Court File FEDERAL COURT FEDERAL COURT COUR FEDERALE BETWEEN: 'g .1 SEP 1 62015 3 SAAD GAYA Ange momma can. 2 . - and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA Respondents APPLICATION FOR LEAVE and. for JUDICIAL REVIEW TO THE RESPONDENT: SUBSECTION 22.1(1) OF THE CITIZENSHIP 0r SUBSECTION 72(1) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT. UNLESS A JUDGE OTHERWISE DIRECTS, THIS APPLICATION FOR LEAVE will be disposed of without personal appearance by the parties, in accordance with paragraph of the Citizenship Act. . IF YOU WISH TO OPPOSE THIS APPLICATION FOR LEAVE, you or a solicitor authorized to practice in Canada and acting fOr you must prepare a Notice of Appearance in Form IR-2 prescribed by the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, serve it on the tribunal and the applicant?s solicitor or, if the applicant does not have a solicitor, serve it on the applicant, and ?le it, with proof after service, in the Registry, within 10 days after the day on which this application for leave is served. IF YOU FAIL TO DO SO, the Court may nevertheless diSpose of this application to for leave and, if the leave is granted, of the subsequent applicatiOn for judicial review without further notice to you. Note: Copies of the relevant Rules of Court, information on the local of?ce of the Court and other necessary information may be obtained from any local of?ce of the Federal Court or the Registry in Ottawa, telephone: (613) 992?4238. The Applicant seeks leave of the Court to commence an application for judicial review of: The Applicant is not seeking to review a decision. The Applicant is seeking a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from applying certain provisions of the Citizenship Act as set out below and for an order in the nature of a declaration that those provisions are inconsistent with Sections 7, 11(h) and 12 and 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (?the Charter?), cannot be saved under s. 1, and are therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. IF THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE IS GRANTED, THE APPLICANTS SEEK THE FOLLOWING RELIEF BY WAY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: 1. This is an application for a declaration pursuant to s: 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 that sections 10(2), (3) and (4), and 104(2) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 029, as amended by the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, 8.0 2014, c. 22 violate sections 7, 11(11), 11(i), 12 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a manner. that cannot be saved under s. 1, and is therefore of no force or effect. 2. An Order in the nature of prohibiting the Minister of his delegate(s) from applying sections 10(2), (3) and (4), and 10.4(2) against the Applicant because they are inconsistent with the Charter and therefore of no force 0r effect. 3. An order quashing the Minister?s Notice of Intent to Revoke Citizenship of the Applicant by reason that sections 10(2), (3) and (4), and 10.4(2) are inconsistent with the Charter and therefore of no force or effect. 4. Such further and other relief as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit. IF THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE IS GRANTED, THE APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IS TO BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: A. THE FACTS 5. The Applicant was born on November 17, 1987 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. 6. On June 2, 2006, the Applicant was arrested in relation to a conSpiracy to commit terrorist acts along with 17 other individuals. On September 28, 2009, the Applicant pleaded guilty to commission of an indictable offence for a terrorist group, contrary to section 83.2 of the Criminal Code, namely using explosives contrary to paragraph 81(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. On January 18, 2010, the Applicant was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment. The Crown filed an appeal to his sentence and on December 17, 2010, the Applicant?s sentence was increased from 12 to 18 years of imprisonment. 7. Currently incarcerated at Warkworth Institution in Campbellford, Ontario, the Applicant received a Notice of Intent to Revoke Citizenship, which is dated July 31, 2015, on August 6, 2015. 8. The Applicant?s conviction under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code, in relation to an I offence contrary to paragraph 81(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and the sentence imposed of 18 years of imprisonment fall within the legislative framework for revocation of citizenship as de?ned under paragraph 10(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act. 9. While the Notice recognizes that the Applicant is a Canadian-born citizen, it alleges that the Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan by descent, for reasons outlined below. This justi?cation is used in order to satisfy 3. 