{a CONFORMED COPY 22 MARTIN D. SINGER (SEN 78166) . LYNDA B. GOLDMAN ANDREW B. BRETTLER (B 0. 262928) LAVELY a: SINGER (103?;ng PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ?11,131) 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400 C'C?urt Los Angeles, California 90067~2906 Telephoine: (310) 556-3501 EC 0 4 29? Faesuni e: 310 5566 6.15 h9rri?.Cert . Attorneys for Defendant WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR. elk/a. BILL COSBY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANOELES - JUDY HUTH, an individual, CASE NO. BC 565560 Terese Beaudet Dep?t 97] Plaintiff, Reservation ID: 141204034626 . A v. DEFENDANT WILLIAM HENRY coseY. NOTICE OF MOTION MLLIAM HENRY COS-BY, JR. a/k/a AND MOTION FOR BILL COSBY, OF POINTS AND AND DECLARATION Defendant. 0F MARTIN D. SINGER . [(Proposed) Order submitted herewith] 3 Date: March 12, 2015 Tilne: 1:30 p.111. Dept; 97 [Complaint Filed: December 2, 2914] . TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on March 12, 2015 at 1 :30 p.11, or as soon thereafter as the 4 matter may be heard, in Department 97 of the above?entitled located at 11 1 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, Defendant COSBY, IR. elk/e BILL and hereby does move tenninating Sanctions and menetaxy sanctions Ofnot less than $332,295 against Plaintiff JUDY HUTH and Plaintiff ?s counsel Men; S. Streeker, Esq. Of Streeker LawIOf?ces, jointly and severally. 120414 (v2)_wpd 1 WON I?t I?L'h?t l?i h?lH This Motion is based upon this Notice, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities ?led herewith, the Declaration of Martin D. Singer, all other pleadings and papers on ?le in this action, and such other documents, oral evidence or argument as may be presented before or at the time of the hearing on this matter. DATE: December 4, 2014 FOR 2 LAVELY SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MARTIN D. SINGER LYNDA B. GOLDMAN ANDREW B. BRETT ER By: MARTIN D. SIN Attorneys for Defendant WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR. a/k/a BILL COSBY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION FACTUAL BACKGROUND This is a case where Plaintiff through her lawyer engaged in extortion. Approximately ten years ago, Plaintiff Judy Huth unsuccessfully tried to get money from a tabloid by selling the same story about Defendant Bill Cosby that is the subject of this lawsuit. Now, approximately ten years later, and 40 years after the alleged incident, Plaintiff rushed to the courthouse and filed this baseless time?barred lawsuit once she knew that she and her lawyer had been accused of engaging in a Shakedown. Plaintiff?s claims are absolutely false. They are also untimely. Plaintiff and her attorney know that there was no legal basis to file this lawsuit. Knowing that since she disclosed her allegations to a media outlet 10 years ago she cannot claim to have a repressed memory and could not make such a contention to justify her belated claim, she nevertheless filed a lawsuit knowing that legally she could not do so. Plaintiff and her attorney have engaged in deliberate and egregious misconduct by filing an outrageous, stale lawsuit asserting specious claims that have been time?barred for decades. After 40 years of inaction, interrupted only by Plaintiff?s unsuccessful efforts to pro?t by selling her story to the tabloids years ago, she engaged in a new opportunistic tactic to make money from events she claims took place in 1974. Through her laWyer, Plaintiff made extortionate threats to Mr. Cosby (through his counsel) about criminal penalties, coupled with ever-increasing demands for a six?figure payday to keep quiet about her long?since-expired claims. In conversations her attorney, Marc Strecker, peppered with references to ?a serious crime? and purported ?criminal penalties,? he repeatedly demanded a six figure payment for his client in increasing amounts, jumping from $100,000 to $250,000. (Singer Decl., 111] 9-10.) Plaintiff?s counsel did so While refusing to provide any legal basis whatsoever to justify the purported Viability of four-decade-old claims that are barred by applicable statutes of limitation. (Singer Decl., 3?4, 7?12.) Tellingly, throughout his attempts to extract a substantial unmerited payment on time?barred claims, Plaintiff? attorney was unable to answer even the most basic questions about the events that FOR SANCTLONS 120414 (v2).wpd i Plaintiff claims occurred during her alleged encounter with Mr. Cosby four decades ago. Given the lack of factual basis for her claims, combined with the fact that Plaintiff?s counsel could not articulate any legal basis for avoiding the statute of limitations on a 40-year?old claim, and