AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA



CONFIDENTIAL

Report on the Phoenix Park Concerts July 2012

July 2012

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The subject matter of this report is the Swedish House Mafia Concert in the Phoenix Park on the 7th July 2012. This concert was one of three concerts held in the Phoenix Park on the 5th, 7th and 8th of July 2012. The headline acts for these concerts were as follows:

- 5th July 2012 The Stone Roses
- 7th July 2012 Swedish House Mafia
- 8th July 2012 Snow Patrol

This report outlines An Garda Síochána's input into the pre-event management activities in respect of these concerts and the policing arrangements implemented by An Garda Síochána for their duration.

The Event Controller

MCD Productions were the concert promoters for the three concerts held in the Phoenix Park. MCD Productions' Event Controller for the three concerts was Mr had overall responsibility for the management of the three concerts. The event controller was assisted within the concert venue by An Garda Síochána, and retained control unless a serious emergency was declared, at which stage the event controller hands over control to the appropriate Emergency Controller of the relevant statutory agency i.e. An Garda Síochána, Dublin Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service. The DMR West Divisional Officer was An Garda Síochána's Emergency Controller for the three concerts and was present in the Event Control Centre for the duration of each concert. An Garda Síochána's role and responsibilities are set out in An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan for each concert (Policing Plan for 7th July contained in Appendix C of this document).

Security/Stewarding

MCD Productions provided five hundred and eleven (511) security/steward personnel for the Swedish House Mafia concert. This was an increase of fifty four (54) on the number of security/steward personnel provided for the Stone Roses concert on the 5th July. The minimum security/steward personnel requirement was three hundred and fifty nine (359). The security/steward personnel searched patrons upon entry to the concert venue via the two entrance gates (Gate A – Chesterfield Avenue and Gate B – North Road). Members of An Garda Síochána assisted the security/steward personnel performing these searches. It was the responsibility of the security/steward personnel to conduct full bag searches and utilised Hand-Held Metal Detection Wands in addition to cursory pat-down searches of the patrons attending at each concert date.

A review of the incident logs for the Swedish House Mafia Concert on the 7th July (see sections 7.7 and 7.8 of this report) indicates that there were periods where the security/steward personnel encountered large volumes of patrons at the entrance gates seeking admittance to the concert. This resulted in incidents of pushing at the barriers and pressure being placed upon security/steward personnel. The logs indicate that the security/steward personnel were unable to contain these incidents. In addition, there were numerous breaches in the perimeter fence. In some of these incidents large groups breached the perimeter fence and this is reflected in the comments of the MCD Productions' event log (e.g. 17.40 Hours 'people pouring in' and 18.16 Hours 'Not able to hold them at the moment').

Pre-event planning

Members of Garda management attached to the Blanchardstown District formed part of the event management structure and liaised with MCD Productions and other stakeholders in the planning phase for the three concerts. This process commenced in January 2012 and included twelve (12) formal meetings which culminated in a table top exercise using a number of scenarios to test the rigor of the various concert's event management plans. This pre-event planning process resulted in the development of a customised Event Management Plan and Event Control Manual for the three concerts in addition to An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan, Traffic Management Strategy and Risk Assessment for the events (Material for the 7th July contained in the Appendix of this document). During the pre-event planning phase An Garda Síochána raised a number of concerns with the Event Controller regarding the sale of alcohol, gate opening times and stewarding of the concerts (full details are set out in section 4 of this document)

Public Event Licence

The regulations governing outdoor concerts where the attendance is anticipated to be more than 5,000 persons require the promoters to apply for a Public Event Licence from the relevant Local Authority in accordance with The Planning and Development Act 2001: Part XVI (Licensing of Outdoor Events Regulations). MCD Productions prepared an Event Management Plan (contained in Appendix A of this document) in support of their application for a Public Event Licence from Dublin County Council under the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. Dublin City Council granted the Public Event Licence for the Whitefields location as a concert venue on the 3rd July 2012. (A copy of the Public Event Licence is included in Appendix E of this document).

Risk Management

Risk management was an integral part of the event planning process undertaken by An Garda Síochána in the planning of policing operations for the concerts held in the Phoenix Park. A detailed risk assessment was prepared for each concert in accordance with An Garda Síochána's Risk Management Policy and Standard Operating Procedures, the requirements of the Mullarkey Report 2002 and Section 45 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. The policing plan for each concert was continuously assessed and revised in accordance with information available, in order to provide the safest possible resolution to incidents as they arose pre, during and post the concert events. Section 4.5 of this document sets out the pre-concert risk assessment performed by An Garda Síochána. A copy of the risk assessment for the 7th July concert is contained in Appendix F this document.

An intelligence-led policing approach

The Event Controller had overall responsibility for each concert. However, An Garda Síochána in anticipation of a requirement for a spontaneous response by members of An Garda Síochána to any incidents that may pose a threat to public order or public safety, adopted an intelligence-led approach to the policing of each concert. At each concert, the Garda management team deployed at the on-site Event Control Centre continuously monitored the information and intelligence received from both the Event Management Team and Garda personnel. The assessment information/intelligence determined the scale and tactical Garda response to resolve These assessments took the form of a dynamic risk and/or a threat assessment for incidents that required a spontaneous Garda response to incidents as they arose.

On the 7th July, the concert gates opened at 15.00 Hours and the concert concluded at 22.48 Hours. The initial report of three stabbing incidents to An Garda Síochána was at 21.15 Hours. An Garda Síochána responded immediately to this incident through the deployment of a Public Order Snatch Squad and uniform personnel to search for and locate the suspect. The suspect was arrested at 21.55 Hours. During the period 15.00 Hours to 21.15 Hours the incidents reported to An Garda Síochána were assessed and received the appropriate Garda response. These incidents were typical of those associated with large outdoor concerts event and in alignment with the preconcert Risk Assessment conducted by An Garda Síochána.

