No. 14-574
IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
GREGORY BOURKE, et al.,
& TIMOTHY LOVE, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
STEVE BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS GOVERNOR OF KENTUCKY,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF A PPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
LEIGH GROSS LATHEROW
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM H. JONES, JR.
GREGORY L. MONGE
VANA NTWERP, MONGE, JONES,
EDWARDS & MCCANN, LLP
P.O. Box 1111
Ashland, KY 41105
(606) 329-2929
llatherow@vmje.com
Counsel for Respondent
March 27, 2015
257727

A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

 i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
license a marriage between two people of the same
sex?

2.

Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
recognize a marriage between two people of the same
sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and
performed out-of-state?

 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
A. Kentucky’s Marriage Recognition History . . . . .2
B. The Petitioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
C. Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
I.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not
require a state to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex . . . . . . . . . .10
A. Windsor reaffi rms, not undermines,
each state’s province to define marriage
in accordance with the consensus
of its citizens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

 iii
Table of Contents
Page
B. The constitutionality of Kentucky’s
marriage statutes should not be
assessed under the Equal Protection
Cl ause by apply i ng height ened
scrutiny. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
1.

Same-sex marriage is not deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history . . . . . . .16

2. Gays and lesbians do not constitute
a suspect class or a quasi-suspect
class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
a. Gays and lesbians as a class
clearly have the ability to attract
the attention of lawmakers . . . . . .20
b. Kentucky’s codification of
its traditional man-woman
marriage definition has no
bearing on any history of
social discrimination against
gays and lesbians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
c.

The Petitioners have not
established that gays and
lesbia ns have obv ious,
immutable, or distinguishing
traits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

 iv
Table of Contents
Page
3. Kentucky’s marriage laws do
not discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
4. Kentucky’s marriage laws do not
discriminate on the basis of sex . . . . . .26
C. Kentucky’s marriage laws are rationally
related to a legitimate state interest . . . . .28
1

Promotion of birth rates is a
legitimate interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

2. Asking whether there is harm to
the state’s interest by allowing
same -sex ma r r iage asks the
wrong question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
3. Kentucky is not required to draw
exact lines for its classification . . . . . . .33
4. Kentucky’s marriage laws also meet
a heightened standard of review . . . . .34
II. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
require a state to recognize marriage of
two people of the same sex when their
mar r iage was law fully licensed and
performed out of state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

 v
Table of Contents
Page
A. Windsor does not compel Kentucky to
adopt a marriage definition in accordance
with the consensus of other communities
that recognize same-sex marriage. . . . . . .35
B. The loss of rights attendant to being
married experienced by same-sex
couples with marriage licenses issued
by other states does not compel
Kentucky to adhere to the consensus
of other communities rega rding
the definition of marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
C. Kentucky’s “place of celebration”
rule does not single out same-sex
marriages for non-recognition. . . . . . . . . . .39
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

 vi
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind.,
132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 28
Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19, 34
Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Beddow v. Beddow,
257 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder,
962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . .27
Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

 vii
Cited Authorities
Page
Butler v. Wilson,
415 U.S. 953 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21, 27, 28
Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Dean v. D.C.,
653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Geiger v. Kitzhaber,
994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Gilbert v. Gilbert,
122 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

 viii
Cited Authorities
Page
Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Griego v. Oliver,
316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Hernandez v. Robles,
855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 28
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22, 27-28
In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Jackson v. Abercrombie,
884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2012), vacated
and remanded as moot, 585 F. Appx. 413
(9th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9, 31, 32
Jones v. Hallahan,
501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 14, 23
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

 ix
Cited Authorities
Page
Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12, 15
Latta v. Otter,
19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho), aff’d,
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27, 28
Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18, 19
Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Mangrum v. Mangrum,
220 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

 x
Cited Authorities
Page
Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190 (1888). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Nyguist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21, 35
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Robinson v. Commonwealth,
212 S.W.3d 100 (Ky. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40, 41
Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent County,
387 U.S. 105 (1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 15
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S 1 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20, 21

 xi
Cited Authorities
Page
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14, 15
Sevcik v. Sandoval,
911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S.,
265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) . . . . . . . . .2, 14, 23
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
Stevenson v. Gray, Etc.,
56 Ky. 193 (1856) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 17
Wolf v. Walker,
986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . .27

 xii
Cited Authorities
Page
Statutes
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/201. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
An Act for Regulating the Solemnization
of Marriages, § 1, 1798, Ky. Acts. 49 . . . . . . . . . . 2, 23
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46B–20 TO 46B–20A . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
DEL. CODE A NN. TIT. 13, § 101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
D.C. CODE § 46–401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199,
110 Stat. 2419 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572–1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.020(1)(d) . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 14, 23
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.030 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.040(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

 xiii
Cited Authorities
Page
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.045 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
MD. CODE A NN., FAM. LAW §§ 2–201 TO 2–202 . . . . . . . .21
ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 19–A, § 650–A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
MINN. STAT. A NN. §§ 517.01 TO 517.03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
N.H. REV. STAT. A NN. §§ 457:1-A TO 457:2 . . . . . . . . . . . .21
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10–A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15–1–1 ET SEQ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
VT. STAT. A NN. TIT. 15, § 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010 TO 26.04.020 . . . . . . . . . .21
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
KY. CONST. § 233A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 14

 1
INTRODUCTION
States’ “historic and essential authority to defi ne
the marital relation” of their citizens is without dispute.
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
Further, “until recent years,” the concept of defi ning
“marriage between a man and woman no doubt had been
thought of by most people as essential to the very definition
of that term and to its role and function throughout the
history of civilization.” Id. at 2689. As recognized in
Windsor, our nation has been involved in a state-by-state
democratic debate about whether to redefine the age-old
definition of marriage. Id. (“That belief [in the traditional
man-woman marriage definition], for many who long
held it, became even more urgent, more cherished when
challenged. For others, however, came the beginnings
of a new perspective, a new insight. Accordingly, some
states concluded that same-sex marriage ought to be
given recognition and validity in the law for these samesex couples who wish to define themselves by their
commitment to each other.”). The Petitioners seek to end
the democratic debate. They ask this Court wholly to
remove the states’ role – the citizens’ role – in defining
marriage through the democratic process and to have the
Court declare that the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified
in 1868, compels states to define marriage as a genderless
institution.
In holding that the decision of whether to define
marriage to include same-sex couples belongs to the
states, not to the judiciary, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized that “this is a case about change
– and how best to handle it under the United States
Constitution.” Pet. App. 4a. The Court recognized that

