CONFORMEO COPY 22 ND Os 1-1 LB l-f MARTIN D. SINGER (SBN 73166) CONFORMED COPY LYNDA B. GOLDMAN (SBN 119765) 0F ORIGINAL FILED ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO- 262928) L05 Ameles Simenor Dun LAVELY ?2 SINGER - PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION DEC 0 4 2014 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, Califomia 90067?2906 Fla Cart?, Executive Officer/Clerk Telephone: (310) 556-3501 53" M0593 3010:136qu Facsimile: (310) 556-3615 Attorneys for Defendant WELIAM R. We BILL COSBY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES JUDY an iriditridual, CASE NO. 130565560 [Hon Teresa Beaudet Dep?t 97] Plaintiff, Resmvation 1D: 141204034625 V. NOTICE OF WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, IR. a/k/a DEMURRER AND BILL COSBY, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND . AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF Defendant. Date: November 3, 2015 Time: 1:30 pm. Dept: 97 [Complaint Filed: December 2, 2014] TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on November 3, 2015 at 1:30 p.111, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Department 97 of the above?entitled Court, located at 111 Norm Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, Defendant WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, a/k/a BILL COSBY will and hereby does demur to the Complaint and each cause of action asserted therein by Plaintiff JUDY HUTH. This Demurrer is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 439.10, upon the grounds that Plaintiff failed to file the requisite certi?cates pursuant to Caliibmia Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (I) and that Plaintiff Complaint fails to?state SuftiCient facts to constitute a cause of action for any claims arising Ont of alleged childhood sexual abuse; Among 120414 (v2) 1 other reasons, Plaintiff? 40-year old claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. This Demurrer is based upon this Notice, the accompanying Demurrer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all other pleadings and papers on ?le in this action, and such other documents, oral evidence or argument as may be presented before or at the time of the hearing on this matter. LAVELY SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MARTIN D. SINGER LYNDA B. GOLDMAN DATE: December 4, 2014 Attorneys for Defendant WILLIAM HENRY cos??Y, JR. a/k/a BILL COSBY l204l4 2 DEMURRER F0 RUIN \wa'lChUI DEMURRER Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, Defendant WILLIAM HENRY COSBY, JR. a/k/a BILL COSBY hereby demurs to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff JUDY HUTH on the following grounds: SPECIAL DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT When asserting claims based on alleged ?childhood sexual abuse,? a plaintiff over 26 years of age is required to ?le Certificates of Merit executed by her attorney and by a licensed mental health practitioner attesting to the meritorious nature of the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subds. and Plaintiff failed to file the requisite certificates. ?The failure to ?le certificates in accordance with [Section 340. 1] shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 43 0. 1 (Id. 340.1, subd. GENERAL DEMURRER TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff?s first cause of action for sexual battery fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. 430.10, subd. GENERAL DEMURRER TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff?s second cause of action for intentional in?iction of emotional distress fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. 430.10, subd. GENERAL DEMURRER 0 THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Plaintiff?s third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress fails to state facts suf?cient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. 430.10, subd. 120414 (v2) 1 WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that the demurrer to the Complaint be sustained as follows: 1. The demurrer to the ?rst, second, and third causes of action be sustained without leave to amend; 2. An award of attorneys? fees and costs against Plaintiff in favor of Defendant; and 3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem to be just and appropriate. LAVELY SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MARTIN D. SINGER LYNDA B. GOLDMAN DATE: December 4, 2014 MARTIN D. Attorneys for Defendant WILLIAM HENRY COSBYIJ . a/k/a BILL COSBY 120414 2 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT Ox U1 laMEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT BACKGROUND Plaintiff Judy I?Iuth ?led a meritless and unsupported 40-year old claim against Bill Cosby alleging decades-old sexual abuse immediately after Mr. Cosby rejected Plaintiff?s outrageous demand for money in order not to make her allegations public. Recognizing that they committed extortion and could face signi?cant consequences for their conduct, Plaintiff?s counsel, Marc Strecker, rushed to the courthouse to ?le this lawsuit on behalf of his client. In doing so, Plaintiff and her attorney violated the express provisions of the statute mandating that such claims must be supported by Certi?cates of Merit