COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Case No. 06 of 2015

In Re:

M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private Ltd.,
26, Jayalakshmipuram,
Nungambakkam, Chennai.

Informant

And

M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.,
4th Floor, ‘A’ Wing, Sunteck Centre,
37-40, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai.

Opposite Party

CORAM

Mr. Ashok Chawla
Chairperson

Mr.S. L. Bunker
Member

Mr. SudhirMital
Member

Augustine Peter
Member

Mr. M. S. Sahoo

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 Member

Justice (Retd.) Mr. G. P. Mittal
Member

Appearances:

For the Informant:

Mr.A.N. Haksar, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Udayan Jain, Advocate
Ms. ChitraParande, Advocate
Mr. Rajiv M. Brahma, Advocate

For the Opposite Party:

Mr. Ramji Srinivasan, Sr. Advocate
Ms. Nisha Kaur Uberoi, Advocate
Mr. Bharat Budholia, Advocate
Ms. NanditaSahai, Advocate
Mr. Arvind, Advocate
Ms. Sara Sundaram, Advocate

Order under Section 33 of the Competition Act, 2002

This order shall dispose of the prayer made by M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private
Limited (hereinafter, the „Informant‟),videits application dated 08.06.2015,for
grant of interim relief under section 33 of the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter,
the „Act‟). The Informant has primarily prayed for an order from the Commission
directingM/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.(hereinafter,the „Opposite Party‟) to
restrain from indulging in alleged practice of predatory pricing.
2. Briefly, the Commission,vide its order dated 24.04.2015 passed under section
26(1) of the Act, prima facieheld that the Opposite Party has abused its dominant
position in violation of section 4 of the Act. The matter was accordingly sent to

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 the Office of Director General (hereinafter, the „DG‟) for detailed investigation.
Pursuant to the said order, the Informant had filed an application seeking interim
relief which was considered by the Commission in its meeting dated 17.06.2015
and it was decided to accord an opportunity of hearing to the Informant as well as
to the Opposite Party. The Informant and the Opposite Party were represented by
their legal counsels in the ordinary meeting of the Commission dated 15.07.2015
wherein detailed submissions were made on the interim application filed by the
Informant.

3. Bereft of details, the Informant, in the Information,inter alia, has alleged that the
Opposite Party, armed with moneybags from various funding agencies, has
unleashed a series of abusive practices of unfair conditions, predatory pricing etc.
to establish its monopoly and eliminate otherwise equally efficient competitors,
who cannot indulge in such predatory pricing in the radio taxi services market in
the city of Bengaluru. It was contended that the Opposite Party, under the brand
name Ola cabs, is offering various unrealistic discounts and rates to lure the
customers and unviable incentives to its drivers thereby resulting in business loss
for the Informant. It was also alleged that such conduct is resulting in ousting the
existing players out of the market and is also creating entry barrier for the
potential players.

4. The Commission, while placing reliance on the material submitted by the
Informant, prima facie, held the Opposite Party to be dominant in the relevant
market of „Radio Taxi services in the city of Bengaluru‟.The Commission was of
the view thatthe Opposite Party was spending more money on discounts and
incentives on customers and drivers compared to the revenue it was earning,
thereby contravening the provisions of section 4 of the Act. While passing the
order under section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission observed that while the
veracity of the figures submitted by the Informant is a subject matter of
investigation, prima facie, such figures indicatedlow cost pricing by the Opposite
Party to oust other players from the market.

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 5. In the interim relief application, the Informant has contended that the Opposite
Party after having received funds of about $250 Million from Soft Bank, Japan in
March, 2014 unleashed an onslaught of anti-competitive practices resulting in
large scale erosion of market share of the Informant. It was alleged that as a
financial impact, monthly revenue of the Informant in the Bengaluru market
eroded from Rs. 23 lakh in March 2014 to about Rs. 9.5 lakh by December 2014
leading to significant losses. It was also highlighted that despite the prima facie
order of the Commission, the Opposite Party has not stopped its practices of
charging predatory prices.

6. The Informant has also stated that the radio taxi business model relies heavily on
the network effect. That a competitors‟ practice of unduly luring away drivers
from its network significantly reduces its ability to serve customers and similarly
a competitors low prices to customers also lures away customers from using its
network. Under such situation, the Informants‟ ability to bounce back from a
reduced business is extremely difficult and next to impossible. The Informant has
pointed out that the Opposite Party was fully aware of the effects of killing the
competitor‟s network and instead of using good operational and ethical business
practices, it had allegedly adopted predatory pricing tactics. It is averred that if
such policy of the Opposite Party continues then in no time entrepreneurs like the
Informant will be forced to exit from the market.