 2
in deciding this question of paramount importance to
this nation, “[p]rocess and structure matter greatly in
American government” and “[o]f all the ways to resolve
this question, one option is not available: a [judicial] poll…
about whether gay marriage is a good idea.” Id. Pet. App.
5a.
The Petitioners’ reliance upon Windsor as the basis
to federalize the defi nition of marriage is unfounded.
Windsor compels the opposite conclusion. Windsor
recognizes that “there is no federal law of domestic
relations” and that, subject to respecting the constitutional
rights of persons, “regulation of domestic relations is an
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive
province of the States.” Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2691. As set
forth below, Kentucky’s marriage laws do not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Kentucky case presents both questions certified
by the Court: licensing (Question 1) and recognition
(Question 2).
A. Kentucky’s Marriage Recognition History
Kentucky has never defined marriage to include samesex couples, and the Kentucky courts have long established
that such unions do not constitute a marriage. See An Act
for Regulating the Solemnization of Marriages, § 1, 1798
Ky. Acts. 49, 49-50, and S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d
804, 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). The Kentucky Supreme
Court rejected a same-sex couple’s federal constitutional
challenge to Kentucky’s marriage laws more than thirty

 3
years ago. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky.
1973).
Kentucky, like 33 other states, has exercised its broad
authority to regulate domestic relations by adopting
a traditional man-woman defi nition of marriage. The
Kentucky legislature has passed a number of statutes
recognizing that same-sex marriages are against
Kentucky public policy, including KY. REV. STAT. A NN.
§§ 402.005, 402.020(1)(d), 402.040(2), and 402.045. 1
Approximately ten years ago, the Kentucky General
Assembly and 74% of participating voters (1,222,125
citizens) passed and ratified the following amendment to
Kentucky’s constitution, re-affi rming Kentucky’s existing
policy:
Only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical
or substantially similar to that of marriage
for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized.
KY. CONST. § 233A. 2 Read together, these laws declare
Kentucky’s public policy in favor of traditional marriage,
defi ne marriage as between one man and one woman,
prohibit the creation of same-sex marriages in Kentucky,
and prohibit Kentucky’s recognition of same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions.

1. The statutes are set forth at Pet. App. 158a-161a.
2. Pet. App. 158a.

 4
B. The Petitioners
One group of petitioners, the Love Petitioners,
challenges the Commonwealth’s marriage-licensing law.
The other group, the Bourke Petitioners, challenges the
ban on recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages. Pet.
App. 8a-9a. Both groups contend that Kentucky’s marriage
laws deny them benefits they would otherwise receive,
including preferential treatment for inheritance taxes,
compelled spousal fi nancial support, spousal privilege
in trial proceedings, intestacy inheritance rights, loss of
consortium benefits, health care coverage, standing to
bring workers’ compensation claims for deceased spouses,
and certain federal benefits such as social security benefits
and FMLA3 leave to care for a spouse. The Petitioners also
argue that children being raised by same-sex couples are
humiliated because same-sex couples are not permitted
to marry and that such children are further harmed by
the reduction of “family resources and by denying their
family social and legal recognition and respect.” J.A. 581.
According to the Petitioners, non-recognition of their
status as spouses also limits their rights with regard to
adoption and status as parents. J.A. 591, 594-95, 614.
C. Procedural History
As stated above, Kentucky presents both of the
certified questions in this case: licensing (Question 1) and
recognition (Question 2).
1. The recognition laws of Kentucky were first
challenged by the Petitioners, Gregory Bourke and
3. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3,
107 Stat. 6.

 5
Michael DeLeon and their minor children, on July
26, 2013 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky. J.A. 541. The Complaint
was subsequently amended to name additional plaintiffs
Randall Johnson, Paul Campion, and their minor children;
Kimberly Franklin; Tamera Boyd; Jimmy Lee Meade;
and Luther Barlowe, alongside Bourke and De Leon, to
challenge Kentucky’s marriage recognition laws. J.A. 566584. An Answer to the Second Amended Complaint was
filed on behalf of the Respondent Governor Steve Beshear
and Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway. J.A. 544.
On February 12, 2014, the district court granted
the Bourke Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment
based solely on the pleadings. The court held that
Kentucky’s laws and constitutional provision regarding
the non-recognition of same-sex marriages performed
in other states violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution. Pet. App. 125a. While
Plaintiffs raised several constitutional challenges, the
lower court addressed only the Equal Protection claims.
Pet. App. 134a. The court recognized that neither the
Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
had ruled that same-sex marriage was a fundamental
right, and therefore applied rational basis review. Pet.
App. 138a-139a. Despite no clear showing of animus, the
district court ruled that Kentucky’s marriage recognition
laws could not withstand rational basis review. Pet. App.
145a, 148a. Respondent Beshear fi led a notice of appeal
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 18, 2014.
On March 19, 2014, the district court entered a stay until
further order of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.A.
550.

 6
2. The Love Petitioners (Timothy Love, Lawrence
Ysunza, Maurice Blanchard, and Dominique James), who
are challenging the marriage license laws of Kentucky,
were allowed to intervene in the Bourke action after the
district court granted summary judgment to the Bourke
Petitioners. J.A. 547. Kentucky Attorney General Jack
Conway was dismissed from the Love case and from the
Bourke matter on March 24, 2014 after indicating to the
district court that he would no longer defend Kentucky’s
marriage laws in this matter. J.A. 550-551. The Love
Petitioners fi led their motion for summary judgment on
April 18, 2014. J.A. 551. A timely response and a reply
to that response were fi led. J.A. 551. The district court
granted summary judgment to the Love Petitioners on
July 1, 2014, but stayed enforcement of his ruling until
further order of the Sixth Circuit. Pet. App. 96a-123a. The
Love decision did not determine whether or not Kentucky’s
marriage laws interfered with a fundamental right. The
district court interpreted Windsor to mean that this Court
would not recognize same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right. Pet. App. 98a. The opinion was decided solely on an
Equal Protection Clause analysis. Pet. App. 98a. Despite
recognizing that this Court has never explicitly identified
homosexuals as a suspect class and despite existing Sixth
Circuit precedent to the contrary, the district court found
that homosexuals should be considered a “quasi-suspect
class” for the purposes of Equal Protection analysis and
that the proper level of scrutiny is intermediate. Pet.
App. 115a. The court did not apply intermediate scrutiny,
however, but instead ruled that Kentucky’s marriage
licensure laws could not withstand rational basis review.
Pet. App. 120a. Respondent Beshear fi led his notice of
appeal with the Sixth Circuit on July 8, 2014.

 7
3. Respondent Beshear filed his appellant brief in the
Sixth Circuit in the Bourke case on May 7, 2014. J.A. 555.
The Bourke Petitioners filed their response on June 9, 2014.
J.A. 555. A reply was fi led June 26, 2014. J.A. 556. After
the Love motion for summary judgment was granted on
July 1, 2014 and notice of appeal was fi led by Respondent
Beshear, the Bourke and Love cases were consolidated on
July 16, 2014. J.A. 556, 561. The Kentucky cases, along
with cases from Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee that
involve either the licensure and/or recognition questions,
were consolidated for oral argument and argued before
a panel of the Sixth Circuit on August 6, 2014. J.A. 558.
The Sixth Circuit opinion reversing the federal district
courts, including the Western District of Kentucky, and
upholding the rights of states to regulate the licensure and
recognition of marriage within their borders, authored
by Judge Sutton and joined by Judge Cook with Judge
Daughtery dissenting, was entered on November 6, 2014.
Pet. App. 1a-95a. The Bourke and Love Petitioners jointly
petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari on November
20, 2014. J.A. 558, 564. The Court granted the petition for
certiorari on January 16, 2015. J.A. 558-59, 565.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Through the democratic process, Kentucky citizens
have elected not to license or recognize same-sex
marriage licenses issued by other states. The statutes
and constitutional amendment that are the subject of this
litigation did not change the law in Kentucky. Rather,
they codified what has always been the consensus of
Kentuckians. That other communities and citizens in other
states have chosen to permit same-sex marriages does not
mandate that Kentucky follow.