executed both by Plaintiff?s counsel and by a mental health practitioner, who interviewed Plaintiff and found there to be meritorious cause for her claim. In addition, until the Court reviews the Certi?cates of Merit, and ?nds that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for ?ling this action against Mr. Cosby, under the statute, Plaintiff is required to name him as a ?Doe? defendant, and is prohibited from publicly revealing his identity. Notwithstanding the express statutory requirements, in a blatant effort to garner publicity for himself and for his client, Mr. Strecker named Mr. Cosby as a defendant in the action before the Court could consider whether Plaintiff even had the right to pursue this baseless action. It is evident that the statutory requirements were willfully disregarded, as evidenced by the fact that in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Plaintiff actually cites the relevant statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Under California law, the only way that an alleged victim of childhood sexual abuse would be able to assert an otherwise time?barred claim is to allege that the injury or illness had been repressed and was only discovered within the last three years. Without providing any speci?c allegations, or the mandated certi?cation from a mental health professional to support her claim, Plaintiff alleges that she discovered her injuries and illness ?within the three years prior to the ?ling of [her] Complaint.? (Compl, 1 8.) Conspicuously absent from her Complaint, however, is the fact, con?rmed by Plaintiff?s counsel, that Plaintiff unsuccessfully tried to sell her story to the tabloids nearly a decade ago. This fact belies the allegation in the lawsuit that Plaintiff only just discovered the basis for her claims within the past three years. Indeed, as of at 120414 (v2) 1 hubleast 2005, Plaintiff tried to pro?t from them and obtain money by selling the media a story containing her allegations. Plaintiff and her attorney did not even attempt to comply with the Statute by ?ling the requisite Certi?cates of Merit because they knew Plaintiff?s claim was meritless and that no mental health practitioner would ?nd her claim reasonable or meritorious. Indeed, Plaintiff?s attorney acknowledged that as of November 21, 2014, he was unaware of whether Plaintiff ever saw a mental health practitioner regarding her claims. Nevertheless, recognizing that Mr. Cosby was not going to caVe into extortionate demands and that they faced exposure for their conduct, Plaintiff and her attorney disregarded California law and hastily filed this action without the mandated supporting documents. Worse, in violation of the statute, Plaintiff and her counsel publicized the filing by naming Mr. Cosby as a defendant prior to obtaining Court permission to do so. As a result of Plaintiff?s failure to abide by the express provisions of the statute and the fact that all of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the Court should sustain the demurrer to the Complaint, without leave to amend. Further, as requested in the accompanying Motion for Sanctions, the Court should issue terminating sanctions. and monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorney, jointly and severally, including reasonable attorneys? fees and costs in favor of Mr. Cosby. II. THE STANDARD ON DEMURRER California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 requires that a demurrer be sustained where a complaint fails to state facts suf?cient to constitute a cause of action. A demurrer may be used to challenge defects that appear on the face of the complaint, or for matters outside the complaint that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Code Civ. Proc. 430.30, subd. ?Generally, material facts alleged in the complaint are treated as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer.? (Cd?aH Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co, (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.) However, ?contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint are not considered in judging its suf?ciency.? (101.; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 135, 138 fn. [?argumentative allegations, and conclusions 120414 (v2) 2 of law, are not . . . presumed true?]; Windham at CarmelMountain Ranch Ass ?11 v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1162, 168 [?we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law? on demurrer].) Moreover, unless the pleading party demonstrates how the complaint can be amended, leave to amend is properly denied. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [it is the pleading party?s burden to ?show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his Where, as here, ?the insuf?ciency of the complaint is revealed on its face,? a demurrer should be sustained. (Seidler v. Municipal Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233.) There is no basis for Plaintiff?s attorney to be able to amend the Complaint since Plaintiff was prohibited from identifying the defendant by name Without court permission. This fatal defect in violation of section 340.1 is incapable of being cured. ARGUMENT A. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer to Plaintiff?s Complaint Because She Failed To File the Requisite Certi?cates of Merit Pursuant to the Code. By Plaintiff?s own admission, her claims arise from alleged childhood sexual abuse? pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (Oomph, 1] 8.) Under the cited Code section, the time for commencement of an action baSed on alleged childhood sexual abuse ?shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that injury or illness occurring after the age of maj ority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Plaintiff was 15 years old in 1974 when the alleged abuse took place, meaning Plaintiff was approximately 56 years old as of the date she filed her lawsuit. (C0mpl., 113.) The Code further provides that ?[e]very plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the action is ?led shall ?le Certi?cates of Merit . . . executed by the attorney for the plaintiff and by a licensed mental health practitioner selected by the plaintiff.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subds. and The respective Certi?cates of Merit from plaintiff? counsel and the selected mental health practitioner shall set forth the following information: 120414 (v2) 3 (1) That the attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, that the attorney has consulted with at least one mental health practitioner who is licensed to practice and practices in this state and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involVed in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the ?ling of the action. The person consulted may not be a party to the litigation. (2) That the mental health practitioner consulted is licensed to practice and practices in this state and is not a party to the action, that the practitioner is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, and that the practitioner has interviewed the plaintiff and is knowledgeable of the relevant facts and issues involved in the particular action, and has concluded, on the basis of his or her knowledge of the facts and issues, that in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. ?The failure to ?le certi?cates in accordance with this section shall be grounds for a demurrer pursuant to Section 430.10 or a motion to strike pursuant to Section 435.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. see also Jackson v. Doe (201 l) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 752 [noting that the purpose ofthe Certificates of Merit requirements is to impose ?pleading hurdles aimed at reducing frivolous claims?] [citing legislative history].) In Jackson, the plaintiff failed to file the requisite Certi?cates of Merit with her original complaint. (Id. at p. 747.) The Jackson plaintiff then lodged a ?rst amended complaint to which she attached the Certi?cates of Merit in an effort to cure her prior defect. (Id. at p. 748.) However, the trial court sustained the defendant?s demurrer, without leave to amend, on statute of limitations grounds. (Id. at p. 751.) In affirming the trial court?s order, the Court of Appeal held that section 340.1 ?requires the ?ling of the Certi?cates of Merit before the running of the statute of limitations? because the Certi?cates of Merit are ?an aspect of the complaint.? (Id. at p. 753 [citing Doyle v. Fenster (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1701, 1707].) Here, Plaintiff did not even attempt to comply with the express provisions of section 340.1. Like the in propia persona plaintiff in the Jackson case, Plaintiff in this action failed to ?le the required Certi?cates of Merit with her Complaint even with the benefit of counsel.I Because, as Mr. Strecker con?rmed, Plaintiff attempted to sell her story to the tabloids more than nine years ago, Plaintiff will not be able to rely on section 340.1, subdivision which ostensibly permits the requisite certi?cates to be ?led within 60 days after filing the complaint because Plaintiff?s counsel did not submit a certi?cation claiming that he was unable to obtain the certificates prior to the imminent expiration of the statute of limitations. (See Doyle v. enster, 47 Cal.App.4th at p.1706) 120414 (v2) 4 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT she and her attorney knew there was no legitimate basis to claim that Plaintiff?s alleged injuries due to the alleged sexual abuse were discovered within the last three years. Fatal to her Complaint, Plaintiff failed to plead?or support with the requisite certifications?any speci?c allegation pertaining to the discovery of her alleged injuries and/or illness. Plaintiff does not even allege in her Complaint the approximate date when she discovered her alleged injuries and illness. Rather, in conclusory and self?serving fashion, Plaintiff merely asserts that the discovery was ?within the three years prior to the filing ofthis Complaint.? (Compl., 11 8.) In light of these fatal ?aws in Plaintiff? pleading and the absence of any Certi?cates of Merit corroborating Plaintiff." allegations, the Court should sustain the Demurrer without leave to amend. B. The Court Should Sustain the Demurrer to Plaintiff?s Complaint Because Plaintiff Identi?ed the Defendant by Name Prior to Obtaining the Court?s Permission. There are two requirements for filing a lawsuit under Code section 