altaf also told  him that he was not feeling well and he left the keys  H with   the   valet   parking.     DW­1   then   got   up   and  changed  his  clothes and went  to  JW  Marriott  hotel.  ba y He   went   to   the   porch   and   saw   the   Land   Cruiser  vehicle.  He saw the bodyguard i.e. Ravindra Patil who  B om was standing outside the vehicle.     The engine of the  Land   Cruiser   was   on.   He   opened   the   door     of   the  vehicle and he saw the accused sitting on the driver's  seat and the AC was on.   He then sat on the driver's  seat and the accused went to the seat besides that of  the driver.   Ravindra Patil sat behind the driver's seat  in the back portion.  According to this DW­1 the fourth         242 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:31:59 ::: 243  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       person   was   Kamal   Khan   and   he   was   sitting   behind  C ou Salman Khan at the back portion.  Then on the actual  happening of the event, the evidence of this witness in  para­3   has   already   been   discussed   as   to   the   route  taken   for   coming   to   Hill   Road.   Thereafter   after   the  ig h incident also the substantive evidence of this witness is  of much importance to be seen.  He further stated that  H due to the incident he was in shock. He opened the  door by his side and got down.  According to him the  ba y accused tried to open the door from his side but the  left door was jammed.   This witness saw the people  B om beneath the car   who were shouting.   People started  assembling near the car.  The accused got down from  the car from the driver's seat.   This witness and the  accused tried to lift the car to rescue the people found  beneath the car but the car did not move.  According  to   this   witness   the   accused   told   him   to   inform   the  police.     In   the   meantime   people   that   had   gathered         243 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 244  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       there   gave “pull and push” to said DW­1 and also to  C ou Ravindra Patil who by then had got down from the car.  This witness has dialed 100 number and informed the  police   about   the   incident.     He   then   proceeded   to  Bandra   police   station.     There   he   was   told   that   the  ig h police had already left for the spot.   He narrated the  incident to the police.   However, he was asked to sit  H till 10:30 a.m. when the accused came to the police  station.  He talked to the accused that he had already  ba y told the police about the incident but the police did  not entertain him.   According to this witness he told  B om the accused that he was suspecting some foul play and  police then took the accused by arresting him. 159. In fact, this is the sum and substance of the  examination­in­chief   of   this   witness   in   which   he  indicates   that   when   he   arrived   at   the   JW   Marriott  hotel he saw the accused sitting on the driver seat and         244 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 245  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the door of the car was closed and the air conditioner  C ou was  on.     In   fact  this position  is in  consonance  with  what is told by the parking assistant at JW Marriott  hotel, PW­12 Kalpesh Verma.  Even in the evidence of  this   witness   he   has   mentioned   regarding   the   route  ig h taken via Gonsalves road and there is a cross reference  in   order   to   find   out   probability   of   this   by   way   of  H alteration in the first information report and which is  accepted   by   the   investigating   officer   and   apparently  ba y there is no explanation as to the change of the name  from Manuel Gonsalves road to St. Andrews road in  B om the FIR.   Though this witness was cross­examined by  the learned prosecutor on various aspects including his  conduct, from the date of the incident till he came to  Sessions Court for giving evidence, there is no specific  cross­examination   that   this  witness   did   not   take   the  route via Manuel Gonsalves road.        245 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 246  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 160. rt                                                                                                                       Apart   from   the   above   on   various   objections  C ou raised on behalf of the State as to belated examination  of   this   witness   it   is   submitted   on   behalf   of   the  appellant that in fact the stage of recording of defence  witness   comes   only   after   the   entire   evidence   of   the  ig h prosecution is over and the statements of the accused  are recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.  Only at that  H stage as per the criminal procedure of trial of sessions  case and for that matter all the criminal cases that the  ba y accused is asked if he wants to adduce any material in  his defence.  In the present matter it is seen that when  B om the   matter   was   before   the   Metropolitan   Magistrate  Court only 17 witnesses were examined and still two  investigating officers were remained to be  examined  and at that stage on the application of the prosecution  the issue was taken as to applicability of Section 304  Part II of IPC and then the matter was transferred to  the Court of Sessions by committal.   As such, before         246 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 247  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the Metropolitan Magistrate Court there was no scope  C ou for the defence witness to be examined as that stage  had not then arisen.  So far as recording of evidence of  defence witness in the Sessions case again the stage  was  after  recording  of the  statement  of  the   accused  ig h under  Section  313 of  Cr.P.C.  and  prior  to  that   there  could   not   be   any   possibility   of   asking   the   defence  H witness   to   be   examined.     Apparently   a   wrong  impression has been created and that too expressed by  ba y the learned Prosecutor before the Sessions Court that  the   defence   witness   is   coming   after   13   years   and  B om apparently this aspect has been highlighted  by various  agencies and the media coming to the conclusion that  this is a belated defence.   In fact apparently the trial  Court i.e. Sessions Court also was carried away by this  impression of belated recording of the evidence.  The  criminal procedure is otherwise and it is required to be  honored and followed.   As such argument leveled by         247 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 248  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the   State   that   the   witness   is   coming   at   the   fag   end  C ou cannot be accepted as an argument of substance, more  so when the defence is not at all to establish his case  and if at all to putforth any evidence i.e. to be only to  probabilities. 161. ig h the   extent   of   acceptance   under   preponderance   of  Lastly on this point it is argued on behalf of  H the  State that if not before  the Court for giving the  evidence but at least a person could have approached  ba y some   other   institutions.     By   this   argument   learned  Prosecutor   presupposes   that   this   defence   witness  B om should have gone to the Media.   In each   and every  circumstance and situation everybody is not expected  to rush to the media though in the recent years the  media   is   considered   as   a   fourth   pillar   of   the  Constitution.  Much responsibility is on the media and  when a person approaches the media then apparently         248 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 249  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       an impression is created in the mind of general public  C ou that whatever he is telling is having some ring of truth  and the matter is required to be taken to task by the  appropriate   agencies.  Without  commenting  much  on  this,   suffice   it  to say  that  not  going to any external  ig h authorities   than   the   Court   of   law,   cannot   be  considered as a deficiency when the witness is coming  H before the Court at an appropriate stage to mention  what had happened. In that event his evidence is to be  ba y appreciated with rather care with the principle that his  evidence   is   to   be   accepted   on   the   touchstone   of  B om preponderance   of   probabilities.     Even   as   per   PI  Shengal   (PW­27),   DW­1   was   present   at   the   police  station   immediately  after  the  incident   and  remained  there   thereafter   and   was   interrogated   but   his  statement was not recorded. 162. Here   it   is   not   a   question   of   believing   or         249 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 250  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       disbelieving a defence given, but here the question is  C ou whether the prosecution has established its case as to  driving   by   the   appellant/accused   that   also   drunken  driving.  