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's Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass Destruction

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(S//NF) Errata sheet for NIE 2002-16Hc; October 2002: Iraq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons ofMass Destruction
Change 1

~ Page 7. first sub-bullet under first full bullet.

Replace the following:

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Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin B W agents; these
facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these
units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced
in the years prior to the Gulf war.

•

With this language:
•

Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these
facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within three to six months
these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq
produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.

This change is reflected in the te}l.t as follows:

~ Page 43, last bullet on page. Replace the following:

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(b)( 1)

With this language:

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/approximately 14 to 26 weeks to produce the amount UNSCOM
assessed was actually produced rior to the Gulf war.

L__--~---'

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•

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With this language:

•

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NIE 2002-16HC

~his

Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board under the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

~repared under the auspices of Robert D

Walpole,
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs: with assistance from Paul Pillar,
N/0 for the Near East and South Asia; Lawrence K.
Gershwin. N/0 for Science and Technology; and
Major General John R. Landry, NIO for Conventional
Military Issues.
-

~quiries

may be directed to the NIO [or Strategic
and Nitclear Pro,r:rams on I
pr (703) 482-7424.

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October 2002

Handle

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vc

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Scope Note
(U) This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was requested by the Director of Central
Intelligence to address the status of and outlook for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs.
(C) This Estimate builds on the work and judgments of recent Intelligence Community products
·
on this issue, including:

•

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• ~ Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, (NIE
2001-19HJIL):T0P S~
~of December
2001.
•

:tS~ The BW Threat to the Global and US Agricultural Sectors
I~6F9Im'/Xl of March 2001.
SE

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(ICB 2001-09),

• 'tl.Q.. The Biological Warfare Threat (NIC 2290),lJNCb\S~lflEQ of January 2001.
•

~ lrao: Steadilv Pursuine W"_!!apabilities, (lCA 2000-00?HCX), TOP
JNOF~Ytxl .of December 2000.

'SECitB~

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• '1'f:<9. Emerging Land-Attack Cruise Missile T?zreat (2000-2015), (NIE 99-25) TOP
-s!!e~

~of December 1999.

• "(C1fNN4 Worldwide BW ProKf!ms: Trends a1ul Prospects, (NIE 99-0SCX/D) TOP
~
pOFGRJ\Lof August 1999.

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• 1'69. Reconstitution of Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox, (JAEIC 99003) SEC!tB'f//NOFQR~ of June 1999.
•

~

The Foreign Biolo · al and Chemical Wea ons Threat to the United States, (ICA 9807CX) TOP SECREt
of July 1998.

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-· _ .Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

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2

Handle viJ

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.,._ Jo~in.....tlYL_________~~-

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lM"ORMI!Kl.

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Contents
Page

1!:9...Scope Note

1

~Key Judgments

5
11

""(tJ) Wscu~sion
~

11

Introductiop

~ddam's

Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

~Limited Information and Iraqi Denial and Deception
~History

of the Nuclear Weapons Program

~Reconstitution Efforts

'iQ. Chemical Warfare (CW) Program-Rebuilt and Expanding
~CW

Agent Production
"(t:ft Stockpiles and Storage Facilities
"'fY) Agent Research, Development, and Testing
~ CW Doctri~e. Training, and Defensive Posture
"tY> Procurement

12
13
15
16
28
29
33
33
34
35

iQ. Biological Warfare (BW) Program-Larger Than Before
~ Agent Production and Storage
~ Agent Research, Development, and Testing
~ Procurement
-tYf Delivery Means
~BW Employment

35
36
43
44
46
47

~ Delivery Systems-Iraq Increasing Its Options
M The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Threat
~ The Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program-Rising From the Ashes
~ Liquid Propellant Ballistic Missile Programs
1t:ft- Current Solid-Propellant Ballistic Missile Programs
~Payload Options
~Iraqi Nonm1ssile WMD Threats

49
49
52
55
57
61
61

~------~'--~

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han
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ne-ls_J,_oi-nt_l"---------------"

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~octrine and WMD

62
62

Use

~ Continued Restraint Today?
~ Saddam's

Decisionmaking on WMD Use

~Covert Acts ~mploying WMD
~ National Responses to Iraqi WMD

Attacks

Annexes
A.
Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
B.~ Inspections, Media, and Cover Stories
C. ~ Iraqi Special Operations Forces and Intelligence Service

M

~--------~
i ~

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63

66
69

74
86
88

4

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Key Judgments
~

Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of" Mass Destruction

-ffli~IEl.. We judge tha~ Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and
biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left
unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR
alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)
We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to
Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly
demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific
infonnation on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.

~

~

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort,
energized its missile p~ogram, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view
of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
•

Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD
programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled, from $580 million
in 1998 to about $3 billion this year.

•

Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation
Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of
civilian production.

•

Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working
with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver
biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.

•

Although we assess .that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to
make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started
reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departedDecember 1998.

~ ,How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on

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~vhe~urfl~ient weapons-grade fissile material.
•

If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon
within several months to a year.

5

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Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until
2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce
highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts
to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors-as well as Iraq's attempts
to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools-provide
compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for
Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear
program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)
Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as
activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway.
All agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying
to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly
enriched uranium per year.

•

In a much less likely scenario, Baghdad could make enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other
materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium
enrichment facilities.

~ We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF

(cyclosarin), and V:X; its capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the
Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.
•

An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has procured covertly the types and
quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production
hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

•

Although we have little specific infonnation on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has
stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents-much
of it added in the last year.

•

The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles.
We assess that that they possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited
number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with extended ranges.

~ We judge that all key aspects-R&D, production, and weaponization~f Ir~iv;BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more
advanced than they were before the Gulf war.
•

We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly
producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by
bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.
6

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Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program.
Baghdad probably bas developed genetically engineered BW agents.

•

Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production
capability.
-

Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these
facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units
probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the
years prior to the Gulf war.

~ Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development

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programs, including for a UAV probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
•

Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a
few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

•

Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababil-1 00 SRBMs, which are capable of flying
beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variant beyond
150 km-perhaps as far as 300 km.

•

Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if
brought close to, or into, the United States, the US Homeland.
An Iraqi UA V procurement network attempted to procure commercially available route
planning software and an associated topographic database that would be able to support
targeting of the United States, according to analysis of special intelligence.
-

•

The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not
agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for
chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV
strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent
capability.

Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabiJities, largely through foreign
assistance in building specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines more powerful
than those in its current missile force.

~We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use Wl\'ID.
•

Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against
US forces, friends, and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt US war preparations and
undermine the political will of the Coalition.

7
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•

Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD
could foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.

•

He probably would use CBW when he perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the
military and security situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point.

•

We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical weapons than biological
weapons on the battlefield.

•

Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the use of WMD; however, he
probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific
circumstances.

~aghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks
with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi
Involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.

probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US Homeland if
Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or
unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks-more likely with biological than
chemical agents-probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence
operatives.
·

~Iraq

•

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (ITS) probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks
against US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action
against Iraq. The ITS probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to
conduct any CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence
information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.

~Saddam, If sufticlently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as
al-Qa'ida-with worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already
engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United States-could perpetrate the type of
terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

• In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist
terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to
exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.
~tate/INR

Alternative View oflraq's Nuclear Program

~The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (INR) believes that
Saddam continues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdad is
pursuing at least a limited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities.
The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is
currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to
(continued on nextpage... )
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(cominued ... ) (C) State!INR Alternative View
acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence
inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched
a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that
such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to project a timeline for the
completion of activities it does not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict
when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.
~In

INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that
Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, but INR is not persuaded that the tubes
in question are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. INR accepts the judgment of technical
experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeks to
acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium enrichment and finds
unpersuasive the arguments advanced by others to make the case that they are intended for that
purpose. INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are intended for another purpose, most
likely the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the way the
tubes were tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the
procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead INR to
conclude that the tubes are not intended for use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.
CU) Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments in This Estimate
~

High Confidence:

•

Iraq is continuing. and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile
programs contrary to UN resolutions.

•

We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.

•

Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.

•

Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weaponsgrade tissile material.

~

•

Moderate Confidence:

Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely to
have a weapon by 2007 to 2009. (See INR alternative view, page 84).

lSttN£1

Low Confidence:

•

When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.

•

Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland.

•

Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with ai-Qa'ida.

9
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Discussion

these weapons and the many options to
deliver them.

~Iraq's

•

Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and
biological weapons facilities damaged
during Operation Desert Fox in 1998 and
has expanded its chemical and biological
infrastructure under the cover of civilian
production.

•

Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of
150 km with its ballistic missiles and is
developing unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), which allow for a more lethal
means to deliver biological and, less
likely, chemical warfare agents.

•

Iraq's recent procurement attempts
indicate it is reconstituting its nuclear
program to produce fissile material for a
nuclear weapon in the next several years.

•

Saddam's growing ability to sell oil
illicitly increases his capabilities to
finance WMD programs; his annual
earnings in cash and goods have more
than quadrupled, from $580 million in
1998 to about $3 billion this year.

Continuing Programs
for Weapons of Mass
Destruction
~Introduction
(S//NF) Intelligence information over the
past ten years makes clear that Saddam has
never abandoned his pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). He has used
chemical weapons against Iran and his own
people, demonstrating that he produces WMD
to be able to use, not just to deter.
•

Even before the Gulf war, Iraq concealed
its WMD programs and lied about its
capabilities. Despite inspections after the
war. Iraq never fully disclosed its
capabilities and was able to retain
chemical precursors, biological media,
thousands of munitions suitable for
chemical and biological agent. and
probably a small force of Scud-variant
missiles.

\SI~l~Since

the inspections ended in
December 1998, Saddam has maintained
elements of his chemical weapons effort. and
is reconstituting and expanding it; energized
his missile program; increased investment in
biological weapons; and is reconstituting his
nuclear weapons program (See INR
alternative view on Iraq's Nuclear Program
on page 14). Iraq's concerted effort to
enhance its chemical, biological, nuclear, and
missile infrastructure has resulted in a number
of gains that increase the threat posed by

~We judge

that we are only seeing a
portion of Iraq's WMD efforts owing to
Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception
(D&D) efforts. We lack specific information
on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD
programs. Revelations after the Gulf war
starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts
undertaken by Iraq to deny information. The
revelations also underscore the extent to
which limited information fostered
underestimates by the Intelligence
Community of Saddam's capabilities at that
time.

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~ WMD

Expenditures Despite Sanctions

~We estimate Iraq will earn about

$1.9 billion in cash and goods this year from
illicit oil exports to Syria, Jordan, and Turkey,
and up to another $1 billion by imposing
surcharges and kickbacks on oil-for-food
suppliers and buyers.

~ Baghdad had an extensive

•
~Economic

sanctions have inhibited
Baghdad's ability to procure essential items
for programs prohibited under UN
resolutions. Despite Iraqi oil smuggling,
Baghdad still uses the Oil-for-Food Program
for most of its oil exports, and the UN still
controls 80 percent of Iraq's revenue. Most
countries adhere to the ban on conventional
weapons sales to Iraq, and most of Iraq's
illicit military purchases have been limited to
spare parts, ammunition, and most recently a
limited number of combat support systems.
That said, Saddam continues to pursue WMD
components through a variety of creative and
deceptive means, attempting to procure
illicitly those items unavailable to him
legitimately.

~ Baghdad's goal of becoming the
predominant regional power and its hostile
relations with many of its neighbors,
especially Iran and Israel, are key drivers
behind Iraq's WMD programs. Baghdad also
is concerned about weapons proliferation in
the region and believes WMD provide
deterrent value.

~ Saddam's Pursuit of Nuclear

Weapons
~ We judge that Saddam never
abandoned his nuclear weapons program.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet
have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to
make any, he remains intent on acquiring
them.

(b )(3)

program to develop a nuclear weapon for
missile delivery in 1990, but Coalition
bombing and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) activities set back
the effort significantly.
On the basis of information obtained after
the Gulf war, we assess th~t
b late 1990
Baghdad had a design for
/nuclear weapon
.
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I
•

•

During the 1990s, the Iraqi program
became less active, althoughj'--;;;-~-'
L_~---=-~-----' stated that Iraqi
authorities concentrated the former
nuclear project staff in dedicated groups
and continued research into design and
construction of "nuclear bombs."

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

In November 1993, Saddam reportedly
began to reorganize the nuclear program
so that it would be poised to commence
work once sanctions were lifted. At that

~

\the goal was a
"deployable" nuclear weapon.

I

~With the advent of
prolonged UN sanctions, we judge that
Saddam most likely shifted his strategy from
waiting until the sanctions were removed to
waiting for weapons inspections to end. We
assess that Baghdad began reconstituting its
nuclear program shortly after the departure of
UNSCOM inspectors in December 1998.
•

We believe Iraq retains the technical
expertise, designs, and data necessary to
make nuclear weapons.

•

Saddam's illicit procurement network
remains active and ambitious. Most

(b )(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(0){~)

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disconcerting are the repeated attempts to
acquire tens of thousands of specialized
aluminum tubes, machine tools, and
magnet technology-dual-use items that
C()Uld be used for gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment.
•

Our projections about when Iraq will
obtain its first nuclear weapon depend on
numerous factors:
-

If Baghdad acquires sufficient
weapons-grade fissile material from
abroad, it could make a nuclear
weapon within several months to a
year. Although we have seen only a
few Iraqi attempts to acquire material
from abroad, those efforts do not seem
to be part of a systematic effort to
acquire foreign fissile materials from
Russia and other sources. Iraq
apparently has not instituted such a
program because of fears of sting
operations and scams and because the
amount of material so obtained
probably would be sufficient for only
one or two weapons-not the arsenal
Saddam intends to build.
Nevertheless, the Key Judgments from
our unclassified Annual Report to
Congress on the Safety and Security of
Russian Nuclear Facilities and
Military Forces in February 2002
included our concern about "the total
amount of material that could have
been diverted [from Russia] in the last
10 years," noting that "weapons-grade
and weapons-usable nuclear materials
have been stolen from some Russian
institutes" and that "we assess that
undetected smuggling has occurred,
although we do not know the extent or
magnitude of such thefts."

-

Without fissile material from abroad,
Iraq probably would not be able to
make a weapon unti12007 t~ 2009,
owing to inexperience in building and
operating centrifuge facilities to
produce highly enriched uranium and
challenges in procuring the necessary
materials, equipment, and expertise.

-

In a much less likely, but faster-paced
scenario, Baghdad could make enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon
by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable
centrifuge tubes this year and had all
the other materials and technological
expertise necessary to build
production-scale uranium enrichment
facilities. This period probably is the
minimum amount of time to establish
a centrifuge facility and would require
direct and continuing foreign
assistance with materials and
expertise.

~Limited Information and Iraqi Denial
and Deception (D&D)

~ Today we have less direct access and
know even less about the current status of
Iraq's nuclear program than we did before the
Gulf war when significant collection gaps and
effective Iraqi D&D measures resulted in
Intelligence Community (IC) divisions over
the status of Iraq's nuclear program.
Although we have gained knowledge of Iraq's
nuclear program through defector reporting
and IAEA ins ections throu h December
1998

•

(b)( 1)

Only through defectors and inspections
after the Gulf war did we learn that Iraq in
1991 was just a few years away from
producing a nuclear weapon and had
many facilities involved.

13
Handle l'ia

(b )(3)

Channels Joint/\'

~~,T~O~P~S~E~C~R~EL~~c:::::===========~~~O~P66fti@~L~<N~JL_

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(b )(3)

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(b )(3)

.._,....~ INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Nuclear Reconstitution
~ Saddam Hussein wants nuclear weapons and will exploit any viable opportunity to
acquire the capability to produce a nuclear device or weapon. The long absence of UN
inspectors makes it more difficult than it was prior to 1999 to reach confident judgments about
the status of Iraq's efforts to acquire this capability, and INR has taken note of intelligence
information obtained during the past two years indicating increased Iraqi attempts to acquire
dual-use goods with potential nuclear uses. But the detected procurement efforts are limited and
rarely involve highly specialized goods. INR believes the indicators we have to be at best
ambiguous and sees no compelling evidence-of the sort it would expect to detect-that Iraq has
commenced what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to
acquire nuclear weapons. The evidence indicates that Saddam wants to maintain and, as
feasible, expand his nuclear capabilities but does not add up to a compelling case for
reconstitution.
The information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent
with a coherent effort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. Many key scientists evidently
have been assigned to critical positions in the non-nuclear defense sector, casting doubt on their
ability concurrently to perform nuclear-weapon-related research-unless one assumes a more
elaborate denial and deception effort than INR is willing to posit.

