Page it ofl Calian Wilkerson From: Patti Saliba on behalf of Mae Beavers Sent: Monday, August 01, 2011 10:03 AM To: Cailan Wilkerson Subject: FW: Complaint Re Judge Bill Swann From: Russell Egii Sent: Saturday, Juiy 30, 2011 12:53 PM To: timothy.discenza@att.net Cc: Russell Egli; Mae Beavers Subject: Complaint Re Judge Bill Swann iV|r. Discenza: The following shall serve as a formal complaint against Judge Bili Swann ofthe Knox County Fourth Circuit Court. Recentiy, I was retained as counsel for Pamela Beeler who is in the midst of a divorce and chiid custody action in Judge Swann's Fourth Circuit Court. On Friday, July 22, 2011, l\/lrs. Beeier's former withdrawing counsel, Herston, provided the court with an agreed order of withdraw and substitution of counsel which I had approved and Mrs. Beeler had approved. Judge Swann had open court communications with John l-iarber, his good friend, who represents the opposing side in the Beeler case without my being present and decided not to enter my agreed order but a different order which only allowed Mr. Herston to withdraw. Subsequently, I filed a motion to recuse based on the fact that i have a pending civil lawsuit against Judge Swann, the facts of which he is well aware of along with a proposed order granting the recusai. Judge Swann has in ail other occasions except for the Bishop matter recused himself sua sponte as he should by direction of his judiciai canons. However, in this Beeler matter, Judge Swann has decided to abrogate his Judicial Canons and set the motion to recuse for hearing on August 8, 2011. You and I know that a fudge cannot sit in judgment of his own recusal, especially when the Judge is aware of facts that require him to recuse immediately without hearing. Judge Swann is in violation of Rule 10 Judicial Canon and must be disciplined appropriately. in closing, you and i aiso itnow this is not the first time this Judge has decided to disregard his Canons. I look forward to hearing back from you. LAW OF RUSSELL EGLI, PLLC 11470 Parkside Drive, Suite 201 Knoxvilie, TN 37934 (865) 304-4125 9/22/2011 Sli Union Street Suite 600 Nashville, 37243-O67 TUDGES OF THE TENNESSEE COURT OF THE JUDICIARY Don R. Ash Presiding .fudge J.S. (Steve) Daniel Disciplinary Counsel Chris Craft David M. Cook Angelita Blackshear Dalton Jane Latimer Christy R. Little Paul Neely Pamela Reeves Kathy McMahon Mary Martin Schaffner Gregory D. Smith Steve Stafford .lean A. Stanley Dwight Stokes D. Michael Swiney Bernie Wein [nan Thomas T. Woodall fu I 7' fs ,spin -L i, _r fr 9 if. ii, -up t-.THE TENNESSEE COURT OF THE .FUDICIARY Michael W. Catalano, Clerk EGO Supreme Couit Building 401 Seventh Avenue, North - Nashville, TN 372194407 July 15, 2009 6i5>>253-1470 CONFIDENTIAL Vv'endy W. Rose-Egli 537 MacArthur Lane Knoxville, Tennessee 37922 RE: Complaint against Judge Bill Swann File No. 07-3145 Dear Ms. Rose>>l-Egli: Our inquiry into your complaint against the above-named judge has been completed. The panel did not simply dismiss your complaint. The investigative panel took what it felt was the appropriate action as a result ofthe investigation. However, due to Tennessee statutes and rules of the Court, I am not permitted to describe to you the specific type of action taken. Your cooperation with Disciplinary Counsel during the investigation and your interest in maintaining the integrity of the Tennessee judiciary by bringing this matter to our attention is greatly appreciated. Very truly yours, gyda Don. R. Ash Presiding Judge -1- DRA/mpm I I oc: Disciplinary Counsel investigative _Panel wendyaoae 3 3 3 From: Russell Egii Esc; [iegalaction3O@aim.com] Sent: Sunday, October 03, 2810 11:24 AM To; 'Wendy 'Wendy Rose' Subject; FW: Judicial Reousal From: Blitzer, Jonathan Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2009 1:11 PM To: legalaction3O@airn.com Cc: Subject: RE: Judiciai Recusai Dear I\/lr. Egli, Thanl< you for getting in touch with us concerning the Rose v. Rose case and for bringing what appears to be such an egregious case ofiudicial misconduct to our attention. After a preiiminafy review ot the materials you sent us, 1 should say that we are very sympathetic to l\/is. Rose's position and agree that the circumstances surrounding her case were incredibly unfortunate, to say the least. We wonder, though, in what capacity you would like us to act at this point. It seems, from your ietter, that Judge SWBUUIS initial ruling (on I\/is. Rose's custody) has been reversed on appeal, and that the Tennessee Court of the Judiciary has since investigated Judge Swann. It does seem frustrating and peculiar that iudge Asn refused to disclose what the Judiciary has decided with respect to Judge Swann. That said, what - iianything remains to be done? And what do you have in mind exactly in terms of the Brennan Center's involvement in the aftermath ofthe case? Again, thank you for reaching out tothe Brennan Center. Best, Jonathan From: Russeli L. Egii, Esq. Sent: Wednesday, July 29, 2009 12:41 AM To: Subject: Judicial Recusal I have a case against a Judge here in Tennessee who refused to recuse from a ease Wherein a iitigant campaigned against him in his 2006 eiection. The State Judiciary did nothing about it. Let me know if you are interested in this ease I can send you the tile. I took fotward to heating back from you. Russell L. Egii LAW OFFICE OF RUSSELL L. P.O. Box 23843 Knoxville, TN 37933 (865) 531-8192 1 m. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-rnail message is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. lf you are not the intended recipient, please Contact the Sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. if you are the intended recipient but do not Wish to receive comniunications through this medium, please so advise the sender mm-< tw-Q." T-.7-W- ew _.wt -4--iw . fn- Hot'DeaIs at Dell on Popular Laptops perfect for Back to School irirri ei ?152 i 5 ik i ui - et--ii' _:le er 32 fr Cer1'ri?3e for Eiecricn Court Seye BY L. HUDSQN JR. Poiitice een be realgivemci-iurribie, even ic ?udiciei feces, but there eil-EI ere Iimiie. The 'Couri of Appeals enrerced one eucrr !irr1it_ eiete circuii courljuclge he cermot ber en efriorney from practicing in his ,ieciiciei oierricifuei the attorney announced ire is going to run egeinei the judge in the nerr? eleciion. i\io_ (Got. QTY). Swann, judge in me Fcurirz Circuit Court for Knox County since 1952, issued rembiing order in Juigr that barred attorney David C. Lee from ecceering in his court, saying Lee "voILm'teri|y created ihis confiict. which makes