As such, with the above observations it must  be said that the evidence of defence witness is to be  ig h viewed with such caution and to see whether on those  probabilities putforth by the defence witness whether  H the   prosecution   has   established   its   case   beyond  reasonable doubt.   ba y NON­EXAMINATION OF KAMAL KHAN : 163. With   these   observations   now   the   another  B om concept is required to be taken as to whether on non­ examination of Kamal Khan an adverse inference can  be  drawn.  Prior to coming to this aspect  as to non­ examination   of   Kamal   Khan   and   whether   adverse  inference can be drawn, certain basic factual position  is required to be narrated.   According to the case of         250 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 251  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       prosecution there were only three persons in the car  C ou since night of 27.9.2002 till early hours of 28.9.2002  and they were the  appellant/accused, Ravindra Patil  and   Kamal   Khan.     As   against   this,   the   probable  defence of the accused is that there was fourth person  ig h and he was driver.   Now during the trial before the  Sessions   Court   the   position   was   very   clear   that  H Ravindra Patil was no more and the appellant/accused  being   an   accused   could   not   have   given   evidence   to  ba y show   as   to   who   was   driving.     The   only   option  remained was that of Kamal Khan.   According to the  B om defence there was fourth person and the appropriate  steps were taken for examining that fourth person but  so far as the prosecution is concerned when Ravindra  Patil   was   not   available   for   cross­examination   and  when his evidence was accepted under Section 33 of  the   Evidence   Act   before   the   Sessions   Court   it   was  incumbent   upon the prosecution to put forth before         251 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 252  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the Court the factual aspects by way of direct evidence  direct evidence then available. 164. C ou and only the evidence of Kamal Khan was the other  In   view   of   the   above   factual   position   as   to  ig h according to the case of the prosecution out of three  persons   travelling   in   the   car   only   the   person   Kamal  Khan was not examined and the evidence of Ravindra  H Patil was taken from the M.M. Court from the earlier  proceeding.     As   such,   during   the   arguments   of   this  ba y Appeal at the fag end an application was preferred on  behalf of the appellant for examining said Kamal Khan  B om as a Court witness under provisions of Section 391 of  Cr.P.C. Said application was preferred on 16.11.2015  at the conclusion of defence arguments.   It remained  pending for few dates as by that time the arguments  on behalf of the State were started and in progress.  Detailed   reply   was   filed   by   the   State   opposing   the         252 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 253  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       application by submitting the main contention that it  C ou is not necessary to call Kamal Khan for the evidence as  a Court witness.  It was also specifically mentioned in  the   reply   that   various   steps   were   taken   when   the  matter   was   pending   before   the   M.M.   Court   but   he  ig h could not be examined.  In the reply, it is mentioned in  paragraph 9 therein that even a look out notice was  H issued against Kamal Khan. No explanation was given  by the prosecution as to for what reason said look out  ba y notice   was  taken  out. It  was further  contended that  even   before   the   Sessions   Court   process   was   issued  B om against Kamal Khan. However, the summons could not  be served at the address known to the police from the  statement of Kamal Khan which was recorded in the  year 2002. The report dated 24.6.2014, according to  the case of the prosecution, throws light that Kamal  Khan was not found at the address and the said place  is occupied by some­one else. Copy of said report was         253 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 254  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       filed along with reply of the State.  By this it was tried  C ou to establish by the State that they took the steps for  serving the process against Kamal Khan but for want  of his whereabouts he could not be examined before  the Sessions Court.  It was the submission that in the  ig h absence of evidence of Kamal Khan also, the case of  the   prosecution   can   be   taken   as   established   as   has  H been done by the Sessions Court.  The application was  also objected by the State on the ground that now at  ba y this belated stage, the appellant­accused cannot claim  examination   of   Kamal   Khan.     Said   application   was  B om dealt with by this Court and a detailed order is passed  on 30.11.2015.   This Court held that considering the  purport of section 391 of Cr.P.C., it is not a dire need  for examination of Kamal Khan as a court witness in  order to assist the Court to come to a just decision.  At  that   juncture,   there   was   no   question   of   drawing  adverse inference for non­examination of Kamal Khan         254 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 255  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       as argued by the State and in fact that aspect was kept  C ou pending till the final adjudication of the appeal and as  such   under   this   premise   the   present   aspect   is   being  dealt with as during the course of arguments, learned  Senior   Counsel   for   the   appellant   vehemently  ig h submitted that on non­examination of Kamal Khan by  the   prosecution,   adverse   inference   is   required   to   be  H drawn.   As   such   it   be   treated   as   mitigating  circumstance to the case of the prosecution. Though at  ba y the time of deciding the application under section 391  of Cr.P.C., this Court held it not necessary to call Kamal  B om Khan as a court witness, now at this stage an inference  is  required  to be  drawn further argued. Considering  the manner in which the prosecution has taken steps  to   bring   Kamal   Khan   before   the   trial   Court   for  recording of his evidence.  165. In   fact,   it   is   certain   that   according   to   the         255 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 256  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       prosecution, Kamal Khan was the only person, apart  C ou from   Ravindra   Patil,   to   throw   light   on   the   factual  position as to who was driving.  This  is more so, when  the   evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   was   to   be   critically  discussed and having less evidential value because of  ig h no opportunity of cross­examination in Sessions Court.  Examination of an eye­witness and when the case is  H on a very limited number of eye­witnesses, as in the  present   case,   according   to   the   prosecution   of   two  ba y witnesses,       non­examination   of   one   of   the   eye­ witnesses is definitely detrimental to the case of the  B om prosecution, if otherwise the prosecution is not coming  with a stand that the said witness has been won over  and definitely not available in spite of   due diligence  to secure his presence.  166. In   the   present   case,   both   the   things   as  mentioned above are to be tested, whether it was just         256 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 257  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       and proper for the prosecution to bring Kamal Khan  C ou before the Sessions Court and to record his evidence  by   that   way   the   corroboration   could   have   been  obtained   on   the   vital   aspect   of   driving   and   also   on  drunkenness.    Definitely, the substantive evidence  of  ig h Ravindra Patil as accepted by the Sessions Court was  of a weak type so far as the drunkenness is concerned,  H due to improvements. Under such circumstances, non­ examination of Kamal Khan may apparently mean that  ba y he was withheld by the prosecution. This is more so  for the reason that the process issued against Kamal  B om Khan   was   on   the   address   written   in   his   statement  under section 161 of Cr.P.C recorded in the year 2002  i.e.   immediately   after   the   incident.   In   fact,   many  events   had   followed   after   the   year   2002   and  specifically   in   the   year   2008   when   the   matter   was  before the M.M. Court for trial for the offence under  section   304­A   of   IPC.     It   is   admitted   position   and         257 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:00 ::: 258  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       which is brought on record on behalf of the appellant  C ou that   on   three   occasions  Kamal   Khan   was  before   the  M.M. Court with his application asking for permission  to   go   out   of   India   and   then   coming   back   within   a  particular time. These dates are 26.8.2008, 18.9.2008  ig h and 12.11.2008. On these occasions before the M.M.  