ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THIS JUDGMENT UNTIL
3.00PM ON 5 JUNE 2015.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2015-485-000235
[2015] NZHC 1239
UNDER

The Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

BETWEEN

LECRETIA SEALES
Plaintiff

AND

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Defendant

Hearing:

25-27 May 2015

Counsel:

A S Butler with C J Curran, C M Marks, M L Campbell and E J
Watt for Plaintiff
Mr M Heron QC, Solicitor-General with P T Rishworth QC, E J
Devine and Y Moinfar for Defendant
M S R Palmer QC and J S Hancock for Human Rights
Commission
V E Casey and M S Smith for Care Alliance
K G Davenport QC with A H Brown and L M K E Almoayed
for Voluntary Euthanasia Society of New Zealand
(Incorporated)

Judgment:

4 June 2015

JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J

Summary of judgment
[1]

Ms Seales is dying from a brain tumour.1 She is 42 years old and may have

only a short time to live.2
1

2

The names of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, another oncologist who has treated her and her
doctor have been suppressed. Affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, 2 April 2015 at [7][8]; Ms Seales’ principal oncologist has explained Ms Seales has “diffuse astrocytoma ... with
elements of an oligodendroglioma. This combination is often abbreviated to ‘oligoastrocytoma’.
Both astrocytoma … and oligodendroglioma … grow diffusely and infiltrate the brain”.
Second affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, 22 May 2015 at [6]; Ms Seales can now

SEALES v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2015] NZHC 1239 [4 June 2015]

 [2]

Ms Seales wants to have the option of determining when she dies. To do this,

Ms Seales would like her doctor to be able to either administer a fatal drug to
Ms Seales, or provide Ms Seales with a fatal drug to enable Ms Seales to end her life
by herself.
[3]

Ms Seales’ doctor is willing to take either of these steps, but will not do so

unless she can be assured she would be acting lawfully if she acceded to either of
Ms Seales’ requests.
[4]

Ms Seales has sought two declarations concerning the meaning of two

provisions of the Crimes Act 1961 (the Crimes Act) to determine whether or not
Ms Seales’ doctor can lawfully accede to either of Ms Seales’ requests.
[5]

First, Ms Seales has sought a declaration that her doctor would not commit

either murder or manslaughter under s 160(2)(a) and (3) of the Crimes Act if she
“administered aid in dying” to Ms Seales.3 “Administered aid in dying” is defined in
the statement of claim to mean:4
… the administration by a medical practitioner, or a person acting under the
general supervision of a medical practitioner in the context of a
patient/physician relationship, of medication or other treatment that brings
about the death of a patient who:

[6]

(1)

being competent to do so, clearly consents to the administration of
that aid; and

(2)

is suffering from a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of
his or her illness.

Second, Ms Seales has sought a declaration that her doctor would not be

assisting her to commit suicide, which is prohibited by s 179(b) of the Crimes Act, if

3

4

expect to live “no more than weeks or a short number of months”.
160 Culpable homicide
...
(2) Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person–
(a) By an unlawful act…
...
(3) Except as provided in section 178 of this Act, culpable homicide is either murder or
manslaughter.
...
Amended Statement of Claim of L Seales, 20 April 2015 at [11] and annexure.

 her doctor “facilitated aid in” Ms Seales’ dying.5 “Facilitated aid in dying” is
defined in the statement of claim to mean:6
… a medical practitioner, or a person acting under the supervision of a
medical practitioner in the context of a patient/physician relationship,
making available to a patient the means by which the patient may bring
about his or her own death where the patient:

[7]

(1)

being competent to do so, clearly consents to the provision of that
aid; and

(2)

is suffering from a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of
his or her illness.

I refer to s 160(2)(a) and (3) and s 179(b) of the Crimes Act as “the offence

provisions of the Crimes Act”, and the declarations Ms Seales seeks relating to the
interpretation of those provisions as “the criminal law declarations”.
[8]

The criminal law declarations sought by Ms Seales are:7
(1)

(2)

[9]

In circumstances where the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff is a
competent adult who:
(i)

clearly consents to the administered aid in dying; and

(ii)

has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to her in the circumstances of her
illness, administered aid in dying is not unlawful under
section 160 of the Crimes Act.

In circumstances where the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff is a
competent adult who:
(i)

clearly consents to the facilitated aid in dying; and

(ii)

has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to her in the circumstances of her
illness, facilitated aid in dying is not prohibited by section
179 of the Crimes Act.

I cannot declare that Ms Seales’ doctor would be acting lawfully if she

administered a fatal drug to Ms Seales within the terms sought. Nor can I declare
5

6
7

179 Aiding and abetting suicide
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who–
…
(b) Aids or abets any person in the commission of suicide.
Amended Statement of Claim of L Seales, above n 4, at [11] and annexure.
At [38].

 that it would be lawful for Ms Seales’ doctor to provide her with a fatal drug
knowing that Ms Seales intended to use that drug to end her own life and did so.
Because Ms Seales’ health is rapidly deteriorating, I informed the parties of this
aspect of my decision on 2 June 2015.8
[10]

In the alternative, Ms Seales asks that I issue declarations that the offence

provisions of the Crimes Act are not consistent with two rights guaranteed by the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the NZBORA). The rights in question are the
“right not to be deprived of life”9 and the right not to be “subjected … to cruel,
degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment”.10

I refer to the declarations

relating to the application of ss 8 and 9 of the NZBORA as “the Bill of Rights
declarations”.
[11]

The Bill of Rights declarations sought by Ms Seales are:11
(1)

(2)

8
9

10

11

Section 160 of the Crimes Act is inconsistent with sections 8 and 9
of BORA, to the extent that administered aid in dying is unlawful
under section 160 for a competent adult who:
(i)

clearly consents to the administered aid in dying; and

(ii)

has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the
circumstances of his or her illness.

Section 179 of the Crimes Act is inconsistent with sections 8 and 9
of BORA, to the extent that it prohibits facilitated aid in dying for a
competent adult who:
(i)

clearly consents to the facilitated aid in dying; and

(ii)

has a grievous and terminal illness that causes enduring
suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the
circumstances of his or her illness.

Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1210.
8 Right not to be deprived of life
No one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law and are
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.
9 Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately
severe treatment or punishment.
Amended Statement of Claim of L Seales, above n 4, at [40].

 [12]

I have decided that Ms Seales’ right not to be deprived of life is engaged, but

not breached in her case. I have also concluded that Ms Seales’ right not to be
subjected to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment is not engaged
by her tragic circumstances. I have therefore concluded the relevant provisions of
the Crimes Act are consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the
NZBORA.
[13]

The criminal law declarations sought by Ms Seales invite me to change the

effect of the offence provisions of the Crimes Act. The changes to the law sought by
Ms Seales can only be made by Parliament. I would be trespassing on the role of
Parliament and departing from the constitutional role of Judges in New Zealand if I
were to issue the criminal law declarations sought by Ms Seales.
[14]

This judgment has been delivered urgently so Ms Seales can be made aware

of my decision while that is still possible.
[15]

I have had the benefit of considering evidence from 36 witnesses, who

provided 51 affidavits. None were cross-examined. Many of the witnesses reflect
the wide spectrum of views that exist in society about the merits of Ms Seales’ case.
For every proponent of Ms Seales’ case, there is an equally forceful opponent.
[16]

Ms Seales’ proceeding is one of many that have come before the courts in a

number of jurisdictions in recent years, in which parties have tested the lawfulness of
the role of doctors in bringing about the death of patients. Those cases tend to fall
into three categories:
(1)

First, cases in which courts have held that it is lawful for doctors to
withdraw futile medical services to patients in circumstances where it
is known the patient will die without those services.12

(2)

Second, cases in which it has been held that doctors cannot accede to
requests to terminate the lives of competent patients who are not

12

For example, Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 (HC);
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL).

 terminally ill, but nevertheless wish to die in order to alleviate their
suffering.13
(3)

Third, cases in which competent and terminally ill patients have
sought the assistance of their doctors to end their lives in order to
avoid intolerable deaths.14

[17]

The common characteristic to all these cases is that Judges have been asked

to determine complex legal issues, sometimes urgently, in a context in which
philosophical, moral, ethical and clinical viewpoints are deeply divided. Ms Seales’
tragic case is the epitome of this type of proceeding.
[18]

To assist in understanding this judgment I have divided it into three parts.

[19]

Part I explains the context to the decision I have had to make. It explains

Ms Seales’ circumstances, her prognosis, her doctor’s viewpoint and four relevant
principles.
[20]

Part II explains the offence provisions of the Crimes Act and why I have

concluded that Ms Seales’ doctor would risk being prosecuted if she acceded to
either of Ms Seales’ requests.
[21]

Part III explains the rights contained in ss 8 and 9 of the NZBORA and why I

have concluded that while the right not to be deprived of life is engaged by the
circumstances of Ms Seales’ case, that right has not been breached. I also explain
why the rights in s 9 of the NZBORA are not engaged in this case.

13
14

For example, R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2014] 3 WLR 200.
For example, R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home
Department intervening) [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 AC 800; Pretty v United Kingdom [2002]
ECHR 427 (Section IV, ECHR); Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) [2015] SCC 5; Fleming v
Ireland [2013] 1 IESC 19; Morris v Brandenberg Second Judicial District Court, New Mexico
No D-202-CV 2012-02909, 13 January 2014, Baxter v Montana 2009 MT 449 (Mont 2009);
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice [2015] ZAGPPHC 230 (HCSA).

 PART I
CONTEXT
Ms Seales
[22]

When this proceeding was commenced on 20 March 2015 it was estimated

Ms Seales could expect to live approximately three to 18 months.15 Ms Seales’
principal oncologist explained, however, that predicting the life expectancy of a
person in Ms Seales’ circumstances is difficult because brain tumours vary greatly in
their rates of growth and impact.
[23]

Unfortunately, Ms Seales’ condition has deteriorated more rapidly than was

anticipated at the time she commenced this proceeding.

She is now receiving

hospice care. Ms Seales attended Court for part of the hearing. Her presence
illustrated her courage and commitment at a time when she knew she may only have
a few weeks to live.
[24]

Ms Seales’ brain tumour was diagnosed in March 2011.

Since then

Ms Seales has undergone surgery, courses of chemotherapy and radiation treatment.
Despite this treatment, the brain tumour from which Ms Seales suffers is inoperable
and will cause Ms Seales’ death unless she dies from some other intervening event.
[25]

On 1 April 2015, Ms Seales commenced a course of intravenous

chemotherapy designed to slow the rate of growth of her brain tumour.
Unfortunately, however, Ms Seales suffered severe adverse reactions to this
treatment. On 24 April 2015, an oncologist recommended Ms Seales discontinue
intravenous chemotherapy.
[26]

By the time of the hearing Ms Seales was partially paralysed on the left side

of her body, visually impaired and dependent on others for many day-to-day needs.
Ms Seales continues to suffer from fatigue and has difficulty swallowing liquids. In
addition, Ms Seales is suffering the side effects of steroids, which have been

15

Affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, 2 April 2015 at [12].

 administered to her to reduce the effects of intracranial oedema 16 caused by her brain
tumour.
[27]

While Ms Seales’ body is rapidly physically failing, her mind continues to

function without impairment.
[28]

Ms Seales has to date lived a very satisfying and fulfilling life. She is a

successful lawyer who has enthusiastically pursued passions beyond her career. She
has studied German, Spanish, Italian and Māori. She has also learnt to tango and
acquired a range of culinary skills. Most importantly, Ms Seales has a close and
loving relationship with her husband and family members.
[29]