(b)(3)

(b )(3)

~-··.--...._ Based on INR's analysis of all available intelligence information, it sees no compelling
reason to judge that Iraq has entered the timeframe of "at least five to seven years" assessed in
the October 1999 JAEIC estimate to be required for Baghdad to produce sufficient weaponsgrade fissile material for a weapon. Moreover, INR sees no compelling evidence to shorten that
timeline to three to five years under any condition short of Iraq acquiring black-market fissile
material.

~ :post-Gulf war revelations starkly
demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of
Iraq's D&D campaign. In late May 1991,
following the first post-war inspection of
Iraq's nuclear program, the IAEA inspectors
concluded that they found no evidence of
activities with direct relationship to nuclear
explosives development or noncompliance
with Baghdad's Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
obli tions accordin to Embass re ortin .

(b )(3)

•

The IAEA missed signs of proscribed
nuclear activities at these sites owing to a
variety offactors. Frrst, neither the IAEA
nor the US Intelligence Community
anticipated EMIS work was underway in
Iraq, as most pre-war evidence pointed to
a clandestine centrifu e ro

(b)( 1)

14
H~~ewa

ChFmm~ea~J6ommwdL
v ____________~

'------..-."'liriO"jPHSiiFJ~G~RiFK~ll

fOF9RNI'!!_

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.

.

.

.

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(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

~Today, we are again concerned that
significant nuclear activities are escaping our
detection. These concerns stem from the
continued lack of access into Baghdad's
nuclear program, its remaining industrial
infrastructure, illicit imports found by
inspectors while sanctions are still in effect,
and reports that Baghdad has kept portions of
its sizeable cadre of nuclear scientists

•

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
inspections that ag a as earned
important lessons on how to hide nuclear
activities since the Gulf war. We believe
these factors significantly raise the prospect
that Baghdad could again pursue multiple
paths to producing fissile material as part of a
nuclear weapons program and succeed in
hiding activities from us.
~History

of the Nuclear Weapons

Program
~/;'NJii~-lraq' s

nuclear weapons program
probably began in the early 1970s. Initially,
Iraq concentrated on efforts to recover
plutonium from its French-supplied Osirak
reactor. After Israel destroyed this reactor in
June 1981, however, Baghdad de-emphasized
the plutonium pathway and switched to a
highly enriched uranium route.

•

~During the mid- to late-1980s, Iraq
researched several different uranium
enrichment techniques, such as EMIS,
gaseous diffusion, chemical exchange
processes, and gas centrifuge. After setbacks
in the gaseous diffusion program, Iraq
emphasized EMIS and gas centrifuge methods
and established facilities for these types of
enrichment.\

•

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

(b )(1)

(b)( 1)

L-------------------------~ 15

Handle 1•ia

Chan.r-n=el,._s=Jo=i=
nt"""'
h•_ _ _ __ _-----,

L-----.--,-,o)ipp::s;Sf3BCSRREED'I1'

A

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(b)(3)
(b)(3)

 C01030~96

-Approved for Release:-2014/12/09 C01030196

(b )(3)

I

I

The IC had judged in a
November 1990 JAEIC assessment that "Iraq
probably has the technical competence, when
combined with clandestinely obtained
technology and continued foreign assistance,
to develop a nuclear explosive by the late
1990s using indigenously produced fissile
material."

cooperation with UNSCOM; inspectors left in
December and were not permitted to return.
~ Reconstitution Efforts
~Lack of Inspections

the Catalyst. In
June 1999, six months after the abrupt
departure of the inspectors, we lacked specific
evidence that Iraq had begun to reconstitute
its nuclear weapon program. We noted,
however, that the absence of inspections
would give Iraq a greater opportunity to
conduct covert R&D and perhaps undertake
small-scale component production. Today we
judge that Baghdad has reconstituted its
nuclear weapons program. (See page 14 for
INR's alternative view on reconstitution).

(b)( 1)

'-:-=-----c:------:=---=~~ Baghdad Seeks
Aluminum Tubes. Most agencies assess that

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)

Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-strength
aluminum tubes provides compelling
evidence that Saddam is attempting to
reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort for
Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE
agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear
program is underway but assesses that the
tubes probably are not part of the program.
See page 81 and 84 for DOE and INR views
respectively on the likely alternative use of
these tubes). l
I
Saddam is personally interested in
'--:t-.---he -p r_oc
_ u_Jrement of aluminum tubesindicating clearly that such acquisition is a
national priority. In addition, the Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister probably has been
involved in these efforts~
_J
L _ __ _ _ _ _ _

~

After Operation Desert Stann, UN
weapons inspectors directed and oversaw the
destruction of much of Iraq's nuclear
weapons infrastructure. Throughout the
1990s, Iraq denied inspectors full and open
access to its WMD programs through a
variety of D&D techniques. On 5 August
1998, Iraq announced that it was ceasing

Handle

vial

(b)( 1)

•

Iraqi front companies have
to purchase tens of
thousands of high-strength aluminum
tubes with dimensions and tolerances
suited for use as rotors in uranium
enrichment gas centrifuges.

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
.(b)(1)
(b)( 1)

'---:tn-.-.e--.d.-r-ep
_e_a-c-te-,-ly

16
f'Jt'f}n~n~eL..,_s...,Jo.,..in'""tl._._v_ _ _ __

_

C~m"tm:NJj:;ta_

L--~,i~O~r~SECRE~L----------~~F~~~l

(b)(3)
tDJt.j)

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•

About 25,000 centrifuges would be
capable of producing approximately
enough highly enriched uranium to build
two weapons per year;

·;

I

160,000 tubes sought

in earlv 20011

7075 T-6 Aluminum
Stress tests and
chemical analysi
have confirmed thLa--,t---,
t -e---,t_u__e_s_s_e~
tz--.--_j-are made of high-strength 7075 T -6
aluminum-sometimes referred to as ..aircraft
aluminum." 7075 T-6 aluminum has
exceptional tensile strength (570 Mpa) while
maintaining its lightweight properties and is
sufficiently strong to withstand the high-speed
rotational forces generated in gas centrifuges
rotors.
•

Although 7075-T6 aluminum is
considerably more expensive than other,
more readily available material, Iraqi
procurement efforts consistently
demanded that this particular specification
be met even if it meant higher cost,

(b)(3)
(b )(3)

~g~H~
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
•

~ We first became aware of
Baghdad's aluminum tube procurement effort
with potential centrifuge applications in
The effort may have begun
as early as 1999 when Iraq attempted to
purchase 15,000 seamless tubes with identical
dimensions but unknown alloy or tolerances,
I
I Although
conducting a final techmcai review will take
some time, all IC agencies agree that these
aluminum tubes could be used to build gas
centrifuges for a uranium enrichment
program.

I

I

•

I

Most agencies have concluded that the
composition, dimensions, and extremely
tight manufacturing tolerances of the
tubes far exceed the requirements for non-

Handle

\'i~

17
Fha;--:nn~e~ls~J,coz:.::'n._...rl),_'
:::
- --

L___----,-yfi6'tlP~St;iE~S:IRtlr.EI:iil:f

Iraqi agents agreed to pay up to $17.50
each for the 7075 T-6 aluminum tube.
Their willingness to pay such costs
suggests the tubes are destined for a
special project of national interest-such
as a reconstituted gas centrifuge effort.
Materials or tubes meeting com•entional
annament reqrdrements could be acquired
at much lower prices or be produced
indigenously.

nuclear applications but make them
suitable for use as rotors in gas centrifuges. Multiple Rocket Launchers
(MRLs) normally are made out of cheap
steel, as they are expendable assets. The
National Ground Intelligence Center
(NGIC) also that notes some of the
specifications of the tubes are inconsistent
with normal fabrication techniques for
these rockets and are far tighter than
necessary.

- -- - ,

~F OfttiffXL_

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(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)
(b )(3)

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"'lOP SECREl:J.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____j~OfleRNUX1

(b)(3)

~

......

Has Iraq Restarted its Electromagnetic
Isotope Separation (EMIS) Uranium
Enrichment Program?

~--IUGEI~ IWIIII

\

~,

' ltllrtll IAFnt

=:J~ We do not know whether Iraq has

reconstituted its EMIS program. Th~
I
Jdefectors that emerged from 1991
through 1998 indicate that Iraq abandoned the
EMIS effort.!

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
. (b)(1)

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

~Gas centrifuge.

•

I

State/INR and DOE believe that although
the tubes are not directly suitable for use
as rotors, they could be modified for such
use. In this view, the tubes more likely
are intended for such alternative
conventional weapons uses as the MRL
program.

~

If Iraq wanted to pursue EMIS again,
we assess that it could reconstruct many of its
capabilities, perhaps without our detection,
especially if the facilities were built in
smaller, discrete parts instead of one large
facility. EMIS is an inherently lowtechnology approach to uranium enrichment.
Reviews of pre-war intelligence holdings
reveal very few indicators that suggested
EMIS could have been underway in Iraq. If
Baghdad restarted an EMIS effort in 1998
when inspections ended, it probably would
have had to immediately try to solve research
and development problems that plagued the
earlier EMIS work. Iraq needed two to three
years to complete its pre-war EMIS effort;
completing such an effort today could take
four to six years, as Baghdad would still have
to reconstitute facilities and feed material
production capabilities.

~Iraq Needs More
Than Centrifuges. Iraq also would need
numerous other components to build a gas
centrifuge plant, and we have detected efforts
to procure some of these items.

•

In the last few years, Iraq has been
seeking to obtain!' - - - - -- ---'
I
Ia permanent magnet
production capability
Though-..d.-u-----.
----al.--u
-----s-e,-- -t:-h.-----e-______;
L__m_a_gn_e----:ts-- Ira
.,--------"q is seeking are of the proper
materials and possibly size for use in gas
centrifuges. Moreover, the manager of
one of the Iraqi companies negotiating

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

18

Handle viJ

£haFn"--"''"'
nels:.. :J,:. ::o=in=tly
..___ _ __ _ _l"1\Tirmftl~u::Jl.J...

'-------,1M'unr~S~ft~C~R~~~~L------------------~pqurn~~~

A

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(b )(3)

(b )(3)

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•·

(b)(3)
~

the procurement, along with a large
number of personnel for the new
production facility, worked in Iraq's preGulf war centrifuge program.
•

Personnel Changes at the IAEC

I

Several Iraqi front companies have been
seeking high-speed balancing machines
used in initial centrifuge balancing work,

INF)

Several key
scientists and managers from the pre-1991
nuclear weapons program recently have been
reassigned to the IAEC:

(b )(3)

•

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

•
I

Iraq continues to procure numerous
!machine tools from a
variety of suppliers that would add to its
ability to manufacture various other
centrifuge components. Baghdad
probably has been successful at many of
these procurement attempts, as
demonstrated by its track record of illicit
imports even while inspections were
ongoing.

~ Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
Regains Preeminence. Evidence suggests the
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) has
regained its preeminent role in the nuclear
program and is expanding the infrastructureresearch laboratories, production facilities,
and procurement networks-to roduce
nuclear weapons.

•

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

(D)( 1)

(b)(3)

•

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
including the IAEC. Multiple
many of the scientists
recently have been reassigned to the IAEC.
The renewed regular contact between Saddam
and the IAEC, as well as the enhanced
security, suggests the IAEC is again the focal
point of Saddam's nuclear program.

~
so-:-cuc-cr~
ce~s-"mdicate that

•

(b)( 1)

19
Handle 1•ia

Channels Jointly

'-----.,"'ITOOliPiiSHE~S~RR:EE'J1l:il~======~=-=--=--=--=-~--------~-_jl~NtOtfFilE8~R~~~~Ii.1XXl_L
- -------··--·-

...

- . ------

1

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(b)(3)
~ New Nuclear Facility?
~-

Defector reporting from early 2002 provided allegations that several new nuclearrelated facilities had been constructed in haq in the past few years, some since 1998. Although
many of these claims have not yet been substantiated, one of the facilities described in detail by
the defector has been detecte~
!The facility, claimed to be a nuclear laboratory
,·s located on the batikS of the Tigris River north of Baghdad.

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

,,

r------_j
~-

The overall description of the site and the timelines of its construction as described by
the source were reasonably consistent with details detected througlj
I The site
consists of several small buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who
participated iq
!construction. The site was constructed rapidly during the summer of
1998, although the defector claimed construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the
defector may have been confused about the year.

~ The defector reporting provided several datapoints that drive our concern that[c___ _l
may be nuclear-related:
•

Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associated with the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission.

•

The source indicated that he had seen cylinders!
lin 2000 that were similar to
sketches of large uranium hexafluoride cylinder'--s-. _ _ ___,

•

Several buildings reportedly were guarded by Amn Al Khas (the Special Security
Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel. The SSO, directed by
Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay, oversees security and communications at presidential
compounds and guards haq's most sensitive WMD sites. The Manthuma AI Amn is the Iraqi
Intelligence Service's Organization for Military Industrialization (OMI) security element.

'

(h)(~)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

I
/ Additional intelligence reporting is necessary before we can confirm a nuclear
T-as-soc
----;-ia_JtioQ

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

I

Handlev~

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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TOPSEGRE~~--------------~~FOR~
•

(b)(3)

Over the past 18 months, Saddam has
devoted more personal energy-by way of
televised speeches and meetings with
IAEC officials-to urge on his nuclear
establishment than in the preceding
several years.

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

'-:-----::-----=::------=-_J~lncreased Iraqi

(b)(3)

Atomic Energy Commission Security
Precautions. The IAEC security apparatus
has been enhanced substantially in the past
several ears.

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

I

(b)( 1)

ISince lhen,

Saddam has met openly more than a dozen
times with IAEC staff. At these meetings, he
has increased his efforts to motivate members
of the IAEC.

I

(b)~~}(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

l rra~
qi~------'

authorities had concentrated the former
nuclear project staff into closely supervised
groups to conserve their know-how for a
future nuclear proiectl

~ Saddam also has used these forums to
emphasize the obligation of the workers to
him. In early 2002, Saddam told the IAEC
that its responsibilities have been doubled,
because they "owe" it to their past
relationship with him. Saddam officially
oversaw the nuclear weapons program of the
IAEC until 1989 when Dr. Jaffar Dhia Jaffar
assumed the head of the nuclear weapon
development group.
~hanne/s Jointly

~ Consolidation. In addition
to the move back into the IAEC, some
scientists have been consolidated into
establishments previously associated with the
nuclear program. As early as 1995[

I

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

21

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

•tor SRCR4\c___ __ _ _ _ __ __j~FOitU/.OO:
.. -

----- - -.--- - - - ------ --·-- - . -

- -- ~- - - --- - -~. --.- ·-- ·

·--------- -- :- --

... .

-

...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

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_ _ ... __ ___ __

_ _Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196-

(b)(3)

(b )(1)
(b)(3)

th)n)

(b)(3)

..
A

··:

·.. · ...

·.

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;

L __ __

_ __

_

(b )(3)

____JfNOJ6RN/A'J _

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

I

'-::---c~....,.---,~~Al-Tahaa'i. The Al-Tahadi
facility is dedicated to high-voltage and
electromagnetic work~
Activity 'at~thi
~.s f:~a~
ci=
licy
---=-has____j
increased and probably is related to the
procurement of a magnet production line.

I

23

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T~'----------~~FORfYh'U
- - - - --- -···- ··· ..
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(b )(3)
(b)( 1 )

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)
(b )(3)

..

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.

(b)(3)
(b)(1)1)

(b)(3)

•

In December 2000, work was completed
at Al-Tahadi on a high-bay building with
equipment suitable for permanent magnet
production.

c::::1N£l We judge that because negotiations

(b)(3)

for permanent magnets were concurrent with
construction, Al-Tahadi is likely to house the
magnet production line. Also, most of the
scientists I
I
c::=_]have been relocated to Al-Tahadi.

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(1)
(b )(3)

~ Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains
approximately two-and-a-half tons of 2.5
percent enriched uranium oxide, which the
IAEA permits. This low-enriched material
could be used as feed material to produce
enough HEU for about two nuclear weapons.
The use of enriched feed material also would
reduce the initial number of centrifuges that
Baghdad would need by about half. Iraq
could divert this material-the IAEA inspects
it only once a year-and enrich it to weapons

.

Handle v~L_-'""TO!i$gtJ~a'hannels Jointly

'""lOOP SBC» T~L
~_=_=_..:. :_:. : _
=_:L_-

24

__j
ufNIIQ'IOOPF'fl6~Rf'~~l/.fJW...OL

_-_-_-_- _-_-_-_-_-_-

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~j~----------~~N/~
grade before a subsequent inspection
discovered it was missing. The IAEA last
inspected this material in late January 2002.

