No. 14-562
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
-----------------------------------------------------------------VALERIA TANCO, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
WILLIAM HASLAM, et al.,
Respondents.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Sixth Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General
STATE OF TENNESSEE
JOSEPH F. WHALEN
Associate Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MARTHA A. CAMPBELL
KEVIN G. STEILING
Deputy Attorneys General
ALEXANDER S. RIEGER
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243
615-741-3499
joe.whalen@ag.tn.gov
Counsel for Respondents
================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

 i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state
to recognize a marriage between two people of the
same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed
and performed out-of-state?

 ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................................

i

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................

1

INTRODUCTION ................................................

1

STATEMENT .......................................................

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

5

ARGUMENT ........................................................ 10
I.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DOES
NOT REQUIRE A STATE TO RECOGNIZE AN OUT-OF-STATE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE ............................................... 10
A. States have always had authority
under the Constitution not to recognize marriages licensed in other
states ................................................... 10
B. A State is not required to recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage as a
matter of substantive due process ....... 16
1. There is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage.......................... 16
2. There is no fundamental right of
same-sex couples to “remain married” ................................................ 23
C. A State is not required to recognize
an out-of-state same-sex marriage as
a matter of equal protection ................ 28

 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
D. A State is not required to recognize
an out-of-state same-sex marriage on
the basis of the right to travel............. 33
II.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS A STATE TO DEFINE MARRIAGE IN THE TRADITIONAL WAY ...... 36
A. The traditional definition of marriage
has a rational basis ............................. 37
B. A State’s traditional definition of marriage does not warrant heightened scrutiny ....................................................... 40
1. There is no discrimination on the
basis of sex ...................................... 41
2. Sexual orientation does not trigger
higher scrutiny ............................... 43

III.

THE STATES’ RECOGNITION OF SAMESEX MARRIAGE MUST BE LEFT TO
EACH STATE ............................................ 46

CONCLUSION..................................................... 49

 iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981) ...............................................11, 12, 13, 14, 28
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S.Ct. 2073
(2012) ...................................................................... 40
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez,
476 U.S. 898 (1986) ................................................ 35
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222
(1998) ................................................................ 10, 13
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) ....... 18
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)........................ 18
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839) .......... 29
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996) ...................................................................... 15
Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355 (2011) .... 14, 48
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) ............ 32, 34, 36
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ...................... 11
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985) ................................................. 32, 45
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) ............................................................... 43
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458
U.S. 527 (1982) ....................................................... 26
Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) .................................... 26

 v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856) .............................. 17
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) .................. 33
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ............. 34
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307 (1993) ...... 38
Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2009) .................................................. 31, 32
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) .... 42, 47
Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013), stay denied, 79
A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013) ............................................ 22
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003) ........................................ 15, 17, 22
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ............ 15, 38
Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013) .............. 22
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .......... 17
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ...................... 37, 40
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S.
261 (1997) ............................................................... 48
Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) ............... 40
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ....... 20, 23, 44
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ....17, 18, 20, 42, 43
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo.,
377 U.S. 713 (1964) ................................................ 46
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) ................. 17, 18
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) ............ 43

 vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ................... 18
Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268 (1935) ............................................................... 10
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)............. 11, 27, 29
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) ......... 37, 40, 41
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 1039 (2015) ............... 5
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) .................... 10, 11, 14
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) ......................... 34
Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889) ........... 29
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985) ................................................................ 12, 14
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ....................... 41, 43
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) ...................................................................... 42
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)............................... 42
Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970) ...... 29
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).................. 40, 41
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) ................. 33, 34, 35
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) ........................................... 20
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014) ....................................... 46, 48
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) ......... 10
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) .................... 14

 vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ........ 19, 39
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) .................................. 23
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) ........................... 13
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) .............. 38
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) ... 12, 28, 29
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) ......................... 17
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013) .... passim
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)..................... 20, 40
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) ........................ 38
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)........ 22
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)................ 46
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) ...............................................16, 17, 20, 21, 37
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972) ............................................................... 42
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) ............................................................... 47
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514
(1953) ...................................................................... 28
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942) ...................................................................... 27
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2012) ....................................................................... 25
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) ........... 17, 18

 viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03 .......................................... 22
Alaska Const. art. I, § 25 ........................................... 22
Ariz. Const. art. XXX, § 1 .......................................... 22
Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1 ........................................ 22
Colo. Const. art. II, § 3 .............................................. 22
Fla. Const. art. I, § 27................................................ 22
Ga. Const. art. I, § 4 .................................................. 22
Idaho Const. art. III, § 28 .......................................... 22
Kan. Const. art. 15, § 16 ............................................ 22
Ky. Const. § 233A ....................................................... 22
La. Const. art. XII, § 15 ............................................. 22
Mich. Const. art. I, § 25 ............................................. 22
Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263A ...................................... 22
Mo. Const. art. I, § 33 ................................................ 22
Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7 ......................................... 22
Neb. Const. art. I, § 29 .............................................. 22
N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6 ............................................ 22
N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28 ............................................ 22
Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11 ........................................... 22
Okla. Const. art. 2, § 35............................................. 22
S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 ......................................... 22
S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9 ............................................ 22

 ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 ............................ 2, 3, 22, 38
Tex. Const. art. I, § 32 ............................................... 22
Utah Const. art. 1, § 29 ............................................. 22
Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A ............................................. 23
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ............................................... 10
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 ............................................... 33
Wisc. Const. art. XIII, § 13 ........................................ 23
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ..................................... passim
STATUTES
79 Del. Laws 19 (2013) .............................................. 22
2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 09-13 ...................................... 22
2009 D.C. Laws 18-110 .............................................. 22
2009 N.H. Laws 60 .................................................... 22
2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 3 ........................................ 22
2011 Me. Laws I.B. 3 ................................................. 22
2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 95 ............................................... 22
2012 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 3 ..................................... 22
2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. Act 1, § 3 ....... 22
2013 Ill. Laws 98-597 ................................................ 22
2012 Md. Laws ch. 2 .................................................. 22
2013 Minn. Laws ch. 74 ............................................ 22
2013 R.I. Laws ch. 13-5 ............................................. 22

 x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 82 ................................................ 22
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 .................................... 2, 3
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(a) ............................ 39, 44
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(b) .................................. 31
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(d) ...................... 14, 31, 32
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 ...................................... 31
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-102 ...................................... 31
Tenn. Code of 1858, Title 4, Ch. 1 ............................. 30
Tenn. Code of 1917 § 4190 ........................................ 30
W. Va. Stat. § 48-2-104 .............................................. 23
Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101................................................. 23
Section 3 of the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act ....................................................24, 25, 28, 30, 31
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different
States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross
State Lines 117 (2006) ................................. 11, 13, 32
Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787 (1995) ..................................... 14
Black’s Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed. 1999) ............... 17
Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity:
Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform
Marriage Laws, 84 Or. L. Rev. 433 (2005) ............ 25

 xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the
Law of Marriage & Divorce § 225 (1852) .............. 19
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government §§ 78, 79 (1690) ........................................ 19
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v.
Blue Families: Legal Polarization and the
Creation of Culture 119 (2010) ................... 45, 47, 48
Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the
English Language 897 (1st ed. 1828) .................... 19
Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 Creighton L.
Rev. 353 (2005) ....................................................... 12
Prepared Statement of Maggie Gallagher, 58
Drake L. Rev. 889 (2010) ....................................... 46
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 121
(1934) ....................................................................... 11
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 132
(1934) ....................................................................... 11
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 134
(1934) ....................................................................... 11
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283
(1971) ....................................................................... 11
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 284
(1971) ....................................................................... 11

