SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS $36 MILLION COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITY AT CAMP LEATHERNECK, AFGHANISTAN: UNWANTED, UNNEEDED, AND UNUSED This product was completed under SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects, the Special Inspector General’s response team created to examine emerging issues in prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. The work was conducted pursuant to the Special Inspector General’s authorities and responsibilities under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181). MAY 2015 SIGAR-15-57-SP May 20, 2015 The Honorable Ashton B. Carter Secretary of Defense Dear Secretary Carter: The attached report discusses the results of SIGAR’s investigation of the construction of a 64,000 square foot command and control facility at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province, Afghanistan (the 64K building). SIGAR found that DoD requested funds for this facility on the basis that it was necessary to address an immediate operational need associated with the military surge in Afghanistan in 2010. However, then-Major General Richard P. Mills, the general in charge of the surge in Helmand, requested that the facility not be built because it was not needed; existing resources at Camp Leatherneck were already well-suited to the mission he had been assigned. However, the request to cancel the building was rejected by then-Major General Peter M. Vangjel, who believed that it would not be “prudent” to cancel a project for which funds had already been appropriated by Congress. Ultimately, construction of the building was not completed until long after the surge was over, and the building was never used. The failure to follow General Mills’ advice to cancel the 64K building resulted in the waste of about $36 million. Although most of the offices and individuals SIGAR contacted during this investigation were cooperative, some officials, in their own words, attempted to “slow roll” or otherwise frustrate SIGAR’s investigation. Our report includes a discussion of this issue. Based on the results of this investigation, we recommend that DoD: (1) incorporate into the DoD Financial Management Regulation, DoD 7000.14-R, a clear statement that taxpayer funds should not be spent when they are no longer needed, merely because an official does not want to go through the process of requesting the reprogramming or rescission of those funds; (2) adopt, at all appropriate command levels, including at the general officer level, financial management training that promotes this principle and rejects the “use it or lose it” approach to spending; (3) determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Lieutenant General Vangjel in light of his decision to construct the 64K building over the objections of commanders in the field, resulting in the waste of $36 million; (4) determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Major General James Richardson in light of his failure to carry out a fulsome investigation in compliance with General Dunford’s orders; (5) consider issuing a directive to all personnel explicitly reminding them of their legal obligation under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and the SIGAR authorizing statute, to fully cooperate with SIGAR audits, investigations, and requests for information; and (6) determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Colonel Norman F. Allen in light of his failure to comply with law, regulation, and his ethical and professional responsibilities. SIGAR received written comments on a draft of this report from DoD, Lieutenant General Vangjel, and Colonel Allen. SIGAR also sent a copy of the draft report to Major General Richardson for comment, but he did not respond to our request. DoD, General Vangjel, and Colonel Allen did not dispute any of the facts contained in the report, but disagreed with some of the conclusions SIGAR reached based on those facts. DoD concurred with our fifth recommendation, and partially concurred with our first and second recommendations, but did not concur with our third, fourth, and sixth recommendations. DoD also provided “technical comments” on the draft report, none of which warranted changes to the report. General Vangjel and Colonel Allen provided comments regarding their individual roles in this matter, none of which warranted changes to the report. The comments provided by DoD, General Vangjel, and Colonel Allen, as well as SIGAR’s responses to those comments, are included in Appendices I, II, and II, respectively. SIGAR conducted this investigation under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Sincerely, John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction INTRODUCTION While visiting Afghanistan in June 2013, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) learned that the Department of Defense (DoD) had constructed a 64,000 square foot command and control facility (the 64K building) at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.1 Senior military officers encouraged the Special Inspector General to investigate the 64K building because they felt it exemplified a larger problem with military construction. According to one informant, the building had never been used and would probably be torn down or transferred to the Afghan government. The Special Inspector General visited the site and found the building to be well-built and newly furnished. However, it was unoccupied; sheets of plastic still covered the furniture. After coordinating with the DoD Inspector General’s office in Kabul, SIGAR opened its investigation into the circumstances surrounding construction of the 64K building.2 On July 8, 2013, SIGAR sent a management alert letter to the Secretary of Defense, which noted that DoD had apparently spent over $30 million to construct a building that would never be used. The letter requested answers to several questions concerning the decision to construct the 64K building and whether any action could be taken to mitigate the risk that the facility would ultimately be a total waste of U.S. taxpayer funds.3 In response to SIGAR’s letter, DoD revealed that General (GEN) Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), had ordered an Army Regulation 15-6 (AR 15-6) investigation of the circumstances surrounding construction of the 64K building and that Major General James Richardson would be leading that investigation. DoD also informed SIGAR that upon completion of the investigation, it would respond to SIGAR’s request for information. Therefore, SIGAR suspended its investigation while awaiting the outcome of General Richardson’s inquiry. In November 2013, SIGAR received the official report of General Richardson’s investigation. SIGAR concluded that the report did not fully address the questions raised in the alert letter. In addition, the recommendation to spend additional money to complete the building and order troops to occupy it seemed inconsistent with the fact that the surge was over, the U.S. had already begun to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and it was uncertain whether Camp Leatherneck would even remain open.4 Consequently, on November 27, 2013, SIGAR reopened its investigation of the decision to construct the 64K building. This report presents SIGAR’s findings and recommendations, based on a review of more than 10,000 pages of DoD documents and emails, and interviews of senior military officials, including five general officers.5 The primary source documents quoted throughout this report refer to the 64K facility and Camp Leatherneck by several different names. The 64K facility is sometimes referred to as the “Command & Control” or “C2” facility. Camp Leatherneck is sometimes referred to as “Tombstone/Bastion”. 1 2 The DoD IG’s office in Kabul deferred to SIGAR on the issue of the 64K building. 3 Letter from John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (July 8, 2013). 4 Letter from John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (November 27, 2013). Because the official abbreviations for officer ranks vary by branch of service, after the first reference to each officer’s specific rank, e.g., Brigadier, Major, or Lieutenant General, this report refers to them as simply “General” or without abbreviation, to minimize confusion for non-military readers. 5 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 4 Figure 1 - Photos of the 64K building during a site visit on May 8, 2013. Top left: exterior view; top right: tactical operations center; bottom left: cubicles; bottom right: unopened boxes and unused chairs. (Source: SIGAR) THERE WAS NO OPERATIONAL NEED FOR THE 64K BUILDING In January 2010, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) requested funds for construction of a 64K command and control facility at Camp Leatherneck.6 The request stated that the facility was intended to meet “an operational need . . . in Regional Command-South [RC-South], to support the additional personnel and missions coming from the surge” because there were “no facilities available” at Camp Leatherneck for this purpose.7 USARCENT stated that failure to fund the project would mean that “the additional forces provided will not have a facility to provide command and control of ground forces and aircraft, decreasing operational efficiency.”8 In February 2010, the Department of the Army submitted to Congress its request for funds to construct the 64K building, as a part of its Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental Request for fiscal year (FY) 2010.9 The accompanying justification stated: “US Forces have an immediate operational need for the expansion of Tombstone/Bastion [Camp Leatherneck] to meet operational requirements in RC-South, Afghanistan. Sufficient facilities do not exist on Tombstone/Bastion to house the surge of forces. In order to facilitate the execution of the US mission the Command & Control element requires a facility in which to operate.”10 6 FY 2010 Military Construction Project Data (DD Form 1391) for Project Number 76916 (Jan. 23, 2010). 7 Id. The “surge” refers to the 2010 military surge which began in March 2010 and ended in September 2011. 8 Id. Department of the Army, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental Request, Volume 3 of 3, Justification Data Submitted to Congress (February 2010), p. 10. 9 10 Id. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 5 While this funding request was pending in Congress, generals on the ground in Afghanistan began requesting cancellation of the 64K building. On May 19, 2010, then-Major General Richard P. Mills, Commanding General of the Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF (FWD)), i.e., the general in charge of the surge in RC-South, sent a memorandum to the Deputy Commanding General of USFOR-A, reporting the results of a “comprehensive review of the FY10 thru FY12 MILCON [military construction] program for Helmand province.”11 According to General Mills, the “review focused on the relevancy of each project to the overall counter-insurgency mission and the impact the project will have on the servicemen and women aboard our forward operating bases.”12 The review found that the 64K building and five other projects were “not necessary in order to execute our mission within the Helmand province or the need was already met via other means.”13 On June 22, 2010, Major General Timothy P. McHale, Deputy Commander – Support, USFOR-A, agreed with the request to cancel construction of the 64K building. General McHale’s letter stated that “We understand you have met the need for adequate C2 Facility at Leatherneck through other means and thus this project is also no longer required.”14 On June 26, 2010, Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., Commanding General, Joint Engineers, USFOR-A, sent a memorandum to USARCENT-Kuwait, requesting cancellation of the 64K building and three other projects. The memorandum stated that “the requirement for the above projects was evaluated based on the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Basing Strategy and Base Master Plans.”15 General Buckler concluded that “the requirement for adequate C2 Facility at Leatherneck has already been met and thus this project is also no longer required.”16 On July 29, 2010, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010, was signed into law.17 The accompanying Senate report listed the amounts to be spent on specific military construction projects in Afghanistan, including $24 million for the 64K building.18 In August 2010, then-Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Deputy Commanding General of USARCENT, rejected the advice of General Mills, General McHale, and General Buckler, and disapproved the request to cancel the 64K building, stating that: “Currently, this facility is also listed in the FY 12 OCO emerging requirements . . . . Therefore, cancelling the FY10 project, which has appropriated funds, and reprogramming it for a later year is not prudent.”19 11 Memorandum from Major General Richard P. Mills to Deputy Commanding General, United States Forces Afghanistan (May 19, 2010) [Exhibit 1]. