No. 14-571

In the Supreme Court of the United States
APRIL DEBOER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
RICHARD SNYDER, GOVERNOR, STATE OF MICHIGAN, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Bill Schuette
Michigan Attorney General
Aaron D. Lindstrom
Solicitor General
B. Eric Restuccia
Deputy Solicitor General
Ann Sherman
Assistant Solicitor General
John J. Bursch
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, MI 48909
MIAG@michigan.gov
(517) 373-1110
Attorneys for Respondents

 i

QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to
license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

 ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented...................................................... i 
Table of Contents ........................................................ ii 
Table of Authorities .................................................... v 
Introduction ................................................................ 1 
Statement of the Case ................................................ 3 
A.  Competing views of marriage ........................ 3 
B.  The history of marriage in Michigan ............ 4 
C.  The petitioners ............................................... 5 
D.  District-court proceedings ............................. 5 
E.  The Sixth Circuit’s decision ........................... 6 
Summary of Argument ............................................. 10 
Argument .................................................................. 13 
I.  In the absence of a recognized constitutional
right, the Constitution reserves to the states
the role of defining marriage. ............................ 13 
II.  Marriage has traditionally been defined as
only between opposite-sex couples because
the state’s interest in marriage has always
been to encourage individuals with the
inherent capacity to bear children to enter a
union that supports raising children. ................ 17 
III.  There is no substantive-due-process right to
a particular marriage definition. ....................... 21 
IV.  Michigan’s opposite-sex definition of
marriage does not violate equal protection. ...... 28 

 iii
A.  Michigan voters acted rationally in
defining marriage......................................... 28 
1.  The rational-basis standard defers to
voters in order to protect the
democratic process. ................................ 29 
2.  Defining marriage as between a man
and a woman advances legitimate
state interests. ....................................... 31 
a.  Encouraging opposite-sex couples
to enter into a permanent,
exclusive union within which to
have and raise children is a
legitimate state interest
advanced by Michigan’s marriage
law. .................................................. 31 
i.  The “infertility” objection
does not negate the
rationality of Michigan’s
marriage definition. .................. 33 
ii.  The “exclusion” objection does
not negate the rationality of
Michigan’s marriage
definition. .................................. 35 
iii.  The “efficacy” objection does
not negate the rationality of
Michigan’s marriage
definition. .................................. 36 
b.  Michigan’s marriage laws value
the contributions that both sexes
bring to parenting. .......................... 39 
c.  Michigan’s citizens might not
have wished to alter a central

 iv
building block of society before
knowing more about its long-term
impact. ............................................. 41 
3.  Michigan’s marriage laws are focused
on the unique capacity of opposite-sex
couples to procreate, not animus
toward same-sex couples. ...................... 42 
B.  Michigan’s marriage laws are not subject
to heightened scrutiny. ................................ 46 
1.  Michigan’s marriage laws are based
on biological complementarity, not
sexual orientation. ................................. 46 
2.  Michigan’s marriage laws do not
discriminate based on sex. .................... 54 
3.  Michigan’s marriage laws encourage
having and raising children within a
marriage but do not punish
illegitimacy. ........................................... 56 
C.  Michigan’s marriage laws survive any
level of scrutiny. ........................................... 57 
Conclusion ................................................................. 60 
Appendix A: Ballot-box votes on the definition of
marriage.............................................................. 1a 
Appendix B: Legislative action on the definition
of marriage in states that did not have a
state-wide vote .................................................... 8a 

 v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases 
Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999) .............................................. 2
Armour v. City of Indianapolis,
132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012) ........................................ 34
Baker v. Baker,
13 Cal. 87 (1859) ................................................. 17
Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1971) ............................ 17
Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) .............................. 6, 8, 17, 20
Ballard v. United States,
329 U.S. 187 (1946) ............................................ 39
Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) ........................ 34, 36
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) .............................. 47
Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) .................... 43, 44
Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587 (1987) ...................................... 40, 48
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263 (1993) ............................................ 53
Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992) ............................................ 13

 vi
Butler v. Wilson,
415 U.S. 953 (1974) ............................................ 26
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning,
455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) .............................. 47
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) .................................... passim
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) ............................................ 46
Cook v. Gates,
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) ................................. 47
Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) ............................................ 54
Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) ............................................ 38
Davis v. Prison Health Servs.,
679 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2012) .............................. 47
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989) ...................................... 24, 27
Duren v. Missouri,
439 U.S. 357 (1979) ............................................ 41
Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) ............................................ 24
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993) ................................ 29, 30, 42
Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) ............................................ 54
Gard v. Gard,
204 Mich. 255 (1918) .......................................... 17

 vii
Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) ............................................ 56
Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010) .............................................. 14
Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312 (1993) ................................ 30, 33, 37
Hernandez v. Robles,
7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006) ............................................ 17
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office,
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................. 47
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party,
440 U.S. 173 (1979) ............................................ 13
Johnson v. Johnson,
385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004) .............................. 47
Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974) ...................................... 11, 35
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000) .............................................. 38
Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) .......................... 34
Latta v. Otter,
771 F.3d 456 (2014) ............................................ 47
Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) ................................ 13, 22, 46
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973) ............................................ 30
Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) .............................................. 27

 viii
Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) ................................................ 1
Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162 (1986) ...................................... 30, 40
Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family
Servs.,
358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................ 47
Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ........................................ passim
Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &
Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW,
485 U.S. 360 (1988) ............................................ 45
McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964) ............................................ 46
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty.,
450 U.S. 464 (1981) ............................................ 56
Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91 (1982) ........................................ 47, 56
Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53 (2001) .............................................. 38
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) .............................................. 54
Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .............................. 47
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Sch. Dist.,
361 U.S. 376 (1960) ............................................ 31
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical
Health Servs. v. Abbott,
748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014) .............................. 29

 ix
Price-Cornelison v. Brooks,
524 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2008) .......................... 47
Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) .............................................. 54
Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) ...................................... 44, 45
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62 (1990) .............................................. 20
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) .......................................... 27, 51
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend,
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) .............................. 2, 13, 43
Sevcik v. Sandoval,
911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) ................... 50
Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) ............................................ 17
State v. Fry,
4 Mo. 120 (1835) ................................................. 17
Thomasson v. Perry,
80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) ................................ 47
Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) .................................. 20, 23
Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987) ........................................ 21, 26
United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996) ...................................... 54, 56
United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) ................................ passim

 x
Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1979) ........................................ 31, 33
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization
of Cal.,
451 U.S. 648 (1981) ............................................ 30
Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) ............................................ 52
Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) .................................... passim
Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) ................................ 47
Woodward v. United States,
871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989)........................... 47
Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) ...................................... 21, 25
Statutes 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704 ................................. 8a
750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/201 ................................ 8a
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-20 ................................ 8a
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 ..................................... 8a
Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 ....................................... 8a
Iowa Code Ann. § 595.2 ............................................ 8a
Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-201 & 2-202 ............. 3a
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 650-A............................... 3a
Mich. Comp. Laws § 551.1 .......................................... 4
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.335 .................................... 25
Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, Ch. 83, § 9 .............................. 4

 xi
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a ................................. 8a
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a ....................................... 8a
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-1-1.................................... 9a
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-344.......................................... 26
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8........................................... 9a
W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-104 .................................... 9a
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010 ........................... 7a
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 ....................................... 9a
Other Authorities 
1 Laws of the Territory of Michigan ........................... 4
Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to
Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the
Road to Marriage,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 1165 (2006) ......................... 25
David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the
Original Understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause,
42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 (2015) ............. 21, 55
Joseph H. Beale et al., Marriage and the Domicil,
44 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1931) ................................. 4
Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar:
Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for SameSex Marriage, (2013), 193–203 .......................... 50
Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market
in Adoptions,
67 B.U. L. Rev. 59 (1987) ................................... 37
Sir Francis Bacon, 6 Bacon Abr. 523 ....................... 17

 xii
Sonu Bedi, Collapsing Suspect Class with
Suspect Classifications: Why Strict Scrutiny
Is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict Enough,
47 Ga. L. Rev. 301 (2013) ................................... 48
The Honorable Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty:
Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution
(2005) .................................................................. 13
Rules 
Fed. R. Evid. 201 ....................................................... 30
Constitutional Provisions 
Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03 .......................................... 1a
Alaska Const. art. I, § 25 .......................................... 1a
Ariz. Const. art. 30, § 1 ............................................. 1a
Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1 ....................................... 1a
Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5 ............................................. 1a
Colo. Const. art. II, § 31 ............................................ 1a
Fla. Const. art. I, § 27 ............................................... 2a
Ga. Const. art. I, § 4.................................................. 2a
Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 ............................................. 2a
Idaho Const. art. III, § 28 ......................................... 2a
Kan. Const. art. 15, § 16 ........................................... 2a
Ky. Const. § 233A...................................................... 2a
La. Const. art. XII, § 15 ............................................ 3a
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25....................................... 4, 3a
Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263A ..................................... 4a

 xiii
Mo. Const. art. I, § 33 ............................................... 4a
Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7 ........................................ 4a
N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6 ........................................... 5a
N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28 ........................................... 5a
Neb. Const. art. I, § 29 .............................................. 4a
Nev. Const. art. I, § 21 .............................................. 4a
Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11 .......................................... 5a
Okla. Const. art. II, § 35 ........................................... 5a
Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a ............................................ 5a
S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15 ........................................ 5a
S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9 ........................................... 6a
Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 18 ......................................... 6a
Tex. Const. art. 1, § 32 .............................................. 6a
U.S. Const. amend XIV ..................................... passim
Utah Const. art. I, § 29 ............................................. 6a
Va. Const. Art. I, § 15-A ........................................... 6a
Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13 ......................................... 7a

 1

INTRODUCTION
This case is not about the best marriage definition.
It is about the fundamental question regarding how
our democracy resolves such debates about social
policy: Who decides, the people of each state, or the
federal judiciary? Because the U.S. Constitution is
silent about how to define marriage, the issue remains
where it has always been: with the people. When
people of good will disagree—and they invariably do—
they should engage in compassionate and civil dialogue
in the public square. As Justice Holmes observed, our
Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally
differing views.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–
76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The issue of how to define marriage is no exception.
There are certainly many competing views on the
nature and purpose of marriage. One view is that
marriage is inseparably linked with having children
and biological kinship. On this view, marriage is a
means for encouraging individuals with the inherent
capacity to bear children to enter a union that supports
raising children, provides children with the benefit of
both a mother and father, and enables children to have
a relationship with each biological parent. Another
view is that marriage is primarily about commitment,
with gender and biological procreation taking less
prominent roles. From this perspective, marriage is a
commitment that grounds couples and provides
familial stability. Importantly, neither view stigmatizes the other; they are simply different conceptions of
what the marriage institution should be.