him io practice in Pcurrh Circuit Court." The order wee filed ee pert of domestic reietione Ricee mf. Rose->>ir| which Lee wee eiierzt lfilerade F2oee-end wee also used to crock Lees representation of Ciieriee Riciwerfi Joiner in the Jofeerdivorce cecer ;7:3ui ice 'began Leek own divorce which pressed eleo oceurreci iri Swerrne cour1iro.om. /f\ccoz'oir1g lo Lee, Swear! sent Lee to on civii ooritemoi chergee in for failing tc peg; $38,000. Lee ieter announced in open cc-:fri his irzieniion to oppose Swarm in the genera! elections ofAugue't 2006. Judge Swarm wroie in '?he orderi "David Lee may noi use his erfificieiiy created corlfiict, which wee done for his own reesoce in his own divorce litigation, as srretegy to remove this judge from any end elf iirigetion ther he to enter. ir is en efiroct to the orderiy edrninierretion Swann eie-c wrote- rhet Lee had not practiced ie the Fourth Circuit unfit he represented irimeelf in his divorce, end *ihet Lee Ietrtoolf; Fourth Circuii; ore bono. "So the Foes of Fouriri ilircuit practice ce cf no signiicerice to David Lee." Lee eoughi review of the order by The Tennessee Court cf Agzupeeie, arguing that he couici not be eieberred from the court for declaring his iriterrtiori to run against the judge. The court cfeppeeie agreed and ruieci that the proper course of action 1'or'Swenn wouici be io recuee Lee's Fourth _C3ircuii'cesee. . "There is iurrciementei ciiherence between Mr. Lee practicing before the trial judge end Ivir. Lee practicing in Fourth Circuit {3oLfri," Judge Cherries Sueermo wrote 'ior the eppeeie court. "ifrrze triei court cenriot hear-his cases., he ceeinierohenge with other iocei judges cr oe he did in the Lee divorce iitigetion, rho designation of judge 'ro hear 1 1 (if-f-.e?ufi im. i i. 1-3 fi The court oi appeals made cieai' that ciieisarmerri wee The choice: "Disbai'i"nef"ii from praciioirig in a given couri under the circumstances oi 'iizie case sends 'ihe wrong message. it says ihat if one cieoidee io 'run against an imoiirriiseoi iso-ge, he or she must give up the aiiofrierfa praciice in ihe judge? The coori-aieo S\r\iarm`e ruiirig is "oonirary io the public po-iiogi of encouraging ie rim ?oriudQeehios." rzoteci that Lee, as a iioeneeoi aiioroegf in me state of Tennessee, hee ihe to practice io Fourth Circuit Couri unless be has roiacoridoci or noi foliowed ihe "appiicabie rules goverriing the oraciice or iaw," Counsei for ii/Ire. Joiner argued a judge mos? prohibit inriivicluaia from corxvegririg the iiriai ihey are in apeciai io image, which flows Ciireoiiy from Canon oi the Code ofJuciiciai Coniiuci in Tennessee. The aioumani was ihai Swarm. by agreeing io reoofsaisi -in Lees convey the impression 'that Lee heid power 'to the judge. The appeals court rejeoied this argument, writing that Lee was noi in a apeciai io. irrfiueoce ihe judge simoiy because he a motion for recusai. 'Once the triai judge czieoidesi thai was appropriate in of Mr. Lees it was toe trialjucigee eeoisioowand noi any action by ivir. the iriaijucigee 'e.i:it' fiom his Cases." Unix-'ereiiy of Tennessee iaw iaroieesor Penny White agrees with the ruling. a 'Former justice on the Tennessee Supreme Coiifi. teaches courses on eihios for ine hialionai Judicial C-eiiege. "The Code Cooduoi ihai judges may have io reouse in cases in which they cannot be or cannot be perceived io be irripariiai," White Says. "That is the aporooriaie remedy when iuoige ieeis he or she is uraabie to si? fairly in a ease baaed upon who the parties. A jucige has no authority, absent extraordinary circumstances not iiere, to iawyere from appearing in a rrouri, To rio so assumes that <:ouri somehow is the jucigee, which oi' course ii is noi. "F'rooeda_roa are to aiiow a judge io eiep aside ii a particular situation raises a queei?on oi or the appearance of out io aiiow judges fo bar iEiW}i8i'S in effect alio-we a judge to 'force a lawyer to choose iseiweeri his or her or seeking iodiciai ofice Thai ie rro1ihejudge'5 role," she says. Lee is wiih iize appeals couri decision, and has piano. for his run in the 2095 "i\/iy campaign message is eimriiewimpose 'term iimita on this ?uc;ige," Lee says. 'The of support "io me has been o\rerwheimingintimidated," Lee eays. "i not demean the pereoriaily or cierrieafs ihe offi-oe iiseii Bei, I will mg' and not kovriow io 'ihisjuc?ge_" A voice maii message at Swarirfs courihouse ieiaphone number Said he arid his staff were out ofthe oiice -uritii Nov. TS. i-ie could not be reached for comment. ezooa ABA Jourriai OSH 9.12006 55115 PM ab a.o,ei_ orgfza onfpri oft/priotvi ew. ai; oi Ui; eo; uaifer wi I Russell Eglt, Escq. 5 aanif Coonsaia' cal Low "ff :iz 1- nn-1-as J-ary 20, 2009 Judge Don R. Ash Cert?fied Return RecefptMaf1 The Tennessee Court of the Judiciary 0 5 ll Union Street, Suite 600 Nashville, TN37243-067 Re: Complaint against Judge Bill Swann File No.: O7-3145 - Dear Judge Ash: My client is in receipt of your letter dated July 15, 2009. I note that you indicate in your letter that you are not allowed to disclose what action the Judiciary took regarding this complaint. lhave not located any rule of the court or statutes of this State which would justify keeping such information secret. I ask that you Write me and cite the exact statutes you are referring to so that I may move forward accordingly. I thank you in advance for your timely response to my request. Very truly yours, .fv - -0 5 Russell L. Eglr cc: Wendy W. Rose~Egli The Honorable oe G. Riley .teea ag sag ta 'fl il? Sci wg; The Tennessee Court of the Judiciary 1. s. DANIEL _los o. RILEY DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL ASST DISC. COUNSEL I I5 Lake Street Post Office Box 40 Ridgely, TN 33080 TEL. FAX 73 l/256-9433 April l6, 2009 Ms. Wendy W. Rose-Egli 537 MacArthur Way Knoxville, TN 37922 RE: Complaint against Judge Bill Swann File No. 07-3145 Dear Ms. Rose-Egli: Enclosed is the judge's response to my letter of March 18. You need not further respond. I realize you have disagreement with some of the matters set forth in the response. However, Question 1 is a matter of law; Question 2 is a matter of judicial interpretation; in Question 3 the judge concedes he was aware of your campaign activity prior to the recusal motion (regardless of exactly when it may have been); and in Question 4 the judge concedes he recused himself inthe other eases. For these reasons, I believe the judge has conceded those things that are material to the panel's determination of how it wishes to pioceed. Accordingly, I will send the matter back to the panel for