Court the  then latest address at Mumbai and also the  H permanent address at U.K. was given by Kamal Khan.  Admittedly, Kamal Khan was British National, even at  ba y the   time   of   incident   of   2002   and   his   permanent  residence was at U.K. At least by these applications the  B om latest   address   was   known   to   the   prosecution.  However, apparently, no care was taken to secure the  presence of Kamal Khan by sending the process for his  attendance  on  the said new addresses.   Instead, the  process was issued on the address which was of the  year   2002.   This   conduct   on   the   part   of   the  Investigating Agency leads to the conclusion that the         258 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 259  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       investigation was not desirous of bringing Kamal Khan  C ou before the Court for giving evidence. Whatever might  be the reason for not bringing him before the Court,  the fact remains that he was one of the eye­witnesses  to the incident and should have thrown light on the  ig h factual circumstances and more so when the defence  of the appellant­accused was spelt out much earlier as  H to driving of the vehicle by the fourth person by name  Ashok   Singh.   Even   apparently,   the   name   of   Ashok  ba y Singh   has  already   appeared   in   the   record   when   the  matter   was   before   the   M.M.   Court.   As   earlier   seen,  B om during examination Ravindra Patil had taken his name  as one of the drivers driving only during the day time.  As   such   presence   of   fourth   person   and   that   also   of  Ashok   Singh   was   the   defence   of   the   accused   and  known   to   the   investigating   agency.   However,   an  apparently   futile   attempt   was   made   for   service   on  Kamal Khan on the address of 2002 and not on the         259 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 260  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       address  which was given to M.M. Court  in the  year  167. C ou 2008.  Now,   again   coming   to   the   conduct   of   the  Investigating   agency,   a   reference   is   required   to   be  ig h made   about   the   affidavit   filed   by   ACP   of   Bandra  Division.   Said   affidavit   is   dated   23.11.2015.   Along  with affidavit at Exh.D a xerox copy of the letter dated  H 24.6.2014   addressed   by   Senior   PI   Bandra   Police  Station   to   the   Sessions   Court   No.   16   Mumbai   is  ba y attached. This letter is the report  of outcome of the  summons   issued   against   the   witnesses   including  B om Kamal   Khan.   Name   of   Kamal   Khan   is   mentioned   at  serial No.3 in these witnesses.  What was pointed out  on   behalf   of   the   appellant­accused   by   the   learned  Senior Counsel was that apparently this report is not  forming part of the Court record of the Sessions Case.  Factually   this   position   was   checked   and   learned         260 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 261  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       prosecutor in the appeal admitted that apparently this  C ou original report is not forming part of the court record  of the Sessions Court.   This Court has also examined  the Roznama of the relevant dates including the date  of 24.6.2014 but there is no mention regarding filing  ig h of this report before the Sessions Court.  Of course, at  this juncture, this Court does not want to endorse the  H view  that  this application  itself is entirely fabricated  and   placed   before   the   High   Court   only   for   the   first  ba y time. This is for the reason that by  inadvertence also  any such report may be lost while the matter is before  B om the Sessions Court.   Unless there is concrete material  this   Court   is   not   inclined   to   initiate   any   action   for  fabrication of this report.   However, the fact remains  that   the   conduct of the Investigating Agency can  be  seen   from   this   circumstance.   Definitely,   the   process  was not issued at the known address of Kamal Khan  and an attempt was made to serve him on the address         261 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 262  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       of 2002. Apparently, for certain purpose this witness  C ou was withheld by the prosecution and as such in the  considered   view   of   this   Court   a   necessary   adverse  inference   is   required   to   be   drawn   against   the  prosecution for non­examination of Kamal Khan as a  ig h prosecution   witness. Coming back  to the  application  under section 391 of Cr.P.C., the same was filed by the  H appellant­accused at the fag end of the present appeal.  Be that as it may, the same was strongly opposed by  ba y the   prosecution.   Taking   an   over   all   view,   this   court  rejected   the   said   application   on   30/11/2015   on   the  B om grounds   contained   in   the   said   order   and   more  particularly   that   on   the   basis   of   already   available  material it was not a case where a just verdict would  not be possible unless Kamal Khan is examined. Power  under section 391 is not to be invoked casually and  the refusal thereof does not preclude the Court from  drawing   adverse   inference,   on   the   basis   that   such         262 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 263  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       witness was not examined during trial despite ample  C ou opportunity. Though, it is so, independently also the  case of the prosecution is being analyzed and is being  appropriately dealt with keeping aside this aspect of  adverse   inference   on   the   non­examination   of   Kamal  168. ig h Khan.  To   substantiate   the     argument   on   behalf   of  H the appellant, the following authorities are cited :­ 1)  AIR 1954 SC 51 ba y (Habeeb Mohammad Vs. State of Hyderabad) 2)    (2012) 4 SCC 722 B om (Govindraju Alias Govinda Vs. State by Shrirampuram Police Station & Anr) 3)    (2014) 11 Supreme Court Cases 335 (Joginder Singh Vs. State of Haryana) 4)   AIR 1956 SC 35 (The Member, Board of Revenue Vs.        263 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 264  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       5)    2001 (2) A.W.C. 1447 (S.C.) C ou Arthur Paul Benthali) Oriental   Insurance   Co.   Ltd   vs.   Hansrajbhai   V.  Kodala (S.C.) ig h 6)   (2010) 13 SCC 657 (Sunil   Kumar   Sambhudayal   Gupta   (Dr)   and   169. H Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra) Even on this issue the following authority is  ba y cited on behalf of the State:­ 2001 6 SCC 145  (Takhaji   Hiraji   Vs.   Thakore   Kubersing   B om Chamansingh & Ors) 170. Now   coming,   apparently   to   the   last  submission i.e. applicability of Section 304 Part II of  IPC,   in   the   present   case,   a   great   deal   of   arguments  were advanced before the Court by the rival sides by  taking shelter of two authorities. A reference to these         264 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 265  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       authorities was earlier made by this Court. However,  C ou this issue will be discussed rather at length.  The first  authority   is   (2012)   2   SCC   648     (Alister   Anthony  Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra) and another (2012)  Sanjeev Nanda. 171. ig h 8 SCC (State through PS Lodhi Colony, New Delhi Vs.  Prior   to   discussing   the   ratios   of   the   above  H authorities, it must be mentioned at the threshold that  each and every case is to be determined on its own  ba y fact situation and applicability or otherwise of a penal  section  is  to be considered on  those facts and there  B om cannot   be   any   particular   formula   that   on   certain  circumstances a particular penal section is a must to  be applied.   This is more so when it is tried to argue  on   behalf   of   the   State   on   the   authority   in   Alister  Pareira.   Certain factual position in the said case can  be mentioned in order to appreciate the finding of the         265 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 266  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Hon'ble Supreme Court in that matter. The facts of the  C ou said case are that on the South­North Road at the east  side   of   Carter   Road,   Bandra   (West),   Mumbai   in   the  early hours of 12.11.2006 between 3:45 a.m. to 4:00  a.m. a car ran into the pavement killing seven persons  ig h and causing injuries to eight persons. The appellant,  Alister   Anthony   Pareira   was   at   the   wheels.   The  H appellant   was,   at   that   time,   found   in   drunken  condition.     