7. The Informant has further contended that the balance of convenience is in its
favour since it is on the verge of being eliminated from the market due to the
abusive conduct of the Opposite Party. It is urged that if immediate ad-interim exparte orders are not granted in its favour,the informant shall suffer irreparable loss
and injury, which cannot be compensated in terms of money.

8. Based on these averments, the Informant has sought interim relief from the
Commission and prayed that an ex-parte ad-interim stay should be granted and the

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 Opposite Party be directed to restrain from indulging in predatory pricing with
immediate effect.
9. The Opposite Party, on the other hand, has submitted that the Informant‟s interim
relief application is misconceived on account of discrepancies in the facts and
figures submitted before the Commission at the time of filing the Information and
at the time of filing the interim relief application. The counsels for the Opposite
Party highlighted that the per trip loss to the Opposite Party was stated to be Rs.
230 in the Information whereas, the data submitted by the Informant along with
the interim relief application shows that the average per trip loss to the Opposite
Party to be around Rs. 84 (Rs. 9415 loss for 112 trips). Further, it is submitted that
the Opposite Party has a complex pricing mechanism in place and the incentives
and discounts are designed to compete with similarly placedservice providers in
the market like Uber.

10. The Opposite Party has submitted that the Informant failed to give details about
its business model and costing. In such a scenario, it would be unfair to attribute
the Informant‟s failure to sustain itself in the market on account of its
inefficiencies to the Opposite Party. It is also argued that the market is contestable
in nature and any other service provider can also resort to venture funding the way
the Opposite Party is doing. Accordingly, the Opposite Party submitted that the
reliefs prayed for by the Informant are baseless and should not be allowed by the
Commission.

11. The Commission has perused the documents submitted by the parties and heard
their counsels in detail.The principles for deciding the interim relief application
under section 33 of the Act have been laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
CCI v. SAIL (2010 CompLR 0061 SC) matter whereinthe Hon‟ble Supreme Court
mandated that while recording a reasoned order under section 33 of the Act, the
Commission shall, inter alia, ensure fulfilment of following conditions:

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 a)

record its satisfaction (which has to be of much higher degree than
formation of a prima facie view under Section 26(1) of the Act) in clear
terms that an act in contravention of the stated provisions has been
committed and continues to be committed or is about to be committed;

b)

it is necessary to issue order of restraint and

c)

from the record before the Commission, there is every likelihood that the
party to the lis would suffer irreparable and irretrievable damage, or there
is definite apprehension that it would have adverse effect on competition in
the market

12. On the first element it may be mentioned that the Commission has already held
that the Informant has a prima facie case and has directed the DG to conduct
investigation in the matter. At the same time, the figures cited by the Informant
regarding per trip loss incurred by the Opposite Party have already been modified
in the interim relief application filed by the Informant. These figures are yet to be
examined by the DG. Thus, simply because the Informant has a prima faciecase,
by itself will not entitle him to the grant of interim relief, unless, he satisfies that
there is irreparable loss and injury to him and that the balance of convenience also
lies in his favour.

13. The existence of the second element, i.e., irreparable loss to the Informant or
definite apprehension of adverse effect on competition in the market has also not
been satisfied in the instant case. The Informant has contended that its active pool
of 600 taxis in March, 2014, came down to a mere 250 taxis in March, 2015,
because of the anti-competitive strategy of the Opposite Party. The Opposite
Party, however, argued that out of 350 taxis which moved out of the Informant‟s
network, only around 120 taxis came on the network of the Opposite Party.
Furthermore, the Informant has stated in the interim relief application that