its determination. This could take some time, but i will let you know once the panel has reached its determination. yours, Joe G. Riley Assist Disciplir ary Counsel ri' it i -Q To . THE Conair or THE JUDICIARY 3 1 2 JOE STEVE I I 8' O09 Assr. con sz COUNSEL - Box 40 . - - Pitons: (731) 26-#5611 lfiinlaszr-ri l_ l-lrillgw F-ef; A P. O. Box l~ll6'6 Knoxville, TN 37939-l 166 . RE: Complaint of Wendy Rose-Egli against Judge Bill -Swann File No. 07-3145 Dear Mr. Hollow: Enclosed is the con'iplainant's 'reply to your earlier response on hehalf of Judge Swann.; It is not -necessary for you to respond to the various points raised in the reply. However? believe the investigative panel will want- certain additional information. Accordingly, would appreciate your responding only to the following: - - - l. The Court in Davis v. Liberty Mutual insurance Co., 38 560 (Tenn. 2001), stated that even if a judge can hear a case fairly _and irnpartially, the judge 'should grant a motion to recuse if"thejudge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 0, Cannon Hence, the test is ultim'ately~an objective one since the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial system as actual bias. Irealize our issue is an ethical one and not an appellate one; however, do We agree this is the standard in I f? l`er1nessee 2. I ani enclosing .ludicial_ .Ethics Opinion 99-l as the last two pages of the attachment. What material distinctions can heinade betweenithat opinion andthe facts of ourniatter? A 'f 3. At any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing on May 1 l, 2006, in which Mr. Lee sought Judge tvann's recusal, was Judge Swann aware that the complainant had been critical ofludge Swann and supportive _of Mr. _Lee's canipaignf? lfso, approximatelywhen did-Judge Swann become aware 'of this?" i 'l . it EXHIBIT L. la_ slffJiasiaizxnt Disip?iziearg im 39% J. 'Wi 3.21 225 th 5543 G16 ffam QV Q4 QQ1 lf) _mea - Heatlaer Russeii WH der PU. Box 12136 Knoxville, Tennessee '37Ef}12 Complaint agai11St'J`ucige Swann Fiie No Dear .31/Is. Wilder: This wi?? acknowmaige receipt of yank compiaint filfz? against; Swann. This office has caaefuilyf reviewed the allegations sez fcarth in your Akers' r;cms_ide_fation of your c>>omp1aini I have determined tiaat it slaves not rise to the level that wauid justify thriiafzr antics; in order for us to pmcreed, the Statute requires aliggations. of specif?s; 'fact which 'wczuici cause sa pe;'sc;m_ to is a substantial ?x'Qhz1bi_1i_t5; that the has i;ommit'ted judimiai Sea Timm. Ceda Ann. 1 "file Cou1'?of'?h@ is The iz; not an appeals wux? and does have the zmthofiiy its Qhazage a_ny have made. 35 only investigate aiiegationg provided by ?aw_ A<;<;ordingIy, your conmpiaiazt is rJur;EURii@ is cioseni Piease be advised that you l1zwet_herighito appeal ihis summary dismissed to an ?xwesti gative pane? of tha Caurt mf this Judiaiaxy if you wi sh to ?19 SD, piaasfz to me a zxrniiufz appeal this ciecis-ion and 1 wiil pafnei. yoms, x' Discenza Diaciplinafy Counsel STATEMENT OF FACTS The following complaintls) is based on the actions ofludge "Bill" K. Swann from November 2007 through October 2010 in his capacity asjudge of the Fourth Circuit Court in Knox County, Tennessee. The case in question is Wilder v. Wilder, case number 108931. This case consists of issues relating to the divorce of the two parties, Piaintiff Heather Russell Wilder from her estranged husband, Defendant Joseph Chambiee Wilder. This case involved the actual divorce, as weli as custody issues of the parties' three minor children, hereafter known as RCW, MEW and1AW. Additionally, the plaintiff also had an Order of Protection against the Defendant from November 2007 until September 2009 (when it was replaced by an agreed permanent injunction); obtained through the Famiiy iustice center in Knoxville, Tennessee. Throughout the entire proceedings concerning my divorce, Judge Swann made ruiings, orders and statements against me, ali of which show the court's own personal bias and blatant discrimination, and ail of which denied me the opportunity to timely and unprejudiced actions by the court with regards to settiing any issues stemming from the divorce itseif. believe there are several reasons for this. First, I am a minority female from a working class Socioeconomic background who filed for divorce from my Caucasian husband whose socioeconomic background of being from a weaithy, politically influential famiiy mirrors Judge Swann's personal upbringing. Second, Judge Swann had been accused of acts of domestic violence, mental and even failure to pay chiid support, just like petitions filed against the Defendant, ioseph Chamblee Wiider, in divorce issues with former wife, Diana Swann. (See Exhibit 42) Third, he behaves as though he is above reproach, and can dictate the law, not according to the iaw codes, rather, to whatever floats his boat. The pattern of behavior displayed by the court, some of which I have addressed below, throughout the nearly three years that I have been drug through clearly shows a favorable bias towards the Defendant and against me. I have found a disturbing trend about women iike me in Swann's court; he punishes the wives of wealthier spouses. Since appearing before the court, I have also discovered a large number of reported complaints against Swann for similar behavior that have been dismissed or ignored by the Court Of The judiciary. For those complaints that ended in sanctions against him that i have discovered, have been dealt with "privateiy" by the Court ofthe Judiciary; leaving the pubiic unaware of his misconduct in the court and unabie to do anything about it once they find themselves a casualty in Fourth Circuit Court. I also discovered that one of the main groups his honor refers custodiai evaluations to, Behavior Consultants, is a firm that has a history of the doctor's within the practice writing negative reports against mothers to force them into unequal divorce settlements in order to simply keep some type of custody of their children. Through my investigation I discovered that Judge Swann was even invoived on a Board of Directors that was spearheaded by this group. (See Exhibit 43) This is a clear conflict of interest which caused me to have to find a and in Nashville, Tennessee to rebuke the false and biased custody evaluation the court ailowed into record. It should also be noted that Swann refused testimony and documentation by local who had been seeing my children and continued to reschedule hearings where the court's witness couid