THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP TANDEM IN INTERACTION:
INSIGHTS FROM MOVEMENT ANALYSIS
January 2011 (Revised April 2011)

By: Brenda Connors, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
Prepared for: The Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official view,
policy, or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1 - Introduction
Section 2 - The Puzzle
Section 3 - An Alternative Methodology
Section 4 - The Logic of Movement Pattern Analysis
Section 5 - Action Man (Medvedev) and Chess Player (Putin)
Section 6 - A Complex Partnership
Section 7 - A Team of Two That Works
Section 8 - Tandem Decision Preferences
Section 9 - Complementarity and the 2012 Watershed
Section 10 – Back to the Puzzle
Section 11 – Recommendations for US Action

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THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP TANDEM IN INTERACTION:
INSIGHTS FROM MOVEMENT ANALYSIS
by
Brenda Connors,
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group
January 2011 (Revised April 2011)

This paper, produced as part of the BODY LEADS project out of the Strategic Studies
Group, applies nonverbal methodology, primarily Movement Pattern Analysis, to shed
light on the unusual and controversial power-sharing arrangement in contemporary
Russia. Russia is a regional and world power, flawed yet a long way from
inconsequential, and is a major target of current United States policy through the “reset”
launched in 2009. It is prudent for the United States Government to understand what goes
on at the highest levels in Moscow and how these activities impact American interests
and concerns.
Conventional means of getting at leadership in so centralized and secretive a
political regime as Russia’s—and for getting at it in real time, as opposed to historical
retrospect, when the observer benefits from memoirs, diaries, and archival materials—are
hampered by an information deficit and by the inconclusiveness of so much of the
information that can be gleaned from the public record. As a supplement and corrective
to these standard techniques, the analysis of nonverbal data provides valuable pointers to
underlying repertoires and a basis for forecasting future developments.

2

 The Puzzle
Russia has been ruled for almost three years by an unprecedented twin-headed
leadership team, commonly referred to as “the tandem.” 1 Because Vladimir Putin, the
effective, popular, and increasingly undemocratic president since 2000, was
constitutionally ineligible to serve a third consecutive term and unwilling to push through
an amendment to lift this restriction, he decided to step down from the presidency and to
throw his support in the election of March 2008 to Dmitrii Medvedev, a protégé thirteen
years his junior. In that he was riding Putin’s political coattails and had the state
apparatus and mass media at his disposal, Medvedev’s confirmation by the electorate was
a foregone conclusion; he triumphed with over 70 percent of the total vote and was
inaugurated that May.
What was distinctive about the transfer of power was not only the precipitous
promotion of Medvedev, a career functionary who had never run for office until then, but
that his patron Putin chose not to depart the scene and instead migrated to the prime
ministership, the second-ranking position in the executive branch and the political
system. Normally, in a country with a popularly elected president, the office of head of
government, if it exists at all (under a “semi-presidential” mechanism), is vastly inferior
in prestige and influence to that of head of state. This was the situation in Russia when
Boris Yeltsin was president in the 1990s and when Putin reigned supreme from 2000 to
2008. No one knew how the novel, topsy-turvy bargain struck between Putin and
Medvedev would work in practice or where it would take Russian politics and policy.
Speculation about how the new arrangement would function began even before
1

The word tandem is the same in Russian as in English. Russian observers of critical bent have come up
with various plays on words—like for example, tandemokratiya, short for “tandem democracy” or, in
effect, “two-man democracy.”

3

 the transition was finalized. At a farewell press conference, Putin did not attempt to
conceal that his relationship with President Medvedev would have “a unique quality” to
it, “which consists in the fact that I myself was president for eight years and didn’t do a
bad job.” By implication, Medvedev was going to be laboring in his mentor’s shadow.
Putin promised to give his successor the leeway to make presidential decisions, while
insisting that “I naturally [will] have the right to express my views.” Putin acknowledged
that differences of opinion might crop up and also that third parties might try to drive a
wedge between them. Any possible difficulties, he assured the nation, would be
forestalled by their excellent working relationship, going back to joint service at St.
Petersburg city hall in the 1990s. “Dmitrii Anatol’evich and I are well aware that attacks
will be made along personal, political, and economic lines. There will be endless attempts
to find differences in our approaches. There are always differences, I have to say, but
over our more than fifteen years of working together we have gotten used to listening to
each other.” 2
In Putin’s hands, the post of prime minister was upgraded overnight. From the
outset, he was active in policy realms such as energy, foreign economic affairs, and
federalism which had been considered presidential monopolies until then. He also
remained front and center in public politics, taking over the chair of the United Russia
party (which has a commanding two-thirds majority in the State Duma) and
communicating with the citizenry through the mass media and heavily publicized tours of
the provinces. Medvedev took over the president’s constitutional responsibility for
diplomacy, internal security, and law enforcement and participated with Putin in shaping

2

Presidential press conference of February 14, 2008; Russian-language transcript at
http://kremlin.ru/appears/2008/02/14/1327_type63380type82634_160108.shtm.

4

 the response to the global economic recession of 2008–9. More interesting, within a year
of his inauguration the novice president also put forward a biting critique of the Russian
status quo. Not limiting himself to traditional forums such as the annual presidential
address to parliament, he took advantage of the Internet and opened a videoblog and a
Twitter account. In “Go, Russia!” a rambling essay published in a liberal online
newspaper in September 2009, Medvedev assailed Russia’s chronic corruption and “legal
nihilism,” “primitive raw-materials economy,” and technological backwardness and
called for a stem-to-stern “modernization” of society and state. Rhetorically, he
positioned himself in a more reformist place than Prime Minister Putin.
As the duumvirs have tackled their respective roles, they have had almost nothing
of substance to say about their exact division of labor, preferring boilerplate phrases
about mutual respect, cooperation, and regular consultation. Nor have they dropped more
than the odd tidbit about the condition of their personal relations. 3 Medvedev and Putin
seldom appear together in public and steer clear of comment on one another’s work. They
have been tight-lipped about what would happen if their relations soured—a gray zone
where Medvedev is better equipped with formal prerogatives but Putin possesses
enormous informal authority with the elite and the population and controls the ruling
party, to boot. 4 And they have sidestepped questions about the impending fork in the road

3

For example, Putin has disclosed that he addresses Medvedev as ty, the familiar form of the pronoun
“you” (analogous to tu in French), whereas Medvedev addresses him with the more formal vy (like vous in
French).
4
On paper, the president of Russia has the right under the 1993 constitution to dismiss the prime minister
peremptorily. But if Medvedev did so, he would be obliged to nominate a replacement for confirmation by
the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, and that body is dominated by United Russia—whose
leader is none other than Putin. If push came to shove, Putin would have the votes in the Duma to get
himself reinstated as prime minister and, worse from Medvedev’s standpoint, would have probably enough
to have Medvedev impeached as president.