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Memorandum from Major General Timothy P. McHale to Major General Richard P. Mills (Jun. 22, 2010) [Exhibit 2]. 15 Memorandum from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010) [Exhibit 3]. 16 Id. 17 Pub. L. No. 111-212 (July 29, 2010). See Senate Report 111-188, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes, p. 52. 18 19 Memorandum from Major General Peter Vangjel to Deputy Commanding General, United States Forces Afghanistan (August 2010) [Exhibit 4]. DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, defines SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 6 General Vangjel’s memorandum did not contain any other basis for rejecting the request to cancel the 64K building, nor did it dispute General Buckler’s prior statement that the building was not required under the “ISAF Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Basing Strategy and Base Master Plans.”20 Correspondence between USARCENT and USACE further confirms there was no immediate operational need for the 64K building, and no specific operational need for the future. Just five days after the appropriations act funding the 64K building was signed into law, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Marty Norvel of USARCENT told the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) that he wanted to “push the FY10 supplemental C2 Facility at Leatherneck as far to the right as possible (may want to look at Jan 12 as a target).”21 He also stated that he wanted “to ensure we time this award to support other operational requirements” and asked USACE to “move it to the bottom of the pile.”22 The contract to construct the 64K building was awarded in February 2011 and by May 2011, construction had begun.23 By June, however, the surge was drawing down and the number of troops in Afghanistan began to decline. In November, 2011, Major General John A. Toolan, then commander of Regional Command-Southwest,24 issued guidance pertaining to military construction, which stated that, “[i]n light of the POTUS decision, CMC and COMISAF direction and surge recovery efforts, the time to ‘stop building’ is now.”25 Despite this guidance, construction of the 64K building continued until April 2013, when it was reported as being 98 percent complete. During this same month, Major General Walter Miller, then in command at Camp Leatherneck, informed USFOR-A what was already known back in May 2010: that the Marines at Camp Leatherneck did not require a 64K command and control facility.26 By that time, the 64K building had cost U.S. taxpayers about $36 million. reprogramming as “Utilization of Funds in an appropriation account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation. Reprogramming is generally accomplished pursuant to consultation and approval by appropriate congressional committees.” 20 Memorandum from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010) [Exhibit 3]. 21 Email from LTC Norvel to USACE (Aug. 3, 2010). 22 Id. See Memorandum from LTC Erik M. Sell to Deputy Commander, Support United States Forces – Afghanistan (May 20, 2013), p.1. 23 24 Regional Command-Southwest was headquartered at Camp Leatherneck. It was created on July 3, 2010, from an area previously in RC-South. 25 “Weekly BOS-I Meeting” Regional Command-Southwest, Air Ground Team (November 7, 2011). See Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer, Memorandum from Major General James Richardson to General Joseph F. Dunford (Aug. 8, 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the Richardson Final Report), p. 6. 26 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 7 THE DECISION TO CONSTRUCT THE 64K BUILDING OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD RESULTED IN THE WASTE OF $36 MILLION As discussed above, commanders in the field believed there was no immediate operational need for the 64K building, either for the surge or for the future. Since Congress had already appropriated funds for the 64K building, USARCENT should have notified DoD and Congress of its desire to reprogram the funds to support other needs or requested rescission. However, General Vangjel believed this approach would not be “prudent.”27 General Vangjel28 told SIGAR investigators that the 64K building was part of “a larger strategic plan” for Camp Leatherneck to serve as an enduring base. However, he was unable to point to any documents, classified or unclassified, showing the existence of such a strategic plan. Furthermore, this assertion is contradicted by General Buckler’s June 26, 2010, memorandum, in which he stated that the request to cancel the 64K project was based on a review of “the ISAF Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Basing Strategy and Base Master Plans.”29 General Vangjel explained to SIGAR that he rejected the request to cancel the 64K building only after an understanding had been reached between USARCENT, USFOR-A, and the Marines. However, General Buckler of USFOR-A told SIGAR that he never changed his recommendation to cancel the 64K building. General Buckler confirmed that his request to cancel the 64K building was based on a thorough review of the ISAF Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Basing Strategy, and Base Master Plans. Similarly, when SIGAR investigators interviewed General Mills,30 he stated the 64K building was not necessary to execute his mission. He also noted that the command and control facility that existed at the time he was in command at Camp Leatherneck, which he used as his headquarters when he led the surge, was “more than sufficient.” In fact, it is difficult to understand how the existing command and control facility that was “more than sufficient” to handle the high point of troop strength in RC-South (i.e., the surge), would become insufficient for handling reduced troop strength after the surge was over and later, as the overall U.S. military presence began to shrink. In the face of this, General Vangjel’s decision to reject the request to cancel the project seems to have been based on a reluctance to reprogram31 funds already appropriated by Congress, rather than on a reasonable determination that the 64K building addressed an operational need. Not surprisingly, the building was never occupied and on October 29, 2014 Camp Leatherneck, including the 64K building, was closed by the U.S. and transferred to the Afghan government. In the end, $36 million in U.S. taxpayer funds was spent on a building the U.S. never used. 27 Memorandum from Major General Peter M. Vangjel to Deputy Commanding General, United States Forces Afghanistan (August 2010) [Exhibit 4]. 28 Major General Vangjel was promoted to Lieutenant General on Nov. 10, 2011. 29 Memorandum from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010) [Exhibit 3]. 30 Major General Mills was promoted to Lieutenant General on Apr. 18, 2013. DoD 7000.14-R, Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, defines reprogramming as “Utilization of funds in an appropriation account for purposes other than those contemplated at the time of appropriation. Reprogramming is generally accomplished pursuant to consultation and approval by appropriate congressional committees.” 31 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 8 TWO MILITARY INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 64K BUILDING REACHED OPPOSITE CONCLUSIONS AND CONTAINED GAPS IN INFORMATION In the course of its investigation, SIGAR learned that the military had conducted two AR 15-6 investigations of the 64K building. SIGAR investigators hoped that the reports from these investigations could be used to answer some of their questions concerning construction of the 64K building. However, the reports reached opposite conclusions and contained gaps in information, which made them of only limited value. The first AR 15-6 investigation was ordered by Major General Kenneth Dahl, Deputy Commander – Support, USFOR-A, on May 3, 2013, after he learned that the building had never been occupied.32 General Dahl tasked LTC Erik Sell with carrying out the investigation.33 LTC Sell found, among other things, that “the original intended use for this facility was to support the expansion of Tombstone/Bastion to meet the requirements in Regional Command-South and to support the additional personnel and missions that were assumed to be arriving with the troop surge.”34 His report included reference to a sworn statement from the Director of Public Works at Camp Leatherneck, who acknowledged that “the 64k building is not currently occupied.”35 The Director of Public Works also stated that: “We sought volunteers from all but the Marine units as they have been adamant that they are not willing to move into the 64K building. We had a number of units that volunteered but it was nowhere near enough to cost justify occupying the building.”36 In light of this information, LTC Sell’s report recommended that: “In order to utilize the facility effectively we need to look outside of its original intent. Because a Command & Control HQ facility is no longer a requirement the USAG should consider altering the use of the facility to meet an enduring need and best utilize the assets on the base.”37 In particular, LTC Sell believed the 64K building could address morale, welfare, and recreation needs, such as “fitness and recreational centers” and “a movie theater”.38 In his official revisions to LTC Sell’s report, General Dahl removed these suggestions and replaced them with the recommendation that the military “should investigate using the building for an alternate Title 10 purpose.”39 Approximately one month after General Dahl issued his report, General Dunford, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and USFOR-A, wrote to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), recommending a second investigation of the 64K building.40 General Dunford’s 32 Memorandum for Record from Major General Kenneth Dahl (May 27, 2013). 33 Memorandum from LTC Erik M. Sell to Deputy Commander, Support United States Forces – Afghanistan (May 20, 2013). 34 Id., p. 2. 35 Sworn Statement of Robert M. Sanders, Director of Public Works (May 13, 2013). 36 Id. 37 Memorandum from LTC Erik M. Sell, May 20, 2013. “USAG” is the acronym for U.S. Army Garrison. 38 Id. 39 Memorandum for Record from Major General Kenneth Dahl (May 27, 2013). 40 Memorandum of Major General Joseph Dunford to Commander, CENTCOM (undated). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 9 memorandum stated that, “This construction has potential to draw significant attention from auditors and Congress, and raises questions as to its approval and construction.”41 The stated purpose of General Dunford’s new AR 15-6 investigation was to examine “the facts and circumstances surrounding the construction of a Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck after the 1st MEF Commanding General [General Mills] requested cancellation of the project.”42 General Dunford appointed General Richardson to lead the investigation.43 General Dunford gave General Richardson broad authority to travel, gather evidence, and interview witnesses involved in the decision to construct the 64K building and specified that “Witnesses should be sworn, and you should document all witness interviews in writing . . . .”44 However, General Richardson did not follow General Dunford’s instructions regarding sworn statements and witness interviews. For example, while General Richardson’s report stated that his findings were based in part on “interviews with key individuals,”45 he acknowledged to SIGAR investigators that he did not interview any witnesses or take any sworn statements during his investigation. Instead, all questions he posed to witnesses were submitted via email. Moreover, General Richardson told SIGAR investigators that neither he nor anyone on his staff attempted to contact General Vangjel concerning his decision to reject the request to cancel the 64K building. When asked to explain why he did not interview General Vangjel, General Richardson told SIGAR investigators that an interview was unnecessary because he already had sufficient information to conduct his investigation based on documents related to the building. Despite the fact that General Richardson never interviewed General Vangjel, his report contained several statements suggesting reasons why General Vangjel denied the request to cancel construction of the 64K facility: “. . . [General Vangjel] relied upon the CENTCOM strategic vision of Camp Leatherneck and its criticality as an enduring strategic base.”46 “In addition, . . . [General Vangjel], coordinated for CENTCOM and USFOR-A concurrence that the 64K C2 Facility should continue prior to signing his denial memo.”47 “Notably, . . . [General Vangjel] did not sign the denial memorandum until after confirming that CENTCOM, USFOR-A and MEF (FWD) were in agreement that the 64K C2 facility would continue.”48 “. . . [General Vangjel] made the decision [to deny the requests to cancel the 64K building] with knowledge of the CENTCOM strategic vision . . . . ”49 41 Id. Memorandum from General Joseph F. Dunford, appointing Major General James Richardson investigating officer pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6 (Jun. 23, 2013) [Exhibit 5]. 42 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Richardson Final Report, p. 2. 46 Id., p. 4. 47 Id., p. 4. 48 Id., p. 5. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 10 As noted above, General Vangjel’s memorandum denying the requests to cancel the 64K facility did not make reference to any CENTCOM “strategic vision” or to the “criticality” of Leatherneck as an “enduring strategic base.” 50 Since he never interviewed General Vangjel, it is unclear how General Richardson could have concluded that General Vangjel’s decision to construct the 64K building was made on the basis of a “strategic vision” or an intention to make it an “enduring strategic base”. Even the information gathered by General Richardson himself directly undermines that conclusion. For example, in response to an email sent by General Richardson in July 2013, Brigadier General Bryan G. Watson, who was responsible for overseeing construction requirements in Afghanistan for USFOR-A, stated: “I do remember that the MILCON review for Bastion . . . as well as the other Marine bases . . . was very contentious because there was no clear decision on whether Bastion would become an enduring base . . . .51 Further, Major General Larry Nicholson, Commander, II MEF (FWD) informed General Richardson in July 2013, that: “Our team was not aware then, (or today), of any plans to build a permanent state of the art facility like the 64K building at LNK [Camp Leatherneck]. This is not an issue I ever discussed with LTGEN Mills, or then LTGEN Dunford who was my MARCENT CG, or then MGEN Nick Carter who was the CG of RC-South. While there was much chatter about the creation of roads, better billeting, a new PX, post office and the desire for a decent Gym, I was not aware of any planned construction of a follow-on HQ.”52 General Nicholson also stated that: “We certainly needed many things in those early days at Camp Leatherneck, but we were very pleased with the Ark HQ BLDG, and frankly we had many far more pressing facilities issues . . . I am confident that neither I nor any of my team asked for, signed for, or formally or informally requested a new future HQ for my successors.”53 Interestingly, the first version of General Richardson’s report concluded that the 64K building was intended to support the surge and recommended that the military “consider potential alternative uses for the C2 Facility.”54 However, General Richardson later changed that draft and recommended in his final report that USFOR-A “consider directing completion of the remaining elements to make 49 Id., p. 9. See Memorandum from Major General Peter Vangjel to Deputy Commanding General, United States Forces Afghanistan (Aug. 2010) [Exhibit 4]. 50 51 Email from Major General Bryan G. Watson to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 12, 2013) (emphasis added) [Exhibit 6]. 52 Email from Major General Larry D. Nicholson to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 12, 2013) [Exhibit 7]. 53 Id. Memorandum of Major General James Richardson to General Joseph F. Dunford (Jul. 20, 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the Richardson Draft Report). 54 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 11 the facility fully functional and direct occupancy and use of the 64K C2 facility for its original purpose.”55 As noted above, the original purpose of the 64K building was use as a command and control facility. However, the Marines had already declared in writing that their current command and control facility was all they needed. In addition, not only was the surge long over, but the U.S. had already begun to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Camp Leatherneck’s future was in doubt. Under these circumstances, there appears to have been no reasonable basis for General Richardson to have recommended that the 64K building be used for “its original purpose.” The facts indicate that General Richardson mismanaged the investigation by failing to carry out a fulsome investigation in accordance with General Dunford’s orders, and by failing to interview one of the key witnesses, namely General Vangjel. In addition, it is unclear how General Richardson could have credibly concluded in his final report that there was no “no act or omission, dereliction of duty, or any other violation of law or regulation” related to construction of a $36 million facility that was built over the objections of commanders in the field and that was never used for any purpose. 56 THE SECOND MILITARY INVESTIGATION OF THE 64K BUILDING MAY HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED BY INVESTIGATIVE IRREGULARITIES As SIGAR investigators attempted to reconcile the conclusions of General Richardson’s investigation with the results of their own interviews and fact-finding, they began to notice certain irregularities that may have affected the final version of General Richardson’s investigative report. General Richardson completed his findings and recommendations and submitted them to General Dunford on August 9, 2013.57 However, General Dunford did not approve General Richardson’s report until October 21, 2013.58 During the intervening months, changes were made to the report. SIGAR was unable to find any documentation of these changes. However, SIGAR obtained copies of emails indicating that Colonel Norman F. Allen, General Dunford’s legal advisor, passed portions of the report to General Vangjel for review, even though it was General Vangjel who made the controversial decision to proceed with construction of the 64K building.59 On August 28, 2013, Colonel Allen emailed certain “investigation findings”60 from General Richardson’s investigative report to General Vangjel and General Mills, stating that General Dunford “directed me to follow-up directly”.61 The excerpts contained in Colonel Allen’s email stated that General Vangjel’s decision to deny the request “was in keeping with the CENTCOM strategic vision of the enduring presence in RC-SW and was made after coordination with USFOR-A and MEF(FWD) 55 Richardson Final Report, p. 10. 56 Id., p. 9. 57 Email from Major General James Richardson to General Joseph F. Dunford (August 9, 2013) [Exhibit 8]. 58 Memorandum from General Lloyd Austin, CENTCOM, to John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Feb. 13, 2014). 59 See email from Colonel Norman Allen to Lieutenant General Peter M. Vangjel and Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills (Aug. 28, 2013) [Exhibit 9]. 60 Id. 61 Id. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 12 engineers.”62 By disclosing this information to General Vangjel, and doing so without first obtaining his direct, untainted testimony, Colonel Allen may have effectively “coached” General Vangjel, thereby compromising the integrity of the investigation. Rather than simply asking General Vangjel why he thought it was prudent to approve the 64K building, Colonel Allen appears to have provided him with the answer. Colonel Allen ended his email by stating that: “There is no hidden agenda, but simply seeking a complete picture before the boss goes final.”63 On August 29, 2013, General Vangjel responded that he denied the request to cancel the 64K facility because of his understanding of the “criticality of Leatherneck”.64 He also stated that: “MajGen Mills, if he was the previous commander who requested cancellation, was followed by a commander who requested to leave it as an active project, or perhaps MajGen Mills was the new commander . . . just can’t recall specifics”65 Colonel Allen replied to General Vangjel: “Thanks, sir. That’s helpful. Apologize for taking too much of your time, but I’ll dig into the material and provide you some additional background tomorrow and see if we can clarify, just to do so now before DoD or someone asks us to. But I owe you more background. Thanks, sir. Before I came to Afghanistan in February this year, I was the FORSCOM SJA for 2-1/2 years, and we worked several actions, getting your assistance on release of records and such. Always appreciate the support, and will try and reciprocate on this one.”66 However, General Mills’ response to Colonel Allen’s email contradicted the assertion that the decision to construct the 64K building was based on “the CENTCOM strategic vision of the enduring presence in RC-SW”: “I don’t recall being asked a second time about continuing the headquarters buildout . . . rather I recall discussions with my staff that our request to stop had been turned down and that we surmised that it was an indication that Leatherneck would in fact be an enduring facility . . . by the time we turned over in March of 2011, however, that decision had not been made . . . .”67 As noted above, General Vangjel’s memorandum denying the Marines’ request for cancellation of the 64K building did not mention any “strategic vision” or that the facility was intended to support an enduring presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, General Richardson noted in his own report that General Walter Miller, the Marine commander who inherited the 64K facility, stated: 62 Id. 63 Id. 64 Email from Lieutenant General Peter Vangjel to Colonel Norman Allen (Aug. 29, 2014) [Exhibit 9]. 65 Id. (ellipses in original). 66 Email from Colonel Norman Allen to General Peter Vangjel (Aug. 29, 2014) (emphasis added) [Exhibit 9]. Email from Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills to Colonel Norman F. Allen (Aug. 29, 2013) (ellipses in original) [Exhibit 10]. 