10.4 of the Act which'states: (1) Subsections 10(2) and 10.1(2) do not operate so as to authorize any decision, action or declaration that con?icts with any international human rights instrument regarding statelessness to which Canada'is signatory. (2) If an instrument referred to. in subsection (1) prohibits the deprivation of citizenship that would render a person stateless, a person who claims that subsection 10(2) or 10.1(2) would operate in the manner described in Subsection (1) must prove, on a balance of probabilities that the person is not a citizen of any country of which the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe the person is a citizen. 10. The Applicant?s parents were both born in Pakistan. His father, Hussain Amin Gaya, immigrated to Canada from Pakistan in 1977 and subsequently became a Canadian citizen in 1981. His mother, Rukhsana Hussain Gaya, immigrated from Pakistan in 1981 and became a Canadian citizen in 1985. At the time, dual citizenship was not permitted by Article 5 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. The Applicant?s parents therefore lost their Pakistani citizenship when they became Canadian._ The Minister alleges that the Applicant?s parents had their Pakistani citizenship retroactively reinstated on May 10, 2004 as per subsection 14(3) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 which allows dual nationality if there 11. 12. 13. 14. is an agreement. Because Pakistan entered into such an agreement with Canada, the Minister asserts the Applicant?s parents had their Pakistani citizenship reinstated. The Minister alleges that based on this ?nding, although the Applicant was not a Pakistani citizen at the time of his birth, he retroactively became a citizen by descent on May 10, 2004. The Minister alleges that this constitutes reasonable grounds to believe the Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan and therefore would not be rendered stateless. The Applicant has never applied for Pakistani citizenship and denies that he has Pakistani citizenship. B. THE LEGISLATION On June 19, 2014 Royal Assent was given to the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (?Bill 024?). Bill C-24 amended various provisions of the Citizenship Act including, as relevant to this application, expanding the grounds upon which a person may have their citizenship revoked and amending the procedures that lead to revocation (the ?revocation? provisions). i. Revocation Provisions Prior to Bill section 10 of the Citizenship Act provided that an individual?s citizenship could be revoked only if it were established that their citizenship was obtained ?by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances,? in effect removing the grant of citizenship when improperly made ab inirio. A ?nding of fraud could be made only by the Governor in Council on a report prepared by the Minister. Prior to issuing a report, the Minister was required to notify the affected individual, who had a right to require that the matter be referred to the Federal Court for adjudication. The Court would make a determination as to whether or not the Minister hadestablished on a balance of probabilities that the Application had obtained his citizenship by fraud. 15. Bill C-24 both expanded the grounds upon which citizenship could be revoked, and changed the applicable procedure. 16. Beyond revocation based 0n fraud, 3. 10(2) of the Act now permits revocation where the Minister is satis?ed that a citizen was convicted of: a. High treason or treason under s. 47 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life; b. A terrorism offence as de?ned in section 2 of the Criminal Code or any offence outside of Canada that, if it had been committed in Canada, would constitute a terrorism offence, and sentenced to at least ?ve years imprisonment; c. Offences under various provisions of the National Defence Acr related to terrOrism, treason, and spying, and sentenced to imprisonment for life or in the case of terrorism related offences ?ve years; and d. An offence under 16 Or 17 of the Security of Information Act. 17. These provisions operate retrospectively. A person who was convicted of one of 18.- 19. the enumerated offences prior to the enactment of the Bill (3-24 amendments would still be subject to citizenship revocation, even though the law at the time of their conviction or even at the time of the offence did not provide for such a consequence. With respect to the newly enacted grounds for revocation set out in s. 10(2), the decision to revoke citizenship is taken by the Minister directly, not by the Governor in Council. The subject no longer has the right to have the matter referred to Court for adjudicatiOn. Instead, pursuant to s. 10(3), the Minister is required to notify the subject of the grounds on which the Minister is relying to make his decision, and inform them of their right to make written representations. There is no right to an oral hearing. The amended Act states that the Minister may hold an oral hearing if, pursuant to prescribed factors, he is of the view that a hearing is required. There is no right to disclosure of releVant materials in the 20. 21. 22. 23 24. 