Summary of the Garda Personnel Deployment

The following table provides a breakdown of the Garda personnel deployed at the Phoenix Park for each of the three concerts.

Table A: Breakdown of Garda personnel deployed at each concert							
Concert	C/Supt	Supt.	Insp.	Sgt	Garda	R/Garda	Total
5 th July	1	1	4	14	98	4	122
7th July	1	1	4	14	132	6	158*
8 th July	1	1	4	14	98	4	122

^{(*} Excludes one Sergeant and three Gardaí employed at the Bridewell station on prisoner management duties)

An additional thirty six (36) Garda personnel were deployed at the Phoenix Park at the Swedish House Mafia concert on the 7th July 2012. The requirement to deploy these additional resources was determined by An Garda Síochána based upon Risk Assessments and an Intelligence-led approach to the policing of the three concerts. The primary concern in respect of the Swedish House Mafia concert was the crowd demographic and the potential for public disorder, drug and alcohol related incidents. Details of the deployment of personnel is set out in section 6 of this document.

The table below provides a breakdown of the deployment of Garda personnel inside and outside the concert venue on the 7th July.

Table B: Breakdown of Garda personnel deployment inside and outside the concert venue							
Area	C/Supt	Supt.	Insp.	Sgt	Garda	R/Garda	Total
Inside	1	1	2	8	33	3	48
Outside	Nil	Nil	2	6	99	3	110

Synopsis of events on the 7th July 2012

Section 7 of this document provides a synopsis of the events on the 7th July 2012 at the Swedish House Mafia concert under the following headings:

- The impact of the weather conditions on the concert venue
- The Event Control Centre
- Breakdown of the arrival of patrons at the concert
- Breakdown of reported incidents
- Prisoner Detention Strategy
- Incidents requiring medical treatment
- Synopsis of the Event Log for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia concert)
- Security/stewarding related incidents on the 7th July

The following table provides a breakdown of reported incidents at each concert.

Table C: Breakdown of reported inclident Type	05th July	07 th July	08th July	Total
Assault Causing Harm	1	18 (9 x Stabbings)	Nil	19
Assault Minor	Nil	5	1	6
Robbery from the Person	Nil	10	1	11
Theft from the Person	1	11	10	22
Drugs - Section 23 Searches	22	39	9	70
Drugs- Section 3 Simple Possession	15	17	6	38
Drugs - Section 15 Sale and Supply	2	11	Nil	13
Public Order	8	18	8	34
Criminal Damage	Nil	2	Nil	2
Total	49	131	35	215

The table below provides a breakdown of the prisoner numbers for each concert.

Table D: Breakdown of the prisoner numbers for each concert.						
Concert	Blanchardstown Station	Finglas Station	Lucan Station	Bridewell Station	Total	
5 th July	4	5	ı	N/A	10	
7 th July	3	2	Nil	29	34	
8 th July	1	8	Nil	N/A	9	

Review - Lessons Learned

Section 8 of this document sets out the findings of An Garda Síochána's review of the policing arrangements for the three concerts held in the Phoenix Park. The review was carried out under the following headings:

- Location Specific Factors outside the concert venue
- Issues for consideration by the concert promoters
- Issues for consideration by An Garda Síochána
- Issues for consideration by other statutory agencies

The review makes a number of recommendations on the following:

- Selection of concert venue
- Culture of alcohol consumption
- The composition of the on-site Event Control Centre
- The requirement for all relevant statutory agencies to be present at the on-site Event Control Centre
- Security/stewarding
- The provision of Welfare Tents within a concert venue by concert promoters
- The utilisation of temporary concert signage
- The security of temporary outdoor lighting by concert promoters
- The utilisation of Grid Location Systems by concert promoters
- The deployment of Garda Public Order Unit and Reserve Units
- Prisoner Management at the Bridewell Garda Station
- The transport of prisoners from within the concert venue

1 (ntroduction

The subject matter of this report is the Swedish House Mafia Concert in the Phoenix Park on the 7th July 2012. This concert was one of three concerts held in the Phoenix Park on the 5th, 7th and 8th of July 2012. The headlining acts for these concerts were as follows:

- 5th July 2012 The Stone Roses
- 7th July 2012 Swedish House Mafia
- 8th July 2012 Snow Patrol

This report outlines An Garda Síochána's input into the pre-event management activities in respect of these concerts and the policing arrangements implemented by An Garda Siochána for their duration. The layout of this report is as follows:

- Background
- Event management structure
- Pre-event management planning phase
- Methodology adopted in the development of the concert policing plans
- Overview of An Garda Síochána's policing plans for the Phoenix Park concerts
- Synopsis of events on the 7th July 2012
- Review Lessons Learned

2 Background

MCD Productions were the concert promoters for the three concerts held in the Phoenix Park. The maximum number of patrons attending each event was 45,500 with an additional 2,500 as staff and guests. All three concerts were sold out. MCD Productions are an established event management company with experience and expertise in the promotion and management of major outdoor concerts both in Ireland and internationally.

During the period 2002 to 2009, the Phoenix Park has been the venue for sixteen (16) ticketed concerts. Eight (8) of these concerts had attendances of 5,000 patrons. Six (6) concerts had attendances of 10,000 patrons. One (1) concert had an attendance of 84,000 (Red Hot Chilli Peppers) and one (1) had an attendance of 135,000 (Robbie Williams). In addition there were a number of free 'O2 in the Park' concerts with in excess of 60,000 persons in attendance.