 1
OPINIONS BELOW
The March 14, 2014 memorandum opinion of the
district court granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is reported at 7 F. Supp. 3d 759. Pet.
Apx. 108a. The corresponding district-court orders
are unreported. Pet. Apx. 104a, 106a. The April 25,
2014 order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit granting respondents’ motion for a
stay pending appeal is unreported. Pet. Apx. 101a.
The November 6, 2014 opinion of the Sixth Circuit
reversing the preliminary-injunction order of the
district court is reported at 772 F.3d 388. Pet. Apx.
1a.
------------------------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION
In our federal system, States are equal sovereigns, and one State may not impose its policy choices
on another State. This proposition has particular
force in an area of traditional state concern like
marriage. Over the last 12 years, some States have
expanded their definitions of marriage, and petitioners insist that the remaining States must fall in line
and adjust their own policies to match that expanded
definition. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
compel such a result.
------------------------------------------------------------------

 2
STATEMENT
Since 2003, a minority of States (17 and the
District of Columbia) have expanded the definition of
marriage to include same-sex couples by legislative
1
action, ballot measure, or state-court decision. Tennessee is among the majority of States that maintain
the traditional definition of marriage: the union of
one man and one woman. See Tenn. Const. art. XI,
§ 18; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113. Pet. Apx. 132a,
133a. Petitioners are three same-sex couples who
were married in States that license such marriages:
one couple was married in California in 2008, and
two couples were married in New York in 2011. J.A.
476, 477. All three couples thereafter moved to Tennessee, J.A. 488, 491, 495, and in October 2013, they
filed a joint complaint challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee’s marriage laws. Petitioners alleged
that their marriages are not recognized under Tennessee law and that this nonrecognition violates their
rights to due process, equal protection, and travel
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. J.A. 502-15.2
Tennessee has always defined marriage in the
traditional way. And in 1996, the Tennessee General
1

See infra note 9. By virtue of federal-court injunctions,
same-sex marriages are currently authorized in some 18 additional States.
2
The couple from California has since returned to that
State, but press their case on the basis of their prior residence in
Tennessee. Pet. 6.

 3
Assembly enacted a statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3113, reaffirming that traditional definition. The
statute declared that “Tennessee’s marriage licensing
laws reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the
long-standing public policy of this state to recognize
the family as essential to social and economic order
and the common good and as the fundamental building block of society.” In addition to reaffirming the
“historical institution” and traditional definition of
marriage, the statute provides that any law that
otherwise defines marriage “is contrary to the public
policy of Tennessee.” It further provides that if a
marriage is licensed out-of-state but not permitted in
Tennessee, “any such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable in this state.” Pet. Apx. 133a. In 2006,
the voters of Tennessee, by an 81% majority,3 approved an amendment to the State Constitution, art.
XI, § 18, similarly codifying the “historical institution” and traditional definition of marriage and
providing that any law that otherwise defines marriage “is contrary to the public policy of this state and
shall be void and unenforceable in Tennessee.” J.A.
132a.
On March 14, 2014, the district court granted
petitioners’ motion for preliminary relief and enjoined
the State from enforcing these marriage laws as to
them. Pet. Apx. 104a. Tennessee appealed, and the
3

The statewide vote total was 1,419,434 in favor and
327,536 against, J.A. 521, and the measure passed in every one
of the State’s 95 counties, J.A. 525-29.

 4
Sixth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal. Pet.
Apx. 103a.
On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit reversed.
Pet. Apx. 1a. The court majority rejected all of petitioners’ arguments for sustaining the district-court
injunction, concluding that neither the Due Process
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to expand its
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples.
Determining that state laws codifying the traditional
definition of marriage do not burden a fundamental
right and do not involve a suspect classification or
otherwise require heightened scrutiny, Pet. Apx. 44a55a, the court found that such laws have a rational
basis. First, “awareness of the biological reality that
couples of the same sex do not have children in the
same way as couples of the opposite sexes and that
couples of the same sex do not run the risk of unintended offspring . . . suffices to allow the States to
retain authority over an issue they have regulated
from the beginning.” Pet. Apx. 34a. Second, “a State
might wish to wait and see before changing a norm
that our society (like all others) has accepted for
centuries.” Pet. Apx. 34a. See also Pet. Apx. 56a
(“States must enjoy some latitude in matters of timing, for reasonable people can disagree about just
when public norms have evolved enough to require
a democratic response. Today’s case captures the
point.”).
The Sixth Circuit also held that the Constitution
does not prohibit a State from denying recognition to

 5
same-sex marriages conducted in other States. “If it
is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a
relationship between a man and a woman, it is also
constitutional for the State to stand by that definition
with respect to couples married in other States or
countries.” Pet. Apx. 60a. In response to petitioners’
significant reliance on this Court’s decision in United
States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013), for its dueprocess and equal-protection arguments, the court not
only distinguished Windsor but found that it supported the court’s holding. Pet. Apx. 24a, 40a, 50a, 59a;
see Pet. Apx. 62a (“Far from undermining these
points, Windsor reinforces them.”). The court also
held that Tennessee’s Marriage Laws do not violate
the guarantees that protect the right to travel. Pet.
Apx. 64a.
The dissent took issue both with the merits and
the approach of the majority opinion; it rejected “the
majority’s resolution of these questions based on its
invocation of vox populi and its reverence for ‘proceeding with caution.’ ” Pet. Apx. 67a. On January 16,
2015, this Court granted certiorari in this case and
three related cases. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S.Ct. 1039 (2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment does not require
Tennessee to recognize petitioners’ out-of-state samesex marriages, which are contrary to Tennessee’s

 6
public policy. Interstate recognition of marriage is
governed by state choice-of-law rules, and under
those rules States have always had authority to
decline to recognize out-of-state marriages that
violate their own public policy. The Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution
combine to impose only modest restrictions on a
State’s choice of law, and those requirements are
satisfied here. Tennessee is more than competent to
legislate on the subject of marriage, and it is not
required to substitute another State’s law for its own.
Petitioners reside in Tennessee, so there is a significant contact and a sufficient state interest. The State
has a keen interest whenever it is asked by its residents to recognize an out-of-state marriage and thus
administer and regulate all of the incidents, benefits,
and obligations of marriage. Applying Tennessee law
is not arbitrary or unfair; Tennessee has always
defined marriage in the traditional way, and it has
made clear that it will not recognize out-of-state
marriages that are contrary to its public policy.
Substantive-due-process principles do not require
Tennessee to recognize petitioners’ same-sex marriages, because there is no fundamental right to same-sex
marriage. Decisions of this Court recognizing a fundamental right to marry have considered marriage
under its traditional definition: the union of one man
and one woman. The fundamental importance of
marriage is necessarily linked to the procreative
capacity of that man-woman union, and this Court
has said that the right to marry is fundamental

 7
precisely because marriage and procreation are fundamental to the existence of society.
Without a fundamental right to their same-sex
marriages, petitioners cannot invoke any corresponding right to “remain married.” And this Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675
(2013), does not support petitioners’ claim. Unlike the
situation in Windsor, petitioners’ claim implicates the
sovereign power of another State, Tennessee, to define the marital relation within its own borders. And
Tennessee is where petitioners reside, so Tennessee
does not create two contradictory marriage regimes
within the same State when it declines to recognize
petitioners’ marriages.
Equal-protection principles likewise do not
require recognition of petitioners’ marriages. Tennessee’s recent marriage enactments do not “starkly
depart” from its common-law rule for marriage recognition, and the comparison is inappropriate in any
event. Tennessee does not “target” same-sex couples
who marry out-of-state; Tennessee recognizes out-ofstate marriages depending upon whether they comport or conflict with Tennessee’s own public policy.
That classification is rationally related to the State’s
legitimate interest in maintaining a uniform, consistent marriage regime and treating all of its citizens
alike with respect to marriage.
Petitioners’ right to travel is not infringed by not
recognizing their marriages. As new residents of
Tennessee, petitioners enjoy the right to be treated