be proven false, throughout the last year and a half of my case; this will be discussed in detail Page 1 of 15 Beiow is my detailed complaint, the prejudicial actions against, noted documentation and both federal and state violations against myself, the Plaintiff in this case, byludge Bill Swann; 1. Defendant was in contempt of court numerous times, yet no punishment was ever issued against him. (Exhibit 1, Transcript of 10 March 2010 court date) - Shows bias and discrimination of the court against plaintiff 2. Swann denied Plaintiffs request to allow expert witness (chi?dren's or documentation by her on her behaif to counter custody evaluation avowing that court's expert was enough; this was despite one expert being present and plaintiff carrying in a ietter by her expert. (Exhibit 2, 8 and 48) *By doing so the court ignored the Order of Protection, again granted by Swann himself, when allowing Defendant unsupervised visitation with couples three rninor children. - Shows bias and discrimination of the court against Piaintiff as well as violates P|aintiff's Civil liberties 3. Forced Plaintiff to participate in mediation despite Order of Protection being in place, signed by Swann on Nov 2007 and bridged Order of Protection (Refer to Exhibits 3,4) This violated TAC 36-4-131, which clearly states the following: (1) in any proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, an order of protection issued in or recognized by this state is in effect or there is a court finding of domestic abuse or any criminal conviction involving domestic abuse within the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding for divorce or separate support and maintenance, the court may order mediation or refer either party to mediation, only (A) Mediation is agreed to by the victim of the alleged domestic or family violence; (B) Mediation is provided by a certdied mediator who is trained in domestic and family violence in a specialized manner that protects the safety of the victim; and (C) The victim is permitted to have in attendance at mediation a supporting person of the victim 's choice, including, but not limited to, an attorney or advocate. No victim may provide monetary compensation to a non>>attorney advocate for attendance at mediation. (2) Mediation conducted pursuant to subdivision shall be concluded and a report provided to the court no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the complaint for divorce was filed. Page 2 of 15 Additionally, the court also violated similar provisions in TCA 36-6-107 in dealing with mediation and domestic violence. Issued one court order on May 2009 disallowing the Plaintiff to have any contact with minor children while in the care of the defendant for six weeks. Part of this order was illegally replaced /changed within 48 hours after Plaintiff dismissed her first attorney and hired her second. (See Exhibits 5, 6 and 7) The court set the visitation for the Temporary Parenting referred to above based on the excessive recommendation of the custody evaluation; gave more time than normally allowed in visitation for non-residential parent, especially when long Defendant willingly moved 300 miles away. The court slandered P|aintiff's character and motives in open court, based solely on deceptive, biased and untrue opinion on the in question. Legally and ethically, a is not allowed to "label" either parent with any "type of condition". ln our case, the court appointed stated that had intentionally alienated the affections of our children towards their father; thereby labeling me. The court refused to allow me to defend myself (see above number two) and intentionally punished me by the custody order the court entered. lt should be noted that the court carried through with these actions based on terms (Alienation of Affection) that are not recognized by the American Association; something that a sitting judge in charge of custody issues should have made himself aware of over some point in the twenty plus years they sat on the bench. That is of course, unless the court knowingly ignored the coincidence in the high number of custody evaluations preformed by this same group that came back saying nearly the same opinion in every case it was involved in. (See Exhibit 2, 8, 49) The Orders handed down during the September 2009 and January 2010 Trial Management dates were never filed with court. Both were where Defendant had again failed to comply with discovery and where Plaintiff was granted subpoenas for some of Page 3 of 15 the discovery. Rather than dealing with issue the court simply "overlooked" this behavior on the part of the Defendant, and charged the attorney's to work things Out (outside of the courtroom). (See Exhibits 9 and 10) Again showing the bias and inequality of the enforcement of practices within the court itself and violated local court rules 8. Defendant failed to compiy with terms in the Niediated Agreement signed 1 September 2009 and Parenting Plan also signed 1 September 2009. (Exhibits 11, 12 and 13) Specifically compliance with; a. Defendant maintaining drug testing under a to prove medication compliance (medications for Defendant's mental issues) and to show Defendant was not self-rnedicating. in. Defendant was in counseling with to help him deal with his mentai health issues while trying to re-estabiish any type of reiationship with his three minor children. The doctor was to be picked by both parties' counsei for impartiality. During the hearing on the 10th of March 2010, the court overlooked Defendant's non- cornpiiance; instead giving him untii the 28"" of Aprii to comply. Judge Swann allowed Defendant to pick his own doctor; which violated the terms of the Nlediated Agreement by taking away Plaintiffs right to see if the doctor chosen was an acceptable choice for therapy involving her and the children. Additionaily, he ordered Plaintiff to drive to Memphis with the children to see the doctor. The court re-entered the parenting plan for the second time. Swann then told both the Defendant and Plaintiff that if either of them failed to comply with any part of the order, they (whoever had failed to comply) would be immediately found in contempt and punished on the 28" of April hearing. (See Exhibit 1) Defendant tailed to comply. Swann simply ignored it; did not have the hearing and rescheduied the hearing to the day parties' were scheduled for trial (11 May 2010). 