combined with the fact that Plaintiff?s monetary demands increased while her attorney made ominous references to ?criminal penalties? and an alleged ?serious crime,? Mr. Cosby rejected Plaintiff?s demand for money. (Singer Decl, 1 ll and Exh. Once Mr. Cosby refused to capitulate to his extortionate demands and accused Ms. Huth and her attorney of engaging in a Shakedown, Plaintiff? counsel rushed to Court within a day to file the lawsuit in an attempt to avoid the ramifications of engaging in extortion by having first tried to get $100,000 and then increasing the demand to $250,000,while continuously refusing to provide any legal justi?cation to get around the applicable statute of limitations.I Plaintiff and her lawyer brazenly filed the Complaint while blatantly ignoring the explicit statutory mandates of Cal ifornia Code of Civil Procedure 340.1 which require, among other things, submitting sworn Certificates of Merit by a licensed mental health practitioner who has interviewed the plaintiff and by the attorney validating the suit. (California Code of Civil Procedure Plaintiff? counsel admitted within days of filing the lawsuit that he only spent an hour meeting with her and that he did not know if she had ever seen a therapist or undergone any therapy for this incident for which she was demanding hundreds of thousands of dollars. (See Singer Decl, 1] 6.) Moreover, Plaintiff egregiously and wilfully failed to identify Defendant Cosby only by a ?Doe? designation as mandated by California Code of Civil Procedure First, to file an otherwise time?barred claim, Plaintiff would need to obtain a Certi?cate of Merit by a licensed mental health practitioner who has interviewed her and who attests that in their professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe the claims are meritorious. California (Code of Civil Procedure However, her attorney knew he could not get a Certi?cate of Plaintiff also changed her story between her lawyer?s demand letter and calls and Plaintiff? telling of her revised tale in the Complaint in a transparent attempt to cure some of the (incurable) defects precluding her claims. Initially, Plaintiff alleged that she played a drinking game with Mr. Cosby when they met in 1974 during which both she and Mr. Cosby consumed alcohol. When the undersigned counsel informed Mr. Strecker that Mr. Cosby is a life?long non? drinker, Plaintiff changed her story to fit the facts, and she now alleges that she was the only one ?required? to drink. (See Singer Decl., 1W 3, 8, ll; Complaint, 4.) FOR SANCTIONS 120414 (v2).wpd 2 Merit even though it is required because his client did not forget about this alleged incident as evidenced by the fact that she disclosed her allegations to the media a decade ago in a failed attempt to get money, and also that he did not even know if she had ever been treated by a therapist. Second, of utmost signi?cance, Plaintiff is expressly prohibited under the statute from identifying the Defendant by his name until she obtains permission from the Court. After waiting 40 years to assert her specious claims, Plaintiff outrageously rushed to court identifying Mr. Cosby by name instead of by the mandatory ?Doe? designation. Plaintiff and her lawyer filed the Complaint using Mr. Cosby?s name, without a sworn Certificate of Merit by a licensed mental health practitioner, and without a sworn Certificate of Merit by the attorney. The fact that Paragraph 8 of the Complaint itself refers to Section 340.1 at the same time that the Complaint utterly fails to comply with the statute?s clear mandates establishes that these multiple failures to abide by the Statute?s requirements were wilful and intentional . The bell cannot be unrung. Mr. Cosby has been identified by name rather than as a ?Doe? as required by statute, and the prejudicial impact of Plaintiff?s identifying Mr. Cosby by name in this suit cannot be overstated. Plaintiff and her counsel engaged in deliberate misconduct so egregious that no sanction short of dismissal is appropriate. That remedy should be imposed pursuant to this Court?s inherent power to impose terminating sanctions. In addition, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure upon termination of the action in favor of Defendant, the Court should also ?order a party, a party?s attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney?s fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certificate of merit should have been filed.? Upon sustaining the concurrently filed Demurrer, the Court should impose monetary sanctions. (Singer Decl., ll 14.) The Court should not tolerate the blatant disregard of the explicit mandates of Section 340.1, which Plaintiff herself cites