3 (Went Management Structure

MCD Productions prepared an Event Management Plan (contained in **Appendix A** of this document) in support of their application for a Public Event Licence from Dublin County Council under the Planning and Development Regulations 2001. The plan was prepared in accordance with the appropriate codes of practice and addressed the following matters:

- Event Management Structure and Responsibilities
- Event Safety Strategy
- Site Structures and Facilities
- Medical Facilities
- Stewarding and Site Security
- Traffic Management Plan
- Emergency Plans
- An environment monitoring programme for before, during and after the proposed event
- Provision for the full clean-up of the area, and for any remedial works arising from any damage caused to public property, facilities and amenities associated with the event.

The key roles and responsibilities for the management of the event were as follows:

3.1 The Event Controller

The Event Controller for the three concerts was responsibilities included:

- overall responsibility for the management of the three concerts
- being involved in the planning meetings with the relevant authorities i.e. Local Authority, An Garda Síochána, and Health Board, OPW etc.
- ensuring the provision of adequate stewarding, first-aid and medical personnel for the
 three concerts
- remaining at the Event Control Centre before, during and immediately after each concert
- conduct pre and post event meetings

The event controller was assisted within the concert venue by An Garda Síochána, stewards and all other personnel, whether paid or voluntary and retained control unless a serious emergency was declared, at which stage the event controller hands over control to the appropriate

Emergency Controller of the relevant statutory agency i.e. An Garda Síochána, Dublin Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service. The DMR West Divisional Officer was An Garda Síochána's Emergency Controller for the three concerts and was present in the Event Control Centre for the duration of each concert.

The Event Controller operated a three tier emergency alert system for each of the concerts:


- Green: normal status
- Amber: any event where it is necessary to raise the alert state that may lead to an emergency or possible evacuation of the venue
- Red: any emergency that may require part or full evacuation of the concert venue e.g. a suspected explosive device, fire, serious crowd disorder or structural collapse

At no stage for any of the three concerts did the Event Controller declare an Amber or Red emergency alert.

3.2 The Safety Officer

The Safety Officer for the three concerts was Mr

- ensure that the safety details and conditions agreed for the holding of the concerts were implemented and site layout and safety arrangements were in accordance with specifications and agreements, in so far as they impinge on safety matters
- be present at all planning meetings and act as coordinator on behalf of the promoter
 MCD Productions
- act as coordinator of the technical aspects of the arrangements insofar as they impinge on safety matters
- attend the event itself to evaluate the efficiency of structural and safety arrangements
- pay particular attention to the crowd densities in primary viewing areas
- monitor first-aid and rescue tactics for distressed patrons
- take any necessary action to alleviate any perceived risks
- recommend emergency procedures to be initiated





3.3 Security Staff and Stewards

Two security companies were employed at each of the three concerts, Sword Security and Eventsec. Both companies are registered with the Private Security Authority. The detailed role and responsibilities of the stewards and concert security personnel are set out in section 15 of the MCD Productions Event Management Plan (contained in **Appendix A** of this document). The role of the Security Staff and Stewards Management Team was to:

- provide a customer and artist focused friendly, safe and secure environment for the concerts
- ensure that all aspects of the Event Safety Management Plan and Security Operational Plan by Sword Security and Eventsec were implemented and enable the event control team to effectively plan for or react to incidents which could present a hazard to the operation of the concerts
- manage the various security departments in their operations around the concert venue and to liaise with the Statutory Agencies as necessary

A security briefing was held each concert day at 12 noon where security supervisors were given instruction and an event specific briefing by the Event Controller and Safety Officer on the contents of the Event Management Plan (contained in **Appendix A** of this document) and Event Control Manual (contained in **Appendix B** of this document) with particular reference to the Emergency Procedures, Safety Precautions and Duties of Security Personnel. These briefings were attended by members of An Garda Síochána. The security supervisors conducted briefings for personnel under their immediate control on their duties.

MCD Productions provided five hundred and eleven (511) security/steward personnel for the Swedish House Mafia concert. This was an increase of fifty four (54) on the number of security/steward personnel provided for the Stone Roses concert on the 5th July. The minimum security/steward personnel requirement was three hundred and fifty nine (359) based upon guideline ratios of 1 to 100 for 65% of the audience viewing area (295 Stewards) where the audience are standing in a closely packed situation and 1 to 250 for the remainder where the audience are at a much lower occupant density where freedom for circulation and to sit on the grass etc is much greater (64 Stewards). The security/steward personnel were assigned by the Head of Security (Mr

- Entrance and exit gates
- Concert site
- Entrance routes
- Bar areas
- Front of stage, mixing and delay towers
- Wooded areas
- Backstage areas
- Disabled area and exit roadway
- Coach parks

3.3.1 Search Strategy at Entrance Routes

MCD Productions employed security/steward personnel to search patrons upon entry to the concert venue via the two entrance gates (Gate A – Chesterfield Avenue and Gate B – North Road). Members of An Garda Síochána assisted the security/steward personnel performing these searches. MCD Productions implemented the following process to facilitate the search of patrons entering the concert venue:

- On the 5th July, there were 50 lanes leading to the two entrance gates. The extent of the personal search performed by security/steward personnel resulted in an estimated maximum throughput of patrons once searched as being 600 individuals per lane per hour. This equated to approximately 30,000 patrons being searched in one hour.
- On the 7th July, due to the anticipated crowd demographic and potential for the concealment of alcohol, drugs and weapons the search rate was reduced to a maximum throughput of 450 individuals per lane per hour to facilitate a more extensive search of the patrons. This equated to approximately 22,500 patrons being searched in one hour.
- On the 8th July, there were 32 lanes leading to the two entrance gates. The extent of the personal search performed by security/steward personnel resulted in an estimated maximum throughput of patrons once searched as being 600 individuals per lane per hour. This equated to approximately 19,200 patrons being searched in one hour.