5

 of Russia’s politics, the presidential election of 2012; they repeat ad nauseam that the two
of them will discuss the nomination beforehand and arrive at a common position.
Much about the Russian tandem is puzzling, even to seasoned and well-briefed
analysts. Putin is the more familiar figure, having been in the limelight since Yeltsin put
him there at the end of the 1990s. Medvedev is frequently dismissed as an imposter or a
willing accomplice in an elaborate façade masking a Putin dictatorship. “It is horrible,”
one prominent oppositionist has said, “that, in a country with a presidential tradition,
where the central power was always the real power and not a blob, we have ended up
with a representative like this, someone who is not president at all.” 5 Most in the
commentariat who belittle Medvedev predict that Putin will displace him and return to
the Kremlin as president once Medvedev’s term expires in 2012. Analysts who are more
charitable to Medvedev often engage in “tandemology”—reading a lot into symbolic
events, sometimes minute differences in wording and tonality, and the like. 6
It is useful to cite two more probing papers by leading scholars of Russian and
post-communist affairs. One of these, by George W. Breslauer, a political scientist at the
University of California at Berkeley, combs through Medvedev’s and Putin’s public
statements and places them in the context of cycles of change in Soviet and Russian
history. What to make of the apparent disharmony in views between the two chieftains?
Breslauer’s answer is noncommittal: “Much depends on one’s view of the power

5

Boris Nemtsov, former first deputy prime minister, interviewed in
http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2279987.html. The Russian-American scholar Nina
Khrushcheva, a great-granddaughter of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, has sarcastically referred to
Medvedev as “Russia’s first lady.”
6
“Whether they like it or not, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin are stuck with each other. . . . Once
you cut through all the [display] and head-spinning tandemology (Look! Medvedev is asserting himself!
Oh my! Putin is back and he just showed him who’s boss!) and look at the issue logically, it is hard to come
to any other conclusion.” Brian Whitemore, “Tandemology 2.0,” RFE/RL, January 10, 2011; carried in
Johnson’s Russia List of that date.

6

 relationship between the two and one’s view of the magnitude of their differences over
policy.” He sketches a fourfold typology of the possibilities, defined by relatively high
and relatively low policy differences between Putin and Medvedev, on one dimension,
and a relatively high and a relatively low power differential between them, on a second. 7
His images of the possibilities are rendered in Table 1.

Table 1: Breslauer’s Images of the Putin-Medvedev Political Relationship
Power differential
High
Low

Policy differences
High
Putin seizes initiative (A)
Unstable collective leadership
(C)

Low
Putinism in charge (B)
Stable collective leadership (D)

In Cell A, where policy differences are large but Medvedev is politically
dependent on Putin, Putin is in charge and will likely discard or downgrade Medvedev
when it suits him. In Cell B, where the power differential is also great but differences in
opinion are not, Medvedev will compliantly do Putin’s bidding. “In this scenario,
Medvedev would be humoring certain constituencies with insincere rhetoric, as a tool of
Putin who shares Putin’s perspectives.” In the hypothetical Cell C, a low power
differential (that is, Medvedev having political resources of his own) and a wide gap in
policy preferences generate friction and conflict within the tandem, with the outcome
dependent on the relative strength of the pair’s bases of support and their skill in
mobilizing assets. And when the power differential is low but policy differences are

7

George W. Breslauer, “Reflections on Patterns of Leadership in Soviet and Post-Soviet [Russian]
History,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26 (July–September 2010), 263–74; quotations and table from 269–70.
“Power differential” in this instance is defined as whether Medvedev is dependent on Putin politically (high
differential), or acts as his own man (low differential).

7

 slender, as in Cell D, the result would be a stable leadership duo—“until such time,”
Breslauer adds, “as accumulating contradictions tempt one or both leaders to try to seize
the initiative by embracing, cynically or not, either a reformist or a revanchist platform.”
Breslauer’s elegant review of the possibilities, and of circumstances that might affect the
probability of one outcome or another materializing, concludes that the present state of
knowledge about the problem does not permit firm conclusions to be drawn: “We will
just have to wait and see.” 8
An unpublished paper by Timothy Colton of the Harvard University Government
Department, commissioned by me for BODY LEADS, goes over much of the same ground,
devoting rather more attention to Medvedev’s motivations. 9 Making use of the open
record, the Moscow rumor mill, and access to Putin and Medvedev through the annual
sessions of the government-sponsored Valdai Discussion Club, Colton focuses on the
gulf between words and deeds—between the ardently reformist avowals of President
Medvedev and the timidity of the improvements actually undertaken. Like Breslauer and
most close watchers of the Russian scene, Colton concedes that a few changes have taken
place. Instances would include Medvedev’s dismissal of some arch-conservative officials
(such as Yurii Luzhkov, the veteran mayor of Moscow, in September 2010); promotion
of technocrats and businessmen to positions where Putin as president favored veterans of
the security services; his unflinching criticism of the Stalinist past; legislation to end the
pre-trial detention of individuals accused of economic crimes; some slackening of the
administrative pressure on opposition parties, movements, and NGOs; and creation of a
high-technology laboratory town (Skolkovo) outside of Moscow. Nonetheless, Colton is

8
9

Ibid., 274.
Timothy J. Colton, “Some Hypotheses Concerning Medvedev and Putin,” January 2010.

8

 most struck by the disparity between these modest decisions and the soaring goals saluted
in the president’s speechifying. Examples are easily found of Medvedev initiatives that
have petered out or been stymied by bureaucratic and other resistance. And some
prominent decisions have been ambiguous in content and are not necessarily choices that
Putin would have eschewed or opposed. 10
To account for the contradictions between word and deed, Colton advances five
rival hypotheses. They are laid out in Table 2.

Table 2: Colton’s Rival Hypotheses about the Gap between Medvedev’s Rhetoric and
Actions Taken
Hypothesis
Insincerity
Lightweight
Smokescreen
Frustration
Consensus

Assumptions
Medvedev does not believe his promises or understand them at a
deep level.
Although Medvedev may be sincere, he was selected as a political
lightweight incapable of delivering on any program.
Medvedev’s rhetoric is designed to imitate political debate and
contention and help perpetuate the Putin group in power.
Medvedev genuinely wants radical reforms. They are thwarted by
the more old-school Putin.
Medvedev and Putin agree on the need for change but want it to
come about only in small, manageable doses.