in her own Complaint. Unless terminating sanctions are imposed, Plaintiff and her lawyer will be rewarded for ignoring the mandatory requirements of FOR SANCTIONS 120414 (v2).wpd 3 D-Section 340.1 and for rushing to file this specious time?barred case after their failed attempts to extort an unmerited settlement. II. ARGUMENT A. Mr. Cosby Is Entitled to Terminating Sanctions. California courts have inherent discretionary power to control court proceedings before the court (see Code Civ. Proc. 128, subds. and to dismiss claims with prejudice. (Lyons v. Wickhorst (1986) 42 Cal.3d 911, 915.) Indeed, a court?s inherent power to dismiss an action is recognized by statute. (S ee Code Civ. Proc. 581, subd. 583.150.) Courts may exercise such power to dismiss an action with prejudice ?[w]hen a plaintiff?s deliberate and egregious misconduct in the court of litigation renders any sanction short of dismissal inadequate to protect the fairness of the trial.? (Stephen Slesinger, Inc. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 762.) Here, Plaintiff and her attorney ?agrantly violated the express provisions of Code section 340. 1 which requires a plaintiff to ?le Certificates of Merit to corroborate her otherwise time-barred claims (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subds. and Specifically, a plaintiff who is at least 26 years old when she files an action alleging childhood sexual abuse must submit Certificates of Merit from both her attorney and from a mental health practitioner who interviewed her attesting to the reasonableness and meritorious nature of the plaintiff?s claims. (Id. 340.1, subds. Plaintiff and her attorney did not even attempt to comply with the express provisions of section 340.1. Plaintiff did not ?le the required Certificates of Merit with the Complaint because there is no merit to her claim. As Plaintiff?s counsel confirmed, more than nine years ago, Plaintiff attempted to sell her story to the tabloids for money. (Singer Decl, 1[ 5.) Accordingly, she cannot credibly claim that her injuries and/or illness were only discovered within the last three years. (Compl, 8.) Indeed, Plaintiff?s counsel admitted that he had no idea if his client had ever even been treated for her alleged injuries. (Singer Decl., 1I6.) In fact, he admitted that he met with his client FOR SANCTIONS 120414 (v2).wpd 4 \Ow-slmUl-BMNt-l for only an hour before asserting her claims and demanding money to keep them quiet. Id. It is hardly a surprise that there are no Certi?cates of Merit backing up this unmeritorious lawsuit. Signi?cantly, the governing statute expressly mandates that any plaintiff asserting claims pursuant to section 340. 1, subdivision must name the defendant only as a ?Doe? in any pleadings or papers ?led in the action ?until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Before any action can proceed against the anonymous defendant, the Court must find ?based solely on th[e] certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of the action against that defendant.? (Id. 340.1, subd. Here, Plaintiffnamed Mr. Cosby in the lawsuit rather than referring to him as ?John Doe,? as she was required to do under the Code until the Court had the Opportunity to review the certifications in camera and make a determination that Plaintiff could proceed with a public claim against Mr. Cosby. Obviously, Plaintiff and her attorney named Mr. Cosby to embarrass him, and to publicize the lawsuit in an effort to put additional pressure on Mr. Cosby and no doubt to attract new potential clients for Mr. Strecker. Such conduct is unconscionable and subject to discipline. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the That Plaintiff publicly identified Mr. Cosby as the defendant instead of naming him as a ?Doe? illustrates that Plaintiff and her attorney had no intention of complying with any provisions of the statute now or at any time in the future. Allowing the case to proceed after amendment would be inherently prejudicial to Mr. Cosby in light of Plaintiff and her attorneys? egregious behavior. Like any defendant sued where Section 340.1 is implicated, Mr. Cosby was entitled to the anonymity afforded by the statutory scheme unless and until a court determined that the claim had adequate merit and that disclosure of his name was permissible and appropriate. Plaintiff and her lawyer engaged in egregious conduct depriving Mr. Cosby of the statute?s protections. What they have done cannot be undone. Only terminating sanctions can apprOpriately remedy what has occurred in light of their wilful conduct. FOR SANCTIONS 120414 (v2).wpd 5 \cmanI-hwwi?i As explained in Stephen Slesinger, Inc. 12. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 740, ?when a plaintiff?s deliberate and egregious misconduct makes any sanction other than dismissal inadequate to ensure a fair trial, the trial court has inherent power to impose a terminating sanction.? This is such a case. In Slesinger, the Court noted that it was not limiting the varieties of deliberate misconduct that would justify imposing the severe terminating sanction of dismissal pursuant to the court?s inherent power since ?corrupt intent knows no stylistic boundaries.? (Id. at 764, quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp. (lst Cir.l989) 892 F.2d 1115, 1118.) Plaintiff and her attorney overstepped the boundaries of permissible conduct by wilfully failing to obtain and ?le mandatory Certi?cates of Merit and by naming Mr. Cosby in the suit rather than identifying the Defendant as ?John Doe.? What occurred here was severe, deliberate, and egregious, and it cannot be undone. No sanction short of termination is adequate. If Plaintiff and her attorney are permitted to thumb their nose at the express mandates of Section 340.1, they will be rewarded for their egregious wilful misconduct. Identifying Mr. Cosby by name in the Complaint is an intentional act which cannot be undone. For Plaintiff and her counsel to have specifically referenced Section 340.1 in the Complaint while naming Mr. Cosby rather that using the required ?Doe? designation, and while filin the lawsuit in the utter absence of the necessary Certi?cates of Merit to be viewed in camera by the Court is wilful conduct that cannot be remedied and which is so egregious and serious that imposing terminating sanctions is warranted. B. Mr. Cosby_ls Entitled to Monetary Sanctions. Despite limitations on a court?s inherent authority to impose monetary sanctions against parties or their counsel (see Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 63 8-39), numerous statutes and court rules give California courts the power to impose monetary sanctions. In particular, the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that sanctions in the form of attorneys? fees can be awarded to the prevailing defendant in an action for alleged childhood sexual abuse. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Mr. Cosby filed a Demurrer concurrently herewith because the statute provides that a plaintiff? ?failure to file certi?cates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. see also Doyle v. Fenster (1996) FOR SANCTIONS 120414 (v2).wpd 6 mNchoo-qcxm-thr-de 25 26? 27 28 47 Cal.App.4th 1701, 1707 [holding that certi?cates of merit are an ?aspect of the ?Upon the favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to any defendant for whom a certi?cate of merit . . . should have been ?led pursuant to this section, the court may, upon the motion of a party . . . order a party, a party?s attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney?s fees, incurred by the defendant for whom a certi?cate of merit should have been ?led.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Mr. Cosby should not'have had to defend this meritless and invalid action in court or in the media in light of Plaintiff de?cient ?lings and unlawful disclosure of Mr. Cosby?s name. Mr. Cosby has incurred in excess of $23,295 in legal fees and costs in connection with preparing the accompanying demurrer and this motion for sanctions, and anticipate incurring no less than an additional $10,000 in legal fees in connection with reply papers and a court hearing. (Singer Decl., 14.) The Court should impose monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorney, Mr. Strecker, jointly and severally, in the amount of these attorneys? fees and costs. Indeed, the statute expressly provides for discipline against an attorney in these situations 2' violation of this section may constitute unprofessional conduct and may be the grounds for discipline against the attoi-ney.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1,subd. I CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Mr. Cosby respectfully requests that the Court sustain the Motion, impose terminating sanctions and monetary sanctions of not less than $33,295 (see Singer Dec]., 14), and such other or further relief as the Court may deem to be just and appropriate. Respectfully submitted, DATE: December 4, 2014 . . LAVELY SINGER if Attorneys for Defendant . WILLIAM HENRY COS . a/k/a BILL COSBY FOR SANCTIONS 120314.wpcl 7 7 DECLARATION mqamAMNHcowqmm-kwNi?nc DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. SINGER 1, Martin D. Singer, declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before all of the Courts of the State of California and am a member of the law ?rm