REPORT

COLUMBIA BUILDING AND SITE PROJECT
COST AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

00494427.1

Summarv of Findings
We were engaged to

o

Review the report of City Auditor LaVonne Griffin-Valade on the Columbia Building
issued October 2014;
Conduct an investigation;
Detennine whether there is evidence that laws, rules, and ethical guidelines were
violated; and
Provide an analysis of the project management decisions so as to facilitate the
development of future "best practices."

.
o
.
'We

found no evidence that funds were misappropriated, misdirected or mishandled (with the sole
exception of the pass-through payment to the designer discussed in more detail below). We also
found no evidence that caused us to question the motivations of the BES staff. While there is
considerable legitimate debate about BES decisions and judgment calls and whether the right
choices were made, we saw evidence that the BES staff tried to make the best choices for the city
and the ratepayers and we were impressed with their skill level.

Our review, however, identified practices and decisions that contributed to the controversy and
which we believe should be evaluated by the city in its ongoing discussions about best practices
in managingcapital projects of this magnitude. Those are:

o

The apparent circumvention

o
.
o
.
o

paynent.
Working with alarge capital budget without a project budget.
Using "design-first" project management.
Attitude towards procurement requirements.
Insufficient oversight of discretionary choices.
Permitting a possible conflict of interest to exist.

of a Commissioner's directive through a pass-through

Our review is detailed below

Introduction and Background
The Office of the City Auditor was asked to conduct an audit of the BES Columbia Building due
to concern about appropriate levels of project oversight; the audit concludes that city managers
were remiss in not providing appropriate levels of vigilance, transparency and stewardship. The
audit describes why the building project was necessary in the first place, that the cost was $ 1 1.5
million (three times the early budget estimates provided to City Council), and that BES expanded
the scope, made discretionary design choices, and provided ineffective oversight of the design
phase. The report summarizes:

A recently completed Bureau of Environmental Services (BES) project to design
and build an office building and make other improvements at the City's

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 wastewater treatment plant cost ratepayers $1 1.5 million - more than three times
the $3.2 million budgeted in 2010. We conducted this audit to determine why
costs for the office building project increased, and to recommend improvements
aimed at preventing future capital project overruns of this magnitude.

We found that two main factors caused the costs for this offrce building project to
increase dramatically above initial estimates. First, design choices and additions
to the scope made after City Council gave the go-ahead were more costly to
design and construct than originally planned. Second, weaknesses in oversight
during the design stage resulted in additional costs. In addition, a philosophy of
striving to be a model of sustainability at the City and BES turned the project into
an educational "showcase" of values. This resulted in a more elaborate,
architecturally unique and complex project than originally conceived in the capital
budgeting process and agreed to by Council.

We recommend specific ways for BES to improve design choices and design
oversight and control. While these recommendations address issues we observed
on this project, City Council should consider adapting them to capital project
design management citywide.

Our task was not to repeat the audit, which was thoroughly done, but rather to consider its
'We
implications.
reviewed project documents and spoke with a number of BES employees, and
also reviewed the Auditor's working papers. Dean Marriott was represented by counsel and all
communications with him were through or in the presence of counsel. This report and
conciusion of our work was slightly delayed by time necessarily spent by his attorneys reviewing
source documents. Mr. Marriott had announced his resignation from the City before we were
able to meet with him, and we received follow up communication from his attorneys expressing
his views on the project as well. A copy of that communication has been provided to the City.
We conducted in-person interviews with key BES staff in addition to Mr. Marriott, including
Susan Aldrich, Blair Bean, Steve Behrrrdt, Megan Callahan, James Hagerman, Megan Hanson,
Scott Gibson, and William Ryan. We also attempted to speak with James Bowen, presently
employed at Skylab, but he declined. We did, however, speak with key staff of Skylab in the
presence of Skylab's counsel. Additionally, we met with Kelly Edwards, a principal with
Scoft   Edwards Architecture, who had attended a pre-proposal meeting on the project.

We believe that the Bureau's history in managing capital projects is relevant information. We
were advised that during the most recent three fiscal years, BES has completed one hundred
other capital improvement projects which, on average, have exceeded budgets by less than 2%o.
Some of these have been relatively modest (cost under $2,000). Only four of these projects
exceeded $10,000,000. The Columbia Building was the only office building project;l however,
BES projects have from time to time included buildings such as pump stations. BES follows
Bureau protocols for its project management.

