1     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 13 OF 2015 IN THE MATTER OF: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association & Anr … PETITIONERS Versus Union of India … RESPONDENTS SUGGESTIONS OF MR. GOPAL SUBRAMANIUM, SENIOR ADVOCATE DATE: 5TH NOVEMBER, 2015 PLACE: NEW DELHI     2     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 13 OF 2015 IN THE MATTER OF: Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association & Anr … PETITIONERS Versus Union of India … RESPONDENTS SUGGESTIONS OF MR. GOPAL SUBRAMANIUM, SENIOR ADVOCATE 1. The following suggestions are being made in the light of the order passed by this Court on 3rd November 2015, as per which suggestions are to be made to improve transparency, formulation of eligibility criteria, establishment of a Secretariat and a mechanism to deal with complaints or adverse reports. 2. The said suggestions must be consistent with the Second Judges’ case i.e. Supreme Courts Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441. It may be pointed out that paragraphs 2 to 2.2 of the ‘Memorandum showing the Procedure for Appointment of Chief Justice of India and Justices of the Supreme Court of India’ (“Memorandum”) do not require any amendment, except that there   3     should be a consistent practice about the exact time when the outgoing Chief Justice of India would forward a recommendation about the appointment of the next Chief Justice of India so that there is no ‘misgiving’ or ‘suggestiveness’. It is submitted that the outgoing Chief Justice of India may make a recommendation in respect of his successor at least 45 days before the date on which he demits office. If for any reason the outgoing Chief Justice comes to a firm conclusion about the total lack of fitness (moral fitness) to hold the Office, he should consult the President in his capacity as the gaurdian of the Constitution. The President may then in his independent constitutional capacity consult such judges as are necessary to form his opinion. 3. In so far as the appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court is concerned, it is submitted that paragraphs 3 and 3.1 of the Memorandum contemplate that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India would be formed in consultation with a Collegium of the 4 seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. If the successor Chief Justice of India is not one of the 4 seniormost puisne Judges, he would be made a part of the Collegium, as he should have a hand   4     in the selection of Judges who will function during his term as a Chief Justice of India. 4. In addition, para 3.2 of the Memorandum enables the ascertainment of the opinion of the seniormost Judge in the Supreme Court who has been elevated to the High Court from where the person is recommended. If the seniormost Judge does not have adequate knowledge, the next seniormost Judge in the Supreme Court from that High Court should be consulted. Paragraph 3.3 of the Memorandum clarifies that the requirement of consultation with a Judge of the Supreme Court would not be confined only to a Judge who has been orginally elevated to bench of the High Court in question, but also to a judge who may have occupied the office of a Judge or a Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer. 5. Paragraph 3.4 of the Memorandum states that the opinion of members of the Collegium in respect of each of the recommendations, as well as the seniormost Judge in the Supreme Court from the High Court from which a prospective candidate comes would be made in writing and the Chief Justice of India, in all cases, must transmit his opinion, as also the opinion of all concerned   5     to the Government of India as a part of record. In the event the Chief Justice of India or other members of the Collegium elicit views from non-Judges, even though the consultation is not in writing, the person seeking such opinion should make a memorandum thereof and its substance in general terms should be conveyed to the Government of India. 6. It is submitted that before forming a recommendation, it is necessary that some internal criteria have to be clearly established for appointment of a Judge or Chief Justice of a High Court, as a Judge of the Supreme Court. 7. While the opinion of all the members of the Collegium may be in favour of recommendation of a person to be appointed as a Judge, a rigorous process based on objective criteria is essential for the purpose of internal discussions in the Collegium. These criteria are extremely vital and have to be examined with reference to the material which is available on record in terms of judgments, case records and other judicial functions following from a personal interraction with the collegium. They are:-   6     1. Integrity as a lawyer or as a Judge; 2. The ability to be fearless and to withstand pressures from all quarters including the Executive; 3. The ability to distance oneself from one’s own political or other ideology; 4. To act free from prejudice of any kind; 5. The ability to listen; 6. The ability to be able to have a sustained sense of contentment (i.e. the Judge must not actually be seen as looking for any post-retirement office from the Government); 7. The ability to absorb knowledge in new areas, engage with the legal profession and other stakeholders with humility and to become students in the process of learning; 8. The ability to withdraw from friends, former clients, business interests and politicians; 9. The ability to migrate from a life of authority to the life of a common man, to be able to frequently observe and imbibe the contemporary realities of life, to be able to think out of the box freely, and to be familiar with modern technology;   7     10. The ability to cultivate personal interest and habits which will make the Judge a well-rounded person and would bear a balanced personality; 11. The ability to draft well-reasoned judgments and write clearly. 