Ms Seales’ approach to her final stages of life are best explained by quoting

her own words from her first affidavit in this proceeding:17
For the moment I will continue living my life every day as best I can.
Despite my current disabilities and problems I do treasure every day and
have no present desire to end my life. I do not lack courage. If my death is
manageable I should be the one to manage it. But I cannot rule out that it
will be unbearable even with palliative care. [Ms Seales’ principal
oncologist] acknowledges that, for many of my symptoms, palliative care
will have minimal effect. This would include the loss of physical or mental
capacity, being unable to swallow and the loss of the ability to communicate.
While I understand that pain can usually be managed, there can be no
guarantees that pain relief will address all pain. If pain relief is required in
high doses, I am concerned that it could impact on my awareness of myself
and my loved ones.
As my death has become more inevitable, I constantly worry that it could be
slow, unpleasant, painful and undignified. I worry that I will be forced to
experience a death that is in no way consistent with the person that I am and
the way that I have lived my life. I know that it might not turn out this way,
but even the chance that it will is weighing on me very heavily.
Because of this I have started thinking about what I could do to end my own
life before I become physically unable. This is not a choice I want to make.
I know that if I do take this action I would probably have to do that much
earlier than I would if I could ask a doctor to assist me with my death. But
my other choice is to face a possibly unbearable death.
My paralysis means that I am already limited in the methods I could use to
end my life. However, there are still means available to me and I feel I have
no choice but to consider them. I know that some of these methods might
not work (eg poison or carbon monoxide) and could cause my family further
16
17

Swelling of the brain tumour within the cranium caused by the tumour’s absorption of fluids.
Affidavit of L Seales, 9 April 2015 at [47]-[54].

 suffering. I know that if I take my own life, I will need to do so alone and in
secret to avoid the possibility of my loved ones being implicated. I hate the
thought of going through that alone, with my loved ones having to find me,
and not being able to say goodbye to them properly. If I wait too long to
make this decision, I could become physically unable to take my own life
other than by refusing food and water. I do not want to die that way but
dying that way may still be more bearable than having to suffer through to
the bitter end without choice.
It seems incomprehensible to me that I can exercise a choice to end my life
when I am able, and still have quality of life, but can’t get any help to do so
at a later point when my life no longer has any quality for me. I want to live
as long as I can but I want to have a voice in my death and be able to say
“enough”.
I am not depressed. I have accepted my terminal illness and manage it in
hugely good spirits considering that it’s robbing me of a full life. I can deal
with that, and deal with the fact that I am going to die, but I can’t deal with
the thought that I may have to suffer in a way that is unbearable and
mortifying for me.
I have lived my life as a fiercely independent and active person. I have
always been very intellectually engaged with the world and my work. For
me a slow and undignified death that does not reflect the life that I have led
would be a terrible way for my good life to have to end.
I want to be able to die with a sense of who I am and with a dignity and
independence that represents the way I have always lived my life. I
desperately want to be respected in my wish not to have to suffer
unnecessarily at the end. I really want to be able to say goodbye well.

[30]

In a further affidavit, sworn in response to affidavits from some of the

witnesses relied upon by the Attorney-General, Ms Seales reaffirmed:18
(1)

She has not been coerced and no one has applied any pressure on her
to seek confirmation that her decision to end her life with the
assistance of her doctor will be respected.

(2)

She has not been influenced by her doctor’s views. On the contrary, it
was Ms Seales who approached her doctor to ask her for assistance to
end Ms Seales’ life.

(3)

18

She is not depressed or mentally compromised.

Affidavit of L Seales, 18 May 2015 (No 1) at [7]-[10].

 (4)

Her wishes reflect the way she has lived her life as an independent
and intellectually engaged person.

Future treatment
[31]

When Ms Seales commenced her proceeding, her principal oncologist

explained that usually it is possible to provide palliative relief to patients in
Ms Seales’ circumstances to reduce the effect of any pain, nausea and seizures.19
[32]

I have had the benefit of extensive evidence from clinicians who are

experienced in treating patients in Ms Seales’ circumstances. The experts who
provided evidence at the request of Ms Seales included her principal oncologist and
Professor Ashby, who practises as a palliative and pain medicine specialist in
Australia, Dr Munglani, a consultant in pain medicine who practises in England, and
Dr Smales, a palliative care physician in New Zealand. Professor Owens, who is a
psychologist at the University of Auckland specialising in the psychology of end of
life care, also gave evidence in support of Ms Seales’ case.
[33]

The clinical experts who provided evidence at the request of the Attorney-

General included leading palliative care specialists in New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. The Attorney-General obtained detailed statements of evidence
from Baroness Finlay, a consultant physician in Wales and a member of the House of
Lords, Professor O’Brien, a palliative care physician in Ireland, Professor George, a
palliative care specialist in England, Professor R MacLeod, a palliative care
specialist in New Zealand and Drs A Landers, S Donnelly and A S MacLeod, who
are also palliative care specialists in New Zealand. Dr A S MacLeod is also a
clinical psychiatrist.

The Attorney-General also relied on the evidence of

Professor Chochinov, a professor of psychiatry in Canada, who specialises in end of
life issues. Ms Pickthorne, a palliative care nurse, and Ms Schumacher, the Chief
Executive of Hospice New Zealand, also gave evidence at the request of the
Attorney-General.

19

Affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, 2 April 2015 at [12].

 [34]

It is accepted that the development of palliative care medicine as a specialist

branch of medicine and the establishment of hospices has greatly improved the
clinical care of patients who are terminally ill.
[35]

Palliative medicine was recognised as a specialty in the United Kingdom in

1987, in New Zealand in 2001, in Australia in 2005 and in the United States in 2006.
The recognition of this specialist branch of medicine has greatly enhanced the care
that is provided to the terminally ill. Similarly, the establishment of modern hospices
since they were formed in Ireland in 1870, and then by Dame Cicely Saunders in
London in 1905, has led to significant improvements in the care of the terminally ill.
Today, New Zealand has 29 hospices.
[36]

All clinicians accept it is not possible to definitively state how Ms Seales will

suffer during the final stages of her life.

While I have been assisted by the

observations of clinicians relied upon by the Attorney-General, I have found the
evidence of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, Professor Ashby and Dr Smales most
helpful because they have focused as best they can on Ms Seales’ particular
circumstances.
[37]

I have been able to draw a number of conclusions from the evidence placed

before me.
[38]

First, palliative care cannot necessarily provide relief from suffering in all

cases.

The limits of palliative care were explained by Ms Seales’ principal

oncologist, experts who provided evidence in support of Ms Seales’ case and some
of the experts relied upon by the Attorney-General. However, some of the palliative
care specialists who provided evidence at the request of the Attorney-General believe
that Ms Seales’ suffering may be successfully managed through palliative care.
[39]

Ms Seales’ principal oncologist explained:20
… [I]t is usually possible to secure good relief of symptoms such as pain and
nausea and to suppress seizure activity. However, loss of physical and
mental capacity, behavioural changes and psychological impacts can only be
ameliorated to a minimal extent.

20

Affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist, 22 May 2015 at [7].

 [40]

Professor Ashby explained that while “skilled palliative care can nearly

always make a difference for the better”, there are cases in which a patient’s pain and
distress do not respond to pain relief.21 Dr Munglani provided similar evidence to
Professor Ashby and said that “unfortunately, many pains are just not opiate
sensitive”.22
[41]

Professor Ashby described in the following way the possible limitations of

palliative relief for Ms Seales:
(1)

First, the administration of steroids to reduce the effect of intracranial
oedema has a number of very undesirable side effects. One side
effect is a massive weight gain. Ms Seales has already begun to
suffer this side effect. Steroids can also impair a patient’s sleep,
induce mood and behavioural changes and predispose patients to
stomach ulcers and bleeding.

(2)

Second, stopping or reducing steroids is likely to cause Ms Seales to
suffer severe headaches until she dies. Professor Ashby has explained
these headaches “tend to be difficult to control by morphine or other
pain killers”.23

(3)

Third, in any event, a point will be reached when steroids will cease
to be effective. This in turn is likely to increase intracranial pressure
for Ms Seales, which in turn is likely to lead to a condition known as
“coning”. This occurs when the brain “herniates”, or presses down
the spinal canal, and puts pressure on the brain stem, causing the
nervous system functions that control respiration and cardiac function
to shut down. At this point Ms Seales is likely to be administered
“palliative sedation”.

(4)

Fourth, palliative sedation can involve the administration of sedatives,
benzodiazepines, anti-psychotics and/or occasionally barbiturates to

21
22
23

Affidavit of M Ashby, 23 April 2015 at [13].
Affidavit of R Munglani, 22 April 2015 at [17].
Affidavit of M Ashby, 23 April 2015 at [33].

 maintain the comfort and dignity of the patient.

At this point

Ms Seales will not be able to interact with her husband and family.
Dr Smales provided similar evidence. She said:24

[42]

For most dying people in most situations good palliative care is absolutely
what they need. Palliative care teams work exceptionally hard to address the
emotional, physical, intellectual and spiritual issues associated with the
dying process and are in most cases successful. But, there is a small
percentage of people who face pain and suffering that we are unable to
control while keeping the patient conscious.

[43]

Baroness Finlay placed in context questions about the effectiveness of

palliative care.

She stated “there is no intervention in medicine that is 100%

effective all the time”.25 She, however, explained that palliative care can in almost
all cases relieve distress in those with terminal illnesses. Baroness Finlay took issue
with some of the observations of Dr Munglani and Dr Smales concerning their views
on the limits of palliative care.
Professor O’Brien’s evidence was similar to that of Baroness Finlay.

[44]

Professor O’Brien acknowledged, however, that “there are sources of individual
distress that are not responsive to analgesic drugs or interventions”.26 He explained
that modern palliative care facilities manage those rare cases by “focusing on
providing appropriate psychosocial, emotional and spiritual support”.27
[45]

Professor MacLeod, and Drs Allan and Donnelly also emphasised the

importance and effectiveness of palliative care in treating terminally ill patients.
They provided extensive evidence of their experiences of treating dying patients,
almost all of whom experienced peaceful and dignified deaths.

Ms Pickthorne

provided similar evidence from her perspective as an experienced palliative care
nurse.
[46]

Second, experts who gave evidence in support of the case brought by

Ms Seales and some of the experts who supported the position adopted by the
24
25
26
27

Affidavit of E A Smales, 23 April 2015 at [20].
Affidavit of Baroness I G Finlay, 6 May 2015 at [78].
Affidavit of P A O’Brien, 6 May 2015 at [19].
At [19].

 Attorney-General agreed that pain is highly subjective.28 This means that Ms Seales’
perception of her pain is unimpeachable.
[47]

Third, Ms Seales’ circumstances are such that palliative care may not

ameliorate her physical pain. I have reached this conclusion by relying primarily on
the evidence of the experts who have given evidence on behalf of Ms Seales because
they tailored their evidence to her particular circumstances.29
[48]

Fourth, many of the experts, including those relied upon by the Attorney-

General accept that palliative care may not be able to address Ms Seales’
psychological and emotional suffering.30
Ms Seales’ perspective
[49]

Believing her prognosis is particularly unbearable, Ms Seales has identified

in her amended statement of claim the following options she faces:31
(1)

dying by way of “administered aid in dying”, 32 or “facilitated aid in
dying”,33 at the point that she reaches a state of suffering that is
enduring and intolerable to her as a result of her grievous and
terminal illness;

(2)

intolerable suffering and loss of dignity; or

(3)

taking her own life while she is still physically able to do so in order
to avoid that suffering, which could likely occur sooner than would be

28

29

30

31
32
33

Second Affidavit of M Ashby, 18 May 2015 at [20] and [29]; Second Affidavit of R G Owens,
18 May 2015 at [33]; Affidavit of Baroness I G Finlay, 6 May 2015 at [63]; Affidavit of R
MacLeod, 21 May 2015 at [34].
Affidavit of R Munglani, 22 April 2015 at [22]; Affidavit of E A Smales, 23 April 2015 at [31];
Second Affidavit of M Ashby, 18 May 2015 at [30]; Affidavit of Ms Seales’ principal oncologist,
2 April 2015 at [13]; Affidavit of Ms Seales’ doctor, 30 April 2015 at [3]; Affidavit of R G
Owens, 24 April 2015 at [8]-[9].
Affidavit of Ms Seales principal oncologist, 2 April 2015 at [15]; Affidavit of Ms Seales’
principal oncologist, 22 May 2015 at [7]; Affidavit of R G Owens, 24 April 2015 at [9]-[10];
Affidavit of E A Smales, 23 April 2015 at [24]; Second Affidavit of M Ashby, 18 May 2015 at
[4(e)]; Affidavit of R MacLeod, 21 May 2015 at [34]-[35]; Affidavit of P A O’Brien, 6 May
2015 at [20], [22] and [26].
Amended Statement of Claim of L Seales, above n 4, at [11].
Above at paragraph [5].
Above at paragraph [6].