 8
like permanent residents. But Tennessee’s marriage
laws treat all of its citizens the same regardless of
their length of residence. Migration is not penalized
merely because the rights enjoyed by the citizens of
one State are not enjoyed by the citizens of another
State.
Ultimately, Tennessee is not required to recognize petitioners’ out-of-state same-sex marriages because its own marriage policy is indeed legitimate.
The Fourteenth Amendment allows a State to define
marriage in the traditional way because the traditional definition is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. Marriage cannot be separated from its
procreative purpose, and the inherently procreative
capacity of opposite-sex couples cannot be denied.
Maintaining a traditional definition of marriage
ensures that when couples procreate, the children
will be born into a stable family unit, and the promotion of family stability is certainly a legitimate state
interest. The same situation is simply not presented
by same-sex couples, who as a matter of pure biology
do not naturally procreate. So there exists a rational
explanation for not expanding marriage to same-sex
couples.
Heightened scrutiny of Tennessee’s traditional
definition of marriage is not warranted. It does not
discriminate on the basis of sex, a quasi-suspect class,
because it does not provide dissimilar treatment of
men and women who are similarly situated. And this
Court need not decide here whether sexual orientation is a suspect class, because the traditional and

 9
longstanding definition of marriage is not the product
of the arbitrary and invidious discrimination that
heightened scrutiny is designed to root out. The
traditional definition goes back thousands of years,
and that history does not support the presumption of
prejudice on which heightened-scrutiny analysis is
based.
The Constitution does not compel the result petitioners seek, and the ongoing debate regarding
same-sex marriage is properly left to each State. The
Constitution vests each State with the power to
define marriage for its own community, and our
federal structure accounts for the kind of division
that currently exists among the States on the question whether same-sex marriage should be recognized. Each State must be afforded the ability to best
address the needs, wishes, and values of its own
people. When a State has exercised its sovereign
authority to establish its own policy and reaffirm the
traditional definition of marriage, that authority
must not be intruded upon by requiring it to give way
to the policy of another State that has chosen to
expand its marriage definition.
------------------------------------------------------------------

 10
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DOES
NOT REQUIRE A STATE TO RECOGNIZE
AN OUT-OF-STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE.
A. States have always had authority under the Constitution not to recognize
marriages licensed in other states.

Ours is a nation of separate States. Although it
was the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution “ ‘to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties,’ ” Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 232 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935)), the States
remain equal sovereignties—“equal in power, dignity
and authority,” Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct.
2612, 2623 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court’s precedents differentiate between the
credit that one State owes to other States’ judgments
and the credit that one State owes to other States’
laws. Baker, 522 U.S. at 232. The Clause imposes an
“exacting” obligation on one State to give full faith
and credit to the judgments of other States, id. at
233, but it “does not compel ‘a state to substitute the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate,’ ” id. (quoting Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501
(1939)).

 11
This Court’s precedents clearly establish that
“the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a
State to apply another State’s law in violation of its
own legitimate public policy.” Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 422 (1979). See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939)
(full faith and credit “does not here enable one state
to legislate for the other or to project its laws across
state lines”). The Clause does not demand “subserviency” from a state; another state can make and
enforce its own policy as it chooses, but “[o]nce that
policy is extended into other States, different considerations come into play.” Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408, 413-14 (1955); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“[I]n view of the fact that the forum State is also a
sovereign in its own right, in appropriate cases it may
attach paramount importance to its own legitimate
interests.”).
Interstate recognition of marriage has long been
governed by state choice-of-law rules, and those rules
have long included some form of a public-policy
exception to the general rule that out-of-state marriages will be recognized. See, e.g., Restatement (First)
of Conflict of Laws §§ 121, 132, 134 (1934); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 283, 284 (1971).
“States have always had the power to decline to
recognize marriages from other states, and they have
been exercising that power for centuries.” Andrew
Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When SameSex Marriages Cross State Lines 117 (2006); see also

 12
Patrick J. Borchers, The Essential Irrelevance of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 38 Creighton L. Rev. 353, 357 (2005)
(“The public policy exception is a deeply ingrained
feature of traditional choice-of-law principles. . . .
State courts have long refused to recognize marriages
that violate their public policy even if the marriage
was validly celebrated elsewhere.”).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause together place “modest” restrictions on
a State’s choice of law, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985), but the Constitution
does not compel any particular choice-of-law rule,
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring). See id. at 728-29 (Court
will not inquire into the wisdom of an existing choiceof-law precedent). For a State’s application of its own
substantive law to be constitutionally permissible,
“that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.” Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13;
cf. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 822 (a State “may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having
no relation to anything done or to be done within
them”).
The modest restrictions imposed by the Constitution do not require Tennessee to recognize petitioners’
out-of-state same-sex marriages, which conflict with
Tennessee’s public policy. First, while a State’s own

 13
law must relate to a subject matter “concerning which
it is competent to legislate,” Baker, 522 U.S. at 233,
Tennessee is more than competent to legislate on the
subject of marriage, and it has always maintained a
traditional definition of marriage. As this Court
reaffirmed in United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
2675 (2013), the regulation of marriage and domestic
relations is “ ‘an area that has long been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States.’ ” 133
S.Ct. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
404 (1975)).4 Second, petitioners are residents of
Tennessee, so the State has a significant contact,
creating a state interest. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313.
See also Koppelman, supra at 20 (acknowledging that
appropriate weight must be given to the marriage
policy of the State in which the couple resides). “The
recognition of civil marriages is central to state
domestic relations law applicable to its residents and
citizens,” Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2691, so when a State
is asked by its domiciliaries to recognize a marriage
that another State licensed, i.e., to administer and
regulate all of the incidents, benefits, and obligations
4

Although the Court stressed this point in the context of
vertical federalism, i.e., the power of a State to define marriage
vis-à-vis that of the federal government, the point applies with
equal force in the context of horizontal federalism, i.e., the
power of a State to define marriage vis-à-vis that of another
State. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2693 (“The responsibility of the
States for the regulation of domestic relations is an important
indicator of the substantial societal impact the State’s classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its people.”) (emphasis added).

 14
of marriage, it has a keen interest at stake. See
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948) (“[T]he
regulation of the incidents of the marital relation
involves the exercise by the States of powers of the
most vital importance.”). And applying Tennessee law
to decline recognition is not arbitrary or unfair. See
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313. Given both the longstanding
public-policy exception under choice-of-law rules and
the clear provision in Tennessee law that the State
will not recognize marriages that are contrary to the
State’s public policy, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3113(d), petitioners cannot say that they had “no idea”
that their marriages would not be recognized, cf.
Phillips, 472 U.S. at 822.
The ability of a State to apply its own law and
decline to recognize an out-of-state marriage on the
basis of its own legitimate public policy comports with
the interests of federalism. See Pacific, 306 U.S. at
501 (“the very nature of the federal union of states”
precludes compelling one state to substitute the laws
of another state). By reserving the subject of domestic
relations to the States, the Constitution reserves the
subject of domestic relations and marriage to each
and every State, to regulate, manage, and define as
each sees fit according to the needs and values of the
people “in their own community.” Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
at 2692. “States enjoy exclusive authority over family
law . . . because of the fundamental role of localism in
the federal design.” Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and
Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1790 (1995). See
Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)

 15
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991)) (“The federal structure allows local policies
‘more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society’. . . .”).
“[N]o single State [can] . . . impose its own policy
choice on neighboring States,” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996)—a principle that
Massachusetts seemed to recognize when it became
the first State in the Nation to allow same-sex marriage, see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
5
N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003). But when petitioners
and their amici urge this Court to conclude that the
laws of States allowing same-sex marriage must
prevail in every State, they threaten the federal
design. Indeed, by asking this Court to override a
sovereign State’s definition of marriage, petitioners
and their amici are asking this Court to do that for
which Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage
Act was condemned in Windsor.