 8
This Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
2675 (2013), affi rmed a state’s independent sovereign
authority to offer same-sex marriage licenses based
upon the “formation of consensus” of the citizens of that
state, and the federal government’s inability under the
Fourteenth Amendment to interfere with that consensus
if motivated by a discriminatory animus. The corollary
of that holding is that a state, likewise, based upon the
“formation of consensus” of its citizens, may also in the
exercise of its sovereign authority elect not to offer or
recognize same-sex marriage licenses. Kentucky has
exercised its sovereign immunity just as New York did
in Windsor.
Unlike the passage of DOMA4 at issue in Windsor,
the anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), and the repeal of protective legislation in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Kentucky’s marriage statutes
and constitutional amendment did not change the law in
Kentucky. The laws reflect what has always been the law
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the consensus of
Kentucky communities – only traditional man-woman
marriages will be licensed or recognized.
The Petitioners have not demonstrated a basis for
applying heightened scrutiny to their Equal Protection
challenge to Kentucky’s marriage laws. Same-sex
marriage is not a fundamental right because same-sex
marriage is not “objectively ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
4. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419.

 9
they were sacrificed.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)(citations omitted). Heightened scrutiny is
also not available because homosexuals do not meet the
criteria of a suspect class. Primarily, gays and lesbians
cannot demonstrate they are a discrete and insular class
who are unable to attract the attention of lawmakers.
Kentucky’s marriage laws that limit the issuance of
marriage licenses and recognition of out-of-state marriage
licenses to man-woman couples are rationally related
to the state’s interest in furthering procreation. Samesex couples do not further that interest and, therefore,
restricting the benefits and burdens of marriage do not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Petitioners’
contention that procreation would not be harmed if the
state granted them a marriage license or recognized their
out-of-state marriage license applies the wrong test. This
Court has determined that “when…the inclusion of one
group promotes a legitimate government purpose, and
the addition of other groups would not, we cannot say
that the statute’s classification of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is invidiously discriminatory.” Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974). Further, Kentucky is
not required to draw perfect lines in its classifications in
order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause, and the
fact that the laws may be over-inclusive or under-inclusive
does not mandate their invalidation.
The answer to Question 1 and Question 2 certified
by this Court is that Kentucky may, in the exercise of its
sovereign authority, elect not to authorize or recognize
same-sex marriage licenses w ithout violating the
Fourteenth Amendment.

 10
ARGUMENT
I.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
state to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex.
A.

Windsor reaffirms, not undermines, each state’s
province to define marriage in accordance with
the consensus of its citizens.

The Petitioners are asking this Court to federalize
same-sex marriage and to compel Kentucky citizens to
adhere to the “formation of consensus” of communities
in other states regarding same-sex marriage. See United
States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692-2693 (2013)(“The
dynamics of state government in the federal system are
to allow the formation of consensus respecting the way
members of a discrete community treat each other in
their daily contact and constant interaction with each
other.”). The Petitioners assert that Kentucky’s adherence
to the only form of marriage ever recognized by the state
“relegates lesbians and gays to second-class status” and
constitutes discrimination based upon sexual orientation
and on the basis of sex. Pet. Br. 26-38. The Petitioners’
argument mischaracterizes the history of Kentucky’s
marriage laws and overstates the holdings of recent
Supreme Court cases involving homosexual persons.
This Court’s determination in Windsor that § 3 of
DOMA deprived the petitioners “of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of
their marriage” did not remove from political debate or
the democratic process the sovereign right of Kentucky to
decide the important social issue of whether a same-sex

 11
marriage would constitute a valid marriage in Kentucky.
The Petitioners have erroneously applied Windsor
to support their position that same-sex marriage is a
federally mandated right, that states no longer maintain
independent sovereignty to decide this issue, and that a
state’s decision to adhere to traditional marriage rather
than adopt a new definition relegates homosexuals and
their children to second-class citizens.
Windsor instructs that if a state exercises its
independent sovereign authority to offer same-sex
marriages, then Congress lacks authority to strip the
benefit from the citizens who had been conferred that
benefit. Windsor does not compel all states, however, to
provide that benefit or to recognize same-sex marriages
authorized in other states. Instead, Windsor confi rms
that these decisions should be made on the local level,
and – once made – the federal government lacks authority
to interfere with that decision when based upon a
discriminatory animus. Congress’ interference with what
has traditionally been the province of the states – defining
marriage – evidenced a discriminatory motive.
Likewise, that this Court invalidated the unlawful
state legislative acts in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), does
not compel invalidation of Kentucky’s marriage laws. The
challenged Kentucky laws codified the only definition of
marriage that Kentucky has ever known and that a majority
of Kentuckians voted to maintain. Unlike the challenge
in Romer to Colorado’s constitutional amendment, which
prohibited all “legislative, executive or judicial action at
any level of state or local government designed to protect”
homosexual persons, the Kentucky marriage statutes do

 12
not remove any rights previously afforded by Kentucky
to homosexual couples or same-sex couples. Similarly,
unlike the criminal sodomy laws invalidated by Lawrence,
the Kentucky marriage statutes do not infringe upon the
Petitioners’ privacy rights to engage in consensual activity
without interference from the government. The Lawrence
Court specifically acknowledged that its striking state
sodomy laws as unconstitutional “does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” 539
U.S. at 578.
This Court has long recognized the strict rules
limiting the judiciary’s interference with the states’
authority over these types of domestic matters:
[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect,
and strengthen family life as well as to regulate
the disposition of property left in [the States by
its citizens] is committed by the Constitution
of the United States and the people of the
[State] to the legislature of that State. Absent
a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that
legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this
Court, to select from among possible laws.
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971). This Court
has further instructed that “[w]hen social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows
the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes
that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified
by the democratic process.” City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(citations omitted).