 2
It is “demeaning to the democratic process to
presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an
issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational
grounds.” Schuette v. Coalition to Defend, 134 S. Ct.
1623, 1637 (2014) (plurality). The Constitution
reserves to the states “a substantial portion of the
Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dignity
and essential attributes inhering in that status.” Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999). Our federal
structure allows individuals to exercise that dignity
through the ballot box at the state level. That is why
the “Constitution foresees the ballot box, not the
courts, as the normal instrument for resolving
differences and debates”; it is a “ ‘democratic political
system through which the people themselves must
together find answers’ to disagreements of this kind.”
Coalition to Defend, 134 S. Ct. at 1649–50 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
The Sixth Circuit recognized these essential
federalism principles, holding that the power to define
marriage must be left where “it has been since the
founding: [in] the hands of state voters.” Pet. App. 29a.
That conclusion follows this Court’s recent admonition
that “the definition and regulation of marriage” has
been “treated as being within the authority and realm
of the separate States.” United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). It is also consistent with
decisions by courts around the world—including the
United Nations Human Rights Committee and the
European Court of Human Rights—which have
concluded that it is the people, not the courts, who
have the right to define marriage.

 3
The Fourteenth Amendment does not dictate any
particular marriage view, so the courts are not in a
position to impose one. Voters have a legitimate
interest in promoting their own views, and while not
all voters agree, the marriage view adopted since
before the country’s founding is constitutional.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Competing views of marriage
People have many different understandings of
marriage and the role it should play in society. Those
who wish to retain the opposite-sex marriage model
may believe the government has no legitimate interest
in recognizing adult emotional commitments. Their
marriage view is biologically based, primarily childcentered, and has a conjugal meaning, with a primary
purpose of uniting every child to his or her biological
mother and father whenever possible. See, e.g.,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(describing competing visions). Some who favor
redefining marriage believe marriage’s primary
purpose is to recognize commitment. Because the
commitment of a same-sex couple is just as strong and
sincere as that of any other, under this view the
government’s refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage
is arbitrary discrimination and unfairly withholds
benefits from the couple’s children. See id.
The difference in these views is not that one side
promotes equality, justice, and tolerance while the
other endorses inequality, injustice, and intolerance.
They are simply different conceptions of what role the
institution should play in our society.

 4
B. The history of marriage in Michigan
Michigan has defined marriage as the union of one
man and one woman since before statehood. E.g., 1
Laws of the Territory of Michigan at 30–32 (1805
statute using the terms “wife” and “husband” and
“man” and “woman”). Early statutes required parties
wishing to be married to solemnly declare that they
take each other as “husband and wife.” Mich. Rev.
Stat. 1846, Ch. 83, § 9. In fact, “[t]he law of every
common-law state, and indeed of every European and
American state, deal[t] with marriage as a voluntary
union of a man and a woman.” Joseph H. Beale et al.,
Marriage and the Domicil, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 504
(1931). Michigan reaffirmed this and other aspects of
marriage in 1996: “Marriage is inherently a unique
relationship between a man and a woman.” Mich.
Comp. Laws § 551.1. “As a matter of public policy, this
state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting,
and protecting that unique relationship in order to
promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare
of society and its children.” Id.
In 2004, one year after Massachusetts’ highest
court struck down that state’s marriage law, nearly 2.7
million Michigan voters placed their statutory marriage definition in their state Constitution. The people
recognized that what makes marriage unique is the
capacity to create children and inherently expressed
that it was their prerogative, not that of the courts, to
decide an issue so important to them: “To secure and
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and
for future generations of children, the union of one man
and one woman in marriage shall be the only
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union
for any purpose.” Mich. Const. art. I, § 25.

 5
C. The petitioners
April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse are an unmarried,
same-sex couple residing in Hazel Park, Michigan.
Both are nurses and state-licensed foster parents. Each
has adopted children with special medical needs:
DeBoer has adopted child R, and Rowse has adopted
both N and J. Pet. App. 105a.
D. District-court proceedings
This case began as a challenge to Michigan’s
adoption laws. But when the district court concluded
that Michigan’s adoption laws had not caused any
injury, the court “invit[ed] plaintiffs to seek leave to
amend their complaint to include a challenge to
[Michigan’s marriage amendment].” Pet. App. 106a.
After the petitioners amended, the court denied
cross-motions for summary judgment. The court
recognized both that “[t]he underlying facts are not in
dispute” and that under rational-basis review “ ‘[t]he
government has no obligation to produce evidence to
support the rationality of its . . . [imposed] classifications and may rely entirely on rational speculation
unsupported by any evidence or empirical data.’ ” Pet.
App. 34a. Yet the court held that “a triable issue of fact
exists regarding whether the alleged rationales for the
[marriage laws] serve a legitimate state interest.”
The trial lasted nine days. Treating the question of
rational basis as hinging on factual disputes that could
be resolved at trial, the court concluded that the testimony of every one of the petitioners’ expert witnesses
was credible, and that every one of Michigan’s experts
was not. Pet. App. 109a–16a, 116a–23a.

 6
As a result, the district court struck down
Michigan’s marriage definition. In so doing, the court
recognized that it was not possible to make any finding
that the voters acted out of animus: “Since the Court is
unable [to] discern the intentions of each individual
voter who cast their ballot in favor of the measure, it
. . . cannot ascribe such motivations to the approximately 2.7 million voters who approved the measure.”
Pet. App. 133a. But the court said that none of
Michigan’s suggestions for why voters might have
enacted the amendment was rational. Pet. App. 127a.
E. The Sixth Circuit’s decision
The Sixth Circuit reversed. At the outset, the
majority recognized that “[t]his is a case about
change—and how best to handle it under the United
States Constitution.” Pet. App. 13a. The court
explained that our constitutional structure leaves the
question of how to define marriage not to the federal
courts but “to the less expedient, but usually reliable,
work of the state democratic processes.” Pet. App. 16.
Writing for the majority, Judge Sutton first noted
that as a lower court he was bound by Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). Pet. App. 25a–26a. He then
examined the question presented through a number of
lenses—“originalism; rational basis review; animus;
fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving
meaning”—and concluded that not one of the plaintiffs’
theories “makes the case for constitutionalizing the
definition of marriage and for removing the issue from
the place it has been since the founding: in the hands
of state voters.” Pet. App. 28a–29a.

 7
Starting with original meaning, the majority reasoned that people who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment would not have understood it “to require the
States to change the definition of marriage.” Pet. App.
30a. The pathway for change is “the agreed-upon
mechanism[ ]”—the amendment process. Pet. App. 29a.
As for rational-basis review, the court recognized
that government has an interest in the marriage
definition—“not to regulate love,” but out of concern for
“the intended and unintended effects of male-female
intercourse.” Pet. App. 32a. As the court noted, at least
two rational bases support this legitimate interest.
First, “[b]y creating a status (marriage) and by
subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privileges and
deductions), the States created an incentive for two
people who procreate together to stay together for
purposes of rearing offspring.” Pet. App. 34a–35a.
“That does not convict the States of irrationality, only
of awareness of the biological reality that couples of the
same sex do not have children the same way as couples
of opposite sexes and that couples of the same sex do
not run the risk of unintended offspring.” Pet. App.
35a.
Second, referencing the 2003 Massachusetts
Supreme Court decision that occurred one year before
the amendment passed, the court held that it is
rational “to wait and see before changing a norm that
our society (like all others) has accepted for
centuries[,]” as doing so is not simply “preserving
tradition for its own sake.” Pet. App. 35a.

 8
In accepting these reasons as rational, the majority
acknowledged that marriage laws include inconsistencies, but explained that other views of marriage,
including the petitioners’ definition, also suffer from
“line-drawing problems” and would likewise fall if the
existence of underinclusion and overinclusion problems
were sufficient to make a law irrational. Pet. App. 37a.
Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit also
concluded Michigan’s marriage amendment was not
motivated by animus; it merely “codified a longexisting, widely held social norm already reflected in
state law.” Pet. App. 40a. “[I]f there was one concern
animating the initiatives, it was the fear that the
courts would seize control over an issue that people of
good faith care deeply about.” Pet. App. 41a. It is just
as “unfair to paint the proponents of the measures as a
monolithic group of hate-mongers” as it is “to paint the
opponents as a monolithic group trying to undo
American families.” Pet. App. 44a.
As for substantive due process, the majority
reiterated this Court’s test: whether the asserted right
is “ ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’
and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Pet.
App. 46a (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)). And it concluded that the petitioners’
claim does not satisfy this test because “[t]he first state
high court to redefine marriage to include gay couples
did not do so until 2003.” Pet. App. 46a. Nor, the court
reasoned, did Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
change this analysis, as evidenced by the fact that, just
five years after Loving, this Court in Baker v. Nelson
rejected the same due-process argument the petitioners
make here. Pet. App. 47a.

 9
The court of appeals also declined to create a new
suspect class based on sexual orientation, noting that
while “gay individuals have experienced prejudice in
this country,” “the institution of marriage arose
independently of this record of discrimination,” which
shows that “[t]he usual leap from history of
discrimination to intensification of judicial review does
not work.” Pet. App. 51.
Finally, the court concluded that even taking into
account “evolving moral and policy considerations”
under the “living constitution” theory, the focus would
be “on evolution in society’s values, not evolution in
judges’ values.” Pet. App. 57. Because the objective
evidence of society’s values can be seen in the fact that,
“[f]reed of federal-court intervention, thirty-one States
would continue to define marriage” as only between a
man and a woman, the majority concluded it had no
right “to say that societal values, as opposed to judicial
values, have evolved toward agreement in favor of”
plaintiffs’ marriage definition. Pet. App. 57a.

 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourteenth Amendment and this Court’s cases
interpreting it say nothing about how to define marriage or the policy goals marriage must serve. That is
why a majority of circuits have been unable to coalesce
around any one of the petitioners’ legal theories. As the
public discussion shows, all sides of the marriage
debate can present good-faith policy arguments supporting their definition. These varying views are the
essence of democracy and the reason the Court should
leave this decision where the U.S. Constitution places
it: in the hands of the states, through either the
amendment process or state-level democracy. Our
constitutional system entrusts to the people this liberty
to engage in public debate and governance.
1. The liberty to engage in self-government is the
fundamental right at stake in this case, a right held by
all members of society in common. The issue of how to
define marriage has been subject to a vigorous debate
that is still ongoing. After the casting of more than 70
million votes, 11 states’ marriage laws have been
expanded to include same-sex couples; the other states’
laws have not. That public conversation should
continue without judicial interference.
2. The state’s primary interest in defining marriage
as between opposite-sex couples is to encourage
individuals with the inherent capacity to bear children
to enter a union that supports child rearing. Michigan’s
marriage laws have nothing to do with animus toward
anyone, and it would take a radical alteration of this
Court’s constitutional doctrines to hold that the
Constitution requires the redefinition of marriage.