~ Iraqhasabout

550 metric tons of yellowcake 1 and lowenriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is
inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also
began vigorously trying to procure uranium
ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would
shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce
nuclear weapons.
•

A foreign government service reported
that as of early 2001, Niger planned to
send several tons of "pure uranium"
(probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of
early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly
were still working out arrangements for
this deal, which could be for up to 500
tons of yellowcake. We do not know the
status of this arrangement.

•

Reports indicate Iraq also has sought
uranium ore from Somalia and possibly
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

~ We cannot confirm whether Iraq

succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or
yellowcake from these sources. Reports
suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic mining
and milling of uranium to foreign acquisition.
Iraq possesses significant phosphate deposits,
from which uranium had been chemically
extracted before Operation Desert Storm.
Intelligence information on whether nuclearrelated phosphate mining and/or processing
has been reestablished is inconclusive,
however.

(b)(3)

~ Uranium Milling and Conversion.

(b)(3)

If Iraq succeeds in purchasing uranium ore or
yellowcake, it still will need facilities to
process the material for eventual use in a
uranium enrichment plant. All known
uranium milling facilities were destroyed
during Desert Storm. Building a new facility
typically would take three to five years.\

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

D INA Nuclear Weapons Design.

(b)(3)

Intelligence reporting subsequent to
Operation Desert Storm revealed that Iraqi
nuclear weapons research was further along
than we had assessed previously~

(b)( 1)

~::------,.-...!/ On the basis of information obtained

after the Gulf war, we judge that by 1990
Baghdad had a design for ~'------____j

(b)( 1)

~ A refined fonn of natural uranium.

1

Handle 1•i~

25

IChann:---=e~ls'-"J,~
om=·t=ly,___ _ _ _ _----,

'----~·rnoLJpptislfE~s~R~vli:rT~

Nmie~un

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

.. - · ··· ··· - - -· . - --.------·- · -· ______ ____ ___ ---· ----- ·----·---· -·····- - ---- -------· ··-.,

.._______________Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

 C01030196
- - - - - -.Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196----- ---- --

·~

"""TOP SBSPEILj'--------__j~
[nuclear weapon

•

Common home computers now provide
more than adequate computational power
for an increasingly sophisticated set of
modeling tools.

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~ Gun-Assembled Devices

•

~ A gun-assembled nucl.ear device is an
alternative nuclear weapon des1gn concept that
does not use an implosion system to compress
the fissile material to produce nuclear yield.
Although this device is relatively simple to
design and build-well within Iraqi
capabilities-it has several ve undesirable
ro erties

A large volume of detailed information on
HE performance and modeling and
nuclear weapons-related design
information has become available in the
open literature since the early 1990s.

z~ INRjudges that Baghdad did not have such

a design by 1990 and sees no reason to change the

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

im lication from the 1997 JAEIC assessment that Iraq

(b)( 1)
'--o-~,...--~--.-.--1

INR. however, judges that
since 1990 Iraq probably completed the design for such
a weapon.

26

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J~ChChrl:anne
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)

----------------------

 C01030196

.

.

Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

1"0P SECRET/~

(b )(3)

L-----------------~

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

rThus,
we judge that Iraq would be able to make a
nuclear weapon within months to a year of
acquiring sufficient weapons-grade fissile

~--~~~~----~~~~--~

material.

~The pre-Desert Stonn nuclear
weapons program was Saddam's most highvalue strategic priority. The program was
tightly compartmented and highly concealed,
and it likely remains so. The infonnation
on Iraq's recent procurement activities,
though limited; as well as imagery of suspect
facilities; and occasional source reporting on
Iraqi efforts indicate that Saddam is
continuing with his nuclear weapons program.

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

27
(b )(3)

(D)t~ )

~------------------~1

..

·-·-- --------- -- - - - ---·---- - - - - --- - - ------ ---------A

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.

- ;._-- -

-----Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196,----

·.

(b)(3)

i€t- Chemical Warfare (CW)

•

Program-Rebuilt and Expanding
~We judge that, prior to the Gulf war,
Iraq possessed the largest and most
sophisticated CW program in the developing
world. We assess that Iraq has rebuilt key
portions of its CW infrastructure and that
Baghdad already has begun renewed
production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin),
and VX. Although we have little specific
information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam
probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons
(MT), and possibly as much as 500 MT, of
CW agents-much of it added in the last
year. 3
~/It~

The Iraqis have experience in
manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets,
and projectiles. We assess that the Iraqis
possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads,
including for potential covertly stored Scud
variants.

Baghdad did not adequately account for
pre-war chemical precursors and large
numbers of munitions. This material
could be combined with renewed
precursor production and imports to
synthesize CW agents (See box on
following page on problems with Iraqi
accounting).

~

CW Arsenals: Estimating CW
Weapons Inventories

~ Obtaining accurate information on

the size of foreign CW weapons holdings is
extremely difficult because CW munitions
storage areasj
and because most foreign states take
extrao,~ precautions to conceal their
locationsj

~ Iraq's CW capability probably is
more limited now than it was at the time of
the Gulf war, although VX production and
agent shelf life probably have been improved.

•

Iraq tested chemical warheads for Scudvariant missiles before the Gulf war and
almost certainly weaponized VX in
warheadsJ

I

(b )(3)
I

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

~Conservative estimates of Iraqi CW
precursor stocks and production capacity, combined
with Iraqi motivations and military requirements,
suggest the stockpile is composed of at least 100 tons.
We believe the Iraqis are capable of producing
significantly larger quantities of CW agent in some
scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into
account practical bounds, such as Iraq's limited
delivery options, and approximates Iraq's stocks at the
time of Operation Desert Storm.

(b )(3)
tDJt.jJ

A

roved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

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1nJPSEGRETjL________________~

•

•

•

{\Q Problems with Iraqi Accounting

(b)( 1)

~ UNSCOM has accounted for some of

(b)(3)

Iraq's filled munitions but not for thousands
of empty munitions that Iraq could fill quickly
with agent. Iraq also retains the capability to
produce many types of weapons that it could
fill with chemical agents.

Iraq admitted to possessing CW-filled
mortar rounds, artillery shells, rockets, A1
Husayn missile warheads, and aerial
bombs. In addition, Iraq admitted to
researching a chemical fill for a rocketpropelled grenade, RPG-7, and producing
and testing an air-delivered CW cluster
bomb.

•

Iraq provided little verifiable evidence
that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000
artillery rockets after the Gulf war.

(b)( 1)

Baghdad denies that it loaded VX into its
650-km-range al-Husayn ballistic missile
warheads, despite strong forensic
evidence to the contrary. An independent
US laboratory detected degraded products
from VX on metal fragments collected
from al-Husayn warheads in 1998.
Despite destruction of CW-related
facilities by Coalition forces and
UNSCOM post-war dismantlement
operations, Saddam also retained some
elements of his CW infrastructure,
including R&D, production and
weaponization. He probably also retained
some CW-weaponized delivery
capabilities, including ballistic missiles,
spray tanks, bombs, artillery and rockets.

~ CW

(b )(3)

•

An Iraqi Air Force document discovered
by UNSCOM inspectors in July 1998
suggests that Baghdad overstated by at
least 6,000 the number of chemical
munitions it used during the Iran-Iraq war.
Iraq has refused to hand over the
document and has not accounted for these
munitions. In addition, UNSCOM could
not verify the disposal of 308 R-400
bombs. that Iraq claims it unilaterally
destroyed.

•

UNSCOM was unable to account for
about 550 artillery shells filled with
mustard agent.

Agent Production

~7N£l. Capitalizing on Dual-Use

I

Facilities. Iraq almost certainly has a CW
agent production capability embedded within
its chemical industry, which enables Baghdad
to conceal chemical agents, munitions,
precursors, production equipment, and
sensitive program information. We have been
unable to corroborate multipl~
I

(b)(3)

!claims of large-scale chemical agent
production, but an array o~
I
reporting reveals that Baghdad is covertly
procuring the types and quantities of
chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow
limited CW agent production. We have no
credible information indicating that Iraq is

29

Handle ,.;al. ?:nrune~lsul<tMomin:u.tll.L'_ _ _ __ _

(t;)(1)

(b)( 1)

rmJffl~~a.__

(b)(3)
(b )(3)

'-----...,1MU'Tr~Siil!!i!IC~~Ii~~L~---------__j~F6Rf'i/JJ['
·~ · · · --

•••• ··-··--------

- ~ -- ··· -- - - - -- - · P --• • -

o

--- ----- -- -- ~---

- --

- - ·

-- -

- --

-

--

-

-

··

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~

. ---- ---------,Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

- - - -------·.

~~L__ __ _ _ _ ___jfNOF6RNJfX1_

(b )(3)

'tlQ. Chemical-Filled Munitions Declared by Iraq
Iraqi 250-gauge
chemical bomb.

Iraqi 500-gauge
chemical bombs.

/raqiDB-2
chemical bomb.

lraqiR-400
chemical bombs.

Iraqi 155-mm
chemical shell.

Iraqi AI Husayn
chemical
warheads.

122-mm rockets

fiUed with the
chemical nerve

agent sarin prior
to destruction.

(b)(3)

UNetA&&IREP

HandleviJ

30
________pmm
~n~e~h~~~om
~
·r~wL__ _ __ ___~~~~~LT~~IL__ _ __ _ _ _ ___jfN'OFOltHMK1

.-Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01 030196 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

L . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

 C01030196

Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 .

(b)(3)
'iUl_lraq's Biological and Chemical Bombs

Two R-400A bombs in foreground photographed by UNSCOM inspectors at Murasana Airfield near the AI Walid
Airbase In late 1991 bear marfdngs lntfJCStfng they were to be flfled with botulinum toxin. Other bombs appear to have
markings consistent with binary chemical agent fill.

(b)(3)
researching nontraditional agents.4
/
/suggests Baghdad
is developing a mobile CW agent production
capability.

'---.....J~/NF) We judge that Iraq is expanding

infrastructure that it could divert quickly to
CW-related production\

I
•

its chemical industry primarily to support CW
production because it is rebuilding a dual-use
~~Nontraditional

agents, developed by Russia, are
designed to defeat or complicate US and NATO
detenses and to escape coverage under the Chemical
Weapons Convention.

}c~nnels Jointly

Hm1dle l'ia l
L __ _

.....

The Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants
have been operational since March 2000,
according to analysis of satellite imagery.
Fallujah II was designed and built as a
dedicated CW precursor production
facility in the mid-1980s but now is
operated as part of an ostensibly
commercial entity known as the Tareq

31

~11nu~cP~SHE~C~RRE~c.:::::::=============~1fn~un~F~OMH~H~L~~~~~

·--

...

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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.. ... .. - ----Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196· · ·

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

suggesting that it was modified for illicit
use.

State Establishment. Chlorine and phenol
can be used to produce CW precursors
and, although they have legitimate civilian
applications-water treatment or pesticide
and resin production-such needs already
are met adequately through UNauthorized imports and the three other
civilian chlorine plants in the country.
Furthermore, modifications to the phenol
plant was observed on satellite imagery
after the departure of UNSCOM,

•

MoreoverJ

L___----.....----.----,-_JI Falluj~

!detected
members of the facility engaged in

• I

Channels Jointly

~--~~~O~P~SiE~SR~~~~~~r~::::::==========~~~nu~E~6~R~~~u~arLL

.A

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

worried about maintaining the cover story
that some undisclosed material the plant
had acquired was actually pesticide.

32
Handle vi

I
I

roved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)
(b )(3)

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-,OPSE~R~~-----------------~8RN"Xl
shallow burial of equipment, almost
certainly for D&D purposes.
•

D&D efforts, the limitations of remotely
monitoring known and suspected sites, and
the dual-use nature of such sites make
determining the location of suspected Iraqi
CW stockpile and production facilities
extremely difficult.

Furthermore
L __ _

_jl ind:.-ic-a-te-th
~at---,I=-a
r-q~
is_u_s~
in-g~i__j
ts

procurement network to try to acquire
precursors for the various agents it has
made in the past.
•

•

•

We do not know the functions of at least
three chemical production facilitiesnever inspected by UNSCOM-which
Iraq built during the 1990s.

because we have
observed activity on imagery, including
transshipment operations involving tanker
trucks associated with the CW program,
the use of decontamination vehicles, and
special security measures. Activity at
these sites suggests CW already is
deployed with the military logistic chain.

indicates that the
management of the Tareq facility includes
previously identified CW persollllel.

~ Iraq can still produce blister agents,
but the limited availability of key types and
quantities of chemical precursors and the
destruction of its known CW production
facilities during the Gulf war and the
subsequent UN inspections regime probably
impeded its sustained production of large
amounts of G-series nerve agents and VX.
Iraq historically only has had rudimentary
capabilities to produce VX. We cannot rule
out, however, that Iraq has produced VX on a
small-scale or that it has procured enough
chemical precursors to support larger-scale
production.

•

Although virtually any structure could
store chemical weapons, several sites are
suspected of storin CW material-alMusa ib

~ Agent Research, Development, and
Testing
~aq probably is focusing its
offensive CW research and development on
quality control and extending agent shelf life
of VX and other nerve agents. Baghdad
probably is hiding small-scale agent
production within legitimate research
laboratories, but our knowledge rests on
limited intelligence reporting on suspicious
activity at only a few research centers. One
of these sites, the al-Basel Research Centera chemical research laboratory that Iraq
declared as part of its CW program-and the
facility at Habbaniyah II may be collaborating
I
on CW-related tasksj

Iraq's attempts to procure precursorsoften involving efforts to circumvent UN
sanctions-indicate Baghdad is not yet
self-sufficient in producing chemical
agents.

~ Stockpiles and Storage Facilities
~Our information on Iraq's current

•

CW stockpile is limited, but based on its Gulf
war stockpile, precursor orders, and
Baghdad's intentions, we conclude that Iraq
has restocked some chemical warfare agents.
The paucity of detailed intelligence, Iraq's

Iraq is likely to continue field-testing a
large variety of CW bombs, artillery
shells, rockets, ballistic missile warheads,
submunitions, and spray tanks to im rove
their effectiveness

33
Handle 1•ia

Channels Jointly

'------~"'TnO~P~S;J!E~C:lRilFE~Itf::::::~=============l~~uD:rrF'fOtiR~~IIl.ol'tl./XDl._

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

(b)( 1 )

(b)(3)
(b )(3)

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-- --- ---Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 -·· ·--·

(b)(3)

•

ballistic missiles, or covert means. Even
the threatened use of CW against air and
seaports of debarkation could result in the
loss of critical civilian support personnel,
such as stevedores.

At the end of the Gulf war, Iraq was
testing submunitions-which pennit
better agent distribution-for bombs and
potentially for ballistic missile warheads
in the future.

ifiNf1

Iraqi troops could use NBC

~ent 'ciefensively against a WMD attack
or as a preventive measure during an
offensive attack. If Iraq used a nonpersistent
CW agent such as sarin, its troops would need
protection in case the agent blew back on
them, and if it used a persistent CW agent,
such as VX, Iraqi troops would need
nt~t:_=.o-=e-=
n-=
te=r-=th=-=e~--------,
defensive equipme;=.
contaminated areaJ

~ CW Doctrine, Training, and Defensive

Posture
~

Our information on Iraqi CW
doctrine is derived largely from our analysis
of chemical attacks against Iranian forces
during Baghdad's war with Tehran in the
1980s. Because its CW doctriDe changed
during the Iran-Iraq war, we assess that Iraq
continued to fine-tune its doctrine in the years
that followed.

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)

{b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
•

Saddam delegated the authority to use
CW to his corps-level commanders after
realizing that his troops could not act fast
enough if he maintained release authority.
Saddam used couriers to overcome
communications difficulties and to avoid
detection, affecting the speed at which his
orders were carried out

~ Although we do not know Iraq's CW
employment plans, several options exist for a
conflict with US and Coalition forces:
•

The use of persistent CW agents to
contaminate areas through which US and
Coalition forces would attack or along key
lines of communications.

•

CW employment targeting of US forces
conducting river crossings during an
attack north.