Laver Singer Professional Corporation, counsel of record for Defendant William Henry Cosby, Jr. herein. I have personal and ?rst-hand knowledge of the matters set forth in this Declaration and, if called as a witness, could and would testify competently thereto under oath. 2. This Declaration is ?led in support of Defendant?s Motion seeking the imposition of both monetary and terminating sanctions due to Plaintiff?s egregious ?ling of a time?barred Complaint which speci?cally acknowledges the mandatory statutory requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure 340.1 while brazenly failing to comply with those statutory mandates which require, among other things, submitting sworn Certi?cates of Merit by a licensed mental health practitioner who interviewed the plaintiff and by the attorney validating the suit, and identifying the defendant only by a ?Doe? designation ?until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.? (California Code of Civil Procedure No Certi?cates of Merit were obtained or ?led with the Complaint as required by section 340. Moreover, Mr. Cosby was identi?ed by name in the Complaint rather than being referred to only by 21 ?Doc? designation as required by section As set forth in the Motion, the Complaint alleging time?barred claims based on purported events of 40 years ago was ?led for improper purposes following a series of unsuccessful extortionate demands by Plaintiff for payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars. In view of the severity of this egregious misconduct, the imposition of terminating sanctions and monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1(q) is appropriate. 3. In a letter to Mr. Cosby?s long?time attorney, John P. Schmitt, Marc S. Strecker stated that he represents a woman whom he identi?ed only as ?Judith,? claiming that she had allegedly been sexually abused by Mr. Cosby in 1974 when she was 15 years old. That letter contained numerous specious and inflammatory allegations about Mr. Cosby, including certain of the allegations underpinning Judith?s purported claims which are obviously false, such as the DECL (vi) 120314.de 1 DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. SINGER claim that she engaged in a drinking game with Mr. Cosby in which they both consumed beers; it is well known and easily veri?able, that Mr. Cosby is a life-long non-drinker. The letter claimed that his client allegedly sustained damage and mental anguish which allegedly caused signi?cant problems throughout her life since the incident. Signi?cantly, that letter contained no legal justi?cation at all for the potential assertion of any legal claim 40 years after the alleged 1974 incident, yet it ominously warned that Mr. Strecker would proceed with enforcing Judith?s legal rights if Mr. Cosby did not ?do the right thing by Judith? and if Mr. Strecker was not contacted by 5:00 pm. on November 21, 2014. 4. On November 21, 2014, Mr. Schmitt and I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Strecker. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Strecker repeatedly refused to provide any legal justi?cation or argument whatsoever to explain why his client?s 40-year-old claims were not time-barred. Nevertheless, he communicated to us that in exchange for a substantial payment from Mr. Cosby, his client would not pursue criminal charges or civil claims or disclose her story to the media. 7 5. Signi?cantly, during my telephone conversation with Mr. Streckerion November 21, 2014, he admitted that his client, Judith, had attempted to sell her story to a national tabloid almost 10 years ago. Moreover, during that telephone conversation, Mr. Strecker admitted that his client had no repressed memory, as con?rmed by the fact that she tried to sell her story to the tabloids almost a decade ago. 6. During that conversation on November 21, 2014, Mr. Strecker admitted that he had met with his client for only one hour. Mr. Strecker also admitted that he had no idea whether his client had obtained any therapy or had ever been treated by a therapist at all in the past 40 years. 7. During the telephone conversation of November 21, 2014, Mr. Strecker demanded that his client be paid a substantial sum of money. Mr. Strecker stated during that telephone conversation that ?ling a lawsuit ?obviously would be a matter of public record? and my client should ?put this matter behind both of them? as supposedly his ?client has no desire to go public.? However, he refused to explain the legal basis justifying the request that his client be DECL (v1) 120314.wpd 2 DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. SINGER paid money for a 40-year-old claim. 