25. possession of the Minister. The Minister need only set out the grounds on which he is relying to make his decision. As opposed to the previous procedure the Applicant?s case is not referred to the Governor in Council for final determination. The Applicant has lost the right to make submission to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council could consider equitable circumstances. The right to make submission on. that point has been lost. Bill C-24 also contains provisions related to the issue of statelessness. Section 10.4(1) provides that the new revocation provisions do not authorize any action that would con?ict with ?any international human rights instrument regarding statelessness to which Canada is a signatory.? The Act does not contain any further indication of what relevant instruments Canada is a party to, nor what the effect of any such instrument might be. It also does not appear to capture customary international law norms binding on Canada. If there exist any such instruments to which Canada is a party that prohibit the deprivation of citizenship that would render a person stateless, subsection 10.4(2) of the Act places an onus on the affected person to establish on a balance of probabilities that they are not a citizen of any country that the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that they are a citizen. . There is no right of appeal against the decision of the Minister. The sole recourse against a decision by the Minister to revoke citizenship under the new grounds of revocation is an application for leave for judicial review pursuant to s. 22.1 of the Act. I There is no right of appeal against a declaration made by the Federal Court under s. 10.1(2) unless the Court certi?es that a serious question of general importance is involved and states the question: 5. 10.3. Under the amended Act, a person whose citizenship is revoked due to a conviction for an offence under s. 10(2) or for engaging in armed conflict with Canada under 10.1 becomes a foreign national: s. 10.3. 26THE REVOCATION PROVISIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL The newly enacted provisions that permit the revocation of citizenship based on conduct that post?dates the grant of citizenship violate the Constitution both because cf inherent unfairness in the process that leads to revocation, and based on the severe and discriminatory impact that revocation imposes on individuals. i. The Revocation Provisions Violate Section 12 of the Charter The revocation provisions constitute cruel and unusual treatment and/or punishment. Revocation is a form of punishment as it is a penal consequence that ?ows from a criminal conviction or from a ?nding that the individual has engaged in armed conflict with Canada (which itself will ordinarily be criminal conduct). In addition, citizenship revocation constitutes ?treatment.? for s. 12 purposes. Dealings with an individual by the state in the context of an administrative regime can constitute treatment. Deportation of an individual from Canada is a form of treatment that can be addressed under s. 12 of the Charter. The revocation of citizenship is based on a process initiated by the Minister, and normally results in deportation; it is accordingly treatment that falls within the scepe of s. 12. A punishment is cruel and unusual when it is grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. If revocation is not considered a punishment and is analyzed solely as treatment, the aSSessment under s. 12 involves an examinatiOn of several factors including whether the treatment goes beyond that which is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim; whether there are adequate alternatives to the treatment; whether the treatment is arbitrary; and the treatment?s value or social purpose. Citizenship revocation imposes harms on individuals that are wholly disproportionate to any legitimate government objective. Revocation results in the loss of civil rights that are so fundamental that they have themselves been 33. 34. 35. 36. enshrined in the-Charter, and exiles individuals from the Canadian polity. Revocation also renders individuals foreign nationals, which exposes them to extended periods of detention in Canada, or expulsion from Canada to other countries to which they may have no connection whatsoever. The loss of citizenship also impacts individuals by placing them in circumstances of precariousness and-uncertainty as to their status or-future. In some cases, this impact will rise to the level of serious mental anguish and harm. The revocation regime as it exists also gives rise to a real risk that individuals will be rendered Stateless. The reverse onus provision in s. 10.4(2) of the Act, in tandem with the subjective discretion that makes istatelessness a matter of the Minister?s opinion,.creates circumstances where the Minister believes that a person is a citizen of a particnlar foreign state notwithstanding that at least from the perspective of that foreign state the individual is not a citizen. The result would be a situation where, notwithstanding the existence of doubts