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 monthly revenue of the Informant in Bengaluru market has eroded from Rs. 23
lakh in March 2014 to about Rs. 9.5 lakh by December 2014 leading to significant
losses. The Opposite Party has contested these losses stating that in the absence of
further evidence from the Informant, it is extremely difficult to conclude whether
the said losses are attributable to the conduct of the Opposite Party or due to the
inefficiency of the Informant. Further, the Opposite Party argued that the
Informant has not able to demonstrate howits prices negatively affect other
competitors or the consumers. The Commission observes that the figures
submitted by the Informant need to be investigated before any conclusions can be
drawn upon them at this stage. Also,since the damages in this case are
quantifiable in terms of money, the harm does not appear to irreparable. Though
the Informant has contended that it will be difficult to calculate the compensation
at a later stage, this does not impress the Commission to grant an interim relief
especially when the interim relief application clearly mentions the loss to the
Informant in monetary terms.
14. Further, the balance of convenience also does not seem to lie in Informant‟s
favour. The Opposite Party has contended that its incentives and discounts are
devised as part of its competitive strategy to compete with similarly placed
aggregators in the market like Uber. The Informant has alleged the same to be
predatory in nature aimed at ousting players like the Informant out of the market.
The Commission has already stated earlier that the figures cited by the Informant
regarding per trip loss incurred by the Informantwere subsequently modified by
the Informant. Though such a discrepancy does not affect the prima facie view of
the Commission, it cautions that such figures cannot be relied upon further unless
the same areverified by the DG in its investigation.

15. The issue of predatory pricing by the Opposite Party is already under
investigation by the DG, pending which the Commission is not convinced that
any interim relief is required to be granted in this case. For the aforesaid reasons,
the prayer of the Informant is disallowed.

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 16. The Secretary is directed to inform all concerned suitably.

Sd/(Ashok Chawla)
Chairperson

Sd/(S .L. Bunker)
Member

Sd/(SudhirMital)
Member

Sd/(M. S. Sahoo)
Member

Sd/Justice (Retd.) Mr. G. P. Mittal
Member
New Delhi
Date: 03.09.2015

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 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
CASE NO. 06/2015

DISSENT NOTE

UNDER SECTION 33 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

PER

AUGUSTINE PETER, MEMBER

1.

I am unable to agree with the analysis and conclusions by the learned
Members and, therefore, write a separate Order.

2.

M/s Fast Track Call Cab Private Limited (hereinafter, the ‘Informant’),
a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, engaged in the
business of providing radio taxi services under the brand name „Fast
Track‟ in southern India, filed the Information in the present case under
Section 19(1) (a) of the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter, the ‘Act’)
against M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, the ‘Opposite
Party’), a company engaged in the provision of services of radio taxi
under the brand name „OLA‟, alleging, inter alia, contravention of the
provisions of section 4 of the Act.

3.

As per the Information, the Opposite Party, backed by huge funding from
various agencies, has indulged in a series of abusive practices including
predatory pricing with a view to establishing its monopoly and eliminate
otherwise equally efficient competitors from the radio taxi services
market. The Informant averred that the Opposite Party held a dominant
position in the market of radio taxi services in Bengaluru and abused
such dominance through unrealistic incentivisation of drivers leading to

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 exclusion of existing competitors and creating entry barriers for the
potential entrants. It was further alleged that the Opposite Party restricted
its driver fleet operators from using any other competing platform for
providing their services and that the Opposite Party‟s „direct cost‟ for
providing taxi services was way above its revenue from customers.
Moreover, the Opposite Party has allegedly been offering general
discounts and loyalty rebates to its customers through its wallet system,
which apart from fidelity building, also leads to discriminatory pricing.
As a result, the Informant purportedly is losing cabs on its network and
consequently passengers, witnessing a significant drop in the Informant‟s
revenue leading to huge financial loss. The conduct of the Opposite Party
was alleged to be in contravention of the provisions of section 4(2) (a) (i)
and (ii) of the Act.

4.

The Commission, upon perusal of the facts and circumstances of the case
and the materials available on record, defined the relevant market in the
present case as the market for „Radio taxi services in the city of
Bengaluru‟.Taking note of the Opposite Party‟s market share of 69% in
the relevant market in terms of trips per day (as computed in the market
research report on „Bangalore Radio Taxi Service market analysis‟
prepared by „New Age TechSci Research Pvt. Ltd. and presented by the
Informant) including that of „Taxi for Sure‟ (with market share of 21.3
percent in the relevant market) which has been recently acquired by the
Opposite Party,in conjunction with the fact that such high market share
was achieved in a short span of three to four years, the Commission
formed a prima facie view that the Opposite Party held a dominant
position in the relevant market for radio taxi services in the city of
Bengaluru.

5.