8. During my telephone conversation with Mr. Strecker on November 21, 2014, he again asserted, as he had in his letter, that my client consumed alcohol during a drinking game in 1974, and that he allegedly drank three (3) beers. 9. On November 25, 2014, Mr. Schmitt and I had another telephone conversation with Mr. Strecker. During that conversation Mr. Strecker said that ?there are criminal penalties? for the conduct his client claimed occurred in 1974, and he demanded money to ?compensate? her and keep her claims quiet. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Strecker again refused to provide any legal justi?cation whatsoever justifying how his client could assert a legal claim against Mr. Cosby 40 years after the events Mr. Strecker?s client claimed occurred. During this November 25, 2014 conversation, Mr. Strecker stated that my client had engaged in ?a serious crime.? He also stated that his client wanted $100,000. 10. I had a further telephone conversation with Mr. Strecker on November 26, 2014. During this conversation, for the ?rst time he provided me with his client?s surname, Huth. Mr. Strecker increased his ?nancial demand from $100,000 and demanded that his client be paid $250,000 in exchange for his client refraining from pursuing criminal or legal claims or going to the media with her claims. He stated that for the $250,000, ?you?ll get anything you want.? 11. Attached hereto as Exhibit is a true and correct copy of my letter to Mr. Strecker dated December 1, 2014. That letter con?rms my prior conversations with Mr. Strecker and rejects his client?s demand for money. If also con?rms that Mr. Strecker had continued to refuse to provide any legal basis for the assertion of time-barred claims based on alleged events of 40 years ago. It also points out that contrary to his assertions that Mr. Cosby drank three (3) beers during an alleged drinking game with Mr. Strecker?s client, Mr. Cosby is a life-long non-drinker. 12. Mr. Strecker tried to backtrack from statements that he had made to Mr. Schmitt and me in telephone calls we had with him by sending a responsive email to my December 1 letter (Exhibit In response, I sent a letter to Mr. Strecker dated December 2, 2014, a true and correct copy which is attached hereto as Exhibit That letter con?rms that DECL (v1) l203l4.wpd DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. SINGER notwithstanding repeated requests that he do so, Mr. Strecker continued to refuse to provide any legal basis to justify the demand that his client be paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for 40? year?old claims barred by applicable statutes of limitation. It also recon?rms Mr. Strecker?s admission that his client had no repressed memory justifying her delayed assertion of claims inasmuch as she tried to sell her story to the tabloids approximately a decade ago. 13. Plaintiff?s Complaint in this action was ?led on December 2, 2014. In the Complaint, Mr. Cosby is identi?ed as a defendant by name rather than a ?Doe? designation being used as required by Code of Civil Procedure The Complaint was also ?led without a Certi?cate of Merit by a licensed mental health practitioner who interviewed the plaintiff, and without a Certi?cate of Merit by the attorney. Yet, the Complaint itself specifically refers to Code of Civil Procedure 340.1 at page 2, paragraph 8, thereby indicating that Plaintiff?s counsel is well aware of that statute and its requirements and that the egregious failure to comply with those requirements was wilful. 14. Mr. Cosby has incurred in excess of $23,295 in attorneys?s fees in connection with the preparation of the Motion for Sanctions and accompanying Demurrer. This is comprised of legal fees expended in excess of the following on these matters: 6.5 hours at my hourly rate of $850, totaling $5,525; 14.6 hours at Lynda B. Goldman?s hourly rate of $625, totaling $9,125; and 18.2 hours at Andrew B. Brettler?s hourly rate of $475, totaling $8,645. We also anticipate incurring legal fees of no less than $10,000 in preparation of Reply papers and attending a court hearing, for total fees of $33,295. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. DECL (v1) [20314.Wpd 4 DECLARATION OF MARTIN I). SINGER EXHIBIT A JOHN H. LAVELY. JR. MARTIN D. SINGER BRIAN G. WOLF LYNDA B. GOLDMAN MICHAEL D. HOLTZ PAUL N. SORRELL MICHAEL. E. WEINSTEN EVAN N. SPIEGEL. LAVELY 8v: SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ATTORNEYS AT LAW SUITE 2:100 2049 CENTURY PARK EAST LOB ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067~2906 TELEPHONE (310) 5563501 FACSIMILE (310) 556-3615 TODD S. ANDREW E. DAVID B. JONELJS ZEN JONATHAN M. KLEIN HART HENRY L. haulamuinlum NY m' AND NJ December 1, 2014 VIA EMAIL: Marc S. Strecker, Esq. Strecker Law Offices 2600 Michelson Drive Suite 1700' Irvine, CA 92612 Re: Bill Cosby Judith Hut-h Our File 980?50 Dear Mr. Strecker: Your demand for money from Mr. Cosby is rejected. In our several conversations, youhave repeatedly asserted that a crime was committed, but you have been unable to anSWer the most basic questions about the events your client claims to have oc0urred four decades ago. Moreover, certain of the allegations underpinning your purported claims are obviously false. For example, your client. Claims that she engaged in a drinking game with Mr. Cosby in which they both consumed three beers. It is well?known, and easily verifiable, that Mr. Cosby is a life?long non?drinker. You also stated several times that Mr. Cosby coached your client to claim she was 19 years old in order to be served drinks at the Playboy mansion. The drinking age in California at the time was 21, not 18. Finally, you have said on a number of occasions that your client does not wish to- have her claims publicized. However, in response to a question from me, you admitted that she had unsuccessfully attempted to sell her story to a national tabloid almost 10 years ago. You have also been unwilling, and we believe you are unable, to provide any legal argument that any of her claims would not be time barred. Nevertheless, you have told me that in exchange for a substantial payment from Mr. Cosby, your client will not pursue criminal charges or civil claims or disclose her story to the media. We have heard your protestations that you and your client are not engaged in a shakedown. However, given the above, it appears that that is exactly what is happening here. Marc S. Strecker, Esq. Re: Bill Cosby/Judith Huth December 1, 2014 Page 2 Our client reserves all rights against you and your client. This does not constitute a complete or exhaustive statement of all of my client?s rights or claims. Nothing stated herein is intended as, nor should it be deemed to constitute a waiver or relinquishr?nent, of any of my client?s rights or remedies, whether legal 01" equitable. S. . ?z r" mcere .- MARTIN D. SINGER .10th. Schm?itt, Esq. 120114.wpd EXHIBIT JOHN H. JR. D. SINGER BRIAN G. WOLF LYNDA H. GOLDMAN D. PAUL. NI somaaLL MICHAEL E. WEINSTEN LAVELY SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION LAW SUITE 2400 2049 CENTURY FARK EAST Lo-s ANGELES, CALIFORNIA gooev-aooe TELEPHONE (310) 556-3501 TODD S. ANDREW l3. DAVID B. JONELIS ZEV JONATHAN M. KLEIN ALLISON S. HART EVAN N. SPIEGEL FAGSIMILE 555.3615 HENRY L. SELF. COUNSEL ALIO ADMWTID NT ALSO ADMITTIO IN NT AND N) December 2014 VIA EMAIL: Marc- S. Strecker, Esq. Streeker Law Of?ces 2600 Michelson Drive, Suite 1700 Irvine, CA 92612 Re: Bill Cost Judith Huth Our File No: 980?50 Dear Streeker: There is nothing false in my December 1-, 2014 letter, Moreover, notwithstanding my repeatedrequests, you failed to provide any legal basis whatsoever to justify the demand that your. client be paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to resolve a 4(Lyear?olcl claim that has long, been time~barred by applicable statutes of limitation. This is especially clear in this matter, since you. admitted your client had no repressed memory when she tried to sell her story to the tabloids almost a decade ago. There would be no reason for you to refuse to inform me of your legal theory supporting a four?decade extension of the statute of limitation if such a theory existed. The fact that you have not proffered any legal justi?cation at all for the six ?gure settlement demand on a time-barred claim speaks volumes. I stand by what I said in my prior correspondence. All rights reserved. 3? ?It! . if?? a: a . ARTIN SINGER . .., 1" cc: John P. lssq. it l20l l4 PROOF OF SERVICE C.C.P. Revised 5/1/88 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400, Los Angeles, California 90067?2906. On the date listed below, I served the foregoing document described as: DEFENDANT WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AND DECLARATION OF MARTIN D. SINGER [(Proposed) Order submitted herewith] on the interested parties in this action by placing: a true and correct copy the original document thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: . Marc S. Strecker, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff: Strecker Law Of?ces 2600 Michelson Drive, Suite 1700 Judy Huth Irvine, CA 92612 Tel: (949) 852-3600 BY MAIL: I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the ?rm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with US. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed December 4, 2014 at Los Angeles, California. H. Hancock