In Colton’s diagnosis, Medvedev may or may not believe in his own rhetoric—the
degree of his sincerity and depth of understanding is unknown. In the Insincerity,
Smokescreen, and Frustration scenarios, the president is lacking in both honesty and

10

A case in point is the dismissal of Luzhkov in 2010. Putin’s relations with the mayor had always been
strained, going back to the struggle to succeed Boris Yeltsin in the late 1990s. Luzhkov’s replacement,
Sergei Sobyanin, is more closely tied to Putin than to Medvedev and served as chief of staff to him in both
the presidential administration and the prime minister’s chancery. An example of a stymied initiative would
be the lack of follow-up to the inquiry into the mistreatment of Sergei Magnitskii, the Moscow attorney for
a group of defrauded investors who died in prison in November 2009. After the incident, Medvedev fired
some officials and promised a thorough review, but little has happened since then.

9

 understanding; in the Lightweight version, his commitments are real but hazy; in the
Consensus mode, he favors change, only with the proviso that it must be the sort of
unthreatening, unhurried change that is acceptable to his sponsor, Putin. Putin in turn
figures in these hypotheses in varying ways. In the Insincerity and Lightweight
hypotheses, he is the mastermind of the current situation, having selected a nominal
successor who is incapable of engineering real change. In the Frustration hypothesis,
Putin opposes changes Medvedev wishes to institute. Following the Smokescreen and
Consensus hypotheses, Putin would be Medvedev’s co-conspirator, working with him
either to blunt reform or to confine it to baby steps.
On preferences, Colton takes note that now and then the duo has granted that they
are not perfectly uniform. Asked about his alleged jibe vis-à-vis Putin in an interview
with Fareed Zakaria of CNN in September 2009, President Medvedev pointed out, as he
had before, that he had always considered himself a member of Putin’s team and that the
two attended the same law school, at Leningrad (later St. Petersburg) State University, a
bit more than a decade apart. But there was more to the story, he said:
In this sense our convictions are very close. But if you talk about certain kinds of
nuances, about penchants, then, sure, there can be some differentiation. I have my
convictions and he has his. Over the course of eight years he [Putin] had the
chance to put his convictions into effect, and in my opinion he put them into
effect successfully. There are no identical persons and there are no identical
leaders. 11
Colton is agnostic about where these “nuances” and “penchants” might lead, and
who would prevail if their differences were to escalate. In sum, though, his judgment is
11

At http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/5516.

10

 that differences will be contained and Putin will continue to have the advantage, barring
crises that transform the broader context of high politics. Like Breslauer, he argues that
only time will tell the tale.

An Alternative Methodology
The premise of BODY LEADS is that meticulous attention to nonverbal signals—to
the physical movement of the body and its parts, as distinct from speech 12—yields
insights into the behavior of individuals, including for present purposes political leaders.
In much recent research and in the present essay, the main tool I employ is Movement
Pattern Analysis (MPA), a technique that evolved between the 1930s and 1960s as a
result of synergy between two founding figures: the brilliant Hungarian choreographer
Rudolf Laban, who started the ball rolling with a system for notating dance; and Warren
Lamb, an inventive British management consultant who found applications for the
evolving method in industry and white-collar office work. MPA and much
nonverbal/movement analysis in general posits that the study of bodily movement gives
the analyst otherwise unavailable information about the man or woman beneath the skin.
As Lamb’s collaborator, Carol-Lynne Moore, expresses it, “Normally invisible thoughts
and feelings become perceptible as they assume a form in movement. . . . One could say
that movements are translucent wrappers for the flow of inner moods and intentions . . . a
pigment through which something of the mover’s inner process may be seen.” 13

12

In earlier research phases, Body Leads correlated speech to motion after the movement baseline was
established. This process was undertaken in the credibility validation study and in leader profiles relative to
level of certitude on political topic.
13
Carol-Lynne Moore, Movement and Making Decisions: The Body-Mind Connection in the Workplace
(New York: Dance Movement Press, 2005), 60.

11

 MPA models bodily movement in two principal domains and envisions a
multistage decision process toward which each individual is thought to have an
idiosyncratic, ingrained orientation. One dimension, EFFORT, which was Laban’s focus,
describes how energy is brought to bear on a physical task; it involves factors of focus,
pressure, and time. The second axis, SHAPE, made more central to the venture by Lamb,
delineates where the action takes place and relates movements to the cardinal planes of
three-dimensional space (horizontal, vertical, and sagittal). In the domains of effort and
shape, there are three types of movement: POSTURE, or habitual body attitude; GESTURES,
or isolated actions confined to one part of the body; and POSTURE-GESTURE MERGERS
(PGMs), integrated movements of peak performance 14. MPA measures PGMs only to
determine decision style.
Profiling through expert inspection of PGMs does not presume access to detailed
biographical or psychological information about the subject. MPA uncovers decision
preferences from the movement actions. This makes MPA an especially attractive angle
for the analysis of persons such as foreign political leaders who can be studied on
video/cd and for whom reliable bio and psychological information is simply unavailable.
An additional advantage of PGMs is that they are believed to reveal authenticity—they
cannot be faked by the person or by propagandists out to burnish his reputation.
Correlating nonverbal patterns and verbal statements can reveal not only veracity on a
topic but can also indicate the degree of certitude a leader may embody on a topic. 15

14

Peak performance in the project has referred to moments of heightened intensity, for example during a
speech –when a leader in performance pulls out all the stops throughout the body and in terms of context.
PGMs, by definition indicate total involvement from head to toes that manifests in integrated posture
gesture mergers.
15
Brenda Connors, Body Leads, A Non-Traditional Approach to Understanding Leadership and
Performance Style, Naval War College, 2002.

12

 MPA conceptualizes people making decisions in three sequential stages, each
linked to telltale body expressions. At every stage, there is a pair of overarching ways in
which the decision process is approached. The ASSERTIVE approach, the more tactical and
operational of the two, has to do with applying effort and energy to make the process
occur. PERSPECTIVE is more strategic in outlook and has to do with positioning oneself
and shaping the environment to achieve the desired result. The combination of three
stages and the two general modes yields six action motivations altogether. See Table 3
for a summary of the types.