•

The use of CW against US and Coalition
marshalling activities in Kuwait (or other
theater areas), delivered by UAVs,

Handle vid,__ _,t"JP~~~~i'hannels Jointly

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
atropine auto-injectors, Geiger counters,
chemical detection tubes, a decontamination
shower. and NBC defensive equipment,

I

I

(b)( 1)

34

~OPSEC~~[=~===~=============~N~ORF~OMR~~~U~QQn

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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rmamfat.
----====~----~

(b)(3)
/l- \ I A \

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

~Procurement
I
~ We cannot link definitively

(b )(3)

Iraq's procurement of CW precursors,
technology, and specialized equipment from
foreign sources directly to Iraq's CW
program, but Baghdad is working to set up
CW-related clandestine procurement
networks. Iraq previously used these
networks to shield its military programs from
detection!
I
We assess that Iraq's procurements have
contributed to the rebuilding of dual-use
facilities that probably are adding to Iraq's
overall CW agent capability.

(b)( 1)

~Biological

Warfare (BW)
Program-Larger Than Before

~We

assess that all key aspectsR&D, production, and weaponization-of
Iraq's offensive BW program are active and
that most elements are larger and more
advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

35

Handle \•iaj

J~la-::n::n.. : el=-'
: . :s J=-=o-=-in=tl)L'..------~'01~~/a.L

'-----rr'ITQnp~SittE~Cr=:llfl:l~:U·'-----------_j~Ot!91@JJOC1

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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""TOP SESRI::;q

(b)(3)

~----------------~

•

•

We judge Iraq has some lethal and
incapacitating BW agents and is capable
of producing and weaponizing quickly a
variety of such agents, including Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax).
Baghdad has been able to renovate and
expand its fixed dual-use BW agent
production facilities and to develop a
significant mobile BW bacterial and toxin
agent production capability designed to
evade detection and inspections and
improve survivability.

(S/INF) Iraq's BW program, however,
continues to be difficult to penetrate and
access, and we do not have specific
information on the types of weapons, agent,
or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal.
'l'6j. Agent Production and Storage
~ We judge that Iraq retains a

mature offensive BW program, including
R&D, production, and weaponization
capabilities. Despite international efforts to
disarm Iraq, Baghdad has continued and
expanded its program by establishing a largescale, redundant, and concealed BW agent
production capability. We assess that Iraq has
some BW agent and maintains the capability
to produce B. anthracis, botulinum toxin,
aflatoxin, Clostridiwn perfringens (gas
gangrene), and ricin toxin: It also may be
able to produce a number of other
incapacitating and lethal agents that it has
researched over the years. (See Table 1 on
page 37 for list of agents Iraq bas researched.)
Iraq's capability to manufacture equipment
I
and materials--j
~and to rocure other necessary, dual'--u-se__
m__J
aterials

~

Was Iraq linked to the anthrax letters
in fall2001?

~

We have no intelligence information
linking Iraq to the fall2001 attacks in the
United States, but Iraq has the capability to
produce spores of Bacillus anthracis -the
causative agent of anthrax-similar to the dry
spores used in the letters. We do not have
information suggesting that Iraq possesses the
Ames strain of B. anthracis, the strain used in
the letters. Baghdad in the I 980s approached
a British laboratory to obtain the Ames strain
but the request was denied, according to a
United Nations inspector quoted in the press.

~

The spores found in the Daschle and
Leahy letters are highly purified, probably
requiring a high level of skill and expertise in
working with bacterial spores. Iraqi scientists
could have such expertise, although samples
of Iraqi B. thuringiensis-which Iraq used as
an anthrax simulant-were not as pure as the
anthrax spores in the letters. The spores from
the letters do not contain bentonite, the
material Iraq used to enhance dissemination
in its B. thuringiensis spore preparations.

•

Various intelligence reporti
I
/
~eporting indicate that Iraq
probably has retained unauthorized stocks
of Variola major virus, the causative agent
of smallpox. Baghdad reportedly kept
smallpox virus sam les from its 19711972 outbreak
--- - r------,

We assess that the
c
ces are even that smallpox is part of
Baghdad's offensive BW program,
although credible evidence is limited.

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1 )

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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·· . .

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;..

~6P SKCR~L--------~OF6RNAIXL

(b)(3)

Table 1

1S1fNE.t BW Agents that Iraq has Researched
Bacillus antltracis (anthrax)
Botulinum toxin (botulism)
Ricin
Clostridium peifringens (gas gangrene)
Yersinia pestis (Pl!lgue)
Brucella melitensis (brucellosis)
Variola major virus (smallpox)
Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
Aflatoxin
Mycotoxins
Tilletia species (wheat covered smut)
""tYl.. This table is~

•

Enterovirus 70 (acute hemorrhagic conjunctivitis)
Camelpox virus
Rotavirus
Vibrio cholerae (cholera)
Clostridium tetani (tetanus)
Hemorrhagic fever viruses
Staphylococcal enterotoxins
Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus)
Francisella tularensis (tularemia)
Shigella dysenteriae (dysentery)

~

(b )(3)

According to Iraqi declarations to
UNSCOM, tons of wheat covered smut.
which degrades wheat crops, were
produced from 1984 to 1993.

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

I

\suggest Iraq has
...
equivalent particle-size drying capabilities
in mobile and fixed facilities.

~

We assess that Baghdad
also has increased the effectiveness of its BW
arsenal by mastering the ability to produce
dried agent. Dried agents can be
disseminated over a much wider area than wet
agents. Iraq had the capability to dry
organisms in a respirable particle size prior to
the Gulf war but declared that all weapons
systems deployed during the Gulf war were
filled with li uid a ent. MoreoverJ
I
reporting on the
Lp=-=rccoc.,.,.u=-=rc-=-=m
-=-e=n:7t-=-o...-Iu::::-:T--=-=u-:se drying and milling
equipment suggest continued interest by Iraq
in the capability to dry and size at least some
of the agents in its arsenal. We assess that
Iraq has both liquid and dry BW agents in its
arsenal.

(b)(3)

~ The nature and amounts of

(b)(3)

Iraq's stored BW material remain unresolved
by UNSCOM accounting.
•

From the end of the Gulf war to mid1995, Iraq denied that it had an offensive
BW program, claiming that it had
conducted only "defensive research."
Only after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad
with irrefutable evidence of excessive
growth media procurement did Iraq admit
that it had an offensive BW program and
had made 30,000 liters of concentrated
biological weapons agents. Even then,
UNSCOM estimates that Iraq's
production of anthrax spores and

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

37
HaJidle l'i

.

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

Channels Jointly

L__-.....,~TOOPF:SS~J!:~C:BR~F::£l1t::~::~-=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=--=----_-[ffi~F~9BRR.:N:N/i."X!Ul
~· - --- · ·

..,

_________ -- - --·--- ----- -·--·- A

--. -------

roved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

-·- - - - - ----- ·

-·

-

 C01030196

_ _ _ _Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196-- - - --- --- -- -

(b)(3)
large amount of media was lost in failed
production runs or was stolen from the
high-security BW facility at AI Hakam
and other sites, according to unclassified
UNSCOM data.

botulinum toxin could have been two to
four times higher than claimed by
Baghdad.
•

Iraq has not explained serious
discrepancies between the amount of BW
growth media it procured before 1991 and
the amount of finished agent it declaredor could have made using the medialeadina
believe that Iraq
produced substanti y greater amounts of
biological agents than it declared. Iraq
was unable to substantiate claims that a

•

l

Iraq claimed it destroyed 157 aerial
bombs it had filled with BW agent, but
UNSCOM could not confirm this
destruction despite considerable efforts to
do so. Iraq claimed that it produced four
aerosol spray tanks by modifying a
Mirage F-1 fuel drop tank. We have no

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

38
(b)(3)
(b)(3)

A

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-,orsE~REij

(b )(3)

~------------------~

have consumed Iraq's previously
procured, unaccounted-for growth media.

evidence that the Iraqis destroyed these
tank_§

jN£) Fixed Dual-Use Facilities.
We are increasingly concerned that
Baghdad's renovation and expansion of its
:fL"l:ed, dual-use facilities that served as Iraq's
BW agent production capability prior to the
Gulf war are part of an effort to increase
significantly Iraq's BW agent holdings.

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

L _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _

•

increased activity and
construction at the Amiriyah Serum and
Vaccine Institute since at least 2000,
suggesting more than pharmaceutical
production or distribution is taking place.
Iraqi scientists reportedly conducted
quality testing at this site on BW agents
roduced in the mobile production units,

This storage capability
far exceeds the amouLn_t ____
'---------l
necessary for vaccine distribution and
production at this facility.

•

•

UNSCOM's final report from January
1999 indicates that about 20 mobile
double-jacketed storage tanks, which we
judge may contain previously produced
agent, remain unaccounted for. These
could be used to produce, store, or
transport BW agents.
These discrepancies are overshadowed,
however, by the large quantities Iraq can
produce through its expanding mobile
production program, which may already

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

Several new
torage structures
been built, for exam le,

•

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

__j

The castor oil plant at Habbaniyah I (also
known as Fallujah ill), which was
damaged in Desert Fox, was rebuilt by
earl 20001
I
The facility continues to extract
rom the castor beans, allegedly for use
in brake fluid production.\

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

L___----.--=-------'1 Although the
extraction of castor oil is a legitimate
endeavor, a by-product of the processthe bean "mash.,-<:ontains the BW agent,
39
(b )(3)

(b)(3)

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ricin toxin_ Ricin probably is not
extracted at the castor oil plant because
ricin extraction from the bean mash is a
separate and distinct process from castor
oil extraction. Recently noted concurrent
activity at the castor oil extraction plant
and the nearby main production building,
however, suggests that toxin extraction
may be taking place in the main
production building. Iraq admitted to
small-scale production of ricin toxin, as
well as field testing 155mm artillery shells
for ricin delivery.

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

UNSCOM

L.....-in~s~
pec
---,to~rs
re~
p~
ort
--:---T"t:r--!
at the facility

was
one of two in the country capable of
containing highly pathogenic biological
organisms. UNSCOM rendered it useless
in 1996 by filling ductwork with a cement
and foam mixture and destroying
equipment used for BW agent production
but left other research and production
equipment in place.,

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

40
Handle vi_L.__---::;j-.mifeiPqs~v~cn~=EC::t:lufrnn...e...,/s'-"'J.-""oin
...,t...,lv'-------~Wftl.m~u_

r---~bM~~~~-----------------~~F6R)YIXL

Approv~d for Re_lease: ?01~!_!~Q9 C01030196

(b ){3)

(b )(3)

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(b)(3)
~

Iraq's Denial and Deception (D&D) Program for Biological Weapons

[)Nf>

Iraq has a national-level BW D&D program. The survival of the Iraqi offensive BW
program stems primarily from the effectiveness of this effort.

(b )(3)

•

(b)( 1)

~ Iraq's BW D&D program centers on usino j:!;eneric facilities and embeddino BW

(b )(3)

development, production, and storage\

•

(b)( 1)

The dual-use nature of these types of facilities allows Iraq to conceal BW production behind
a legitimate front.

~ Iraq uses codcwords to compartmentalize BW program elements, conceal the

(b)(3)

acquisition of BW-related equipment, and impair Western attempts to monitor Iraqi technology
acquisition. Codes may refer to sensitive activities, personnel, or places. "Project 600" was
Baghdad's code for BW activity at Abu Ghurayb, Iraq's alleged "baby milk factory" that
Coalition forces bombed in Operation Desert Storm.\

(b)( 1)

I
~ To further protect its BW program, Iraq strictly enforces personnel security and

(b)(3)

takes additional damage-control measures when personnel with access to classified information
defect.

c__-------,-'1 Iraq probably has renovated the

researching and filling agent into munitions or
containers, according to multipl~
I
sources. Iraq has pursued mobile BW
production options, largely to protect its BW

facility, but we are unable to determine
whether BW a ent research or roduction
has resumed

capability from detection. according to a
suggest

credible source. This information tracks with
UNSCOM evidence that Iraq in the mid1990s was considering a mobile fermentation
capability
Such prod}-u-cti'"·o_n_u_ru
--.-.ts
:--p-ro-vt--.-.d"e_a_r_e'
du
-n~d'an
---,t:---'
,
mobile, large-scale, and easily concealed BW
production capability, which surpasses that of
the pre-Gulf war era; they also make Iraq's

at

c,B"a-g"h-.
da~d"h-e"
ld.--:t:-ru e--ot_j
o its 1999 press claim

to renovate this facility, reportedly to
produce FMD vaccine.
I

~ Mobile BW Production

.

U11its. Baghdad has transportable facilities
for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents
and may have other mobile units for

41
Handle 1•ia,

'h·l"'an:mnlli.Je/...._
s.....,JoaJintu_llu:\'_ _ _ _ _ _-----,

L__.__,'Tl'iOOf'MSiJ!i;(;C~R~EJini

roP8PN 1'Xl.

Approved for Release: 2014/12/99 C0103Q_196

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

 C01030196

· ------- ·-- -- -----Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 ·

""'lOP SRCRi:~L----------~~~WXl

(b)(3)

~aqiBWTest

-

Test of dlssemlnatlon of BW agents from a modified drop tank carried by a Mirage F1. The drop tank was filled
with 1,000 liters of sluny Bacillus subtilis, a slmulant for B. anthracis, and disseminated owr Abu Obeydl Allbase
in January 1991. The photo is from a videotape provided by lmq to UNSCOM.

u~

(b)(3)

42

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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(b )(3)
BW capability more difficult to monitor,
target, and eliminate.
•

produced 20 to 30 metric tons of "primary
biological weapons product" (probably an
unconcentrated slurry of agent and culture
media) by early 1999.

In mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish
mobile laboratories for BW agent research
to evade UNSCOM inspections, according
to Maj. Harith Mamdouh Majid al-Assaf,
an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi
National Congress.

•

We estimate that if all seven mobile plants
were operational, Baghdad would be able
to produce\

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•

~~ An Iraqi defector deemed

I

(b )(3)
~gent

credible by the IC said seven mobile BW
production units were constructed and that
one began production as early as 1997.

Testins!
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

•

The seven mobile plants were built under
the cover of the "Grain Purification
Project," according to the source. One
mobile production plant is composed of
two railroad cars and the other six plants
consist of three tractor trailers each. The
reported locations of these plants have
been identified in imagery, but Iraq has
most likely dispersed these units since the
source defected.
·

•

Following difficulties in operating the
original truck production plants, designs
for a more concealable and efficient twotrailer system were completed in May
1998, possibly increasing the overall
number of truck production plants.

•

Hand/~ l'i~'-----Tu'J»P1i!•:tOr!fC~Rill~£CTT'hj'nne/s Jointlv
~.c;c~-~

~I
~n t999
that R&D in support of Iraq's offensive BW
program was continuin~
I
I
IIn the absence of UN inspectors,
Iraq probably has intensified and expanded
these efforts.
indicates that
several Iraqi biological research facilities are
actively engaged in genetic engineering and
biotechnology research and development.
Some of these research facilities are suspected
of involvement in Iraq's BW R&D program.

(b)(3)

I

The mobile production units were to
produce five different BW agents. Two of
the agents probably are B. anthracis
(anthrax) and botulinum toxin. The
source also stated that one of the labs

"

Research, Development, and

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

43

reF..QPNilU_

'-------------~

-------- -

·-

------- -·- ------------

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.. ---

..

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- - - --Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

1rV¥&gCBEJJ~-----------------~OF9RNUXl

(b)(3)

in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha
area" for CBW testing-probably to the
Qadisiyah complex-from Baghdad
prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995
were missing during UNSCOM
inspections of the Baghdad prisons in
1998, adding weight to the source's claim.