It was the responsibility of the security/steward personnel to conduct full bag searches and utilised Hand-Held Metal Detection Wands in addition to cursory pat-down searches of the patrons attending at each concert date

3.4 An Garda Síochána

An Garda Síochána's role was to assist the Event Controller in the management of the event, with a focus on crowd management issues, public order both inside the concert venue and in the vicinity of the venue, traffic management and emergency access routes, safety arrangements, and emergency protocols. An Garda Síochána's role and responsibilities are set out in An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan for each concert (Policing Plan for the 7th July is contained in **Appendix C** of this document). In addition the Blanchardstown District Officer made an order under Section 21 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 for each concert date (The Order for the 7th July is contained in **Appendix D** of this document). This order conferred powers upon members of An Garda Síochána to control access to the event, search for alcohol and arrest where appropriate.

4 The Pre-Event Management Planning Phase

Members of Garda management attached to the Blanchardstown District formed part of the event management structure and liaised with MCD Productions and other stakeholders in the planning phase for the three concerts. This process commenced in January 2012 and included a number of formal and informal meetings which culminated in a table top exercise using a number of scenarios to test the rigor of the various concert's event management plans. This pre-event planning process resulted in the development of a customised Event Management Plan and Event Control Manual for the three concerts in addition to An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan, Traffic Management Strategy and Risk Assessment for the events.

4.1 Pre-Event Management Meetings

The pre-event management meetings between MCD Productions and An Garda Síochána commenced on the 11th January 2012. There were a total of twelve (12) meetings during the planning phase for the three concerts (11th January, 8th February, 7th March, 21st March, 2nd April, 3rd April, 1st May, 28th May, 6th June, 8th June, 29th June, and 4th July). The meetings addressed the following topics: venue plan and layout, concert dates, event control and gate opening times, traffic management, weather contingency plan and the sale of alcohol. During these meetings An Garda Síochána raised the following matters with the Event Controller regarding the sale of alcohol, gate opening times, stewarding of the concerts and crowd demographics:

- The details of the artists to play at the concerts were not confirmed to An Garda Síochána until the 7th March 2012. Once confirmed An Garda Síochána raised concerns about the audience profile for the Swedish House Mafia concert, the implementation of the per-person limit regarding the sale of alcohol and the requirement for additional Garda personnel for the Swedish House Mafia concert.
- The Event Controller was of the view that each event brings its own risks and these events could be managed. In regards to the audience profile

 (MCD Live Event Manager) was of the view that "the Swedish House Mafia was not a hard dance act and is at the softer end of the scale". In addition at the meeting of the 7th March the Event Controller confirmed the type of alcohol product that MCD Productions proposed to sell within the venue (Draught Beer, Mojito Premix, Captain Morgan's Premix, Vodka Premix and PET Bottled beer). However, An Garda Síochána objected to this range of products. Subsequently the Event Controller complied with An Garda Síochána's request. Beer and wine were the only alcohol products on sale within the concert venue for all three concerts.



- Following the meeting of the 7th March 2012, An Garda Síochána registered their concerns via e-mail (on the 7th March) with the Event Controller on the following points (copy of e-mail and the Event Controller response is included in **Appendix G** of this document):
 - The availability of alcohol for sale from the 15.00 Hours gate opening time which would increase the potential for public order incidents occurring within the concert venue.
 - The impact the early sale of alcohol on Saturday and Sunday may have on the other users of the Phoenix Park not attending any of the concerts through the potential for public order incidents and traffic congestion. An Garda Síochána requested that consideration be given to moving the gate opening time to a later time on both dates. The Event Promoter stated that the reasons for requesting bars to be open from gate open times is based upon their experience of concerts both here and abroad in similar environments to the Phoenix Park. The Event Controller expressed concern for the safety of concert goers attending these

events stating that if alcohol was not available for sale from gates open three scenarios become almost inevitable:

- Concert patrons in the venue text friends outside that there is no alcohol on sale leading to people drinking in the park
- o Concert patrons in the venue attempt to exit en-mass against a flow of incoming audience, creating a dangerous pedestrian contraflow
- o MCD Productions operates a strict no re-entry policy at events. If concert patrons attempt to re-enter the concert venue, their tickets will scan invalid leading to potential public order difficulties outside the venue

The Event Controller stated that MCD Productions allow concert patrons into the concert venue as early as possible to mitigate any risk presented by a build up of individuals outside the venue. The Event Controller stated that in his experience, and advice from their insurers was, that it is easier to ensure the safety and success of these events if the audience is in a safe comfortable environment with artists on stage and ready access to food and beverage facilities under their control.

On the 21st March 2012, An Garda Síochána advised MCD Productions to apply for a music and singing licence. An Garda Síochána again raised the issue of alcohol purchasing limits, the number of bars, their location and the ratio of security/steward personnel per person. The Event Controller informed An Garda Síochána that the alcohol purchase limit for the Swedish House Mafia Concert would be reduced from four (4) to two (2) drinks. An Garda Síochána requested advance notice on the statutory notice on the liquor licensing applications. In addition, An Garda Síochána requested the proper supervision of queues for the purchase of alcohol and agreement on the process of ejection from the site. The Event Controller assured An Garda Síochána that the age range for the concerts will be in the 17 – 25 bracket and again reiterated that 'the Swedish House Mafia band are at the lower scale of dance music' and based upon experience there would be no major incidents.