13

 The Logic of Movement Pattern Analysis

Table 3: The Logic of Movement Pattern Analysis
Decision stage

Attending

Action motivation
ASSERTIVE
PERSPECTIVE
Investigating
Exploring
Making the effort to probe, scan,
Gaining perspective by perceiving
and classify information within a
the scope available, uncovering,
prescribed area
encompassing and being
perceptive to information from
many areas
Outcome: systematic research,
establishing method, defining
standards
Determining
Making the effort to affirm
purpose, build resolve, forge
conviction, justify intent

Outcome: discovering
alternatives, new approaches

Outcome: persisting against
difficult odds, resistance to
pressure
Timing
Making the effort for
implementation, to adjust the
moment-to-moment timing of
action

Outcome: clarity of intention,
crystallization of issues, realism

Outcome: alertness to tactics and
time priorities for opportune
implementation

Outcome: setting goals, measuring
progress, and updating plans

Intending

Committing

Evaluating
Gaining perspective by perceiving
relative importance, weighing up
the immediate needs, and sizing
up the issues

Anticipating
Gaining perspective by perceiving
the developing stages of action
and foreseeing the consequences
of each stage

The first MPA stage is known as the ATTENDING phase. Here the body’s
movement orients toward preliminary consideration and structuring of the problem at
hand. If the individual varies focus assertively either directly or indirectly in the
horizontal plane, the motivation is considered to be one of INVESTIGATING. In

14

 investigating, the person curiously examines a problem by probing directly or scanning
and categorizing indirectly. If perspective rather than assertion is the dominant approach,
the motivation is one of EXPLORING, which involves searching out new ideas and
alternatives among a broad gamut of information. As in the other two phases, MPA
analysts have observed a consistent correlation between physical movement and the
mental activity of decision making. Investigating “requires the capacity to utilize space
effort, varying the focus between directing (with its pinpointing and probing quality) and
indirecting (with its scanning and scrutinizing quality).” Exploring “requires the ability
to shape in the horizontal plane, varying one’s relationship to the fields of available
information by enclosing (gathering in ideas from a variety of sources) and spreading
(making oneself open to a range of views).” 16
The intermediate decision stage in the MPA lexicon is the INTENDING phase, the
bridge between initial contemplation and taking action in response to the designated
problem. In DETERMINING mode, under assertion, the individual builds resolve to ensure
there is sufficient resolution to proceed. This is displayed physically in movement in the
vertical plane, expressed in either a light or decreased pressure upward or a strong or
increased pressure downward to assert force or personal weight. Alternatively, in
EVALUATING,

under perspective, the individual establishes the relative importance of the

action and ranks issues in order to have a realistic sense of priorities and a clear
perspective. The body gains perspective on a problem by rising in the vertical plane to
look an issue over, so to say, or by descending to penetrate beneath its surface to get a
different sense of proportion.

16

Ibid., 81.

15

 The third and culminating MPA stage is COMMITTING, which is the
implementation piece of the decision process. Committing is about choosing the right
moment to act and seizing opportunities to stage the action and deliver results. It centrally
involves either TIMING or ANTICIPATING. The assertive variant, timing, entails managing
the pace of implementation and selecting the opportune moment to proceed. It is echoed
physically in acceleration or deceleration of cycling movement in the sagittal plane.
Perspective-oriented anticipating involves strategically controlling the ongoing process of
timing each decision stage to reach long-term objectives and avoid negative
consequences. In Moore’s words, “This requires the ability to shape in the sagittal plane,
controlling the deployment of action by retreating (temporarily withdrawing for strategic
reasons) and advancing (proceeding when an avenue for forward motion becomes
open).” 17
When Lamb and his colleagues have applied MPA to corporate executives, they
normally undertake an interview of two hours with the individual on company premises.
Anywhere from one hundred to several hundred PGMs will be detected in the typical
interview, live and on videotape; these are recorded and then coded by the analyst along a
number of axes of measurement related to time, pressure, energy, and space. The outline
of a subject’s MPA portrait is formed by estimates of the relative occurrences devoted to
the various coded tasks. These sum to 100 percent, and may be interpreted as
representing the intensity of the person’s behavioral investment in the specified segments
of the decision process.
For political figures, the logic is identical, although the implementation will vary
because a foreign leader cannot be subjected to a sit-down interview on terms set by the
17

Ibid., 82.

16

 analyst. 18 As a proxy, MPA exploits video recordings of the statesman being interviewed,
delivering speeches, conversing with subordinates and fellow leaders, at press
conferences or answering journalists’ questions, and so on. The aim is the same—to sift
out systematic movement clues about innate, irreducible decision proclivities. Studying a
leader’s PGMs in context riddled with high stress which is more typical of the decision
environment is seriously taken into consideration.

Action Man and Chess Player
For the tandem in power in the Russian Federation, we are fortunate to have MPA
workups of both of them executed for BODY LEADS by the MPA pioneer Warren Lamb.
Lamb analyzed Medvedev in the spring/summer of 2008, as he settled into his new
position, basing it on video of him in action from files complied at the USNWC. Putin
was studied by Lamb in 2004-2005 for the project and his MPA was reviewed for pattern
stability at this time. Lamb and I then corresponded at length about his findings. MPA
score charts for Medvedev and Putin are reproduced as Tables 4 and 5 (indicators
rounded off to the nearest 5 percent). I will start by explicating the core information about
each individual’s action motivation.

18

A methodological distinction, Body Leads has sought to study leaders in high stress since the project’s
inception. The MPA method derives decision signature elicited from a no stress interview in which
conditions support the most natural elicitation of the individual’s movement. This aspect of measurement
will be further refined in the work ahead.

17

 Table 4: MPA Profile for Medvedev a
Decision stage
Attending – 15%
Intending – 40%
Committing – 45%

Action motivation
ASSERTIVE – 55%
PERSPECTIVE – 45%
Investigating – 5%
Exploring – 10%
Determining – 20%
Evaluating – 20%
Timing – 30%
Anticipating – 15%
Dynamism – 8 (on a scale of 1–10)

a) Estimated by Warren Lamb, May–September 2008

If a single phrase captures Dmitrii Medvedev’s approach to decisions (see Table
4), it is Action Man. In terms of the three stages of decision making, he is motivated most
strongly to committing to action, which accounts for 45 percent of the Medvedev PGMs
coded by Lamb. Intending, or building purpose, is a little less prominent in his profile,
with a score on that component of 40 percent. By far the most neglected of the three
stages for Medvedev is the first, attending, or preliminary weighing and analysis of the
problem confronting him. Attending occupies him a mere 15 percent of the time. 19 As
between the assertive as opposed to the more contemplative perspective modes,
Medvedev has a measurable bias toward the former. This asymmetry is especially evident
in the committing stage, where Medvedev expends about twice as much effort on timing
than on anticipating long-term consequences and striding toward ultimate goals. As Lamb
and I construe the movement evidence, Medvedev is inclined to size up situations quickly
and to do so in black and white terms, shunning subtler shades of gray. The wide-angled
spectrum of what his proposed initiatives will give rise to substantively may be of little
19

It is relevant to note here that Medvedev’s ability to move about in an integrated way relative to space is
low. That capacity is synonymous behaviorally with focus and attentiveness to information. He has said he
passed over Putin’s 1999 offer to work as head of the Russian securities commission because he would
have found this detailed administrative work boring. See Marina Nikolay and Svandize, “Dmitriy
Medvedev: Governing a Country Like Russia is Always Going To Be Trickier Than Other Countries,
translated by https://www.opensource.gov/portalserver/.pt/gateway, New Book Cites Medvedev on Past
Life, Law, Democracy, Putin, Siloviki, p. 12.