9. Swann canceled the 11 Nlay 2010 trial date on/or about the 5/6 May 2010 because Defendant had stili not complied with the court's own order from 10lVlarch2010; citing that no new date for contempt hearings would be re-scheduled until Defendant I complied. Again this went against the court own threat of punishment. Page 4 of 15 10. The Order suspending Defendant's visitation from 10 March 2010 hearing has never been flied nor signed; Plaintiff has had to reiy on transcripts to prove that the court ordered this. 11. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS 81 OUTRIGHT COLLUSION BY THE COURT Ort or about the 5th or Gt" of May 2010, the court held a meeting with both parties counselors, as to the status ofthe case. lronicaliy, there was never a court date scheduled for the above dates and therefore, this case should have never been discussed that day by the court. This meeting happened outside the Plaintb'f's knowledge and accidentally discovered it for her~seb' after the fact, while checking documentation in the court's file. During this "secret meeting" the court ordered Plaintiff to appear for depositions on 11iVlay 2010 and canceled the already ordered hearing date set for 11lVlay2010. However, Swann did not order the Defendant to appear for his depositions that same day; again showing Swann's repeated pattern of preferentiai treatment towards the male Defendant. The orderls) from this "secret meeting" was not entered until the end of l\/lay 2010; nearly two weeks after Plaintiff was unknowingly ordered to appear for depositions. This order was not signed by the court until 2 June 2010. (See Exhibit 14) 12. In addition to the above ex-parte communication, the court signed an order on the 5th of May 2010 to give the mediator, John Harbor, the fees he feit were owed to him by Plaintiff; Mr. Harbor knowingly ignored the order for reduced mediation fees for Plaintiff Harbor had flied his motion on the 28th of Aprii 2010 and a hearing date was scheduled for the 19th of May 2010. (See Exhibits 15, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21) When the Plaintiff arrived, without counsel, on the 19th of l\/lay, she was told by the court that Mr. Harbor had been granted his motion on the 5th of May because both parties' counsel had agreed in a meeting with the court, that I\/lr. Harbor was entitled to the full amount of fees and that he was sorry but Plaintiffs counsel had agreed and that order wouid stand. The court refused to hear Plaintiffs argument (defense) and his actions clearly violated the Plaintiffs rights and reaffirmed the order for Mr. Harbor; which had been attained under false pretences to the court. (See Exhibits 20 and 21) This violated Due process and the ability to appeal the order within the 10 day time frame 1 Ignored Order for Reduced fees signed by the court February 2009 Page 5 of 15 Also violated TCA36-4-131. (2) Either party is unable to ajjford the cost of the mediation, unless the cost is waived or subsidized by the state or if the cost of mediation would be an unreasonable burden on either or both of the parties 13. Court personally signed every motion filed by Defendant against Plaintiff; however, the sarne cannot be said for any motions filed against Defendant by Plaintiff. (See Exhibits 22 and 23) 14. Motion for Contempt against Defendant first flied in February 2010 was "lost" while in Swann's possession during his leave for surgery and recovery. Plaintiff iearned of this nearly two weeks after and had attorney's office re-file a copy of the petition. Had the Plaintiff not caught this in time, she would have lost the opportunity to have countered faise contempt charges against her. (See Exhibits 24 and 25 15. The court refused to allow the parties' children, RCW, MEW and JAW, the right to testify about the Defendant's behavior; both before and since the Piaintiff filed for divorce. All three chiiciren, current ages 8, 9, and 12, have had two and their who are of the opinion that the children are mature enough to testify. The court's actions violated the children's civil liberties and TCA 36-6-106 which states the following: in a suit for annulment, divorce, separate maintenance, or in any other proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made onthe basis of the best interest of the child. The court shall consider ali relevant factors, including the foiiovving, where applica ble: (1) The love, affection and emotional ties existing between the parents or caregivers and the child; (2) The disposition ofthe parents or caregivers to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care and the degree to which cl parent or caregiver has been the primary caregiver; (3) The importance of continuity in the chilci's life and the length of time the child has iived in a stable, satisfactory environment; provided, that, where there is a finding, under subdivision of child abuse, as defined in 39-25-?01 or or chiicl sexual abuse, as defined in 37~1~602, by one (1) parent, and that a nonperpetrating pa rent or caregiver Page 6 of 15 has relocated in order to flee the perpetrating parent, that the relocation shall not weigh against an award of custody; (4) The stability of the family unit of the parents or caregivers; (5) The mental and physical health of the parents or caregivers; (6) The home, school and community record of the child; (7) (A) The reasonable preference of the chilai 0' twelve (12) years of age or older; (B) The court may har the preference ofa younger child on request. The preferences of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children; (8) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any other person; provided, that, where there are allegations that one (1) parent has committed child abuse, as defined in 39~i5~401 or or child sexual abuse, as defined in 37~1~602, against a family member, the court shall consider all evidence relevant to the physical and emotional safety of the child, and determine, by a clear preponderance ofthe evidence, whether such abuse has occurred. The court shall include in its decision a written finding of all evidence, and all findings of facts connected to the evidence. in addition, the court shall, where appropriate, refer any issues of abuse to the juvenile court for further proceedings; (9) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or _frequents the home of a parent or caregiver and the person 's interactions with the child; and (10) Each parent or caregivers past and potential for future performance of parenting responsibilities, including the willingness and ability of each of the parents and caregivers to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and both of the