5

In rejecting the argument “that expanding the institution
of civil marriage in Massachusetts to include same-sex couples
will lead to interstate conflict,” that State’s highest court stated:
“We would not presume to dictate how another State should
respond to today’s decision. . . . The genius of our Federal system
is that each State’s Constitution has vitality specific to its own
traditions, and that, subject to the minimum requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment, each State is free to address
difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own
Constitution demands.” Id.

 16
B. A State is not required to recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage as a
matter of substantive due process.
Petitioners invoke substantive due process to
insist that Tennessee must recognize their New York
and California marriages, asserting a fundamental
right to marry and the deprivation of a liberty interest “in their existing marriages.” Br. Pet. 19-21. Both
arguments fail.
1. There is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage.
The substantive component of the Due Process
Clause “provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests,” but only “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’
. . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted). Under
this Court’s “established method” of substantive-dueprocess analysis, “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” is required, and
“[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices”
provide the crucial guideposts “that direct and restrain” exposition of the Clause. Id. This method of
analysis reflects the Court’s “reluctan[ce] to expand
the concept of substantive due process,” which flows
from the Court’s recognition that when it extends

 17
constitutional protection to an asserted right or
liberty interest, “[the Court], to a great extent,
place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate
and legislative action.” Id. at 720.
Petitioners invoke the fundamental right to
marry. Br. Pet. 17. Carefully described, though, the
right petitioners are invoking can only be the right to
same-sex marriage. Because in every case in which
this Court has considered marriage and the marital
relationship, it has necessarily considered marriage
only under its traditional definition: the union of one
man and one woman. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (noting that the law in
question “operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
212 (1888) (quoting Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87, 101
(1856)) (“marriage . . . signifies the relation of husband and wife”). See also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
952 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed.
1999) (“[t]he everyday meaning of ‘marriage’ is ‘the
legal union of a man and a woman as husband and
wife’ ”). Petitioners rely specifically on this Court’s
decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), as
well as those in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978); and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96
(1987), in support of the proposition that they have
the right to marry the person of their choice. As the
Sixth Circuit observed, however, “[w]hen Loving and
its progeny used the word marriage, they did not

 18
redefine the term but accepted its traditional meaning.” Pet. Apx. 47a.6
Moreover, the Court’s reason for deeming the
right to marry fundamental has undoubtedly been
based on the procreative capacity of that man-woman
relationship. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (“A decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional
family setting must receive . . . protection.”); Loving,
388 U.S. at 12 (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil
rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival.”); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211 (“[Marriage] is
an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (The
right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . [is] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”). In short, this Court has said that
“the right to marry is of fundamental importance,”
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383, precisely because “[m]arriage
6

In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), this Court
dismissed, for want of a substantial federal question, an appeal
from a state court presenting the question whether the right to
marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental
right. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
The Sixth Circuit aptly asked in this regard, “Had Loving meant
something more when it pronounced marriage a fundamental
right, how could the Court hold in Baker five years later that
gay marriage does not even raise a substantial federal question?” Pet. Apx. 46a.

 19
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,” Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
This understanding regarding the fundamental
purpose of marriage has been expressed by commentators throughout history,7 and the union of one man
and one woman has been the definition of marriage
throughout the United States since its founding. See,
e.g., Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law
of Marriage & Divorce § 225 (1852) (“It has always
. . . been deemed requisite to the entire validity of
every marriage . . . that the parties should be of
different sex.”). Marriage, to be sure, is not just about
sex; marriage has other important aspects as well,
such as the “expressions of emotional support and
public commitment” to which petitioners point. Br.
Pet. 20. But these aspects are not why marriage has

7

See, e.g., John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government §§ 78, 79 (1690) (defining marriage as “a voluntary
compact between man and woman” and opining that “this
conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after
procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and
support of the young ones”); Noah Webster, An American
Dictionary of the English Language 897 (1st ed. 1828) (marriage
“was instituted . . . for the purpose of preventing the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, for promoting domestic felicity, and
for securing the maintenance and education of children.”). See
also Br. Amici Curiae Scholars of History Supporting Respondents 2 (“eminent authorities throughout the ages have uniformly confirmed that the institution of marriage owes its very
existence to society’s vital need to regulate sexual relationships
between men and women”).

 20
been deemed “fundamental to our very existence and
survival.” Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (citing San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35
(1973)) (“courts must look to the Constitution, not the
‘importance’ of the asserted right, when deciding
whether an asserted right is ‘fundamental’ ”).
Petitioners suggest that Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), supports their contention that samesex marriage is a fundamental right. Br. Pet. 20. In
Lawrence, this Court held that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as a violation of due process. 539 U.S. at
578-79. The decision stands for the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from
intruding upon the privacy of a same-sex relationship
by criminalizing private, consensual intimate conduct. But the Court expressly noted that the case
“[did] not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter,” id. at 578, and the case
does not support that proposition. See id. (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (“Texas cannot assert any legitimate
state interest here, such as . . . preserving the traditional institution of marriage.”).
In contrast to traditional marriage, same-sex
marriage is of relatively recent vintage and is not
“deeply rooted in our legal tradition,” Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721; same-sex marriages were unknown to the
laws of this Nation before 2003. Indeed, this Court

 21
acknowledged in Windsor that “until recent years . . .
marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had
been thought of by most people as essential to the
very definition of that term and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” 133 S.Ct.
at 2689. To find that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right, this Court “would have to reverse
centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike
down the considered policy choice” of a majority of
States. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
Petitioners’ amici suggest that the institution of
marriage has moved from its traditional moorings;
that States have gained “a new perspective on samesex marriage” and that traditional marriage “does not
reflect modern society.” Br. Amici Curiae of NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, et al., in Support of
Petitioners 5; Br. Amici Curiae of the State of Minnesota in Support of Petitioners 18. In apparent support
of this point, they assert that only 13 States do not
allow same-sex marriage. NAACP Br. at 5; Minnesota
Br. at 15.8 But this assertion is highly misleading.
While there is no question that some States have
seen fit to allow same-sex marriage, it is a clear
minority of States that have done so. Only 17 States
and the District of Columbia currently allow same-sex
8

Other amici for petitioners repeat this assertion. See, e.g.,
Br. Amici Curiae of the Columbia Law School Sexuality and
Gender Law Clinic in Support of Petitioners 4. Petitioners
themselves similarly assert that a “minority” of States do not
allow same-sex marriage. Br. Pet. 13.