respecting an individual?s foreign citizenship, their Canadian citizenship is revoked and they are rendered stateless. Being rendered stateless imposes severe impacts on individuals. Stateless individuals are deprived of the exercise of basic rights, are unable to claim the protection of a home state, and are at serious risk of mistreatment. The gross disprOportionality of all of the consequences of revocation is particularly acute given that many individuals would have already been punished within the context Of the criminal justice system for their conduct. ii. The Revocation Provisions Violate Section 7 0f the Charter I Section 7 of the Charter provides that ?everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.? Engagement of s. 7 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. Revocation of citizenship restricts an individual?s liberty interest. It removes their mobility and voting rights, which are inherent aspects of liberty. When an individual is citizenship is revoked under either ss. 10(2) (national?security related convictions) or 10.1 (armed con?ict), they are rendered a foreign national. Such a person would inevitably be viewed as inadmissible under either 35. 34, 36 or 40 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 This may result in the prolonged detention of such individuals: IRPA s. 55. RevocatiOn will also impact the security of the person interest by placing an individual at a real risk of being deported to face serious mistreatment. Labels placed on an individual, such as ?terrorist? or ?traitor? in the case of the Applicant may enhance the risk of mistreatment or persecution. Revocation also engages the. security of the person interest because of the serious and prolonged suffering it may impose on individuals. For many individuals captured by the new revocation provisions and who would now face deportation, including the Applicant, their other nationality derives from a country with which they have no meaningful connection, have little or no familiarity with the language or culture, and have no family or other support network. The risk of removal that arises as a direct consequence of revocation may have a suf?ciently severe and social impact so as to engage 5. 7?3 security of the person interest. The Applicant was born and grew up in Canada. His family is in Canada and has been since before he was born Revocation also raises a real risk of rendering a person stateless. Notwithstanding 3. 10.40) of the Act, there is a real risk that revocation will render an individual stateless in some circumstances. This risk arises because, unless an individual can establish that they are not a citizen of any other state on a balance of probabilities, the Minister?s conclusion that they would not be rendered stateless through revocation is dispositive, even if this conclusion is speculative or erroneous. Individuals may not be in a position to discharge their burden due to the inherent problems with proving of a negative, the above-described lack of disclosure from the Minister, and practical issues such as dif?culties proving foreign law. 42. Revocation proceedings may occur while an individual is outside of Canada and lacks access to local assistance, effectively depriving them of a meaningful the evidence Opportunity to adduce necessary respecting citizenship. Consequently, by creating a reverse onus situation, individuals may be stripped-of citizenship on the basis of the Minister?s subjective views, even if there exist reasonable grounds to believe those views are wrong and that the individual is not a citizen of any foreign'state. Stateless persons are inherently vulnerable and at risk of not being able to exercise basic human rights. Stateless persons are particularly vulnerable to prolonged detention. Procedural Fundamental Justice 43. 44. 45, 46. Because revocation engages s. 7 of the Charter and may result in extreme consequences, individuals subject to revocation are entitled to a high degree of procedural fairness. The need for procedural fairness is all the more acute given the absence of any right of appeal from a decision of the Minister to revoke. The Act establishes aidiscretionary regime that lacks basic procedural protections for persons at risk of revocation. With the exception ?of revocation for engaging in armed con?ict with Canada, which requires the Minister to bring a proceeding in the Federal Court,-the extent of the procedural protections the person is given notice of the grounds on which the Minister is relying to make a decision and (2) is informed of their right to make written representations within a speci?ed period of time: s. 10(3). The new regime fails to afford suf?cient protections to meet the requirements of natural justice because: a. The Act does not require the Minister to disclose relevant information in his possession to the individual; b. By requiring that the Minister notify an individual of the grounds upon which he is relying to render his decision, but not necessarily the evidence supporting. those grounds, the Act does not guarantee the right to know the case put against one and to answer that case; 0. The Act imposes an unfair onus on the individual to establish that revocation would not render them stateless; d. The Act does not guarantee a hearing before an independent and impartial magistrate; and e. The Act does not guarantee an oral hearing in all circumstances where such a hearing is necessary. 