Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 23-PagelD 169 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION ERICA KINSMAN, Plaintiff, - CASE NO. v. Dispositive Motion THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Defendant. MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW Defendant The Florida State University Board of Trustees (?the Board? or by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff?s (?Kinsman?) Complaint under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons more fullyexplained in the incorporated Memorandum of Law, the Board respectfully reduests that the Court dismiss the Complaint. Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 2 of 23 PageID 170 Preliminary Statement and Factual Backgroundl FSU in this case ?nds itself in the unusual and unwelcome position of being adverse to a former student and alleged sexual assault victim, Erica Kinsman. It is critical that the University community have full con?dence in commitment to the safety and well- being of every one of its students. Accordingly, should this-case proceed beyond this Motion to Dismiss, the University looks forward to demonstrating the record of extensive assistance the FSU Victim Advocate Program provided. to Kinsman, most of which she has omitted from her Complaint. But the Court does not need proof of this extensive care for and support of Kinsman to resolve this case: even accepting as true the allegations of the Complaint with no further facts, SU is not liable to Kinsman under. Title IX. Far from being deliberately indifferent to Kinsman, FSU provided her the services of its con?dential Victim Advocate Program within hours of her alleged sexual assault and continuously thereafter, Compl. 53, 61,164, 88, DE. 1, and a University victim advocate informed Kinsman of the school?s student? I disciplinary process, id. ii 61. Title of?cials at learned of Kinsman?s alleged assault by Winston only days before the rest of the world, when the media broke the story of Kinsman-?s allegations in November 2013, which is consistent with her failure to allege that she ever spoke with any FSU of?cial outside of the Victim Advocate Program prior to August" 6, 2014. Id. 101, 129. Regrettably, the media?s reporting of Kinsman?s allegations led to an Internet and social media backlash?harassment that FSU did not cause, in an environment that SU could-not control. Id. 112?13. Kinsman left the University FSU accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true solely for purposes of the Motion. Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 3 of 23-PagelD 171 when the news broke. Id. .1113. At the same time, the State Attorney for Tallahassee conducted an investigation that resulted in a decision in December 2013 not to charge Winston. Id. il114. Having waited for the law enforcement investigation to conclude, FSU reviewed the record from that investigation, attempted unsuccessfully to interview Winston, and reached its own conclusion that the record did not support student-disciplinary charges at that time. Id. 118?20. After a great deal of correspondence between Kinsman?s attorneys and the University, id. 122~26, Kinsman gave a Title IX interview in August 2014, id. ii 129. FSU then convened an investigative hearing, presided over by retired Florida Supreme Court Justice Major Harding, which included live testimony from Kinsman and Winston. Id. 'll 135. Justice Harding concluded that the preponderance of the evidence did not support a finding that Winston had assaulted Kinsman. Id. Nothing about handling of this matter Was unreasonable?much less clearly unreasonable, which Kinsman must prove to survive this Motion to Dismiss. Kinsman?s'Complaint is remarkable in many ways. She does not allege identifying I Winston as her assailant to anyone at SU other than her con?dential victim advocate before the media broke the story of her alleged assault, causing her to leave the University. She does not allege that FSU denied her a single request for remedial action. And?having seen her claims of an assaUlt rejected by both the State Attorney and a University-appointed hearing of?cer?she seeks from this Court a third bite at the apple, essentially asking this Court to serve as a student-disciplinary appeal board. When her Complaint is stripped of its rhetorical ?ourish and legal conclusions, its failure to allege that deliberate Case Document 35 Filed 03l09/15 Page 4 of 23 PagelD 172 indifference caused her any harassment is clear, so Kinsman?s Complaint should be dismissed. MEMORANDUM OF LAW Standard of Review Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure a court must dismissa complaint whenever the plaintiff fails ?to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.? Fed. R. Civ. P. To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must ?state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.? Bell Art. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Thus, ?a complaint must present suf?cient factual matter, accepted as true, to ?raise a right to relief I above the speculative level.? Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc, 744 F.3d-702, 708 (1 1th Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although a court must accept well-pled allegations as true at this stage, a court should not accept as true legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Ashcro?? v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.-662, 678 (2009). Moreover, a court must read the complaint ?as a whole,? without ?pars[ing] and read[ing] in isolation the allegations in the complaint.? Rosky ex rel. Wellcare Health Plans, I Inc. v. Farha, No. 2009 WL 3853592, at *2 (MD. Fla. Mar. 30, 2009) Title IX provides, ?No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene?ts of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal ?nancial assistance.? 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). Sexual harassment is ?discrimination? in the schOol context under Title IX, which Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 5 of 23 PageID 173 allows recovery of money damages for student-on-student harassment ?in certain narrow circumstances.? Williams v. Bd. ofRegenis of Univ._ Sys. of Ga, 477 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th I Cir. 2007); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). Ina student-on-student sexual harassment case, a plaintiff must prove foUr elements. irsi, the defendant must be a Title IX'funding recipient. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1293. . This element is undisputedly satis?ed in this case. Second, an appropriate school official must have actual knowledge of the harassment. Id. Because Title IX requires this actual knowledge be of ?knownIstudent-on-student harassment in its schools,? this standard necessarily requires that the school of?cial must know that both the Victim and the alleged assailant are students. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added). Otherwise, the school of?cial could not possibly know of ?student?on- studeni harassment.? Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the actual knowledge must belong to an f?appropriate person,? who is, ?at a minimum, an of?cial of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.? Williams, 477 F.3d at 1293 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)). In other words, ?the official with notice of the harassment must be ?high enough up the chain?of-command that his acts constitute an of?cial decision by the school district itself not to remedy the misconduct.? Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cray, Fla, 604 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Floyd v. Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264, 1264 (11th Cir. 1999)). Third, the defendant must have acted with ?deliberate indifference? to known acts of harassment. Deliberate indifference ?is an exacting standard.? Id. at 1259'. It is met ?only Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 6 of 23-PagelD 174 where the. recipient?s response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.? Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Or another way, it-rcquires a plaintiff to show ?an official decision by the. recipient not to remedy the violation.? Gebser, 5.24 U.S. at 290; see also Murrell v. Sch. Dist. N0. 1, Denver, Colo, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999) (?That standard makes a school district liable only where it has made a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination in its programs . . . Deliberate indifference is therefore a high bar?wnegligence or gross negligence falls far short-of it. See, I v. Indian River Crity. Hosp. Dist, 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir. 2012); Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2001). Importantly, this deliberate indifference must subject the plaintiff to further harassment. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. Thus, ?a Title IX plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage must allege that the Title IX recipient?s indifference to the initial discrimination subjected-the plaintiff to further discrimination.? Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296; see also Hill v. Madison Cary. Sch. Bd, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (ND. Ala. 2013) must .be the deliberate indifference of the [school]. that is the causation of the harassment suffered by the victim?). - Fourih, the discrimination must-have been ?so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim?s access to an educational opportunity or bene?t.? Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. Put differently, the discrimination must ?be? serious enough to have the systemic e?eci of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity.? Id. at 652 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has cautioned that courts in Title IX student?on-student sexual harassment cases ?should refrain from second-guessing the decisions of school Case Document 35 Filed 03/09/15 Page 7 of 23 PageID 175 administrators.? Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. The Court also stressed that Title IX does not give victims of peer harassment ?the right to mal