 22
marriage by legislative or popular enactment or by
state-court decision.9 Meanwhile, traditional marriage
is by no means an anachronism in this country. At
least 30 States, by legislation or popular enactment
or both, maintain a traditional definition of mar10
riage. These numbers do not at all support recognition
9

California (2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 82); Connecticut (2009
Conn. Pub. Acts 09-13); Delaware (79 Del. Laws 19 (2013));
Hawaii (2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. Act 1, § 3); Illinois
(2013 Ill. Laws 98-597); Iowa (Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009)); Maine (referendum approving 2011 Me. Laws I.B.
3); Maryland (referendum approving 2012 Md. Laws ch. 2);
Massachusetts (Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003)); Minnesota (2013 Minn. Laws ch. 74); New
Hampshire (2009 N.H. Laws 60); New Jersey (Garden State
Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013), stay
denied, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013)); New Mexico (Griego v. Oliver,
316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013)); New York (2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 95);
Rhode Island (2013 R.I. Laws ch. 13-5); Vermont (2009 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 3); Washington (referendum approving 2012
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 3); District of Columbia (2009 D.C. Laws
18-110).
10
Alabama (Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03); Alaska (Alaska
Const. art. I, § 25); Arizona (Ariz. Const. art. XXX, § 1); Arkansas (Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1); Colorado (Colo. Const. art. II,
§ 3); Florida (Fla. Const. art. I, § 27); Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I,
§ 4); Idaho (Idaho Const. art. III, § 28); Indiana (Ind. Code § 3111-1-1); Kansas (Kan. Const. art. 15, § 16); Kentucky (Ky. Const.
§ 233A); Louisiana (La. Const. art. XII, § 15); Michigan (Mich.
Const. art. I, § 25); Mississippi (Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263A);
Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33); Montana (Mont. Const. art.
XIII, § 7); Nebraska (Neb. Const. art. I, § 29); North Carolina
(N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6); North Dakota (N.D. Const. art. XI,
§ 28); Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11); Oklahoma (Okla. Const.
art. II, § 35); South Carolina (S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15); South
Dakota (S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9); Tennessee (Tenn. Const. art.
XI, § 18); Texas (Tex. Const. art. I, § 32); Utah (Utah Const. art.
(Continued on following page)

 23
of a fundamental right to same-sex marriage.11 Although a few States have acquiesced in recent federal
injunctions against their traditional-marriage laws,
at best the States are decidedly split on the question.
History and tradition, therefore, must be both the
starting and the ending point of the substantive-dueprocess inquiry in this case. Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
572.
2. There is no fundamental right of
same-sex couples to “remain married.”
Petitioners assert that the Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize their same-sex
marriage because not to do so would violate their
right to “remain married.” Br. Pet. 21. It is true that
this Court has often said that the marital relationship deserves protection. It is “the basic foundation of
the family in our society.” Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843
(1977). But as discussed above, in those decisions the
Court was necessarily examining the contours of the
traditional marriage relationship and the fundamental
1, § 29); Virginia (Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A); West Virginia (W. Va.
Stat. § 48-2-104); Wisconsin (Wisc. Const. art. XIII, § 13); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101).
11
The suggestion of petitioners’ amici gains no support from
developments in the international community either. See
generally Br. Amici Curiae for 50 International and Comparative
Law Experts, et al., for the Respondent.

 24
right to marry. Without a fundamental right to their
same-sex marriages, petitioners cannot invoke any
corresponding right to “remain married.”
Petitioners nevertheless point to this Court’s
decision in Windsor to support their argument, contending that “Windsor underscored the liberty interests at stake here.” Br. Pet. 22. It did not. The
situation presented in Windsor was materially different from the situation presented here. Indeed, because of those differences, Windsor hurts rather than
helps petitioners’ cause.
In Windsor, this Court held that Section 3 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violated
“basic due process and equal protection principles
applicable to the federal government” not because the
Constitution requires recognition of same-sex marriages but because the federal government lacks
authority to interfere with a State’s power to define
marriage by imposing a different definition on persons residing in a State that recognizes same-sex
marriage. “By creating two contradictory marriage
regimes within the same State, DOMA force[d] samesex couples to live as married for the purpose of state
law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law. . . .”
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2694 (emphasis added). Central
to the Court’s decision was the State’s power in
defining the marital relation, a power that New York
had chosen to exercise to expand its marriage definition to include same-sex couples in that community.

 25
Id. at 2692-93.12 But DOMA intruded upon that power
and “injure[d] the very class New York seeks to protect.” Id. at 2693.
Windsor reaffirmed that “the regulation of domestic relations is an area that has been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States” and that
“[t]he definition of marriage is the foundation” of that
broader authority. Id. at 2691. Here, that power is
also of central relevance. But petitioners’ claim for
recognition of their marriages, in contrast to the one
in Windsor, necessarily implicates the power and
authority of another State with equal power to define
the marital relation within its borders. Moreover,
petitioners now reside in that second sovereign, the
State of Tennessee, which maintains a traditional
definition of marriage. Marital status “depends on
the general recognition states give to one another’s
marriages.” Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage
Laws, 84 Or. L. Rev. 433, 473 (2005). By not recognizing petitioners’ marriages, Tennessee does not

12

The couple in Windsor had not married in New York.
They resided in New York but traveled to Canada in 2007 to be
married. After one member of the couple died in 2009, the other
sought recognition of the marriage in the context of seeking
eligibility for a marital exemption from the federal estate tax. At
that time, New York recognized same-sex marriages performed
elsewhere, id. at 2683 (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d
169, 177-78 (2d Cir. 2012)); in 2011, New York amended its
statutes to permit same-sex marriages, id. at 2689.

 26
create two marriage regimes within the same State
as in Windsor.
Each State is entitled to make policy determinations for itself, for its own community. As this Court
recounted in Windsor, New York “sought to give
further protection and dignity” to the bond between
same-sex couples. Id. at 2692. But this was more than
the Fourteenth Amendment requires. A State can
choose to do more than the Amendment requires,
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527,
535 (1982), but when it does, surely the Fourteenth
Amendment does not then require other States, with
equal sovereignty and power over the subject at hand,
to be bound by that choice.
Petitioners complain of “the most egregious of
intrusions” on their marriages by Tennessee, Br. Pet.
23, and their amici offer a laundry list of “harms”
that are imposed upon same-sex couples who occupy
the same position, Br. Amici Curiae of States of
Massachusetts, et al. 32-37. But Tennessee has not
“intruded” upon petitioners’ lives, and it is simply
unfair to lay this litany of “harms” at Tennessee’s
feet. After all, it was petitioners who moved into
Tennessee, subjecting themselves to Tennessee’s laws.
The Due Process Clause requires States not to deprive citizens of their fundamental rights, but it does
not impose affirmative obligations on States to act.
See Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). As the Sixth Circuit
observed, Tennessee has merely applied its own rule
of law—the definition of marriage that the State has

 27
always had. See Pet. Apx. 40a (Tennessee’s most
recent enactment “codified a long-existing, widely
held social norm already reflected in state law.”). If
the circumstances were otherwise, if every State in
this country had always defined marriage to allow the
marriage of two persons of the same sex, and then
Tennessee altered that definition to limit it to “the
union of one man and one woman,” one might better
understand the complaints of “intrusion” and “harm.”
The reality, however, is exactly the opposite. It is
New York and California, among other States, that
have altered the legal landscape by recognizing samesex marriage. That is their right and prerogative, of
course. But petitioners cannot rightly point to that
shift and use it as the basis upon which to insist that
Tennessee, which had no voice in those decisions,
must now give way. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 426. The
people of Tennessee have the same right and prerogative to keep marriage as it has always been. “In a
country like ours where each state has the constitutional power to translate into law its own notion of
policy concerning the family institution, and where
citizens pass freely from one state to another, tangled
marital situations . . . inevitably arise.” Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). By merely exercising its sovereign
right to apply its own law and declining to recognize
petitioners’ out-of-state marriages, Tennessee does
not deprive petitioners of a liberty interest.