1

Budget to actuals for FY 12-14 completed projects, supplied by Jim Blackwood.

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 DISCUSSION
Needfor

a

permanent structure

reason to debate whether a pennanent structure was a needed
improvement, and BES employees we spoke to were unanimous in describing that as a legitimate
business need. Employees had been working in aging trailers that had long outlived their useful
lives. They were described as moldy and leaking2 and there were safety concems related to the
decking. There were questions related to the number of employees to be housed at the site, but
in our view an appropriate decision had been made to locate engineering staff working at the
plant at that location. At a minimum this beneficially affected the efficiency of their work. The
trailers had been intended to be temporary in any event. It is our view that BES properly
considered the altematives (replacement with newer trailers, relocating the employees, building a
pennanent structure) and made a reasoned decision that a permanent structure would be the best
of the choices.

In our view, there is little

There were certain minimum requirements for the building set by the city. The city has a Green
Building Policy, BCP-ENB-9.01, which requires the city to incorporate green building practices
into the design, construction, remodeling and operation of city-owned facilities and requires that
all new, occupied city-owned facilities register and certify for LEED gold level and have an
ecoroof covering at least 10o/o of the roof. Responsibility for incorporating the policy is imposed
on each bureau. Here, the Bureau also sought community involvement and incorporated features
desired by the community.

Preliminary and "optimal confidence" cost estimates

Initial project cost was based on a very preliminary per-employee calculation. That initial early
estimate followed the project and colored the public perception of the project cost. In our view,
any analysis of the project should make clear that the initial preliminary estimate was just that.
The analysis should focus on how the project developed over time.
The project shows as "opened" on February 15,2010. City Ordinance No. 185171 authorizes the
construction of a plant support facility at an estimated cost of $5,400,000, at an "Optimal
Confidence" level. We agree with the many BES staff who told us that the initial preliminary
estimate was not a valid benchmark. The $5,400,000 figure is, however, a proper benchmark.

In a summary which Mr. Marriott

prepared

for the auditors (dated May 13, 2014), he

summarized the project cost as follows:
o

Original construction budget for building and improvements on the surrounding {ive
acres - $6.7 million.

a

Final construction - $7.7 million (including construction process change orders).

'cc-r,4-2
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 Building cost - $5.5 million ($366/sq ft "using guidance from the American Institute of
Architects").'

- 52.2 million.

a

Site work and improvements

a

Additional costs raised the total to $11.4 for entire project (this would be an additional
$3.7 million): relocation of staff, engineering, design, permitting, land use review and
approval, inspections, equipment, fuiniture.a

A

summary provided by BES5 states that the construction contract initially went to bid at
$5,400,000, with four bids received. Approximately 3-Il2 months later, the city executed a
contract (Contract No. 30002705) with Skanska for $6,695,000. The change orders increased the
cost to $7.7 million or by I5o/o and included excavation, utility work, pond and parking lot work,
access control, foundation for public art, fall protection for ecoroof, and smaller changes to
design. BES identified that the change orders were for necessary improvements that would be
more cost effective under this contract.
BES prepares annual reports on its capital projects. For fiscal year 2012-13 the published report6
listed the building project at a revised budget of $4,000,000 with expenditures through 7123/2013
of $7,585,877.

The city has two systems from which costs can be gathered. One, in use internally at BES,
tracks hard costs. The city, separately, has its own accounting system which adds additional soft
costs (debt load, interest, and so on). Those will necessarily differ.

Audit source documentation identifies the reasons for the increases in the cost of the project and
how they were handled during the project; these include the costs of the building itself as well as
additional work that was added to the overall project to address "campus" issues.

In our view there was insufficient clarity whether the $5,400,000 figure was to be the building
alone, or was to be the building with all site improvements. Ordinance No. 185171 suggests that
the cost estimate was intended to be inclusive of site improvements. The Ordinance's findings
state in pertinent partthat "constructing a new facility has been determined to be a long term cost
effective solution and the project provides site improvements beneficial to site function, site
security, pedestrian safety, sustainable site design, and enhanced staff and public open
space." (emphasis supplied). We consider this to be an important consideration for future
projects. During our discussions with BES staff, we were told that the view of the Columbia
Building and related projects did not exemplify cost ovemrns so much as it resulted from an
increase in project scope, with the additional cost attributed to the increased scope more so than
In a May 16, 2Ol4 memorandum to Beth 'Woodward, Mariott identifies the enclosed work and visitor area at
11,490 square feet and the outdoor covered area as 4690 square feet. His calculations added half of the exterior
covered areas to the covered areas (per AIA guidance) as well as 1711 sq ft of mechanicalmezzanines (attics with
3