 13
If, as Windsor declared, states like New York may
act to accept and sanction same-sex marriage, and those
“actions were without doubt a proper exercise of [New
York’s] sovereign authority within our federal system,
all in the way that the Framers of the Constitution
intended,” Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2692, then the corollary
of that proposition must stand. That is, the Framers of
the Constitution intended the same “sovereign authority”
to provide states the ability to define marriage so as to
reject and refuse same-sex marriage in favor of traditional
marriage. When this Court held that “[t]he dynamics of
state government in the federal system are to allow the
formation of consensus respecting the way the members
of a discrete community treat each other in their daily
contact and constant interaction with each other,” id.,
the Court recognized Kentucky’s ability to maintain the
traditional definition of marriage in accordance with the
consensus of its citizens, which it has done – and which
the challenged laws do. Id. The consensus of the Kentucky
legislature and the citizens of the Commonwealth to
maintain the traditional, man-woman marriage is no
less a proper exercise of Kentucky’s sovereign authority
within the federal system than New York’s exercise of its
sovereign authority to change the definition.
This conclusion is suppor ted by this Cour t’s
determination in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014), that
“[s]ave and unless the state, county or municipal
government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has
vast leeway in the management of its internal affairs.” Id.
(quoting Sailors v. Board of Ed. of Kent County, 387 U.S.
105 (1967)). What occurred in Kentucky with regard to
adoption of the constitutional amendment and enactment

 14
of marriage statutes is not comparable to Congress’
passage of § 3 of DOMA, which invaded the states’
rights. Kentucky’s enactment of its marriage statutes
and adoption of Section 233A of its Constitution codified
what has always been the law in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky – prohibition of same-sex marriages. See
S.J.L.S., 265 S.W.3d at 822 (“Such marriages have been
prohibited by statute since 1998, [KY. REV. STAT. A NN.]
§ 402.020(1)(d), and by common law since the formation
of the Commonwealth.”)(emphasis added); see also Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973)(recognizing that
Kentucky has never permitted the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples).
“Same-sex marriage presents a highly emotional and
important question of public policy—but not a difficult
question of constitutional law” when it comes to the states’
right to enact laws preserving or altering the traditional
definition of marriage. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2714 (Alito,
J., dissenting). When this Court in Schuette determined
that the Michigan voters’ decision to amend the Michigan
constitution to prohibit race-based preferences as part of
the admissions process for state universities was within
their authority, the Court confi rmed that even sensitive
issues involving federally protected rights can be decided
through the political process:
This case is not about how the debate about
racial preferences should be resolved. It is
about who may resolve it. There is no authority
in the Constitution of the United States or in
this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set
aside Michigan laws that commit this policy
determination to the voters. See Sailors Board

 15
of Ed. of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105 (1967)
(“Save and unless the state, county or municipal
government runs afoul of a federally protected
right, it has vast leeway in the management of
its internal affairs”). Deliberative debate on
sensitive issues such as racial preferences all
too often may shade into rancor. But that does
not justify removing certain court-determined
issues from the voters’ reach. Democracy does
not presume that some subjects are either too
divisive or too profound for public debate.
Schuette, 134 S.Ct. at 1638.
In sum, Windsor does not stand for the proposition
that the federal constitution compels states to allow samesex marriages. As this Court held in Labine, “absent a
specific constitutional guarantee, it is for the legislature,
not the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from
among possible laws.” Labine, 401 U.S. at 538-39. “If
the States are the laboratories of democracy, requiring
every state to recognize same-gender unions—contrary
to the views of its electorate and representatives—turns
the notion of a limited national government on its head.”
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014)
(Kelly, J., dissenting)(citing Bond v. United States, 131
S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)(explaining that federalism allows
for state responses instead of relying upon the eventuality
of a federal policy)).

 16
B. The constitutionality of Kentucky’s marriage
statutes should not be assessed under the Equal
Protection Clause by applying heightened
scrutiny.
The Sixth Circuit correctly applied rational basis
review, not heightened or intermediate scrutiny, to the
Petitioners’ Equal Protection challenge to the states’
same-sex marriage laws. Pet. App. 22a. This Court
has “long held that ‘a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines
. . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’”
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S.Ct. 2073, 2080
(2012)(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320 (1993)).
There is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, and
homosexual orientation is not a suspect class.
The Petitioners’ Brief appears to vacillate between
a modified rational basis standard (Pet. Br. 25)(“States
should not be able to impose such an exclusion without
showing that it is at least reasonably adapted to further
some substantial goal”) and “heightened scrutiny” (Pet.
Br. 32) for a “quasi-suspect” class based upon sexual
orientation. As set forth below, heightened scrutiny is not
the appropriate standard by which to analyze Kentucky’s
marriage statutes.
1.

Same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history.

In order to establish a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, the Petitioners must establish that same-sex

 17
marriage is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)(internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Petitioners cannot meet this burden, however. This
Court recognized in Windsor that “[i]t seems fair to
conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had not
even considered the possibility that two persons of the
same sex might” marry. 133 S.Ct. at 2689; accord 133
S.Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J. dissenting)(“It is beyond dispute
that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”) and Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006)(“Until a few decades
ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone that
ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that
there could be marriages only between two participants
of different sex.”)
The Petitioners’ argument that there is a general
fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice and
to a genderless marriage misapplies prior holdings from
this Court regarding the fundamental right of marriage.
Glucksberg cautions that there must be a “careful
description” of the asserted fundamental right. 521 U.S.
at 721. Judicial declarations regarding the fundamental
“right to marriage” have intrinsically tied marriage to
procreation, which is a biological impossibility for samesex couples. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), this Court held
that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race” when reviewing
the constitutionality of a state statute that provided for
the sterilization of habitual criminals. The link between

 18
marriage and procreation was made long before Skinner.
In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), the Court
referred to traditional marriage as “the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”
And, more recently, in Turner v. Safl ey, 482 U.S.
78 (1987), this Court held that a state prison regulation
that prohibited inmates from marrying except for a
compelling reason violated the prisoner’s fundamental
right to marriage. The marriage right was tied to the fact
that “most inmates eventually will be released by parole
or commutation, and therefore most inmate marriages
are formed in the expectation that they will be fully
consummated.” Id. at 96. The Turner Court was careful
to distinguish its holding that there was a “constitutionally
protected marital relationship in the prison context” from
the Court’s earlier holding in Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S.
953 (1974), that the restriction on marriage did not violate
those prisoners’ right to marriage because those prisoners
were sentenced to life imprisonment and hence there was
no expectation of consummation of the marriage. Thus, the
Court’s prior recognition of the importance of marriage
in our society has been in the context of the traditional
man-woman version of the institution and not an individual
fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice or
to a genderless marriage.
Finally, while Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
recognized the right to marriage as one of the “basic
civil rights of man,” the Court described the right as
“fundamental to our very existence and survival.” Id.
at 12. Unlike a person’s race, which has nothing to do
with procreation, a person’s sex has everything to do

 19
with procreation. Thus, the fundamental principle upon
which Loving was based simply does not transfer to
same-sex marriage. Certainly, if Loving had established
a fundamental right to marry any person, particularly a
person of the same-sex, then this Court would not have
rejected, just five years later in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S.
810 (1972)(dismissing appeal for “want of a substantial
federal question”), the identical challenges presented by
the Petitioners in this case.
2.

Gays and lesbians do not constitute a
suspect class or a quasi-suspect class.