4.2 Garda concerns on the Swedish House Mafia Concert Crowd Demographic

The line up of acts for the Swedish House Mafia concert was as follows:

- Original Rude Boys
- Calvin Harris
- Snoop Dogg
- Tinie Tempah
- Swedish House Mafia

These five (5) bands can be categorised as 'electric music'. They have a general appeal to the 17 – 25 age group. An Garda Síochána examined the profile of these bands and their potential concert audiences. This examination identified that:

- The Original Rude Boys is an Irish acoustic hip hop band from Dublin which formed in 2011.
- Calvin Harris is a Scottish DJ, singer, songwriter, and record producer. He performed in the Temple Complex in Carlow in 2010 and the O2 Dublin in 2011 and no specific policing indicators were identified.
- Tinie Tempah, is an English rapper. He made his first mixtape in 2007. He played in Oxygen Festival in 2011 and no specific policing indicators were identified.
- Snoop Dogg played in the Dublin Olympia and the Marquee Cork in 2010. The artist Snoop Dogg has a number of convictions for drugs possession. In 2009 Snoop Dogg was in court for assaulting an audience member on stage in 2005. As a result he was banned from entry into the UK from May 2006 to March 2010. More recently, in January 2012 Snoop Dogg was arrested for possession of drugs in the US. On the 30th June Snoop Dogg was arrested in Norway for possession of drugs. This profile raised An Garda Síochána's concerns of the potential public order and drug related incidents that could occur at the event. This was flagged early in the planning process with the Event Controller at the pre-event planning meeting on the 7th March and at numerous other meetings when discussing the deployment of Garda personnel at the concert venue and the immediate environs.

The Swedish House Mafia is a Swedish electronic dance music trio. The group played Oxygen Festival in 2011 and consultation with the Naas District Officer identified no specific policing indicators.

In addition, it is noted that at the Swedish House Mafia concert in Milton Keynes on the 14th June 2012, three concert patrons were stabbed in one isolated incident within the concert venue and there were a number of public order and drugs related incidents.

4.3 Table-Top Exercise

On the 29th June 2012, MCD Productions hosted a Table-Top Exercise using a number of scenarios to test the rigor of the event plans. Members of Garda management from the Blanchardstown District who were performing key Garda roles at the concerts attended this exercise along with members of the HSE, the Ambulance Service, Dublin Fire Brigade, Dublin City Council and MCD Productions event management personnel. The exercise scenarios were as follows:

- extreme weather conditions
- potential public order scenarios outside the concert venue
- fire emergency within the concert venue and evacuation plans and
- a medical emergency outside the concert venue which test emergency access routes and the traffic management plan

Each scenario examined the interdependencies among the agencies involved and scaled the level of response required from each agency to manage and control the incidents. There was a debrief for all participants upon conclusion of the exercise. The learning gained from the exercise facilitated a revision of protocols to be adhered to in the Event Control Centre for the duration of the concerts. The HSE and Dublin Fire Brigade informed those in attendance at the Table Top Exercise that they would not be in attendance at the three concerts unless requested to respond to a specific incident (see recommendation 8.4).

4.4 Event Licensing and change of concert venue

The regulations governing outdoor concerts where the attendance is anticipated to be more than 5,000 persons, require the promoters to apply for a Public Event Licence from the relevant Local Authority in accordance with The Planning and Development Act 2001:Part XVI (Licensing of Outdoor Events Regulations).

MCD Productions made an initial application for a licence to Dublin City Council in December 2011 for seven concerts to be held in the Phoenix Park in July 2012. This application did not include details of the artists or the concert dates. Dublin City Council did not approve this application due to the absence of the information listed above. On the 9th March 2012, MCD Productions submitted a detailed application for the three concerts at the Ashtown Castle area of the Phoenix Park to Dublin City Council.

In the interim, the Bloom Festival was held at the Ashtown Castle area in the Phoenix Park from the 31st May to the 4th June 2012. Post the Bloom Festival on the 6th June 2012, members of An Garda Síochána and representatives from the OPW and MCD Productions inspected the Ashtown Castle area of the Phoenix Park. This inspection identified that due to the severe damage caused to this area as a result of adverse weather for the duration of the Bloom Festival it would not be advisable to proceed with the concerts at this location.

Consequently, representatives for MCD Productions requested permission from Dublin City Council to move the concert venue to the Whitefields area within the Phoenix Park. This location could cater for approximately 58,600 patrons. The application was made on the 25th June 2012 and included an updated Event Management Plan and maps. The OPW supported this application. Prior to granting permission to move location, Dublin City Council, the OPW and MCD Promotions inspected the proposed new location.

The original Ashtown Castle location was a compact site with a number of potential health and safety hazards due to the ground conditions. The new location at Whitefields was previously used as a concert venue and due to its composition was more suitable than the Ashtown Castle location. An Garda Síochána had no objection to the new concert location where the new application was based on the grounds of the health and safety of both patrons and staff working at the concert.

The transfer of location required An Garda Síochána to revise their policing plan, traffic management strategy and risk assessment for the concerts. The new location was an open field site compared to the contained venue at Ashtown Castle. This resulted in a revised deployment of Garda personnel policing the concerts. Dublin City Council granted the Public Event Licence for the Whitefields location on the 3rd July 2012. A copy of the Public Event Licence is included in **Appendix E** of this document.

4.5 Risk Management

Garda management from the Blanchardstown District utilised risk management techniques during the planning, briefing and deployment stages of each concert's policing plan. They prepared a detailed risk assessment for each of the three concerts in accordance with An Garda Síochána's Risk Management Policy and Standard Operating Procedures, the requirements of the Mullarkey Report 2002 and Section 45 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. A copy of the risk assessment for the concert on the 7th July is contained in **Appendix F** of this document.