 the case if administered aid in dying or facilitated aid in dying were
available to her.
[50]

Ms Seales “wishes to have the choice to die by way of facilitated aid in dying

or administered aid in dying at the point that she reaches a state of suffering that is
intolerable to her as a result of her grievous and terminal illness”.34
[51]

Evidence to support the proposition that people in Ms Seales’ circumstances

may shorten their lives can be found in the evidence of Dr Weaver, an historian from
Canada who, together with Dr Munro, conducted extensive research into suicides in
New Zealand between 1900 and 2000. That research suggests that between three
and eight per cent of suicides in New Zealand during the last century were by
persons who were rational, competent and suffering a terminal illness. A number of
the cases studied by Drs Weaver and Munro revealed suicides where the deceased
persons took their lives when they retained the ability to do so, rather than waiting
for their illnesses to cause further debilitation.35
[52]

A number of clinical experts also provided evidence that persons in

Ms Seales’ position may attempt to take their lives before they reach a point where
they would not be able to do so. Those experts were Dr Grube, Professor Owens,
Dr Smales, Professor Ashby, Dr Reagan and Dr Kress. 36 Drs Grube and Reagan
practised medicine in Oregon where it has been possible for doctors to assist patients
in Ms Seales’ circumstances to die since that state’s Death with Dignity Act 1997
came into effect in 1999. Dr Kress practises medicine in Montana, where it has been
possible for doctors to facilitate patients’ deaths since the Supreme Court of Montana
decided Baxter v Montana.37

34
35
36

37

Amended Statement of Claim of L Seales, above n 4, at [12].
Affidavit of J C Weaver, 4 May 2015 at [15], [18], [20]-[22].
Affidavit of D R Grube, 24 April 2015 at [22]; Affidavit of R G Owens, 24 April 2015 at [15];
Affidavit of E A Smales, 23 April 2015 at [34], [36] and [40]; Affidavit of M Ashby, 23 April
2015 at [25]; Affidavit of P L Reagan, 1 May 2015 at [16]; Affidavit of E J Kress, 19 May 2015
at [15].
Baxter v Montana, above n 14.

 [53]

Ms Seales’ evidence that she may have no choice but to take her own life

prematurely also resonates with evidence from the United Kingdom referred to in R
(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, where Lord Neuberger said:38
The evidence shows that, in the light of the current state of the law, some
people with a progressive degenerative disease feel themselves forced to end
their lives before they would wish to do so, rather than waiting until they are
incapable of committing suicide when they need assistance (which would be
their preferred option).

[54]

Ms Seales’ desire to control the final stages of her death is a common trait

amongst those in society who consider themselves to be successful and driven. This
trait was explained by Professor Owens, who said that people with Ms Seales’
personality traits “frequently find the effects of an illness [of the kind suffered by Ms
Seales] particularly intolerable because of the loss of autonomy and inability to
manage their lives is directly contrary to the things they value”.39
Ms Seales’ doctor
[55]

Ms Seales’ doctor respects and understands Ms Seales’ wishes. However,

Ms Seales’ doctor is not willing to assist Ms Seales in the way she wishes unless I
grant the declarations I have set out in paragraph [8] of this judgment.
[56]

Many health professionals regard the approach of Ms Seales’ doctor as being

the antithesis of the values which underpin the practice of medicine. Those doctors
would not contemplate taking any steps to shorten a patient’s life. This view of the
role of health professionals in preserving life can be traced to the origins of the
medical profession.

Part of the original Hippocratic Oath required doctors to

undertake not to succumb to any “entreaties … to administer poison to anyone [or]
counsel any man to do so”.40
[57]

Dr Landers, a palliative care physician in New Zealand, explained that the

Australian and New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine (the ANZSPM) is
completely opposed to doctor administered and facilitated aid in dying under any
38
39
40

R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, above n 13, at [96].
Affidavit of R G Owens, 24 April 2015 at [9].
Ludwig Edelstein The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation (Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1943) at 56.

 circumstances. Dr Landers pointed out that the position taken by ANZSPM is
entirely consistent with the New Zealand Medical Association’s (the NZMA)
opposition41 to euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide and position statements from
the World Medical Association (the WMA).42

Professor MacLeod’s evidence

supported the stance taken by Dr Landers.
[58]

Dr Donnelly is very concerned about the ethical implications for doctors if I

were to grant the criminal law declarations sought by Ms Seales. Dr Donnelly
referred to the opposition to doctor-assisted suicide and euthanasia in the statements
from the WMA, NZMA and ANZSPM. Dr Donnelly said those statements reflected
“a core ethical principle of medicine: doctors do not kill their patients”.43
[59]

The approach of Ms Seales’ doctor resonates, however, with the experiences

of Drs Grube and Reagan, who provided evidence about their experiences in Oregon
of being willing to assist terminally ill and competent patients to end their lives. In
their experiences, patients in Ms Seales’ circumstances feel empowered and
reassured knowing that they can choose the time and surrounding circumstances in
41

42

43

Affidavit of A L Landers, 4 May 2015 at [17]: The New Zealand Medical Association position
statement, approved in 2005, states:
The NZMA is opposed to both the concept and practice of euthanasia and doctor assisted
suicide. Euthanasia, that is the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient, even at the
patient’s request or at the request of close relatives, is unethical. Doctor-assisted suicide, like
euthanasia, is unethical. The NZMA however encourages the concept of death with dignity and
comfort, and strongly supports the right of patients to decline treatment, or to request pain relief,
and supports the right of access to appropriate palliative care. In supporting patients’ right to
request pain relief, the NZMA accepts that the proper provisions of such relief, even when it
may hasten the death of the patient, is not unethical. This NZMA position is not dependent on
euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide remaining unlawful. Even if they were to become legal,
or decriminalised, the NZMA would continue to regard them as unethical.
Affidavit of A L Landers, 4 May 2015 at [21]-[22]: The World Medical Association’s
Declaration on Euthanasia was adopted by the 53rd WMA General Assembly, Washington DC,
USA, in October 2002 and reaffirmed with minor revision by the 194 th WMA Council Session,
Bali, Indonesia, April 2013. It states:
Euthanasia, that is the act of deliberately ending the life of a patient, even at the patient’s own
request or at the request of close relatives, is unethical. This does not prevent the physician from
respecting the desire of a patient to allow the natural process of death to follow its course in the
terminal phase of sickness.
The WMA Statement on Physician-Assisted Suicide, adopted by the 44th World Medical
Assembly, Marbella, Spain, September 1992 and editorially revised by the 170 th WMA Council
Session, Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2005 likewise states:
Physician-assisted suicide, like euthanasia, is unethical and must be condemned by the medical
profession. Where the assistance of the physician is intentionally and deliberately directed at
enabling an individual to end his or her own life, the physician acts unethically. However, the
right to decline medical treatment is a basic right of the patient and the physician does not act
unethically, even if respecting such a wish results in the death of the patient.
Affidavit of S M Donnelly, 12 May 2015 at [55].

 which they die. Drs Grube and Reagan explained that their patients were often
reassured by the knowledge that they had the option of having their doctors assist
them to die, even if that option was not ultimately pursued. Both doctors also gave
examples of terminally ill patients who died in a peaceful and controlled manner
through taking a prescribed lethal medication while surrounded by their families and
loved ones.44
[60]

The experiences of Drs Grube and Reagan were summarised in the following

way by Dr Reagan:45
In my experience, [facilitated] aid in dying is beneficial to patients and to
families. The [lethal drug] prescription itself is therapeutic because it helps
foster better communication with loved ones and reduces significant sources
of distress for those patients who desire aid in dying. For many patients, I
believe that the ability to make autonomous decisions about their last days
was of great importance to them. It was not something that came from me or
is about me; and the final decision whether to use the drug or not was never
one that I was able to predict. My patients had control over the final
decision and they really valued that control.

[61]

Dr Morris practises as an oncologist in New Mexico, where it has been held

that doctors may lawfully provide a prescription for a lethal drug to a mentally
competent, terminally ill patient.46 Dr Morris’ evidence was similar to that of Drs
Grube and Reagan, as was the evidence of Dr Kress, who gave evidence of his
experiences in Montana where the law is similar to that in New Mexico.47
Four principles
[62]

Ms Seales’ case engages four principles which require brief explanation.

Those principles are:

44
45
46
47

(1)

the sanctity of life;

(2)

respect for human dignity;

(3)

respect for individual autonomy; and

Affidavit of D R Grube, 24 April 2015 at [21]; Affidavit of P L Reagan, 1 May 2015 at [25].
Affidavit of P L Reagan, 1 May 2015, at [26].
Morris v Brandenberg, above n 14.
Baxter v Montana, above n 14.

 (4)

protection of the vulnerable.

Sanctity of life
[63]

The sanctity of human life principle underpins the criminal law relating to

culpable homicide. It was said by Blackstone to be the first rule of English law.48
[64]

The sanctity of life is not, however, an absolute principle.

There are

occasions where the principle of sanctity of life must yield to other principles, such
as accepted standards of medical practice which recognise individual autonomy and
human dignity. Thus, in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Lords Keith, Goff and Mustill
all recognised limits to the principle of the sanctity of life. Lord Keith, for example,
said:49
… The principle [of the sanctity of life] is not an absolute one. It does not
compel a medical practitioner on pain of criminal sanctions to treat a patient,
who will die if he does not, contrary to the express wishes of the patient … It
does not compel the temporary keeping alive of patients who are terminally
ill where to do so would merely prolong their suffering. …

[65]

The New Zealand approach to limits on the sanctity of life principle mirrors

that of the United Kingdom. In Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General,
the High Court of New Zealand held that doctors have no duty to maintain a patient
on ventilatory support when doing so was not consistent with good medical
practice.50 A similar approach was taken in Shortland v Northland Health Ltd.51 In
that case an application was made to the High Court to direct the Northland Health
Board to continue dialysis treatment for a patient who would die without a kidney
transplant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Northland Health Board
could not be compelled to continue to provide the patient with dialysis treatment
because the decision of the Health Board was consistent with prevailing medical
practices. In those cases the sanctity of life principle yielded to accepted standards
of medical practice.

48

49

50
51

Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1765) vol 1 at
130.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 12, at 859. See also Lords Goff at 865-866 and Mustill at
891.
Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, above n 12.
Shortland v Northland Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 (CA).

 Respect for human dignity
[66]

Ms Seales’ application invokes respect for human dignity, which is the

foundation of human rights theory and practice.52 In Stransham-Ford v Minister of
Justice, a case similar to that of Ms Seales which was decided by the High Court of
South Africa on 4 May 2015, Fabricius J explained:53
The right to life … incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to dignity
and to life are intertwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a
right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life
is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity.

[67]

The importance of human dignity in the international human rights system is

evidenced by its inclusion in major international human rights instruments. The first
recital to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that “recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”. The
fifth recital notes that through the United Nations Charter, member states “reaffirmed
their faith … in the dignity and worth of the human person”. Article 1 states that “all
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.
[68]

New Zealand human rights cases have emphasised the importance of human

dignity.54 For example, in Attorney-General v Udompun,55 the Court of Appeal was
required to consider s 23(5) of the NZBORA.56
[69]

In Udompun Hammond J explained:57
The starting point is that we are here talking about fundamental human
dignity. This rests on the Kantian philosophy that requires us to treat every

52

53

54

55
56

57

See Christopher McCrudden “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights”
(2008) 19 EJIL 655 at 656.
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice, above n 14, at [12]; citing O’Reagan J in S v Makwayane
[1995] ZACC 3, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 at [338] per McGrath J; Helu
v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2015] NZSC 28 at [67], [73]-[74] and [105] per Elias
CJ; Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [177]-[182] per Thomas J; and
Attorney-General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204 (CA) at [196]-[203] per Hammond J.
Attorney-General v Udompun, above n 54.
23 Rights of persons arrested or detained
…
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the person.
Attorney-General v Udompun, above n 54, at [200]-[201].

 human being as an end, not as a means. R M Dworkin, in Taking Rights
Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1977 put the point this way:
“Anyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who praises our
Government for respecting them, must have some sense of what that
point is. He [or she] must accept, at the minimum . . . the vague but
powerful idea of human dignity. This idea, associated with Kant, but
defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that there
are ways of treating a [person] that are inconsistent with recognising
[that person] as a full member of the human community, and holds
that such treatment is profoundly unjust”
[P 198].
Intrinsic dignity is not just a metaphysical concept. What such a concept
does is to recognise human dignity as a universal value; as an inalienable
value; and as a matter which is significantly tied up with human autonomy.
And it must live and breathe in the real world. In that sense it is also a social
construct. (See generally Fletcher G P, “Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Value” (1984) 22 UW Ont L Rev 171; Raz J, Value, Respect and Attachment,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, at pp 124 – 176; Schachter
O, “Human Dignity as a Normative Concept” (1983) 77 Am J In’l L 848).