18

 conscious interest for him, and he will seek justification for what he promotes as change
only retrospectively, once he has acted.
It is notable that Medvedev himself has referred to some of these qualities. In an
interview with the journalist Nikolai Svanidze in early 2008, he confided that he tends to
see life in stark terms: “I am often overly harsh in my judgments. . . . Unfortunately, this
is the case, and it sometimes comes out pretty sharply. It is hard for me to struggle with
this.” He also volunteered that he prefers to get down to making choices without delay.
“On many everyday questions,” he said to Svanidze, “I have always made my decisions
quickly. And, speaking frankly, I have almost never been mistaken. . . . It is just that I
understand that if I do not make a decision, I will end up expending extra time on the
issue. And once I have made a decision, I carry it out immediately and almost never
agonize over what I have done. Life is short.” 20

20

Nikolai and Marina Svanidze, Medvedev (St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2008), 310–11.

19

 Table 5: MPA Profile for Putin b
Decision stage
Attending – 45%
Intending – 35%
Committing – 20%

Action motivation
ASSERTIVE – 40%
PERSPECTIVE – 60%
Investigating – 25%
Exploring – 20%
Determining – 10%
Evaluating – 25%
Timing – 5%
Anticipating – 15%
Dynamism – 7 (on a scale of 1–10)

b) Estimated by Warren Lamb, 2004-5; May–September 2008

Vladimir Putin has very different predilections, nearly the reverse of his associate
so far as the three decision stages and the two general modes go (see Table 5). His
movement signature discloses Putin to be more of a shrewd, forward-looking chess
player than an action man. Unlike Medvedev, he invests the bulk of his effort (45
percent) in attending activity—as might well be appropriate for someone who began his
career as a KGB officer specializing in intelligence gathering abroad. For intending,
Putin’s score (35 percent) is roughly the same as Medvedev’s, but he gets around to
building intent after systematically investigating and exploring the situation and the
choice options. The evidence suggests that Putin methodically cycles back to aspects of
the problem facing him, continually revisiting data to verify his research and confirm his
priorities. Committing (20 percent) is the least accentuated stage of decision for him,
whereas it is the most accentuated in Medvedev’s profile. Putin takes the initiative to
commit only when satisfied that he has left no stone unturned. 21 Another contrast with
Medvedev is that Putin favors the strategic perspective mode over the more tactical
assertive mode. At the intending and committing stages, he functions in perspective mode

21

My earlier research, reported in Vladimir Putin: Movement Patterning and the Decision Making Process
during Crisis, argues when Putin perceives threat such as during a crisis, he may react quickly and react to
control versus deliberating.

20

 two or three times more frequently than in assertive mode. For Putin, evaluating and
anticipating activity overshadows determining and timing activity; for Medvedev,
determining is privileged as often as evaluating, and timing is privileged over
anticipating.
One overall criterion on which Putin and Medvedev are fairly similar is in terms
of DYNAMISM, which Lamb and his group define as “the number of simultaneous novel or
non-routine cycles of decision an individual will initiate and continue.” 22 On a scale of 1
to 10 (constructed by counting the number of simultaneous effort and shape changes the
individual makes), Putin scores 7; Medvedev registers 8 out of 10. Medvedev is slightly
higher than Putin in his capacity to undertake simultaneous and novel decisions.
The MPA methodology prompts some conclusions at variance with the
conventional wisdom about the Russian duumvirs. It is Medvedev, not Putin, who is
marginally the more dynamic of the two and the more proficient at pursuing multiple
assignments at the same time. Putin is the more imaginative and strategic member of the
duo. He is hardwired to shape in order to gain perspective on his agenda. Despite his
image as an authoritarian strongman, his language of the body implies that he expends
much more energy on strategizing than he does on strong-arming. Putin persistently
postpones getting on the slope to action. The danger is that he may be excessively
disposed to collect, process, and store information and may wander off mentally rather
than focus on the practical choice set. For example, Putin has talked off and on since
2000 about the need to reduce corruption in Russia. As president and prime minister,
nevertheless, he has done little concretely to make headway toward this goal.

22

Moore, Movement and Making Decisions, 90.

21

 Medvedev, often pictured as a weak underling of Putin’s, is in fact the more
action-attuned of the two. He puts much more energy than Putin into committing, most of
which flows into tactically-alert timing choices. Medvedev is in some ways more
reminiscent of a Western corporate executive than of a typical head of state: he is
motivated to begin making decisions by committing to action based on the
implementation of his beliefs and priorities. His preference is to get hold of something he
values and get right down to doing it.
The flip side of this characteristic is that Medvedev is given to moving without a
general strategic design in mind. His speeches and pronouncements often lack intellectual
depth, specifics about how his program might come about in practice, and a strategic
vision as to how the parts fit together and the sequence in which they might unfold.
Concerning action outcomes, he seems more fixated on pacing than on content or on
realizable targets. His statements sometimes contain glaring contradictions. In the “Go,
Russia!” manifesto, for example, Medvedev lamented Russia’s dependency on energy
extraction but then said the first vector of economic modernization should be about
remaking Russia into “one of the leading countries in the efficiency of the production,
transportation, and use of energy.” On occasion, Medvedev may begin to develop an
inclusive design only after he has committed to a policy. His hasty decision to recognize
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Moscow-protected enclaves in Georgia, as sovereign
states in August 2008, only two weeks after Russia’s war with Georgia, illustrates this
tendency.

22

 A Complex Partnership
Putin the Chess Player and Medvedev the Action Man are dissimilar human
beings. Politically, one owes his position entirely to the other, the established national
leader. This dissimilarity is mirrored in their movement signatures. Initial proxemics
analysis by BODY LEADS of appearance at Medvedev’s swearing-in ceremony in May
2008 indicated that, while Medvedev was seeking to forge ahead on his own, he did so
with an acute degree of spatial respect and deference to the older man. 23 He literally fell
back into step whenever Putin edged ahead as the two presented themselves in
combination to the world. Our assumption is that Putin retains the upper hand in terms of
raw power and standing within the tandem.

A Team of Two That Works
That, however, is not by a long shot the only line in the story, as traced by MPA. It
should not detract from another insight—that in many ways Putin and Medvedev form a
complementary and quite compatible
leadership team. In a preliminary look
at Putin’s movement pattern in 2004,
Warren Lamb surmised that, due to
Putin’s low committing function, “he
benefits from trusted aides who

23

Proxemics, a term coined by anthropologist E.T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (New York: Doubleday,
1982) refers to the study of the use of space and distances that can affect people as they relate to one
another socially and professionally in business relations, cross cultural interaction, and architecture.