The Sixth Circuit correctly rejected the Petitioners’
contention that homosexual orientation is a suspect
class warranting a heightened level of scrutiny and
recognized that this Court “has never held that legislative
classifications based on sexual orientation receive
heightened review and indeed has not recognized a new
suspect class in more than four decades.” Pet. App. 42a.
This Court had the opportunity to apply heightened
scrutiny in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and most recently
in Windsor, but did not do so.
Only state classifications based upon race, alienage,
and national origin have been classified as suspect
classes, while sex and illegitimacy have been classified
as quasi-suspect. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (race); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)(alienage);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(national origin); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(sex); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)(illegitimacy).
The Court has clearly rejected other minority groups’

 20
efforts to obtain protected status, such as the elderly and
mentally disabled, even though such groups could have
benefited from such protection. Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)(age), and
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-446 (mental disability).
Four criteria have been relied upon by this Court when
identifying the limited number of suspect classifications:
(1) inability to attract the attention of lawmakers; (2) a
history of unequal treatment; (3) an obvious, immutable
or distinguishing trait; and (4) bearing no relation to their
ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. at 441, 445;
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); San Antonio
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(plurality). The balance
of those factors do not weigh in favor of classifying
homosexual orientation as a suspect class.
a.

Gays and lesbians as a class clearly
have the ability to attract the attention
of lawmakers.

The Petitioners’ contention that they have been unable
to “attract the attention of lawmakers” or that they cannot
rely upon “the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities” in which
to achieve success in the same-sex marriage debate at
the ballot box strains credulity. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
445-446 (rejecting suspect class status for the mentally
disabled based upon their ability to attract the attention
of lawmakers), and United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938). The Petitioners cannot
legitimately contend that homosexual persons – as a
class – have been “relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection

 21
from the majoritarian political process.” Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217, n. 14 (1982)(quoting Rodriquez, 411
U.S. at 28).
To the contrary, same-sex marriage advocates have
succeeded at the ballot boxes or through legislation in
twelve states (inclusive of the District of Columbia).
Additionally, a number of states and local governments
have adopted civil rights legislation creating a protected
class for gays and lesbians on the same par as protections
afforded to classifications based upon race, sex, and
national origin. 5 See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d
963, 974-75 (Wash. 2006)(en banc)(“The enactment of
provisions providing increased protections to gay and
lesbian individuals in Washington shows that as a class
gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead
exercise increasing political power.”); Conaway v. Deane,
932 A.2d 571, 611 (Md. 2007)(“We are not persuaded
that gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons are so politically
powerless that they are entitled to extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process. To the
contrary, it appears that, at least in Maryland, advocacy
to eliminate discrimination against gay, lesbian, and
bisexual persons based upon their sexual orientation has
been met with growing successes in the legislative and
executive branches of government.”)(internal quotation
marks omitted).
5. State civil rights legislation protecting homosexual
orientation includes: Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46b–20 to 46b–20a;
Del.Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101; D.C.Code § 46–401; Haw.Rev.Stat.
§ 572–1; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/201; Me.Rev.Stat. tit. 19–A, § 650–A;
Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2–201 to 2–202; Minn.Stat. Ann.
§§ 517.01 to 517.03; N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 457:1-a to 457:2; N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Law § 10–a; R.I. Gen. Laws § 15–1–1 et seq.; Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 8; Wash. Rev.Code §§ 26.04.010 to 26.04.020.

 22
The amicus briefs (by volume and supporters) fi led
in this case supporting the Petitioners is a testament to
the ability of this class to garner political support and
of their political might: 167 Members of the U.S. House
of Representatives and 44 U.S. Senators; 226 Mayors;
AFL-CIO; American Bar Association; United States
Department of Justice; Hawaii; Kenneth B. Mehlman
and others; 6 Minnesota; Massachusetts, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and
Virginia. These amici briefs are similar in number and
supporters to those filed in Windsor and Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013). “Any minority can be said to
be powerless to assert direct control over the legislature,
but if that were a criterion for higher level scrutiny by the
courts, much economic and social legislation would not
be suspect.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. The Petitioners’
success at the local level to obtain protection as a group,
along with the extraordinary support of government and
political officials, see supra note 4, weigh against creating
a federally-recognized suspect class status for this group.

6. The amici fi lers of this Brief describe themselves as:
“social and political conservatives, moderates, and libertarians
from diverse backgrounds. Many have served as elected or
appointed officeholders in various Presidential administrations,
as governors, mayors, and other officeholders in States and cities
across the Nation, as members of Congress, as ambassadors, as
military officers, as officials in political campaigns and political
parties, and as advocates and activists for various political and
social causes.”

 23
b.

Kentuck y ’s c o d i f ic ation of it s
traditional man-woman marriage
definition has no bearing on any
history of social discrimination
against gays and lesbians.

Just as it is disingenuous for the Petitioners to assert
that they are politically powerless or lack the ability
to attract the attention of lawmakers, it also would be
disingenuous for the Respondent to assert that gays
and lesbians have not been subjected to a history of
unequal treatment by society. Unequal treatment by
society, however, is not the type of unequal treatment
necessary for recognition as a suspect class. For example,
the mentally disabled in Cleburne experienced unequal
treatment by society, but they were not afforded status as
a protected class. The social discrimination experienced
by homosexual persons is distinguishable from the
systematic governmental discrimination experienced by
recognized protected classes, which have been limited to
race, alienage, national origin, sex, and illegitimacy.
Further, any history of social discrimination
against homosexual persons is wholly unrelated to
Kentucky’s long-standing history of limiting marriages
to the traditional man-woman model. Kentucky’s earliest
marriage statutes, adopted six years after Kentucky was
granted statehood, reference marriage as a union between
“man and wife.” An Act for Regulating the Solemnization
of Marriage § 1, 1798, Ky. Acts 49, 49-50 (approved Feb.
3, 1798); see, also, S.J.L.S., 265 S.W.3d at 822 (“Such
marriages have been prohibited by statute since 1998,
KY. REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.020(1)(d), and by common law
since the formation of the Commonwealth.”), and Jones
v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973)(recognizing that

 24
Kentucky has never permitted the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples).
Thus, while homosexuals as a class may have a history
of social rejection and discrimination, it is distinguishable
from the systematic government discrimination sufficient
to elevate that class to having protected status for Equal
Protection analysis.
c.

The Petitioners have not established
that gays and lesbians have obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing traits.