•

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

that was involved in

• [

~~~~o the Gulf war.
\was working in 1997 on
transferring the gene encoding tetanus
toxin from Clostridium tetani into

~Procurement

~ Iraq continues to
circumvent and undermine UN sanctions to

enhance its biotechnical self-sufficiency,
while advancinE its BW oro2J'am when
possibleJ

Bacillus subtilis-:1

I

•!

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

a project to
discover a strain o c o era resistant to
antibiotics,\

(b)( 1)

I

(b)( 1)

•

•

(b)( 1)

L__~---,---,------------'

In

addition, Iraq has attempted to procure
other, BW-applicable equipment, such as

0~ Iraq may have tested BW agents at a

I capable of grinding hundreds
\ajet mill
of kilograms

facility near the Qadisiyah Reservoir in
western Iraq, according t~
reporting.

•

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•
I

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

of biological material per hour to 1 to 10

A former Directorate of General Security
officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners
44

~-----------------roPORNt~l

a.;__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- - ' -_ _

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(0)(~)

-----=~---------------

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.

-

,_,. _

- ···-·

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(b )(3)

•

microns--the ideal particle size range for
BWagents.

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

•

•

Three Iraai intelligence officers reportedly
travele~
lin mid-1999
to obtain ..materials" for use in the

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

•
~ Baghdad maintains a robust network
of intennediary firms in:
Iand

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

elsewhere that assist with procurement of
dual-use and support equipment for Iraq's
offensive BW program. Since the embargo
was imposed in 1990, this network of front
companies appears to have circumvented
import controls through D&D techniques,
exploitation of UN humanitarian exemptions
and emphasis on the civilian applications of
dual-use technology.

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~ Maintaining Some Indigenous

(b)(3)

Capabilities. We assess that Iraq also
maintains the capability to manufacture some
BW-related equipment and materials
indigenously.

•

(b)( 1)

Iand credited them
with the capability to manufacture
Handle

,.;~

45

r;hian-"-'n-'-'
el-s=-./.
_:_:o_il_:_:
lt("-" ------~r0ti19l!Dii/Di.l.

~--~'ITOnP~S~E~S~RRutE~~~--~------~~F9~"Xl

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01 030196_ _ _ _........__ _ _ _ _ _ __

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-Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 · ·

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

mduction such
and

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•

•
--=-----'IN£l..

Aerial spraying of a
BW agent is the most efficient method of BW
dispersal. Many manned aircraft currently in
the Iraqi inventory could be fitted with the
spray tanks necessary to deliver biological
weapons. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq pursued
R&D of UAVs, as well as light aircraft and
helicopters used in agricultural spraying for
BW delivery. Most importantly, however,
Iraq has tested aerial spray systems for BW
delivery and had spray tanks ready to deploy
during the Gulf war.

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

L _ __ _

•

~¥eans

~Our understanding

of
Iraq's current BW delivery systems is limited,
based primarily on pre-Gulf War capabilities
and Iraqi claims to the UN. Iraq possesses a
variety of overt, military means to deliver
biological agents. Iraq's pre-Gulf war BW
arsenal consisted of aerial bombs, Al-Husayn
missile warheads, and aircraft-fitted drop
tanks modified for aerial spray delivery. Iraq
probably still has such weapons and also may
have developed cluster bombs, tube artillery
shells, battlefield rockets, and other portable
spray devices for the delivery of BW agents.
In addition, Iraq could revert to more covert
means of delivering biological agents by Iraqi
intelligence operatives, special forces, or
proxies, although we have limited information
suggesting this option.
•

•

Explosive-type weapon systems decrease
the dissemination efficiency of the BW
agent fill. The heat and blast associated
with these systems decrease the viability
of the agent contained in the weapon, as
well as dispersing the agent in a relatively
small area.

•

(b )(3)

Pre-Gulf war dispersal trials of anthrax
simulant from the Mirage F-1 fighter
fitted with spray tanks, as well as
agricultural spray systems on helicopters,
provided Iraq with valuable data for BW
agent dissemination.

'---~-~_jlraq modified drop tanks for

·et trainer to deliver CBW
agents.
at attempts
with a MiG-23 modified drop tank for this
same purpose failed and that Iraq also

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

46
Handle via

Charnn=e=ls...=.J,.oin
::..:=t::Lly_

_ _ _ __

~;n)Pe~NW:JU_

'----~"T'TT·OiiP~SiiH~G~RU£;T~
RoP6DlllXJ
·1~.----------------~1
-

Approv~d

for

Rel~ase:_ 2014/12/09

C01030196

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

tested some army aviation helicopters as
CBW delivery systems.

•C

•

Iraq has an active UA V program,
which in the past has included attem:ts to
convert the MiG-21. L-29j
_
I
I
Iinto a UAV. Although we ave
no information linking the current UAV
development with BW delivery, this new
airframe may represent another future
method of BW delivery\
~

1

1 1-\/A \

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)(1)

(b)( 1)

1csee

discussion ofUAVs on page 50).
~BW Employment
, - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - - , ~ We lack good intelligence on how,
where, or when Saddam's regime plans to use
•
BW.
(S/INF) Against the US Homeland. We
assess that the liS probably would be the
primary means by which Iraq would attempt
to attack clandestinely the US Homeland with
biological weapons. We have no specific
intelligence that Saddam's regime has
directed attacks against US territory, however,
and Baghdad has far less capability to wage a
campaign of violence and destruction in US
territory than it does in the Middle East
region.

~ Iraq could revert to covert means of

delivenng biological weapons usmsz
unconventional methods.\

~In the Region. The liS probably
also has been directed to conduct attacks
against US and Allied interests in the Middle
East in the event the US takes action against
Iraq. In addition, Iraq's Republican Guard
Special Forces, special missions units (SMU)
subordinate to the General Directorate of
Military Intelligence, or the Fedayeen
Saddam, ostensibly under the command of
Uday Saddam Hussein, could be used to
perform covert delivery in the region .

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)
/L.. \ ,......, \

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
•i
~------------~

47

Handle

,.iJ'- --~"Tl~~~tl]c~'f'harn_ne'-'/s- '- 'J-,-o''- '·n=
- '-tl)'·---------~Ol''ai~(LX:L
ThP Sf!16'PEx1

f'OP6ImVXL

'----- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -

. Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 .

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

 C01030196

-Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196 -- - -

-

(b)(3)
•

•

Saddam would use BW against Kuwait
for two reasons: a realization that Kuwait
is a crucial staging base for US and allied
military operations against Iraq, especially
a ground invasion; and a desire for
vengeance against the Sabah-regime that
he despises and blames for the years of
ongoing UN sanctions and US/UK
military attacks.

SMUs are more likely to be used for
surreptitious attacks, including those
possibly involving BW weapons. Many
reports put the SMU training facility at
Salman Pak, southeast of Baghdad, the
same area where there is a known special
operations training facility and former
BW facility. The only information we
have linking SMUs to CBW use is an
Iraqi defector's claim in a recent
newspaper interview that terrorists were
trained in CBW use at Camp 999, the
Salman Pak facility.

•

We have no information supporting the
role of the Fedayeen Saddam-a small,
lightly armed internal security force-in a
BW attack, although this group could be
used to conduct a BW attack. Such an
attack probably would be unsophisticated
and limited to countries bordering Iraq.

~ Baghdad's planned BW employment

strategy outside Iraq probably emphasizes
countervalue targeting; i.e., attacking enemy
population centers, which include ports and
many airfields. The regime probably also has
contingencies against purely military targets
such as naval forces afloat, isolated military
bases and airfields, and unit assembly areas or
logistics depots.
•

•

We judge that Baghdad would lack
confidence in its ability to attack
successfully well-defended military point
targets outside Iraq with biological
weapons, except via its missile forces.
The limited numbers of dependable
delivery systems-to include missilesprobably would cause Iraq to emphasize
attacks against population centers and
less-well defended civilian facilities. The
regime also would be seeking maximum
destructive and psychological impact,
suggesting civilian populations would be
the focus of its BW plans. Iraq also may
want to hit selected military targets if
enough missiles were available, however.

~

Saddam's regime may resort to
methods of BW attack that result in more
indiscriminate and widespread contamination
throughout the Gulf region-not just Kuwait
or selected point targets-using an aerial
delivery system in Iraqi airspace with
prevailing winds carrying the agent across its
borders.

We believe that Israel almost certainly is a
target for an Iraqi BW attack, with the city
of Tel Aviv topping Saddam's list. Iraq's
most reliable means of delivering BW
against Israel is its covert Scud-variant
missile force-the most sure means of
penetrating Israel's defenses and Coalition
attempts to block Iraqi attacks. Iraq's Air
Force and covert operators, however,
remain alternate BW delivery
mechanisms.

~ossible constraints on Saddam's use
ofBW in this manner may be concerns about
contaminating Iraq and his desired legacy as a
great pan-Arab leader. Saddam probably
thinks that if he contaminates Arab countries
indiscriminately, his popular, historic image
could be undermined. Saddam, however, also
is vengeful and he may conclude that any
"defensive" actions would be fully justified
inasmuch as US-led "aggression" against Iraq

Kuwait is the most likely non-Israeli
regional target for BW attack. We assess

48
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(b)(3)
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(b )(3)

;;

is only possible because other Arab
governments have betrayed the Arab cause.
~Inside

Iraq. We judge that Saddam
may be hesitant to employ BW against any
enemy targets in the Arab heartlands of Iraq,
especially the Sunni areas-preferring CW or
conventional means of resistance. In
extremis, we cannot rule out such BW attacks,
however. If the regime attempts to use BW
inside the Arab-inhabited areas of Iraq, the
emphasis will be against enemy military
targets rather than Iraqi population centers.
•

Saddam's regime probably realizes it has
little or no means to control the effects of
BW once unleashed among its own
population and, as long as Saddam
believes he or members of his family
might survive to carry-on, he probably
would be reluctant to use BW inside Iraq.

status.5 (See Air Force view in next
paragraph.)

(b)( 1)

•

•

Iraq also conducted feasibility studies on
various aircraft!

(b)( 1)

\MiG fighter aircraft were among

~th..o_s_e_c__J
onsidered.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~Delivery

Systems-Iraq
Increasing Its Options

~The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

Threat

~ Baghdad continues to develop
UAVs, which could be used as delivery
platfonns for BW, and less likely CW, agents.
They could threaten Iraq's neighbors; US
forces in the Persian Gulf; and if brought
closer to or into the United States, the US
Homeland. Iraq's UAV program includes
converted aircraft as well as small and
medium-sized UAVs.

29 UAV airframes remain

0~ Converted Aircraft. We assess that

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

by 2000, Iraq had converted as many as 10 L29s-1960s vintage Czech-built jet trainersinto UAVs. We do not know their operational
~ The Military Intelligence Community
assesses that the role of the L-29 UAV-modified
aircraft is largely historical and that concentrating on it
distracts from other more viable delivery mechanisms
forCBW.

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
(b)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

•

•

•

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

•

•

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

.

•

(b)( 1)

.(b )(3)

L__---,------.,--"NEJ The UAV program faces
several tecmti.cd hurdles-particularly
guidance and control-and appears to have
suffered a setback when an unmanned L-29
crashed last October 2000, apparently shakin
there ime's confidence in the s ste

~ Small and Medium-Sized

UAVs. We are concerned about Iraq's current
development and flight-testing of small to

(b)( 1)

50
(b)(3)

{D)~ 6)

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•

(b)( 1)

•

medium-sized UAVs and its recent
procurement of significant amounts of UAVrelated equipment. Although limited to
smaller payloads, such UAVs would be more
difficult to detect and shoot down than
manned aircraft or converted aircraft-UAVs
and could pose a greater danger to US forces
and allies in the region.

•

Iraq in the past has configured small
UAVs to deliver BW agents'--_ __
andUNSCOM
discovered 11 small UAVs at the Iraqi
BW R&D. production, and storage facility
at Salman Pak.

~ Iraq has at least one small

_j

UAV that could be employed covertl a ainst
the continental United States.

~------;-~--;

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

might be available for operational use within
months~

•

(b )(3)

/ L \I A \

(b)( 1)
indicates the same Iraqi procurement
network has been associated with attempts
to procure UAV components, as well as
to be used to
manufacture dozens of small- to mediumsized UAVs.

(b)( 1)

L _ __ _ _ _ _ ____j

•

\ U )\ I)

~ Centers for US civilian and military

(b )(3)

personnel in Kuwait are the easiest targets for
a BW-armed UAV attack, because of
Kuwait' s close proximity to airfields in
southeastern Iraq. These targets would
receive little warning before the attack if the
UAV avoided radar by flying in low to the
ground or if the agent was disseminated near
the lraqi-Kuwaiti border.\

•

(b)( 1)

•

I

~ An Iraqi UAV procurement
network attempted to procure commercially
available route planning software and an
associated topographic database that will

51

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(b)(3)

(b )(3)
(b )(3)

 C01030196

· ·-··· Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

i

(b)(3)
provide coverage of the "50 states"-referring
• Iraq is advancing longer-range missile
to the United States-according tq
I
development capabilities, largely through
during the summer of
foreign
assistance in building specialized
"--::-:=---==-=--~_j
2001. This software would provide for
facilities, including a test stand for
in
engines more powerful than those in its
L..th
~
e ::-:
U:-m-;.ted~
Sta
tes
---,;
fo_r_th
.--esm
-all
--=-'U
.........
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h
existing missile force~
software is useless outside the United States,
which strongly suggests that Iraq is
investigating the use of these UAVs for
missions targeting the United States.
~ Pre-Gulf War Developments. Prior
to the Gulf war, Iraq had several programs to
extend the range of the 300-km-range Scud B
• We are attempting to collect additional
SRBM-:first acquired from the Soviet Union
information regarding the intent of this
in the mid-1970s-and gained experience
procurement effort.
working with liquid-propellant technology.
During the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Iraq
~ The All' Force judges that Iraq
sought a missile with sufficient range to reach
is developing UAVs primarily for
Tehran. Iraqi engineers extended the length
reconnaissance rather than delivery platforms
of the Scud B propellant tanks and reduced
for CBW agents. The capabilities and
the payload mass to produce the 650-kmmissions of Iraq's new UAV remains
range al-Husayn SRBM-successfully flightundetermined. but in this view its small size
strongly suggests a primary role of
tested in 1987 and subsequently deployed
reconnaissance. CBW delivery is an inherent
operationally. By 1988, Iraq was flightcapability of UAVs but probably is not the
testing the 900-km.-range al-Abbas SRBMimpetus for Iraq's recent UAV programs.
developed by further lengthening the
propellant tanks and reducing the payload
mass. The al-Abbas probably was never
~ The Iraqi Ballistic Missile Programdeployed operationally.
Rising from the Ashes
~ Iraq maintains a ballistic missile
[JN£,L In addition to these programs, Iraqi
force and related development program.
engineers were researching several other
SRBM design concepts that involved
• Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM
, - - - -- - ,
clustering Scud and SA-2 encines \
suggest that Saddam retains a covert force
of up to a few dozen Scud-variant
SRBMs, some with ranges up to 650-900
lan.
•

Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and
Ababil-1 00 SRBMs, which are capable of
flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-lan
range limit; Iraq has tested an al-8amoud
variant beyond 150 Jan-perhaps as far as
3oo~anj
1

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

fh \( ~)

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

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Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

~Dll''11
u~L___
... " " ...

_ _ _ _ _

I~F61H'1MY1_
__Jr"

(b)(3)

~ Iraq's Ballistic Missile Force

(b)( 1)
.

:. ;.-;;;;_ ._;-

.

(b)( 1)

we assess this
missile uses the same
engine as the AI
Samoud and Iraq
extented the range by
increasing the amount
of propellant and
lengthening the bum

Me d.

Sea

--

bme.

J~·
,J

Meters

o

--------------------lo

400-......

400~ft

~--------~~--~----~------------__j

15

(b )(3)

10

Range (km)

AIHuuyn

AI Abbas

AISamou~

Ababll·100

650

900

140·180

135-210

(b)( 1)
Propellant

Ltquid

Liquid

Liquid

Solid

type

(b )(3)

53
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,

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(b)(3)

(b)(3)

 C01030196

· --- · - · Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01 030196

(b)(3)
Iraq has begun development of both longerrange liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic
missiles. In January 2002, Iraq flight-tested
an extended-range version of the al-Samoud
that flew beyond the 150-km range limit.

(b)( 1)

~

Iraq also began a solid-propellant
program in the late 1980s to develop a twostage missile-the Badr-20006-in
conjunction with Argentina and Egypt and
had constructed the necessary motor
production and testing infrastructure prior to
the start of the Gulf war. The Badr-2000 had
two variants, one with a range of 750 km, the
other 1,000 km.

~ Post-Gulf War Developments.

Damage sustained during Operation Desert
Storm and the subsequent destruction of
missiles, components, and infrastructure
mandated by the UN brought the Iraqi
ballistic missile program to an abrupt halt
UNSCR 687 imposed a further restriction on
the Iraqi program by prohibiting development
of any missile with a range greater than 150
km. That resolution, however, allowed Iraq
to retain its cadre of missile engineers and
some of its production infrastructure; work
was begun on two systems, the liquidpropellant al-Samoud SRBM and the solidpropellant Ababil-100 SRBM. Both systems
have exceeded the 150-km-range limit
imposed by the UN during flight tests and are
now currently entering Iraq's operational
inventory. These new SRBMs allow Iraq to
target Kuwait City from within its borders.

•

We do not know how many missiles and
launchers Iraq may have retained from its
pre-Gulf war force.

~ Covert BaHistic Missile Force.
Although we have no direct evidence, we
assess-on the basis of significant
discrepancies in accounting to UNSCOM and
Iraq's domestic production capabilities-that
Iraq retains a small force of up to a few dozen
Scud-variant SRBMs in defiance of UN
resolutions, probably the al-Husayn 650-km
SRBM and possibly the al-Abbas 900-km
SRBMs.

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

I

~~ UNSCOM believed that Iraq's
accounting of its unilateral destruction of its
missiles after the Gulf war was seriously
flawed. We are concerned about other
accounting discrepancies as well:

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
~ Since late 2000, Iraq has rebuilt and
continues to expand many facilities, including
those damaged during Operations Desert
Storm and Desert Fox, providing the
infrastructure necessary to develop ballistic
missiles with ranges equal to or greater than
Iraq's pre-Gulf war systems. We assess that
6

~

.

L
1
- - - . . . . _ _ _
-

-

•

-

-

(b)( 1)

Known as the Condor in Argentina and

Vector in Egypt

54
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(b)(3)

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~ SA-2 (AI Samoud) Engine Test

•

Iraq has not accounted for a large number
of Scud missile components-!

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

~Liquid

Propellant Ballistic Missile
Programs
The al-Samoud SRB

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)

UNClASSJFfl:jg

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

Analysis of the al-Samoud
140 to

L__
sugge-st.,-s--.-:
its