The Commission further observed that the Opposite Party was spending
more money on discounts and incentives (apart from the other variable

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 costs that it may be incurring) on customers and drivers compared to the
revenue it was earning, which formed the basis of the Commission‟s
prima facie view that the Opposite Party was indulging in predatory
pricing to oust other players from the relevant market and that its conduct
amounted to abuse of dominant position within the meaning of section 4
of the Act. The Commission, vide its order issued under the provisions of
section 26(1) of the Act on 24.4.2015, directed the Director General
(hereinafter, the ‘DG’) to cause an investigation into the matter.

Application for Interim Relief

6.

The Informant has filed an application dated 8.6.2015 seeking interim
relief under Section 33 of the Act. The Informant claims that despite the
Commission‟s order for initiating investigation against the Opposite
Party, the Opposite Party has not refrained from its predatory practices.
In support of its claim, the Informant has provided a copy of an account
statement of the Opposite Party vis-à-vis a cab operator in the relevant
market for May 1 2015 to June 1, 2015. Besides the Informant has also
furnished copies of OLA Cab Blogs dated 17th and 24th July 2015.

7.

The Informant reiterated that it had an active pool of 600 taxis attached
to its network till March 2014 which was doing approximately about
2500 trips per day and it was expected to reach an active pool size of 800
taxis by the end of December 2014 doing approximately 4000 trips per
day. But the alleged anti-competitive practices of the Opposite Party
since March 2014 after it received $250 million from Soft Bank, Japan,
resulted in large scale erosion of market share of the Informant. By the
end of December 2014, the Informant was left with an active pool size of
250 taxis doing about 1200 trips per day.

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 8.

When the Informant approached the Commission for interim relief under
section 33 of the Act it was indicated that owing to the continued
onslaught of alleged predation by the Opposite Party, the Informant‟s
network further reduced to 110 taxis making about 400 trips per day. The
monthly revenue of the Informant has come down to about Rs 4.4 lakh
from Rs 23 lakh in March 2014 and the Informant purportedly has been
suffering heavy losses. The Informant has pleaded that in view of its
precarious position if the Commission did not interfere by passing an exparte ad-interim injunction order against the Opposite Party, the
Informant would be eliminated from the relevant market in no time.

9.

It has been argued that the radio taxi business model relies heavily on the
network effect and that a competitor‟s practice of unduly luring away
drivers from its network significantly reduces the Informant‟s ability to
serve customers. This, coupled with the Opposite Party‟s unduly low
prices for customers affect the ability of the Informant to compete and
bounce back from a reduced business.

10.

The Informant further apprised that the Opposite Party, since the filing
of the Information, has received an additional funding from Soft Bank,
Japan and other investors to the extent of $400 million in April 2015,
thus taking its total foreign funding to $800 million. A news article was
appended in support of the statement. The Opposite Party allegedly has
been burning money in the market to eliminate its competitors with no
possibility of slowing down on predation, which will force the Informant
to exit the market. It has been further averred that due to the additional
funding and with continuous predation, many other players in the market
would either be eliminated or would be forced to merge their operations.
In this connection, it was mentioned that Serendipity InfolabsPvt. Ltd
running „Taxi For Sure‟ merged its operations with the Opposite Party
under pressure created by such predatory pricing mechanism.

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 11.

The Informant pleaded that the balance of convenience was in favour of
grant of immediate ex-parte interim injunction against the Opposite Party
since it was on the verge of being eliminated from the relevant market
due to the abusive conduct of the Opposite Party.

12.

Both the Parties were heard by the Commission on 15.7.2015. The
Opposite Party was given the opportunity to make known its views on
the prayer of the Informant for interim relief.

The counsel for the

Opposite Party did not, however, contradict any of the allegations by the
Informant, and argued that: (a) the Informant being an inefficient player
in the market is feeling pressure due the presence of the OP; (b) most of
the players in the relevant market are receiving funds from abroad (to
support this relevant newspaper clippings were circulated by the OP to
the Commission during the hearing). No written submissions were made
by the OP.

Assessment

13.

The principles laid out by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of (CCI v. SAIL (2010))form the basis for granting interim relief
under section 33 of the Act. The judgment enunciated the conditions to
be satisfied by the Commission while recording a reasoned order under
section 33 of the Act, whointer alia, should:
(a)

record its satisfaction (which has to be of much higher degree
than for formation of a prima facie view under Section 26(1) of
the Act) in clear terms that an act in contravention of the stated
provisions has been committed and continues to be committed
or is about to be committed;

(b)

Case No. 06 of 2015

It is necessary to issue order of restraint; and

Page 13 of 25

 (c)

From the record before the Commission, there is every likelihood
that the party to the lis would suffer irreparable and irretrievable
damage, or there is definite apprehension that it would have
adverse effect on competition in the market.