The   trial   Court   convicted   him   under  ba y Sections 304­A and 337  of IPC  and sentenced him to  simple imprisonment for six months with fine of Rs.5  B om lakhs for the former offence, and fifteen days' simple  imprisonment for the latter. However, it acquitted him  of the offences under sections 304 Part II and 338 of  IPC.   The   High   Court   set   aside   the   acquittal   of   the  appellant under section 304 of IPC and convicted him  for the offences under sections 304 Part II, 338 and  337 of IPC.   It sentenced him to three years' rigorous         266 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 267  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5 lakhs for the offence  C ou under   section   304   Part   II,   one   year   rigorous  imprisonment and six months' rigorous imprisonment  for   the   offences   under   sections   338   and   337   IPC  respectively. The fine imposed by the trial court had by  ig h then   been   distributed  to   the   families  of   the   victims.  The appellant therein then filed the appeal.  It was the  H appeal   preferred   by   the   accused   Alister   Anthony  Pareira   challenging   the   order   of   the   High   Court.  ba y However,   the   final   decision   of   the   Hon'ble   Supreme  Court was that the offence under section 304 Part II of  B om IPC   was   proved.   Another   observation   in   the   said  authority reads thus :­ “One   of   the   prime   objectives   of   the   criminal   law   is   imposition   of   appropriate,   adequate,   just   and   proportionate sentence commensurate   with the nature and gravity of crime   and the manner in which the crime is          267 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 268  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc done. There is no straitjacket formula   C ou for sentencing an accused on proof of   rt                                                                                                                       crime. The courts have evolved certain   principles:   the   twin   objectives   of   the   sentencing   policy   are   deterrence   and   correction. What sentence would meet   ig h the ends of justice depends on the facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case   and   the   court   must   keep   in   mind   the   H gravity   of   the   crime,   motive   for   the   crime,   nature   of   the   offence   and   all   ba y other attendant circumstances.”  172. In   the   said   authority   another   case   was  discussed by the Apex Court and that is Prabhakaran  B om Vs. State of Kerala (2009) 1 SCC  (Cri) 873 “45.   In   Prabhakaran   v.   State   of   Kerala this Court was concerned with   the appeal filed by a convict who was   found guilty of the offence punishable   under   Section   304   Part   II   Indian   Penal   Code.   In   that   case,   the   bus          268 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 269  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc driven by the convict ran over a boy   C ou aged   10  years.  The  prosecution   case   rt                                                                                                                       was that bus was being driven by the   Appellant   therein   at   the   enormous   speed   and   although   the   passengers   had   cautioned   the   driver   to   stop   as   ig h they   had   seen   children   crossing   the   road in a queue, the driver ran over   the   student   on   his   head.   It   was   H alleged   that   the   driver   had   real   intention to cause death of persons to   whom   harm   may   be   caused   on   the   ba y bus   hitting   them.   He   was   charged   with offence punishable under Section   302   Indian   Penal   Code.   The   Trial   B om Court   found   that   no   intention   had   been   proved   in   the   case   but   at   the   same time the accused acted with the   knowledge that it was likely to cause   death,   and,   therefore,   convicted   the   accused   of   culpable   homicide   not   amounting   to   murder   punishable   under   Section   304   Part   II   Indian          269 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 270  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc Penal   Code   and   sentenced   him   to   C ou undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   for   rt                                                                                                                       five   years   and   pay   a   fine   of   Rs.   15,000/­   with   a   default   sentence   of   imprisonment   for   three   years.   The   High Court dismissed the appeal and   ig h the matter reached this Court.”  “46.   While   observing   that   Section   H 304A   speaks   of   causing   death   by   negligence   and   applies   to   rash   and   ba y negligent acts and does not apply to   cases   where   there   is   an  intention   to   cause death or knowledge that the act   B om will in all probability cause death and   that   Section   304A   only   applies   to   cases   in   which   without   any   such   intention   or   knowledge   death   is   caused   by   a   rash   and   negligent   act,   on the factual scenario of the case, it   was   held   that   the   appropriate   conviction   would   be   under   Section          270 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 271  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 304A     Indian   Penal   Code   and   not   C ou Section   304   Part   II   Indian   Penal   rt                                                                                                                       Code.   Prabhakaran   does   not   say   in   absolute terms that in no case of an   automobile   accident   that   results   in   death   of   a   person   due   to   rash   and   ig h negligent   act   of   the   driver,   the   conviction can be maintained for the   offence   under   Section   304   Part   II   H Indian   Penal   Code   even   if   such   act   (rash or negligent) was done with the   knowledge   that   by   such   act   of   his,   ba y death   was   likely   to   be   caused.   Prabhakaran   turned   on   its   own   B om facts.” 173. At the end of paragraph no. 46   the Hon'ble  Apex Court has expressed its view that Prabhakaran's  case   turned   on   its   own   facts.   The   facts   of  Prabhakaran's case are also discussed in paragraph 45  as detailed above.         271 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 272  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 174. rt                                                                                                                       The   above   reasoning   either   in   Prabhakaran  C ou case or in the Alister Pareira   case, again endorse the  view that each case obviously has to be decided on its  own facts and whether the person had a knowledge or  175. ig h not is to be seen considering the circumstances. Another   observations   in   the   said   authority  which are appearing in paragraph no.41 in the Alister  H Pareira's matter are reproduced :­ ba y “Rash or negligent driving on a public   road   with   the   knowledge   of   the   dangerous   character   and   the   likely   B om effect of the act and resulting in death   may   fall   in   the   category   of   culpable   homicide not amounting to murder. A   person,   doing   an   act   of   rash   or   negligent   driving,   if   aware   of   a   risk   that a particular consequence is likely   to result and that result occurs, may   be held guilty not only of the act but   also of the result. As a matter of law ­          272 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:01 ::: 273  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc in view of the provisions of the Indian   C ou Penal   Code   ­   the   cases   which   fall   rt                                                                                                                       within last clause of Section  299 but   not within clause 'fourthly' of Section   300   may   cover   the   cases   of   rash   or   negligent act done with the knowledge   ig h of   the   likelihood   of   its   dangerous   consequences   and   may   entail   punishment under Section 304 Part II   H Indian   Penal   Code.   Section     304A   Indian   Penal   Code   takes   out   of   its   ambit the cases of death of any person   ba y by   doing   any   rash   or   negligent   act   amounting   to   culpable   homicide   of   B om either description.” 176. In   fact,  this  observations  of  the  Apex  Court  are also to be construed and to be accepted when the  earlier   issue   as   to   applicability   of   Section   33   of   the  Evidence Act has been discussed by this Court and it is  in   respect   of   the   requirement   of   that   section   in   the         273 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 274  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       proviso that the “questions in issue were the same in  C ou the first and second proceeding.” Though it is argued  on   behalf   of   the   State   that   in   view   of   the   ratio  propounded by Alister Pareira's case, in each and every  case of drunken driving and causing death of a person  177. ig h section 304 Part II of IPC may not be applicable.  