23

 complement him in encouraging work progress toward implementation and create an
operational work environment.” 24 This statement is a near perfect description of
Medvedev, who at the time was serving as Putin’s Kremlin chief of staff. Lamb
conjectured in 2008, when he revisited Putin’s profile in more detail and examined
Medvedev’s for the first time, that Putin was attracted to Medvedev because Medvedev is
a strong pacer of implementation, which Putin is not. Medvedev, for his part, has praised
Putin publicly for his extreme attention o detail, which Medvedev leans toward skipping
over. 25

Tandem Decision Preferences
One measure of the goodness of fit emerges if we average the respective strengths and
weaknesses of the president and prime minister between the first and second columns of
Tables 4 and 5. Their combined preferences even out rather nicely, with each man
compensating for the other’s deficit in the attending category (for Medvedev) and
committing (for Putin); they do not differ markedly in the intending category. Together,
they dedicate 30 percent of their efforts to attending (15 percent Medvedev, 45 percent
Putin); 37.5 percent to intending (40 percent Medvedev, 35 percent Putin); and 32.5
percent to committing (45 percent Medvedev, 20 percent Putin). As between the assertive
(tactical) mode of action and the perspective (strategic), they are only slightly biased
toward the perspective mode (by 52.5 percent to 47.5 percent). This distribution of inner
24

Warren Lamb, memorandum to Brenda Connors, December 18, 2004.
Medvedev said of his mentor, “You know what struck me first was his meticulous attitude towards
information and how he tries to investigate to the most thorough degree every problem that he comes across
- and came across, even in that period. And how he takes decisions only on the basis of such a complex and
overarching analysis. I think this is very important for any leader, and even more so for a president. And
here there is something for many people to learn from President Putin.” See Lionel Barber, Financial
Times Interview with Dmitrii Medvedev, 24 March 2008.

25

24

 motivation represents an evenhanded perspective on any political agenda—provided that
their decision preferences are really shared. The balance is especially evident at the
intending stage, where Putin, transfixed by his appetite for information, is only half as
motivated as Medvedev to get on the bully pulpit.
Further leverage on Medvedev and Putin is provided by MPA’s framework for
gauging the quality of INTERACTION between individuals. Tables 6 and 7 convey the
extent to which Medvedev and Putin fulfill the potential for SHARING and PRIVATE styles
of decision making.
These measures are derived from movement observation and the calculation of the
matching or consonance between effort and shape movements, for sharing, or the
mismatching or dissonance of effort
and shape movements, for private.
In a sharing style, the individual
feels the need to carry out initiatives
with and through other people; in
the private style, the desire is to go
it alone. If a person’s movement consonance is higher than 50 percent of potential, and
movement dissonance is lower than 50 percent, MPA considers her or him to have a
sharing style. If these ratios are reversed, the individual is deemed private in style. If both
consonance and dissonance come out as less than 50 percent, the individual is classified
as NEUTRAL in style, or reliant on the interactional initiatives of others. Lamb’s scheme

25

 also provides for a fourth style, VERSATILE, in which the individual wavers between
sharing and private decisions. 26
Here again we witness a significant discrepancy in movement profile between the
two principals in the tandem. Medvedev (Table 6) presents a highly sharing exterior in
two of the three canonical stages (intending and committing). In the attending stage, he
comes across as neutral and disinclined to create either privacy or sharing; his sharing
instinct exceeds his private instinct, while neither clears the 50 percent mark. Medvedev’s
neutrality at one out of three stages and propensity for sharing at the other two help
explain his quintessential and ineffectual rhetorical habits. 27
Table 6: Interaction for Medvedev a
Decision stage
Attending: Neutral
Intending :Versatile
Committing: Sharing

Sharing potential
40%
85%
75%
Identifying – High

Private potential
20%
55%
35%

a) Estimated by Warren Lamb, May–September 2008

The MPA data demonstrate Putin (Table 7) to be strongly private and
independent-minded, and probably disinclined to share ideas and confidences, in two of
the three decision stages (attending and committing). Indeed, Putin is one of the most
private-regarding leaders studied over the whole span of BODY LEADS. It follows that
early and late in the decision process he is not apt to be influenced much by anyone—the
26

Versatile interaction is reported when both sharing and private are 55% or more. Versatile Intending
which Medvedev falls under combines sharing and private styles. The Versatile intender is able to present
his or her opinions and invite reciprocal sharing with the aim of establishing an agreed-upon joint purpose;
also versatile intenders are able to preserve independence in determining and evaluating so that the process
of forming an intention is managed without being influenced by the views of other people.
27
In other recent work for BODY LEADS, I have noted Medvedev’s inability to focus through the relevant
coding of his head and eye subsystems in interview and speech behavior.

26

 president of Russia included. The nonverbal evidence also suggests how, whatever their
relations in the past, Putin could hold great influence over the information platform of the
current-day tandem, especially since Medvedev himself is so unmotivated to focus on the
information-gathering (attending) stage at all. By implication, Medvedev could be being
used by Putin to broadcast policies that do mollify Kremlin opponents—as they often
charge.
Table 7: Interaction for Putin b
Decision stage
Attending:Private
Intending:Sharing
Committing:Private

Sharing potential
45%
55%
45%
Identifying – Medium

Private potential
90%
35%
55%

b) Estimated by Warren Lamb, 2004-5; May–September 2008

Intending, i.e., the middle of our three successive decision phases, is of special
interest vis-à-vis interaction, since it is here and only here that Medvedev and Putin are
both predisposed to operate through sharing. Medvedev’s sharing is scored at 85 percent
of the potential. Although Putin’s rating is noticeably lower, at 55 percent, at this stage he
is just as noticeably less private and more sharing-minded than anywhere else in his
portfolio. This concurrence is a potential foundation for cooperation—or also,
conceivably, for stress. The merits of this or that policy option aside, they may not always
feel comfortable with approaching the decision process per se in such different fashions.
Yet, this is the decision area where they do have the greatest prospect for getting
together.

27

 With regard to the general MPA parameter of IDENTIFYING with others, Putin and
Medvedev are cut from different cloth (see the bottom row of Tables 6 and 7). Identifying
refers to the degree of spontaneity an individual retains in their relationships with others
and the environment. The frequency of variation of the free-bound effort flow and
growing-shrinking of shape flow indicate high, medium or low identifying. Medvedev’s
movement retains a high amount of what is known in MPA parlance as shape flow,
meaning he enthusiastically identifies and engages with others. Putin is moderate in
identifying or engaging with others and the surrounding milieu. His movement’s effort
flow is more bounded or restrained, which tends to make his perspectives tightly
structured and contained. Bringing aspects together is more Putin’s forte than expanding
outwards. He exercises discretion about whether and when to get involved with others.