14.

The Informant‟s prayer for interim relief in the present case has been
evaluated in terms of these three conditions.

Contravention of the provisions of the Act and continuation thereof

15.

The Informant and the Opposite Party are engaged in the provision of
radio taxi services in Bengaluru city which essentially entails a
technology-enabled linking of drivers/cabs on one hand with customers
needing taxi services on the other. The indirect network effects in such
markets create a positive feedback loop with the number of customers
depending on the number of cabs attached to a network and vice-versa.
In the present case, as evidenced in the materials on record and
information available in the public domain, the Opposite Party offers
steep incentives to drivers as a driver acquisition and retention measure
while also providing deep discounts on passenger fares to get customers
onto its network.

16.

The market research report on „Bangalore Radio Taxi Service Market
Analysis‟ by New Age TechSci Research Pvt. Ltd. placed on record by
the Informant shows that the standard radio taxi day/night fare of the
Opposite Party in the relevant market comprises of flag down fares of Rs
100, Rs 150 and Rs 200 for the first 6 kms and Rs. 10, Rs. 13 and Rs 18
per km for every subsequent km for mini cars, sedans and luxury cars
respectively. Taxi for Sure, which has been acquired by the Opposite
Party, charges flag down fares of Rs 25 for the first 2 kms for mini cars,
Rs 49 for the first 4 kms for hatchbacks and Rs 200 for the first 10 km

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 for sedans. The charge for every subsequent km is fixed at Rs 10 for mini
cars, Rs 14 for hatchbacks and Rs 16 for sedans. The fare structure of the
other players such as Meru cabs, Mega cabs and Easy cabs include a flag
down day fare of Rs 80 for first 4 kms and the corresponding night fare
of Rs 88, with Rs 19.5 being charged for every subsequent km in the day
and Rs 21.5 in the night. Uber‟s flag down fare for first 4 kms is Rs 50
for Uber X and Rs 80 for Uber Black. For every subsequent km Rs 15 is
charged for Uber X and Rs 18 for Uber Black. Evidently, the Opposite
party offers the lowest per km rates among the major players in the
relevant market. In addition, the Opposite Party offers discounts such as
first free ride for a new customer, discount for OLA wallet users, cash
incentives for using OLA money etc. leading to even lower effective
prices for passengers.

17.

Low prices generally benefit consumers and pricing below competitors‟
prices occurs in many competitive markets which does not violate the
provisions of the Act. However, in the present case it was observed that
the low prices charged to the customers and the corresponding low
revenues accruing to the Opposite Party were not sufficient to offset the
payments made by the Opposite Party to the drivers/cab operators
including the sizeable incentive payments, not to speak of other variable
costs, thereby involving significant per trip losses as well as overall
losses. Such low prices therefore can in no manner be viewed as an
outcome of efficiency gains achieved by the Opposite Party.

18.

The share of passenger revenue and the incentives paid to the drivers/taxi
owners by the Opposite Party clearly exceeds the revenue it earns, as
reflected in the information related to sample taxis submitted by the
Informant. The argument of the Opposite Party that the losses brought
out by the two separate sample taxies differed substantially is not of any
consequence because these are two account statements pertaining to

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 separate taxi owners at two different points of time. The first account
statement submitted at the time of filing of Information was with respect
to one driver for the period of December 1, 2014 to January 13, 2015 and
the second account statement submitted at the time of filing application
for interim relief was with respect to one operator for the period of May
1 to June 1, 2015. Further, the Opposite Party is known to be changing
its incentive schemes frequently. The fact remains that both the samples
reflected high losses to the Opposite Party and this has not been
contradicted by it. Since the Opposite Party operates through taxi
operators and do not own taxies, the payments of passenger revenue
share and incentives to drivers form part of „variable cost‟. The
Informant in pages 39-41 of the Information provided extracts of the
Annual Report of the Opposite Party for the year 2013-14 where
revenues from operations was shown to be much lower than the variable
cost. The breakup of the revenue and variable cost was also made
available, where revenue from operations was Rs. 49.61 crores and total
variable cost of operations was Rs. 74.31 crores. During the hearing on
15th July 2015 the Informant invited the attention of the Opposite Party
to these figures which were relating to a period before the period of
alleged predation and requested that the latter may make available
similar information for FY 2014-15, which was not available in the
public domain. No information was made available by the Opposite
Party during the hearing nor thereafter by way of written submission.