 11
3. There is no due-process right to any particular
marriage definition. And it would be illogical to hold
that Michigan’s marriage definition violates due
process when its opposite-sex character provides
Michigan’s primary interest in having a marriage
institution at all. As this Court observed in Windsor,
the “limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual
couples . . . for centuries has been deemed both necessary and fundamental.” 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (emphasis
added). If that limitation has historically been deemed
fundamental to what marriage is, it cannot also be true
that marriage without the limitation is so “deeply
rooted” that it qualifies as a due-process right. Jettisoning the “deep roots” requirement would transform
the due-process doctrine into a quagmire with adverse
consequences, predictable and unpredictable.
4.a. Michigan’s marriage laws satisfy rational-basis
review. The petitioners concede that Michigan pursues
a legitimate interest and reasonably promotes that
interest by acknowledging that marriage brings stability to families and promotes positive child outcomes.
Pet. Br. 22, 37. The fact that Michigan’s marriage
definition may be under- or overinclusive is no ground
to invalidate it. It is not Michigan’s burden to prove
that excluding a group will promote a law’s purpose. To
the contrary, when “the inclusion of one group
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the
addition of other groups would not, we cannot say that
the statute’s classification of beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries is invidiously discriminatory.”
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974). Responding to the reality that a man and a woman are
generally able to create new life neither discriminates
nor entails animus at all.

 12
4.b. Michigan’s marriage laws should not be
subjected to heightened scrutiny under any theory.
“Sexual orientation” is not a protected class under this
Court’s traditional four-part test, as the vast majority
of circuits have recognized. More important, Michigan’s
marriage laws do not discriminate based on sexual
orientation; they classify based on biological
complementarity.
Michigan’s marriage laws also do not unlawfully
discriminate based on sex. The laws treat both sexes
equally in terms of rights and duties and do so without
engaging in any stereotyping about the proper role of
either sex in a marriage.
Michigan’s marriage laws have nothing to do with
illegitimacy. Even Michigan’s non-marriage laws do
not treat illegitimate children differently based on
their status. If any state’s laws did so, the children
would be free to bring a claim of discrimination on that
basis.
Michigan’s marriage laws also satisfy heightened
scrutiny if it were to be applied. Michigan’s marriage
definition is as narrowly tailored as possible. Michigan
cannot exclude infertile couples from its marriage
definition without running afoul of the Constitution.
Nor can Michigan expand its marriage definition
without causing erosion of the procreation paradigm
that motivated Michigan’s focus on opposite-sex
couples from the beginning.
In sum, absent a radical change in this Court’s
jurisprudence, the Constitution leaves it to the people
of each state to choose a philosophy of marriage. The
court of appeals should be affirmed.

 13

ARGUMENT
I.

In the absence of a recognized constitutional
right, the Constitution reserves to the states
the role of defining marriage.

When the Constitution does not vest a power in the
federal government, that power is reserved for the
states, as is “the right of citizens to debate so they can
learn and decide and then, through the political
process, act in concert to try to shape the course of
their own times.” Coalition to Defend, 134 S. Ct. at
1636–37 (plurality). For this reason, “voting is of the
most fundamental significance.” Illinois State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979). And that right, exercised indirectly by electing
representatives or directly through ballot initiatives
and referenda, is “a fundamental right held not just by
one person but by all in common.” Coalition to Defend,
134 S. Ct. at 1637 (plurality).
Consequently, respecting dignity in a democracy is
not limited to preserving liberty to engage in private
conduct, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578
(2003); it includes the liberty to engage in self-government, Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); The Honorable Stephen
Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution (2005). That liberty is the fundamental
right at stake here. In fact, only that liberty made it
possible for 11 states already to choose to issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples—a feat not
likely achievable at the federal level and impossible at
the state level without democratic rights of debate and
self-determination by state citizens.

 14
Nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment’s text or
history requires a state to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex. So, since 1996, the citizens
of every state have exercised their liberty to vote on
this precise issue. More than 74 million Americans in
35 states have done so directly, either in constitutional
amendments or in statutory referenda. App. A. And in
each of the other 15 states, legislatures have addressed
marriage, with 12 passing laws. App. B. As this Court
recognized in another context, “[t]he clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010) (quotations
omitted). While proponents of changing the marriage
definition point to recent polls or lists of signatures in
support of their policy preference, these bellwethers
ring hollow in the face of the record of the actual
democratic process. Compare, e.g., Human Rights
Campaign Amici Br. 1 (200,000 signatures supporting
extending marriage to same-sex couples), with App. A
(more than 70 million votes cast addressing the
definition of marriage).
The petitioners stress that “same-sex couples [are]
now allowed to marry in thirty-seven states.” Pet. Br.
22. But only 11 states adopted the petitioners’ marriage definition by legislative act or popular vote. In
the other 26, courts took the issue away from the
people, including those who would cast a vote in favor
of a new view of marriage. The process of social change
cannot be short-circuited by the lower federal courts,
however numerous their decisions. And this movement
has been so hasty and abrupt that no one can know the
consequences of the change, or the settled view of the
American people.

 15
Because the Constitution is silent regarding
marriage, such court orders indicate a lack of faith in
democracy. By teaching that courts are the fastest
mechanism to achieve social change, such decisions
encourage reliance on the courts for change and thus
weaken democracy. This approach lessens the very dignity that the petitioners seek; rather than achieving
the dignity that comes from persuading fellow citizens
through the democratic process, a litigation victory
merely means that a court order requires compliance.
When the federal courts create new rights with no
constitutional tether, we effectively cease to have a
written Constitution, living or not, and become a
society governed by unelected judges who have
assumed the authority to bind society with their own
views of how we should interact. There is a high cost to
such judicial actions—a loss of the fundamental liberty
of self-governance—that goes far beyond this case’s
immediate context. When courts override the
democratic process with such insubstantial constitutional underpinnings, it is hard to imagine what
social or political question might not be the subject of
the next litigation campaign. That will affect the
nature of the federal judiciary and the rule of law
(poisoning the process of nomination and confirmation
with demands for specific outcomes), no less than it
affects the nature of our representative process, which
will be sidelined.
There is also a serious cost to mutual civility and
respect if the courts declare the long-held marriage
definition beyond constitutional bounds. It is one thing
for citizens to accept a seachange in fundamental
institutions based on their fellow citizens’ good-faith

 16
views; it is quite another for them to acquiesce in the
charge that their own cherished beliefs are hateful and
contrary to constitutional values. That is a recipe for
perpetuating this social and moral divide, not for
transcending it.
Such a holding would also make it difficult for the
people to enact and enforce accommodations for
churches and other institutions with deeply held
objections to this marriage redefinition. Most
legislatures to enact same-sex marriage have also
passed accommodations for dissenters. A ruling for the
petitioners will not do so and, if predicated on moral
claims of irrationality or animus, will make the
enactment of accommodations difficult at best.
Notably, federal circuits that have ruled in favor of
challengers in these cases have placed the United
States out of step with multi-national and constitutional courts around the world—such as the United
Nations Human Rights Committee and the European
Court of Human Rights—which have consistently ruled
that the people, not the judiciary, must decide how to
define marriage. Amici Br. for 50 Int’l & Comparative
Law Experts. These decisions correctly recognize that
marriage’s definition is not a legal issue; it is a publicpolicy issue, with arguments on both sides. That
definition is best left to the political process and, in our
federal system, to the diverse and decentralized states.
Because the Constitution does not require states to
adopt any particular view of marriage, the public conversation should continue regarding how the marriage
institution should be defined and understood.

 17
II. Marriage has traditionally been defined as
only between opposite-sex couples because
the state’s interest in marriage has always
been to encourage individuals with the
inherent capacity to bear children to enter a
union that supports raising children.
“Until a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth
for almost everyone who ever lived, in any society in
which marriage existed, that there could be marriages
only between participants of different sex.” Hernandez
v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 361 (2006) (plurality). The
reason this was so, regardless of people’s varying views
on same-sex relationships, was their recognition of the
indisputable point that the “union of man and
woman[ ] uniquely involve[s] the procreation . . . of
children” and thus the need for “[t]he institution of
marriage” to “rear[ ] . . . [those] children within a
family.” Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 186, 186 (Minn.
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
This Court and others have consistently recognized
that government interest, declaring that “[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.” Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). “[T]he first
purpose of matrimony . . . is procreation.” Baker v.
Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859). “It has been said in
many of the cases cited that one of the great purposes
of marriage is procreation.” Gard v. Gard, 204 Mich.
255, 267 (1918). “[M]arriage is a compact between a
man and a woman for the procreation . . . of children.”
State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 126 (1835) (quoting Sir Francis
Bacon, 6 Bacon Abr. 523, 530).

 18
In Michigan, as elsewhere, there is no obligation to
have children in marriage. Yet it is undeniable that
two sexes are necessary to create children. A man and
a woman uniquely have the inherent ability together to
have a child biologically connected to both parents
without the involvement of third parties, involvement
that introduces cost and legal complexity. Through
marriage, a state recognizes this reality.
Michigan’s marriage definition does not disparage
the ability of others to provide loving homes or establish a stable, nurturing setting for children. Providing
public benefits for opposite-sex couples to marry
reflects no animus toward individuals outside that
rubric but merely reflects the reality that the state’s
interest in recognizing—and thus providing public
benefits for—a private relationship at all stems from
its relationship to procreation, and the raising of
children. Without that compelling public interest, the
state’s intrusion would threaten individual liberty.
Separating marriage from procreation dramatically
changes the state’s interest in the institution. Yet that
is what petitioners urge as they argue that the
“freedom to marry is entirely separate from an ability
or desire to procreate.” Pet. Br. 62. If that is true, it is
unclear what interest the state would have in
recognizing and providing public benefits for the
relationship. It is the state’s interest to encourage
opposite-sex couples to enter into a permanent,
exclusive union within which to have and raise
children that motivates state marriage laws. The
federal government advances the same interest by
providing funding under Title V—authorized and
appropriated by the Affordable Care Act—for state

 19
programs that teach future adults (i.e., teenagers) that
“bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have
harmful consequences for the child, the child’s parents,
and society.”1 Thirty-six states accept federal funding
and promote this interest, including not only Michigan,
but states such as Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, and New York that, by popular vote or
legislative act, issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples,.2
The petitioners argue that Michigan’s marriage
definition harms the children of same-sex couples by
excluding them from benefits and stability. Pet. Br.
24–27. But this argument applies to any marriage definition where children are being raised by caregivers
unable or unwilling to marry. For now and for the
foreseeable future, great numbers of children in
American will be raised by unmarried persons and
couples, and there is no marriage regime that will alter
that social fact. For example, historically, the primary
competing marriage model has been plural marriage,
which remains legal in many countries, and there are
thousands of children in America being raised in such
households. Many more are raised by loving
grandparents or siblings. It is wrong to suggest that
children raised in all of these non-marital households
are stigmatized, humiliated, or demeaned by marriage
laws. If the petitioners’ argument is correct, the state
should recognize all these familial structures as
marriages.
1

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/resource/aegp-fact-sheet
(visited Feb. 23, 2015).
2 http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/resource/2013-title-v-aegp-

awards (visited March 5, 2015).