Complementarity and the 2012 Watershed
The complexity of the Medvedev-Putin partnership is considerable. They are
different persons, with different assets and liabilities. As Lamb has underscored in his
studies over the years, there is more than one way for
any leader to do his or her job, and there is more than
one way to constitute a leadership team.
From this vantage point, the Moscow tandem,
while hardly perfect or without its tensions, has a ring
of ordinariness to it. The programmatic preferences of
Medvedev and Putin diverge somewhat in points of
emphasis but, at least up to now, have been typified

28

 more by overlap and agreement. Although Medvedev has pilloried facets of the status
quo, he does not advocate sudden or radical change—considering revolutionary change to
have been lethal to the well-being of the Russian state and society in the past. In “Go,
Russia!” he expressed his view this way:
Not everyone is satisfied with the rate at which we are moving. . . . They talk
about the need to force the pace of change in the political system and sometimes
about going back to the “democratic” 1990s. No, it is inexcusable to return to
paralysis of the state. I have to disappoint the supporters of permanent revolution.
We are not going to rush. Hasty and ill-considered political reforms have more
than once in our history led to tragic consequences and pushed Russia to the brink
of collapse. We can’t jeopardize social stability or the safety of our citizens for
the sake of any kind of abstract theory. We have no right to sacrifice a stable life,
even for the highest of goals. . . . Changes will come, but they will be steady,
well-conceived, and step by step.
There is little in this passage Putin would find objectionable.
When it comes to decisional style, I would highlight the basic complementarity of
the co-leaders’ stances. They, in a sense, have the indispensable requirements of sound
decision making covered. Their most manifest strengths and weaknesses tend to offset
one another, with Medvedev distinguishing himself in committing and Putin in attending.
The two converge on a healthy interest in intending, and it is precisely at this stage they
are both at their most interactive. In other words, contrary to much analysis in Russia and
abroad, I see grounds for supposing that the Medvedev-Putin partnership is reasonably
healthy and productive.

29

 Will the team remain intact in and past the election year 2012? Here is what
Medvedev said to Zakaria:
If we are talking here about responsible politicians who represent a single political
force—and Premier Putin and I naturally represent a single political force—then
in making such decisions, be it in 2012 or in 2017, we have to look at the real
situation. . . . When, let us say, a party takes a decision whom to put forward for
the position of president, it bases it on what condition this person operates on,
how viable he is, whether he is capable of winning. This is what happened when
Vladimir Putin answered this question [in 2007–8]. The most mundane indicators,
like popularity ratings, have to be taken into account. So far we have good ratings.
That’s why we undoubtedly will come to agreement between ourselves.
Contrary to what many have been writing about the tandem, I predict that sheer
pragmatism and a kernel of shared beliefs will keep the team in harness in 2012. The
odds are that each will retain his present institutional role. The presidential term has been
elongated by constitutional amendment to six years, starting in 2012, and so the tandem
may well be on the scene until 2018 or even beyond. The present formula is more
favorable to Putin’s interests than to Medvedev’s, and that is the wild card in the game. 28
It is possible, though less than likely, that Medvedev will lose patience with the duo’s
joint inaction and attempt to stage a political breakout.

28

Some recent polls have reported that slightly more Russians would prefer Medvedev to be re-elected in
2012 than to see Putin return. But all these soundings take for granted that Medvedev and Putin remain on
the same page politically. If Putin were to go on the attack against Medvedev, the situation would be very
different.

30

 Back to the Puzzle
The rich composite picture of the Russian duumvirs drawn by MPA enables us to
reflect anew on the puzzle of how the tandem functions that was raised early in this
paper.
Let us begin with the Breslauer paper, with its two-by-two matrix of possibilities
for interpretation, defined by axes for ideological and power differentials between our
two heroes. Of his four categories, Cell A features Medvedev as Putin’s political satellite,
with an autonomous point of view but no ability to put it into effect, and hence vulnerable
to being dumped or demoted. In my opinion, this overstates the policy differences
between Putin and Medvedev. In Cell B, Medvedev concurs in Putin’s opinions but puts
on a show of independence. I am dubious about this possibility because Medvedev’s bold
call for accelerated transformation of the system gives every sign of being authentic.
MPA makes the assumption that as a practical matter integral movement cannot be
counterfeited by the subject. Medvedev likely gives voice to notions he holds true,
without him being fully heedful of the empirical consequences or challenges they imply.
The inference is that the rhetorical generalities and overstatement in which Medvedev
indulges have to do at root with his inadequate motivation and communicative liabilities
and not with his inner sense of purpose.
In Breslauer’s Cell C, Medvedev has both a countervailing political base and
discrete opinions. We should be awake to this possibility, but as much in terms of
decision style as of policy positions. The prospect is mitigated by Medvedev’s and
Putin’s reciprocal openness to interaction at the stage of determination of intent. Finally,
in the situation of Cell D according to Breslauer, the tandem is a stable diarchy, or it is

31

 unless and until one principal seizes the initiative, innovates programmatically, and
shoves his counterpart aside. In theory, there is something to the combustive potential of
such an amalgam of power and principle. MPA instructs that the odds militate against it,
as I have explained. 29
Turning to Colton’s hypotheses about the gap between Medvedev’s presidential
rhetoric and the meager results achieved, movement analysis gives us some purchase on
all five.
Is Medvedev insincere in his promises of change? From the MPA data, we can
infer that he in all probability is not. What he is, though, is cursory in his approach to
matters of state and not much driven to delve broadly or profoundly into information and
ideas. Moreover, he is neutral when it comes to expounding his ideas, such as they are,
which makes him pedantic, detached, and inept at imparting and sharing them. He
inherently prefers grandiose, either-or concepts and values, often disconnected from the
substance of what he would do about them in real life—and from his own heart. Since
adolescence, he has exhibited a physical armoring or disunity which inhibits harmonious
movement. 30 Today, this partly explains why he can trumpet comprehensive change and
yet be out of touch with failure of his rhetoric to stir excitement and stick.

29

Earlier project reports argue additional behavioral reasons suggest Putin’s preference is to occupy de jure
number two positions as long as he can conveniently access top power. See Brenda Connors, Movement
Patterning and the Decision-Making Process During Crisis: Vladimir Putin- An Exceptional Case,
Strategic Studies Group, December, 2008. Brenda Connors, An Act of Trust to Move Ahead: Vladimir
Putin, President of Russia, A Behavioral Movement Analysis with Isomorphic Links to Policy, Strategic
Research Department, Naval War College, 2008 .