19.

Direct or indirect imposition of unfair price including predatory price by
a dominant enterprise is prohibited under section 4(2) (a) (ii) of the Act.
According to the Explanation (b) to Section 4 of the Act, “„predatory
price‟ means the sale of goods or provision of services, at a price which
is below the cost, as may be determined by regulations, of production of
the goods or provision of services, with a view to reduce competition or

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 eliminate the competitors.” Thus, a dominant enterprise will be judged as
guilty of predatory pricing if it is found to be charging its customers
below-cost price. The phrase „with a view to‟ implies that exclusionary
intent has also to be demonstrated.

20.

The Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of
Production) Regulations, 2009 defines cost as follows:
“(1) “Cost” in the Explanation to section 4 of the Act shall, generally,
be taken as average variable cost, as a proxy for marginal cost:

Provided that in specific cases, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, the Commission may, depending on the nature of the
industry, market and technology used, consider any other relevant
cost concept such as avoidable cost, long run average incremental
cost, market value

21.

There is no unique form of below cost pricing given also there is no
unique concept of „cost‟ under the Act, read with the Regulations. Below
cost pricing could broadly be divided into „below average total cost
pricing‟ and „below average variable cost pricing‟. In case pricing is
above average variable cost but below average total cost it is possible
that the pricing behaviour of the enterprise could make some business
sense and therefore „intent‟ in the sense of malafide has to be positively
established. In the present case pricing has been below average variable
cost (as reflected in the account statements submitted by the Informant
and as discussed in para 18 above). Selling below average variable cost
does not make any business sense for an enterprise except in very limited
special circumstances like low market demand for the product or service
concerned or recession like conditions in the market or as promotional
measure at the time of entry into the market by the enterprise concerned,

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 or to face competition, for a limited period of time. A dominant player
does not have any need or compulsion to price below average variable
cost, except that it intends to drive out competitors or reduce competition
in the relevant market. The behaviour of the Opposite Party, with a
market share of 69 per cent, continuing with below average variable cost
pricing is a clear pointer to predatory intent since no other rational
explanation can be attached to its behaviour. This has to be also seen in
the context of the Opposite Party acquiring recently (in March, 2015) its
major competitor in the relevant market viz. „Taxi for Sure‟ at a cost of $
200 million. None of the special circumstances justifying below average
cost pricing as a business strategy exists in the relevant market during the
period of alleged predatory pricing by the Opposite Party. Market has
been expanding at exponential rates. Direct evidence for „intent‟ is
therefore not needed at all.

22.

I have further examined whether the market conditions in the present
case were conducive for a credible predatory strategy. “Asymmetric
access to financial resources” is one of the preconditions on which the
strategic theories of predation are founded. On the basis of the
information and evidence obtained, there is reason to suppose that it is
the superior financial endowment of the Opposite Party compared to its
competitors in the relevant market that underpins its ability to withstand
short-term losses and engage in predatory strategy. The fund flows to the
Opposite Party is continuing. The Opposite Party has acquired its next
largest competitor. It continues to announce new schemes of lower prices
for customers in the Bengaluru market. All these point in one direction
only, that predation is continuing and with more intensity than when the
Informant came first to the Commission and also when the Commission
issued order under section 26(1) of the Act. While forming view on the
matter, note was also taken of the fact that the Opposite Party failed to
present any cognizable evidence or argument to the contrary. The

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 Opposite Party has not made any written submission when given
opportunity to do so. The oral submissions were limited largely to the
following: (i) it is the inefficiency of the informant that is responsible for
its current woes; (ii) other players in the relevant market are also
accessing funds and (iii) the pricing strategy of the Opposite Party is to
face competition from rivals like Uber. None of these arguments can
carry the day for the Opposite Party. It is very clear that it is the
consistent pricing below average variable cost by the Opposite Party that
is responsible for the fall in the market share of the other players in the
relevant market, including the Informant. As for the argument that funds
are accessed by other parties as well, including the Informant it needs to
be clarified that competition law envisages competition on prices and not
on discounts. Deep pocket cannot be the determining factor for success
in the market place. The argument that the pricing strategy is to face
competition from Uber is not cogent in that Uber has less than 2 per cent
share in the relevant market.