[70]

The significance of the value of human dignity is also evident in leading

cases in comparable jurisdictions. Thus, in Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), the
Supreme Court of Canada held that underlying the rights to liberty and security of
the person is “a concern for the protection of individual autonomy and dignity”. 58
The Supreme Court said an individual’s respective sense of his or her bodily
integrity and dignity in response to a grievous and irremediable medical condition
was a matter “critical to their dignity and autonomy”. 59 Similar observations have
been made by the European Court of Human Rights.60
Respect for individual autonomy
[71]

Ms Seales’ application also relies on the principle of respect for individual

autonomy.

This concept is multi-faceted and subject to much debate.

In this

judgment, I refer to the concept of individual autonomy as encompassing:61
… self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and
limitations that prevent [the individual from making] meaningful choice[s]
[about his or her body].

58
59
60
61

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [64].
At [66].
Pretty v United Kingdom, above n 14, at [65].
Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th ed, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2013) at 101.

 [72]

In New Zealand, respect for individual autonomy in some medical settings is

reflected in s 11 of the NZBORA which states:
11

Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment

Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment.

[73]

The applicability of the principle of respect for individual autonomy in this

case is vigorously challenged by ethicists who are opposed to Ms Seales’ application.
For example, Dr Kleinsman explains in his evidence that assisted-suicide and
euthanasia can never be viewed as expressions of individual autonomy.62
[74]

From a legal perspective, respect for individual autonomy underpins the

human rights principles of freedom, liberty and security of the person. Personal
autonomy and self-determination have also featured in recent judgments in overseas
jurisdictions concerning doctor-assisted dying.
[75]

In Carter, the Supreme Court described the right to liberty and security of the

person under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian
Charter) in the following way: 63
… Liberty protects “the right to make fundamental personal choices free
from state interference” … Security of the person encompasses “a notion of
personal autonomy … involving control over one’s bodily integrity free from
state interference” … and it is engaged by state interference with an
individual’s physical or psychological integrity, including any state action
that causes physical or serious psychological suffering.

[76]

In Haas v Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights interpreted art 8

of the European Convention, which provides for the right to self-determination and a
private life, as providing a basis for an inalienable right of personal autonomy in end
of life decisions.64

62
63
64

Affidavit of J Kleinsman, 12 May 2015 at [43]-[60].
Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [64].
Haas v Switzerland [2011] ECHR 2422 (Section I, ECHR) at [51].

 Protecting the vulnerable
[77]

Dr Kleinsman has explained vulnerability is a poorly understood concept and

it may comprise a number of elements. He referred to research which suggests that
vulnerability may include:
(1)

communication vulnerability, represented by persons who are
impaired in their ability to communicate because of distressing
symptoms;

(2)

institutional vulnerability, which refers to persons who exist under the
authority of others;

(3)

differential vulnerability, which includes persons who are subject to
the informal authority or independent interests of others;

(4)

medical vulnerability, which refers to those with distressing medical
conditions; and

(5)

social vulnerability, which includes persons who are considered to
belong to an undervalued social group.

[78]

Dr Kleinsman’s approach to vulnerability clashes with the evidence of

Professor Ganzini, a psychiatrist in Oregon, who has undertaken research into
whether Oregon’s laws relating to physician-assisted dying can put the vulnerable in
society at risk. Professor Ganzini’s research suggests that terminal illness is not in
itself a factor that makes a patient vulnerable.
[79]

A number of the clinicians who provided evidence at the request of the

Attorney-General pointed out, however, that it can be very difficult to accurately
assess if a patient is truly vulnerable. For example, Baroness Finlay said:65
An individual’s vulnerability to influence and to being made to feel
despairing is highly personal and context-specific. Vulnerability can relate
to learning difficulties, age, isolation, lack of mobility and any other factors.
65

Affidavit of Baroness I G Finlay, 6 May 2015 at [27].

 Drs Donnelly and A MacLeod gave similar evidence, as did Professors George, R
MacLeod and Chochinov.66
[80]

In New Zealand, as in other enlightened democracies, all branches of

government must be vigilant to protect the vulnerable in society. It is, however,
important to ensure that medical judgements are not based upon assumptions as to
vulnerability. To do otherwise would devalue respect for the principle of individual
autonomy.
[81]

In the present case, Ms Seales has consistently maintained that she is not

vulnerable in any of the senses referred to by Dr Kleinsman.

She says that,

notwithstanding her medical condition, her wishes have been carefully considered
and reasoned. Ms Seales’ self-assessment that she is not vulnerable is endorsed by
her doctor, who has consistently said Ms Seales is pursuing her requests in a
positive, rational manner without showing any signs of depression or lack of full
appreciation of her circumstances. Ms Seales’ statement of her belief that she is not
vulnerable must be respected. Ms Seales’ application for the declarations she seeks
is a rational and intellectually rigorous response to her circumstances.
PART II
CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS
Background
[82]

In Part II of this judgment I analyse the offence provisions of the Crimes Act.

For convenience I will set out the offence provisions again:
160

Culpable homicide

...
(2)

Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person–
(a)

66

By an unlawful act…

Affidavit of S M Donnelly, 12 May 2015 at [48] and [75]-[88]; Affidavit of A MacLeod, 11 May
2015 at [23]-[27]; Affidavit of R George, 14 May 2015 at [98]-[103]; Affidavit of R MacLeod,
21 May 2015 at [20]-[25] and [49]-[56]; Affidavit of H Chochinov, 19 May 2015 at [26] and
[32]-[43].

 …
(3)

… culpable homicide is either murder or manslaughter.

179

Aiding and abetting suicide

Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years who–
…
(b)

[83]

Aids or abets any person in the commission of suicide.

This part of my judgment includes an analysis of ss 63 and 164 of the Crimes

Act, which assist in understanding the culpable homicide provisions of the Crimes
Act.
[84]

Section 63 of the Crimes Act provides:
63

Consent to death

No one has a right to consent to the infliction of death upon himself; and, if
any person is killed, the fact that he gave any such consent shall not affect
the criminal responsibility of any person who is a party to the killing.

[85]

Section 164 of the Crimes Act provides:
164

Acceleration of death

Every one who by any act or omission causes the death of another person
kills that person, although the effect of the bodily injury caused to that
person was merely to hasten his death while labouring under some disorder
or disease arising from some other cause.

[86]

The parties agree that the duty to preserve life provisions of the Crimes Act

are not relevant to Ms Seales’ application.67
[87]

The legislative origins of the provisions of the Crimes Act, which are the

focus of this part of my judgment, can be traced to the Criminal Code Act 1893.
That statute was the product of a series of steps taken in England dating back to 1833
to codify that jurisdiction’s criminal law. The steps taken in England culminated in
the appointment of the Criminal Code Commission in 1878 to consider a draft
criminal code.

67

The draft code which was developed is usually referred to as

Refer Crimes Act 1961, ss 151 and 155.

 “Stephen’s Code”.68

Stephen’s Code was never adopted in England.

As a

consequence, the criminal law of England and Wales is an amalgam of common law
and specific legislative provisions. Stephen’s Code was, however, adopted in New
Zealand in 1893 and in other jurisdictions including Canada.
[88]

In undertaking the legislative analysis required in this part of my judgment, I

have focused upon the text and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Crimes
Act.69

In doing so, I have found it helpful to refer to Sir James Stephen’s

descriptions of the common law at the time Stephen’s Code was drafted.
Appreciating the common law from which the relevant sections are derived assists in
understanding the meaning of those sections. I have also strived to interpret the
Crimes Act in the context of contemporary circumstances,70 recognising that the
meaning of legislation is not fixed in perpetuity and that the requirements of s 6 of
the NZBORA mean legislation may have to be given an interpretation that was not
envisaged at the time of its enactment.71
Consent to death
[89]

Mr Curran, who appeared with Dr Butler as counsel for Ms Seales, submitted

s 63 of the Crimes Act should be construed so as not to preclude consent as a defence
to either murder or manslaughter where the deceased has lawfully asserted his or her
NZBORA rights. Mr Curran also suggested s 63 is directed at prohibiting people
from consenting to death by violent acts that are contrary to public policy.
[90]

At common law no person could consent to being killed. Sir James Stephen

explained this aspect of the common law in the following way:72
Where death is caused the consent of the party killed to his own death is
regarded as wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who causes it.

[91]

Sir James Stephen illustrated the purpose of s 63 of the Crimes Act by

saying:73
68
69
70
71
72

The Chairman of the Criminal Code Commission was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen.
Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1).
Section 6.
R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [14].
Sir James Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England (McMillan and Co, London, 1883)
vol 3 at 16.

 A and B agree to fight a duel together with deadly weapons. If either is
killed or wounded his consent is immaterial.

[92]

The broad scope of the common law prohibition against a person consenting

to his or her own death appears to have been adopted unquestioningly in
New Zealand in Rex v McLeod.74 In that case, the Court of Appeal relied on the
extract from Sir James Stephen which I have cited in paragraph [90].
[93]

Modern authority suggests, however, that s 63 of the Crimes Act is only

engaged in cases where death is intentionally inflicted. This was acknowledged by
the Court of Appeal in R v Lee where it was said:75
… no person can consent to the (intentional) infliction of death upon him or
herself including (probably) murder …

and that s 63 of the Crimes Act:76
… does not apply to homicide by misadventure in cases where the common
law regards consent as rendering lawful an act which otherwise would not be
lawful. …

Where grievous bodily harm is intended, however, there may be sound policy
reasons for excluding consent as a defence.77
[94]

The Court of Appeal’s approach to s 63 of the Crimes Act in Lee is consistent

with the modern common law. In England and Wales the validity of consent to
being injured or even killed is determined by the level of harm done and the
circumstances in which it is inflicted. Thus, today in England and Wales, consent
can provide a lawful excuse for the infliction of harm caused by an assault. A victim
cannot, however, give valid consent to more serious levels of harm such as
wounding or the infliction of death unless the injury or death occurs in a context in
which the courts or Parliament have said the victim’s consent provides a lawful
excuse for the harm done. In England and Wales, as in New Zealand, it is no

73

74
75
76
77

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen A Digest of the Criminal Law (4th ed, MacMillan and Company,
London, 1887) at art 207.
Rex v McLeod (1915) 34 NZLR 430 (CA) at 433.
R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA) at [312].
At [165].
At [300].

 defence to a charge of murder for the defendant to say the victim consented to being
killed.
[95]

On the other hand, the victim’s consent to undergoing a properly performed

but risky surgical procedure may, for example, provide the surgeon with a lawful
excuse and complete defence to any criminal charge even though serious injury or
death may occur. This is the effect of the common law,78 and s 61 of the Crimes Act
which provides:
61

Surgical operations

Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for performing with
reasonable care and skill any surgical operation upon any person for his
benefit, if the performance of the operation was reasonable, having regard to
the patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.

[96]

Applying a textual and purposive approach to the meaning of s 63 of the

Crimes Act has led me to the conclusion that where A kills B by an unlawful act with
the intention of bringing about B’s death, the consent of B to the infliction of death
cannot affect A’s criminal responsibility.
[97]

The approach I have taken to the meaning of s 63 mirrors the law of the

United Kingdom, which was explained by Lord Mustill in the following way:79
It has been established for centuries that consent to the deliberate infliction
of death is no defence to a charge of murder. Cases where the victim has
urged the defendant to kill him and the defendant has complied are likely to
be rare, but the proposition is established beyond doubt …

[98]

Lord Mustill went on to observe that the reason why a person cannot consent

to that type of infliction of death, sometimes referred to as “mercy killing”, is
because “as in the other cases of consent to being killed, the interest of the state in
preserving life overrides the otherwise all-powerful interest of patient autonomy”.80
[99]

I therefore conclude that Ms Seales’ consent would not provide a lawful

excuse to Ms Seales’ doctor if she “administered aid in dying” to Ms Seales.
78

79
80

David Ormerod Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th ed, Oxford University Press, New York,
2011) at 635.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 12, at 892.
At 893.