8. It is submitted that each of the members of the Collegium must determine the qualities of candidates by themselves in the first instance. This can be done by calling for 5-6 reported judgments of the Learned Judge along with the case papers. Secondly, any published papers written by the Judge in the public domain or in any law journal can be taking into account. In other words, the collegium must also be able to identify the quality of judicial product and independence. It is also necessary that must be an examination of some cases where the Judges have not delivered final judgments, but have passed various interim orders. By random selection only, files containing the record must also be examined. In addition, the qualities of punctuality, courtesy to the Bar and fairness are indeed substantially reputational, but in any event there can be ascertainment by means of the suggestions which is being made in the above paraghraphs. In order to determine the ability of the Judge, it is   8     necessary that the selectee must have utmost regard for the Constitution, the commitment to principles of secularism and human rights, and must be completely free from bias and should be capable of protecting the rights of the poor and marginalised sections of the society. 9. After each individual Judge undertakes an assessment on the above criteria, a meeting must be fixed to discuss the appointment of Judges on the basis of the assessment evolved by each member of the Collegium so that the same can be placed on the table. This would actually give a substantial unanimity, if not a convergent verdict, on the person who would be most outstanding to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that mere seniority of a Judge or a Chief Justice is not sufficient for the purpose of appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court. The functions of the Supreme Court under the Constitution are not only constitutional in character, but also have a far reaching impact in the matter of laying of law, and represent the organ of the judiciary in the highest sense in its interface with the Executive and the Legislature. Therefore, it is necessary that while these may be the basic criteria, it is important that there must be a ‘consideration of outstanding merit’ for the   9     purpose of being appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India. It is submitted that if the principle of seniority on an incumbent judge of a High Court were to be followed, it could result in appointment of many Judges who at the end of their career, while they may not have anything adverse against their judicial performance in the High Court, may not be able to endow the Supreme Court with the talent, character, farsightedness, ability, competence, innovativeness and the skills which are required for the future. 10. It is submitted that no prospective appointee or anyone who is likely to be considered must approach either the Chief Justice of India or any of the members of the Collegium for the purpose of subconsciously or consciously furthering his position. It is submitted that unless and until officially called, those who are likely to be considered ought not to call upon either the Chief Justice of India or the members of the Collegium. 11. It is respectfully submitted that one of the primary reasons why the Collegium has attracted criticism from the members of the Bar is that frequent private visits have been made by Chief Justice hopefuls and Judge hopefuls to various members of the Collegium.   This is 10     absolutely unexpected and is inconsistent with the character of a Judge of the Supreme Court when he is endowed with the function of recommending a person as an appointee. Such recommendations must be made with objectivity and must be ‘seen’ to have been done in a spirit of fairness and distance. It is submitted that any Judge or candidate however distinguished he may be, whoever makes a socalled ‘courtesy call’ or who seeks to call upon the Chief Justice or any of the members of the Collegium must be treated as instantly disqualified for further appointment. The same applies to the prospective appointee seeking to meet a Chief Justice of a High Court or Judge of the Supreme Court hailing from or having served in the same State. This is absolutely essential to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. 12. It is also important that if any member of the Collegium wishes to have any clarification from the Judge concerned, the same must not take place ex parte, but the Collegium as a whole must convene an official meeting and interact with the Judge concerned. In my submission that notwithstanding an assessment of outstanding merit, it is safer to have atleast one personal interaction with the Chief   11     Justice and the members of the Collegium so that they are assured of their recommendation. 