The Petitioners attempt to discount this factor
claiming that they are not required to establish that
a trait is “immutable in a literal sense” to qualify for
heightened scrutiny and that they are still entitled to strict
scrutiny even if they could choose their sexual orientation
because they should not have to do so. Pet. Br. 35, n. 6.
The Petitioners’ reliance upon a footnote in Nyguist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977), for their proposition
that immutability is not required is misplaced.
It is fair to conclude that there is at least legitimate
debate regarding sexual orientation being an immutable
characteristic on the same level as race, color, sex or
national origin. Nonetheless, even if gays and lesbians as
a group have immutable characteristics and lack political
power, these disadvantages are not sufficient to elevate
them to suspect class. Other classes with immutable
characteristics have been denied protective status:
If the large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the

 25
reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it
would be difficult to find a principled way to
distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off
from others who cannot themselves mandate
the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least
part of the public at large. One need mention
in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the
mentally ill, and the infi rm. We are reluctant to
set out on that course, and we decline to do so.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
Thus, even if sexual orientation is immutable and even
if gays and lesbians as a group have been unable to achieve
the desired legislative responses, just as the Court refused
to recognize other such groups as suspect class, so should
the Court remain reluctant to do so here.
Not elevating gays and lesbians to protected class
status does not mean that homosexual persons are not
without protection, however. That is clear from Lawrence,
Romer, and Windsor. Further, the rational basis test
is not without teeth, nor is it a license to rubber stamp
discrimination. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (“[E]ven in the
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most
deferential standards, we insist on knowing the relation
between the classification adopted and the object to be
obtained.”). That is, state legislation limiting marriage
to traditional man-woman couples, which necessarily
restricts same-sex couples who are presumptively
homosexual, must be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.

 26
3.

Kent uck y ’s m a r r i a g e laws d o not
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.

The Petitioners state that since Kentucky’s marriage
laws do not allow for the licensing and/or recognition
of same-sex marriage, those laws are “necessarily”
discriminating against same-sex couples on the basis of
their sexual orientation and that because of that alleged
discrimination, they belong to a classification requiring
the application of heightened scrutiny. Pet. Br. 32. The
Petitioners fail to address the fact that Kentucky’s
marriage laws are not facially discriminatory to gays and
lesbians based upon their sexual orientation. Kentucky’s
marriage laws treat homosexuals and heterosexuals the
same and are facially neutral. Men and women, whether
heterosexual or homosexual, are free to marry persons
of the opposite sex under Kentucky law, and men and
women, whether heterosexual or homosexual, cannot
marry persons of the same sex under Kentucky law. See
Dean v. D.C., 653 A.2d 307, 363 n. 1 (D.C. 1995)(Steadman,
J., concurring)(citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 51 n.
11 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (1993)(“[N]ot all opposite-sex marriages are
between heterosexuals, not all same-sex marriages would
necessarily be between homosexuals.”).
4.

Kent uck y ’s m a r r i a g e laws d o not
discriminate on the basis of sex.

The Petitioners argue that the marriage laws of
Kentucky discriminate facially on the basis of sex. Pet.
Br. 38. This argument ignores the reality that Kentucky’s
marriage laws apply equally to members of both genders

 27
and do not discriminate on that basis. The fact that, under
Kentucky law, only men can marry women and vice versa
demonstrates that the Commonwealth’s marriage laws are
sex neutral and not discriminatory. See Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 880 n. 13 (Vt. 1999)(“[T]here is no discrete
class subject to differential treatment solely on the basis
of sex; each sex is equally prohibited from precisely the
same conduct.”); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (2007)
(deciding that a Maryland statute prohibiting same sexmarriages did not draw an impermissible sex-based
distinction because the statute did not separate men and
women into discrete classes for the purpose of granting
to one class benefits at the expense of the other); Wolf v.
Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d
sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014)(“[A] sex discrimination
theory is not viable, even if the government is making
a sex-based classification with respect to an individual,
because the intent of the laws banning same-sex marriage
is not to suppress females or males as a class.”).
Most courts to have considered this issue have rejected
the Petitioners’ sex discrimination theory. Wolf, 986 F.
Supp.2d at 1008 (citing Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F.Supp.
2d 1128, 1140 (D. Or. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 19 F.Supp.3d
1054, 1074 (D. Idaho 2014); Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder,
962 F.Supp. 2d 1252, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Sevcik v.
Sandoval, 911 F.Supp.2d 996, 1005 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d
on other grounds, 771 F.3d 456 (9 th Cir. 2014); Jackson v.
Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1098 (D. Haw. 2012),
vacated and remanded as moot, 585 F. Appx. 413 (9th Cir.
2014); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 880 (N.M. 2013); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438 (Cal. 2008), superseded
by constitutional amendment as stated by Hollingsworth

 28
v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2656, 768 (2013); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 509 (Conn. 2008)(Borden, J.,
dissenting); and Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 601-602
(Md. 2007)), cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59-63 (Haw.
1993)(plurality); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 482 (9 th Cir.
2014)(Berzon, J., concurring). Kentucky’s marriage laws
simply do not discriminate based upon sex.
C.

Kentucky’s marriage laws are rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.

The Sixth Circuit correctly found that the states
could not be convicted of “irrationality” by creating “an
incentive for two people who procreate together to stay
together for the purposes of rearing their offspring.” Pet.
App. 25a-26a. The existence of a rational basis requires
that Kentucky’s marriage laws be sustained.
The Supreme Court has articulated the considerable
deference to be given to the state under a rational-basis
review:
[The] rational-basis review in equal protection
analysis “is not a license for courts to judge the
wisdom, fairness or logic of legislative choices.”
Nor does it authorize “the judiciary [to] sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or
desirability of legislative policy determinations
made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines.” For
these reasons, a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along
suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption

 29
of validity. Such classification cannot run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a
rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose. Further, a legislature that creates
these categories need not “actually articulate
at any time the purpose or rationale supporting
its classification.” Instead, a classification “must
be upheld against equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification.”
Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-20(emphasis added)(internal
citations omitted). In performing a rational basis analysis,
courts are obligated to look to any “conceivable basis”
for the challenged law, and their analysis is not limited
to those articulated, established, recorded, or those that
may have even occurred to the defendant. See FCC v.
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993);
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166
(1980). Further, “those attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden to ‘negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.’” Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. at 315 (internal citations
omitted).
1.

Promotion of birth rates is a legitimate
interest.

The Petitioners have not met their burden to establish
that marriage between opposite-sex couples fails to
further Kentucky’s interests in procreation and promotion
of a stable birth rate. Encouraging, promoting, and

 30
supporting the formation of relationships that have the
natural ability to procreate furthers the Commonwealth’s
fundamental interest in ensuring humanity’s continued
existence.
It is entirely rational for Kentucky to limit the granting
of tax and other benefits to the broad class of opposite-sex
couples in furtherance of population growth even though
not all opposite-sex couples may choose to, or can, have
biological children. State legislatures, by necessity “paint
with a broad brush” and, constitutionally, are granted
wide latitude in enacting legislation to further economic
goals. The issue is not whether excluding same-sex couples
from marriages results in greater natural procreation,
but whether there is any rational basis for granting tax
and other marriage benefits to only heterosexual couples.
2.

Asking whether there is harm to the state’s
interest by allowing same-sex marriage
asks the wrong question.