30

Brenda Connors, Dmitrii Medvedev: A Study in Political Leadership and Decision-Making Style, April
2010 , Strategic Studies Group, for discussion of the psychophysical features of nonverbal style and
personality.

32

 Colton’s second theory hinges on Medvedev being a mediocrity, a political
lightweight whose convictions are a kind of personal hobby project and do not matter one
way or the other. Putin, in this version, deliberately selected Medvedev as a placeholder,
passing over intimates from his inner circle of siloviki (officials with a background in the
secret services) and forceful personalities who might have resisted the ex-president or
stood in the way of him reclaiming the Kremlin in 2012. The MPA evidence does not jibe
with Medvedev as weak or passive, although his sharing propensity does imply some
reliance on others to make decisions. His guru, Putin, is the most important other in
Medvedev’s professional and political life and must be the person on whom he leans the
heaviest. On the positive side, Medvedev is more dynamic and capable of innovating than
Putin and is more resolute and tactical. As recompense for his sharing tendency and for
other reasons, he acts assertively, which on occasion can yield impulsive and even
aggressive decisions. The notion that Medvedev’s ideas are no more than a personal
hobby is implausible. Individuals are incapable of simulating the behavioral prototypes
from and about which Movement Pattern Analysis makes inferences.
What of the third hypothesis floated by Colton, which is that Medvedev is
charged with throwing off a smokescreen that imitates diversity and change and masks
the continuance in power of Putin and his clique? The MPA estimations provide partial
validation for this hypothesis, inasmuch as the tandem is a well-adjusted team whose
members are on the whole mutually supportive and redress some of one another’s
deficiencies. Still, their unity of purpose should not be exaggerated. Putin, in his closed
and value-driven way, is prone to conducting himself as the “bad cop,” spouting harsh
statements about individuals and other actors who do not comply with his expectations.

33

 Medvedev has on occasion telegraphed reservations about Putin’s proclamations—most
recently in his unmistakable expression of unhappiness with a remark by the prime
minister insinuating that the business magnate, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, was guilty as
charged in his second trial for economic crimes. 31 If there is a division of tasks between
the co-leaders in this area, Medvedev takes more to the part of “good cop”—in my
estimation owing to his underlying psychological tendency to be a pleaser and sharer. But
Medvedev’s body from time to time speaks to a well of suppressed anger that could find
outlet in bad-cop behavior.
Yet another possibility would be that the main narrative about the tandem is about
frustration, that is, Medvedev genuinely wants ambitious reforms and they are
systematically obstructed by Putin. There is no denying that the junior leader’s rhetoric,
especially since the autumn of 2009, has been increasingly censorious about Russia’s
failings and increasingly adamant about the need to remedy them through reform. Nor
can it be denied that Medvedev is politically dependent on a senior leader who has the
resources to veto change he disapproves of. That said, not every “nuance” or “penchant”
(as Medvedev put it to Zakaria) will breed bitter discord, and to date any micro
differences have been embedded in a macro context of broad concord on fundamentals.
Even if divisions occur and Medvedev, on the one hand, grows discontent, he will be
inhibited by his lack of spontaneity and his lack of the capacity for energetically unified
nonverbal aggression—in short, the power to telegraph his appeal for change and
consistently mobilize others behind the cause is limited. When Putin, on the other hand,

31

Medvedev made his thinly veiled reprimand on December 24, 2010, saying no official should have the
right to comment on a criminal case before a verdict is reached. This was shortly after Putin stated that
Khodorkovskii was a thief who should “sit in jail.” The week after Medvedev’s intervention, a Moscow
court found Khodorkovskii guilty and tacked a long prison sentence onto the one he was already serving.

34

 puts the brakes on tandem action, some of the time this will be due to his habit of
continually returning to information gathering before forging ahead in the decision cycle.
By nature a deeply private person, he can be counted on to keep his political calculations
to himself until the last possible moment for venting them.
Scenario number five for Colton, leadership consensus, would take with equal
seriousness Medvedev’s credentials as a reformer and Putin’s more conservative
instincts, while synthesizing them into a grand bargain whereby change is introduced, but
only in small, controllable doses. The lens of MPA confirms this hypothesis up to a point.
By the same token, it shows that the co-leaders have stylistic attributes that contribute to
the present stalemate. Putin owns the legitimacy and authority to push through changes;
only to a limited extent does he make the commitment to do so. He is sluggish in
studying any situation and forming intent to make choices; his weakest suit of all is
implementation. Medvedev is more receptive to change but less able to effectively
conceive of it. As he comes up short in getting to the heart of the problems on his agenda,
he often finds himself struggling to carry out vague and anodyne initiatives. Medvedev’s
defects as a communicator and his emotional neutrality are obstacles to rallying the
intelligentsia and the middle-class Russians who otherwise would be his natural audience.

Recommendations for U.S. Action
The foregoing analysis offers action pointers for USG policymakers and
diplomats.
For American representatives who wish to engage the Russian tandem of Action
Man and Chess Player effectively, an appeal to their intending preferences is the best

35

 point of entry. Presenting where the
USG stands, on a solid knowledge base,
is strongly advisable. Sharing at the
intention-forming stage is a common
channel for both Russian leaders
individually as well as between them. It
may open the door to a fruitful three-way interchange.
On substance, meaty policy research and white papers are most recommended for
the information-craving Putin. The format should speak to new data and to options that
lend themselves to evaluation and prioritization, without asking for the firm action
commitments he is loath to give without drawn-out prior consideration. Putin the private
decision maker cannot be expected to enter into public exchanges with others on
information interpretation or a final course of action. He may, all the same, be a fine
sounding board relative to Russian intentions—although he will likely want to revisit the
information stage to verify before crystallizing his goals or strategy. When establishing
goals, he may be ready to get into a searching exchange of ideas.
With Medvedev, I recommend that the USG present priorities that both resonate
with his values and declared objectives and contain a timeline for commitment, the stage
where he is most at home. Medvedev may be keen to participate in high-level dialogue in
the spheres of intending and committing, for example, on issues like Afghanistan and
missile defense. He is apt to engage substantively with whatever partner gets him to
respond to his stated beliefs, half-formed as they may be, and his action plan to date.

36

 If I am right in my analysis, the bicephalous leadership in Moscow will persevere
for some time to come—which is not to say that the chances of it unwinding are zero. At
a minimum, it will direct Russian foreign policy for the next year and a half, as American
policy navigates through choppy waters and our own 2012 election approaches. Whether
the tandem persists past then, comes apart, or is refigured, it will bear careful monitoring
and analysis. It behooves us to make full use of all the conventional and unconventional
instruments available for the job.

37