 20
In light of the state’s conception of marriage’s
purpose, it is unsurprising that Baker v. Nelson—
decided several years after Loving’s due-process
holding—rejected the same claims raised here as not
raising a substantial federal question. 409 U.S. at 810.
As this Court recently observed in a different context,
“[a]ny test the Court adopts must acknowledge a
practice that was accepted by the Framers and has
withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political
change.” Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1819 (2014).
It would take a radical alteration of this Court’s
jurisprudence to hold that the petitioners’ redefinition
of marriage is constitutionally required, and that the
30 states which have enacted constitutional provisions
on this issue in the last 20 years all did so in violation
of the U.S. Constitution. This Court’s various doctrinal
tests are meant to track “history and tradition,” not
supplant them. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62, 103 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy and O’Connor, JJ.). The
people of Michigan have elected to provide legal
support for and to foster relationships that may lead
biologically to children. The people could also elect to
support a different marriage institution. That freedom
is what the democratic process contemplates. As the
next sections show, the petitioners’ claims for a judicial
redefinition of marriage fail under every doctrinal test
this Court has adopted to address the legal theories the
petitioners assert.

 21

III. There is no substantive-due-process right to a
particular marriage definition.
This Court’s cases recognizing a substantive-dueprocess right to marriage have involved state laws that
imposed novel and/or arbitrary limits on the traditional core definition. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978) (striking Wisconsin law prohibiting marriage license to those who owed child support); Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (no marriage license for
those in prison); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(criminal penalties for interracial marriage).3 These
invalidated laws were inconsistent with the original
understanding of marriage as set forth above.
The petitioners seek something quite different
here: a due-process right to an expanded definition of
marriage they prefer—the right of two consenting
partners to marry regardless of “the gender of the
partners,” Pet. Br. 60, which, despite the petitioners’
protestations, is simply the right to same-sex marriage
by another name. In its amicus brief, the United States
does not even advance this argument. And the
argument suffers from two fatal flaws.
1. Under this Court’s long-established test,
substantive-due-process rights must be “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997). As this Court
3

In addition to a distinction based on race being arbitrary and
invidious, race was not a traditional limitation on marriage,
certainly not outside this country, and not even in this country
despite the tradition of slavery. David R. Upham, Interracial
Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 (2015).

 22
recently observed, “until recent years, many citizens
had not even considered the possibility that two
persons of the same sex might” marry. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). Quite the
opposite, the “limitation of lawful marriage to
heterosexual couples . . . for centuries has been deemed
both necessary and fundamental.” Id. at 2689
(emphasis added). If the limitation has historically
been deemed fundamental to what marriage is, it
cannot also be true that marriage without the
limitation is so “deeply rooted” that it qualifies as a
due-process right. So, to recognize a right to marriage
without gender, the Court would have to abandon the
reasoning and holding of the decision it issued just two
years ago in Windsor.
Citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003),
the petitioners suggest this Court has already
discarded Glucksberg’s “ancient roots” test. Pet. Br. 58.
But that is not what Lawrence held. There, this Court
determined that state anti-sodomy laws were not
deeply rooted, and that it “was not until the 1970’s that
any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 570. The “emerging awareness” the
Court described in Lawrence was the deep-rooted
tradition of protecting how adults “conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” Id.
Significantly, modifying Glucksberg to accommodate the petitioners’ claim would have far-reaching
effects. The reason rights must be “deeply rooted” is “to
rein in” the necessarily “subjective elements” of
substantive-due-process review. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 722. This requirement ensures that rights will be
recognized through the democratic process rather than

 23
imposed on the public by federal courts. See id. at 723
(rejecting assisted suicide as a substantive-due-process
right because doing so would “reverse centuries of legal
doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered
policy choice of almost every State”); cf. Town of Greece,
N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (“Any
test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice that
was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”).
If courts have leeway to develop new rights that
lack “deep roots,” the power the Constitution gave the
people, working through the legislative, referendum,
and amendment processes, is commandeered by judicial legislators, in violation of bedrock separation-ofpowers principles. That is precisely the outcome the
Sixth Circuit majority cautioned against when it
upheld Michigan’s marriage laws. Pet. App. 60a–61a
(“It is dangerous and demeaning to the citizenry to
assume that we, and only we, can fairly understand the
arguments for and against gay marriage.”).
As is often the case with substantive-due-process
claims that cannot satisfy Glucksberg, altering the
constitutional test leaves lower courts at sea. Every
line that states have historically drawn around
marriage would be subject to strict scrutiny. Few
would appear to be narrowly tailored to a compelling
interest. For example, to prevent coercion, every state
prohibits underage couples from marrying. Yet this
ban is also over- and underinclusive and therefore
could not withstand strict scrutiny. The same is true of
other longstanding marriage limitations, enforced in
every state, that are already being called into question
in other litigation.

 24
The consequence is either to dispense with limits
on “marriage” and render the term meaningless, or to
allow courts to water down strict scrutiny to uphold
such restrictions, thereby muddling the law. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3
(1990) (making a similar point for why strict scrutiny
should not be applied to religion-neutral laws). The
Court should not abandon Glucksberg’s clarity or its
democracy-promoting constraints on judges.
2. Of all the traditional limitations on marriage, it
is most difficult to say that the opposite-sex limitation
violates substantive due process, since the opposite-sex
right to procreate is the key reason why this Court has
recognized any due-process right in marriage at all.
The Court has never suggested that a right to marriage
requires government recognition.
This Court has held to the contrary that “the Due
Process Clause generally confers no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 196 (1989). “Although the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference,” “it does not
confer an entitlement to such [governmental aid] as
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that
freedom.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court in
DeShaney held that a child in state custody had no
constitutional right against the state’s repeated
placement of him with his biological father, even
though the state knew the boy might have been a
victim of abuse. Id. at 192, 196.

 25
So why has this Court recognized a due-process
right for opposite-sex couples to marry? At the time the
Court decided those cases, a marriage license was a
necessary prerequisite to sexual relations and childbearing. “For most of this country’s history,” “the
choice to live in an intimate relationship outside of
marriage left consenting adults potentially vulnerable
to criminal prosecution.” Ariela R. Dubler, From
McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual
Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1165, 1168 (2006); accord, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.335 (criminalizing unmarried cohabitation). If an
opposite-sex couple desired to procreate and raise
children, the only way to do that legally was to get
married. The state’s denial of a marriage license was,
for practical purposes, denial of the right to sexual
intimacy and children. This Court’s recognition of a
due-process right to marry was necessary to guarantee
underlying freedoms and privacy.
In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978),
for example, this Court held that “if [a couple’s] right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some
right to enter the only relationship in which the State
of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take
place.” That was because Wisconsin criminalized sex
between unmarried people. Describing marriage as a
“right of privacy,” id. at 384, the Court compared
marriage to other personal decisions “that an individual may make without unjustified government
interference,” i.e., interference with underlying negative liberties such as procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing. Id. at 385 (emphasis
added).

 26
Similarly, in Loving, had Mildred Jeter and
Richard Loving had a sexual relationship without a
marriage license, Virginia could have criminally prosecuted them for fornication. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-344.
The Court described the “freedom to marry” as “one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.” Id. 388 U.S. at 12. That “happiness”
did not flow from a state license or benefits; it was
connected to the human race’s “very existence and
survival,” id., i.e., procreation. (Laws against miscegenation had only one purpose: to give legal force to the
idea that members of the black race were inferior to
members of the white race such that they should not be
allowed to mix and have children. Michigan’s marriage
laws are based on the independent principle of complementarity and do not suggest the inferiority of those
outside that rubric. Moreover, Michigan’s laws have
nothing whatever to do with inferiority of women to
men, or men to women. Loving is inapposite to this
case.)
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court
struck marriage limits for prisoners, reasoning that
“most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation
that they ultimately will be fully consummated.” Id. at
95–96. The Court recognized other marriage attributes,
such as “emotional support and public commitment”
and “receipt of government benefits,” id. at 96—all
benefits of same-sex marriage as asserted by
petitioners—but distinguished Butler v. Wilson, 415
U.S. 953 (1974), in which the Court upheld a marriage
ban for prisoners serving a life sentence. Safley, 482
U.S. at 96. A person serving a life sentence could be the
beneficiary of emotional support, recognition, and
benefits, but has no expectation of procreation.

 27
To reiterate, this Court has generally justified a
right to marriage as protecting against government
interference in private procreative conduct, not as
requiring government recognition. That is why if a
state got out of the business of recognizing
relationships entirely (no more government-sanctioned
marriage; no prohibitions on sexual activity or
cohabitation), there would be no constitutional injury
to anyone. The right to prevent government
interference with private intimacy is a world away
from a right to obtain special tax treatment and
survivor benefits. And a right to marriage without
regard to procreation would eliminate the primary
justification as to why a state has any interest at all in
marriage. The petitioners request a transformation of
the substantive-due-process doctrine from one that
protects negative rights as a shield into one that
guarantees positive rights as a sword—a change that
would have far-reaching impacts in areas of the law
that have nothing to do with marriage.
Transformation of substantive due process into an
affirmative right is inconsistent with this Court’s
precedents. DeShaney’s holding is consistent with the
Court’s rejection of other claims to positive rights, such
as shelter for the homeless, Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972), and a public education, San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). It
would require a significant change in this Court’s
substantive-due-process jurisprudence to recognize a
right that does not prohibit government interference,
but instead requires government recognition of certain
relationships as a marriage and provision of all attendant governmental benefits. The Court should decline
to do so.