 Acceleration of death
[100] Section 164 of the Crimes Act reflects the common law position that a person
may be criminally responsible for a death if he or she causes it to occur sooner than
it would otherwise have happened.81

The acts or omissions in question must,

however, constitute more than a minimal contribution to death.82
[101] Importantly in the context of palliative care, acts or omissions that have the
indirect but foreseeable effect of accelerating death are not necessarily criminally
culpable. Ethicists refer to this as the “double effect” principle, the origins of which
are often traced to the writings of St Thomas Aquinas.83
[102] According to the double effect principle there is a morally relevant distinction
between the intentional effects of a person’s acts or omissions and the unintended,
though foreseeable, effects of those actions.
[103] The double effect principle is underpinned by four conditions, each of which
have been questioned by ethicists.84 An example of the double effect principle is
helpfully explained in the following way:85
… consider a patient experiencing terrible pain and suffering who asks a
physician for help in ending his life. If the physician injects the patient with
a chemical to end the patient’s pain and suffering, he or she intentionally
causes the patient’s death as a means to end pain and suffering. The
physician’s action is wrong because it involves the intention to cause the
patient’s death. In contrast, suppose the physician could provide medication
to relieve the patient’s pain and suffering at a substantial risk that the patient
would die as a result of the medication. If the physician refuses to
81
82
83

84

85

R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454 at 457.
Henry Palmer “Dr Adams’ Trial for Murder” [1957] Crim LR 365; R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38.
Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics, above n 61, at 164,
footnote 33.
See Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics, above n 61, at
165: The four underpinning conditions upon which the double effect principle depends are:
(1) The nature of the act. The act must be at least morally neutral, independent of its
consequences.
(2) The agent’s intention. The person carrying out the act must only have intended the good not
the bad effect.
(3) The distinction between the means and effect. The bad effect must not be a means to the
good effect.
(4) Proportionality between the good effect and the bad effect. The good effect must outweigh
the bad effect.
Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress Principles of Biomedical Ethics, above n 61, at 164165.

 administer the medication, the patient will endure continuing pain and
suffering; if the physician provides the medication, it may hasten the
patient’s death. If the physician intended, through the provision of
medication, to relieve grave pain and suffering and did not intend to cause
death, then the act of indirectly hastening death is not wrong, according to
the [double effect principle].

[104] The double effect principle was applied by Lord Devlin in R v Adams when
he addressed the culpability of a doctor charged with murder in circumstances where
the doctor administered increasing doses of morphine to a terminally ill patient, who
died as a consequence.86 Lord Devlin addressed the jury in the following way:87
… If the first purpose of medicine – the restoration of health – could no
longer be achieved, there was still much for the doctor to do, and he was
entitled to do all that was proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering
even if the measures he took might incidentally shorten life by hours or
perhaps even longer.

[105] Similar observations were made by Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland
when he said:88
... the established rule that a doctor may, when caring for a patient who is,
for example, dying of cancer, lawfully administer painkilling drugs despite
the fact that he knows that an incidental effect of that application will be to
abbreviate the patient’s life ...

[106] Thus, if Ms Seales’ doctor were to administer a lethal dose of pain relief such
as morphine to Ms Seales, the doctor’s actions may not be an unlawful act within the
meaning of s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act if the doctor’s intention was to provide Ms
Seales with palliative relief, and provided that what was done was reasonable and
proper for that purpose, even though Ms Seales’ life would be shortened as an
indirect but foreseeable consequence.
Murder/manslaughter
[107] Section 160(2)(a) and (3) of the Crimes Act provide that the killing of another
person by an unlawful act is culpable homicide, and that culpable homicide is either

86
87
88

Henry Palmer “Dr Adams’ Trial for Murder”, above n 82.
At 375.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 12, at 867. See also R (Burke) v General Medical Council
[2006] QB 273 and Dupre “Human Dignity and the Withdrawal of Medical Treatment” (2006) 6
EHRLR 678.

 murder or manslaughter. “‘Homicide’ is the killing of a human being by another,
directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever”.89
[108] The purpose of the law of culpable homicide is to protect human life.90
[109] At common law, the concept of an “unlawful act” in the context of homicide
was explained in very broad terms. Sir James Stephen explained that “homicide
caused accidentally by an unlawful act is unlawful”. He believed the concept of an
“unlawful act” included “all crimes, all torts, and all acts contrary to public policy or
morality, or injurious to the public; and particularly all acts commonly known to be
dangerous to life”.91
[110] Sir James Stephen’s broad analysis of what constituted an “unlawful act” no
longer reflects the law of England and Wales. In R v Lamb it was held that to be an
unlawful act for the purposes of manslaughter the act must be “unlawful in the
criminal sense of that word”.92 The law in England and Wales as to what constitutes
an unlawful act for the purposes of determining if a homicide is culpable was further
refined in R v Dias and R v Kennedy (No 2), where it was held that an “unlawful act”
must be an offence.93 A similar approach had been taken in New Zealand in R v
Myatt, where the Court of Appeal said that an “unlawful act” for the purposes of
s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act must be a breach of “some Act, regulation or bylaw”.94
[111] In New Zealand the term “unlawful act” is now defined in the Crimes Act to
mean “a breach of any Act, regulation, rule or bylaw”.95 The definition of “unlawful
act” was introduced with effect from 2012 and followed the recommendations of the
Law Commission in its Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes against the
Person, which suggested that its proposed statutory definition codified the law as
stated in R v Myatt.96 It is clear, however, the definition of an “unlawful act” in the
89
90
91
92

93
94
95
96

Crimes Act 1961, s 158.
R v Stead (1991) 7 CRNZ 291 (CA) at 295; R v Martin CA199/04, 14 February 2005 at [168].
Sir James Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England, above n 72, at 16.
R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 (CA) at 988. See also R v Dias [2002] 2 Cr App R 5 (CA); R v
Kennedy (No 2) [2008] 1 AC 269.
R v Dias, above n 92; R v Kennedy (No 2), above n 92.
R v Myatt [1991] 1 NZLR 674 (CA).
Crimes Act 1961, s 2 (1).
Law Commission Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes against the Person (NZLC
R111, 2009) at [25] and [4.14].

 Crimes Act expands upon the approach taken in R v Myatt by recognising that a
breach of a rule may constitute an unlawful act. This approach is also broader than
the position in England and Wales as articulated in R v Kennedy (No 2).
[112] The breadth of the definition of an “unlawful act” in the Crimes Act means
that it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish the commission of a specific
offence in order to establish an unlawful act for the purposes of s 160(2)(a) of the
Crimes Act. Evidence of a breach of a “rule” will suffice. I will not attempt to
suggest what “rule” would be breached, if any, if Ms Seales’ doctor was to
administer “aid in dying” to Ms Seales. It is sufficient to note that if Ms Seales’
doctor were to administer a fatal drug to Ms Seales with the intention of terminating
her life, two offences may be committed.97
[113] First, the doctor would probably commit an assault, which is an offence under
s 196 of the Crimes Act.98 By administering a lethal drug, Ms Seales’ doctor would
intentionally apply force to Ms Seales, either directly or indirectly, by the lethal drug
being inserted into Ms Seales, or through the pharmacological effects of the lethal
drug upon Ms Seales’ body.
[114] Second, the doctor would, in all likelihood, also breach s 200 of the Crimes
Act, which makes it an offence to administer a poison or other noxious substance to
another person intending to cause him or her grievous bodily harm.99
[115] The approach which I have taken to the meaning of s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes
Act in this case is consistent with doctors not being criminally culpable when they
withdraw life preserving measures which artificially sustain life in circumstances
which are medically futile. Doctors who withdraw ventilatory support for a patient,
knowing that doing so will invariably result in the patient’s death, may have a lawful
excuse for doing so where to continue ventilatory support would be medically futile.
97

98

99

PDG Skegg and Ron Paterson (eds) Medical Law in New Zealand (Thomson Brookers,
Wellington, 2006) at 511-512.
Crimes Act 1961, s 2: Assault means the act of intentionally applying or attempting to apply
force to the person of another, directly or indirectly, or threatening by any act or gesture to apply
such force to the person of another, if the person making the threat has, or causes the other to
believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose.
See R v Burkholder (1977) 2 AR 119, (1977) 34 CCC (2d) 214 (ABCA); R v Clark (2008)
ABCA 271 (ABCA).

 In those cases, the doctors concerned are unlikely to commit an unlawful act for the
purposes of s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act.100
Assisting suicide
[116] At common law anyone who assisted another to commit suicide was guilty of
murder.101

This reflected the religious and social condemnation of those who

committed suicide or those who assisted others to commit suicide.102 The stigma of
suicide in England was such that a normal church burial for those who committed
suicide was not able to be achieved until 1882.103
[117] Although there is no legislative definition of suicide in New Zealand, Sir
James Stephen said the “true definition” of suicide was “where a man kills himself
intentionally”.104
[118] In New Zealand suicide ceased to be a crime when the Criminal Code Act
1893 was enacted. Attempting suicide ceased to be a crime in 1961 when a number
of changes were made in the Crimes Act concerning suicide. Section 179 of the
Crimes Act was the only provision relating to suicide that was not changed in 1961.
[119] In addition to decriminalising attempting suicide, the Crimes Act 1961
enacted s 180, which introduced into New Zealand law the criminal offence of
killing another person pursuant to a suicide pact.105 Section 180 of the Crimes Act
was modelled on s 4 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK).
100

101

102

103
104
105

Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General, above n 12; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,
above n 12.
R v Dyson (1823) Russ & Ry 523; R v Alison (1838) 8 C & P 418; R v Jessop (1887) 16 Cox CC
204.
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, above n 48, vol 4 at 189: “… the law of
England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power to destroy life, but by
commission from God, the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty of a double offence; one
spiritual, and invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence
uncalled for; the other temporal, against the King, who hath an interest in the preservation of all
his subjects; the law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a particular
species of felony, a felony committed on oneself”.
See Sir James Stephens A History of the Criminal Law of England, above n 72, at 104-105.
At 104.
180 Suicide pact
(1) Every one who in pursuance of a suicide pact kills any other person is guilty of
manslaughter and not of murder, and is liable accordingly.
(2) Where 2 or more persons enter into a suicide pact, and in pursuance of it one or more of
them kills himself, any survivor is guilty of being a party to a death under a suicide pact

 [120] In 1961 Parliament also made changes to what is now s 41 of the Crimes Act.
That section provides:
41

Prevention of suicide or certain offences

Every one is justified in using such force as may be reasonably necessary in
order to prevent the commission of suicide, or the commission of an offence
which would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or
property of any one, or in order to prevent any act being done which he
believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if committed, amount to suicide or
to any such offence.

[121] The provision which s 41 was broadly based upon was s 72 of the Crimes Act
1908.106 Section 72 of the Crimes Act 1908 re-enacted s 55 of the Criminal Code
Act 1893.
[122] When Parliament enacted s 41 of the Crimes Act, it provided a justification
for using reasonable force to prevent the commission of any suicide. A similar
provision has since been enacted in the State of Victoria.107
[123] The Canadian Criminal Code, which is modelled on Stephen’s Code, does not
contain a provision equivalent to s 41 of the Crimes Act.108 Nor does the United
Kingdom appear to have a statutory provision that is similar to s 41, although in that
jurisdiction there may be a common law defence to use reasonable force to prevent a
suicide.