340.1. First, as stated in Section 111A, supra, a plaintiff must file the requisite Certificates of Merit, which Plaintiff failed to do here. Second, a plaintiff cannot identify the defendant by name until the court gives permission to the plaintiff to reveal the defendant?s identity. In this case, it is impossible for Plaintiff to comply with this obligation because Plaintiff already identified Mr. Cosby as the defendant prior to obtaining permission from the Court. Speci?cally, the statute provides that ?no defendant may be named except by ?Doe? designation in any pleadings or papers filed in the action until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Before any action can proceed against the anonymous defendant, the Court must find ?based solely on th[e] Certi?cates of Merit, that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the ?ling of the action against that defendant.? (Id. 340. 1, subd. Despite these clear requirements, Plaintiff named Mr. Cosby in the lawsuit rather than referring to him as ?John Doe,? as she was required to do under the Code until the Court had the opportunity to review the certi?cations in camera and make a determination that Plaintiff could proceed with a public claim against Mr. Cosby. Obviously, Plaintiff and her attorney named Mr. Cosby to embarrass him, and to publicize the lawsuit in an effort to put additional pressure on Mr. Cosby and to attract new potential clients for 120414 (v2) 5 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT Mr. Strecker. That Plaintiff publicly identi?ed Mr. Cosby as the defendant instead of naming him as a ?Doe? illustrates that Plaintiff and her attorney had no intention of complying with any of the provision of the statute now or at any time in the future. There is no reported case that allows a plaintiff suing under Code section 340.1 to proceed with a lawsuit where the plaintiff improperly identified a defendant by name prior to obtaining the court?s permission. As cited above, in Jackson the plaintiff originally identified the defendant by name prior to obtaining the trial court?s permission. (Jackson v. Doe, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 746.) In response to a demurrer, the plaintiff then lodged an amended complaint in which she alleged that ?Doe? molested her. (Id. at. p. 747.) The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to file her amended complaint even though she attempted to cure the defects inherent in her original complaint. (Ibid) I The appellate court af?rmed the trial court?s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. (1d. at p. 756.) C. Each of Plaintiff?s Causes of Action Based on Alleged Childhood Sexual Abuse Are Barred by the Applicable Statute of Limitations. As set forth above, all actions based on alleged childhood sexual abuse must be ?led ?within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later.? (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Because Plaintiff waited more than 30 years after her eighteenth birthday to file this lawsuit against Mr. Cosby, the only way for her claims to be viable under the statute of limitations would be if she did not discover or could not have reasonably discovered her alleged injuries and/or illness until recently. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff? 3 claims do not fall into the category of those discovered within the last three years because she does not allege a single fact pertaining to the alleged recent discovery, or provide the requisite Certi?cates of Merit to support the allegations. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in 1974, while Plaintiff was 15 years old, Mr. Cosby ?proceeded to sexually molest her by attempting to put his hands down her pants, and then taking her hand in his hand and performing a sex act on himself.? (Compl., 1m 3, 6.) Plaintiff alleges that 120414 (v2) 6 DBMURRER TO COMPLAINT this incident was ?traumatic? and ?caused damage and mental anguish . . . that has caused her signi?cant problems throughout her life.? (Compl., 1i 7.) The problem with Plaintiff?s allegations (in addition to the fact that they are patently false) is that they are forty years old; and therefore, are inherently unreliable. Accordingly, California law requires that such claims be supported by two Certi?cates of Merit. The first shall be executed by the plaintiff?s attorney declaring that he has reviewed the relevant facts and consulted with at least one mental health practitioner, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of that review and consultation that there is reasonable and meritorious cause for the ?ling of the action. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. The second certi?cate of merit shall be executed by a mental health practitioner who interviewed the plaintiff, who is knowledgeable of the relevant facts, and who concluded in his or her professional opinion there is a reasonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to childhood sexual abuse. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. Here, the 56-year old Plaintiff failed to ?le either of the Certi?cates of Merit required under California law. As a result, Plaintiff cannot assert a viable claim for childhood sexual abuse 38 years after she attained the age of majority. If Plaintiff wanted to ?le these claims without having to submit the Certi?cates of Merit, she would have had to ?le this lawsuit before she turned 26 years old. (Code Civ. Proc. 340.1, subd. [?Every plaintiff 26 years of age or older at the time the action is ?led shall ?le Certi?cates of Merit . . . Because Plaintiff waited until she was 56 years old and ?led this lawsuit without the requisite Certi?cates of Merit, her claims are time?barred. (See Jackson v. Doe, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 755 [?The Certi?cates of Merit described in section 340.1 subdivision are ?an aspect of the complaint? and plaintiffs action is time?barred because she failed to ?le the Certi?cates ofMerit] [internal citation omitted].) D. Plaintiff?s Third Cause of Action For Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Fails To State Facts Suf?cient To Constitute a Cause of Action and Should Be Dismissed. In addition to the claim being barred by the applicable statute of limitations and Plaintiff?s failure to comply with the requirements of section 340.1, Plaintiff?s third cause of action should be dismissed on the additional grounds that Plaintiff failed to assert facts suf?cient to constitute a viable claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The California Supreme Court has allowed 120414 (v2) 7 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT statorplaintiffs to bring negligent in?iction of emotional distress actions as ?direct victims? in only three types of factual situations: (1) the negligent mishandling of corpses (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879); (2) the negligent misdiagnosis ofa disease that could potentially harm another (Molten v. Kaiser Found. Hosps. (1980) 27 Ca1.3d 916, 923); and (3) the negligent breach of a duty arising out of a preexisting relationship. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1076). Here, none of these requisite factual situations are present. Obviously, there are no allegations in the Complaint that Mr. Cosby mishandled a corpse or misdiagnosed a disease. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any preexisting relationship between her and Mr. Cosby that would give rise to a legal duty. In conclusory fashion only, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Cosby ?had a legal duty to refrain from engaging in sexual conduct with Plaintiff when she was 15 years old and duty of care to ensure that he did not cause sexual, emotional or harm to her.? (Compl., 11 17.) Plaintiff does not allege that she had any special relationship that would give rise to such a duty a legal guardianship). Plaintiff did not aliege such a relationship because no such relationship existed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Mr. Cosby for negligent in?iction of emotional distress. E. Amendment of the Commath Cannot Not Cure the Defects; Leave To Amend Should Be Denied. Given that Plaintiff has aiready outed Mr. Cosby as the defendant in this action, in a blatant violation of Code section 340.1, subdivision no amendment of the Complaint can unring that bell. It would be inherently prejudicial to Mr. Cosby if the Court were to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her Complaint and/or submit the requisite Certi?cates of Merit following this demurrer. The plaintiff has the burden of shoWing how she can amend the pleading and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy that burden because she already violated the statute by publicly identifying Mr, Cosby as the defendant prior to receiving the Court?s permission to do so. (See Jackson v. Doe, 192 Cal.App.4th at p.756 [af?rming the trial court?s order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend].) 120414 (v2) 8 mammamwwawwquAwwr?c IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Mr. Cosby respectfully requests that the Court sustain the Demurrer to each cause of action in the Complaint without leave to amend, and for such other or further relief as the Court may deem to be just and appropriate. DATE: December 4, 2014 980-5 RRER 120414 Respectfully submitted, LAVELY SINGER PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MARTIN D. SINGER LYNDA B. Gown/1%) R, ANDREW B. BRETT By: if ?t If; MARTIN DVSINGEJR if Attorneys for Defendant If; WILLIAM HENRY a/k/a BILL COSBY I 9 DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT \Om?mm-hUJNl?l PROOF OF SERVICE C.C.P. Revised 5/1/88 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400, Los Angeles, California 90067-2906. On the date listed below, I served the foregoing document described as: NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF on the interested parties in this action by placing: a true and correct copy the original document thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: Marc S. Strecker, Esq. STRECKER LAW OFFICE 2600 Michelson Drive, Suite 1700 Irvine, CA 92612 Attorneys for Plaintiff: JUDY HUTH BY MAIL: I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. As follows: I am ?readily familiar" with the ?rm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in af?davit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed December 4, 2014 at Los Angeles, California. H. Hancock