equipment) providing a total by his calculation of 15012 square feet
A separate BES document identifies "other project costs" at $0.8 million, furniture and equipment at $0.4 million,
but adds other categories to account for the $3.7 million including $1.4 million for Skylab project design
s
l1:ay 2,2014 email from Sara Gardner to Beth Vy'oodward.
ó
Posted at the BES website, @p.9.
a

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 the building itself. However, a reading of Ordinance No. 185171 does not fully support that
view, describing as it does a "project" that would address the site improvements. This
observation should not be taken as a suggestion that the site improvements were unnecessary;
rather it is intended to point out that given the way the project was proposed it is not surprising to
us that there has been widespread public perception that the $5,400,000 estimate was intended to
be for the entire project, not just for the building.
Impact of community involvement
Some of the cost of the project resulted from features identified during community involvement

meetings, which appear to have been limited to individual focus groups. Community
involvement is desirable and is a normal and customary process and BES has a "Good Neighbor"
policy. A community meeting room was added to the design. Several BES employees advised
us that they believed that the benefits from the building design could not be determined until the
'We
believe the same is true of the value of the
building had been in operation for some time.
community room. It is not clear to us just how much this feature added to the building cost but it
is likely a meaningful amount since it included not just the square footage of the space itself but
the need to configure building security differently. Mr. Marriott's position statement agrees that
eliminating the community room would have saved "a substantial amount of money." It is also
not ciear to us whether this feature should have been considered necessary or desirable. BES
employees might use the meeting space in the future, but we did not hear that there was a
pressing need for such a large meeting space. In our view, future projects would benefit from a
more critical review of whether to include community-proposed features than appears to have
occurred here.

Mr. Marriott's position letter advises that although there were individual focus groups,

the
general public was not engaged prior to the approval of the design; he suggests more robust
public involvement. We are in partial support of this suggestion. The City does considerable
work with limited resources, and adding an involved process for its usual and customary work
might strain City resources. 'We do recommend, however, that projects that are plainly a
departure from usual and customary work should be preceded by more public involvement than
occurred here. In the case of the Columbia Building, the design is innovative and unusual, and
the project has resulted in a firestorm of criticism which may or may not be merited. A broader
vetting would likely have been beneficial.
Design selection and complexity
The selection of the design brought inherent complexity to the building project, and increased the
cost as well as the difficulty of construction; one bidder backed out of the project because it
believed it could not honor its bid. There is, we believe, agreement amongst virtually all BES
staff members that BES could have built a utilitarian structure. The design selection was not a
requirement but rather a conscious choice by BES. Mr. Marriott's position statement to us
agrees that BES could have built a cheaper structure but at the cost of functionality and a loss of
the value of the aesthetic design. We also heard from BES staff that the design selection was
desirable because Portland lacks so-called statement or iconic buildings, and because the design
builds in new ways of collaborative working, the benefits of which are yet to be seen. In our

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 view these are proper considerations for larger city-wide public discussion, but here we saw
evidence that BES was caught up in the excitement of the design phase, the "story-telling" that
such a building might present, the aesthetics of the design in this industrial neighborhood, the
kinds of designs in other similar locations in other communities, and the fact that it will be a
"100 year building" rather than something less. We believe those appropriate considerations
should really have been discussed in alarger body than just BES (much the same way the City's
green building policy was). Instead, what occurred was basically the selection of an exciting
design as an early step in the building process. Having a clear idea and a firm budget before
selecting a design would have helped constrain the cost of this project.

Additionally, it does not appear that much input from BES Construction Seruices was sought in
the selection of the design, with construction services admittedly not getting to pick what they
have to build. In our view, those staffers would likely have valuable input, and consulting them
in the selection process might have identified some of the issues that would later be costly such
as managing the conflict that developed between the designer and contractor which required
increased management time on the part of BES staff.
Increase in project scope.