23.

On the other hand, the particular urgency for an order of restraint in the
present case arises from the fact that the Opposite Party has continued to
pursue its loss-entailing price-incentive scheme in the relevant market
even after the order of the Commission for initiation of investigation.
The data made availableby the Informant on the collection from
passengers (net of all discounts) and related expenses incurred by the
Opposite Party pertaining to a given cab operator in the relevant market
for the period of May 1 to June 1, 2015 shows that the payments made to
the operator (i.e. „operator‟s share‟ @80% of total collection and
„incentives‟) outstripped the total collection from passengers. The
discussions in para 18 is also relevant in this context. While the veracity
of the data is a subject matter of investigation, the fact remains that it
was not challenged by the Opposite Party. Nor did the Opposite Party
bring its own cost-price data on record for the Commission‟s perusal.

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 19 of 25

 24.

That the predatory behaviour of the Opposite Party has been continuing
even after the 26 (1) order by the Commission on 24-04-2015 is further
corroborated by the following information submitted by the Informant.

a.

OLA Cabs Blog dated 24th July 2015 which reads as follows:
“Now take an Ola wherever you go in Bangalore because
we‟re giving you 25% OFF on every Ola ride! You can enjoy
FLAT 25% OFFon your next 7 cab rides between 24th July –
31st July 2015 when you pay using Ola Money.”

b.

OLA Cabs Blog dated 17th July 2015 which reads as follows:
“We are trying to hook you up with the best ride options
possible. With that in

mind, we recently brought the super-

economical TaxiForSure Hatchbacks on your Ola app. What‟s
even better is that now TaxiForSure has further reduced its
fare from Rs 14/km to Rs 6/km* only”
“What

are

you

waiting

for?

Just

open

the

Ola

app:www.ola.bz/b, click on the “TFS icon, hit RIDE NOW
and #ChaloNicklo”

25.

The latter Blog indicates without doubt that OLA is also extending its
below cost pricing strategy to the newly acquired TaxiForSure cabs
under its control.

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 20 of 25

 Adverse effect on competition and need for order of restraint

26.

I have carefully looked at the market structure for „radio taxi services in
Bengaluru‟. It is a highly concentrated market with the Opposite Party
commanding about 69 per cent of the market. The Opposite Party‟s
recent acquisition of its closest competitor Taxi for Sure in the relevant
market has resulted in a highly asymmetric market share composition.
The next competitor (MERU Cabs) has only 13.7 per cent market share.
Informant has only 2.3 per cent market share. Each of the other players
accounts for less than 5% of the relevant market. Uber, which is the other
major taxi aggregator in the country, has an insignificant presence (less
than 2% market share) in the relevant market. The transaction was not
available for antitrust scrutiny by the Commission. The market structure
seen in conjunction with a number of other important relevant factors
such as the asymmetric access to financial resources of the players, the
rapid erosion of market share and revenue of the Informant and the
network effects tipping the market increasingly in favour of the Opposite
Party, indicates that if the Opposite Party is allowed to continue with its
practice of providing steep incentives-deep discounts so as to expand its
network and retain customers/drivers, there is a strong likelihood of the
smaller players ( and in the relevant market all the other players are small
compared to the Opposite Party) being forced to exit the market.
Predation literally means elimination of the prey, and naturally the Act
refers to the behaviour as that “with a view to reduce competition or
eliminate the competitors”. In a situation of continued pricing below
average variable cost and with reported fall in the absolute number of
taxis of the Informant from 600 in March 2014 to 250 in December 2014
and further to 110 when the Informant came to the Commission for
interim relief, and given the deep pocket of the Opposite Party with the
continued inflow of funds, the elimination of the Informant is imminent.

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 21 of 25

 27.