 28
C. A State is not required to recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage as a
matter of equal protection.
Focusing on Tennessee’s 1996 and 2006 marriage
enactments, petitioners argue that equal-protection
principles require that Tennessee recognize their New
York and California marriages. They assert that the
interstate-recognition component of Tennessee’s laws
should be invalidated under the same “careful consideration” that DOMA was given in Windsor, because it
“represents a stark departure” from Tennessee’s prior
choice-of-law rule and practice and because it “targets” for unequal treatment same-sex couples lawfully married in other States. Br. Pet. 32. These
arguments fail, for several reasons.
First, so long as a State meets the minimum
restrictions for applying its own law under the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, a State’s
choice-of-law rule and its practice thereunder should
be constitutionally irrelevant. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S.
at 735 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953)
(“[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel
a state to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict
of laws”); see also Allstate, 449 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“It is not this Court’s function to establish
and impose upon state courts a federal choice-of-law
rule, nor . . . to ensure that state courts correctly
apply whatever choice-of-law rules they have themselves adopted.”). It follows, therefore, that within those
minimal constitutional bounds, a State should be free

 29
to alter, modify, and apply its extant choice-of-law
rule as it sees fit. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 729 (noting
that a State could adopt a new conflict-of-law rule
“[i]f current conditions render it desirable”); Hall, 440
U.S. at 426 (quoting Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. 519, 590 (1839)) (“when . . . the interest or policy
of any state requires it to restrict the rule [of comity],
it has but to declare its will”). And on the particular
subject of marriage recognition in Tennessee, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“[t]he legislature has, beyond all possible question,
the power to enact what marriages shall be void in its
own state, notwithstanding their validity in the state
where celebrated.” Pennegar v. State, 10 S.W. 305,
306 (Tenn. 1889).
Second, any comparison between Tennessee’s
practice under its common-law rule and under its
enacted-law rule is at once inapt, notwithstanding
that petitioners offer a rather narrow articulation of
Tennessee’s common-law rule. Br. Pet. 32. It is clear
that Tennessee subscribed to the general rule that
prevailed in most every jurisdiction: that a marriage
valid where solemnized is valid everywhere, except
where the marriage conflicts with a State’s own
public policy. See Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522,
523 (Tenn. 1970); see also Pennegar, 10 S.W. at 306
(“there are exceptions to the [general] rule as well
established as the rule itself ”). Tennessee’s enacted
marriage laws work in much the same way; they
reaffirm the traditional definition of marriage as the
State’s public policy and clarify that laws which

 30
otherwise define marriage conflict with that public
policy and will not be recognized.
Under the common-law rule, this traditional
definition of marriage was always understood; it was
13
a given. As this Court observed in Windsor, until
recent years “marriage between a man and a woman
no doubt had been thought of by most people as
essential to the very definition of that term.” 133
S.Ct. at 2689. That marriage is the union between a
man and a woman was always a part of Tennessee’s
(and every other State’s) public policy. So to compare
Tennessee’s recognition of out-of-state same-sex
marriages against the frequency with which Tennessee
courts did or did not recognize out-of-state traditional
marriages in the past is to draw an inappropriate
comparison. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (noting, with respect to the federal
government’s deference to State marriage definitions
prior to DOMA, that “none of those prior state-bystate variations had involved differences over [the
very definition of marriage]” and that “it is hardly
surprising” that the federal government would treat
this “fundamental question” differently).
Third, Tennessee law does not “target and discriminate against same-sex couples who married out-of-state
13

See, e.g., Tenn. Code of 1917 § 4190 (to solemnize marriage, “the parties shall respectively declare, in the presence of
the minister or officer, that they accept each other as man and
wife”); see also Tenn. Code of 1858, Title 4, Ch. 1 (Of Rights in
the Domestic Relations Of Husband and Wife).

 31
as a class.” Br. Pet. 32. As discussed above, the application of Tennessee law certainly does not impact
same-sex marriages in the same way that DOMA did.
And Tennessee recognizes out-of-state marriages
depending upon whether they comport or conflict
14
with Tennessee’s own public policy. Other out-ofstate marriages, not just same-sex marriages, that
conflict with that public policy would not be recognized in Tennessee. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3101 (consanguinity), 36-3-102 (bigamy); see also Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-3-113(b) (defining marriage as the
union of one man and one woman). Indeed, the Tennessee marriage statute expressly provides that “[i]f
another State or foreign jurisdiction issues a license
for persons to marry, which marriages are prohibited
in this state, any such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(d) (emphasis added).15

14

Respondents acknowledge that the public policy on which
Tennessee relies (its definition of marriage) must be “legitimate”
and thus must itself satisfy equal-protection requirements.
Petitioners’ arguments that Tennessee’s marriage laws discriminate on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, Br. Pet. 34-45,
are more properly treated as challenges to that definition and,
accordingly, are addressed separately below. See infra Sec. II.B.
15
Petitioner cites only the Tennessee constitutional provision, not the statute. Br. Pet. 32-33. In the lower courts, petitioners argued that the statute should be construed as applying
only to same-sex marriages, but the provision is plain and
unambiguous. Petitioners have also argued that the decision in
Farnham v. Farnham, 323 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009), a private-party case in which the court recognized an
(Continued on following page)

 32
The equal-protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985). A state law complies with that direction and
will be sustained “if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” Id. at 440. Tennessee’s law distinguishes
between out-of-state marriages that comport with the
State’s public policy and those that conflict with it;
that classification is rationally related to the State’s
legitimate interest in maintaining a uniform, consistent marriage regime and treating all of its citizens
alike with respect to marriage.
In the particular case of out-of-state same-sex
marriages, Tennessee’s rule treats same-sex couples
who have long resided in the State the same as samesex couples who have moved into the State. See
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 (1978) (per curiam)
(making reference to “the independent power of each
State under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly
applicable to all of its residents”); see also Koppelman,
supra at 88 (“A state could reasonably conclude that
it would be unfair to have recent arrivals enjoy benefits that are denied to long-term residents.”). By not

out-of-state marriage on estoppel grounds, contradicts the statute. But the court in Farnham did not cite, much less address,
§ 36-3-113(d).

 33
recognizing petitioners’ out-of-state same-sex marriages, Tennessee does not deny equal protection of
the law.
D. A State is not required to recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage on the
basis of the right to travel.
Petitioners argue that by not recognizing their
New York and California marriages, Tennessee infringes upon their right to travel and to take up
residence in Tennessee. Br. Pet. 23-24. They say that
Tennessee’s marriage laws force them “to ‘choose
between travel and a basic right’ of citizenship, such
as the liberty interest in one’s marriage.” Br. Pet. 26
(quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342
(1972)). But as discussed above, there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. So no “basic right
of citizenship” is implicated by petitioners’ traveling
to and taking up residence in Tennessee. Cf. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 342 (“In the present case, such laws
force a person who wishes to travel and change
residences to choose between travel and the basic
right to vote.”).
The right to travel finds its source in both the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, of
the Constitution and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), this Court identified three
different components to the right to travel. 526 U.S.
at 501-02. The first provides the right of “free interstate movement,” i.e., the right of a citizen of one

 34
State to enter and to leave another State without
impediment. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941) (invalidating law criminalizing bringing indigent persons into California). The second is the right
to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the
second State. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180
(1868) (the citizens of each State are placed “upon the
same footing with citizens of other States, so far as
the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
[other] States are concerned”; “[s]pecial privileges
enjoyed by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States”). The third component encompasses the right to be treated like a permanent
resident for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents of the second State. See
Califano, 435 U.S. 1 (new residents to a State are
guaranteed the same benefits as those that existing
residents enjoy). This right, which derives specifically
from the Fourteenth Amendment, “is protected not
only by the new arrival’s status as a state citizen, but
also by her status as a citizen of the United States.”
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503; see id. at 504 (“That newly
arrived citizens have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, adds special force to their claim
that they have the same rights as others who share
their citizenship.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is this third component of the right to travel
that petitioners’ argument invokes.
Saenz held unconstitutional a California statute
that imposed a durational residency requirement by
limiting welfare benefits through a recipient’s first