BES views the initial cost estimate as relating to the building, whereas the increase over the
estimate was largely related to substantial site improvements. BES reportsT that the "project
scope grew with better understanding of site needs and desire to make the buildings as
multifunctional as possible."
The expansion of the scope greatly increased the originally contemplated cost but identified
many areas which were concerns that would have to be addressed at some point or necessary
repairs. Every proposal showed an opportunity to reconfigure the site for better use. Those
included the entry road, security, and additional changes to a multi-acre facility. We did not find
any ofthese to be unnecessary.
The road, which had previously been built had been initially used to bring concrete onto site for
the digester project, was in bad condition and repair was needed. It made sense to do the repairs
at the same time as the building project because staff were housed elsewhere. Reconfiguring the
entrance was a necessary safety move which offered protection to pedestrian traffic within the
plant; previously traffic entered the site on normal business by driving into the middle of the
facility where employee traffic led to unnecessary hazards; The pond lining was leaking and
repairs were needed. Although safety considerations added to the project cost, we did not find
them to be unnecessary add-ons. The campus is large and safety considerations are not trivial.
BES has two elemental chlorine tanks on the property; these are explosive. The site houses a
fueling station used by police. In addition to the possibility of intruders, before the included spur
road was built, employees had to drive down railroad tracks to access a portion of the site.

We heard a number of complaints about the City's procurement process. The perceived
inefficiencies and delays inherent in procurement were cited to us as reasons for expanding the
scope of the project rather than bidding the site work as a separate project. In hindsight, doing so
7

CIP Annual Repofi, fisca 2012-13 al.p.25

0049442'7.1

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 might have been a benefit to BES for this project since it would have led to a greater public
understanding of where the funds were being spent. We are concerned, however, about the
widespread belief that procurement processes are an impediment to efficient capital project
work.
Imp act of undiffer enti at e d bud g et.

City Council receives a five year budget from BES, Council approves the budget on one year
increments leaving BES free to modify but also to shift money around in the budget year
approved. Accountability is for the bottom line. That means that BES has a large capital budget
without a project budget; the large undifferentiated budget allows the Bureau to move projects
and expenses around and, in this case, permitted the site improvements to be "added" to the
building project. The Bureau budgeting process is a rolling five year plan, with annual approved
budgets. BES is not, however, constrained by its own work plan and has substantial autonomy to
move projects around. The fact that the BES has an undifferentiated budget without specific
project budgets in some ways peÍnitted it to make the decision to add the site improvements
which were largely responsible for what is viewed as the "ovemrns" in cost. That raises the
question whether this process needs to be changed.
Our review does not persuade us that what happened with this project compels a different form
of Bureau budgeting. Undoubtedly future capital projects will have to be shifted for emergency
purposes and there is inevitable tension between allowing the Bureau to make decisions on the
one hand, or requiring a Commissioner or City Council to make them on the other hand. It
appears that the undifferentiated budget has functioned well over a number of years, with this
project as more of an outlier. What appears to us to be the more compelling need is the
transparency referenced by the Auditor. Here, a more precise description of the project, coupled
with more precise reporting of the changes to the project scope would have contributed to a
greater public understanding of where ratepayer funds were being spent.
P as s - thr ough des i gn p ayments

The design and construction required ongoing design work from Skylab so that the design cost
substantially exceeded the amount budgeted for design. BES continued to request, permit or
authorize design work as needed. Although it was evident that the funds approved for design
work would be insufficient to fund Skylab's ongoing selices, BES believed that it was essential
for Skylab to remain involved and work closely with general contractor Skanska, particularly to
resolve issues with the curtain wall. Hiring a different entity to address these issues would have
been more expensive than continuing with Skylab, and not having completed design work could
have led to the intemrption or suspension of construction.

At the time of the fourth amendment, Commissioner Saltzman directed that BES not bring him
any more amendments. That statement, in our view, was a way of instructing that there be no
additional design costs on the building, and that was the way the statement was understood by
BES staff (who viewed it as an "edict"). Mr. Marriott, who had a long working relationship with
the Commissioner Saltzman, explained to us he did not believe the intent of this statement was to

00494421.1

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 forbid additional design costs. In any event, however, it presented a concern about whether to,
and how to, complete the building.
BES staff told us, and we believe it is correct, that completing the building would require the
City to pay additional design costs. The City was not in a position to hire a different designer
since that would involve considerable re-work on the design and ultimately cost much more. If
the Commissioner's statement was intended as an "edrct" BES staff worried that it was a bad
decision. We could not identify any additional effort to clarify with Commissioner Saltzman
what the statement meant and we saw no additional effort to explain the Bureau's concerns. We
could not identify a proper avenue to address this dilemma. What we saw, however, was that
BES permitted Skylab to continue the design work. Mr. Marriott reported he had heard that
Skylab was invested in the project and doing work for which it would not be paid, but it also
appears that BES staff considered it to be professionally "embarassing" that Skylab was not
being paid.