The Petitioners argued below that Kentucky’s stated
interest was not rationally related to traditional marriage
laws because Kentucky had not explained how allowing
same-sex couples to marry would harm or diminish
the Commonwealth’s interest in procreation. Pet. App.
120a. This “no-harm” premise is not grounded in any
legal authority and misses the mark altogether. It is well
established that Kentucky’s legislation is required to be
“presumed constitutional [with] “[t]he burden…on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not
the basis has a foundation in the record.” Heller, 509 U.S.
at 320 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Adoption

 31
of this no-harm standard would make short work of Equal
Protection and Due Process claims. The Commonwealth
has “no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification. ‘[A] legislative
choice is not subject to courtroom fact finding and may be
based upon rational speculation unsupported by evidence
or empirical data.’” Id.
The same no-harm theory could be argued by many
plaintiffs who make Equal Protection or Due Process
challenges when denied a government benefit. This Court
has clearly expressed that “when . . . the inclusion of
one group promotes a legitimate government purpose,
and the addition of other groups would not, we cannot
say that the statute’s classification of beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries is invidiously discriminatory.” Johnson
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974). Same-sex couples
cannot naturally promote Kentucky’s legitimate purpose
of procreation. The exclusion of same-sex couples from
receipt of marriage benefits (i.e., tax and other benefits)
when they do not promote Kentucky’s legitimate purpose
is not invidiously discriminatory.
Johnson demonstrates that even though samesex couples may benefit from the benefits associated
with marriage and even though same-sex couples may
share characteristics with opposite-sex couples, those
factors are not enough to require the state to make the
benefits available to them. In Johnson, the Supreme
Court considered whether the government violated
former Selective Service registrants’ Equal Protection
rights where veterans’ educational benefits were offered
to draftees who served on active duty in the Armed
Forces but not to Selective Service registrants who were

 32
conscientious objectors and served in alternative civilian
service. Both groups were out of the job force during the
time of their service, both had their lives disrupted as a
result of their mandatory service and both would have
benefited from receipt of the government benefits.
This Court, however, found no Equal Protection
violation by Congress’ decision to limit educational
benefits to those who served on active duty. The Court
held that the statutory classification was rationally
related to the objectives of the statute which were to
help induce registrants to volunteer for the draft or seek
a lower Selective Service classification, to make military
service more palatable to a draftee, and thus to reduce
the draftee’s unwillingness to be a soldier. 415 U.S. at 382.
The Court found that the two groups were not similarly
situated because military service with educational benefits
was more attractive to an active service draftee than
military service without benefits. Educational benefits
made no difference to the attractiveness of the military
for a conscientious objector whose refusal to actively serve
was based upon deeply-held religious beliefs. This Court
also rejected the notion that even though both groups
had been displaced from their routines during the time of
their service and even though both would have benefited
from the educational benefit, “a common characteristic
shared by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike, is not
sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics
peculiar to only one group rationally explain the statute’s
different treatment of the two groups.” Id. at 378. Thus,
the Court held that offering educational benefits to the
conscientious objectors would not have promoted the
government’s interest in making the Armed Service
more attractive and there was no violation of the Equal
Protection clause based upon the classifications.

 33
Similarly, even though same-sex couples and oppositesex couples may share some similarities and even if
recognizing marriage between same-sex couples would
not reduce procreation, as the Petitioners allege, offering
same-sex couples the state benefit of marriage recognition
does not promote Kentucky’s legitimate interest in
fostering population growth. Offering the benefit to
opposite-sex couples does, however. Thus, there is no
“invidious discrimination” by excluding same-sex couples
from the state benefit.
3.

Kentucky is not required to draw exact
lines for its classification.

This Court has repeatedly stated that the state is
not required to draw perfect lines in its classifications.
“[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to
accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an
imperfect fit between the means and ends. A classification
does not fail rational basis review because it ‘is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results
in some inequality.’” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (internal
citations omitted). Thus, that man-woman couples who
may not choose, or may not be able, to have children are
allowed to marry does not nullify the rational basis for
a man-woman marriage classification. See Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970)(“[T]he Equal
Protection Clause does not require that a state must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or
not attacking the problem at all. It is enough that the
state’s action be rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination.”)(internal citations omitted).

 34
Notably, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker
rejected the same “line drawing” argument asserted by
the Petitioners:
Petitioners note that the state does not impose
upon heterosexual married couples a condition
that they have a proved capacity or declared
willingness to procreate, posing a rhetorical
demand that this court must read such condition
into the statute if same-sex marriages are to be
prohibited. Even assuming that such a condition
would be neither unrealistic nor offensive under
the Griswold rationale, the classification is
no more than theoretically imperfect. We are
reminded, however, that ‘abstract symmetry’ is
not demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).
4.

Kentucky’s marriage laws also meet a
heightened standard of review.

Because the Sixth Circuit found neither a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage nor that homosexual persons
are entitled to protected class status, the Sixth Circuit
did not analyze whether Kentucky’s prohibition against
same-sex marriage satisfies a standard more stringent
than rational basis. Regardless of the standard of review,
however, Kentucky’s laws do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
Given the longstanding judicial link between marriage
and procreation, Kentucky’s laws restricting marriage
benefits only to couples who can naturally procreate plainly

 35
furthers Kentucky’s state interest and would clearly meet
a heightened threshold for a quasi-suspect class or a
suspect class. See Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)(holding that to uphold a
classification based upon gender, a quasi-suspect class,
there must be a showing “at least that the classification
serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives’”) and Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982)(holding that when a classification
disadvantages a suspect class, the classification must be
“precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest.”).
Accordingly, Kentucky’s marriage statutes are
sufficiently narrowly tailored to overcome the Petitioners’
Equal Protection challenge. Thus, even if a heightened
standard is applied, Kentucky’s marriages laws do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
II. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
state to recognize marriage of two people of the
same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed
and performed out of state.
A.

Windsor does not compel Kentucky to adopt
a marriage definition in accordance with the
consensus of other communities that recognize
same-sex marriage.

The Bourke (recognition-seeking) Petitioners contend
that Windsor compels the conclusion that Kentucky must
recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states.
The Petitioners argue that the Kentucky legislation, like

 36
§ 3 of DOMA, “single[d] out marriages of lesbians and
gays for unequal treatment,” thereby demeaning gays
and lesbians and treating their marriages as secondclass marriages.” Pet. Br. 57. The Petitioners ignore that
§ 3 of DOMA was declared unlawful because Congress
overstepped its authority when its “goal was ‘to put a
thumb on the scales and influence a state’s decision as
to how to shape its own marriage laws.’” Windsor, 133
S.Ct. at 2693 (citations omitted). Congress’ overstepping
into this state-regulated area evidenced a discriminatory
motive.
The 1998 leg islation and 2 0 0 4 constitutional
amendment in Kentucky did not take away a right or
privilege that existed for same-sex couples in Kentucky
or that has ever been authorized by Kentucky. Kentucky
was not trying to influence the decision of any other state
as to how to shape their marriage laws. Kentucky was
acting – like New York did as recognized by Windsor – to
define marriage in accordance with the consensus of its
communities. Kentucky communities have never reached a
consensus to define marriage in a manner in which gender
is irrelevant. Since its inception, Kentucky has adhered
to the traditional model of one man and one woman, and
Kentucky has never recognized genderless marriages
licensed by other states. Unlike Congress’ passage of § 3
of DOMA, Kentucky did not take away or remove any
benefit that has ever been available in Kentucky.