47. Under the previous regime, in which all revocation actions could be referred to 48. 49. 50. the Federal Court for adjudication, courts had adopted a requirement for full disclosure and production of all relevant information within the party?s possession. Under C-24?s apprOach, in which there is no judicial proceeding, there is no general disclosure requirement placed on the government. The Minister is under no obligation to disclose informatioxi in. his possession that, while not being relied upon, is nevertheless relevant to that proceeding. In particular, the Minister has no obligation to disclose information to the individual that tends to undermine the basis for the revocation, even if the Minister were in possession of it and aware of its relevance. This may be particularly relevant when it comes to the question of whether the individual is a citizen of a foreign state. The Minister may be in possession of information or evidence that is relevant to the question of citizenship and provides some support for the proposition that the individual is not a citizen of a different state, and yet have no obligation to provide such information to the individual in . question. Absent such disclosure, the individual may be unable to meet their onus to establish their lack of foreign citizenship. The Minister is, in fact, under no obligation to disclose any relevant evidence. The Act merely requires the Minister to disclose the ?grounds? on which he is relying, not the evidence that he believes supports those grounds. 51. 52. 53. 54. With the exception of those revocation proceedings that fall under s. 10.1 of the Act, the Act does not provide for a fair hearing before an independent and impartial magistrate. The proceedings are purely administrative, with the Minister 'both initiating and adjudicating the revocation process. In practice, both 'the investigative and adjudicative functions under the Act are delegated to of?cials within Citizenship and Immigration Canada?s Case Management Branch, who are not independent from one another or from the Minister himself. The Act is furthermore unconstitutional because it does not guarantee a right to an oral hearing. Procedural fairness requires an oral hearing where credibility is at stake, and serious issues of credibility will often arise during revocation proceedings. The Act does not even require that the Minister grant an oral hearing when prescribed factors point to the need for one. Rather than use the mandatory term ?shall?, 5. 10(4) uses the permissive ?may?, clearly indicating a purely discretionary regime. Establishing a discretionary regime in which the decision maker determines whether or not to conduct an oral hearing cannot replace a right to an oral hearing in circumstances where s. 7 is engaged. The legislation is crafted in such a way that revocation may be effectuated on the basis of a foreign conviction or conduct undertaken abroad, 'where'the citizen is located outside of Canada when revocation proceedings are commenced. In these circumstances, individuals will be unable to meaningfully participate in the revocation process. If revocation occurs, the individual would not be entitled to re-enter Canada to pursue judicial I review, which imposes a significant impediment to obtaining relief form the courts. Substantive Fundamental Justice 55. 56. The revocation provisions also violate the principles of fundamental justice in the substantive sense by imposing punishment on individuals retrospectively. Citizenship revocation under both 5.- 10(2) and s. 10.1(2) may be imposed based on convictions or conduct that occurred prior to the entry into force of Bill C-24. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. This imposes a form of punishment that did not exist at the time of the conduct in question. It is a principle of fundamental justice that no person may be punished for conduct that was not prohibited at the time it was committed. Even where it is permissible to punish a person fer their prior conduct, it is a principle of fundamental justice that they cannot be punished more severely than what the law authorized as- punishment at the time of the commission of the offence. Revocation under 53. 