op~erational range will be

180 km an~'----------__j
C ]he ai-Samoud has been flight-tested to
ranges in excess of 150 km.

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

55
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(b)( 1)

~ Medium-Range

BaFll,.,.is=tic,_____ ______,
Missile-(MRBM) Development?\

~Extended-range al-Samoud. Iraq is

(b )(3)
' (b)(1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

(b )(3)

developing an extended-range variant of the
al-Samoud SRBM. This system was flighttestec:=:JJanuary 2002 and flew beyond
the 150-km-range limit, perhaps as far as 300

(b)( 1 )

•

(b)( 1)

km

(b)( 1)

•

•

Iraq is nearing completion of a liquidpropellant engine test stand at AI Rafah
that probably will be capable of testin_g_
engines more powerful\

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•
56
Handle vi_,___----,.m~~~ci]:;rnels Jointlv

1

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Approved for Releas.e : 2.01_4(12/09_CQ1030196

(b)(3)
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Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

assess Iraq could static test a new engine
at AI Raf~
I

~North Korean
Assistance. Iraq is seeking assistance from

L _ __ _ _ __

(b)(3)

_J

(b)( 1)

\Iraq in
'---::----:--------=---'\2001

sent~

delegation to P'yongyang:)

~Current Solid-Propellant Ballistic

Missile Programs

0~ We assess that the Ababil-100 can

..
•j

canyl

(b )(3)
(b)(
1)
\-I\ . I

Ito ranges of 135 to

210 Ki:ij)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

!Iraqis
interested in acquiring No Dong MRBMs
from North Korea. Such missiles could
serve as a near-term solution to Iraq's
MRBM requirements as it continues to
work toward developing a domestic
capability.\

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

57
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(b)(3)

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

58
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~OFSEGRE~~----------------~~~~~'OUl

(b)(3)

~UNSCOM Accounting of Iraq•s Scud force

~- UNSCOM confirmed with the Russian Government that the Soviet Union supplied Iraq
with 819 operational Scud missile~
I Out of the 819
missiles. UNSCOM could not verify the destructir of two of the Soviet-supplied Scuds and
were domestically produced and unilaterally
seven Scud-variants tha~
destroyed.

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

•

(b)( 1)

•
•
~

We do not know how many components Iraq was able to retain. and therefore we do not
know how many Scud-variant missiles Iraq possesses.

~ The solid-propellant
infrastructure associated with production of
large motors for the Badr-2000 program was
either destroyed during the Gulf war or
dismantled by UN inspectors.\
however, indicates that

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

previously identifi
as motor cases almost certainly are
eat treatment ovens used in the
production of motor cases.

Ha1ldle

,.;~

59

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nt~h~
· ------------~~~~~L

T~

jNUFOJHU~l...

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196_......,_ _ _ _ _ _......_ _ _ __

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(b)(3)

"t\Q Iraqi Ababll-1 00

~Long-term plans.

Iraq probably will
strive to reestablish its SRBM inventory to
pre-Gulf war numbers, continue developing
and deploying solid-propellant systems.
Baghdad also probably will pursue MRBMs
to keep pace with its neighbors in Iran and
Pakistan. Once its regional security concerns
are being addressed, Iraq is likely to pursue a
first-generation SLV/ICBM, especially if Iran
and Pakistan condpct SLV tests, especially if
Iran and Pakistan conduct SLV tests.

Short-Range Ballistic Missile

•

•

With substantial foreign assistance,
Baghdad could flight-test a domestic
MRBM-liquid- or solid-propellant-by
2006. This also presumes rapid sanctions
erosion and Baghdad' s willingness to risk
detection of developmental steps, such as
static engine testing. by 2004. An MRBM
flight test is likely by 2010.

Although Iraq could attempt before
est a rudimen
lon -range missile
we judge
that Iraq is unlikely to do so. Such an effort
almost certainly would fail. After observing
North Korean missile developments that have
occurred since the Gulf war, Iraq most likely
would pursue a three-stage TD-2 approach to
an SLV or ICBM that would be capable of
delivering a nuclear weapon-sized payload to
the United States. Lacking evidence, we can
only postulate on potential Iraqi ICBM/SLV
concepts and timelines from the beginning of
sanctions relief:

L . . . __ _ _ _ _ _ __

•

_

__)

•

If Iraq could buy a TD-2 from North
Korea, it could have a launch capability
within 12 to 18 months of a purchase.
Iraq currently does not have launch
facilities capable of supporting a TD-2
launch and would have to construct a
launch tower.

•

If it acquired No Dongs from North
Korea, it could test an ICBM within three

~

Once development obstacles are
overcome, and in the absence of sanctions and
UN resolutions prohibiting longer-range
missile development, Iraq could flight-test a
single-stage missile based on the larger
motors within two to five years.

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

60

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for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

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(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

years of acquisition by clustering and
staging the No Dongs-similar to the
concept the AI Abid SLV used with
Scuds.
•

If Iraq bought TD-2 engines, it could test
an ICBM within about five years of the
acquisition.

•

Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong2-type system within about ten years of a
decision to do so.

(U) Payload ~~ons
,NIQ_ Before the Gulf war Iraq

(b)(3)

had weaponized ai-Husayn warheads with
chemical and biological agents, and we
assess that Iraq has retained the capability to
weaponize any of its ballistic missile~

~Iraqi

Nonmissile WMD Threats

~ Nonmissile means of delivering weapons

of mass destruction do not provide the same
prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive
diplomacy associated with ICBMs.
Nevertheless, we are concerned about Iraq's
nonmissile options for delivering·WMD to the
United States. Ships, trucks, airplanes, and
other means may be used. Nonmissile means:

•

•

•

Are less expensive than developing and
producing ICBMs.

•

Can be covertly developed and employed;
the source of the weapon can be masked
in an attempt to evade retaliation .

•

Probably would be more reliable than
ICBMs that have not completed rigorous
testing and validation programs.

•

Probably would be much more accurate
than emerging ICBMs over the next 15
years.

•

Probably would be more effective for
disseminating biological warfare agent
than a ballistic missile.

•

Would avoid missile defenses.

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

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~----------------~

~ Doctrine and WMD Use
~ We have low confidence in our
ability to assess when Saddam would use
WMD. Our assessment of Baghdad's
doctrine for using WMD is drawn largely
from Iraq's battlefield use of chemical
weapons during the Iran-Iraq War in the
1980s.\

chemical weapons in clandestine attacks on
the US Homeland. Saddam's threshold for
using BW-which Baghdad has never
employed-probably is higher than for CW.
~ Iraq's historical use of CW against

Iran and its decision not to use WMD against
Israel or Coalition forces in 1991 indicates
that an opponent's retaliatory capability is a
critical factor in Saddam's decisionmaking.

\

~------____j~Although Iraq launched
•

•

. (b)(1)
(b )(3)

chemical attacks against Iranian military
forces during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war to
compensate for its inferior military
manpower, Baghdad did not target Iranian
civilians with chemical weapons. By
contrast, Saddam ordered chemical attacks
against the Kurdish population in Iraq in
1987-88 in retribution for their wartime
support of the Iranians.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad
integrated CW agents into both offensive
and defensive military operations. By the
end of the war, Baghdad had learned to
use its chemical weapons effectivelywhich it did not do when it initially used
them in 1983-making use of weather
conditions to maximize the effects of the
chemical weapons. An understanding of
how weather affects the use of chemical
weapons would contribute to planning the
successful delivery of biological weapons.

•

Because Iraq has had to keep its WMD
capabilities hidden over the past decade,
we know little about Iraqi WMD
battlefield doctrine today, but we have
some reporting of Saddam's
decisionmaking regarding WMD use.

During the 1988 ''war of the cities" late in
the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad firedc = J
conventionally-armed missiles against
Iranian cities.

(b)( 1)

to the 1990-91 Gulf
~-_

_jSaddam and other senior Iraqi
officials took US warnings seriously and
thought that the United States would use
nuclear weapons in response to Iraqi CBW
use.

~Among WMD,

we judge that
Saddam is more likely to use chemical than
biological weapons on the battlefield. Iraqi
forces are more experienced with chemical
weapons. Chemical-filled munitions probably
are more readily available to forces assigned
contingency WMD missions. Baghdad also
might believe that CW agents would have
more immediate, lethal battlefield impact than
BW agents and would achieve a
psychological impact similar to that of BW on
enemy forces operating inside Iraq, without
the unintended or undesirable consequences.
Iraq is more likely to use biological than

(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

~Continued Restraint Today?

~SJJitft Saddam's restraint a decade ago,

however, is less meaningful in the context of
a US attempt to change the regime. Saddam
did not need to play the WMD card to ensure
his survival during the Gulf war, bu~
I

l ~was

I

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

prepared to do so if the Coalition moved on to
Baghdad. An Iraqi official claimed after the
war that Saddam said he would have used

62
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(b )(3)
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"TOt

. : . .··.' . .: · .:.

SE~IlEij'---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _r6F9R.~UX1

(b)(3)

his WMD capabilities despite US air
attacks would mitigate concerns about a
"use or lose" situation early in a war.

CW if the Coalition had moved north of alAmarah, near the 32nd para11el.
~)

Saddam could conclude that a USled war to overthrow him was inevitable and
decide to use WMD preemptively in an
attempt to disrupt US war preparations and
undermine the poJitical will of the Coalition.
In such a scenario, concentrated Coalition
forces at ports, airfields, bases in Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and
naval forces at sea would present the most
lucrative targets for chemical or biological
attacks. Such use would be in the nature of a
last resort because it would foreclose political
or diplomatic options to end the crisis and
would contradict Iraq's decade of denials that
it had such weapons. It also would run the
risk of strengthening, rather than weakening,
US and international resolve against Saddam.
•

•

Unlike 1990, when Saddam tried explicit
and implicit threats to intimidate his
neighbors to deny support to the United
States, his recent actions suggest the Iraqi
leader believes that the political benefits
of his diplomacy and of keeping Iraq's
CBW capabilities hidden outweigh the
military advantages of early use ofWMD.

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

Once Saddam perceived that collapse of
his regime was imminent, he might try to
inflict a final blow of revenge on his
regional enemies, such as Kuwait, Israel,
any countries hosting US forces, or

•

(b)( 1)

against the US Homeland.

M Saddam's Decisionmaking on WMD
Use

~ Saddam's past actions

~Iraq's

actions over the past year offer
other clues into Saddam's mindset. His
attempts to mend fences with neighbors and
internal opposition groups like the Kurds and
periodic hints of flexibility on the inspections
issue suggest Saddam thinks he can avoid war
by preventing the United States from forming
a coalition.
•

Iraq's methodical conventional defensive
preparations also suggest Saddam thinks
an attack is not imminent and that he will
be able to mount some level of
conventional defense to slow US
operations and provide time for
diplomacy. His past success in preserving
63

Handle

(b)(3)

suggest a decision to use WMD probably
would come when he feels his personal
survival is at stake even after he has
exhausted all political, military, and
diplomatic options, but we are unlikely to
know wizen Saddam reaches that point. We
have examined the full range of potential Iraqi
redlines for WMD use. Weighing the
potential benefits and losses as we think
Saddam would perceive them, we have
looked at the following key decision points
and red lines:

,.;JL__ _ "J'lt)p:sf~lik
EChh~r'an_,_,n""el,_s.::.:lo::..:i::::nt:"..lly_ _ __ _ __ Nmi'Al~rJ.ll::t.__
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
•

•

threaten to use WMD, including against the
US Homeland, to deter US actions.

Against an initial force buildup.
Saddam could conclude that a US-led war
to overthrow him was inevitable and
decide to use WMD preemptively. His
WMD forces would have greater freedom
of action against Coalition forces
concentrated at ports and airfields, but any
attack would end any hope he might have
of rallying international pressure against
the United States. An attack under these
conditions would not require sophisticated
delivery means and Saddam probably
would expect such an action to undermine
the US will to proceed.

~

Command Authority. Saddam
historically has maintained tight control over
the use ofWMD. He probably bas provided
contingency instructions to his commanders
to use CBW on the battlefield under specified
circumstances.

After an initial advance into Iraqi
territory. Iraqi ground forces are capable
of delivering chemical weapons but would
encounter difficulty targeting
maneuvering US ground forces. Again,
early use of WMD would foreclose
Saddam's diplomatic options for stalling a
US advance.

•

As Coalition forces move toward
Baghdad. The likelihood of Iraqi WMD
use would increase as US forces
approached Baghdad. If US forces
advance past major cities toward
Baghdad, Saddam might use persistent
agents to block a Coalition advance or a
non-persistent agent to set up an Iraqi
counterattack.

•

As the regime is about to fall. Saddam

•

Saddam delegated CW release authority to
corps-level commanders in the latter
stages of the Iran-Iraq War, but only after
Iraqi military fortunes were at their lowest
following defeats in 1986.

•

Saddam retained release authority during
the Gulf war. According to a memoir
published by the former commander of
Iraq' s missile forces, Saddam instructed
that chemical warheads would be used
only on his command or "in the event of a
massive strike against Iraq."

--(SI~

Whether or not the forces responsible
for carrying out Saddam' s orders to use
WMD would follow through would hinge
upon the assessment of their commanders of
the consequences of disobeying Saddam's
orders. Saddam' s proven wrath enforced by
omnipresent security officers tends to
motivate obedience early in any crisis, but
officers may grow more reluctant to carry out
these orders if the regime appears on the
verge of collapse. Some senior officers,
particularly those from prominent Sunni
families with a history of loyalty to Saddam,
probably would respond to central authority
until they were convinced the regime is no
longer viable. Fear about the post-war
consequences of participating in WMD
attacks could dissuade military personnel
from carrying out orders.

would use all remaining resources he
perceives would forestall the imminent
collapse of his regime. An attack on
Baghdad might prompt a last-ditch use of
WMD to halt US forces or to inflict a final
blow of revenge on regional enemies or
against the US Homeland.

~ When Saddam perceives that
denying the existence of his WMD programs
is no longer of value, he could publicly
Handle vi~

64

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(b )(3)
(0)(;5}

--~~~--~---------------

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·-- ·Approved for Release: 2014/12/09 C01030196

"Tm'-SEC~L__ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___jfuF61Hl/IJU

i

(b)(3)

~Who Controls WMD Employment?

~ Saddam maintains ultimate control over the use of all WMD. using couriers or other
secure communications to deliver orders to subordinate organizations in charge of these \Veapons
systems. Credible reporting, however, suggests that Saddam's second son Qusay-who is in
charge of the Republican Guard and security apparatus through the SSO-probably would have
wartime authority over all !pilitary matters as well, especially if Saddam was incapacitated or
killed.

~)

Beneath Saddam and Qusay, crisis or wartime C3 nodes that have de facto control over
selected BW weapons and delivery systems include the missile and Republican Guard highcommands, and probably the so-called regional commands. The missile and Republican Guard
commanders probably would have authority over most key units and systems that have a WMDdelivery capability. In a crisis, four to five regional commands, including the Northern,
Southern. Central, and Central Euphrates regional commands. with Baghdad sometimes listed
separately, probably would be reestablished.

~ The regional commands were established in 1990-1991 and again during the Desert Fox
time frame.l
uggests these leaders, trusted cronies who have been given
operational control over at least some of the forces in their respective sectors. are empowered to
act on behalf of Saddam under certain circumstances. A credible body of evidence indicates
that. if the ability of the leadership to communicate with and direct Iraqi forces was severed,
Saddam's regime would implement contingency plans to grant selected commanders or forces
authority to execute one or more possible pre-planned offensive or defensive options; we lack
credible. current reporting about specific plans to use BW, however.

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•

•

•

western Iraq and areas south of Baghdad
would best support Iraq's possible
objectives of attacking Israel or US forces.
•

caught, as well as potential loss of control.
We further assess that the chances of
prepositioning increases as Saddam gets
closer to a confrontation.

We assess Baghdad is staging CBW
munitions and delive systems to areas of

r---~ Preparing/or
~nalEnvironment. Iraq's
attempts to acquire NBC defensive equipment
or knowledge suggest it is preparing to
operate in a contaminated environment. The
military has increased chemical defense
training and distributed defensive equipment

We believe Saddam at this time is
unlikely to have prepositioned CBW
outside Iraq, owing to the increased risk
of detection and consequences if he were

65

TrN~ofln;r;C?.,Ww:o:eu:R;f~~
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Handle l•idl__ _ _

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A

...

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. . . 2014/12/09
..

(b)( 1)

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)
\'t3}.Potentiallnadvertent CBW Release
from US Strikes?

any terrorist group. In addition, Baghdad for
now appears to be drawing a line short of
conducting terrorist attacks with conventional
or CBW against the United States, fearing
that exposure of Iraqi involvement would
provide Washington a stronger cause for
making war.

~ We have difficulty identifying Iraq's

likely CBW facilities owing to Baghdad's
D&D efforts. Iraq took great pains to keep its
CBW capabilities from being damaged during
the Gulf war-partly out of its own fear of
contamination-and we would expect
Baghdad to do the same now.

~ Should Saddam conclude that a USWau;ck designed to destroy his regime
could no longer be deterred, however, he
probably would become much less
constrained in adopting the terrorist actions,
and doubly so once hostilities commenced.
At that point, terrorism against US interestseven with Baghdad's hand apparent-would
become one more weapon in what the Iraqi
leader would depict as a final showdown with
..American and Zionist imperialism." Such
terrorism might involve conventional
means-as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at
a terrorist offensive in 1991-or CBW.

~Even so,

in a concerted air campaign
or in ground action, Coalition action could
result in a release of chemical or·~ftological
agents. Predicting the area of contamination
from such a release would be difficult.
Immediate chemical agent casualties tend to
be within a few kilometers or less of the
release point and bombing. Although they are
affected by sunlight, the greater toxicity of
BW agents can produce casualties many times
more distant from the release point than can
CWagents.

.I

to its units. Iraq is trying to procure
specialized protective gear, such as Geiger
counters, chemical detection kits, NBC
reconnaissance vehicles, and decontamination
svstems.l

M. Covert Acts Employing CBW
past clandestine operations that
we know Iraq to have committed, attempted,
or supported have involved conventional
tactics, and we have no solid evidence that
Iraq has ever provided CBW or materials to

HaJuile vial
L__ _

);hrnels

(b)( 1)

~--------------------------~

~ Saddam would have several options
for conducting terrorist attacks against US
interests. He most likely would rely on Iraqi
Intelligence Service (liS) officers to conduct
terrorist-type attacks. (See Annex B for more
details on the liS and the Special Security
Organization (SSO)).

•