 28

IV. Michigan’s
opposite-sex
definition
of
marriage does not violate equal protection.
A. Michigan voters acted rationally in
defining marriage.
Michigan’s marriage definition is focused on the
reality that only opposite-sex relationships have the
inherent capacity to bear children and the ability to
provide a biologically connected mother and father.
This definition has existed since time immemorial and
is not rooted in animus toward same-sex couples or
even an unwarranted stereotype that same-sex couples
cannot provide a loving setting for children.
In the current marriage debate, the marriage
institution is understood in different ways. This is an
issue on which people of good will may reasonably
disagree. And the views of the people of Michigan are
reasoned, not bigoted. There are certainly reasons to
expand the marriage definition to include same-sex
couples, including reasons that likewise seek to
promote child welfare. But the proper recourse to
resolving disagreements in a democracy is continued
discussion and resolution through the voting process.
The proper recourse is not to the federal courts, but to
the people. That is how American democracy is
supposed to work. Michigan’s marriage laws easily
satisfy rational-basis review, and the United States
does not argue otherwise in its amicus brief.

 29
1. The rational-basis standard defers to
voters in order to protect the democratic process.
The rational-basis standard of review is an
important guarantor of judicial restraint and
separation of powers because it preserves the people’s
authority to govern themselves by making policy
decisions. The Equal Protection Clause “is not a license
for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of [the
voters’] choices.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993). To the contrary, “the courts have
been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal
system and with our respect for the separation of
powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to
whether, how, and to what extent [a state’s] interests
should be pursued.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985).
As the Fifth Circuit recently explained, the rational
basis test “affirms a vital principle of democratic selfgovernment”: “[t]he court may not replace legislative
predictions or calculations of probabilities with its own,
else it usurps the legislative power.” Planned
Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v.
Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 594 (5th Cir. 2014). “Only by
faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial
review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independence and its
ability to function.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315
(internal quotation marks omitted). That is why
“rational basis review” includes “a strong presumption
of validity” and is a “paradigm of judicial restraint.” Id.
at 314–15.

 30
The limitations imposed on a court applying
rational-basis review serve this important interest.
Under rational-basis review, courts give the legislative
body—here, the people themselves—the benefit of
every doubt: “those attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden ‘to negate
every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ”
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen
v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364
(1973)). “ ‘States are not required to convince the courts
of the correctness of their legislative judgments.’ ”
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993). If “ ‘the
question is at least debatable,’ ” then rational-basis
review requires upholding the legislative judgment. Id.
(quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 674 (1981)).
These conceivable bases do not have to be proved
by evidence at a trial, a fact the district court ignored:
“a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id.; Heller,
509 U.S. at 320 (“A State, moreover, has no obligation
to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a
statutory classification.”); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 168 n.3, 169 (1986) (“We are far from
persuaded . . . that the ‘clearly erroneous standard’ of
Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of ‘legislative’ facts at
issue here.”); Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee’s
note (explaining the difference between adjudicative
facts and legislative facts). And “[t]hese restraints on
judicial review have added force ‘where the legislature
must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.’ ”
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (quotation omitted).

 31
This added force applies here because defining
marriage inherently requires line-drawing—lines such
as number of participants, sex, consanguinity
requirements, duration, and exclusivity. (Indeed, all
marriage definitions, even the petitioners’, require
some line-drawing.) And as this Court has made clear,
“[e]ven if [a] classification . . . is to some extent both
underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line
drawn by [the legislature or people] is imperfect, it is
nevertheless the rule that in [rational-basis review]
‘perfection is by no means required.’ ” Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979) (quoting Phillips Chemical
Co. v. Dumas Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)).
2. Defining marriage as between a man
and a woman advances legitimate
state interests.
a. Encouraging opposite-sex couples to
enter into a permanent, exclusive union
within which to have and raise
children is a legitimate state interest
advanced by Michigan’s marriage law.
The first question in considering whether it is
rational to define marriage as between only one man
and one woman is to identify the state’s interest in
recognizing and providing public benefits for a private
relationship at all. While many married people consider emotional connection to be an important marriage component, the states have never shown interest
in recognizing emotional connection alone. Friendships,
after all, can also demonstrate love and commitment;
yet no state has passed laws about what it takes to
enter into a friendship, or what it takes to end one.

 32
If marriage, like other friendships, were only about
an emotional connection—if it were only about
commitment and companionship—then it would be
unclear what interest (other than moral approval of
that friendship) the state might have. That is one
reason why the state expresses no interest in religious
and non-religious marriage or commitment ceremonies.
As explained in § II, supra, Michigan’s interest in
marriage as a public institution—separate from other
relationships that have an emotional connection—
springs from a feature of opposite-sex relationships
that is biologically different than all other relationships (including opposite-sex platonic friendships and
same-sex relationships): the sexual union of a man and
a woman produces something more than just an
emotional relationship between two people—it
produces, without the involvement of third parties or
even a conscious decision, the possibility of creating a
new life. Michigan’s marriage definition is designed to
stabilize such relationships, to promote procreation
within them, and to be the expected standard for
opposite-sex couples engaged in sexual relations.
Courts have never questioned the legitimacy of a
state’s interest in promoting procreation and ensuring
that children are raised in a stable family that
enhances the likelihood of success and minimizes the
possibility that government will have to step in and
provide care. That is why the petitioners do not disagree with the legitimacy of Michigan’s interest or that
Michigan’s recognition of marriage and provision of
benefits to married couples reasonably promotes that
interest. Like Michigan, the petitioners assert that
marriage “is a commitment like no other in society.”

 33
Pet. Br. 22. They recognize that the institution
“grounds couples” and encourages them “to stay
together when times are hard.” Id. “Marriage brings
stability to families.” Id. And “family stability is
strongly associated with positive child outcomes.” Pet.
Br. 37. So even the petitioners implicitly acknowledge
that Michigan has satisfied rational-basis review.
In the face of Michigan’s reasonable policy supporting a legitimate interest, those challenging state
marriage laws raise three objections. None of the
objections shows that Michigan’s definition is
irrational.
i.

The “infertility” objection does not
negate the rationality of Michigan’s
marriage definition.

The petitioners argue that Michigan’s marriage
definition does not satisfy rational-basis review
because “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to
marry.” Pet. Br. 37. But while not every marriage
results in children, it remains true that every child has
a biological mother and father. Michigan’s marriage
policy tries to maximize the likelihood that every child
will know and be raised by his or her mother and
father when possible. The petitioners’ objection suffers
from three infirmities.
First, as previously noted, overinclusion is not a
defect under rational-basis review. Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 108–09 (1979); accord Heller, 509 U.S. at
321. “[T]he Constitution does not require the [state] to
draw the perfect line nor even to draw a line superior
to some other line it might have drawn. It requires
only that the line actually drawn be a rational line.”

 34
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2083
(2012). Because Michigan’s line is rational, overinclusiveness is legally irrelevant.
Second, Michigan’s marriage definition is not
actually overinclusive, as sterility and fertility testing
are a severe invasion of privacy. Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648, 662 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755
F.3d 1193, 1222 (10th Cir. 2014). And without such
testing, it is nearly impossible to know whether a male
or female could procreate (within or without a
marriage). Even in the rare case when it is clear that
an opposite-sex couple cannot conceive children, they
demonstrate the importance of keeping sexual
intimacy within the confines of marriage, advancing
the state’s interest, and would provide any adopted
child the benefit of a both a mother and a father. (A
same-sex couple, too, can provide an adopted child with
loving parents, but that does not negate the state’s
interest in its current marriage definition.)
Third, the petitioners’ infertility objection proves
too much: it would require a licensing state to “test” to
ensure that all couples applying for a marriage license
satisfy the state’s purported interest. If marriage is
more about “love and commit[ment]” than having children, see Pet. 23, and if the petitioners are correct that a
state cannot draft an overinclusive marriage definition,
then a state must also test whether two persons
applying for a marriage license are truly committed to
each other (or are instead getting married for other
reasons). The impossibility of performing such testing
would not only exclude the petitioners’ own theory of
marriage, it would also prevent a state from enacting
any marriage definition.

 35
ii. The “exclusion” objection does not
negate the rationality of Michigan’s
marriage definition.
The petitioners also argue that excluding same-sex
couples from the marriage definition does not advance
Michigan’s goal and simply burdens same-sex couples.
Pet. Br. 36–37. This objection, too, is faulty, as it rests
on a premise that this Court has never endorsed: that
a state must provide a chosen benefit to all unless it
can prove that excluding a group would promote the
program’s purpose. To the contrary, when “the inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate governmental
purpose, and the addition of other groups would not,
we cannot say that the statute’s classification of
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is invidiously
discriminatory.” Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383
(1974).
No state law could satisfy the petitioners’
requirement. For instance, assume a state wanted to
provide free books to K–2 students in an urban school
district. Under the petitioners’ test, the law would be
invalid unless the state could prove that excluding
rural children and third graders promotes the state’s
interest in encouraging reading. The Court has never
endorsed such a test, and it should not do so here.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that expanding
Michigan’s marriage definition is cost-free. Will
redefining Michigan’s marriage definition to include
same-sex couples change the meaning of the
institution? The petitioners answer that question
unequivocally: yes. The entire last section of the
petitioners’ brief is devoted to pressing the point that
the “freedom to marry is entirely separate from an

 36
ability or desire to procreate.” Pet. Br. 62–64. If correct,
that is precisely Michigan’s point—Michigan’s
marriage definition is intended to connect sexuality
and having children with the institution of marriage,
not to separate them.
That said, it is not Michigan’s burden to prove that
declining to expand its marriage definition to same-sex
couples serves the legitimate interest in linking marriage and procreation. Michigan need only demonstrate
that including opposite-sex couples serves that interest. It does.
iii. The “efficacy” objection does not
negate the rationality of Michigan’s
marriage definition.
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
rejected Indiana’s and Wisconsin’s marriage definitions
(under a heightened-scrutiny analysis) because there
was no indication that the laws positively impacted the
out-of-wedlock birthrate. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 664. This
objection ignores the reality that those laws still
benefitted children of opposite-sex couples. The
objection also rests on logical fallacy.
First, it would be a plaintiff’s burden to show that a
state’s marriage policy has no effect. Under the
rational-basis standard, this Court does not require a
state to prove by adjudicative fact the rationality of its
adopted policy; a challenger must negate every
conceivable basis that supports the law:
[A] classification “must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

 37
provide a rational basis for the classification.”
A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of a
statutory classification. “[A] legislative choice
is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence of empirical data.” A statute is
presumed constitutional, and “[t]he burden is
on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceivable basis which
might support it,” whether or not the basis has
a foundation in the record. [Heller, 509 U.S. at
319–21 (emphasis added).]
Second, the Court’s negate-every-conceivable-basis
standard is an impossible burden for those challenging
state marriage laws to carry given the many other
variables that affect the non-marital birthrate. E.g.,
Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 63 (1987) (“The decline
in th[e] stigma [of illegitimacy] is also partly
responsible for the increase in premarital sex and the
casual attitude of many engaged in it about
contraception.”). And even if there were no demonstrable effect at all, it would not be irrational for a
state to think things would be worse without the law.
Third, if there is no connection between state marriage policy and encouraging any pregnancies to occur
within the confines of a marriage union, that lack
would suggest marriage is irrational for everyone, not
that an irrational program should be extended to
provide more government rights and duties to more
people. When a plaintiff proves a law’s irrationality,
the remedy is to strike it down, not broaden its scope.