13. It is respectfully submitted that discussions which take place within the Collegium and the seniormost Judge of the concerned High Court must be completely confidential. It is submitted that there must be an affirmation to this effect in writing by each one of the participants in the Collegium. It is respectfully submitted that the disregarding of what happens in Collegium meetings to the prospective appointee is indeed one of the most distressing features of the Collegium system. In fact, the very willingness to share information clearly suggests that the fairness and the distance principle is in breach. 14. It is submitted that no member of the political executive (including a minister who may be a former lawyer) directly or indirectly will seek to influence either the Chief Justice or the members of the Collegium. If any such attempt is made, the Supreme Court must commence appropriate action and must inform the President of India that there is an attempt to influence the judiciary in the matter of judicial appointments. It is respectfully submitted that similarly no   12     civil servant must be allowed access to the Chief Justice or the members of the Collegium for the purpose of sharing any information. It is respectfully submitted that in many cases political access or the amenability to political access has itself deprived the Collegium of respect within the legal profession. 15. The Chief Justice as well as the members of the Collegium must follow a broad based principle of consultation in addition to their own discernment. This can be undertaken by consulting certain independent members of the Bar who too will file a declaration that will not allow anyone to know about the contents of the consultation. The above is subject to a rider. Usually, a large number of complaints are generated when a person is being appointed to a High Court or to the Supreme Court. Some of these are completely engineered and indeed the writer as a Solicitor General has had an occasion to see many such letters. It is respectfully submitted that only complaints which are made by a group of senior lawyers of stature and integrity must be entertained by the Collegium and the Collegium must take recourse to the procedure as would be outlined in the subsequent paragraphs. It is important that in order to enable that there is complete strictness in the matter of professional   13     propriety that no member of the Collegium including the Chief Justice will divulge the name of the member of the Bar who has been consulted in the matter of recommendation lest his appearance before that Judge may cause embarrassment to the judicial process. Incidentally, in the event of a lawyer being consulted, it must be a formal consultation in the presence of all the members of the Collegium. It is submitted that this Court must publish such criteria as are relevant for appointment to the Supreme Court on its website. It is also submitted that similar criteria must apply to the appointment of Judges to the High Courts and be similarly published. 16. It is submitted that diversity in the matter of representation is also significant. In other words, it is also necessary to bear in mind that all sections of society, in the event that the criteria mentioned above including merit are adequately satisfied, then the same must also be taken into account. It is respectfully submitted that the number of candidates who must actually arise for consideration must not be less than 1. In other words, there must be a panel of at least 3 outstanding candidates for the appointment of 1 Judge of the   14     Supreme Court and there should be a process of interaction to choose the best between the members of the collegium and the candidates independently. 17. It is respectfully submitted that in order to enable timely appointments, the Collegium must have a proper Secretariat. The Secretariat must consist of retired officers of the Indian Administrative Service or those who possess a degree in Masters of Business Administration or such other competent persons who would have administrative skills in maintaining and running a Secretariat. The Secretariat must also consist of persons who will be administered an oath of secrecy that no proceedings of the Collegium or recommendations will be divulged. 18. It is submitted that the Secretariat should be tasked with the following functions – (a) Officers who will keep computerised database about the judgments and orders delivered by Judges in the various High Courts and Supreme Court;   15     (b) In addition, the convenor of the Secretariat would upon the directions of the Collegium in fact summon such judgments (original copies/certified copies) and also the records of the case from the concerned High Court. (c) There must also be an Advisory Board in the Secretariat. This is the tier which should be capable of verifying discreetly matters which may touch upon either the integrity, character, reputation or complaints in relation to prospective candidates. It is submitted that in order to obviate any generation of false data by Executive, who may like to oppose the appointment of Judges who may be independent, it would be far safer that the Collegium to have a certain independent input from this Advisory Board that should be led by 3 eminent persons. Each of the 3 must have held a constitutional office with great distinction. For instance, a former Comptroller and Auditor General of India or a former Chief Election Commissioner of India/Election Commissioner. The Secretariat must also in consultation with the Advisor select such officers who would assist them in the matter of verification required.   