Ultimately the resolution was to do a final wrap-up negotiation which resulted in Skylab being
paid a negotiated amount for design by way of a pass-through, with payment to Skylab from
Skanska and a reimbursement to Skanska from the construction budget.
BES analyzed that Skanska was contractually responsible for a part of the additional design costs
related to the curtain wail, and reached an agreement with Skanska in October 2013 that resulted
in a payment to Skylab by Skanska of 534,222.00. Mr. Bean negotiated the agreement as the
best deal the city could reach with Skanska. That palnnent left a sizeable sum still owing to
Skylab for design services.s Skylab had agreed it would accept $95,581.06 as final design
compensation. With Skanska's payment of its agreed-upon share, that left $61,359.00 still
owing to Skylab. We did not find any evidence to suggest that the design work was not
performed and we did not find any evidence to suggest that the design work was unnecessary.
The charges are reflected in invoices and change orders. BES had, however, incurred the
expense without authority. Specifically it had permitted design work to proceed when the design
budget was exhausted and ultimately ananged for payrnent from the construction budget by
means of a pass-through. Skanska paid Skylab the additional amounts as a 'ïendor invoice" and
was reimbursed by the city through a change order.e Mr. Bean, who was not the decisionmaker,
summarized as a recap:

We received management approval to disperse [sic] the design services costs rn
question into other change orders that were cumently drafted and contained design
services by Skylab associated with them during the period of time we were
notified they were providing services without payment.l0

t The total amount owing to Skylab at the time of these negotiations is not entirely clear. Blair Bean memoriahzed
in a memorandum to Mark Hutchinson that Skylab was owed an additional $114,656 at the time it agreed to accept a
lower amount from the City. However the same memorandum notes that in August 2013 fhe total amount owed to
Skylab for additional design services was $137,821.
e
The work is memorialized in Change Orders Nos. 34, 35,54,13,18,80, 81, 82 and 84. Change Order 85 reflects
the negotiated agreement.

l0

We spoke to Bean who said the payment was authorized by "a manager" but that he did not know who the

managef was.

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 If the Commissioner Saltzman

had intended that there be no fuither design payments (which is
BES
our understanding), then
believed that it had the authority to do what it considered the
"right thing" to ensure payment to Skylab in a way that appears to be subterfuge. We would
point out that although given the options at this time proceeding to fund additional design costs
may have been the reasonable option, in city government that is a decision that should not have
'We
been made after the fact within and by a bureau.
also would acknowledge the possibility for
a contrary interpretation of the Commissioner's direction - though we would note that a contrary
interpretation would not, in our view, have required that the payment to Skylab be made by the
pass-through. It could have been made directly. At a minimum, this method of paying Skylab
appears improper and has had a negative impact on the general public's vìew of how this project
and its expenses were handled. We agree with the Auditor's comments about the need for
greater transparency and recommend that future projects reinforce the idea that the public should
never have to work so hard to trace where the money went. In spite of having working papers
available and speaking to witnesses, we found it difficult to trace the decision-making for the
final true-up payment, and Mr. Marriott advised us that he was aware that loose ends had been
tied up but was not specifically advised of how that had occurred, except that he "understood"
normal practices had been followed.

We also recommend that there be at least some discussion about how to address problems such
as this where an apparent directive by a responsible official appears to conflict with a Bureau's
statement that there is a legitimate need.
Additionally, BES did not request reimbursement for errors in design from Skylab (although it
may be that these effors and their related costs washed out in the negotiations that led up to
change order 85). This was a conscious choice motivated by a desire to keep the project moving
forward and finding solutions, rather than initiate adversarial discussions or create the need for
rneetings. We believe that it would be appropriate to detennine whether a staff level is the
appropriate level to make choices such as this.
Conflict of interest.