~~~All

(b)(3)

We have scant information on the
Fedayeen Saddam, other than that its
members are trained in terrorist operations
or assassination of Iraqi opposition
members (see box on suicide attacks).

~ In addition, Saddam might, if
sufficiently desperate, decide that only an
organization such as al-Qa'ida-with
worldwide reach and extensive terrorist

(b )(1)

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)

(b)(3)

66
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infrastructure, and already engaged in a lifeor-death struggle against the United Statescould meet his requirements. In such
circumstances, he might decide that the
extreme step of assisting the lslarnist terrorists
in conducting a WMD attack against the
United States would be his last chance to
exact vengeance by taking a large number of
victims with him.
•

~

(b )(3)

general, apparently be has not been averse
to some contacts with the organization.
We have reliable clandestine rerrting
and press sources that:
direct
meetings between senior Iraqi
representatives and top al-Qa'ida
operatives were held between the early
1990s and the present. Several dozen
additional direct or indirect meetings are
attested to by less reliable clandestine and
press sources over the same period.

Although Saddam has not endorsed
al-Qa'ida's overall agenda and has been
suspicious of Islamist movements in

. ·- ··

(b)( 1)

Suicide Attacks

~) Baghdad ha<> claimed publicly to have a suicide capability since creating the Fedayeen

(b)(3)

Saddam as a small, lightly-armed internal security force in October 1994. Fedayeen "suicide
commandos" marched in televised oarades inaugurating the force wearing white robes and wrapped
in explosives. !
Jshowed the Fedayeen involved in a campaign to
recruit and tram su1cide volunteers. Despite generous enlistment incentives, Baghdad had difficulty
in finding volunteers, with some units filling mandated quotas from the prison population.

(b)( 1)

•

In late December 1998, the Feda~een issued several directives defining criteria for suicide
~ Suitable candidates were to be younger than 35,
recruits.J
willing to carry out "senous miSSIOns' nsking death. distance themselves from their families, and
maintain physical fitness.

•

A senior Fedayeen commander directed the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in January 1999
to forward a list of prisoners willing to conduct suicide missions in exchange for their release.

•

The USDAO in Ankara reported that as of late 2000, the Fedayeen had a 520-member special
operations element trained for airborne. underwater demolition. and sabotage operations. This
group reportedly signed an oath to conduct suicide missions if directed by Saddam.

• I

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

Jreported that the Fedayeen had a 150-member suicide unit in 1997.

• I~========~------~!reports concerning the formation of other

(b)( 1)

su1c1de forces mvolvmg explosive-laden boats or pilots trained to crash jet fighters into US
ground or naval forces but have to date not seen any evidence to corroborate any of the reports.

L~

Saddam has thus far used the Fedayeen and other announced suicide forces exclusively as a
propaganda tool. We have never detected a Fedayeen suicide operation.l

I

(b )(3)
(b )(3)

--;----;:J Saddam is capable of recruiting and equipping a suicide urut and
ordering suicide attacks, but whether his orders would be carried out is questionable.

I---.---.----...,.-,C7""""---:---;-----;-

Handle ,.;~

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(b )(3)

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•

trained in Iraq or by haqi trainers
elsewhere, but given al-Qa'ida's interest
over the years in training and expertise
from outside sources, we cannot discount
reports of such training entirely.

L__--oc-~---~ Another dimension of
possible connections between haq and alQa'ida involves the presence in Iraq of
extremists with al-Qa'ida ties. Most of the
reporting on this presence relates to Kurdishinhabited northern Iraq, which Baghdad has
not controlled since 1991. Baghdad
reportedly has had contacts, however, with a
local Kurdish extremist group called Ansar alIslam, which hosts al-Qa'ida members in the
north. An unknown number of al-Qa'ida
associates also have fled during the past six
months to or through other parts of haq.

~ As with much of the information on
the overall relationship, details on training
and support are second-hand or from sources
of varying reliability. The most conspicuous
pattern in the reporting is of al-Qa'ida's
enduring interest in acquiring chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
~ dozen
expertise from IraT. I
reports I
from sources of varying
reliability suggest the involvement of haq or
haqi nationals in al-Qa'ida's CBW efforts.
We cannot determine, however, how many of
these Iraqi nationals were directed by
Baghdad or how many of the reported plans
for CBW training or support were actually
realized.
•

•

•I

•

Detainee Ibn al-8haykh al-Libi-who had
significant responsibility for training-has
told us that Iraq provided unspecified
chemical or biological weapons training
for two al-Qa'ida members beginning in
December 2000. He has claimed,
however, that Iraq never sent any
chemical, biological, or nuclear
substances-or any trainers-to al-Qa'ida
in Afghanistan.

~n July 2002 indicated
that several iriilitants associated with
al-Qa'ida were checking into hotels in
Baghdad and using the haqi capital as a
base for financial transactions and other
activities.

Senior al-Qa'ida planner Abu Mus'ab alZarqawi was in Baghdad unde:or =an,_____ _
assumed identi in mid-2002~'o-~-_J
L__-------~~-.-Jalthough his
current location is

~The presence of al-Qa'ida
militants in Iraq poses many questions. We
do not know to what extent Baghdad may be
actively complicit in this use of its territory
for safehaven and transit. Given the

I

None ofth~
lal-Qa'ida
members captured during Operation
Enduring Freedom report having been

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)

(b )(3)

(b)(3)

{b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
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(b)(3)

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68
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(b)(3)

. ·.

•

••

l

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pervasive presence of Iraq's security
apparatus, al-Qai'da would have difficulty
maintaining an active, long-term presence in
Iraq without alerting the authorities or without
at least their acquiescence.

~Would

Saddam Target the
Dimona Nuclear Facility?

~Iraqi

attacks against neighboring
states might target nuclear facilities, such as
Israel's Dimona reactor. In addition to the
symbolic value of hitting an adversary's
nuclear program, Saddam might hope to
achieve through conventional weapons the
unconventional effect of a release of radiation
from a damaged reactor. Iraq's ability to
conduct effective strikes against such targets
is limited, particularly because of the
inaccuracy of its missiles. The two Al
Husayn missiles that Iraq fired at Dimona
during the Gulf war fell harmlessly in the
Negev Desert.

~National Responses to Iraqi CBW

Attacks

~ Saddam's rhetoric during various
crises since the Gulf war suggests that in a
war against a US-led coalition he would
attempt to strike Israel and GCC states with
any practicable conventional means, including
ballistic missiles, for the same reasons as in
1991: to try to fracture the Coalition and
disrupt US and Coalition rear areas.
•

•

(b )(3)

Saddam is attempting to establish himself
as the leading proponent of the Palestinian
cause and probably would seek to bring
Israel into the war to recast the conflict as
a Zionist-Arab struggle. At the same
time, he may calculate that strikes against
US allies in the region would strike fear
and exacerbate popular resentment against
a US-initiated war.

(b)(1)
(b )(3)

At a minimum, Saddam would issue
veiled threats or attempt a conventional
strike against his GCC neighbors or Israel
in the hopes of provoking such reactions
without having to play his WMD card.

~ Should Baghdad launch CBW

attacks against its neighbors, those states
capable of responding militarily may not
initially retaliate in kind with WMD. The
effectiveness of the Iraqi strikes and the threat
of more attacks-which create pressures to
re-establish deterrence-would drive
decisions on the nature of retaliatory attacks.
Those states not able to retaliate would seek
greater US support to counter the Iraqi threat
while public reactions in the Arab states
probably would be mixed in blaming Iraq and
the United States for the spread of the war.
Handle

a•i~

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

I

I

69
y:-hann
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(b )(3)

(b )(3)
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(b )(3)
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73
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(h\n\

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(b )(3)

@.AnnexA

'(lQ Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
I

I

~We first became aware of Baghdad's aluminum tube procurement effort
with potential centrifuge applications iq
I The effort may have begun as early as
1999 when Iraq attempted to purchase 15,000 seamless tubes with identical dimensions but
unknown alloy or tolerances

(b)(3)
(b)( 1 )

~enial and Deception (D&D) Efforts Suggest Sensitive End Use. Ira
has proven to be an aggressive user of denial and deception techniques. Since earl 2001
attempting to rocure 60,000 aluminwn tubes

(b)(3)
(b)( 1 )

•

According to multiple sources, Iraq has insisted that the tubes be shipped through such
intermediary countries asi
an attempt to conceal the ultimate
end user; such activities are consistent with the long-standing D&D efforts associated with
Iraq's prewar nuclear procurement strategy but are more robust than post-war D&D efforts.

lin

(b)(1)

(b)( 1 )

(b)( 1)

(b)(1)
(b )(3)

74

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,.

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

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.

.

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(b )(3)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

(b)( 1)

•

~Iraq

I

(b)(3)
(b)( 1)

attempted to procure 60,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes in early2001

(b)( 1)

•
•

I

l

J

1rr=]200 1, the shi ment was seized
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was told of the
shipment, inspected it, and informed!
Ithat the tubes could not be sent on to Iraq
because they are controlled by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) dual-use list and
prohibited by United Nations sanctions on Iraq owing to their applicability for gas centrifuge
components.

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

•

We were able to obtain several samples from this shipment and are continuing to test them
for suitability in gas centrifuges.
was halted Ba hdad

rocurement effo

L.......,,----,...,.-----,--..,.-, - - . . . , - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - '·all

(b )(3)
(b)( 1)

attempts have been for at least

60,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes.

Handle ••iaLI---,m~~:q~·f
~c~hannriels Jointly

TOP SEC~

75

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---

(b )(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

•

(b)( 1)

•

(b)( 1)