 38
The lesson with respect to all three of the abovenoted objections is that the “Constitution does not
empower this Court to second-guess state officials
charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating
limited public welfare funds among the myriad of
potential recipients.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 487 (1970). The “Equal Protection Clause does not
require that a State must choose between attacking
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem
at all.” Id. at 486–87. “It is enough that the State’s
action be rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination.” Id. at 487. Michigan’s law meets that
test.
Federal courts “will not overturn [a classification]
unless the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that [this Court]
can only conclude that the [classifications] were
irrational.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 84 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
And it cannot be said that varying treatment based on
the biological difference between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples is irrational or constitutes
invidious discrimination. “To fail to acknowledge even
our most basic biological differences . . . risks making
the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so
disserving it.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).

 39

b. Michigan’s marriage laws value the
contributions that both sexes bring to
parenting.
It is within the realm of reason to believe that
children benefit from being raised by both a mother
and a father. Men and women are different, and having
both a man and a woman as part of the parenting team
could reasonably be thought to be a good idea. It is not
irrational to think that mothers and fathers both might
make important contributions.
This Court has recognized that “ ‘[t]he two sexes
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of
one is different from a community composed of both.’ ”
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946). In
Ballard, in the context of whether women needed to be
included on juries, the Court recognized that “a distinct
quality is lost if either sex is excluded.” Id. If this
principle—that both men and women have important
viewpoints and contributions to make—is true in the
context of a jury pool, it is certainly rational that the
principle may apply in the context of a family.
Even the petitioners’ experts agree there are
“average differences in the ways that mothers and
fathers interact with their children,” J.A. 35, that
“different sexes bring different contributions to
parenting,” and that “there are different benefits to
mothering versus fathering.” J.A. 168–69. If, as the
petitioners’ experts conclude, mothers and fathers
provide different benefits, it is hard to see how it could
be irrational to encourage a structure that brings both
sets of benefits to children. A rational person, in short,
might think that “ ‘[t]he optimal situation for the child

 40
is to have both an involved mother and an involved
father.’ ” Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 614 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). That is certainly not the only
view. But again, in a democratic society, that view is
entitled to respect where it emerges from the people’s
fundamental right to govern themselves.
The petitioners make the same “exclusion”
argument that they raised in connection with Michigan’s attempt to link marriage and procreation. Pet.
Br. 39 (“there is no rational connection between the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and the
State’s claimed interest in providing children with role
models of both genders) (emphasis added). As noted
above, this has never been the test under rational-basis
review, and adding an underinclusive component to the
test would result in the invalidation of nearly every
state law on any topic.
Finally, the petitioners claim that Michigan’s
parenting interest “presumes stereotypical genderbased roles in opposite-sex marriages that are as
factually antiquated as they are legally unsound.” Pet.
Br. 41. That is incorrect. Michigan makes no presumption about how mothers and fathers are supposed to
act or interact with their children. But Michigan voters
might rationally have agreed with the petitioners’
experts that there is a difference between men and
women as parents. That presumption is neither
irrational nor subject to adjudicative fact-finding.
McCree, supra.
A rational person might think that “men and
women are persons of equal dignity and they should
count equally before the law” while also thinking that
“they are not the same.” Tr. of Oral Argument at 15,

 41
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (argument by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg). “There are differences between
them that most of us value highly. . . . I think that
we—perhaps all understand it when we see it and we
feel it but it is not that easy to describe, yes, there is a
difference.” Id.
c.

Michigan’s citizens might not have
wished to alter a central building block
of society before knowing more about its
long-term impact.

The Sixth Circuit also accepted as rational that a
state “might wish to wait and see before changing a
norm that our society (like all others) has accepted for
centuries.” Pet. App. 35a. A rational voter might worry
about the law of unintended consequences, and might
conclude that there is some risk that changing the
definition of marriage to remove its inherent
connection to procreation might undermine it in the
long term as an institution for linking parents to their
biological children. A rational person might think, for
example, that “[t]he long-term consequences of this
change are not now known and are unlikely to be
ascertainable for some time to come.” Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting). “At present, no one—
including social scientists, philosophers, and
historians—can predict with any certainty what the
long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of
same-sex marriage will be.” Id. at 2716. That is one of
the benefits of our federal system: “it permits
laboratories of experimentation—accent on the
plural—allowing one State to innovate one way,
another State another, and a third State to assess the
trial and error over time.” Pet. App. 35a.

 42
As the Sixth Circuit recognized, “the only thing
anyone knows for sure about the long-term impact of
redefining marriage is that they do not know.” Pet.
App. 36a. “A Burkean sense of caution does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, least of all when measured by a timeline less than a dozen years long and
when assessed by a system of government designed to
foster step-by-step, not sudden winner-take-all,
innovations to policy problems.” Pet. App. 36a.
Reasonable people of good will might think it is at
least debatable that this definition advances
Michigan’s interest in encouraging parents to stick
together to care for and raise their children. And if it is
at least debatable, then federal courts have no
authority to overturn the people’s legislative choice.
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 320 (“The assumptions
underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the
very fact that they are ‘arguable’ is sufficient, on
rational-basis review, to ‘immuniz[e]’ the congressional
choice from constitutional challenge.”).
3. Michigan’s marriage laws are focused
on the unique capacity of opposite-sex
couples to procreate, not animus
toward same-sex couples.
The United States does not assert that Michigan’s
marriage laws are motivated by animus, but the petitioners assert that the “primary purpose” of these laws
was to “demean same-sex couples and their families.”
Pet. Br. 45–49. That argument is wrong and contrary
to the district court’s fact findings. Pet. App. 133a.

 43
Michigan’s longstanding marriage definition is not
based in animus toward same-sex couples or
individuals who experience same-sex attraction. Every
human life has inherent dignity and is of immense
worth. Michigan, through its laws, encourages all
people to treat each other with respect. Rather,
Michigan’s marriage definition reflects the state’s
interest in, and the people’s considered view about, the
unique capacity of opposite-sex relationships to create
children, and the benefits to a child in having a close
connection to the biological mother and biological
father when possible.
A court cannot infer animus on the part of tens of
millions of voters based on isolated statements from
proponents of ballot measures or legislation. Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1100 n.6 (10th Cir. 2014)
(Holmes, J., concurring). As this Court noted only last
Term in another case challenging a Michigan
constitutional provision, “[i]t is demeaning to the
democratic process to presume that the voters are not
capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on
decent and rational grounds.” Coalition to Defend, 134
S. Ct. at 1637 (plurality). The Sixth Circuit was exactly
right when it concluded that it is just as “unfair to
paint the proponents of the [Michigan marriage]
measures as a monolithic group of hate-mongers” as it
is “to paint the opponents as a monolithic group trying
to undo American families.” Pet. App. 44.
In his concurrence in the Tenth Circuit’s decision
in Bishop, Judge Holmes concluded that opposite-sex
marriage laws do not show the type of animus this
Court has found to be sufficient to invalidate a state
law. Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1105 (Holmes, J., concurring).

 44
For example, Judge Holmes noted that these marriage
laws are far from the type of “unprecedented” law this
Court invalidated in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996); “they are actually as deeply rooted in precedent
as any rule could be.” Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1105. And,
importantly, the conception of marriage as between an
opposite-sex couple predated and arose independently
of the record of prejudice against gays and lesbians in
this country. Pet. App. 51a. These laws are also unlike
DOMA, where animus could be inferred from the fact
that the federal government “veered sharply” from the
usual deference it gave to state marriage laws. Id. at
1108.
The petitioners place a great deal of weight on this
Court’s invalidation of DOMA in Windsor, particularly
the Court’s conclusion that Congress and the President
intended through DOMA “to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma” on legally married
same-sex couples, and to “interfere[ ]” with “the equal
dignity” of same-sex couples. Pet. Br. 47 (quoting
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–94). But the “dignity” of
which Windsor spoke was not that bestowed by a
federal court or even the federal Constitution; it was
the dignity bestowed by the states, acting through the
democratic process. 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“a dignity
conferred by the States in the exercise of their
sovereign power”); id. (“the congressional purpose [in
DOMA § 3 was] to influence or interfere with state
sovereign choices about who may be married”); id. at
2694 (recognizing that DOMA § 3 affected “statesanctioned marriages” that “the State has sought to
dignify”); id. at 2696 (“a status the State finds to be
dignified and proper”); id. (“those whom the State, by
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and

 45
dignity.”). The wisdom of Windsor is its recognition of
the respect due to the people’s choices about how to
define marriage—the very principle that Michigan
seeks to vindicate here.
A conclusion that all of Michigan’s marriage laws
going back to 1805—and indeed, the marriage laws of
every state—can be explained solely (or even at all) by
animus toward same-sex couples is historically
inaccurate and would contradict centuries of this
Court’s precedents. Such a conclusion would also
profoundly change this Court’s equal-protection
jurisprudence. In Romer and Windsor, animus was a
resultant inference, drawn only after the Court
concluded the challenged law served no legitimate
interest. See also, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (“This statement”—
that “ ‘a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
government interest’ ”—“is merely an application of the
usual rational-basis test.”).
Because Michigan has a legitimate interest here,
there is no animus. Changing the animus inquiry to
accommodate the petitioners’ claim would inevitably
open the door to a multitude of plaintiffs, in a
multitude of contexts, claiming, in the petitioners’
words, that state laws were enacted “to disadvantage a
politically unpopular group.” Pet. Br. 46. This Court
has never endorsed such an analysis and should not do
so here.