The contract with Skylab included a standard conflict of interest provision restricting Skylab
from hiring certain City staff. BES elected to permit Mr. Bowen to take a position with Skylab.
In doing so, BES did not confer with the City Attomey, and no waiver was confirmed in writing.
Mr. Bowen was a temporary, limited pu{pose employee of the city. He was assigned
responsibiiities on the building project, including as a proposal evaluator, and then serued as
project manager on the design side.rr Mr. Bowen disclosed his discussions with Skylab to BES
management, who arranged for him to have no signing authority once he was working for
Skylab, at a time that he was also working for the City. For its par1, Skylab confirms that it took
care to ensure that Mr. Bowen was assigned projects different form the Columbia Building.

It does not appear to us that either Mr. Bowen or Skylab behaved improperly with respect to his
employment. We were not made aware of any decision that Mr. Bowen made regarding the
construction or any funding decisions. At issue, however, is how BES managed the contract
provision and Mr. Bowen's dual employment once a waiver was provided and the concern of a
tt cc-r,r5-2.

00494427.1

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 possibility of a conflict of interest. There is at least one email communication directing that he is
to be "involved in the decision making process" for the city during a period of time that Ms.
Aldrich would be absent, and the apparent subject matter of the email was the need to ensure that
Skylab received its delayed design payments. See Aldrich email to Bean, September 25,2013.
We believe that BES should not have handled Mr. Bowen's request in this manner. Certainly the
contract clause was to protect the City and could therefore be u'aived by the City, but in our view
such a waiver should have been discussed with the City Attorney, confirmed in writing, and
should not have been followed by a suggestion that the employee would be placed in a decisionmaking loop during a time he held dual employment.
Summarv of Recommendations
1

At the outset of

capital projects, the Bureau shculd prepare and submit to the
Commissioner in charge of the Bureau both a preliminary initial project anticipated cost
and a detailed description of the anticipated final scope of the project. In addition, the
Bureau should provide the controlling entity with its best estimate of possible viable
additions necessary or desired additions to that scope immediately upon determining their
viability.

2

The Bureau should provide to the Commissioner in charge of the Bureau a detailed report
of all requested additions to the scope of a project prior to undertaking the
implementation of the additions. It is recommended that those requested or necessary
additions to the scope be put into a separate memorandum to the Commissioner which
clearly is designated as a "Scope Enlargement" request.

J

The Bureau should present both a clear statement of the scope of the project and a firm
budget estimate based on the scope of the project before proceeding with the selection of
a design.

4

The Council, or at a minimum the Commissioner in charge of the Bureau, should engage
in a detailed and critical review of community proposed features, including the estimated
cost, expected impact on the community, availability of similar features elsewhere in the
Bureau or City, and the relationship between the proposed feature and the initial
designated scope ofthe project.

5

In situations where projects are a departure from the usual and customary work of the
Bureau, the project should be preceded by an enhanced effort to obtain public
involvement.

6

BES Construction Services should be consulted about and involved with the
detennination of the scope of a project, selection of a design, and construction
management.

1

A

of communication guidelines between the BES Director and the
Commissioner in charge of the Bureau should be established. In parlicular, a
clear set

communication format should be adopted designed to highlight significant changes in the

00494427.1

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 budgetary requirements of a project, and cumulative cost of the
changes or anticipated changes to the project to that date and anticipated in the future. A
complete transparency in reporling to the Commissioner should be a requirement at every
stage of the project.
scope

8.

of a project,

The procurement processes should be examined to ensure that they are adequately
protecting the City and at the same time allowing for the efficient and cost effective
completion of projects.

9

The transparency points referenced by the City Auditor at several points in the City
Auditor's Report should be adopted and implemented immediately. The understanding
of the project scope and the project requirements will be enhanced for the Commissioner
in charge of the Bureau, the City Council, and the greater public.

10

The Commissioner in charge of the Bureau and the senior staff of the Bureau should
develop a structure that allows for the exploration of differences and conflicts regarding
whether expenditures should be or can be incurred on a designated project or in the
completion of items that are a part of an expanded scope. In particular, in any
circumstance where there is any question or concefiì about a spending directive of the
Commissioner in charge of the Bureau or the City Council, that expenditure should not
be undertaken or incurred without a full vetting of the difference or conflict and a revised
directive by the Commissioner.

11

All waivers of a conflict of interest provision in a contract should be discussed with the
City Attorney, confirmed in writin5, and monitored.
Respectfully submitted,

BARRAN LIEBMAN LLP

Edwin A. Harnden
Paula A. Barran

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