10(2) and 10.1(2) violate this principle. Section 10(2) also violates the principles of fundamental justice by authorizing the imposition of a punishment on individuals who have already been punished fer their conduct. Revocation under s. 10(2) is predicated on an individual having already been convicted of an offence and having been sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment (ranging from five years to life imprisonment, depending on the underlying offence). Revocation acts as a second punishment that may be applied even long after the original punishment has been served. It is a principle of fundamental justice that an individual not be punished twice for the same conduct. Revocation under s. 10(2) violates this principle. The Revocation Provisions Violate Sections 1101) and of the Charter Section 11. of the Charter guarantees a series of protections for individuals who have been charged with an offence. The section is engaged when either of two conditions are met: when a proceeding is, by its very nature, criminal; or when true penal consequences ?ow from a proceeding. With reSpect to revocation based on s. 10(2) of the Act, every such person has by definition been charged with an offence, and therefore enjoys the protection of s. 11 of the Charter in relation to that proceeding and the consequences that ?ow from it. Section 11(h) of the Charter provides that 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69 Any person charged with an offence has the if ?nally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again. . Revocation of citizenship as a result of a conviction as set out in s. 10(2) of the Act violates of the Charter because revocation in these circumstances is a true penal consequence which is imposed upon someone who has already been punished for the same offence. It constitutes impermissible double?punishment. A true penal consequence is one that, by its magnitude, would appear to be imposed for the purpose of redressing the erng done to society at large rather than to the maintenance of internal disoipline within a limited sphere of activity. While revocation under s. 10(1) based on misrepresentation can be understood as a consequence directed at restoring an outcome that would have obtained had the true facts been known at the relevant time, individuals subject to revocation under s. 10(2) do not fall within the same framework. In this category of revocation, the claim is that individuals ought to face the consequence of losing citizenship that was properly obtained. In." these circumstances, citizenship revocation is the modern enactment of the 18th and 19th century criminal punishment of transportation, and constitutes de facto exile. M0reover, the magnitude of the consequence of revocation is far more severe than many consequences for a criminal conviction: it divests the individual of comtitutionally-enshrined rights and eliminates their right to remain in Canada. In enacting the C-24 amendments, Parliament intended that revocation Operate as a form of punishment. When revocation occurs under s. 10(2), it imposes a punishment on an individual who has already previ0usly been punished for an offence, and therefore violates .s. 11(h). .Revocation under s. 10(2) also violates s. 11(i) 'of the Charter, which provides that: Any person charged with an offence has the if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the bene?t of the lesser punishment. 70. To the extent that s. 10(2) operates retrOSpectively, it seeks to impose a more 71. 72. 73. severe punishment as a consequence of the prior conduct than existed at the time of its commission, when citizenship revocation was not an available punishment. iv. The Revocation Provisions Violate Section 15(1) of the Charter Because revocation may only intentionally be applied to dual or multi-citizens, the provisions discriminate between persons based on the analogous ground of citizenship. Mono-citizens (those who have no claim to any citizenship other than Canadian) are not subject to revocation. Those who hold other citizenships are. This constitutes discrimination on the basis of the recognized analogous ground of citizenship. The revocation provisions establish tWo classes of citizens: mono-Canadian citizens (who are not subject to revocation) and dual or multi-citizens (who are subject to revocation). It treats those individuals who are not citizens of any other state preferentially to those persons who do hold a second citizenship, as the former category are not at risk of losing Canadian citizenship and the bene?ts that ?ow from it. This distinction perpetuates historical disadvantage of Canadian citizens who originate from other countries, and is in?uenced by prejudicial reasoning respecting the ?otherness? or disloyalty of those who hold the citizenship of a foreign state. It renders dual citizens less secure in their Canadian citizenship than mom-citizen's. IF LEAVE IS GRANTED, THIS APPLICATION WILL BE SUPPORTERD BY THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL: 74. Af?davit from the Applicant, to be sworn; 75. Af?davits from experts and other witnesses prepared in support of the application, to be sworn; and 76. Such further material as this Honourable Court may permit. As there is no decision and as the application for a constitutional declaration, the Applicant has not received the reasons from the tribunal. If the Application for Leave is granted, the Applicant proposes that the Application for Judicial Review be heard at Toronto in English 5L0 'ste Solicitor '1 Eglinton Ave. E. Toronto, Ontario M4P 1L3 Tel: 416 482 6501 Fax: 416489 9618 Counsel for the Applicant