chilcl'5 parents, consistent with the best interest of the child. Page 7 of 15 16. The Defendant quite making payments on the family home in 2008, the Plaintiff's 2004 Chevrolet Suburban (28iVlarch2008) and did not begin paying any child support untii after Plaintiff had to turn in her vehicle for repossession. Defendant aiso removed Plaintiff from the family car insurance policy in 2008; two years before the conclusion of this case. Despite Piaintiff writing in the November 2007 Order of Protection that husband threatened to cut off ali monies to her if she filed for divorce, as well as Defendant threatening to murder their children to pay Plaintiff back for leaving him, the court did absolutely nothing to protect Plaintiff and the children, nor did the court punish the Defendant for doing so. (See Exhibits 26, 27, 23, 29 and 30) Since the temporary Parenting Pian and Order of Protection were still in effect, the court allowed the Defendant to violate the foiiowing: A. 36-3-605. Scope of protection order. - A protection order granted under this part to protect the petitioner from domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault may include, but is not limited to: (1) Directing the respondent to refrain from committing domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault or threatening to commit domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault against the petitioner or the petitioner's minor children; (2) Prohibiting the respondent from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; (3) Prohibiting the respondent from stalking the petitioner; as defined in 39~17-315; (4) Granting to the petitioner possession of the residence or household to the exclusion of the respondent by Page 3 of 15 evicting the respondent, by restoring possession to the petitioner, or by both; (5) Directing the respondent to provide suitable alternate housing for the petitioner when the respondent is the sole owner or lessee ofthe residence or household; (6) Awarding temporary custody of or establishing temporary visitation rights with regard to, any minor children born to or adopted by the parties; (7) Awarding jinancial support to the petitioner and such persons as the respondent has a duty to support. Except in cases of paternity, the court shall not have the authority to order financial support unless the petitioner and respondent are legally married. Such order may be enforced pursuant to chapter 5 of this title; (8) Directing the respondent to attend available counseling programs that address violence and control issues or substance abuse problems. A violation of a protection order or part of such order that directs counseling pursuant to this subpart may be punished as criminal or civil contempt. The provisions of gig; apply with respect to a non-lawyer general sessions judge who holds a person in criminal contempt for violating this subdivision or (9) Directing the care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or a minor residing in the household. ln no instance shall the animal be placed in the care, custody, or control of the respondent, but shall instead be placed in the care, custody or control of the petitioner or in an appropriate animal foster situation. Relief granted pursuant to subdivisions shall be ordered only after the petitioner and respondent have been given an opportunity to be heard by the court. Any order of protection issued under this part shall include the statement of the maximum penalty that may be imposed pursuant to violating such order. Page 9 of 15 No order of protection made under this part shall in any manner affect title to any real property. lf the petitioner is a victim as defined in 36-3-601 C), the provisions of subdivisions and (5) shall not apply to such petitioner. (I) An order of protection issued pursuant to this part shall be valid and enforceable in any county of this state. An order of protection issued pursuant to this part that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) shall contain the disclosures set out in B. TCA 36-6-402 which states that "Temporary parenting plan means a plan for the temporary parenting and the best interests of the child, including the establishment ofa temporary residential schedule, and the establishment of temporary financial support designed to maintain the financial status quo to the extent possible, consistent with title chapter 5, and the guidelines there under. C. TCA 36-3-603 which states that lf an order of protection is ordered by a court and either the petitioner or respondent files a complaint for divorce, the order of protection shall remain in effect until the court in which the divorce action lies modhiies or dissolves the order. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a petitioner from requesting relief under this section in a divorce action 17. The Court may have been under the infiuence of prescription drugs (pain medicine) at the time of several court datels) due to personal injury and corrective surgery. 18. The temporary parenting planls) remained in effect for nearly two years after the initial filing of divorce in November 2007. The court never decided on a permanent parenting plan, rather, mother was pressured into an agreement during the September 1, 2009 mediation by her former attorney and mediator; Plaintiff was told that if the court had to decided it, she would be punished and would lose all custody of her children. 19. Court entered a copy of the Permanent Parenting Plan into the court record because the mediator "lost" the original in December 2009; along with a false Order of Contempt by Page 10 of 15 Defendant and his counsel (that was pulled the day of the hearing) had attempted to use as intimidation against the Plaintiff. Then during the March 10, 2010 when Plaintiff was attempting to modify the Permanent Parenting Plan, the court "entered" a copy of the Niediated Agreement signed the same day as the above. The court however, already had entered a copy of said agreement on fiie with the date stamped as September 1, 2009. This copy was re-entered for the sole purpose of denying Plaintiff the ability to force the court to pursue contempt against the Defendant untii thirty days after the entry of said plan. This was an act of coilusion on the part of the parties counsel, mediator and the court, to find a way around punishing the Defendant and denying Piaintiff and parties' children the justice they were seeking. It shouid aiso be noted that the mediator managed to fiie the Nlediated Agreement signed the