Risk management was an integral part of the event planning process undertaken by An Garda Síochána in the planning of policing operations for the concerts held in the Phoenix Park. Consequently, in order to identify the potential event management risks associated with these concerts, local Garda management in the Blanchardstown District undertook a planned and systematic approach to the identification, evaluation and control of any identified potential risks. These activities included:

- Prior to the concerts, An Garda Síochána identified the profile of the patrons that might attend the concerts, their intentions, their tactics and their notions of acceptable behaviour. This intelligence assisted in determining the proportion of potentially difficult individuals and groups that may attend the concerts and how focused that crowd might be in its intention, for example, the balance of those prone to violence and/or disruption and those who are peaceful. The collection of material on the internet enabled An Garda Síochána to build a profile of the artists and the potential patrons that would attend the concerts. This process identified that a different crowd demographic would attend at all three events. It was determined that a mature crowd (30 - 45) age group) would attend the first concert on the 5th July 2012 (Stone Roses) and there was a low risk rating associated with this concert. In regards to the Snow Patrol concert on the 8th July it was determine that there would be a younger element in the crowd due to the composition of the supporting acts. Consequently, this concert also received a low risk rating. As indicated earlier in this report, An Garda Síochána identified potential issues with the Swedish House Mafia concert on the 7th July 2012 and these were raised with the Event Controller at the pre-event meetings.
- Consultation with the Garda management in the Naas District who policed the most recent Tinie Tempah and Swedish House Mafia performances at the Oxygen Festival in

- 2011. This exercise did not identify any potential policing issues with the potential patrons attending these performances.
- The utilisation of the Traffic and Event Management Unit attached to the Blanchardstown District to develop An Garda Síochána's policing plans, traffic management strategy and risk assessments for the concerts. This unit has particular experience in event management for large scale events in the Phoenix Park. During the period 2002 to 2012, the unit has developed policing plans for sixteen (16) ticketed concerts with attendances ranging from 5,000 to 135,000 patrons, a number of free 'O2 in the Park' concerts with attendances in excess of 60,000 patrons, the Bloom Festival with an annual attendance of approximately 90,000 for the duration of the festival and numerous other non concert events.
- Liaison with Garda management in the Mountjoy District on the policing of concerts at Croke Park to compare the event management approach being adopted at the outdoor venue in the Phoenix Park. This exercise utilised the Red Hot Chilli Peppers concert held July 2012 and focused on logistics, crowd behaviour and movement of patrons to and from the venue, the composition of the Event Control Centre and roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders.

5 Methodology adopted in the development of the concert policing plans

The policing of the three Phoenix Park concerts were planned Garda public order operations, where An Garda Síochána had the opportunity to develop strategies, tactics and contingency plans in advance of the concert dates. Each concert had a specific detailed policing plan and operational briefing order. The policing plans clearly outlined the roles and responsibilities of members of An Garda Síochána deployed to police each concert. The policing plan for each concert was continuously assessed and revised in accordance with information available, in order to provide the safest possible resolution to incidents as they arose pre, during and post the concert events. All operational decisions taken during the policing of the concerts utilised the Garda Decision Making Model and were recorded in an incident log.

Regular briefings of Garda personnel deployed at the concert played a significant role in the policing of the concerts. The pre-event briefings outlined the policing objectives for each concert and the legal principles applicable. All members of An Garda Síochána deployed at the concerts were instructed at this briefing to ensure that their actions were compatible with the rights of

dividuals under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The briefings held during the concerts provided current updates on the status of concerts events and matters identified and revisions to the policing plans where applicable. The post event briefings allowed for a full de-brief of the concert and facilitated any adjustments to the policing plans for the subsequent concert(s).

5.1 Intelligence-led policing approach

The Event Controller had overall responsibility for each concert. However, An Garda Síochána in anticipation of a requirement for a spontaneous response by members of An Garda Síochána to any incidents that may pose a threat to public order or public safety, adopted an intelligence-led approach to the policing of each concert. The three stages of the approach were as follows:

- Pre-event, to develop preventative policing strategies, and ensure the adequate briefing of all members of An Garda Síochána deployed in the policing of the concerts.
- During the event, Garda managers were made aware of all relevant intelligence and information without delay to determine the appropriate response to incidents as they arose.
- Post-event, this allowed intelligence gathered during the event to be used by the post-event investigation team in the preparation of investigation files on incidents that occurred during the concerts.

This intelligence-led approach did not identify any indicators/intelligence to suggest that consideration should be given to the cancellation of the concert. As stated earlier in this report (section 4) it did identify a higher risk level for the concert on the 7th July compared to the concerts on the 5th and 8th of July. This was incorporated into An Garda Síochána's Risk Assessment for the concert on the 7th July (contained in **Appendix F** of this document).

At each concert, the Garda management team deployed at the Event Control Centre continuously monitored the information and intelligence received from both the Event Management Team and Garda personnel. The assessment of this information/intelligence determined the scale and tactical Garda response to resolve incidents. These assessments took the form of a dynamic risk and/or a threat assessment for incidents that required a spontaneous Garda response to incidents as they arose. On the 7th July, during the period 15.00 Hours to 21.15 Hours the incidents reported to An Garda Síochána were assessed and received the appropriate Garda response. These incidents were typical of those associated with large outdoor concert events and in

'ignment with the pre-concert Risk Assessment conducted by An Garda Síochána. The initial report of three stabbing incidents to An Garda Síochána was at 21.15 Hours. An Garda Síochána responded immediately to this incident through the deployment of a Public Order Snatch Squad and uniform personnel to search and locate the suspect. The suspect was arrested at 21.55 Hours. These stabbings were attributable to a single suspect. This incident does not reflect upon the overall events of the day and the conduct/behaviour of the majority of patrons that attended the concert.