67 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 13 “. . . I have no intent to move in. Many reasons, we are too small . . . we are rolling into the fighting season and it is not ready. We have recently stopped any future installs to the C2 infrastructure to the 64 K iot [in order to] end the money drain.”68 Given these facts, it is unclear why General Vangjel would claim after the fact that General Mills or one of his successors had requested construction of the 64K building. However, that was General Vangjel’s position after he received Colonel Allen’s email containing some of the findings of General Richardson’s report. The Army’s regulations pertaining to AR 15-6 investigations state, in part, “the interviewer must scrupulously avoid coaching the witness or suggesting the existence or nonexistence of material facts.”69 The decision to pass portions of the AR 15-6 report to General Vangjel prior to obtaining his untainted testimony deprived SIGAR investigators and, in effect, General Dunford of the opportunity to hear General Vangjel explain for himself why he decided to approve construction of the building. Moreover, it diminished the value of General Richardson’s report as a source on which SIGAR could rely. SIGAR’S INVESTIGATION WAS MET WITH RESISTANCE Unfortunately, during the course of SIGAR’s investigation, there were a number of instances in which military officials apparently decided to “slow roll” or discourage candid responses to SIGAR’s requests for documents and information pertaining to the 64K building. For example, an email from Colonel Allen to several addressees, including General Richardson’s legal advisor stated, “I wanted to slow roll these [responses to SIGAR questions] a bit more . . . .”70 Another email from Colonel Allen, which he sent to several individuals, including a CENTCOM attorney and an employee of the CENTCOM Inspector General, stated: “I don’t think people in this command should be subject to interviews that make them go behind official decisions here; for instance, I would consider it inappropriate for members of the command to address with SIGAR what they think of the 15-6 investigation appointed and approved by the commander. I have a good deal of knowledge about that investigation, but I would not answer questions to SIGAR; it’s not just out of loyalty to the command, but by process it would mean SIGAR is investigating the commander, and that, I believe, is way outside their purview.”71 By virtue of his position as General Dunford’s legal advisor, Colonel Allen was in a position to discourage full cooperation with SIGAR. Other officials also seemed interested in frustrating SIGAR’s inquiry into the circumstances surrounding construction of the 64K building. For example, a memorandum sent from a command Inspector General to CENTCOM stated that: 68 Richardson Final Report, p. 6, quoting email from General Miller. 69 Department of the Army, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, p. 14. 70 Email from Colonel Norman F. Allen to Colonel Brett A. Barraclough, et al (Nov. 11, 2013) [Exhibit 11]. Email from Norman F. Allen to Colonel Walter M. Hudson and Duane T. Rackley, et al (February 1, 2014) [Exhibit 12]. General Richardson’s Chief of Staff was also copied on this email. Contrary to Colonel Allen’s assertion, neither the Inspector General Act or SIGAR’s authorizing statute exempt general officers from SIGAR audits and investigations. 71 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 14 “We respectfully request that appropriate authorities intervene to cease the SIGAR’s evaluation of command internal business; if there are valid concerns, those are appropriate for CENTCOM or DOD inquiry, but not for SIGAR”72 In addition, an email sent by a senior military officer assigned to CENTCOM stated with regard to a SIGAR document request: “Our initial assessment is that there was no obligation to go out and search and preserve any records related to the C2 facility. We conducted an investigation, as we needed to do and we have already cooperated with SIGAR by providing them a copy of that investigation . . . .”73 Although these efforts appear to have been largely unsuccessful, it is likely that they discouraged full and candid cooperation with SIGAR investigators’ efforts to uncover all of the facts pertaining to the 64K building.74 For example, the Special Inspector General wrote to General Lloyd J. Austin, CENTCOM commander, on February 27, 2014 to request enforcement of SIGAR’s November 2013 request for preservation of records and production of documents and information. SIGAR’s letter followed the discovery by SIGAR investigators that certain key records relating to the 64K building had not been turned over.75 It was not until March 17, 2014 that DoD issued a document preservation order. It is particularly surprising that a senior lawyer with substantial experience as a commissioned officer in the Judge Advocate General branch of the U.S. Army, would appear to condone violation of Section 6 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, which requires Federal agencies to provide all information requested by an inspector general and to cooperate with an inspector general’s audits and investigations.76 Some of these apparent efforts to discourage cooperation with SIGAR’s investigation occurred around the same time that Senator Claire McCaskill was also requesting DoD to produce information related to the 64K building.77 CONCLUSION Although it cost approximately $36 million to build and furnish, there was no operational need for the 64K building and it was never used. While the building was intended to support the 2010 military surge, construction did not begin until May 2011, just two months before the first drawdown of the surge. By the time the surge ended in September 2012, the 64K building was still under construction. By April 2013, about 7 months after the conclusion of the surge, the 64K building was 98 percent complete. 72 Memorandum from Colonel Thurinton Harvell, Inspector General, U.S. Army, to CENTCOM (Feb. 4, 2014). 73 Email from Commander Robert Passerello to Colonel Norman Allen (Dec. 30, 2013) [Exhibit 13]. 74 SIGAR does not have the authority to subpoena other government agencies or to compel testimony; its investigators must rely on the forthright conduct of the agency personnel from whom it requests documents and other information. SIGAR does not normally conduct separate investigations of efforts to impede its own investigations, but when warranted, refers such matters to the Department of Justice for further evaluation. 75 Letter from John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Feb. 27, 2014). 76 5 U.S.C. App. 3, § 6. See also § 1229 (g) and (h) of SIGAR authorizing statute, 5 U.S.C. App. 3, § 8G note. Letter from Senator Claire McCaskill, Chairman, Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight, to Secretary Chuck Hagel, Department of Defense (January 9, 2014). 77 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 15 This could have been avoided. A year and a half before construction began, General Mills (the general in command of the surge), General McHale, and General Buckler, requested cancellation of the project. If their recommendations had been followed, at least $36 million would have been saved. However, General Vangjel denied their requests to cancel construction, on the basis that it would be imprudent not to spend funds that had already been appropriated by Congress. Despite these facts, General Richardson recommended in his final investigative report that the commander of USFOR-A “consider directing completion of the remaining elements to make the facility fully functional and direct occupancy and use of the 64K C2 facility for its original purpose.”78 General Richardson’s recommendation seems startling, given that the surge had already ended and the U.S. had already begun withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, it contradicts both the findings and conclusions of the first AR 15-6 investigation and an earlier version of his own investigative report.79 Most significantly, had General Richardson’s recommendation to complete the building been acted on, it would have brought the total cost of the 64K building to $41 million.80 Since there was no operational need for the building, this recommendation is particularly difficult to understand. SIGAR believes that General Richardson’s conclusion that, “[t]here is no evidence to support that continued processing for approval and construction at the USFOR-A level was the result of any act or omission”81 does not adequately address the failures that led to this waste of taxpayer dollars. Finally, although SIGAR received substantial cooperation from most of the offices and individuals it contacted, SIGAR encountered efforts by certain military officials to “slow roll” or otherwise frustrate this investigation.82 These actions discouraged full and candid cooperation with SIGAR’s investigation and seemed intended to obscure the fact that $36 million was wasted on construction of a building that commanders on the ground in Afghanistan did not want, did not need, and did not use. RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the findings of its investigation into the circumstances surrounding construction of the 64K building, SIGAR recommends that DoD: 1. Incorporate into the DoD Financial Management Regulation, DoD 7000.14-R, a clear statement that taxpayer funds should not be spent when they are no longer needed, merely because an official does not want to undertake the burden of requesting the reprogramming or rescission of those funds. 78 Richardson Final Report, p. 10. 79 As discussed above, an earlier draft of General Richardson’s report stated, “based on the facts, findings and conclusion, I recommend the Commander, USFOR-A consider potential alternative uses for the C2 Facility.” Memorandum of General James Richardson to General Joseph Dunford (Jul. 20, 2013). 80 DoD told SIGAR that it would cost U.S. taxpayers an additional $5 million to make the 64K building fully functional and another $1 million to maintain it every year. The cost to demolish the facility and count the $36 million project as a loss would be another $2 million. 81 Richardson Final Report, p.9. 82 See, e.g., Email from Colonel Norman F. Allen to Colonel Brett A. Barraclough, et al (Nov. 11, 2013) [Exhibit 11]. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 16 2. Adopt, at all appropriate command levels, financial management training that promotes this principle and rejects the “use it or lose it” approach to spending. 3. Determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Lieutenant General Peter M. Vangjel in light of his decision to construct the 64K building over the objections of commanders in the field, resulting in the waste of $36 million. 4. Determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Major General James Richardson in light of his failure to carry out a fulsome investigation in compliance with General Dunford’s orders. 5. Consider issuing a directive to all personnel explicitly reminding them of their legal obligation under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and the SIGAR authorizing statute, to fully cooperate with SIGAR audits, investigations, and requests for information. 6. Determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for Colonel Norman F. Allen in light of his failure to comply with law, regulation, and his ethical and professional responsibilities. AGENCY COMMENTS AND SIGAR RESPONSE We provided a draft of our report to DoD, General Vangjel, General Richardson, and Colonel Allen for review and comment. DoD, General Vangjel, and Colonel Allen provided written comments, which are reproduced in Appendices I, II, and III, respectively. General Richardson did not respond to our request for comments. In its comments, DoD did not dispute any of the facts contained in our draft report. However, DoD stated that, after reviewing our report and General Richardson’s final report, it had determined that General Vangjel’s decision to deny the request to cancel the 64K was prudent, because “[a]t the time of the decision, Camp Leatherneck was being considered as a potential enduring location for the U.S. military.” DoD concurred with our fifth recommendation, and stated that it partially concurred with our first and second recommendations, but did not concur with our third, fourth, and sixth recommendations, regarding administrative or disciplinary action for General Vangjel, General Richardson, and Colonel Allen. With regard to DoD’s concurrence with our fifth recommendation, we appreciate DoD’s commitment to provide guidance to its personnel acknowledging our jurisdiction over military construction projects like the 64K building. However, we found DoD’s responses to our other recommendations to be confusing and, particularly in reference to the involvement of the DoD IG, contradictory. With respect to both our first and second recommendations, DoD states that it “strongly agrees with the basis of the SIGAR’s recommendation”, but it rejects both recommendations because in DoD’s view they are not necessary. As discussed in more detail below, DoD’s comments on our first and second recommendations reference information that supports the conclusions contained in our report. Therefore, we maintain that our first and second recommendations remain valid in their entirety. DoD did not concur with recommendations three, four and six, that DoD determine appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for General Vangjel, General Richardson, and Colonel Allen. In all three cases, DoD stated that: “The Department reviewed the actions of [these officers] that were highlighted in the report and determined that they do not represent misconduct warranting consideration of SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 17 administrative or disciplinary action. The DoD IG has also reviewed this matter and finds insufficient basis for conducting or directing further investigation.”83 DoD did not explain how its decisions to take no action were reached, whether any internal inquiry was conducted, or whether any report was made. However, based on DoD’s statement that it “determined that [the actions of these officers] do not represent misconduct”, SIGAR is concerned that DoD may have focused its review too narrowly by applying only a “misconduct” standard. Under DoD policy, allegations of misconduct by senior officers (i.e., general officers and colonels being considered for promotion to general) are defined as a violation of criminal law, or a violation of a “recognized standard” involving elements of personal integrity, such as the ethics regulations.84 While the actions of General Vangjel and General Richardson did not constitute misconduct, SIGAR believes their actions constituted mismanagement, including waste and abuse,85 and DoD should take action accordingly. SIGAR also believes that the actions of Colonel Allen in attempting to coach witnesses involved in an active investigation and in encouraging military personnel not to cooperate with SIGAR, constitute both misconduct and mismanagement, and DoD should take action accordingly. In its comments, DoD also stated that a separate review of the draft report was conducted by the DoD IG, who “finds insufficient basis for conducting or directing further investigation.” DoD’s comments give the impression that the DoD IG’s office reviewed the matter or conducted an investigation. However, it turns out this is not the case. After receiving DoD’s comments, SIGAR contacted the DoD IG’s office to request an explanation of how these conclusions were reached, including what standards were applied, and what evidence was considered. SIGAR also requested a copy of any report of investigation, report of investigative inquiry, or other memorandum explaining the disposition of these three recommendations.86 In reply, the DoD IG’s Director, Investigations of Senior Officials, stated that, “Because the OIG does not participate in management decisions to take, or not take, action, we are unable to provide an explanation and suggest you direct your request to the responsible Department officials.” He went on to state that, “. . . in the absence of a specific request for a separate investigation, we did not find it necessary to conduct an additional investigation.” Finally, he stated that with respect to Colonel Allen, “We did not find the allegations you referenced to be something that merits reporting in accordance with AR 20-1 . . . .”87 In an attempt to obtain further clarification, the Special Inspector General contacted the DoD IG directly. In a telephone discussion, the DoD IG explained, “[he] was aware of the conclusions in the SIGAR report. Considering the existence of the SIGAR report, and in the absence of a request from responsible DoD officials that additional investigative work be conducted, [the DoD IG] declined to conduct further investigation of this matter.” 83 See Appendix I. 84 See, e.g., DoD Directive 5505.06, Investigations of Allegations Against Senior DoD Officials, pp. 1 and 6 (June 6, 2013). 85 See. e.g., Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, p.99 (definition of “mismanagement”). Letter from Sharon E. Woods, Deputy Assistant IG for Investigations, SIGAR, to Anthony D. Jones, Director, Investigations of Senior Officers, DoD IG (Feb. 25, 2015) [Appendix IV]. 86 Letter from Anthony D. Jones, Director, Investigations of Senior Officers, DoD IG, to Sharon E. Woods, Deputy Assistant IG for Investigations, SIGAR (Mar. 20, 2015) [Appendix V]. 87 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 18 In sum, DoD stated that the DoD IG decided not to investigate, while the DoD IG stated that he declined to investigate because DoD didn’t ask him to. Although these statements contradict each other, the result was the same: no investigation was done and none was requested. DoD also provided “technical comments” on the draft report. These comments did not warrant any changes to the report. To the contrary, they reinforce our conclusion that the decision to construct the 64K building appears to have been based on an intent to avoid reprogramming or returning funds already appropriated by Congress. General Vangjel and Colonel Allen provided separate comments regarding their individual roles in this matter, but did not comment on SIGAR’s recommendations. The comments provided by General Vangjel and Colonel Allen did not introduce any new information or warrant changes to the report. Although General Vangjel asserted that there were “significant errors throughout the draft report,” his comments did not identify any errors, significant or otherwise. Instead, General Vangjel faulted SIGAR for not giving greater weight to evidence he believed showed a strategic and operational need for the 64K building. We have again reviewed the evidence highlighted by General Vangjel and find that it supported our conclusion that his decision to reject cancellation of the 64K building appears to have been based on his belief that it would be imprudent to request the reprogramming of funds already appropriated by Congress. Colonel Allen did not dispute any of the facts contained in our draft report, but he disagreed with “the characterization of my communications and actions” and offered additional “context”. The additional “context” Colonel Allen offered consists of assertions regarding his intent at the time he provided draft investigative findings to General Vangjel, advised other DoD personnel to “slow roll” responses to SIGAR’s requests for information, and encouraged them not to cooperate with SIGAR’s inquiry. However, our findings are supported by Colonel Allen’s contemporaneous emails, which in our view are the best evidence available with regard to his intentions at the time. He has not disputed the facts as related in this report. Vague and unsupported attempts to provide “context” after the fact do not controvert those findings. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 19 APPENDIX I: COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SIGAR’S RESPONSE SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 20 SIGAR Comment 1 SIGAR Comment 2 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 21 SIGAR Comment 3 SIGAR Comment 4 SIGAR Comment 5 SIGAR Comment 6 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 22 SIGAR Comment 7 SIGAR Comment 8 SIGAR Comment 9 SIGAR Comment 10 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 23 SIGAR Comment 11 SIGAR Comment 12 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 24 SIGAR’s Response to DoD Comments 1. DoD partially concurred with our first recommendation. DoD agreed that “appropriated funds should be expended only to meet valid, current agency requirements and not to avoid the inconvenience of a subsequent reprogramming or recession.” However, DoD believes it is unnecessary to incorporate a statement to this effect into the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) because “the Department is already prohibited from expending appropriated funds for purposes other than the satisfaction of a bona fide need that exists during the appropriation’s period of availability”, citing “the so-called Bona Fide Needs Rule, which derives from Title 31, U.S. Code, section 1502 . . . .”88 DoD also asserts that “it is unlikely that DoD personnel will consider reprogramming concerns when assessing whether an acquisition of goods or services is required.” We disagree with DoD’s reasoning on this issue. In our view, the facts of this case demonstrate that DoD cannot rely solely on senior officers’ knowledge of the Bona Fide Needs Rule. Moreover, DoD’s assertion that “it is unlikely” that DoD personnel will violate the Bona Fide Needs Rule is not only unsupported, it is controverted by the case of the 64K building. In sum, SIGAR continues to believe that an amendment to the Department’s Financial Management Regulation to explicitly state that funds should not be spent when they are no longer needed would be more effective than relying solely on an officer’s presumed familiarity with the Bona Fide Needs Rule. If the FMR had contained our recommended clarification back in 2010, General Vangjel might at least have been compelled to document a legitimate basis for proceeding with the 64K building. At best, the clarification could have prompted General Vangjel to cancel the 64K facility, thereby saving $36 million. Therefore, we maintain that our first recommendation is valid in its entirety. 2. DoD partially concurred with our second recommendation, explaining that it “strongly agrees with the basis of the SIGAR’s recommendation, specifically, that appropriated funds should be expended only to meet valid, current agency requirements” and not to “embrace a ‘use it or lose it’ approach to spending.” However, DOD rejected the recommendation that financial management training incorporating this principle should be adopted at all command levels, because “DoD financial management training already emphasizes the fiduciary duty to expend taxpayers’ funds responsibly and lawfully.” We do not understand DoD’s refusal to include in its financial management training a principle which the Department claims it supports, namely that taxpayer money should not be spent on a “use it or lose it basis.” While DoD asserts that this training is not necessary, the facts of this case demonstrate that the status quo is simply not enough. 88 The Bona Fide Needs Rule, in its most basic form, provides that “A fiscal year appropriation may be obligated only to meet a legitimate, or bona fide, need arising in, or in some cases arising prior to but continuing to exist in [the appropriation’s period of availability].” U.S. Government Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Volume I, Chapter 5, p. 5-11 (January 2004) (emphasis in original). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 25 While DoD does not disagree with any of the facts stated in our report, it claims our recommendation is based on a “misinterpretation of the decision-making process.” However, our report shows that General Vangjel did not approve construction of the 64K building in order to meet a requirement in FY 2010. In fact, the evidence gathered by our investigators indicates that the 64K building never served any operational need. Although some officials proposed converting the building into “fitness and recreational centers” or “a movie theater,”89 it was transferred to the Afghan government in October 2014 without ever having been used. As shown in our report, after undertaking a comprehensive review of pending military construction projects and of existing strategic plans, the generals on the ground in Afghanistan at the time determined that the 64K building did not meet an operational need.90 Moreover, contemporaneous evidence shows that General Vangjel did not mention a 2010 operational requirement as his basis for proceeding with construction of the 64K facility. Instead, his decision memorandum noted that the 64K building was also “listed in the FY 12 OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] emerging requirements,”91 indicating that the building was not an actual or definite requirement for FY 2010. The lack of an operational need for the 64K building in FY 2010 is also demonstrated by the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Norvel of USARCENT, who was on General Vangjel’s staff at the time, told USACE that he wanted to “push the FY10 supplemental C2 Facility at Leatherneck as far to the right as possible (may want to look at Jan 12 [2011] as a target).”92 He also stated that he wanted “to ensure we time this award to support other operational requirements” and asked USACE to “move it to the bottom of the pile.”93 If the decision to fund construction of the 64K building was, as DoD asserts, “based on a determination that a valid requirement existed in FY 2010,” then it is puzzling why LTC Norvel sought to move the project to the “bottom of the pile.” Moreover, the construction contract for the 64K building was not awarded until February 2011 and construction did not begin until sometime around May 2011, about eight months after the close of FY 2010.94 Given these facts, there does not appear to be any basis for claiming that there was an operational need for the 64K building in FY 2010, nor has DoD produced any support for its interpretation now, five years later. As noted above, General Vangjel’s decision to reject the requests to cancel the 64K building appears to have been an attempt to avoid having to reprogram funds by directing them 89 Memorandum from LTC Erik M. Sell, May 20, 2013. 90 Memorandum from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010). 91 Memorandum from Major General Peter Vangjel to Deputy Commanding General, United States Forces Afghanistan (Aug. 2010) (emphasis added). 92 Email from LTC Norvel to USACE (Aug. 3, 2010). 93 Id. SIGAR notes that a legal opinion of the Chief of Contract and Fiscal Law at U.S. ARCENT stated that “typically, to be properly considered a bona fide need of FY 10, the need for construction must exist in FY 10 and the construction work, itself, usually must commence NLT [no later than] 1 January 2011.” Memorandum of Major Danisha L. Morris, JA, Chief, Contract and Fiscal Law (June 29, 2010). 94 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 26 toward a project that did not meet a known operational or strategic need. The failure to cancel the 64K building led to approximately $36 million being wasted on a facility that was unwanted, unneeded, and unused. General Vangjel’s actions indicate that DoD personnel at all appropriate command levels would benefit from training that clearly and unequivocally rejects a “use it or lose it” approach to spending. Therefore, we maintain that our second recommendation is valid in its entirety. 3. DoD did not concur with our third recommendation. DoD stated that it “reviewed the actions of then-MG Vangjel that were highlighted in the report and determined that they do not represent misconduct warranting consideration of administrative or disciplinary action.” DoD also noted that the “DoD IG has also reviewed this matter and finds insufficient basis for conducting or directing further investigation.” DoD did not explain how its decision to take no action was reached, whether any internal inquiry was conducted, or whether any report was made. However, based on DoD’s statement that it “determined that [the actions of General Vangjel] do not represent misconduct”, SIGAR is concerned that DoD may have focused its review too narrowly. Under DoD policy, allegations of misconduct by senior officers (i.e., general officers and colonels being considered for promotion to general) are defined as a violation of criminal law, or a violation of a “recognized standard” involving elements of personal integrity, such as the ethics regulations.95 Apparently, DoD limited its review to whether General Vangjel’s actions constituted “misconduct”. SIGAR believes that General Vangjel’s decision to construct the 64K building over the objections of commanders in the field, resulting in the waste of $36 million, constituted mismanagement. Under Army Regulation 20-1, for example, “mismanagement” is defined as: “A collective term covering acts of waste and abuse. The extravagant, careless, or needless expenditure of Government funds or the consumption or misuse of Government property or resources resulting from deficient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. Also includes abuse of authority or similar actions that do not involve criminal fraud.”96 General Vangjel’s decision to proceed with construction of the 64K building over the objection of commanders in the field appears to meet this definition. Therefore, we stand by our third recommendation. 4. DoD did not concur with our fourth recommendation. DoD stated that it “reviewed the actions of MG Richardson highlighted in the draft SIGAR report and determined that they do not represent misconduct warranting consideration of administrative or disciplinary action.” DoD also noted that the “DoD IG has also reviewed this matter and finds insufficient basis for conducting or directing further investigation.” 95 See DoD Directive 5505.06, Investigations of Allegations Against Senior DoD Officials, pp. 1 and 6 (June 6, 2013). 96 Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, p.99 (definition of “mismanagement”). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 27 DoD did not explain how its decision to take no action was reached, whether any internal inquiry was conducted, or whether any report was made. However, based on DoD’s statement that it “determined that [the actions of General Richardson] do not represent misconduct”, SIGAR is concerned that DoD may have focused its review too narrowly. Under DoD policy, allegations of misconduct by senior officers (i.e., general officers and colonels being considered for promotion to general) are defined as a violation of criminal law, or a violation of a “recognized standard” involving elements of personal integrity, such as the ethics regulations.97 Apparently, DoD limited its review to whether General Richardson’s actions constituted “misconduct”. SIGAR believes that General Richardson’s failure to conduct his investigation in accordance with General Dunford’s orders and his failure to interview the key witness who made the decision to construct the 64K building (i.e., General Vangjel), constituted mismanagement. Under Army Regulation 20-1, for example, “mismanagement” is defined as, “A collective term covering acts of waste and abuse. The extravagant, careless, or needless expenditure of Government funds or the consumption or misuse of Government property or resources resulting from deficient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. Also includes abuse of authority or similar actions that do not involve criminal fraud.”98 In view of DoD’s narrow interpretation, we are amending our report to explicitly state that we believe the actions of General Richardson constituted mismanagement. Therefore, we stand by our fourth recommendation. 5. DoD concurred with our fifth recommendation. DoD stated that “the documentation collected during the investigation indicated confusion among members of the Department regarding the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the SIGAR.” We appreciate DoD’s recognition that the actions of certain individuals were not a proper response to SIGAR’s requests for information. Moreover, we appreciate DoD’s decision to provide guidance to its personnel regarding SIGAR’s broad oversight authorities, including its authority to investigate matters related to the 64K building and other military construction projects. 6. DoD did not concur with our sixth recommendation. DoD stated that it “reviewed the actions of Colonel (COL) Allen that were highlighted in the draft SIGAR report and determined that they do not represent misconduct warranting consideration of administrative or disciplinary action.” DoD also noted that the “DoD IG has also reviewed this matter and finds insufficient basis for conducting or directing further investigation.” DoD added that Colonel Allen would be provided guidance regarding the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of SIGAR. DoD did not explain how its decision to take no action was reached, whether any internal inquiry was conducted, or whether any report was made. Current DoD policy prescribes 97 See, e.g., DoD Directive 5505.06, Investigations of Allegations Against Senior DoD Officials, pp. 1 and 6 (June 6, 2013). 98 Army Regulation 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures, p.99 (definition of “mismanagement”). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 28 specific procedures for handling allegations of this nature. DoD Directive 5505.06 provides that, “Allegations of misconduct against senior officials will be vigorously investigated by appropriate investigative organizations.99 The directive goes on to provide that the DoD IG receives those allegations and notifies the appropriate DoD components if an investigation is opened. The directive requires the relevant component (in this case, the Army) to “initiate an investigation into the issues raised in the allegation” unless the DoD IG assumes investigative responsibility for the matter.100 In addition, Army Regulation 20-1 provides a separate process for handling allegations against Army lawyers.101 It is unclear whether these procedures were followed with respect to Colonel Allen. This is particularly troubling because the evidence uncovered by SIGAR indicates that Colonel Allen attempted to coach witnesses involved in an active investigation and encouraged military personnel not to cooperate with SIGAR. SIGAR believes Colonel Allen’s actions constituted both misconduct and mismanagement, and violated his professional and ethical responsibilities as an Army lawyer. DoD should take action accordingly. Therefore, we stand by our sixth recommendation. SIGAR’s Response to DoD Technical Comments 7. DoD claimed that only $25.1 million was spent on the 64K building, not approximately $36 million, as stated in our report. We disagree. DoD reached its reduced total by excluding amounts spent to construct the infrastructure, including utilities and roads, that served the 64K building. However, DoD did not provide any information indicating that this infrastructure was intended to serve any purpose other than support of the 64K building. Since this infrastructure was built to serve the 64K building, our report will continue to reflect these costs in the total cost of the 64K project, which was approximately $36 million. 8. DoD claimed that, by quoting General Toolan’s statement that the “time to ‘stop building’ is now,” SIGAR insinuated “that individuals responsible for the construction of [the 64K] facility did not heed MG Toolan’s guidance.” We disagree. Given that General Vangjel had already rejected the request of the surge commander to cancel the 64K building, there would have been little basis for the military personnel overseeing construction of the 64K building to assume that their work would be affected by the drawdown from the surge. As General Buckler told General Richardson when he asked why the 64K project proceeded, “My assumption is that we were told to continue and we did so.”102 However, General Toolan’s statement does support SIGAR’s main point: the surge was over and the 64K building was not wanted and not needed. 