What weighs on my mind while considering the urgency of the matter
are the following: (a) the Opposite Party is pricing below average
variable cost which is inconsistent with rational business behaviour by a
dominant player, not requiring proof of predatory intent; (b) substantial
funds continue to flow to the Opposite Party and it continues to divert
such funds for incentivisation of drivers and for lower prices for
customers, unjustified by any business rationale; (c) the conduct of the
party is resulting in higher and higher concentration in the relevant
market, reducing competition in the market and with a near certain effect
on the viability of competitors in the relevant market unless these
competitors also have substantial access to funds which they decide to
divert for pricing below variable cost to meet the challenge from the
Opposite Party and that too for an indefinite period of time; (d) such
predatory behaviour by the Opposite Party which has presence in multi
markets in India ( the Opposite Party has radio taxi services in at least 67
towns/cities in India) will have reputational effects in those markets as
well because knowing about the deep pocket of the Opposite Party and
its continued access to finance and its behaviour in the Bengaluru
market, competitors in other markets would tend to meekly surrender in
those markets if and when the Opposite Party exhibits such predatory
behaviour in those markets (the Commission does not have any
information on such behaviour at this point of time). The Opposite Party
has to be stopped on its tracks so that damage in other markets in India is
avoided. The Commission‟s mandate is to „eliminate practices having
adverse effect on competition in markets (emphasis added) in India‟.

28.

The Opposite Party being a dominant player in the relevant market is in a
position of strength to affect the relevant market in its favour. While its
deep-pocket may enable it to provide its services at a loss, it creates a
risky probability that: (i) competition in the relevant market would be
reduced; and (ii) competitors, who, even if they are as efficient as the

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 22 of 25

 Opposite Party, but because of their lower

financial resources and

disinclination to engage in non-business like „below average variable
cost pricing‟ war, are incapable of matching the incentives and fares
offered by the Opposite Party, get eliminated causing irreparable damage
to competition in the relevant market.

Conclusion

29.

Based on the above I am of the view that there is a clearer case than what
is required for a prima facie order that the Opposite Party is engaging in
predatory pricing in the relevant market. Since the pricing is below
„average variable cost‟, there is no need to prove „intent‟ as there is no
other rational justification for such pricing behaviour by a dominant
player given the structure and characteristics of the relevant market.
There is an imminent danger of the Informant and even other players in
the relevant market getting totally eliminated from the relevant market
within a short span of time, and there is an urgent need to stop the
Opposite Party on its tracks. This is coupled with the real danger of
competition in the relevant market further getting considerably reduced,
verging on monopolisation. Reputational effects are likely to vitiate the
other markets in which M/s ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd is operating
currently. In case the Informant is made to wait for the final order by the
Commission there is a very high likelihood that the Informant and other
players in the market may by that time have been eliminated from the
market and substantial reduction in competition would have occurred by
weakening of the other players in the market and through the network
being created purely based on incentives and below average variable cost
pricing. Once the Informant and other competitors are eliminated from
the market, re-entry for those players is not at all easy given the nature of
the market which is network based and is highly dominated by the
Opposite Party who continues to have access to substantial financial

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 23 of 25

 resources which it is diverting for pricing below „average variable cost‟,
irreconcilable with rational business behaviour. The Opposite Party is not
competing on price, but on discounts and therefore its market
performance is not based on its efficiency but on deep pocket and
predatory strategy. In the same way the travails of the Informant cannot
be attributed to his inefficiency, but due to the predatory practices of the
Opposite Party. The Majority order appears to take on its face value the
arguments by the Opposite party that: (i) other players in the relevant
market also have access to funds; (b) the pricing strategy of the Opposite
Party is due to competition from Uber and other competitors; and (c)
inefficiency of the Informant is the reason for its travails. As brought out
in Para 22 above none of these arguments of the Opposite Party are
tenable.

Order

30.

It is therefore ordered as follows:

(i)

With immediate effect the Opposite Party shall organize

its

pricing system in the relevant market in such a way that the
incentives paid by the Opposite Party to the cab operators/drivers
together with the share of the passenger revenue passed on to the
cab operators and other

variable costs do not exceed the

passenger revenue collected by it. This order does not imply
determination of the price at which the Opposite Party may
provide its services in the relevant market.

(ii)

The Opposite Party shall notify the Commission about the details
of its pricing schemes in the market for „radio taxi services in the
city of Bengaluru‟ as on 17-02-2015, when the

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 24 of 25

 Informant brought the information to the Commission, within ten
days of this Order.

(iii)

The Director General shall complete investigation of the case
within 60 days from the date of this order and submit its report to
the Commission.

(iv)

This order shall be applicable only until the final decision is taken
by the Commission relating to the alleged abuse of dominance by
the Opposite Party.

(v)

Secretary is directed to convey this decision to the Parties and to
the Director General for compliance.

Sd/(Augustine Peter)
Member

New Delhi
Date: 03 / 09 /2015

Case No. 06 of 2015

Page 25 of 25