Again   on   the   specific   circumstances   of   the  H case in the matter of Alister Pareira, the Hon'ble Apex  Court has upheld the order of this Court for conviction  ba y of the appellant for the offence under section 304 Part  II   of   IPC.     The   circumstances   were   very   dreadful.  B om Paragraph   no.71   of   the   authority   depicts   the  circumstances. The vehicle was lying in the middle of  the road between the road divider and footpath on the  Carter Road at about 50 feet from the north side of  Varun   Cooperative   Housing   Society   gate   and   about  110 feet from railway quarters gate on the south side.         274 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 275  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       The front wheel of the car was broken and mudguard  C ou was pressed. The spot panchnama shows 70 feet long  brake   marks   in   a   curve   from   west   side   of   the   road  divider towards footpath on eastern side. It is further  seen   from   the   spot   panchnama   that   a   tempo,   mud  ig h digger   and   two   trucks   were   parked   on   the   road  between   the   railway   quarters   gate   and   Varun  H Cooperative   Housing   Society   gate   near   the   accident  spot. That was a case in which the spot panchnama  ba y was duly proved by PW 11 and 16. There is nothing in  the cross­examination of these witnesses to doubt their  B om presence   or veracity. The long brake  marks in curve  show   that   the   vehicle   was   being   driven   by   the  appellant at high speed; the appellant had lost control  of the speeding vehicle resulting in the accident and,  consequently, seven deaths and injury to eight persons. 178. In   the   said   authority   in   paragraph   76   a         275 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 276  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       reference is made by the Apex Court regarding notice  C ou taken by the High Court as to the people sleeping on  pavements.     The   said   paragraph   76   is   reproduced  hereunder :­ ig h “The High Court took judicial notice of   the   fact   that   in   Mumbai   people   do   sleep on pavements. The accused was   H also aware of the fact that at the place   of   occurrence   people   sleep   as   the   accused was resident of that area. The   ba y High Court took note of the fact that   the accused had admitted the accident   and   his   explanation   was   that   the   B om accident   occurred   due   to   mechanical   failure   and   the   defect   that   was   developed in the vehicle but found his   explanation   improbable   and   unacceptable.   The   High   Court   also   observed that the factum of high and   reckless   speed   was   evident   from   the   brake marks at the site. The speeding          276 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 277  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc instantaneously.”  179. C ou car   could   not   be   stopped   by   him   rt                                                                                                                       Of   course,   though   in   Alister   Pareira,   the  Hon'ble   Apex   Court   has   come   to   the   conclusion   of  ig h maintaining  the  charge  under  section  304  Part  II   of  IPC, it was on the fact situation of that matter, wherein  H the vehicle was heavily damaged. So far as matter in  hand   is   concerned   almost,   entire   evidence   of   the  ba y prosecution   has   been   discussed   in   this   appeal   and  various observations have been made by this Court. In  B om the   considered   view   of   this   Court   based   on   the  decision of Alister Pareira,  present  matter cannot be  taken as a case in which there is application of penal  section 304 Part II of IPC.  Of course, in fact, this is for  the academic interest as this Court has already come  to the conclusion as to the failure of the prosecution to  bring   that   material   on   record   to   establish   beyond         277 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 278  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       reasonable   doubt   that   the   appellant   accused   was  C ou driving   the   vehicle,  further  more  that  he  was under  the   influence   of   alcohol.   Moreover,   there   is   still   a  doubt created as to whether the incident has occurred  due to the bursting of the tyre prior to the incident or  180. ig h the tyre got burst after the incident.  So   far   as   the   ratio   in   the   another   case   of  H Sanjeev   Nanda   (2012)   8   SCC   450.   It   was   also   the  punishment for the offence under section 304 Part II  ba y of IPC and on special circumstances of that case the  Hon'ble   Apex   Court   had   given   the   finding   as   to  B om applicability   of   Section   304   Part   II.   Specific  observations in paragraph no.29 of that authority are  of much significance which read thus : “It has also come on record that seven   persons   were   standing   close   to   the   middle   of   the   road.   One   would   not   expect such a group, at least, at that          278 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 279  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc place of the road, that too in the wee   C ou hours   of   the   morning,   on   such   a   rt                                                                                                                       wintry night. There is every possibility   of the accused failing to see them on   the road. Looking to all this, it can be   safely   assumed   that   he   had   no   ig h intention of causing bodily injuries to   them but he had certainly knowledge   that causing such injuries and fleeing   H away from the scene of accident, may   ba y ultimately result in their deaths.” 181. Again   in   the   considered   view   of   this   Court,  B om ratios   in   Alister   Pareira's   case   and   Sanjeev   Nanda's  case are to be construed in the light of specific facts of  those cases. 182. Now   coming   to   some   minor   points   as   to  examination of a panch witness, drawing of a site map  and   the   discrepancies   in   the   site   map   vis­a­vis   the         279 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 280  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       factual position and the presence or otherwise of the  C ou footpath at the scene of offence and the topography of  the   area   of   the   occurrence   of   the   incident   certain  observations   are   required   to   be   made   prior   to  183. ig h disposing of the appeal; PW   1   is   the   panch   witness,   one   Sambha  Gauda he was running a tea stall near one temple at  H St. Andrews Road, Bandra. At about 3:00 a.m. he was  called on the spot on 28.9.2002 by Bandra Police and  ba y was     informed   that   one   car   was   involved   in   the  accident and to act as pancha. He and another person  B om by name Arjun, apparently his  friend, both, attended  the   spot.   The   important   part   of   his   substantive  evidence is to the effect that the front portion of the  car was damaged. The  bumper of the car also touched  the   shutter   of   American   Laundry.   Five   persons   were  beneath the car. Car had climbed the stairs and went         280 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 281  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       in the American Laundry.     The police had measured  C ou the spot. According to him, the police collected broken  glass   pieces   and   also   number   plate   and   also   took  charge  of these articles and also collected the blood  stains. Then, according to him, spot panchnama was  ig h drawn   and   he   identified   it   as   Exh.28.   During   cross­ examination he had specifically answered that the left  H tyre   of   the   car   was   found   punctured.   Further,   he  answered   that   it   did   not   happen   that   the   police  ba y entered in the car by opening the door of the car for  inspection and   that police found RC book, certified  B om copy   of   New   India   Assurance   and   Police   took  possession of these documents and key of the car. This  witness   denied   the   police   having   done   so   and   also  when confronted with the portion mark “A” from the  panchnama   he   stated   that   it   was   not   correctly  recorded. He further stated that he had not measured  the   spot   personally   and   that   police   had   done   the         281 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 282  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       marking in his presence. Another important admission  C ou he gave is that the police in his presence did not take  charge   of  the  portion of the shutter. Whereas in  his  evidence the portion of a shutter is produced before  the   Court   and   by   pointing   it   out   it   is   submitted   on  ig h behalf   of   the   appellant   that,   in   fact,   there   is   a  tampering of the article and various articles were not  H seized   during   the   panchnama   but   they   were   done  subsequently seized. This is significant enough when  ba y according to the case of the prosecution and as stated  by   Ravindra   Patil the  car  had entered  the   American  B om Express Laundry by dashing into the shutter and car  entered   to   the   extent   of   3   and     ½   feet   inside.   