5.2 Factors considered in the development of the concert policing plans

The following factors were considered in the development of the concert policing plans:

- Crowd Demographic and Behaviour
- Public Order Strategic Principles

5.2.1 Crowd Demographic and Behaviour

Garda management from the Blanchardstown District was cognisant of the crowd demographic attending each concert and the potential risks to public safety or a potential for disorder arising from the following behavioural patterns:

- The concert crowds may contain persons with many different attitudes and behaviours. A public order trigger incident may result from actions by crowd participants, or as a result of altered perceptions arising from the interactions between them.
- Members of a crowd do not necessarily get carried away by 'crowd hysteria'. Each person in a crowd has a different perception of events based upon their ability to see, hear and move. This may affect their behaviour.
- When crowd members become highly emotional or aggressive, their visible behaviour can spread and become regarded as acceptable by those around them. It can be an opportunity for a minority to influence and mobilise others around them.
- Anonymity removes the fear of identification and sanction from crowd members and may lead to the breakdown of legal and moral constraints.

- During crowd movement, non-directed crowds will follow routes of least effort. Highly motivated crowds will attempt to follow the most direct route to achieve their objective.
- If it is desired to direct the movements of crowds, exits and escapes must be considered.
- The higher the crowd density:
 - The higher the likelihood of interaction within the crowd and joint action by the crowd.
 - The more difficult it becomes for crowd members to leave.
- The less informal control there is within the crowd in relation to the crowd members, the more likelihood of the need for Garda control.

5.2.2 Public Order Strategic Principles

There are occasions at outdoor events/concerts when disorder occurs suddenly and unexpectedly or public order trigger events are not identified at an early stage and disorder/serious disorder is threatened or occurs. In these circumstances, normal policing methods may be unable to deal with the situation and restoration of the law and order becomes necessary using additional resources and tactics. The Garda response to such incidents requiring a spontaneous response will be based around the following principles:

- The initial response, is where in order to restore law and order, all appropriate options are considered (from soft line tactics through to the mobilisation of Specially Trained Public Order Personnel issued with public order personal protective equipment). All available information and intelligence is used to inform the decision making process and the potential for trigger incidents should be considered.
- Effective resourcing, the ability to effectively mobilise members of An Garda Síochána is critical to the early resolution or containment of disorder. This principle is based upon sound planning, effective training and exercising and accreditation. The level of resources deployed should reflect the ongoing threat to public safety, the degree of potential for disorder and the ability of An Garda Síochána to perform its statutory function.

Tactical deployment, to convert a policing strategy into tactics by the use of an operational plan and the deployment of appropriate and risk assessed public order tactical options.

6 Overview of An Garda Síochána's Policing Plans

The following section provides an overview of An Garda Síochána's Policing Plans for the three Phoenix Park concerts under the following headings:

- Summary of the Personnel Deployment
- Deployment of additional personnel at the Swedish House Mafia Concert
- Public Order Strategy
- Traffic Management Plan

6.1 Summary of the Personnel Deployment

The following table provides a breakdown of the Garda personnel deployed at each of the three concerts.

The second secon	CHECKS TO STREET, STRE	The second secon	TARGEST STREET	oyed at eac		D/C1.	T-4-1
Concert	C/Supt	Supt.	Insp.	Sgt	Garda	R/Garda	Total
5th July	1	1	4	14	98	4	122
7 th July	1	1	4	14	132	6	158*
8 th July	1	1	4	14	98	4	122

^{(*} Excludes one Sergeant and three Gardaí employed at the Bridewell station on prisoner management duties)

An additional thirty six (36) Garda personnel were deployed in the Phoenix Park at the Swedish House Mafia concert on the 7th July 2012. The requirement to deploy these additional resources was determined by An Garda Síochána based upon Risk Assessments and an Intelligence-led approach to the policing of the three concerts. The primary concern in respect of the Swedish House Mafia concert was the potential for public disorder, drug and alcohol related incidents.

The table below provides a breakdown of the deployment of Garda personnel inside and outside the concert venue on the 7th July.

Table Two	: Breakdown	of Garda per	sonnel dep	loyment in	side and out:	side the conce	rt venue
Area	C/Supt	Supt.	Insp.	Sgt	Garda	R/Garda	Total
Inside	1	1	2	8	33	3	48
Outside	Nil	Nil	2	6	99	3	110

Deployment of Additional Garda personnel at the Swedish House Mafia Concert

The additional thirty six (36) Garda personnel employed in the Phoenix Park at the Swedish House Mafia concert were deployed as follows:

- Fourteen (14) Gardaí were deployed as two Public Order Units.
- Four (4) Gardaí were employed on plain clothes drugs unit duty at the concert. This increased the complement of those employed on drug unit duties to one (1) Sergeants and eight (8) Gardaí in the context of the concert on the 7th July
- Three (3) Gardaí supplemented the Garda contingent at the concert entrance gates
- Utilising the unit overlap provided by the new five unit roster system, at 21.00 Hours fifteen (15) Gardaí were deployed on high visibility patrols outside the concert venue along the North Road, the Phoenix Monument and Chesterfield Avenue, thereby maximising the policing presence in the vicinity of the entrance/exit gates to the concert (Gate A and Gate B)

In addition to these personnel, nine (9) Garda personnel were redeployed from locations within the concert venue to the two entrance gates (Gate A and Gate B), and the Park Gate Street entrance to the Phoenix Park as these were identified as critical locations from the post concert briefing on the 5th July and the anticipated crowd demographics attending the Swedish House Mafia concert.