106

107
108

contrary to this subsection and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
but he shall not be convicted of an offence against section 179 of this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this section the term suicide pact means a common agreement between
2 or more persons having for its object the death of all of them, whether or not each is to
take his own life; but nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be
treated as done by him in pursuance of the pact unless it is done while he has the settled
intention of dying in pursuance of the pact.
(4) It shall be for the person charged to prove that by virtue of subsection (1) of this section he
is not liable to be convicted of murder, or that by virtue of subsection (2) of this section he
is not liable to be convicted of an offence against section 179 of this Act.
(5) The fact that by virtue of this section any person who in pursuance of a suicide pact has
killed another person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of murder shall not affect
the question whether the homicide amounted to murder in the case of a third person who is
a party to the homicide and is not a party to the suicide pact.
72 Prevention of certain offences
Every one is justified in using such force as may be reasonably necessary in order to prevent the
commission of an offence for which an offender might be arrested without warrant, and the
commission of which would be likely to cause immediate and serious injury to the person or
property of anyone, or in order to prevent any act being done which he believes, on reasonable
grounds, would, if committed, amount to any such offence.
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 463B, amended by Crimes Act 1967, No. 7546/1967.
Criminal Code RSC 1985 c 46.

 [124] In Carter, the Supreme Court of Canada reasoned the purpose of the
prohibition upon assisting a person to commit suicide is to protect the vulnerable in
society. The Supreme Court said that:109
… [T]he direct target of [the law against assisting suicide] is the narrow goal
of preventing vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a
time of weakness.

[125] Similar observations were made by Baroness Hale in her dissenting judgment
in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, where she observed:110
The only legislative aim which has been advanced for [the prohibition on
assisting suicide] is the protection of vulnerable people, those who feel that
their lives are worthless or that they are a burden to others and therefore that
they ought to end their own lives even though they do not wish to do so.

[126] It is also to be noted that in Pretty v United Kingdom,111 the European Court
of Human Rights said that the provision in the Suicide Act 1961 (UK) which
prohibited assisting suicide “was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak
and vulnerable and especially those who are not in a condition to make informed
decisions against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life”.
[127] It was submitted on behalf of Ms Seales that the only purpose to s 179 of the
Crimes Act is to protect the vulnerable in society, and that the changes made to the
Crimes Act in 1961 reflected Parliament’s intention that when giving effect to
s 179(b) of the Crimes Act, the principle of individual autonomy should prevail over
the sanctity of life. This submission owed its genesis to the passages in Carter and R
(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice which I have cited in paragraphs [124] and [125].
[128] Section 41 of the Crimes Act does not distinguish between the vulnerable and
those who might commit a “rational suicide”. If s 41 is to have any effect, it must
apply to all suicides.

109
110
111

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [78].
R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, above n 13, at [311]. See also Lord Mance at [171].
Pretty v United Kingdom, above n 14, at [74].

 [129] Parliamentary records relating to the second reading of the Crimes Bill 1961
confirm that attempting suicide was decriminalised for humanitarian reasons. The
Hon Ralph Hanan explained:112
…[A]ttempted suicide will no longer be an offence. For many years charges
of attempted suicide have been brought almost solely to enable those
unfortunate people who try to commit suicide to be taken and looked after.
However, there are better ways of doing that than by convicting them of a
criminal offence … An amendment to the Health Act last year … provided
for different procedure … for us still to have it in the criminal law is what
one might call humanitarian misuse of the criminal law, so by this bill the
crime of attempting to commit suicide goes out.

[130] The decriminalisation of attempting suicide in New Zealand occurred at the
same time similar changes were made in the United Kingdom by the Suicide Act
1961 (UK).
[131] Lord Bingham explained the effect of the changes made in the United
Kingdom in the following way:113
Suicide itself (and with it attempted suicide) was decriminalised because
recognition of the common law offence was not thought to act as a deterrent,
because it cast an unwarranted stigma on innocent members of the suicide’s
family and because it led to the distasteful result that patients recovering in
hospital from a failed suicide attempt were prosecuted, in effect, for their
lack of success. But while the 1961 Act abrogated the rule of law whereby it
was a crime for a person to commit (or attempt to commit) suicide, it
conferred no right on anyone to do so. Had that been its object there would
have been no justification for penalising by a potentially very long term of
imprisonment one who aided, abetted, counselled or procured the exercise or
attempted exercise by another of that right. The policy of the law remained
firmly adverse to suicide…

[132] The decriminalisation of attempting suicide in New Zealand, combined with
the retention of s 179 and the adoption of ss 41 and 180 demonstrate Parliament gave
effect to two objectives. First, the absolute protection of the lives of all who are
vulnerable. Second, recognising that suicide is not an offence, s 179 aims to protect,
so far as is reasonably possible, the lives of those who are not vulnerable. I do not
think the changes made to the suicide laws in 1961 involved Parliament placing
respect for personal autonomy over the sanctity of human life. As Lord Bingham
112
113

(3 October 1961) 328 NZPD 2682.
R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department
intervening), above n 14, at [35]. See also Lord Hope at [106]; and R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of
Justice, above n 13, at [212] per Lord Sumption JSC.

 noted, the policy of the law remained firmly adverse to suicide. The purpose of
s 179 of the Crimes Act in the New Zealand context is broader than the equivalent
law in Canada and is not confined to protecting the vulnerable in society.
[133] The approach I have taken when determining the purpose of s 179 of the
Crimes Act reflects approaches taken by New Zealand courts when considering
sentences following convictions under s 179. In R v Ruscoe, Cooke P, when the
Court of Appeal quashed a prison sentence for a conviction under s 179, noted:114
… There are obviously many occasions, perhaps most occasions, of aiding
suicide where a custodial sentence will be required by the paramount dictates
of the principle of sanctity of human life.

[134] Ms Seales’ application also challenges what constitutes suicide for the
purposes of the Crimes Act. Ordinary dictionary definitions of suicide say that
suicide is “the intentional killing of oneself”.115
[135] Mr Curran suggested that the term “suicide” in s 179 of the Crimes Act can
be interpreted to exclude from its ambit “rational decisions to die”.116 Mr Curran
submitted there is a distinction between suicide which he says is “irrational and a
product of impaired thinking” and a “rational decision to die” by a mentally
competent adult who is not depressed but is enduring a terminal illness.117
[136] The appropriateness of the ordinary meaning of suicide in all cases where the
deceased takes his or her own life has been called into question by a number of
philosophers, such as Emile Durkheim118 and Manuel Velasqueiz.119 It is argued, for
example, that a person who is coerced into taking his or her own life should not be
considered a case of suicide.

114
115

116
117
118

119

R v Ruscoe (1992) 8 CRNZ 68 (CA) at 70. See also R v Mott [2012] NZHC 2366 at [12].
HW Fowler and FG Fowler The Concise Oxford Dictionary (9th ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1995) at 1393.
Plaintiff’s submissions, 18 May 2015 at [8.4].
At [8.9].
Emile Durkheim Suicide: A Study in Sociology translated by John A Spaulding and George
Simpson (New York Free Press, New York, 1966).
Manuel Velasquez “Defining Suicide”, in Tom L Beauchamp and Robert M Veatch Ethical
Issues in Death and Dying (2nd ed, Prentice Hall Inc, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1996) at
106-111..

 [137] Professor Beauchamp frames the issue by suggesting that a person who is
handed a cyanide pill and told that unless he or she kills him or herself, his or her
family will be put to death, does not commit suicide because he or she has not acted
voluntarily.120

Similarly, the soldier who sacrifices his or her own life on a

battlefield by falling onto a grenade to save his or her comrades is generally regarded
as a hero rather than a person who has committed suicide. In that case, the soldier’s
death is not branded as an act of suicide because he or she has acted altruistically, in
the greater good to save others.
[138] Mr Heron QC, the Solicitor-General, appeared with Professor Rishworth QC
as counsel for the Attorney-General. He submitted that a patient who declines or
wishes to no longer receive life sustaining medical procedures does not commit
suicide when, for example, he or she dies following removal from a ventilator.
Support for this approach can be found in the judgment of Lord Goff in Airedale
NHS Trust v Bland, who observed that:121
… in cases of this kind, there is no question of the patient having committed
suicide, nor therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in doing so.

[139] Some philosophers and ethicists also question the appropriateness of ordinary
conceptions of suicide where a competent terminally ill patient obtains assistance to
end his or her life from a medical practitioner.122 Supporters of Ms Seales’ case say
that a rational, competent and terminally ill patient who ends his or her own life by
taking a fatal drug is not in a substantially different position from a person who
declines to receive life sustaining medical services. However, such views are not
universally accepted. There are many who suggest there is no concept as “rational
suicide”.123

120
121
122

123

Tom L Beauchamp “The Problem of Defining Suicide”, above n 199, at 113-118.
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 12, at 864.
See for example, Tom L Beauchamp “The Right to Die as the Triumph of Autonomy” (2006)
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (6) at 643-654; Tom L Beauchamp “When Hastened
Death is Neither Killing Nor Letting Die” in Physician-assisted Dying T E Quill and M P Battin
(eds) (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2004) at 118-129.
Michael McGonnigal “This is Who Will Die When Doctors Are Allowed to Kill Their Patients”
(1997) 31 J Marshall L Rev 95; Yale Kamisar “Against Assisted Suicide – Even A Very limited
Form” (1995) U Det Mercy L Rev 735; Affidavit of Baroness I G Finlay, 6 May 2015 at [42];
Affidavit of H Chochinov, 19 May 2015 at [60]; Affidavit of R George, 14 May 2015 at [80][85].

 [140] The approach to the meaning of “suicide” submitted on behalf of Ms Seales
faces challenges in giving effect to s 41 of the Crimes Act. It is difficult to see how a
person who intervenes to prevent a suicide can assess whether or not he or she is
intervening in a case of “rational” suicide.
[141] Mr Curran drew attention to a passage in Baxter v Montana concerning the
meaning of “suicide”. In that judgment, Nelson J said:124
“Suicide” is a pejorative term in our society … The term denigrates the
complex individual circumstances that drive persons generally – and, in
particular, those who are incurably ill and face prolonged illness and
agonizing death – to take their own lives. The term is used to generate
antipathy, and it does. The Patients and the class of people they represent do
not seek to commit “suicide”. Rather they acknowledge that death within a
relatively short time is inescapable because of their illness or disease. And
with that fact in mind, they seek the ability to self-administer, at a time and
place of their choosing, a physician-prescribed medication that will assist
them in preserving their own human dignity during the inevitable process of
dying. Having come to grips with the inexorability of their death, they
simply ask the government not to force them to suffer and die in an
agonizing, degrading, humiliating, and undignified manner. They seek
nothing more nor less; …

[142] While Baxter provides a point of reference, the issue the Supreme Court of
Montana had to consider is not directly applicable to Ms Seales’ case. In Montana,
prior to the Baxter decision, a doctor who supplied a lethal drug to a patient to assist
the patient to take his or her own life risked being prosecuted on a charge of culpable
homicide. In Montana, charges relating to assisting suicide can only be brought
where the attempt to commit suicide fails. Under Montana’s law, consent can be a
defence to culpable homicide if the case falls within one of four statutory exceptions.
One statutory exception applies if “it [is] against public policy to permit the conduct
or the resulting harm, even though consented to”. By a majority of three to two, the
Supreme Court of Montana held in Baxter that facilitated aid in dying that was
provided by a doctor to a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient was not
against public policy for the purposes of Montana’s exception to the consent defence.
Baxter provides little assistance in determining the meaning of suicide in s 179 of the
Crimes Act.

124

Baxter v Montana, above n 14, at [71].

 [143] In my assessment, there is an important distinction between those who end
their lives by taking a lethal drug and those who decline medical services and die
from natural causes. There is also a distinction that can be drawn between those who
end their lives by taking a lethal drug, those who are coerced into taking their own
lives, and those who take their own lives for altruistic purposes.
[144] Those distinctions lead me to conclude that Ms Seales would commit suicide
if she took a fatal drug supplied to her by her doctor and died from that drug. There
are three features to that scenario that lead me to conclude that it would be a case of
suicide. Those factors, which must be viewed in totality, are:
(1)

first, Ms Seales would be intending to bring about her death; and

(2)

second, Ms Seales would be acting voluntarily and not altruistically
or subject to coercion; and

(3)

third, the immediate cause of Ms Seales’ death would be the fatal
drug, not natural causes.