 46

B. Michigan’s marriage laws are not subject
to heightened scrutiny.
1. Michigan’s marriage laws are based
on biological complementarity, not
sexual orientation.
The petitioners devote only four pages of their 65page brief to the argument that Michigan’s laws
discriminate based on sexual orientation. But the
United States frames sexual-orientation discrimination
as the only theory on which the petitioners should
prevail. U.S. Br. 2–35. That theory is incorrect for
three independent reasons.
1. As noted above, Michigan’s definition of
marriage grew out of a historical desire to encourage
individuals with the inherent capacity to bear children
to enter a union that supports child rearing. It had
nothing to do with discrimination or animus based on
sexual orientation. In other words, “reasons exist to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
disapproval of an excluded group.” Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The whole point of heightened scrutiny is to
“smoke out” illegitimate uses of a “suspect tool.” City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion). Where, as here, a public policy is
not the product of “arbitrary and invidious discrimination” (as was the case with racial discrimination,
which the Fourteenth Amendment specifically targeted), there is no need for heightened scrutiny to root out
discrimination that does not exist. See McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964).

 47
2. Next, the circuits have overwhelmingly rejected
“sexual orientation” as an obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristic that defines a discrete
and politically powerless class.4 As recently as
Windsor, this Court declined to use “sexual
orientation” as the defining characteristic of a suspect
class, despite the federal government’s invitation to do
so. See, e.g., U.S. Windsor Br. at 18–36 (arguing that
“classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to heightened scrutiny”). There are numerous
reasons why.
As an initial matter, this Court has been reluctant
to apply heightened scrutiny to any new classification.
In the 30-plus years since it recognized illegitimacy as
a classification subject to heightened review in Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982), the Court has
consistently declined to recognize any new classification that warrants heightened scrutiny. And with good
reason. Once the Court has designated a suspect class,
there is no mechanism to un-designate it, even if circumstances change. And because heightened scrutiny
4 Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012);

Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2008); Price-Cornelison
v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1113 (10th Cir. 2008); Citizens for Equal
Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v.
Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 532 (5th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t
of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004);
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 927–28 (4th Cir. 1996); High
Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573–
74 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th
Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
but see Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (2014); Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (2013).

 48
applies in both directions, such designations often
result in the invalidation of laws that were enacted to
benefit the protected class, as has occurred for suspect
classes subject to strict scrutiny. See Sonu Bedi,
Collapsing Suspect Class with Suspect Classifications:
Why Strict Scrutiny Is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict
Enough, 47 Ga. L. Rev. 301, 307 (2013) (noting that
between 1990 and 2003, the “overwhelming majority”
of laws struck based on race classifications were those
that sought to ameliorate the status of racial
minorities, such as affirmative-action policies).
Moreover, the small set of characteristics this
Court has recognized as warranting heightened
scrutiny (race, sex, ethnicity, illegitimacy) satisfy all
four of the following factors: (1) the class has suffered
historical discrimination, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587, 602 (1987); (2) the characteristic has no
relation to the person’s ability to perform or contribute
to society; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41; (3) the state
discrimination has used “obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define [the
members] as a discrete group,” Gilliard, 483 U.S. at
602; and (4) the class has “a minority or politically
powerless” status, id. (The federal government says
that “political powerlessness” is not necessary, citing
the opinion of Justice Marshall concurring in part and
dissenting in part in Cleburne. U.S. Br. 17 (citing 473
U.S. at 472 n.24). This Court has never agreed,
because to do so would place a judicial thumb on the
political scale to give aid to a group that has no need of
it.) “Sexual orientation” does not satisfy this test.

 49
Consider the factors in reverse order. Political
power (factor four) is the factor that most clearly
undergirds the need for heightened judicial review. A
discrete and insular class that has been subject to
historical discrimination for no good reason but now
enjoys substantial political power to shape laws has no
need for judicial protection. Thus, in Cleburne, this
Court rejected quasi-suspect status for the mentally
disabled because, among other things, “the distinctive
legislative response . . . belies a continuing antipathy
or prejudice and a corresponding need for more
intrusive oversight by the judiciary.” 473 U.S. at 443.
The “legislative response, which could hardly have
occurred and survived without public support, negates
any claim that the mentally [disabled] are politically
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to
attract the attention of the lawmakers.” Id. at 445.
It cannot be disputed that, nationally, gays and
lesbians have garnered significant political power and
tremendous public support. One amicus brief filed in
support of the petitioners in the Sixth Circuit
estimated that 2.5% of Americans identify as LGBT.
Br. of Amicus Curiae Gary J. Gates in Support of Pls.,
DeBoer v. Snyder (6th Cir. 2014), 7. National polls
show support for issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples at over 50%. The President of the United
States now supports the concept and has proposed that
the Social Security Administration dispense federal
benefits to same-sex partners regardless of state law5;
the issue is part of the Democratic National Committee
5

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-02/obamawants-same-sex-couples-to-have-spousal-benefits (visited
March 11, 2015).

 50
platform6; and many prominent Republican politicians
and hundreds of corporations signed on to amici briefs
supporting the petitioners. And the best indication is
that 11 states—more than 20%—already issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Further statistical
analyses suggest that all states will legislatively adopt
the petitioners’ marriage view within 10 years if the
political process is left to run its course. Michael J.
Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts,
Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage,
193–203 (2013). This is democracy at work.
It is true that the petitioners’ desired outcome has
not already arrived everywhere. But if “a plaintiff
could necessarily win on the political powerlessness
factor . . . by the very fact that he was unable to challenge a particular law democratically, the factor would
be meaningless.” Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d
996, 1009 (D. Nev. 2012). Groups that constitute a
single-digits percentage of the population will often fail
to obtain legislation they desire, despite political
power. “The question of ‘powerlessness’ under an equal
protection analysis requires that the group’s chances of
democratic success be virtually hopeless, not simply
that its path to success is difficult or challenging
because of democratic forces.” Id. Factor four weighs
strongly against recognition of a suspect classification.
Factor three is also not satisfied, because “sexual
orientation” is not a distinguishing characteristic that
defines a discrete and insular group. According to the
American Psychological Association, sexual orientation
6 http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform (visited

March 11, 2015).

 51
does not refer to a particular “characteristic” at all, but
rather to “an enduring pattern of emotional, romantic,
and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or both
sexes.”7 There is “no consensus among scientists” as to
why someone develops a particular orientation, nor a
consensus as to whether orientation is determined by
“genetic, hormonal, developmental, social, [or] cultural
influences.”8 And sexual orientation “ranges along a
continuum” and is “defined in terms of relationships
with others.”9 While “most people experience little or
no sense of choice about their sexual orientation,”10
nonetheless, sexual orientation is unlike race,
ethnicity, sex, or illegitimacy insofar as it is defined by
relationships as contrasted with a status or physical
identity. These features make sexual orientation
profoundly different from any previous characteristic
giving rise to a suspect class.
“Sexual orientation,” then, does not define a
discrete group. And that fact is fatal to a claim for
heightened scrutiny. E.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445
(denying protected status to mentally disabled because
they are a “large and amorphous class”); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1973)
(law in question did not discriminate against any
“definable category of ‘poor’ people,” but rather against
a “large, diverse, and amorphous class”).
7 American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions

For a Better Understanding of Sexual Orientation & Homosexuality, available at http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation.pdf
(visited March 8, 2015).
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

 52
“Sexual orientation” also does not define an insular
group. Very different from the nation’s history of racial
segregation, same-sex couples live among opposite-sex
couples as relatives, friends, and neighbors, and
opposite-sex couples can see the love and support
same-sex couples provide for their children. This is the
exact opposite of “insular.”
As for factor two of the analysis, it is not possible to
say that Michigan’s decision to define marriage based
on biological complementarity is irrelevant to the
state’s interest. As explained in § II, supra, it is the
fact that an opposite-sex couple has the unique
capacity to create new life when they engage in sexual
conduct that motivated the people’s interest in joining
this inherent capacity to marriage. A different definition may well be what the democratic process yields,
but the Fourteenth Amendment does not require Michigan to define marriage only in one particular way.
The final factor is whether a class has suffered
historical discrimination. It is impossible to deny the
long history of unfair treatment against same-sex
conduct. But that is not what this case is about. The
marriage institution developed not out of any attempt
to harm gays and lesbians or their children, but to
encourage individuals with the inherent capacity to
bear children to enter a union that supports raising
children, and to remain in that union. (That is one
crucial difference between this case and Lawrence).
The fact that marriage laws have had a disparate impact does not make sexual orientation a suspect class.
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of” invidious discrimination.).

 53
If the Court were to modify its traditional analysis
and designate “sexual orientation” as a protected
characteristic, the door would be open to innumerable
other groups claiming a need for heightened protection
from democratically enacted laws. And as the Court
observed in Cleburne, “[h]eightened scrutiny inevitably
involves substantive judgments about legislative
decisions.” 473 U.S. at 443. Such judgments result in
the federal courts striking down more democratically
enacted laws, sometimes based on subjective value
judgments; they fundamentally change the constitutional compact the people ratified. The Court should
decline the invitation to create a new suspect class.
3. Finally, Michigan’s marriage laws do not
discriminate based on sexual orientation. (That is why
no Michigan official inquires as to a person’s sexual
orientation before issuing a marriage license.) They do
not even classify based on sexual orientation; they
classify based on biological complementarity—the
creation of new life requires both a mother and a
father. Accordingly, no other type of coupling is
biologically the same for purposes of an equalprotection analysis. (This Court has never applied a
disparate-impact analysis for identifying a protected
class. E.g., Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993) (laws regulating pregnancy
and abortion do not qualify as sex discrimination
despite near total disparate impact on one sex).) And
crucially, Michigan’s marriage laws exclude many
other combinations of people who raise children, not
just same-sex couples. The laws are not a “ban” on
these combinations any more than they are a ban on
same-sex-couples. The laws are an affirmation of the
state’s interest in procreative capacity.