 35
year of residency. 526 U.S. at 492, 510-11. In Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898
(1986), this Court declared unconstitutional a New
York law restricting civil-service-examination preference only to those veterans who entered the armed
forces while residing in New York rather than to
veterans who were not New York residents upon
enlisting but became residents before the time of
examination. 476 U.S. at 900. In each instance, the
State either advantaged residents (Soto-Lopez) or
disadvantaged new residents (Saenz), thereby treating newcomers differently from their own citizens.
The Court held that these laws violated the right to
travel because they imposed a direct penalty on
migration, i.e., they treated newcomers to the State
differently from those who already resided there. See
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04.
By contrast, Tennessee’s marriage laws make no
distinction between or among its citizens based on the
length of their citizenship or residency in Tennessee.
Tennessee does not recognize any same-sex marriage,
in-state or out-of-state, regardless of the couple’s
residency; as discussed above, no out-of-state marriage is recognized if that marriage conflicts with the
State’s public policy. Indeed, petitioners’ assertion
that Tennessee “treat[s] them adversely as compared
to other married Tennesseans,” Br. Pet. 26, amounts
to a restatement of their equal-protection argument.
On the distinct right-to-travel question, the Sixth
Circuit performed exactly the right comparison, Pet.
Apx. 64a-65a; Tennessee’s marriage laws treat all

 36
citizens of the State exactly the same, regardless of
their length of residence in Tennessee. Migration is
not “penalized” merely because the rights enjoyed by
the citizens of one State are not enjoyed by the citizens of another State. See Califano, 435 U.S. at 908
(rejecting the argument that a newcomer must be
given benefits superior to current residents of a State
if the newcomer enjoyed superior benefits in another
State). By not recognizing petitioners’ out-of-state
marriages, Tennessee does not infringe upon their
right to travel.
II.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS A STATE TO DEFINE MARRIAGE
IN THE TRADITIONAL WAY.

Respondents’ position that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a State to recognize an
out-of-state same-sex marriage necessarily assumes
that the Fourteenth Amendment allows a State to
maintain the traditional definition of marriage, i.e.,
that the Tennessee public policy with which petitioners’ out-of-state same-sex marriages conflict is indeed
legitimate. The Sixth Circuit stated it in the converse:
“If it is constitutional for a State to define marriage
as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is
also constitutional for the State to stand by that
definition with respect to couples married in other
States or countries.” Pet. Apx. 60a. It is constitutional
for Tennessee to so define marriage.

 37
A. The traditional definition of marriage
has a rational basis.
A state law challenged under the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment must, at a minimum, be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. Under
rational-basis review, a law is presumed constitutional, and “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 320 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners insist that Tennessee’s marriage laws lack
a “rational connection” to any state interest, Br. Pet.
47, but their argument turns rational-basis review
upside down. Rather than show, as they must, how
Tennessee’s traditional, opposite-sex definition of
marriage lacks any rational basis, petitioners assert
that there would be no harm in expanding the definition to include same-sex couples, Br. Pet. 48, 50, and
they focus on the irrationality of, and the harms they
say result from, the State’s failure to so expand it. Br.
Pet. 47-50. This is essentially a policy argument; it is
not an argument for why Tennessee’s definition is
unconstitutional. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (rational-basis review does not “authorize the judiciary to sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“[C]ourts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental action on the ground that it denies equal

 38
protection of the laws.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
96-97 (1979). In areas of social policy, a statutory
classification must be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” F.C.C. v. Beach
Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993). Deference is
particularly justified here, where the challenge is to a
State’s definition of marriage, a subject falling within
the State’s “virtually exclusive province.” Windsor,
133 S.Ct. at 2691; see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 648 (1973) (noting that equal-protection scrutiny
“will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State’s constitutional
prerogatives”). Tennessee’s marriage laws also include a state constitutional amendment, approved by
an overwhelming majority of Tennessee voters,16 and
the presumption that a law is constitutional is
stronger with regard to laws passed by the citizens
themselves at the ballot box. See Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991) (noting that a state constitutional provision is approved by “the people of [the
State] as a whole” and thus “reflects . . . the considered judgment . . . of the citizens of [the State] who
voted for it.”).
Nevertheless, one need not strain to conceive of a
rational basis for Tennessee’s definition of marriage
as the union of one man and one woman. As discussed
16

Article XI, § 18, of the Tennessee Constitution was passed
in 2006 in every one of the State’s 95 counties and by a
statewide majority of 81% of the voters. J.A. II. 520-529.

 39
above, marriage cannot be divorced from its procreative purpose, see, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535
(“[M]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race.”), and the
inherently procreative capacity of the man-woman
relationship cannot be denied. The Sixth Circuit aptly
observed that “governments got into the business of
defining marriage, and remain in the business of
defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate
sex, most especially the intended and unintended
effects of male-female intercourse.” Pet. Apx. 31a. The
promotion of family stability is certainly a legitimate
state interest, and Tennessee furthers that interest
through its definition of marriage by increasing the
likelihood that when children are born, they will be
born into stable family units. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-3-113(a) (recognizing family “as the fundamental
building block of our society”). There is nothing
irrational about maintaining the institution of marriage under its traditional definition.17
The same rational basis exists for distinguishing
between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples.
Obviously, same-sex couples cannot procreate naturally. Biology alone, therefore, provides a rational
explanation for not expanding marriage to add same-sex
17

The Sixth Circuit agreed that this was a rational basis for
maintaining a traditional definition of marriage. It also found a
second: that “a State may wish to wait and see before changing a
norm that our society (like all others) has accepted for centuries.” Pet. Apx. 34a.

 40
couples. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 383
(1974) (rational basis exists where “the inclusion of
one group promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups would not”); see
also Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (there is no violation of
the Equal Protection Clause “if there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and
some legitimate governmental purpose”). Any charge
that the State’s traditional definition of marriage
does not do enough, or even that it does too much, to
further the State’s interest must be disregarded in
the constitutional analysis. See Heller, 509 U.S. at
330 (where the State identifies a rational basis, “[the
Court] must disregard the existence of alternative
methods of furthering the objective”); Armour v. City
of Indianapolis, 132 S.Ct. 2073, 2083 (2012) (“the
Constitution does not require [a legislature] to draw
the perfect line nor even to draw a line superior to
some other line it might have drawn”). Tennessee’s
marriage laws easily pass rational-basis review.
B. A State’s traditional definition of marriage does not warrant heightened
scrutiny.
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
classifications. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10. States
“must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike
cases accordingly.” Vacco, 521 U.S. at 799. In Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), this Court acknowledged
that “most legislation classifies for one purpose or
another, with resulting disadvantage to various

 41
groups or persons.” 517 U.S. at 631. Heightened
scrutiny of a law is warranted only when it “burdens
a fundamental right [or] targets a suspect class.” Id.;
see Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10. The reason for subjecting laws that target a suspect class to heightened
scrutiny is that such classifications “are more likely
than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14
(1982). Tennessee’s law defining marriage as the
union of one man and one woman does not warrant
heightened scrutiny. For the reasons discussed above,
Tennessee’s definition of marriage does not burden a
fundamental right. And for the reasons discussed
here, it does not target a suspect class or otherwise
reflect the invidious discrimination that heightened
scrutiny otherwise presumes. See id. at 217.
1. There is no discrimination on the
basis of sex.
Sex is a quasi-suspect class, and petitioners
argue that Tennessee’s definition of marriage draws a
distinction based on sex and perpetuates stereotypical gender roles. Br. Pet. 35, 36. But while the words
“man” and “woman” obviously are part of the traditional definition, this definition does not distinguish
between men and women. As discussed above, by
defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, the law focuses not on the sex of the individual
but on the opposite sexes of the couple. The distinction
then, when one introduces the question of same-sex