16     19. It is submitted that if any material to the contrary is provided by the Government, the same should again be subjected to verification by the independent Advisory Board so that the Collegium is satisfied about the truth or otherwise of any material. 20. However, it needs to be said that those who are familiar with the practical workings of Government as well as the way in which the system has operated, need to clarify that:- a) The moment the Judge’s recommendation is afloat, people do come to know; b) There are many likely competitors or successors who would like to steal a march over the incumbent in matters of seniority; c) One of the porus methods by which the recommendation process of an incumbent can be altered is by interventional delays by the Department of Justice; d) Intervention by the Intelligence Bureau; and e) Intervention of the Union Minister for Law & Justice for political reasons.   17     21. In fact, it must also be pointed out that verifications are often made not by the Joint Director of the Intelligence Bureau or a senior officials as claimed, but are delegated to subordinate officials of paramilitary forces who are on deputation to the Intelligence Bureau. Indeed, to place the reputation of a prospective Judge in the hands of such persons is perilous. Very often, the Intelligence Bureau collect materials from various journals such as Outlook, Frontline and others and edits them as their own inputs and attributes them to secret sources. This is not to denigrate the work of the Intelligence Bureau, except to say that an unusually high premium on its ability ought not be placed. The writer has been a Counsel for the Intelligence Beaurau and has advised on matters of National Security. 22. In view of the fact that the date of retirement of a Judge of the Supreme Court causing a vacancy cannot change, the Secretariat must commence the process of selection at least 90 days before the occurrence of the vacancy and the recommendation must be sent to the Government at least 30 days before the occurrence of the vacancy so that the appointment is in place.   18     23. It is also submitted that the Secretariat must publish on the website of the Supreme Court, the number of meetings of the Collegium, the dates on which the meetings were held, the members who attended and the time spent by the Collegium in the selection and appointment of Judges. 24. It is further submitted that no Judge must be asked to state what he considers are ‘his best judgments’. It is further submitted that having regard to the prowess of Law Clerks who are presently assisting Judges, it is often difficult to find out the true ability of a Judge to either undertake research or discover whether there has been original thinking on the subject. 25. It is submitted that the rationale for transfer of Judges and Chief Justices needs to be properly understood. It is submitted that ‘we the people of India’ certainly do not deserve a Judge who is suspect or who lacks integrity. If the Chief Justice of India or his colleagues or the Collegium is of the opinion that judge ought to be transferred to another Court for reasons relating to suspicions about his integrity or judicial ability, it is completely undesirable that any High Court must be visited by such a Judge. In fact, there have been large scale   19     tensions in various sections in this country because it has come to be verily believed that their High Courts have been chosen often as ‘dumping ground’ and been made 'punishment postings'. It is, therefore, necessary that a Judge who is short of integrity must be confronted with the material and must be asked to demit office failing which the Collegium must write to the President, the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the Speakers of both houses of Parliament recommending impeachment of the Judge in question. 26. It is respectfully submitted that the transfer of Judges to gain seniority in transferred High Courts for the purpose of being elevated to the Supreme Court is also not a correct practice and prima facie has been viewed as manipulative. It is necessary to discontinue such a practice. 27. On the question of transfer of Chief Justices, it is submitted that the performance of transferred Chief Justices has not been entirely of consistent uniformity. In fact the time taken by any person to undergo a process of familiarisation and understand the local ethos, the traditions of the High Court, the manner in which colleagues are accustomed to be dealt with, has led to fractious behaviour in many   20     High Courts. This has seriously undermined the independence of the judiciary. In fact, it is submitted that the Chief Justice is only the first among the equals in a High Court. A Transferred Chief Justice, however, unconsciously believes that he carries a slightly higher mandate . Under these circumstances, it is necessary to revisit the idea of transferring Chief Justices from one court to another court. It is also important to bear in mind that former Judges of the Court from where the transferred Chief Justice is being appointed must not be seen to influence his decisions or make suggestions in relation to matters of appointment. Thus, it is submitted that the transfer of Chief Justices must be revisited in an appropriate way by the Supreme Court. 