 54
It is an opposite-sex couple’s capacity to create new
life independently that provides Michigan’s primary
interest in recognizing marriage. And when
“individuals in the group affected by a law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the
State has the authority to implement” (here, biological
complementarity), courts will not “closely scrutinize
legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what
extent those interests should be pursued.” Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 441–42. Defining marriage based on the
reality that a man and a woman are required to create
new life classifies based on biological complementarity,
not sexual orientation.
2. Michigan’s marriage laws do not
discriminate based on sex.
Neither the petitioners here nor the United States
argues that Michigan’s marriage laws discriminate
based on sex. But the petitioners in Bourke v. Beshear
devote a page to the theory, Bourke Br. 38, which
requires a brief response.
Discrimination based on sex means that “members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions . . . to which members of the other sex are
not exposed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523
U.S. 75, 81 (1998). See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
73 (1971) (preference for men over women when
administering estates); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 678–79 (1973) (different burdens for men and
women to establish spousal dependency); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191–92 (1976) (different drinking
ages for men and women); United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 519–20 (1996) (women barred from

 55
military college). Yet it is indisputable that Michigan’s
marriage laws do not single out men or women as a
class. The laws treat the sexes equally, both in terms of
relative rights and burdens and in non-stereotyping
purpose. Recognizing that both a man and a woman
are necessary for marriage reaffirms their equality.
These features distinguish this Court’s decision in
Loving, which was based on Virginia’s invidious racial
discrimination, which is specifically barred by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Loving, 338 U.S. at 11–12.
Here, the people of the United States have not passed
any constitutional amendment whose central meaning
is to address the procreative capacity of couples.
Loving also involved a dramatically different
historical record. State laws that criminalized
interracial marriage were generally invalidated or
repudiated during Reconstruction on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, and interracial marriages were
valid in a clear majority of states in the years after the
Amendment’s ratification. David R. Upham, Interracial
Marriage and the Original Understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 213 (2015). In contrast, marriage did not exist for
same-sex couples anywhere in the world until 2000,
when the Netherlands allowed it.
Finally, it is not impermissible discrimination for a
state to limit marriage to a man and a woman because
the state’s interest is in making permanent the union
between two people with the inherent capacity to
create new life, and biology does in fact matter when
advancing that interest. This Court has frequently
recognized that the government may account for
differences in biology between the sexes. E.g., Michael

 56
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464,
469–73 (1981) (“this Court has consistently upheld
statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the
sexes are not similarly situated”); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (sex not a proscribed classification if based on relevant physical differences between
men and women); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (“To fail to
acknowledge even our most basic biological differences
. . . risks making the guarantee of equal protection
superficial, and so disserving it.”). And Michigan’s
marriage laws are consistent with these precedents.
Through its laws, Michigan promotes procreation
and reinforces the benefit of every child being
connected to his or her biological mother and father,
maintaining a child-centered view of marriage that
increases the likelihood that biological parents stay
together even when their emotions fade, and reducing
the risk that any child will be born out of wedlock. This
interest is based on biological differences.
3. Michigan’s marriage laws encourage
having and raising children within a
marriage but do not punish illegitimacy.
The United States raises no argument based on
illegitimacy, but the petitioners devote two pages to the
proposition. Pet. Br. 54–56. The theory is based on this
Court’s holdings that “ ‘a State may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying
them substantial benefits accorded children
generally.’ ” Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982)
(quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973)).

 57
Whether Michigan’s marriage laws allow certain
adults to marry says nothing about how Michigan law
treats the children of unmarried adults. If there is a
freestanding claim that the state is treating children
differently based on that status, then the children are
free to bring that claim and it can be adjudicated on its
merits. There is no such claim presented here.
Moreover, the relief for a claim based on the
differential treatment of children would be to eliminate
the differential treatment of children. The remedy
would not be to deem the parents married (how would
that work if the parents did not want to get married, or
if one of the parents was already married to someone
else?). And accepting the petitioners’ argument would
allow other, non-married couples to bring the same
complaint about how the law treats their children.
Illegitimacy is not a ground for applying heightened
scrutiny to Michigan’s marriage laws.
C. Michigan’s marriage laws survive any
level of scrutiny.
Michigan’s marriage definition satisfies rationalbasis review, and heightened scrutiny does not apply.
As a result, Michigan need not justify why the
marriage definition it has retained since 1805 is overinclusive or underinclusive nor how redefining marriage may harm the existing marriage institution. But
even if this Court were to change one of its constitutional doctrines such that heightened scrutiny was
necessary, Michigan’s marriage law would still pass
muster.

 58
To begin, scholars have analyzed the impact of
redefining marriage, and there are numerous social
costs and risks associated with doing so. Br. of Amici
Curiae 109 Scholars of Marriage in Support of
Respondents & Affirmance. Chief among these is a
further erosion of the paradigm that procreation takes
place within marriage, an erosion that will naturally
result in more children being raised without the benefit
of two parents. Id. As noted above, the petitioners
confirm that their marriage definition erodes that
paradigm. Pet. Br. 62 (“The freedom to marry is
entirely separate from an ability or desire to
procreate.”).
In addition, Michigan’s marriage definition is as
narrowly tailored as it can be. Michigan cannot exclude
infertile couples from its marriage definition without
running afoul of the Constitution. And Michigan
cannot expand its marriage definition without causing
erosion of the procreation paradigm. Accordingly,
Michigan’s law passes even heightened scrutiny.
***
This case is not about the best definition of
marriage or any stereotypes about families. Families
come in all types, and parents of all types—married or
single, gay or straight—love their children. This case is
about whether the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a
single marriage view on all states such that the people
have no right to decide. It does not.
It is difficult to believe that the same Constitution
that created the most successful liberal democracy in
the history of this world was designed to remove from
public debate the fundamental policy decision of

 59
marriage’s core purpose and what role it should play in
society and government. And it would be stranger still
to say that the marriage system that has existed for
thousands of years—including when the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment were ratified—is
actually unconstitutional.
The right to marry a person of one’s own sex cannot
be a due-process right because it is not firmly based on
our nation’s history and traditions. And Michigan’s
marriage definition does not deny the equal protection
of the laws to same-sex couples because they are
treated the same as many other combinations of people
who live together, share lives together, and raise
children together.
Instead, Michigan’s definition of marriage is based,
as the public institution has been for millennia, on the
fact that children are born only to opposite-sex couples,
and that keeping those couples together affects
children’s welfare. Perhaps recent social and technological changes have made these facts less important;
democratic majorities in some states have so
concluded. But these changes affect only the wisdom,
not the constitutionality, of the marriage definition.
Social policy questions notwithstanding, Michigan’s
law does not deny anyone due process or equal
protection. It is therefore constitutional—particularly if
it is a written Constitution we are expounding.

 60

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Bill Schuette
Michigan Attorney General
Aaron D. Lindstrom
Solicitor General
B. Eric Restuccia
Deputy Solicitor General
Ann Sherman
Assistant Solicitor General
John J. Bursch
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Counsel of Record
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, Michigan 48909
MIAG@michigan.gov
(517) 373-1110
Attorneys for Respondents
Dated: MARCH 2015

 1a

APPENDIX A: BALLOT-BOX VOTES ON THE
DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE
State

Ala.

Alaska

Ariz.

Ark.

Cal.

Colo.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition
2006 697,591

1998 152,965

2008 1,258,355

2004 753,770

2008 7,001,084

2006 855,126

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

161,694

Ala. Const.
art. I,
§ 36.03

71,631

Alaska
Const.
art. I, § 25

980,753

Ariz.
Const.
art. 30, § 1

251,914

Ark.
Const.
amend. 83,
§1

6,401,482

Cal. Const.
art. 1,
§ 7.5

699,030

Colo.
Const.
art. II,
§ 31

 2a

State

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

Fla.

2008 4,890,883

3,008,026

Fla. Const.
art. I, § 27

Ga.

2004 2,454,930

768,716

Ga. Const.
art. I, § 4

117,827

Haw.
Const.
art. I, § 23
(reserving
definitional
authority
to legislature)

163,384

Idaho
Const.
art. III,
§ 28

Haw.

Idaho

1998 285,384

2006 282,386

Kan.

2005 417,675

179,432

Kan.
Const.
art. 15,
§ 16

Ky.

2004 1,222,125

417,097

Ky. Const.
§ 233A

 3a

State

La.

Me.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition
2004 619,908

2012 334,723

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

177,067

La. Const.
art. XII,
§ 15

372,887

Me. Rev.
Stat.
tit. 19-A,
§ 650-A
(approved
by voter
referendum)

Md.

2012 1,246,045

1,373,504

Md. Code
Ann.,
Fam. Law
§ 2-201 &
2-202
(approved
by voter
referendum)

Mich.

2004 2,698,077

1,904,319

Mich.
Const.
art. I, § 25

 4a

State

Minn.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition

2012 1,399,916

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

1,510,434

None
(amendment to
maintain
marriage
definition
defeated)

Miss.

2004 957,104

155,648

Miss.
Const.
art. 14,
§ 263A

Mo.

2004 1,055,771

439,529

Mo. Const.
art. I, § 33

148,263

Mont.
Const. art.
XIII, § 7

203,667

Neb.
Const.
art. I, § 29

164,573

Nev.
Const.
art. I, § 21

Mont.

Neb.

Nev.

2004 295,070

2000 477,571

2002 337,197

 5a

State

N.C.

N.D.

Ohio

Okla.

Or.

S.C.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition

2012 1,317,178

2004 223,572

2004 3,329,335

2004 1,075,216

2004 1,028,546

2006 829,360

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

840,802

N.C.
Const.
art. XIV,
§6

81,716

N.D.
Const.
art. XI,
§ 28

2,065,462

Ohio
Const.
art. XV,
§ 11

347,303

Okla.
Const.
art. II,
§ 35

787,556

Or. Const.
art. XV,
§ 5a

234,316

S.C. Const.
art. XVII,
§ 15

 6a

State

S.D.

Tenn.

Tex.

Utah

Va.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition

2006 172,305

2006 1,419,434

2005 1,723,782

2004 593,297

2006 1,328,537

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

160,152

S.D.
Const.
art. XXI,
§9

327,536

Tenn.
Const.
art. XI,
§ 18

536,913

Tex.
Const.
art. 1, § 32

307,488

Utah
Const.
art. I, § 29

999,687

Va. Const.
Art. I,
§ 15-A

 7a

State

Wash.

Wis.

Votes to
maintain
Year
marriage
definition

2012 1,431,285

2006 1,264,310

Votes to
change
marriage
definition

Resulting
law

1,659,915

Wash.
Rev. Code
Ann.
§ 26.04.01
0
(approved
by voter
referendum)

862,924

Wis.
Const.
art. XIII,
§ 13

Total votes by
45,429,813 28,882,647
position
Total
votes

overall

74,312,460

 8a

APPENDIX B: LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON THE
DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE IN STATES THAT
DID NOT HAVE A STATE-WIDE VOTE
State

Year

Statute

Conn.

2009

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-20

Del.

2013

Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101

Ill.

2014

750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/201

Ind.

1997

Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1

Iowa

1998

Iowa Code Ann. § 595.2

Mass.

2005

No recent statute on issue, but
legislative activity11

N.H.

2010

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a

N.J.

2012

Bill vetoed12

N.M.

2014

No affirmative statute on issue, but
legislative activity13

N.Y.

2011

N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-a

Pa.

1996

23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704

11

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/national/15amendment.
html?_r=0.
12

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/christie-vetoesgay-marriage-bill.html?_r=0.
13

http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/with-end-to-newmexico-legislative-session-the-freedom-to-marry-stands-once/.

 9a
R.I.

2013

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-1-1

Vt.

2009

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8

W. Va. 2001
Wyo.

1977,
2011

W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-2-104
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101