same day as the parenting plan in a timely fashion after the September 1, 2010 date. (See Exhibits 11, 12, 13,31Denied Plaintiff the argument for 13 years of support based on (non-documented) word of the mediator and Defendant's counsel; the parties' had briefly and amicably divorced in 2005, for a period less than ninety days before remarriage occurred. This decision was handed down over a year and a half after filing for divorce and left Plaintiff at a huge economic disadvantage in relation to Defendant. - Which violated Local Rules (QC for example) Swann postponed the trial date three times because the Defendant had failed to comply with discovery due to the Piaintiff rather than punishing him for non-compliance. (See exhibits 35addition to the already mentioned violations, many ofthe same actions listed above that were committed by Judge Swann were also vioiations under the foilowing federal and state laws: Under the Constitution of the United States, Amendments 5, 14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Articie VII No man to be disturbed but by law, TN Const Art 1, sec 8. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 Title EV, sec. 40001~40703 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 HR 3355, Public Law 103-322 Under Articles I, II, Vlli, XVI, XVII, and of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights TAC 39-17-309. Civil Rights intimidation; specifically (b2) TAC 7-88-111. Compliance with Civil Rights Act Under the Constitution ofthe United States, section 1. [Judicial power.] Page 11 of 15 TAC 2-19-104. Misconduct in performance of duties for purposes of misleading another; specifically (1), (2), (3) TAC 39-16-403. Official oppression TAC 17~5~302. Judiciai offenses TAC 16-1-102. Powers of the court. (1), (3), (4), (6) TAC 20-7-101. Grounds -Timing TAC 20-7-102 Consent of Parties. TAC 17-5-102. Applicability. (2) TAC 17-5-101. Legislative intent. (1B), (1C), (2), (3) TAC 39-12-103. Criminal conspiracy. TAC 40-13-216. Aiieging conspiracy. Judge Swann's actions have forever changed both mine and my chiidren's view ofjustice under our legal system. Swann failed to act in the best interest of any member of my family, inciuding my husband. He acted out what appears to be revenge for how one of his own divorces was handled. The attorney's, mediator and performing the custody evaluation knew his pattern, knew his prejudices and worked them to their own financial gain. Unfortunately, this pattern has been covered up; both by attorneys' who refuse to call the court on his behavior and by the Court of the Judiciary who ignores compiaints when written by average persons who have no understanding of how to properly navigate the complaint process in fact, this will be the fourth attempt to have the Court of the Judiciary even acknowledge my compiaint; a complaint that I do not feel wouid have ever come to light in my case had I not testified before the senate committee on October 5, 2010. Additionally, when this compiaint is sent for response to Judge Swann, I want him to know that my current attorney, Margaret Held, has no knowiedge that I am taking this action; so that neither she nor her other clients will suffer the court's wrath. By the same token, whoever reads this complaint needs to know that both Vance Martin and Samuei Engiish, who are considered in good standing with the court, refused to file for Swann to recues himself from my case (because of their involvement with trying to force me into a inequitable settlement as apparent with their involvement in obvious coiiusion with the court) despite repeated and numerous requests by me. Both attorneys also advised me not to file complaints against the court, because Swann would punish me worse then he already had. i will be complaints against them, opposing council, mediator John Harbor and the who performed the custody evaluation, Dr. Thomas Hanaway for the collusion and fraudulent misconduct performed by them with regards to my case. Judge Swann needs to be heid accountable for the damage he has caused to victims of his corrupt behavior. l\/ly children have learned that if you have enough money and power, you can abuse anyone you want and get away with it. My husband, who suffers from mental illness, has made poor iife choices, especially concerning his relationship and financial responsibility regarding our children. When whoever reads this complaint sees that the defendant, who has Page 12 of 15 yet to abide by the IN/iediated Agreement and Parenting Plan, signed more than a year ago, in order to see his children and then agreed to a final divorce decree that states his visitation is suspended, will wonder why the court aliowed such a person such leeway given their actual behavior only further proves what the Plaintiff stated all aiong; that the parties' children were being used as a tool to make her look bad in court and to force her to agree to a inequitable settlement (financially) with the welfare of her children forever dependant on the impulse of an erratic, mentaiiy ill abusive, father and controlling paternal grandparents who helped defraud the court and parties' so they could maintain control over the parties' and their children's (family) trust funds. [See Exhibit 47) The court had the opportunity to try and get the Defendant the mental help which he so desperately needs, but ignored it. The court could have forced Defendant's counsel and his family to turn over all true accounting information, thus not placing Plaintiff at an economic disadvantage, but did not. The court could have protected the parties' children from the undue and unnecessary emotionai rollercoaster because of forced visitation with their abusive and mentally ill father and paternal grandparents, which has forever created a sense of distrust between my children and those in authority, but faiied to act in their best interest. The court personally slandered the character of the Plaintiff in open court, based solely on the opinion of the biased custody evaluation. The court also cost the State of Tennessee the amount it has paid out in welfare benefits to the Plaintiff (a figure that would be close to $200,000 in reality) as well as the cost for the three years of the time this case has taken up because of the courts inefficiency and delay to taxpayers in Knox County and Tennessee. How much have Swann's biased decisions in other cases cost taxpayers over the iast twenty years? I am willing to bet it would be quite a bit. Should the public worry because friends and close colleagues' of