9. Our report notes that General Vangjel was unable to provide evidence supporting his claim that his decision to proceed with construction of the 64K building was based on a “larger 99 DoD Directive 5505.06, Paragraph 3.a. (Jun. 6, 2013). 100 DoD Directive 5505.06, Enclosure 2, paragraphs 1.b. and 2.b. 101 AR 20-1, Ch. 7-1, b (7)i(4). Email from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 9, 2013), attaching list of responses to interview questions. 102 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 29 strategic plan.” DoD’s technical comments stated that “LTG Vangjel may not have been able to point to a plan that existed at the time; however, by August of 2012 it was included in the camp master plan to meet operational requirements.” The existence of a plan in 2012 does not explain why General Vangjel decided in 2010 to proceed with construction of the 64K building. As noted in our report, General Vangjel’s assertion that he based his decision on a “larger strategic plan” is contradicted by General Buckler’s June 2010 memorandum, which stated that the request to cancel the 64K project was based on a review of “the ISAF Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Based Strategy and Base Master Plans.”103 Moreover, neither General Vangjel nor DoD has provided SIGAR with evidence of a strategic plan that in 2010 justified construction of the 64K building. 10. DoD stated that, “in response to inquiry from MG Richardson, BG Buckler could not recall specifics about his recommendation on this particular facility.” DoD also stated that “CENTCOM confirmed with Lt Col Arnold, BG Buckler’s MILCON Program Chief, that USFOR-A will not request cancellation of the building.” These statements do not contradict General Buckler’s statement to SIGAR investigators that he did not change his recommendation to cancel the 64K building. DoD’s first statement concerning General Buckler’s recommendation to cancel appears to be based on a misquotation. General Buckler did not tell General Richardson that he did not recall his recommendation to cancel the building; General Buckler simply wrote that he did “not have a clear recollection of the specifics on this project.”104 DoD’s second statement, concerning General Buckler’s recommendation, is more puzzling. Even if Lieutenant Colonel Arnold did not oppose the decision to proceed with construction of the 64K building, it is not reasonable to conclude that General Buckler changed his mind regarding whether the building addressed an operational need. General Buckler provided General Vangjel with his assessment that the 64K building was not needed to support an operational requirement. If General Vangjel or other officials higher in the chain of command wanted the facility built regardless, then General Buckler and his staff would not have been in a position to overrule them. As General Buckler told General Richardson when he asked why the 64K project proceeded, “My assumption is that we were told to continue and we did so.”105 11. Our report noted that General Richardson’s AR 15-6 investigative report contained several statements speculating about why General Vangjel denied the requests to cancel the 64K building, even though General Richardson never interviewed General Vangjel. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DoD further speculated that “General Richardson could have ascertained the CENTCOM strategic vision from his email interview with CDR Timothy Wallace,” and therefore would not have needed to speak with General Vangjel. 103 Memorandum from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010). 104 Email from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 4, 2013) (emphasis added). Email from Brigadier General William M. Buckler, Jr., to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 9, 2013), attaching list of responses to interview questions. 105 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 30 DoD’s speculation on this issue indicates a continuing effort to rationalize General Richardson’s conclusion rather than to critically examine it. This effort falls short for several reasons. First, it begs the question why DoD did not just ask General Richardson why he chose not to contact General Vangjel. Second, DoD’s comment appears to ignore the fact that General Richardson’s investigative report stated that his findings were based in part on “interviews with key individuals,”106 even though he did not interview General Vangjel, arguably the most key individual involved in the decision to proceed with construction of the 64K building. Third, DoD’s comment ignores Colonel Allen’s contemporaneous statement that he contacted General Vangjel because he was “simply seeking a complete picture before the boss goes final.”107 Colonel Allen’s email demonstrates that he recognized that General Richardson’s report would be incomplete without input from General Vangjel. Most importantly, DoD’s comment ignores the fact that CDR Wallace’s statement supports our conclusion that the decision not to cancel the 64K building appears to have been based on the desire to avoid the reprogramming process. General Richardson asked CDR Wallace, “What was discussed reference the potential for cancellation of the [64K] facility?”108 CDR Wallace replied, “It was easier to shift location or size of an approved MILCON than start over with approval process so I believe decision was made not to cancel at that time until all new requirements were known.”109 Rather than supporting the contention that the 64K facility was needed to support “the CENTCOM strategic vision,” CDR Wallace’s statement indicates there was no clear need for the 64K building at the time General Vangjel made his decision and that the project was continued because that was “easier” than to “start over with [the] approval process.” In sum, CDR Wallace’s email provides no basis for either General Richardson or DoD to claim the existence of a “CENTCOM strategic vision” to justify construction of the 64K building. 12. The fact that subsequent MILCON reviews did not result in cancellation of the 64K building does not show that General Vangjel’s 2010 decision was based on a strategic plan. If anything, it shows the opposite: that despite a lack of plans, construction continued. General Watson’s statement to General Richardson confirms the fact that there was no strategic plan or “strategic vision” for the 64K building. As General Watson noted, “the MILCON review . . . was very contentious because there was no clear decision on whether Bastion [Camp Leatherneck] would become an enduring base.”110 General Watson’s statement calls into serious doubt the accuracy of General Richardson’s claim that, at the time General Vangjel made his decision, he “relied upon the CENTCOM strategic vision of Camp Leatherneck and its criticality as an enduring strategic base.”111 106 Richardson Final Report, p.2. See Email from Colonel Norman Allen to Lieutenant General Peter M. Vangjel and Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills (Aug. 28, 2013). 107 108 Email from to General James Richardson to CDR Timothy A. Wallace (Jul. 22, 2013). 109 Email from CDR Timothy A. Wallace to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 24, 2013). 110 Email from Major General Bryan G. Watson to Major General James Richardson (Jul. 12, 2013) (emphasis added). 111 Richardson Final Report, p.4 (emphasis added). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 31 APPENDIX II: COMMENTS OF GENERAL VANGJEL AND SIGAR’S RESPONSE SIGAR Comment 1 SIGAR Comment 2 SIGAR Comment 3 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 32 SIGAR Comment 4 SIGAR Comment 5 SIGAR Comment 6 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 33 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 34 SIGAR’s Response to General Vangjel’s Comments 1. General Vangjel stated in his comments that “there are significant errors throughout the draft report and inadequate consideration of context and timelines.” However, General Vangjel did not identify any errors in our report or provide new information that would warrant changes to our report. General Vangjel also stated, “I refute any finding or insinuation that I was ‘coached’ at any point during inquiries into this matter.” Presumably General Vangjel was referring to the portion of our report concerning Colonel Allen’s disclosure of investigative findings to General Vangjel prior to obtaining General Vangjel’s direct, untainted testimony. The excerpts disclosed by Colonel Allen’s email stated that General Vangjel’s decision to deny the request “was in keeping with the CENTCOM strategic vision of the enduring presence in RC-SW and was made after coordination with USFOR-A and MEF(FWD) engineers.”112 General Vangjel’s comments on our report do not contain new information regarding his exchange with Colonel Allen on this issue. Therefore, General Vangjel’s comments are unsupported and do not warrant any change to our report. 2. General Vangjel commented that his decision to deny the requests to cancel the 64K building “was based on a reasonable determination that the 64K building addressed an operational need and a determination that the project was in line with CENTCOM’s strategic intent.” General Vangjel also stated that our report “fails to consider the strategic view and intent of CENTCOM and other senior leaders which supported the need for the 64K C2 Facility at Camp Leatherneck as a Regional Headquarters.” We disagree. As noted in our report, General Buckler’s request to cancel the 64K building “was evaluated based on the ISAF Campaign Plan, the Afghanistan Basing Strategy and Base Master Plans.”113 In contrast, General Vangjel’s decision memorandum merely stated that cancelling the 64K building and requesting a reprogramming of the funds would “not be prudent” because the funds were already appropriated by Congress. General Vangjel’s memorandum denying the request to cancel the 64K building does not mention a CENTCOM “strategic intent” or an operational need for the building. General Vangjel also asserts that “[CENTCOM’s strategic intent] had been communicated by members of the CENTCOM staff via email as well as during CENTCOM Commander Conference Executive Sessions which I attended.” However, General Vangjel has not provided copies of any emails or documents in support of this assertion. Nor did General Richardson cite any emails or documents in his investigative report supporting this assertion. Finally, SIGAR was not able to locate any DoD documents or emails that support this assertion. Most significantly, General Vangjel did not refer to this rationale in his decision memorandum denying the requests to cancel the 64K building. 112 See email from Colonel Norman Allen to Lieutenant General Peter M. Vangjel and Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills (Aug. 28, 2013). 113 Memorandum of Brigadier General William A. Buckler, Jr., to USARCENT Kuwait G7 (June 26, 2010) [Exhibit 3]. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 35 3. General Vangjel commented that our report “fails to take into consideration the documentary evidence that demonstrates the operational need for a C2 Facility on Camp Leatherneck.” We disagree. Rather than showing an operational need for the building, which was never used, the documents indicate that some subordinate officers later agreed not to request cancellation of the project, in order to have “an opportunity to obtain clarity” on how a number of different projects might be used.114 In other words, the documents referenced by General Vangjel support our conclusion that his decision was based on concerns related to keeping the funds already appropriated by Congress, rather than to meet an existing operational need for the 64K building. General Vangjel also asserted in his comments that, after requesting cancellation of the 64K building, the commanders on the ground requested funds for a smaller command and control facility to be available in 2012. General Vangjel believed “it was prudent to move forward with the already-approved project, with the knowledge that there would be other opportunities to de-scope or even cancel the project if the situation dictated.” In addition to the fact that General Buckler, one of the commanders on the ground, told SIGAR investigators that he never reversed his decision to request cancellation of the 64K building. General Vangjel’s comments support our conclusion that the 64K building was not needed to support an operational need in 2010. The decision to proceed with the project appears to have been an effort to retain funds already appropriated, so as to leave them available for a future need that was not yet fully defined. As noted in our report, a future need never arose, the 64K building was never used, and $36 million was wasted. 4. General Vangjel asserts that he rejected the request to cancel the 64K building only after he was notified that USFOR-A was in agreement not to cancel the project. In support of this assertion, General Vangjel enclosed with his comments a copy of an email from the USFOR-A Chief of Construction, stating that he [the Chief of Construction] had “spoken w/ I MEF (Fwd) G7 (Col. Flowers) and we are in agreement that USFOR-A will not request cancellation of the project.” However, we note that in response to that email from the Chief of Construction, LTC Norvel, a member of General Vangjel’s staff, stated, “Want to push [the 64K building project] as far to the right as possible (may want to look at Jan 12 as a target). Want to ensure we time this award to support other operational requirements.”115 In other words, the point was not to meet an existing operational need – after all, Generals Mills, Buckler, and McHale had already determined that an operational need did not exist. Instead, the real purpose was to retain the project for some other possible use in the future. SIGAR’s interpretation is further bolstered by the rest of the email chain, which General Vangjel did not include with his comments. In response to LTC Norvel’s email, Elizabeth Cain, a USACE Military Program Manager, expressed some misgivings about this, stating, “My only comment on this is that we will have to provide to HQUSACE a justification for scheduling an FY10 award that late. ‘Customer request to support operational requirements’ should be sufficient justification, but may need additional input from you if we get questions.”116 In other words, Ms. Cain made it clear that she wanted cover if someone later questioned her about it. 114 See, e.g., Email from Lieutenant Colonel Neil Arnold, USFOR-A, to CDR Timothy Wallace (Aug. 3, 2013). 115 Email from LTC Norvel to USACE (Aug. 3, 2010). 116 Email from Elizabeth U. Cain (Aug. 4, 2010). SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 36 5. General Vangjel noted that following his departure in 2011, the USFOR-A commander did not cancel or reduce the scope of the 64K project. General Vangjel stated that “It is inconceivable that commanders on the ground would continue to modify a contract and incur additional costs if there was not, in fact, an operational need for the facility.” We disagree. The fact that commanders on the ground respected the orders of General Vangjel and CENTCOM is not a basis for assuming that they saw an operational need for the facility. In fact, General Walter Miller, the Marine commander who inherited the 64K facility, stated: “. . . I have no intent to move in. Many reasons, we are too small . . . we are rolling into the fighting season and it is not ready. We have recently stopped any future installs to the C2 infrastructure to the 64 K iot [in order to] end the money drain.”117 Again, it was the commander on the ground who recognized that continuing construction of the 64K building was a waste of money. 6. General Vangjel commented that the operational need for the 64K building is shown “by the multiple contract modifications made to the project increasing its cost from the original $24 Million to $36 Million and extending the completion date from January 2012 to October 2012.” As explained in our preceding comment, we do not agree with the proposition that continued spending constitutes evidence of an operational need that commanders in the field had already determined did not exist. 117 Richardson Final Report, p. 6, quoting email from General Miller. SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 37 APPENDIX III: COMMENTS OF COLONEL ALLEN AND SIGAR’S RESPONSE SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 38 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 39 SIGAR’s Response to Colonel Allen’s Comments Colonel Allen did not dispute any of the facts contained in our draft report, but disagreed with “the characterization of my communications and actions” and offered additional “context”. The additional “context” Colonel Allen provided in his comments consists of unsupported statements regarding his intentions when he passed draft investigative findings to General Vangjel and advised his colleagues to “slow roll” responses to SIGAR’s requests for information. While Colonel Allen argues that he provided draft investigative findings to General Vangjel in order to “seek clarification”, he fails to address the overriding issue: why didn’t he or General Richardson ever ask General Vangjel why he rejected the requests to cancel the 64K building. Colonel Allen’s continued insistence that it was legitimate for him to question SIGAR’s right to investigate the decisions of senior officers indicates that he still does not fully appreciate that SIGAR has a statutory duty to “conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan” and “to keep the [Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State] and the Congress fully and currently informed . . . concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations administered or financed by [their agencies] . . . .”118 In addition, SIGAR’s authorizing statute requires that all Federal Government entities provide such information or assistance as may be requested by the Inspector General, without jurisdictional limitation.119 Congress adopted this broad mandate because it recognized that to do otherwise would permit the subject of an inquiry to evade it simply by refusing to acknowledge SIGAR’s authority. In sum, as an experienced lawyer, Colonel Allen knew, or should have known, that it was not within his discretion to decide whether to cooperate with a SIGAR inquiry. Equally troubling is Colonel Allen’s apparent view that decisions of senior officers should not be questioned. For example, after receiving a SIGAR request for information and documents related to the 64K building, he stated in an email: “I don’t think people in this command should be subject to interviews that make them go behind official decisions here; for instance, I would consider it inappropriate for members of the command to address with SIGAR what they think of the 15-6 investigation appointed and approved by the commander. I have a good deal of knowledge about that investigation, but I would not answer questions to SIGAR; it’s not just out of loyalty to the command, but by process it would mean SIGAR is investigating the commander, and that, I believe, is way outside their purview.”120 Evidently, Colonel Allen believes that the actions of generals and other senior officers should not be subject to Inspector General inquiry. Not only is this contrary to SIGAR’s authorizing statute and the Inspector General Act, it is counter to a foundational principle of the U.S. States Constitution, that all citizens are equal before the law, without regard to rank or privilege. Section 1229(f) of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2008, and Section 4(a)(5) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. 118 119 Section 1229(h)(5) of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2008. Email from Colonel Norman F. Allen to Colonel Walter M. Hudson and Duane T. Rackley, et al (February 1, 2014) [Exhibit 12]. General Richardson’s Chief of Staff was also copied on this email. Contrary to Colonel Allen’s assertion, neither the Inspector General Act or SIGAR’s authorizing statute exempt general officers from SIGAR audits and investigations. 120 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 40 APPENDIX IV: INQUIRY LETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 41 APPENDIX V: RESPONSE LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 42 EXHIBIT 1 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 43 EXHIBIT 2 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 44 EXHIBIT 3 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 45 EXHIBIT 4 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 46 EXHIBIT 5 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 47 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 48 EXHIBIT 6 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 49 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 50 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 51 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 52 EXHIBIT 7 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 53 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 54 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 55 EXHIBIT 8 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 56 EXHIBIT 9 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 57 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 58 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 59 EXHIBIT 10 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 60 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 61 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 62 EXHIBIT 11 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 63 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 64 EXHIBIT 12 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 65 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 66 EXHIBIT 13 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 67 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 68 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 69 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Claire M. Barnard, Senior Analyst Christopher Staszak, Senior Investigative Counsel Alexandria M. England, Executive Assistant SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 70 SIGAR’s Mission Obtaining Copies of SIGAR Reports and Testimonies To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Afghanistan Reconstruction Programs The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:  improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;  improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;  improve contracting and contract management processes;  prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and  advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan. To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publically released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site. To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR’s hotline:  Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud  Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil  Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300  Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303  Phone International: +1-866-329-8893  Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378  U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065 Public Affairs Officer Public Affairs  Phone: 703-545-5974  Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil  Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs 2530 Crystal Drive Arlington, VA 22202 SIGAR-15-57-SP Report: $36 Million Command and Control Facility at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan Page 71