28. It is further submitted that the concept of ‘representation’ geographically in terms of diversity may a valid consideration. However, it must not keep out Judges who belong to the outstanding merit criteria as long as they are seen positively better than those from other High Courts. 29. It is submitted that a Judge must not be appointed in the High Court in if any of his relatives practice in that Court. The definition of   21     ‘relative’ is appended to the schedule herein. It is also important to bear in mind that negative briefing is a well-known practice in High Courts in order to prevent the Judge from taking up a matter. It is respectfully submitted that the Chief Justice of India or any member of the Collegium must not during the time he is the Chief Justice of India or a member of the Collegium, allow any of his relatives to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court. It is submitted that the mere recusal of a Judge from such a meeting is completely inadequate and is utterly unconvincing. Certain recent episodes have in fact lefd to serious concerns amongst the members at the Bar. 30. It is important to bear in mind that Chief Justices of High Courts, before they send recommendations, have often been seen as consulting either the members of the Collegium or even the Judges from that High Court who are in the Supreme Court in order to enable names to be sent. This practice must be completely discontinued. Such informal interactions in the higher judiciary have in fact undermined the character, the reserve and the strength, the dispassion which is required in making judicial appointments.     22   31. It is submitted that no Judge of the Supreme Court must in fact accept an office after retirement. Similarly, no Judge of the High Court or Chief Justice of the High Court should accept such office after retirement. It is submitted that Parliament should make a law by which the last drawn pay must be granted as a life pension for such Judges. In order to see that the administration of justice is not impaired by the absence of retired judicial personages, it would be safer if those jurisdictions are vested in serving judicial personages. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the sinecure for retired Civil Servants and retired Judges is indeed one of the most useful basket of favours which any Executive Government has in its hand to ‘squint’ at the independence of the judiciary. It is not unknown that upon the pronouncement of certain judgments in favour of political leaders, Judges were amply rewarded immediately upon their demitting office. It is also submitted that the practice of retired Chief Justices and Judges giving opinions on matters which could be placed before statutory and Government authorities to persuade them to take a view must be prohibited. This kind of post retirement conduct is destructive of the Independence of the Judiciary. It may be added that no Judge shall join a political party after he demits office. In fact, if he does so, it will be a serious impairment upon his   23     independence and would cast a sorry reflection on the way in which he was a Judge. It is respectfully submitted that the Code of Conduct of Judges must prevent retired Judges and Chief Justices from being elected to the Rajya Sabha, the same is a completely unhealthy precedent and must be stopped. 32. It is submitted that no Judge must accept any National honour such as Padma Bhushan or Padma Vibhushan because it is expected that a Judge performs his judicial functions not for the purpose of an honour or recognition, but truly to be silent and true to the Office. 33. Interim Measure: It is also necessary to bear in mind that instead of the Government actually having the final say in the matter of appointment of the retired Judge who would be actually most competent to fill up the position in a Tribunal, the Central Government must seek the recommendations of the Collegium about the most suitable Judges for such appointment (which is purely an interim measure until recommendations in relation to life pension as well as restoration of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals to the Courts of Judicature are undertaken).   24     34. It is submitted that appointments of leading District Lawyers to the High Court must also be encouraged. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the District Judiciary must not be viewed any longer as subordinate judiciary. Many instances of abuse of authority by Administrative Judges of the High Court in relation to such District Judges has come to the notice of this writer. It is necessary that there should be a judicial order by which all administrative Judges, their families including wives, sons, daughters, grandchildren, nieces, nephews must be prohibited from seeking any hospitality and/or material favours from any Judges of the lower judiciary. 35. It is submitted that the provision of a car to the District Judge must be made out of the funds which are allocated to the District Court. The District Judge must be prohibited from asking the Collector or any officer of the Executive Branch of the State to make available such facilities. In fact, it is the inability’ of district Judges to provide ‘proper welcome’ to administrative Judges because of which, very often, District Judges have paid a price. It is necessary to bear in mind that the work of District Judges must be appreciated objectively and carefully.   