Bill Swann such as Don Ash, ignore his behavior as a result of their relationship? Should a judge's political and business ties be cause for concern when that judge specifically favors certain business and those institutions react to him in way unbiased towards whichever party the courts collusive mannerisms favor? Yes. ls there a cause for alarm if attorneys do not represent their clients to the best oftheir ability, regardless of whether is it out of fear retaliation of the court or simply maintaining favor ofthe court? Absolutely, especially when it undermines constitutional rights guaranteed under our legal system and corrupts the system itself. Realizing that no matter how much evidence against my husband, I would never receive a fair hearing or any type ofjustice while .ludge Swann was hearing our divorce, i settled my divorce on October 1, 2010. (See Exhibits 44, 45, and 46) I walked away with my children; no compensation (alimony) for the 13 years we were married, the Defendant paying very few bills, no attorney's fees, no home, no vehicle, and no justice. My husband told me he would take everything away from me to teach me a lesson and he almost succeeded. l-le has not paid one cent beyond the small court ordered amount of child support he is required to pay towards our children's private school tuition, medical reimbursements, activities, etc. He has not even bothered to send birthday or Christmas presents (or money to Santa Clause) since lfiled for divorce in November of 2007; yet the court considers this non-involved, distant mentally ill Page 13 of 15 and abusive parnt a "good father" based on a prejudiced and biased custody evaluation preformed by what seems to be the group most favored by the court. The same can be said for the mediator, for whom the court went out on a huge limb for by violating my civil liberties. Swann needs to be stopped from harming further families and I am asking for the Court of the Judiciary to investigate my complaint and take the appropriate action, that should include public sanctions so that the voters and mothers in Knox County can take the action for which the COTJ has covered up for Swann for more than 20 year by removing him from the bench. Bill Swann needs to be stopped from harming further families and I am asking for the Court ofthe Judiciary to investigate my complaint and take the appropriate action. Table of Contents Transcript of 10 March 2010 court date Transcript of May 2009 court date Ex Parte Order of Protection Nov 2009 Bridging Ex Parte Order of Protection Dec 2009 Temporary PP signed 13 May 2009; I received in court Changed Temporary see above Order from 13 May 2009 - Letter from Dr. Wilson dated April 2009; excluded from court on 13 May 2009 Exarnpie of Subpoena's granted during Triai Management; no Order found Example of Subpoena's granted during Triai Management; no Order found Nlediated Agreement signed 1 September 2009; stamped with same date by court Permanent PP signed 1 September 2009;_entered by court on 17 Dec 2009 Report of the Mediator; stamped 8 September Court Order entered 20 May 2010; signed by court on 2 June 2010 Reduced Fee Order (signed by court 20 February 2009) Letter about more mediation dates from Sam to Harbor 2010 Letter from Taylor to Harbor about stopping mediation 30 April 2010; two days after Harbor filed paperwork saying he had completed our mediation/order for taxation of costs Order for Taxation of Costs 5 May 2010; though hearing was not scheduled until 19 Nlay 2010 Motions by Harbor for Taxation of Costs 28 April 2010 Letter frorn Sam English stating he never agreed to Harbor's Motions filed 28 April 2010 dated 21 September 2010 Letter from Scott Taylor stating he never agreed to 1-Iarbor's Motions filed 28 April 2010 dated 21 September 2010 Show Cause order signed by court (against Plaintiff) dated 11.Ian 2010 Page 14 of 15 Show Cause order signed by court (against Plaintiff) dated 6 Nov 2009 Order to Show Cause fiied by Piaintiff's counsei 5 Feb 2010; iost by court himself Petition for Contempt against Defendant filed by Piaintiff's counsei 5 Feb 2010; lost by court himseif Letter dated 15 April zoos Letter dated 15 February 2008 Letter dated 13 March 2008 Petition for Contempt (against Defendant) for Non~Payment of Child Support; fiied6 August 2010 Letter dated 8 April 2010 Motion for expedited hearing regarding visitation; filed 21 Aug 2010 Petition to Modify Permanent PP (exhibit 12 contains this exhibits 1) 3 March 2010 Motion to adopt Temporary PP filed 3 March 201.0 Motion for New for Custody Evaluation; filed 3 March 2010 Triai Management Order March 2009 Motion to Compei against Defendant April 2009 Motion for Continue Aprii 2009 Triai Management Order March 2009; from court himself Order of Referrai for Evaluation February 2008 Order of Referral to Mediation February 2008 Transcript from 6 February 2008 court date Diana Swann v. Biil Swann court records Appeai: Nielsen v. Nieisen Wiider v. Wilder 108931; Final iudgment of Divorce from 1 October 2010 Wiider v. Wilder 108931; Final Ruie 10 from 1 October 2010 Wiider v. Wilder 108931; Marital Dissolution Agreement 1 October 2010 Letter from 17 February 2010; Defendant using visitation request to cause conflict between court and Plaintiff Letter advising Defendant's Counsel that Defendant is not seeing someone for treatment that is qualified. Letter from Dr. Bradley Freeman, Vanderbiit department of Forensic Service, critique of "Family Evaluation" done by Dr. Thomas Hananway Page 15 of 15 - M?m Ph_is, 31f?3 Eh-Qne: [991] You1iNa,n1e: I . i- - AddreSSfd1s=~bi1 ff iflfw i11<1sf= ?f sm TEM.-gig 1. When Where did$I1is_hpp - fiyour i13fq1T?1ation_ ariSes_.ou? gf a_ please answer H) Whgtis tl1ena,1ne_ (F Cas? Cm NO- b) gfgase isit? Ei CI g?n_?rai_sessipns E2 prgbagg ficizvil E35 juvemile is the cage? I Cz E3 for ?3 ?_witness_for EJ d) If I 91" esemgg *hi5 15= I S) any f>fh?r arte . Wi - Represented: 3. Lis; chat h?1p_ yum information that or linas a di`fsabilitY, noting YQU have at?aQ@d: Lb 4. Identify, i_?Ys1uGa11, any other wimessas to the conduct 5- Swcifsr dewiis U1?jQ6ge_or_a?1ingjudgs= -Q1iS=f\bi1i1v~ (Pleasefiype 01 print P-asfTHAT STATE LAW PROVIDES THAT "ffm CQURT OF THE REQUEST FQR P-RE PRIOR TO THB FILHWG- OF BY COUNSEL. OF PERJURY, I SVEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THESE STATEMENTS IMQRMAQQN nu ANY gm UE T0 THE BEST OF MY AND CON-STITLJTE ALL OF MY _c_ow:P_LA1Nfrs Asov THIS QATB - 31- QRAC GE. 1 - TE: STATEOF Nm!" CGUNTY iffxa SWORN TO .QND of Notary NDTARY 5 $5 5 5 'f cc>\l