[145] Before Ms Seales’ doctor could be convicted of an offence under s 179 of the
Crimes Act in the circumstances that are contemplated by this case, Ms Seales’
doctor would have to:
(1)

know Ms Seales was contemplating suicide; and

(2)

intentionally assist Ms Seales to commit suicide.

[146] In addition, Ms Seales’ death would have to be as a consequence of the
assistance provided by her doctor.125
[147] I conclude therefore that Ms Seales’ doctor would be exposed to prosecution
under s 179 of the Crimes Act if she supplied Ms Seales with a fatal drug, with the

125

R v Tamatea (2003) 20 CRNZ 363 (CA).

 intention that Ms Seales would use that drug to take her own life, and if Ms Seales
did so.
[148] I am reinforced in reaching my conclusions about the meaning of the relevant
provisions of the Crimes Act by the following two points.
[149] First, in Canada where there is not yet legislation authorising the types of acts
Ms Seales wishes her doctor to undertake, the Supreme Court of Canada has issued a
declaration that has some similarities to the first of the Bill of Rights declarations
sought by Ms Seales.126 The offence provisions of Canada’s Criminal Code are
almost identical to the offence provisions of the Crimes Act that I have interpreted.127
The provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code that were referred to by the Supreme
Court in Carter were assumed to have the meaning I have given to the equivalent
provisions of the Crimes Act.128
[150] Second, the approach I have taken to the meaning of s 179(b) of the
Crimes Act is consistent with decisions of the House of Lords, the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights in which it was
assumed that s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (UK) has the meaning I have attributed
to s 179(b).129 It was therefore not surprising that no counsel could point to any
decision in cognate jurisdictions in which provisions equivalent to the offence
provisions of the Crimes Act had been interpreted in the way urged on behalf of
Ms Seales.
PART III
SECTIONS 8 AND 9 NZBORA

126
127

128
129

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14.
Compare Crimes Act 1961, s 63 with Criminal Code RSC 1985 c 46, s 14; Crimes Act 1961, s
164 with Criminal Code RSC 1985 c 46, s 226; Crimes Act 1961, s 160 with Criminal Code
RSC 1985 c 46, s 222(1); Crimes Act 1961, s 179(b) with Criminal Code RSC 1985 c 46, s
241(b).
Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [1] and [13].
R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department
intervening), above n 14; R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice, above n 13; Pretty v United
Kingdom, above n 14.

 [151] The Bill of Rights declarations sought by Ms Seales ask me to declare that
ss 179 and 160 of the Crimes Act are not consistent with the rights guaranteed to
Ms Seales in ss 8 and 9 of the NZBORA in the circumstances of her case. I will first
examine s 8, and then s 9.
Right not to be deprived of life
[152] The right not to be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established
by law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice involves three
components, namely:
(1)

the right to life;

(2)

exceptions to that right established by law; and

(3)

consistency with the principles of fundamental justice.

[153] The right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights and was
described by Blackstone as the first of the absolute human rights.130 It is a right that
is found in international instruments131 and states’ bills of rights.132
[154] In the United Kingdom, the right to life is set out in art 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (1950),133 and is incorporated into United Kingdom
law through the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).134
130
131

132

133

Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, above n 48, at 101.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), art 6; European Convention on Human
Rights (1950), art 2.
United States Constitution, 14th Amendment; Irish Constitution (1987), art 40.3.1; South African
Constitution (1966), s 11; German Basic Law (1949), art 2.2; Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (1982), s 7; The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 1 and sch 1(incorporating art 2 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950)).
Rights and Freedoms
Article 2 Right to life
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it
results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

 [155] In Canada, the right to life is in s 7 of the Canadian Charter which provides:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.

[156] Section 7 of the Canadian Charter protects a wide range of personal
autonomy interests that are not expressly part of s 8 of the NZBORA. Similarly, the
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits deprivation of “liberty”
without due process of law. That right goes beyond the basic right to life and
engages a broad range of rights such as the right to abortion,135 accessing
contraception136 and parental rights relating to the upbringing of children.137
[157] The broader nature of s 7 of the Canadian Charter and the 14th Amendment of
the United States Constitution means caution is required when considering Canadian
and American jurisprudence in the context of s 8 of the NZBORA.
[158] Notwithstanding the need for caution when considering cases decided under
s 7 of the Canadian Charter when assessing the right in s 8 of the NZBORA, I have
derived assistance from the approach taken in Canadian decisions concerning s 7 of
the Canadian Charter, and in particular the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Carter.
[159] The Supreme Court of Canada applied s 7 of the Canadian Charter and found
the prohibition in the Canadian Criminal Code against assisting suicide, and the
provisions of that Code which say a person cannot consent to his or her own death,
were of no force to the extent that they prohibited doctors from assisting a patient to
die where the patient is a competent adult who:

134
135
136
137

Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), introduction.
Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973).
Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965).
Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923).

 (1)

clearly consents to the termination of his or her life; and

(2)

has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an
illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is
intolerable to the patient in the circumstances of his or her condition.

[160] The Supreme Court of Canada exercised its jurisdiction to issue a declaration
of invalidity. The declaration was suspended for 12 months so as to enable the
Parliament of Canada to devise an appropriate remedy.
[161] There are two features of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada
which are relevant to Ms Seales’ case, namely, the Court’s analysis of the right to
life, and its consideration of the principles of fundamental justice in s 7 of the
Canadian Charter.
Right to life
[162] Ms Seales’ reliance on her right to life in s 8 of the NZBORA may seem
counterintuitive in circumstances where she is seeking assistance to die. The case
presented on behalf of Ms Seales, however, mirrors the approach taken in Carter by
the Supreme Court of Canada and involves three steps.
[163] First, the sanctity of life is one of society’s most fundamental values.138 It
underpins s 8. Section 8 does not, however, require all human life be preserved in all
circumstances.

This was illustrated in Shortland v Northland Health Ltd and

Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General.139
[164] Second, the right to life in s 8 of the NZBORA may be engaged where the
law or the actions of the state impose an increased risk of death.140

138
139

140

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, above n 12, at 863-864 per Lord Goff.
Shortland v Northland Health Ltd, above n 51; Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General,
above n 12.
Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [62]; Osman v United Kingdom [1998]
ECHR 101 (ECHR) at [116].

 [165] Third, Ms Seales has explained that she will consider taking her life earlier
than she otherwise would if her general practitioner could lawfully assist her to die.
In this respect Ms Seales’ circumstances are identical to those addressed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Carter. The Supreme Court of Canada explained that
the right to life was engaged when:141
… the prohibition on physician-assisted dying had the effect of forcing some
individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear that they would be
incapable of doing so when they reached the point where suffering was
intolerable.

[166] It is said on behalf of Ms Seales that this aspect of the reasoning in Carter
applies with equal force to her circumstances. Applying that reasoning to the present
case leads to the conclusion that the offence provisions of the Crimes Act I have
interpreted in Part II of this judgment may have the effect of forcing Ms Seales to
take her own life prematurely, for fear that she will be incapable of doing so when
her condition deteriorates further. Accordingly, the right to life provision of s 8 of
the NZBORA is engaged in the circumstances of this case.
Exemptions established by law
[167] Section 8 of the NZBORA does not guarantee the state will never deprive a
person of life. Rather, s 8 guarantees the state will do so on grounds established by
law.
[168] In the present context, the interference with Ms Seales’ right to life is based
upon grounds established by law, namely the offence provisions of the Crimes Act
that I have analysed in Part II of this judgment. Those provisions were passed by
Parliament and therefore constitute “grounds established by law”.
Consistency with the principles of fundamental justice
[169] It is not sufficient for the interference with a person’s right to life to be on
grounds established by law. If s 8 is engaged, the interference with a person’s right
to life must also be consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The scope
of the phrase “consistent with the principles of fundamental justice” has not been
141

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [57].

 determined in New Zealand. I have again found it helpful to resort to Canadian case
law when analysing this aspect of s 8.
[170] Canadian cases identify three components to be considered when determining
whether the principles of fundamental justice have been breached.
[171] First, the principle of fundamental justice prohibits arbitrariness and targets
situations where there is no rational connection between the objective and the law.
This component is referred to as “arbitrariness”.
[172] Second, laws which go further than necessary breach the principle of
fundamental justice when they deny the rights of individuals in a way that has no
bearing on the objective of the law. In Canada, this component of the principle of
fundamental justice is called “overbreadth”.142 My preference is to address this
component of the principles of fundamental justice under the heading of “overly
broad”.
[173] Third, the principle of fundamental justice is breached if the impact of the
restriction on an individual’s life is grossly disproportionate to the purpose of the law
in question. This is referred to as “gross disproportionality”.
[174] In Canada, the onus on establishing a breach of the Canadian equivalent of
s 8 of the NZBORA rests with the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Canada in Carter
explained:143
A claimant under s 7 [of the Canadian Charter] must show that the state has
deprived them of their life, liberty or security of the person and that the
deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[175] Significantly, under Canadian jurisprudence a plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a breach of s 7 of the Canadian Charter if his or her individual rights
under that section have been breached. This approach is compelling, and I adopt it
in this judgment.

142

143

Thus, the wider societal perspective required by s 5 of the

Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford [2013] SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 at [112]; Carter v
Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [85].
Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [80].

 NZBORA analysis does not form part of the individual rights focus required by s 8.
This point was explained in the following way in Carter:144
… [T]he principles of fundamental justice are derived from the essential
elements of our system of justice, which is itself founded on a belief in the
dignity and worth of every human person. To deprive a person of
constitutional rights arbitrarily or in a way that is overbroad or grossly
disproportionate diminishes that worth and dignity. If a law operates in this
way, it asks the right claimant to “serve as a scapegoat” … It imposes a
deprivation via a process that is “fundamentally unfair” to the rights
claimant.
This is not to say that such a deprivation cannot be justified under s 1 of the
Charter. In some cases the government, for practical reasons, may only be
able to meet an important objective by means of a law that has some
fundamental flaw. But this does not concern us when considering whether
s 7 of the Charter has been breached.

Arbitrariness
[176] In Chaoulli v Canada (Attorney-General), McLachlin CJC and Major and
Bastarache JJ explained:145
A law is arbitrary where “it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
objective that lies behind [it]”. To determine whether this is the case, it is
necessary to consider the state interest and societal concerns that the
provision is meant to reflect …
In order not to be arbitrary, the limit on life, liberty and security requires not
only a theoretical connection between the limit and the legislative goal, but a
real connection on the facts … The question in every case is whether the
measure is arbitrary in the sense of bearing no real relation to the goal and
hence being manifestly unfair …

[177] This test has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada
(Attorney-General) v Bedford and Carter.146
[178] I have previously determined that the purpose of s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes
Act is to protect all human life. It is not arbitrary because that is its objective.
Therefore Ms Seales’ rights under s 8 of the NZBORA are not limited arbitrarily by
s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act.
144

145
146

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [81]-[82]; citing Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act
[1985] 2 SCR 486; Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 SCR 519.
Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney-General) [2005] 1 SCR 791 at [130]-[131].
Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford, above n 142, at [111]; Carter v Canada (AttorneyGeneral), above n 14, at [83]-[84].

 [179] I have explained the dual purposes of s 179(b) of the Crimes Act in paragraph
[132] of this judgment. Those purposes are broad, although not as broad as the
absolute protection of all life that underpins s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act.
[180] The prohibition on assisting suicide in s 179(b) achieves the dual objectives
which I have explained in paragraph [132]. Therefore Ms Seales’ rights under s 8 of
the NZBORA are not limited arbitrarily.
[181] I am reassured in reaching this conclusion by the fact the Supreme Court of
Canada also concluded the equivalent of s 179 of the New Zealand Crimes Act was
not arbitrary when analysed in the context of s 7 of the Canadian Charter.147
Overly broad
[182] In Canada, laws which infringe a protected interest under s 7 and are cast
more broadly than necessary to meet the state’s objective may be struck down as
being overly broad, and therefore found to be in breach of the principles of
fundamental justice.148
[183] In Carter, the Supreme Court explained:149
… Like the other principles of fundamental justice under s 7 [of the
Canadian Charter], overbreadth is not concerned with competing social
interests or ancillary benefits to the general population. A law that is drawn
broadly to target conduct that bears no relation to its purpose … may
therefore be overbroad … The question is not whether Parliament has chosen
the least restrictive means, but whether the chosen means infringe life,
liberty or security of the person in a way that has no connection with the
mischief contemplated by the legislature. The focus is not on broad social
impacts, but on the impact of the measure on the individuals whose life,
liberty or security of the person is trammelled.