25     36. It is important to bear in mind the ‘uncle-son’/'uncle judge' syndrome which has been referred to and has caused consternation amongst the younger members of the Bar need to be addressed. The younger sections of the Bar are vibrant, full of energy, dynamism, yet impatient because they clearly see what is wrong. It is important to bear in mind that the promotion of sons by other Judges while their sons are promoted by Judges in other Courts is a pernicious practice. It is should be stopped forthwith. Thus, it is necessary to transfer all Judges in India whose relatives are practicing in that particular High Court. 37. As far as division of Courts and expertise of Judges is concerned, to suggest that it should be based upon region and the branch of cases dealt with by the High Court is a fallacious argument. It is respectfully submitted that merely because High Courts in the North East do not deal with very many heavy commercial litigations does not mean that Judges in the North East cannot be outstanding while dealing with commercial matters. This is a only matter of perception. However, it is important to bear one caveat in mind. Those Judges who do not know criminal law or have not practiced criminal law, should not attempt to write judgments in a field where the tendency   26     to err will be very high and if wrongful convictions including sentences or life or death take place, the consequences would be unimaginable. Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind that before a Judge is allowed to write judgments in matters of criminal law, he should have at least an adequate experience and training sitting with a senior Judge of that High Court who is completely familiar with the subject, knows the actions of investigation and prosecution, as well as other relevant matters. 38. It is respectfully submitted that the talk of globalisation, foreign institutional investors, praising economic policies of incumbent Government by Judges has led to very serious breaches of judicial propriety. It is humbly and respectfully submitted that Judges must be careful not to comment upon the merits or demerits of such policies. To speak on subjects without adequate understanding of them can often be a very serious breach of judicial sobriety and objectivity.   27     ANNEXURE 1. That for the purposes of the above two rules, the word relative may be defined as any of the following1:1. Father (including step-father). 2. Father's brother 3. Father's brother's wife 4. Father's brother's son 5. Father's brother's daughter 6. Father's brother's son's wife 7. Father's brother's daughter's husband 8. Father's brother's son's chid 9. Father's brother's daughter's child 10. Father's sister                                                                                                                         1 This definition is based primarily on the definition contained in s. 6 of the Companies Act, 1956. However, it has been modified in keeping with the particular requirements of the judiciary and some of the criticisms that have been made. A possible alternative to this definition is to define relatives in terms of the definition of sapindas contained in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. However, prima facie, it seems that this definition might be a little too broad for this particular context. A narrow definition is also contained in s. 2(41) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, but perhaps the definition confined to purely lineal descendants and ascendants is not suitable to the context of legal practice in India, where it is common for entire families to be involved in the profession of law and maintain close familial ties with each other. A somewhat broader definition is also contained in s. 13 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and it is submitted that this definition is fairly similar to the definition under Section 6 of the Companies Act, 1956 and as such is another possible basis for the present definition.   28     11. Father's sister's husband 12. Father's sister's son 13. Father's sister's daughter 14. Father's sister's son's wife 15. Father's sister's daughter's husband 16. Father's sister's son's chid 17. Father's sister's daughter's child 18. Mother (including step-mother). 19. Mother's brother 20.Mother's brother's wife 21. Mother's brother's son 22.Mother's brother's daughter 23.Mother's brother's son's wife 24.Mother's brother's daughter's husband 25.Mother's brother's son's chid 26.Mother's brother's daughter's child 27.Mother's sister 28.Mother's sister's husband 29.Mother's sister's son 30.Mother's sister's daughter 31. Mother's sister's son's wife   29     32.Mother's sister's daughter's husband 33.Mother's sister's son's chid 34.Mother's sister's daughter's child 35.Son (including step-son). 36.Son's wife. 37.Son's son. 38.Son's son's wife. 39.Son's daughter. 40.Son's daughter's husband. 41. Daughter (including step-daughter). 42.Daughter's husband. 43.Daughter's son. 44.Daughter's son's wife. 45.Daughter's daughter. 46.Daughter's daughter's husband. 47.Brother (including step-brothers). 48.Brother's wife. 49.Brother's son 50.Brother's son's wife 51. Brother's daughter 52.Brother's daughter's husband   30     53.Sister (including step-sister). 54.Sister's husband. 55.Sister's son 56.Sister's son's wife 57.Sister's daughter 58.Sister's daughter'shusband