 37
B. The loss of rights attendant to being married
experienced by same-sex couples with marriage
licenses issued by other states does not compel
Kentucky to adhere to the consensus of other
communities regarding the definition of
marriage.
The Bourke Petitioners devote considerable space
in their Brief to explaining the impact to them and their
families of their decision to move to Kentucky where the
consensus of communities is not to allow or recognize
same-sex marriage. The alleged impact includes: being
required to execute power of attorney and healthcare
surrogate forms not required of married couples; fear
that they may be forced to reside at separate health care
facilities one day and therefore possibly being prevented
from caring for each other in their old age; having to seek
out real estate professionals experienced with working
with same-sex couples to ensure their joint property rights
are protected when purchasing Kentucky real estate;
the possibility that the lack of a permanent parent/child
relationship with children they are raising would threaten
the stability of their family if the legal adoptive parent
died; the inability to consent to medical treatment for the
adoptive children of their spouse; having to keep adoption
papers with them to “fend off questions concerning their
legal status; the inability to receive health insurance
through the other’s employer; and the additional costs
associated with state inheritance taxes.” Pet. Br. 8-11.
While the Bourke Petitioners’ decisions to move to
Kentucky may have resulted in these additional burdens
and costs, these additional burdens are no different than
for heterosexual couples whose otherwise lawful out-of-

 38
state marriages would not be recognized by Kentucky.
For example, in California, where Bourke Petitioners
Johnson and Campion were married, first-cousin marriage
is lawful. Kentucky, however, prohibits marriages between
fi rst cousins and considers such marriages to be void. KY.
REV. STAT. A NN. § 402.010. Any couple whose marriage
violates Kentucky’s public policy experiences the same
concerns and challenges. Windsor does not stand for
the proposition that Kentucky (and states like it whose
citizens’ consensus is to maintain the traditional manwoman definition of marriage) is required to conform to
the consensus of the citizens of California, Connecticut,
New York or Hawaii when their citizens move to Kentucky.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “does not require
a State to apply another State’s law in violation of its own
legitimate public policy.” Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
422 (1979). The Petitioners’ reliance upon the Fourteenth
Amendment to challenge Kentucky’s marriage laws should
not lead to a different result. Judge Sutton below correctly
stated if a state is constitutionally permitted to limit the
issuance of marriage licenses to man-woman couples, then
“a State does not behave irrationally by insisting upon its
own definition of marriage rather than deferring to the
definition adopted by another State.” Pet. App. 55a. The
Court recognized that preservation of a state’s authority
to recognize, or to opt not to recognize, an out-of-state
marriage preserves a state’s sovereign interest in deciding
for itself how to define the marital relationship.” Pet. App.
55a.
Kentucky’s refusal to recognize the out-of-state
marriages of the Bourke Petitioners did not result from
the “unprecedented exercises of power [that] call for

 39
judicial skepticism,” as in Windsor and Romer. Pet. App.
56a. Kentucky’s non-recognition of same-sex marriages
is consistent with its refusal to recognize other marriages
that violate its public policy.
C.

Kentucky’s “place of celebration” rule does
not single out same-sex marriages for nonrecognition.

The Petitioners argue that because Kentucky courts
have recognized heterosexual marriages performed in
other states that would not have been valid if performed
in Kentucky, then Kentucky’s statutory and constitutional
provisions against the recognition of same-sex marriages
performed outside of Kentucky are unconstitutional.
The Petitioners erroneously assert that Kentucky has
“singled out the marriages of lesbians and gay men for
unequal treatment.” Pet. Br. 57. The Petitioners rely upon
what they term the “place of celebration” rule, which
they defi ne as states generally recognizing marriages
validly performed in other states, even if the marriage
would not have been licensed in the domiciliary state.
Pet. Br. 54. The Petitioners’ reliance upon this general
rule misstates Kentucky law as applicable to this case
and ignores the pivotal distinction made by the Kentucky
courts in recognizing marriages performed in other states
that would not have been validly performed in Kentucky:
whether or not the marriage considered was void, or
merely voidable.
The “place of celebration” rule does not obligate
Kentucky, or any other state, to recognize every marriage
from other jurisdictions if valid in the foreign jurisdiction.
There have always been exceptions to the general rule.

 40
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 122 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Ky. 1938)(“But a
marriage, valid where it takes place, is valid everywhere,
except in those instances, not necessary to mention here,
where the marriage is against the public policy of the
state.”)(internal citation omitted). When marriages,
validly performed in other jurisdictions, are found to be
against the public policy of Kentucky, those marriages are
void and not recognized by the Commonwealth. Compare
Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W.2d 45, 47- 48 (Ky. 1952)
(marriage of incompetent person void), with Mangrum
v. Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Ky. 1949)(marriage of
underage person voidable).
When determining whether or not a marriage is
considered void and not merely voidable, the Kentucky
courts consider whether or not the legislature has explicitly
expressed its intent in the statutory language. Stevenson
v. Gray, 56 Ky. 193, 222 (1856)(“[I]t was not absolutely
void, because it was not so declared by the statute….”);
Mangrum, 220 S.W.2d at 408 (“If the Legislature had
intended to declare such a marriage against the public
policy of the state, it would have made it absolutely void
regardless of the place where the marriage ceremony was
performed.”); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W.3d
100, 105 (Ky. 2006)(“If the legislature had intended to
declare an underage marriage against the public policy
of the state, it would have made it absolutely void—as
it has done with incestuous marriages and same-sex
marriages—and it would not have enacted KY. REV. STAT.
A NN. § 402.030.”).
In every case cited by the Petitioners as examples
of the application of the “place of celebration” rule, each
marriage was merely voidable as the legislature had not

 41
made such unions absolutely void. Id. Even if, as in the case
in Robinson, the Court preferred to render the marriage
void because it felt nullifying the marriage to be in the best
interest of the public, the courts show restraint because
it is the prerogative of the legislature to determine what
is against public policy. Robinson, 212 S.W.3d at 106 (“It
is beyond the power of a court to vitiate an act of the
legislature on the grounds that public policy promulgated
therein is contrary to what the court considers to be in the
public interest. It is the prerogative of the legislature to
declare that acts constitute a violation of public policy.”)
(internal citation omitted).
The “place of celebration” rule does not require the
recognition by the Commonwealth of Kentucky of samesex marriages validly performed in other states when such
marriages are against the stated public policy of Kentucky
as decided by the legislature and its citizenry when, as
has been shown herein, the statutory and constitutional
provisions barring recognition are rationally related to a
legitimate purpose.

 42
CONCLUSION
Kentucky’s marriage laws which prohibit the
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and
the recognition of same-sex marriages entered into outof-state do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should be
affi rmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LEIGH GROSS LATHEROW
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM H. JONES, JR.
GREGORY L. MONGE
VANA NTWERP, MONGE, JONES,
EDWARDS & MCCANN, LLP
P.O. Box 1111
Ashland, KY 41105
(606) 329-2929
llatherow@vmje.com
Counsel for Respondent
March 27, 2015