As  against   this,   the   evidence   of   this   person   did   not  mention anything regarding breaking of the     shutter  of   the   laundry   and   the   car   going   inside   the   shop  premises. The piece of the shutter is produced before  the trial Court. It is not the piece obtained by cutting it         282 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 283  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       from the entire shutter. It is also not seen having any  C ou puncture   except   that   it   is   slightly   bent.   This   factual  position   is   not   in   consonance   with   the   case   of  prosecution as to puncture to the shutter by dash from  184. ig h the car.  Apart from the above, it is also brought to the  notice of this Court that another pancha, according to  H this witness and according to the panchnama Exh.28 is  by name Arjun and his address is given as Antop Hill,  ba y Sion Koliwada.   B om 185. By pointing   this out, it is submitted that in  the   absence   of   any   material   on   record   by   the  investigating agency as to how this person by name  Arjun was brought from Antop Hill, Sion, Koliwada at  3:00   a.m.   on   28.9.2002   at   Bandra,   the   presence   of  said   second   pancha   renders   the   entire   panchnama  doubtful.        283 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 284  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc 186. rt                                                                                                                       After analysis of the substantive evidence of  C ou PW 1 panch witness Sambha Gauda, now a reference  is required to be made regarding the arguments as to  the   topography   of   the   area   where   the   incident   had  occurred   and   also   whether   there   was   a   cement  ig h platform in front of the American Bakery and whether  there were any steps i.e. sort of stair­case and whether  H there   was   a   footpath.   Also   the   aspect   as   to   the  interview given by Ravindra Patil to the Mid Day on  ba y 29.9.2002   and   which   is   printed   and   published   on  30.9.2002, can be discussed in  short. As earlier entire  B om evidence   of   the   prosecution   on   various   aspects   has  been   dealt   with   in   detail,   thus,   holding   that   the  evidence brought before the Court by the prosecution  has   not   reached   that   standard   of   proof   which   is  required   to   establish   the   guilt   of   the   present  appellant–accused beyond reasonable doubt, no much  importance   can   be  given   to   the   argument   on   minor         284 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 285  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       points   as   to   the   discrepancies   appearing   in   the   site  C ou map vis­a­vis the contents of the spot panchnana. Site  map is at Exh.143 before the Sessions Court and it was  prepared by the officer, when, in fact, the vehicle was  not on the spot and it was already removed to Bandra  ig h Police   Station.     There   is   variance   in   the   substantive  evidence of the prosecution witnesses and mainly of  H the injured persons and also of the police officer. PW 3  stated that the right front side tyre was resting on the  ba y Ota   (platform).     According   to   him,   left   tyre   was   in  between   the   laundry   and   the   bakery.   PW   4   in   his  B om evidence   has   stated   that   both   the   corners   of   the  bumper touched the shutter.  Back tyres of the vehicle  were resting at the end of the stairs.  Also, according  to him, both front tyres of the vehicle were resting on  the stairs up to the shutter.   According to the police  officer PW 26, vehicle Land Cruiser had climbed three  stairs   and   the   right   front   wheel   was   resting   on   the         285 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 286  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       stairs of the Laundry. In fact, what is depicted in the  C ou site map Exh.143 is not what is appearing from the  substantive evidence of these witnesses.  Moreover, in  fact, it is also not in consonance with what is stated by  Ravindra Patil that the car had gone inside the shop to  ig h the extent of 3½ feet thereby puncturing the shutter of  the laundry. As such this map also does not show the  H correct position and as such apparently it is also one of  the   mitigating   circumstances   to   the   case   of   the  ba y prosecution. 187. Now   coming   to   the   interview   given   to   the  B om newspaper   Mid­Day   by   Ravindra   Patil,   various  questions  were asked to him and in fact  one  of the  questions   was   “whether   you   have   stated   to   the  Reporter of Mid­Day that Altaf was on the wheel when  Salman and Kamalkhan returned from Rain Bar and  started to Salman's house by car.” Ravindra Patil has         286 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 287  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou answered this question to the following effect : rt                                                                                                                       “I   do   not   remember   the   interview   given to Mid­Day”. 188. The   next   question   asked   was   that   whether  ig h Salman   Khan   returned   from   JW   Marriott   after   15  minutes and sat on driver's seat of his motor car.  The  H answer   was   “I   have   stated   so”.   Further   there   was  a  question as to whether this witness has stated to the  ba y reporter of Mid­Day that Salmankhan i.e. the accused  was driving the motor car at the speed of 70 km per  B om hour.   To   this   question   witness   answered,   “I   do   not  remember”.   By   pointing   to   these   questions   and  answers,   it   is   submitted   on   behalf   of   the   appellant­ accused  that this witness has conveniently answered  to the question that he does not remember and those  answers are to the questions as to the driving by Altaf  and speed of the car was 70 km per hour when it was         287 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:02 ::: 288  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       driven   from   JW   Marriott   Hotel   back   to   home.   As  C ou against   this,   further   argued   that   the   answer   of   this  witness   Ravindra   Patil   to   the   questions   that   in   the  valet parking of JW Marriott Hotel car was halted, the  accused sat on driver's seat and the witness answered  ig h in the affirmative. By pointing  this out, it is submitted  that the answers  “I do not remember” are required to  H be construed that  he was not sure whether what was  asked, did actually happen or not. His answer is not  ba y negative   to   the   questions   regarding   Altaf   and  regarding   speed   of   car   70   km/hr.     Of   course,   this  B om argument was strongly objected by the learned Public  Prosecutor  on various counts, firstly   it is submitted  that   the   Reporter   of     the   Mid­Day   is   not   brought  before   the   Court   to   establish   the   factum   that   there  was, in fact, interview taken and taken in a particular  manner contending the circumstances which were put  to   Ravindra   Patil   during   his   cross­examination.     In         288 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 289  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       fact, as per Section 145 of the Evidence Act if at all the  C ou witness is to be contradicted then only the said earlier  statement of the witness is required to be shown to  him.   Otherwise, the witness can be asked questions  on   his   earlier   statement.     As   such,   considering   this  ig h legal   position   and  considering   the   answers   given   by  Ravindra Patil and acceptance by him that he did give  H interview to the Mid­Day on 29.9.2002, in the opinion  of   this   Court,  though   what   is  argued  on   this   aspect  ba y cannot be accepted on behalf of the appellant­accused  but still the conduct of Ravindra Patil can be seen by  B om way of the answers given. Otherwise also this Court  has   earlier   held   as   to   the     non­admissibility   of   the  evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   under   section   33   of   the  Evidence Act.  189. Now, the last argument advanced on behalf of  the appellant­accused is that death of Nurulla was not         289 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 290  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       due   to   the   accident   or   due   to   the   driving   of   the  C ou vehicle.     