[184] Applying this approach, the prohibition of murder and manslaughter in
s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act is directed at protecting all life. Given that broad
objective, it cannot be said that s 160(2)(a) of the Crimes Act overreaches its
purposes, thereby breaching the principles of fundamental justice.
147
148

149

Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [84].
Robert J Sharpe and Kent Roach The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (5th ed, Irwin Law Inc,
Toronto, 2015) at 237.
Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), above n 14, at [85].

 [185] While the purpose of s 179(b) of the Crimes Act is not as broad as
s 160(2)(a), it nevertheless is directed at the protection of human life. In light of my
understanding of the purpose of s 179(b), as set out in paragraph [132] of this
judgment, it is not possible for me to conclude that s 179(b) of the Crimes Act
overreaches its objective. It is therefore not “overly broad”.
[186] In Carter, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded the prohibition against
aiding suicide in the Canadian Criminal Code breached the “overbreadth”
component of the principles of fundamental justice because the objectives of the law
prohibiting assisted suicide were able to be construed more narrowly. I am not able
to construe s 179(b) in that same way, when having regard to New Zealand’s
different legislative framework governing this country’s criminal laws relating to
suicide.
Gross disproportionality
[187] The “gross disproportionality” component of the fundamental principles of
justice was first referred to in R v Malmo-Levine.150 A significant proportion of the
Canadian jurisprudence on gross disproportionately relates to s 12 of the Canadian
Charter.151
[188] The authors of The Charter of Rights and Freedoms explain that in the
context of s 7 of the Canadian Charter:152
Gross disproportionality describes state actions or legislative responses to a
problem that are so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate
government interest.

[189] In Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that the “gross
disproportionately” standard is high. The Supreme Court said:153
Gross disproportionality asks a different question from arbitrariness and
overbreadth. It targets the second fundamental evil: the law’s effects on life,
150
151

152

153

R v Malmo-Levine [2003] 3 SCR 571 at [160]-[161].
Every one has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment,
which equates to s 9 of the NZBORA.
Robert J Sharpe and Kent Roach, above n 148, at 247, citing Canada (Attorney-General) v PHS
Community Services Society [2011] 3 SCR 134 at [133].
Canada (Attorney-General) v Bedford, above n 142, at [120].

 liberty or security of the person are so grossly disproportionate to its
purposes that they cannot rationally be supported. The rule against gross
disproportionality only applies in extreme cases where the seriousness of the
deprivation is totally out of sync with the objective of the measure. This
idea is captured by the hypothetical of a law with the purpose of keeping the
streets clean that imposes a sentence of life imprisonment for spitting on the
sidewalk. The connection between the draconian impact of the law and its
object must be entirely outside the norms accepted in our free and
democratic society.

[190] Applying this approach, I conclude that the objective of s 160(2)(a) of the
Crimes Act is proportionate because it achieves its fair objective of protecting all
life. The connection between the impact of the law and its object are within the
norms accepted in New Zealand society.
[191] Similarly, s 179(b) is not grossly disproportionate because the impact of that
section and its dual objectives is well within the norms accepted by New Zealand
society.
[192] In reaching this conclusion, I emphasise that I have applied a legal analysis.
By focusing upon the law it may appear that I am indifferent to Ms Seales’ plight.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I fully acknowledge that the consequences
of the law against assisting suicide as it currently stands are extremely distressing for
Ms Seales and that she is suffering because that law does not accommodate her right
to dignity and personal autonomy.
[193] For completeness, I note that the Supreme Court of Canada did not have to
consider the “gross disproportionality” component of the principles of fundamental
justice in Carter because it found the law against assisting suicide in Canada
overreached the objectives of that law.
Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment
[194] In determining Ms Seales’ rights under s 9 of the NZBORA, it is necessary to
determine if, in her circumstances, she is subjected to cruel, degrading or
disproportionately severe treatment.

 [195] The rights in s 9 can be found in international instruments154 and states’ bills
of rights.155 The commentary to the draft of what became s 9 noted its origins could
be found in the Bill of Rights 1689 (UK), which prohibited any form of treatment or
punishment that was incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human
person.156
[196] The case for Ms Seales is that her suffering constitutes a form of suffering if
it can be prevented, and that by depriving her the opportunity to bring her suffering
to an end, the state, through the offence provisions of the Crimes Act, is subjecting
her to cruel, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment.
[197] This line of reasoning was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Rodriguez v British Columbia.157

The appellant in that case was permanently

disabled and suffering from a progressive and degenerative terminal illness.
Ms Rodriguez sought an order which, if granted, would have enabled her doctor to
assist her to take her own life at a time of her choosing. Ms Rodriguez’s case was
that the prohibition against assisting suicide in s 241(b) of the Canadian Criminal
Code breached, among other rights, Ms Rodriguez’s right not to be subjected to cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment in s 12 of the Canadian Charter. Sopinka J
wrote the judgment of the majority.

He reasoned that before there could be

“treatment” under s 12 of the Canadian Charter, there had to be some form of state
control over an individual. He was of the view that a person was not subjected to
“treatment” for the purposes of s 12 of the Canadian Charter if his or her suffering
was due to the effects of disease. Although much of the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez has been overtaken by that Court’s decision in Carter, the
Court’s approach to s 12 of the Canadian Charter in Rodriguez does not appear to
have been put in issue in Carter.
[198] The House of Lords in R (Pretty) v Department of Public Prosecutions took a
similar approach to that taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez. Ms

154

155
156
157

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 131, art 7; European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), art 3.
Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms (1982), s 12; Irish Constitution 1937, art 40.3.2.
Hon G Palmer A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper (1985) AJHRA.6 at [10.1.62].
Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General), above n 144.

 Pretty’s circumstances were in all material respects the same as those suffered by Ms
Rodriguez. Ms Pretty’s claim was that the Director of Public Prosecutions erred by
not undertaking to refrain from prosecuting her husband if he assisted her to commit
suicide, which is an offence under s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (UK). Part of Ms
Pretty’s case was that the decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions breached
art 3 of the European Convention which prohibits inhumane and degrading
treatment.
[199] The House of Lords reasoned Ms Pretty’s rights under art 3 of the European
Convention were not infringed. The essence of the House of Lords’ reasoning was
that the United Kingdom was not obliged to ensure that a competent terminally ill
person in Ms Pretty’s position was able to lawfully engage the services of another to
assist her to take her own life. Lord Steyn said:158
The word “treatment” [in art 3 of the European Convention] must take its
colour from the context in which it appears. While I would not wish to give
a narrow interpretation to what may constitute degrading treatment, the
concept appears singularly inapt to convey the idea that the state must
guarantee to individuals a right to die with the deliberate assistance of third
parties.

[200] The European Court of Human Rights reached the same conclusion as the
House of Lords about the effect of art 3 of the European Convention when it heard
Ms Pretty’s appeal:159
The applicant has claimed … if he assisted [his wife] to commit suicide and
the criminal-law prohibition on assisted suicide disclosed inhuman and
degrading treatment for which the state is responsible as it will thereby be
failing to protect her from the suffering which awaits her as her illness
reaches its ultimate stages. This claim, however, places a new and extended
construction on the concept of treatment, which, as found by the House of
Lords, goes beyond the ordinary meaning of the word. While the Court must
take a dynamic and flexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention,
which is a living instrument, any interpretation must also accord with the
fundamental objectives of the Convention and its coherence as a system of
human rights protection. Article 3 must be construed in harmony with
Article 2, which hitherto has been associated with it as reflecting basic
values respected by democratic societies. As found above, Article 2 of the
Convention is first and foremost a prohibition on the use of lethal force or
other conduct which might lead to the death of a human being and does not

158

159

R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department
intervening), above n 14, at [60].
Pretty v United Kingdom, above n 14, at [54].

 confer any right on an individual to require a State to permit or facilitate his
or her death.

[201] I appreciate that the European Court of Human Rights has developed its
jurisprudence since Pretty, but it has done so through art 8(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.160

Thus, in Haas v Switzerland and Gross v

Switzerland the European Court of Human Rights reasoned that an individual’s right
to decide the way in which and the point at which his or her life should end was an
aspect of the right to respect for private life within the meaning of art 8 of the
Convention.161 There is no correlation between art 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and the provisions of the NZBORA that I have been required to
consider.
[202] For completeness, I also note that in Carter there was no suggestion at
appellate level that s 12 of the Canadian Charter was engaged. Section 12 of the
Canadian Charter equates to s 9 of the NZBORA.
[203] The Canadian Supreme Court, the House of Lords and the European Court of
Human Rights have all concluded that persons in Ms Seales’ circumstances are not
subjected to “treatment” for the purposes of s 12 of the Canadian Charter and art 3 of
the European Convention because they are unable to lawfully enlist the services of
others to assist them end their own lives.
[204] The reasons why I have concluded Ms Seales’ rights under s 9 are not
engaged in the circumstances of her case are broadly similar to the reasons given by
the House of Lords in Pretty. I have distilled my reasons to the following three key
points.
[205] First, Ms Seales’ distressing circumstances are the direct consequence of her
tumour, not her treatment.

160

161

Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
...
Haas v Switzerland, above n 64; Gross v Switzerland [2013] ECHR 429 (Section II, ECHR).

 [206] Second, the treatment Ms Seales is currently receiving is designed to
alleviate, to the extent that it is possible, the worst effects of her tumour.
[207] Third, the duty of the state under s 9 is not to subject persons to cruel,
degrading or disproportionately severe treatment. This positive obligation is not
engaged when the criminal law prohibits culpable homicide and assisting suicide
even when the effect of the law is that persons in Ms Seales’ position will continue to
suffer from the effects of their illnesses.
[208] Like Lord Steyn, I believe the concept of cruel, degrading or
disproportionately severe treatment in s 9 of the NZBORA is very inapt to convey
the idea that the state must guarantee individuals in Ms Seales’ circumstances a right
to die through her doctor administering a fatal drug to Ms Seales, or by providing a
fatal drug to enable Ms Seales to take her own life.
[209] The analysis of ss 8 and 9 of the NZBORA undertaken in Part III of this
judgment leads to the conclusion that the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act as I
have interpreted them in Part II of this judgment are consistent with the rights and
freedoms contained in the NZBORA.162
Conclusion
[210] I am unable to issue any of the declarations sought by Ms Seales. In reaching
this conclusion I have focused on the substantive issues rather than having resorted
to the jurisdictional grounds referred to by counsel for the Attorney-General. I have
taken this course because of the significance of the issues to New Zealand society
raised by Ms Seales’ case.
[211] Although Ms Seales has not obtained the outcomes she sought, she has
selflessly provided a forum to clarify important aspects of New Zealand law. The
complex legal, philosophical, moral and clinical issues raised by Ms Seales’
proceedings can only be addressed by Parliament passing legislation to amend the
effect of the Crimes Act. I appreciate Parliament has shown little desire to engage in
162

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6.

 these issues. The three private members bills that have attempted to address the
broad issues raised by Ms Seales’ proceeding gained little legislative traction.163
However, the fact that Parliament has not been willing to address the issues raised by
Ms Seales’ proceeding does not provide me with a licence to depart from the
constitutional role of Judges in New Zealand.

___________________________
D B Collins J

Post Script
Ms Seales died of natural causes on 5 June 2015.

Solicitors:
Russell McVeagh, Wellington for Plaintiff
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Defendant
Human Rights Commission, Auckland
McLeod and Associates, Auckland for Care Alliance
Toni Brown Law, Tauranga for Voluntary Euthanasia Society of New Zealand Inc

163

Death with Dignity Bill 1995, (00-1) (Members Bill) introduced by M Laws MP on 2 April
1995; Death with Dignity Bill 2003 (37-1) (Members Bill) introduced by P Brown MP on 6
March 2003 and End of Life Choice Bill (Members Bill) placed into the Private Members Bill
ballot by M Street MP in 2013 and withdrawn from the ballot in October 2013.