 42
marriage, is between opposite-sex couples and samesex couples.
Tennessee’s marriage law does not provide “dissimilar treatment for men and women who are . . .
similarly situated.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971). It does not give advantage, disadvantage, or
preference to one above the other. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (citing Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)). And it does not engender “disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
252 (1989). Petitioners may be correct to say that
marriage has historically enshrined sex roles in the
law, Br. Pet. 38, but the fundamental purpose of
marriage—to make provision for the procreative
capacity of the male-female relationship—is not
based on any stereotype. In short, an opposite-sex
definition of marriage does not amount to gender
discrimination.
Petitioners’ reliance on Loving is misplaced. Br.
Pet. 35. Loving invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statutes because they “rest[ed] solely upon
distinctions drawn according to race.” 388 U.S. at 11.
Although the Court rejected the argument that there
was no invidious discrimination because these “statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro
participants in an interracial marriage,” id. at 8, the
laws were invalidated because they promoted racial
disparity. The Court rested its holding on the conclusion that there was “patently no legitimate overriding

 43
purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination” that justified the classification. Id. at 11. The
same cannot at all be said about the longstanding
definition of what constitutes a marriage.
2. Sexual orientation does not trigger
higher scrutiny.
Sexual orientation has not previously been
identified as a suspect class, but petitioners assert
that Tennessee’s traditional definition of marriage
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation and
that this discrimination warrants heightened review.
Br. Pet. 39. Petitioners point out that the Court has
previously had no need to determine whether sexual
orientation is a suspect classification, Br. Pet. 40, and
it need not do so here. A State law defining marriage
as the union of a man and a woman is not the product
of the “arbitrary and invidious discrimination” that
heightened scrutiny is designed to root out. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); see City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (purpose of heightened scrutiny is
to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of a “suspect tool”).
Tennessee, like every other State in the Nation
prior to 2003, has always defined marriage in the
traditional way. And it would strain reason to suggest
that by defining marriage this way, Tennessee has
been discriminating against same-sex couples for hundreds of years—that this definition reflects “deep-seated
prejudice” rather than rationality, Plyler, 457 U.S. at

 44
216 n.14, when the idea that same-sex couples might
aspire to occupy the institution of marriage is a
relatively recent development, see Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
at 2689. As the Sixth Circuit explained, while “[t]he
traditional definition of marriage goes back thousands of years and spans almost every society in
history,” this Court has noted that “laws targeting
same-sex couples did not develop until the last third
of the 20th century.” Pet. Apx. 50a (quoting Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequently, history does not support the presumption of prejudice on which heightened-scrutiny analysis is based; there is no cause for the skepticism that
would engender such review. “The usual leap from
history of discrimination to intensification of judicial
review does not work.” Pet. Apx. 50a.
Petitioners’ arguments focus on Tennessee’s
recent enactments, but those just reaffirmed the
traditional definition; they “codified a long-existing,
widely held social norm already reflected in state
law.” Pet. Apx. 40a. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(a)
(making reference to the “historical institution” of
marriage). Pet. Apx. 133a. If the traditional definition
does not invidiously discriminate against same-sex
couples, the mere codification of that definition does
not either.
But even if one focuses on the State’s decision to
reaffirm the traditional definition, “reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
disapproval of an excluded group.” Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Indeed,

 45
Tennessee’s statute expressly declares that its marriage laws “reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the long-standing public policy of this state to
recognize the family as essential to social and economic order.” Pet. Apx. 133a. Tennessee does not
maintain a traditional definition of marriage with the
design to “exclude” same-sex couples; as discussed
above, that is but the natural consequence of marriage’s original and fundamental purpose and the
inescapable biological fact that opposite-sex couples
procreate and same-sex couples do not. And that
reality counsels against, not in favor of, closer judicial
scrutiny. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
The State and its voters can legitimately favor
this traditional purpose of marriage without that
view having anything to do with denigrating samesex couples. Commentators have observed that proponents of the traditional definition of marriage
“emphasize [its] mandatory nature. That is, they
continue to insist on the unity of sex, marriage, and
procreation; the complementary nature of the relationship between men and women; and the importance of commitment . . . to marital stability.”
Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue
Families: Legal Polarization and the Creation of
Culture 119 (2010); see id. at 128 (“Within the red
paradigm, marriage is the optimal basis for childrearing, and it is an eternal institution, rooted ‘in creation
itself,’ for the purpose of ordering sexual relations and
uniting mothers, fathers, and their biological children.”).
The vote in favor of traditional marriage is a vote in

 46
favor of traditional marriage; it is not a vote against
same-sex couples as persons. See Prepared Statement
of Maggie Gallagher, 58 Drake L. Rev. 889, 896 (2010)
(“The idea marriage has something important to do
with procreation was not made up in response to gay
marriage. We did not invent it because we do not like
gay people.”).18 There is no reason to suspect invidious
discrimination; the Court need not subject Tennessee’s marriage definition to heightened scrutiny.
III. THE STATES’ RECOGNITION OF SAMESEX MARRIAGE MUST BE LEFT TO EACH
STATE.
Marriage is an area of traditional state concern,
though “[s]tate laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights
of persons.” Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2691. Respondents
agree with petitioners that “constitutional law is not
a matter of majority vote.” Br. Pet. 55 (quoting Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713,
737 n.30 (1964)). But the Fourteenth Amendment
18

Respondents acknowledge that some individuals may act
with improper motives, but “it is unrealistic . . . to invalidate
otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive
affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional
process.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (“It is demeaning
to the democratic process to presume that voters are not capable
of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational
grounds.”).

 47
does not compel the result petitioners seek—it does
not require States to recognize same-sex marriages.
The question whether States should recognize
same-sex marriage is obviously a matter of great
debate, and it is one on which people of good will
disagree. Indeed, the differences among the States on
the question of same-sex marriage appear to reflect
the larger cultural divide that currently exists in this
country on a host of family-related issues. See Cahn
& Carbone, supra at 119. “But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably
‘politically divisive’ issues from the ambit of the
legislative process, whereby the people through their
elected representatives deal with matters of concern
to them. The goal . . . is to hold true the balance
between that which the Constitution puts beyond the
reach of the democratic process and that which it
does not.” Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (plurality opinion). Our federal
structure accounts for such divisions, and the answer
is debate and democratic consensus. “[D]emocratic
institutions are weakened . . . when [the Court]
appears unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of
broad social and political importance at the very time
they are under consideration within the prescribed
constitutional process.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692.
The Constitution invests each State with the
power to define marriage; it does not put the question
whether that definition should encompass same-sex
couples beyond the reach of the democratic process.
Our federal structure is well suited to address divisive

 48
social-policy issues like this one. See Cahn & Carbone,
supra at 208 (“[M]arriage promotion should be handled in decentralized ways through the federalist
system, allowing each part of the country to redefine
family aspirations in regional terms based on shared
values.”). That structure also protects the “dignity
and respect afforded a state,” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997), and the
dignity of individual state voters—“the right of citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then,
through the political process, act in concert to try to
shape the course of their own times,” Schuette v. Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1637
(2014). The whole point of horizontal federalism is to
afford each State the opportunity to best address the
needs, wishes, and values of its own people; it “enables greater citizen ‘involvement in the democratic
processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive
by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry.’ ” Bond, 131 S.Ct. at 2364. Here, having
invested in that process and reaffirmed the traditional definition of marriage for their own community,
both through an act of the legislature and with 1.4
million of their votes, the citizens of Tennessee have
an interest at stake too.
The decision of a State like New York or California to expand its definition of marriage to include
same-sex couples is “without doubt a proper exercise
of its sovereign authority within our federal system.”
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2692. But it is also a proper
exercise of Tennessee’s sovereign authority within our

 49
federal system to maintain the traditional definition
of marriage, and to recognize out-of-state marriages
accordingly. It would intrude on Tennessee’s sovereignty to require it to substitute another State’s
marriage policy for its own.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General
STATE OF TENNESSEE
JOSEPH F. WHALEN
Associate Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MARTHA A. CAMPBELL
KEVIN G. STEILING
Deputy Attorneys General
ALEXANDER S. RIEGER
Assistant Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243
615-741-3499
joe.whalen@ag.tn.gov
Counsel for Respondents