C)~ Tube Characteristics. G¥ centrifuge experu

~~~~B

tested and evaluated the tubes seize<(
~o detemn·
-:_,ne---:th-eir
;--sw
--:.-t a-:b-;:c
ili:--ty- as
_ ro
_ t_o-rs--:i-n g-as- centrifuges. Most agencies agree that the dimensions, materials, manufacturing tolerances.c=J
I
1a11 indicate that the tubes are suitable for gas centrifuge rotors.

(b)( 1 )

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)

•
• I

Ihave spun an aluminum tube built to the Iraqi specifications for the tubes
s e t z e q i n a laboratory setting to 60,000 rpm (1000Hz). This test was performed
without balancing the tube-a critical step required for full speed operation-but still
provided a rough indication that the tube is suitable as a centrifuge rotor. Testing is being

(b)( 1 )

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

~ Tight Manufacturing Tolerances and Dimensions.
IIraqi front companies attempting to procure aluminum tubes
'----.-h-av_e_r_e-q wre
-..----.
d- - '
I
extremely tight manufacturing tolerances from suppliers. Most agencies assess these tolerances
are indicative of those necessary for gas centrifuge rotors but unnecessary for such conventional
armament as multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). In 2001, Iraq specified roundness tolerancesthe inner and outer diameter-to be plus or minus +/-0.1 mmlL __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

~

(b)( 1)
(b )(3)
(b)(3)

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(b )(3)
I Such tight roundness dimensions are necessary to obtain optimal

c___,
b~
al,..,.an
-c~ing
-,----,o"j<'
f .,...
th,..,.e-r-=ot:-:co-r .,-J
during operation.

•

In addition to the tolerances[
paper!
Iduring shipment. I

l IraQ reQuested that the tubes be wrapped in wax

(b)( 1)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

·;

(b)( 1)

~ The dimensions of the tubes seize~
~e similar to those used in the
Zippe and Beams-type gas centrifuge-declassified designs from the early 1960s that were
instrumental in the early Russian and US centrifuge programs. The inner diameter of the seized
tubes-74.4 mm-nearly matches the tube size used by Zippe and is described in detail in his
unclassified report on centrifuge development. We assess these designs were the basis for Iraq's
prewar centrifuge effort. The length and wall thickness of the seized tubes are similar to Iraq's
prewar Beams design.

I

•

Based on analysis ofZippe's report to the US Atomic Energy Conunission, DOE believes
that the Zippe rotor is 1 mm thick. Tubes with a thickness three times greater than the Zippe
design significantly complicate the design of the lower suspension system.

•

Although the tubes sought by Iraq are Ionger-900 mm-than the declassified Zippe design,
we assess they will be cut to form two centrifuge rotors approximately 400 mm in length.
The IAEA Action Team that acquired and evaluated a tube seize~
~etermined that
cutting the tubes in this manner is viable.

(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

•

Iraq performed internal pressure tests to induce a hoop-stress level similar to that obtained by
an operating rotor.

(b)( 1)

•

77

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,.;~L-~"TiEJP~~ii£Ec~~nannels Joint/\'
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(b)(3)
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(b )(3)
(b)(1)
(b )(3)

(b)( 1)
(b)(3)

L___---o---=---!~ Why Use Aluminum Rotors Now? We assess that Baghdad currently is
pursuing aluminum rotors for its centrifuge program because the centrifuge designs that use
these rotors were the only ones Iraq was successful in building prior to the Gulf war without
extensive assistance from foreign experts. This is a viable option for Baghdad. particularly if
Iraq has had difficulty obtaining access to foreign expertise.
Handle vi~

(b )(3)

78

~h.r=an~n=els~J,=o'=·nt=ly_ __ _ _ _~

L___~-rTOMP~Sii!J!::i:C:IRUF~~

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(O)(;:s}

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(b)(3)
~Comparison

of Rotor Dimensions

Oil
Centrifuge
Rotor

Tubes Seized
1-

Length
Inside diameter
Outside diameter
Wall thickness

651 mm
84mm
96mm
6mm
~ Tllis table is classijied j

•

1ff-

Beams
Centrifuge
Rotor

Zippe
Centrifuge
Rotor

-900mm
69.85mm
76.2mm
3.175mm

279.4-381 nun
68.6-76.3 mm
74.2-81.9 mm
2.8mm

}'F-...

(b)( 1)
(b)( 1)

(b )(3)

Iraq's prewar centrifuge development program focused on two different gas centtifuge
designs in its efforts to enrich uranium. The earliest cennifuge developed by Iraq was based
on the Beams design. This design requires a high-strength aluminum rotor that is
approximately 900 mm long and 3.175 mm thick. Based on information provided by UN
inspectors, we know that Iraq operated an unknown number of oil centrifuges using 7075

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~

These centrifuges,
the Gulf war. are made of maraging steel and have a
greater separation capacity than those made of
aluminum.

~he Zippe unclassified report discusses several centrifuge rotor designs but does not explicitly state the wall
thickness of any of the rotors. Based on the limited documentation, we can infer that Zippe used rotors with wall
thickness that range from 1 mm to approximately 2.8 mm. We know that more advanced Zippe designs used rotors
with I mm thick walls. We do not know what exact wall thickness was used in the early Zippe designs. The rotor
wall thickness for the Beams centrifuge bas also been specified as 6.35 mm.

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~Rocket Motor Application?

D~ Experts at the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) have examined the
possibility that the tubes seize~
!could be used for conventional military systems. In
particular, we have examined whether these tubes are intended for use as rocket motor casings
for Iraq' s Nasser 81 Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL). Most agencies agree with NGIC, the
DoD experts on conventional military s;vstems, that tubes with the specifications--materials and
tolerances-like those seized
~e highly unlikely to be intended for rocket motor cases.
NGIC also concluded that the wall thickness and overall weight would make these particular
tubes poor choices for rocket motor bodies.
•

Tubes of apparently similar dimensions were discovered during IAEA inspections at the
Nasser State Establishment-one of Baghdad's industrial centers-in 1996. The Iraqis
claimed to UN inspectors that the tubes were 7075-T6 aluminum and were used by Iraq for
the Nasser 81 MRL.

•

We have compared th~
!tubes to the US Mark 66 2.75 inch rocket that uses a 7075
aluminum case and found that the tubes Iraq is seeking are much more precisely
manufactured, far exceeding US requirements for such a system. In fact, no US or Russian
manufactured MRL-that we are aware of-uses tubes of the accuracy required for the Iraqi
tubes.

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aluminum rotors. Iraq modified the design slightly by reducing the size of the rotor to 650
mm. This gas centrifuge design was the first indigenously developed by Iraq. Although Iraq
sought outside technical help for the Beams centrifuge program, the technology was
understood by indigenous personnel,

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~

The View of DOE and the National Laboratories on Iraqi Tube Procurement
Efforts and Nuclear Reconstitution

it'S{~ According to recent sensitive reporting, Iraq is continuing in its attempt to

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procure large numbers of seamless, 7075 T6 aluminum alloy tubes. DOE assesses that these
tubes could be modified for use as centrifuge rotors. No successful centrifuge cascade has ever
been built using rotors of the size and material being procured. Technical experts at DOE and
the National Laboratories believe, however, other conventional military uses are more plausible.
The tubes are built of the same material and have the same dimensions as those used by Iraq in
the past to manufacture rocket casings, including the Nassr-81 rocket. In 1996, Iraq declared to
the UN and t.he IAEA an in-country stockpile of over 66,437 such 7075-T6 aluminum alloy
tubes. Regardless of their end use, any Iraqi inventories of such tubes (including new
acquisitions) are required to be declared and subjected to UN/IAEA monitoring under the terms
of existing UN Security Council resolutions.

~ Our centrifuge experts note that the tubes' specifications and the number of
tu~atch what we would expect to see for centrifuge rotors. One possibility is that

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Iraq could modify these tubes, or some portion of the tubes, to make centrifuge rotors. The other
option is that the tubes are intended for some other specialized military application. Because we
observe that the characteristics of these attempted orders align more closely with a previously
observed Iraqi rocket motor casing application, DOE and the National Laboratories assess that
this is the more likely intended end use.
~ More specifically, several technical aspects of the tubes and their handling
seem inconsistent with a gas centrifuge application. First is the reported pressure-testing of the
tubes. Materials intended for use in high-speed rotational equipment, such as centrifuges, would
typically be subjected to a battery of tests, such as spin testing, to determine ultimate tensile
strength, yield strength, metallurgical flaws, and balance. The tests conducted by Iraq have
focused on the dimensional conformity to the specifications and the pressure rating of the tubes.
The tubes were reportedly pressure tested to approximately 150 percent of the design pressure,
which is the industry standard testing procedure. We assess that if Iraq were pressure testing the
tubes to qualify them for use as centrifuge rotors, it would have conducted the pressure test to
failure-a value likely much greater than the 150-percent value-to verify the ultimate tensile
strength of the tubes. Pressure testing is not a known test method for centrifuge rotors.

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~ Another apparent inconsistency is the length. The recent reporting indicates

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that the Iraqis plan to use the tubes in lengths of 900 mm. In order to disguise the tubes, it was
suggested that the tubes be fabricated in lengths of 1,800 mm or 2,700 mm and then to cut them
into two or three pieces once they arrive. A 900-mm long centrifuge rotor with a wall velocity of
350 rnls would operate well above the first flexural critical and possibly above the second
flexural critical. Operating a supercritical one-piece metal rotor with a magnetic suspension was
attempted in the US centrifuge program, as well as various foreign programs. The approach was
abandoned in favor of constructing long metal rotors from short tube sections connected by
tle.xible bellows. We assess that Iraq does not have the engineering capabilities to resolve the
technical issues associated with operating a 900-mm long one-piece metal rotor.
(continued onne.\1 page... )

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(continued... ) (SIINF) The View of DOE and the National Laboratories on Iraqi Tube

Procurement Efforts and Nuclear Reconstitution
~ In contrast, the dimensions of the tubes are consistent with applications to rocket motors
previously declared by Iraq. According to research by DOE and National Laboratory technical
analysts, many conventional rocket motors are approximately 80-85 rom in outer diameter, 900
mm in length, and are composed of high-strength aluminum alloys.
•

The Nassr-81 is made at Nassr State Establishment Iraq has manufactured large numbers of
these 81-mm rockets since the 1980s. When inspected by the IAEA in 1996, the Iraqis bad
sixty-six thousand four hundred and thirty-seven 7075 T6 aluminum tubes with the same
dimensions as the tubes originally sought by Iraq last year. IAEA inspectors reportedly
reviewed this case and determined that the factory was indeed producing rockets for the
Nassr-81. This 81-rom rocket of aluminum construction was declared by Iraq in its 1996
"Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure" on missiles to the UN following the Gulf war.

•

These procurements are being conducted at a security level consistent with much of Iraq's
military and industrial procurement activities, and not at a level that we would expect for
WMD procurements.

~ Furthermore, the reported pressures, stresses, and method of testing are
• consistent with the testing of rocket motor casings. Unlike centrifuges, which develop their
stresses from the high speed of rotation, solid-fuel rocket motors develop stresses from internal
pressure, and hydrostatic testing is typical for rocket motor cases.
•

UNSCOM missile inspectors at Nassr State Establishment noted hydrostatic testing of 81mm rocket motor tubes in progress in 1993.

•

The specification for the 2.75-inch (70-rom, 1.8-mm wall thickness) aluminum motor tube of
the US Mark 66 rocket requires that each item be hydrostatically tested at 183 bar. Based on
the Mark 66 tube dimensions, this test pressure is equivalent to a hoop stress of 349 MPa,
which is close to the 370 :MPa value calculated for the Iraqi pressure test.

•

We have also analyzed a Russian 80-rom air-to-surface missile that has an anodized
aluminum casing similar to this tube (905 rom long, 80 rom in diameter) and assess that a
300-bar hydrostatic test would be consistent as well with the internal design pressure for that
tube.

~ Several other features also appear to track with an intended use in solidfu~ca;~.

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(continued... ) ~ The View of DOE and the National Laboratories on Iraqi Tube

Procurement Efforts and Nuclear Reconstitution
•

The tube wall thickness. The tube wall's thickness does not correspond with what we would
expect to see in centrifuge designs-except possibly a Beams-type centrifuge-it is too thick
for the design we assess that Iraq is most likely to be ~ursuing today, the Zippe design. The
tubes sought earlier by Iraq and intercepteq
have a wall thickness nominally three
times thicker than other known aluminum centrifuge rotors using a Zippe-type suspension.
Although Iraq has experimented with a Beams-type design in the past, it abandoned that
design in favor of the Zippe design, and DOE assesses that a cascade based on a Beams-type
design is not viable. The significantly thicker tube wall substantially increases the mass of
the assembled rotor, with attendant undesirable increases in the load on the bottom bearing
and damping system. Increasing the wall thickness of the aluminum tubes by yet another I
mm just compounds this problem relative to the gas centrifuge end-use. On the other hand,
the tube wall thickness would accommodate internal threaded joints on each end necessary
for a rocket motor application and external machining.

•

Balancing of the tubes. The fact that Iraq appeared more interested in the pressure rating of
the tubes than the ultimate balance of tubes suggests that the end use may not be a centrifuge
rotor.

•

Surj£tce finish of the tubes. Tube samples obtained purportedly were anodized on the outside
mther than the inside. We assess that the requirement for anodization is not necessary-and
is even problematic-for centrifuges. It is well established in open sources that bare
aluminum is resistant to UF6 and anodization is unnecessary for corrosion resistance, either
for the aluminum rotors or for the thousands of feet of aluminum piping in a centrifuge
facility. Instead, anodization would likely introduce uncertainties into the design that would
need to be resolved before a centrifuge could be operated. In contrast. anodization is a
standard practice in missile construction for environmental protection.

•

Qualltity of tubes: The quantity of the tubes Iraq is attempting to procure (60,000 or more) is
inconsistent with its needs. Ten thousand to twenty thousand machines would be capable of
producing sufficient HEU for approximately two weapons annually. The fabrication of
60.000 centrifuges would take well over a decade even if Iraq was able to produce 20
acceptable centrifuges per day, a large number for a proliferant country. This means that a
centrifuge plant incorporating all of these aluminum tubes would not be operational until
well into the next decade.

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('eHNi+ INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
~ Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are, by all indications,

bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnetproduction line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts
involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment-including a variety of machine
tools-and are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed
nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not
clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in
Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.

I

I

INR accepts the DOE technical assessment that the high-strength aluminum tubes
sought by Iraq in recent years are poorly suited for use as centrifuge rotors, and we judge that
they are fully consistent with ordnance casings for Iraa's Slm ''Nasser" multiDle rocket launcher
MRL) system. \

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r------,~~~-.--;---.--.,.,.-,-.-----.-.----.-.,.---,......--__jl Whereas there is a strong

possibility Iraqi nuclear scientists have considered these tubes as centrifuge rotors, many
technical experts assess that the Iraqis should understand the serious drawbacks of these tubes in
terms of centrifuge use.

~As the paper implicitly recognizes, high-strength aluminum is used for tactical
rockets in the US and other countries. Iraq has negotiated relatively low prices for these tubestypically around $15 to $16, and apparently as low as $10 in some instances!
I
t--~-:---:------:--,----;;-~---:c-=:;-----;:-~;---1 Moreover, these tubes clearly have been
used in huge quantities for Iraq's 81 mm MRL system. IAEA inspectors in the mid-1990s
observed virtually identical tubes intended for 81mm rocket casings at an Iraqi rocket production
facility (which UNSCOM visited as well). Plant records indicated that 160,000 of these tubes
were at the site in 1989 and over 60,000 in 1996..

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(continued... ) (l.:J1'N.&O INR's Alternative View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum
Tubes
~ Iraq also has sought aluminum tubes in huge volumesf

\ Finally, operational securitv

practices-j
/-are zmcharacteristica/1\' loose in

I

I terms of Iraqi nuclear procurement. I

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_____________________________

~.AnnexB

W) Inspections, Media, and Cover Stories
[}Nio

A robust. unconstrained inspection regime would hinder over time Iraqi WMD and
longer-range missile development efforts, but inspectors would have difficulty discovering and
slowing all elements of these programs. We assess that inspectors would have only a small
chance of finding significant portions of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program.
•

We can identify a few sites that may be involved in portions of the program
I

•

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•

Moreover, before any inspectors arrive in country, Iraq would hide materials, components,
and documentation
perform other denial and deception operations to thwart inspectors.

•

Although unlikely, the inspectors could fortuitously find something at one of the sites.

and

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~ Missiles~
inspectors to known missile facilities, where they would be
~e t~dentify and monitor large-scale work (research, development. testing) for ballistic
missiles but would be unlike! to discover covert facilities an hidden missiles or widel
dispersed manufacturin .

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I
~ Hiding the Programs. Before offering to allow inspectors back into the country, Iraq
almost certainly developed evasion schemes.

•

Iraq's CW program is hidden within its civilian chemical industry.

•

Baghdad developed mobile BW production units for survivability and to evade detection,
including to evade UNSCOM inspections; the same techniques will be used during these
inspections.

•

Even with the al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles in hand, inspectors would be hard-pressed
to prove that the systems could deliver payloads over the 150 km limit and could not prove
that the al-Samoud had flown over 150 km.

86

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Given the leaks on the differences in the Intelligence Community regarding whether the
aluminum tubes are intended for gas centrifuges rather than rockets, Iraq could mock up--for
the international media-a facility for small rocket manufacture using similar tubes.
Although the tubes themselves are proscribed items, their discovery as rocket casings would
cause Saddam significantly less problems than their discovery as uranium enrichment
centrifuges; he probably would assess that this revelation also could deflect attention from
his pursuit of nuclear weapons.

(S/INI<t- Using the Media. Baghdad's offer in August 2002 to let foreign journalists tour
facilities that historically have been linked to its CBW programs is intended to bolster the cover
provided by such dual-use sites. Tours of ostensibly legitimate facilities reveal few indicators to
untrained observers and reinforce the benign cover stories that mask ongoing CBW activity.

~ As expected on a planned and guided visit, the journalists found no evidence of BW

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activity at the Dawrah Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant orTaji warehouse facilities during
tours in August. Indeed, we now judge that the Taji warehouse appears currently to be used
exclusively to store food vice to store heat-sensitive BW weapons.

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•

•

The Taji warehouse facility was bombed during the Gulf war because of suspicions that it
was a BW storage facility. Baghdad orchestrated the tour on 20 August in response to a US
press report!
/that speculated this facility still was
linked to Iraq's BW program.

•

Iraq allowed reporters to visit the Habbaniyah I facility-also known as Fallujah ID-on 28
August. but no indications of suspected CBW-related production activity were seen.

•

Reporters on 2 September were shown the AI
destroyed durino the Gulf war.

aim uranium extraction facili

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that was

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~AnnexC
~ Iraqi Special Operations Forces and Intelligence

Service
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The National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence
Community's estimative process, incorporating the best avallable
expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the
Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US
Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive
issues for the Community as a whole.
Acting Chairman

Stuart A. Cohen

(703) 482-6724

Vice Chainnan for Evaluation

Mark Lowenthal

(703) 482-7745

Acting Director, Senior Review,
Production, and Analysis

William R. Heaton

(703) 482-8834

Africa

Robert Houdek

(703) 482-7225

At-Large

Stuart A. Cohen

(703) 482-0741

Conventional Military Issues

John Landry

(703)482-7105

East Asia

Arthur Brown

(703) 482-5721

Economics & Global Issues

Karen Monaghan,
Acting

(703) 482-4128

Barry F. Lowenkron

(703) 482-6295

Latin America

Fulton T. Armstrong

(703) 482-3136

Near East and South Asia

Paul Pillar

(703) 482-6833

Russia and Eurasia

GeorgeKolt

(703) 482-6297

Science & Technology

Lawrence Gershwin

(703) 482-6811

Strategic & Nuclear Programs

Robert D Walpole

(703) 482-7424

Warning

Robert Vickers

(703) 482-0993

National Intelligence Officers

.Europe

92
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-_ J

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Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

National Security
Information

Information available as of 1 October 2002 was used in
the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
j,

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
National Imaging and Mapping Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Department of Energy
AJso participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director ofNaval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,
Department of the US Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the
Director of CentraJ Intelligence.

Dluemln•tloa Control
Abbreviations

NOFORN(NF)

Not releasable to foreign uatiooals

REL. ••

This information bas been authorized for r~lease 10..•

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~

All material ou this page'TStl&iassifM.-

I

Copies of this documeDt are avail@le from DCIINIC/NIO/S~

IRe!I!!D IIIIIICCded copies to: CWDCIINICJSNP.C'-------- - ----1

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~~H~~

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