During   the   arguments,   it   is   submitted   that  there is substantive evidence of witnesses to show that  the crane was brought on the spot to lift the vehicle  which was immobilized and also had a burst left front  ig h tyre.   It is an admitted position that crane was called  to lift the vehicle and place it aside so that the injured  H beneath the vehicle could be removed. That time the  body of Nurulla was also removed from beneath the  ba y vehicle.   The   argument   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   is  that   death   of   Nurulla   was   because   of   falling   of   the  B om vehicle  while it was being attempted to be lifted by  using a crane. That type of evidence has also come on  record   that   at   one  point  of   time  the   vehicle  slipped  from   the   hook   of   the   crane   and   fell   again   on   the  ground.   Apparently, the body of Nurulla was below  the vehicle. By pointing  this out, it is tried to suggest  that by that time said Nurulla was alive and his death         290 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 291  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       was only due to the heavy impact of the vehicle when  C ou it fell down due to slipping from the hook of the crane.  As   against   this   argument   learned   Public   Prosecutor  brought   to   the   attention   of   this   Court,   the   injuries  reported   in   postmortem   report.   The   postmortem  ig h report is Exh.149 before the Sessions Court.   Column  no.   16   of   the   postmortem   report   show   both   arms  H crushed   and   lower   legs   extended.   Column   no.   17  regarding surface wounds and injuries show multiple  ba y crushed injuries over head, neck, chest and abdomen.  All internal organs crushed badly. So far as column 19  B om is concerned regarding injuries on the head and skull,  the finding is “crushed completely.” The same finding  is for thorax, lungs and other parts of the body.  Even  the abdomen was crushed completely. Even the spine  and spinal cord were crushed up to T­20 and cause of  death   was   haemorrage   and   shock   due   to   multiple  crushed injuries (unnatural). Apparently, by single fall         291 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 292  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       of a heavy vehicle whatever might be the weight of the  C ou vehicle, as suggested on behalf of the appellant, such  type   of   injuries   are   not   possible   and   on   this   count  argument   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   cannot   be  accepted that the death of Nurulla was due to falling  ig h of the vehicle when it was tried to be lifted. It must be  taken that the death was due to the running over by  H the   vehicle   when   Nurulla   was   sleeping   on   the  platform.   Though   this   is   the   finding   from   the  ba y postmortem   report   and   after   analyzing   the   evidence  and arguments on this point, still it will not lead this  B om Court to hold more than this as earlier this Court has  held   that   the   prosecution   has  failed  to  establish   the  case against the accused on all the counts as to driving  that also in a drunken state.  190. Now,   again   this   Court   needs   to   consider  whether the offence punishable under section 134 of         292 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 293  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       the Motor Vehicles Act  read with section 187 of the  C ou said   Act   is   to   be   attracted   so   far   as   the   present  appellant­accused is concerned. Though this court has  held that the prosecution has failed to establish that  the appellant­accused was driving the vehicle during  ig h the incident, still it is a factual position that he was  present   in   the   vehicle   and   this   position   cannot   be  H negated.   As   such,   the   import   of   section   134   of   the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is required to be construed.  B om ba y Section 134 reads thus : “When any person is injured or any   property of a third party is damaged,   as a result of an accident in which a   motor vehicle is involved, the driver of   the vehicle or other person in charge   of the vehicle shall­ (a) unless it is not practicable to do   so   on   account   of   mob   fury   or   any   other reason beyond his control, take   all reasonable steps to secure medical   attention for the injured person,  [by   conveying him to the nearest medical   practitioner  or  hospital, and it  shall          293 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 294  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc ig h C ou be the duty of every registered medical   practitioner or the doctor on the duty   in the hospital immediately to attend   to   the   injured   person   and   render   medical   aid   or   treatment   without   waiting   for   any   procedural   formalities], unless the injured person   or his guardian, in case he is a minor,   desires otherwise; rt                                                                                                                       B om ba y H (b) give on demand by a police officer   any information required by him, or,   if   no  police  officer   is  present, report   the   circumstances   of   the   occurrence,   including   the   circumstances,   if   any,   for   not   taking   reasonable   steps   to   secure   medical   attention   as   required   under clause (a), at the nearest police   station   as   soon   as   possible,   and   in   any case within twenty­four hours of   the occurrence; [(c) give the following information in   writing to the insurer, who has issued   the certificates of insurance, about the   occurrence of the accident, namely:­ (i)     insurance   policy   number   and   period of its validity; (ii) date,   time   and   place   of   accident;        294 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 295  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc C ou (iii) particulars   of   the   persons   injured or killed in the accident; rt                                                                                                                       (iv) name   of   the   driver   and   the   particulars of his driving licence. 191. ig h Explanation. ­ For the purposes of this   section   the   expression   "driver"   includes the owner of the vehicle.]” The   above   section   contemplates   that   there  H was   a   duty   imposed   by   law   on   a   person   to   give  medical assistance / help and this duty is cast not only  ba y on the driver of the vehicle but also every person in­ charge of the vehicle. Though it is not established that  B om the appellant­accused was driving the vehicle still he  comes under the later part as 'a person in­charge of  the   vehicle'   and   as   per   the   explanation   to   the   said  section, 'driver' includes the owner of the vehicle. Now  the question arises whether the circumstances on the  spot were such that the act of the appellant­accused in         295 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 296  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       leaving   the   spot   without   apparently   giving   any  C ou medical   assistance   or   to   take   reasonable   steps   to  secure the medical aid to the injured.  On this aspect,  it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that after the  incident a mob of many people had gathered and the  ig h mob   was   in   aggressive   mood   and   some   of   the  members   were   also   armed   with     rods   and   other  H articles.  Even according to the witnesses and also the  injured   who   had   been   on   the   spot,   the   mob   was  ba y furious and in fact there could have been   a law and  order problem and it in fact happened as the mob had  B om spotted   the   appellant­accused   coming   out   of   the  vehicle   and   the   vehicle   had   caused   death   of   one  person   and   injuries   to   other   four   persons.   As   such  considering   this   argument   and   the   factual   position  that   the   circumstances   were   such   that   in   order   to  escape   from   the   fury   of   the   mob   and   these  circumstances   were   beyond   the   control   of   the         296 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 297  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       appellant,   no   such   appropriate   steps   were   taken   to  C ou secure   the   medical   aid   to   the   injured   persons.   Of  course, on this aspect, it is argued by learned Public  Prosecutor that if not immediately after the incident  but   subsequently   also   there   is   no   step   taken   by   the  ig h appellant to see what is the condition of the injured  and whether they require any medical help.   In fact,  H the  law  requires as mandated by section 134 of the  Motor   Vehicles   Act   that   such   aid   is   required   to   be  ba y given   by   the   driver   and   also   the   other   persons   in­ charge of the vehicle when any person is injured or  B om any property of a third party is damaged as a result of  the   accident   in   which   motor   vehicle   is   involved.   So  this presupposes that   such assistance is immediately  given at the time of the incident and in near proximity  in time. As such, in the considered view of this Court,  even   this   charge   under   section   134   of   the   Motor  Vehicles Act   cannot be attracted in the present case         297 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 298  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       192. C ou considering the circumstances.  Now, in summing up, it must be mentioned  that on the main broad aspects as to the driving and  drunkenness   the   prosecution   has   not   brought   that  ig h material on record to point out only the guilt of the  appellant­accused   as   almost   entire   evidence   of   the  prosecution is in the nature of circumstantial evidence  H though   the   evidence   of   Ravindra   Patil   can   be  considered as a evidence of a direct nature, still this  ba y Court has earlier held as to its inadmissibility and has  subsequently   also   marshalled   his   evidence   as   to   his  B om evidential value.  193. While   arriving   at   the   above   findings   this  Court is not oblivious of the perception or the opinion  of   members   of   general   public.   However,   it   is   well  settled principle that a Court must decide the case on  the   material   brought   on   record   and   which   can   be         298 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 299  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accepted   as   an   evidence   as   per   the   procedure   laid  C ou down by  law. The court shall not be swayed away by  any popular belief that a particular person considering  his   avocation,   profession   or   standing,   must   have  committed  such an offence and must be held guilty.  ig h The Court is expected to be impervious to the pressure  from   the   public   and   also   from   the   Media.     It   is   for  H good reasons that the law of Evidence has no place for  the   general   public   opinion   as   a   factor   that   should  ba y weigh with the Court while deciding a case at hand.  Probably because such opinion or such perception is  B om many   a   times   gathered   on   the   basis   of   the  information/news   that   is   constantly   being   told   /  broadcasted   by   the   Media   and   other   institutions.   It  often happens that a proposition that is     repeatedly  fed   to   the   general   public   has   the   possibility   of  achieving the status of   'truth'.   This is as far as the  general public at large is concerned.  However, this so         299 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 300  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       called   'truth'   i.e.   the   proposition     is   required   to   be  C ou proved   before   a   Court   of   law   and   in   which   the  established principles of law of evidence are required  to be followed.   Even the basic cardinal principle of  Criminal   Jurisprudence   and   the   burden   on   the  ig h prosecution   cannot   be   forgotten   and   any   strong  suspicion cannot be considered as a material to hold a  H person guilty of a particular offence.  Bearing in mind  the   above   principles,   in   the   considered   view   of   this  ba y Court, the prosecution has failed to establish its case  of all charges. B om 194. Needless   to mention that in every criminal  trial the burden of establishing the guilt of an accused  is  on   the   prosecution and that guilt  is to be  proved  beyond   reasonable   doubt.     The   benefit   of   every  reasonable   doubt   which   arises   out   of   the   evidence  adduced,   must  necessarily  be  given  in  favour of the         300 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 301  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accused.     In   this   case,   considering   the   various  C ou weaknesses   in   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   various  shortcomings such   as non­examination  of necessary  and   appropriate   witnesses,     the   omissions   and  contradictions in the evidence of the injured witnesses  ig h which go to the root of the matter, definitely a doubt  has arisen as to the involvement of the appellant for  H the offences with which he is charged. On the basis of  this type of evidence the appellant cannot be convicted  ba y though the apparent perception might be different as  appearing in the mind of a common man.  Moreover,  B om from   the   careful   analysis   of   the   evidence   collected  during   the   investigation   without   expressing   any  conclusive   opinion   this   Court   feels   that   there   are  following hypothesis possible:  195. Firstly,   though   the   investigation   might   be  impartial, it was conducted in such a careless a faulty         301 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:03 ::: 302  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       manner with scant regard to the established procedure  C ou laid   down   in   law   more   particularly,     the   procedure  required for establishing the chain of evidence when  the   case   is   based   on   the   biological   evidence,   or,   ii)  secondly, the investigation was so conducted  to loosen  196. ig h the prosecution case.  Existence of any of the above hypothesis is, in  H fact, highly deplorable but always it is a duty of the  Court to weigh the evidence which is brought before it  ba y and   to   ascertain   whether   the   offences   are   proved  B om against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 197. Lastly, in the considered view of this Court,  the appreciation of the evidence as is done by the trial  Court in the present matter is not proper and legal as  per   the   settled   principles   of   Criminal   Jurisprudence.  For   example,   it   can   be   said     without   giving   all   the  details that the trial Court had erred in accepting the         302 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:04 ::: 303  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       Bills   which   were   recovered   without   there   being   any  C ou panchnama and the bills altogether saddled with the  fabrication. Secondly, evidence of Ravindra Patil was  not   marshalled   properly   and   thirdly   evidence   to  establish   biological   chain   regarding   alcohol  ig h consumption is not appreciated as per the mandate of  law. As such, consequently, it must be said that this is  H not a case in which the prosecution has successfully  established   its   case   for   all   the   charges   and   as   such  ba y resultantly   the   appeal   is   required   to   be   disposed   of  B om with the following order :­ 1) :: O R D E R :: Criminal Appeal No. 572 of 2015 preferred  by appellant Salman Salim Khan is allowed; 2) The impugned judgment and order dated  6th May, 2015 passed in Sessions Case No. 240 of 2013  is hereby quashed and set aside; 3) The appellant­accused Salman Salim Khan         303 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:04 ::: 304  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       accused shall stand cancelled; 4) C ou is acquitted of all the charges. The bail bonds of the  If the fine amounts which are imposed in  view of the impugned judgment and order, are already  paid, the same shall be refunded back to him; In view of the provisions of Section 437­A  ig h 5) of Cr.P.C., the appellant shall execute a P.R. bond in the  H sum  of  Rs.25,000/­  (Rupees Twenty Five  Thousand)  with one or two sureties in the like amount; On the request on behalf of the appellant­ ba y 6) accused   provisionally   a   cash   security   of   Rs.25,000/­  B om (Rupees   Twenty   Five   Thousand   only),   shall   be  accepted by the office for a period of two weeks and  within   this   time   the   surety   procedure   shall   be  completed. The bail procedure be complied before the  office of this Court; 7) As the bail bonds of the appellant­accused  stand   cancelled,   which   were   given   at   the   time   of         304 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:04 ::: 305  CR APEAL-572-2015-JUDGMENT.doc rt                                                                                                                       admission   of   the   appeal,   Bandra   Police   Station   is  him on proper identification;   8) C ou directed to hand over the Passport of the appellant to  Appeal is disposed of accordingly. Criminal  Application No. 1041 of 2015 does not survive in view  (A.R. JOSHI,J)  ba y H disposed of.  ig h of   disposal   of   appeal   and   hence   it   is   accordingly  TRANSCRIBED BY : B om DESHMANE AND  LADDA (PS)        305 / 305 ::: Uploaded on - 16/12/2015 ::: Downloaded on - 17/12/2015 13:32:04 :::