6.3 Public Order Strategy

An Garda Siochána adopted an intelligence-led approach to the policing of the three concerts. This approach identified the requirement for the additional deployment of two public order units at the Swedish House Mafia concert on the 7th July 2012. The composition of the units was as follows two (2) sergeants and fourteen (14) Gardaí. These personnel were deployed in 'soft cap' uniform dress. They were initially assigned to the two entrance gates to the concert venue (Gate A – Chesterfield Avenue and Gate B – North Road) where they monitored the arrival of patrons to the concert.

During the concert the public order units were redeploy in response to public order incidents as they arose and performed the role of a snatch squad to assist in the arrest of prisoners. In particular the units were deployed to assist at public order incidents at the Half-Way House Bar on the Navan Road, Chesterfield Avenue and North Road, and the prevention of unauthorised access to the concert venue through breaches in the premier fence. One unit was deployed to

R Jas Garda station to deal with a violent prisoner arrested at the concert. At the conclusion of the concert they were redeployed to the exits (Gate A and Gate B) to provide a visible Garda presence and monitor the exit of patrons from the Phoenix Park. Shortly after the majority of patrons had dispersed from the concert venue, the public order units supported by Garda personnel deployed at the concert, conducted a sweep of Chesterfield Avenue in the direction of the Park Gate Street entrance to the Phoenix Park. The objective of this exercise was to check for patrons remaining in the park and escort them out of the park.

An Garda Síochána maintained a policing presence in the Phoenix Park until 02.00 Hours on the 8th July where one (1) Sergeant and six (6) Gardaí performed mobile patrols within the confines of the park.

6.4 Traffic Management Plan

An Garda Síochána developed a traffic management plan for the three concerts in consultation with MCD Productions. The objective of the plan was to allow normal commuter traffic use the Phoenix Pak and the surrounding road network to enable routine activities in the park, i.e. Zoological Gardens, Farmleigh House, St Mary's Hospital, while catering for the movement of patrons to and from the concert. Patrons to the concerts were encouraged to avail of public transport. MCD Productions included the traffic management plan in their event management plan for the three concerts. No traffic management issues arose during the duration of the concerts. In addition, there was a daily review between An Garda Síochána and the MCD Productions event management team to discuss the strategy for the exit of patrons from the concert venue.

7 Synopsis of events on the 7th July 2012

The following section provides a synopsis of the events on the 7th July 2012 at the Swedish House Mafia concert under the following headings:

- The impact of the weather conditions on the concert venue
- The Event Control Centre
- Breakdown of the arrival of patrons at the concert
- Breakdown of reported incidents
- Prisoner Detention Strategy
- Incidents requiring medical treatment
- Synopsis of the Event Log for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia concert)
- Security/stewarding related incidents on the 7th July

Impact of the weather conditions on the concert venue

Early on the morning of the 7th July 2012, the Event Controller Safety Officer the Blanchardstown District Officer and representatives from the OPW inspected the concert venue. There had been continuous rainfall the previous day and during the night. MCD Productions had commenced the process of pumping water from the venue and preparing strips of land for patron entry onto the concert venue. It was the responsibility of the Safety Officer to declare that the condition of the concert venue did not infringe on the safety of patrons and that the concert could proceed as scheduled. The Event Controller and the Safety Officer assured representatives from An Garda Síochána and the OPW that they would implement the following measures to prepare the venue for the concert traffic; bark and straw bales were laid where there were poor underfoot conditions, toilets were cleaned and check for functionality, and one of the three bars (Bar Number 2) remained closed due to ground conditions. MCD Productions informed the representatives from An Garda Síochána and the OPW that they had dealt with similar conditions in the past at the Oxygen Festival. A final inspection was held at 14.00 Hours in advance of the gate opening time at 15.00 Hours. At the final inspection the Safety Officer informed the Blanchardstown District Officer and representatives from the OPW that he had implemented the measures outlined at the earlier inspection and he was satisfied the venue was safe for patrons and the concert could proceed.

The weather conditions had improved in the early morning. This resulted in the 7th of July being a warm summer's day, which attributed to a large number of non-ticket holders being attracted to the concert venue and congregating in the Phoenix Park and the surrounding environment. These individuals mingled with concert patrons and were consuming alcohol. As the day progressed they engaged in anti-social behaviour e.g. urinating in public etc. and a number of arrests had been made as appropriate. In addition to other Garda action, once the concert had commenced, An Garda Síochána utilised a number of mobile units to monitor and sweep the Phoenix Park for individuals not in possession of a concert ticket and they were directed under the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 to leave the area.

7.2 The Event Control Centre

The three concerts were managed from one on-site Event Control Centre. An Garda Síochána manned one table at the Event Control Centre with four personnel including the Blanchardstown Divisional and District Officers. An Garda Síochána had originally requested two tables but due to the size of the centre, the Event Controller was unable to facilitate the second table. The

K./Ambulance Control and Dublin Fire Brigade were not represented in the Event Control Centre for any of the three concerts (see recommendation 8.4).

7.3 Breakdown of the arrival of patrons at the concert

The pre-event planning process for the concerts identified that the younger crowd demographic attending the concert on the 7th July would arrive earlier at the concert venue than for the other two concerts. An Garda Síochána in association with MCD Productions closely monitored the arrival of patrons at the concert on the 7th July 2012. The table below provides a breakdown of the arrival pattern of patrons once the entrance gates opened at 15.00 Hours.

Table Three: Breakdown of the arrival pattern of patrons once the entrance gates opened at 15.00 Hours					
Time	Number of Patrons				
15.30	2,925 -				
16.17	6,721				
16.47	20,798 -				
17.00	25,901				
17.15	28,774				
17.35	33,890				
18.00	37,651				
18.15	40,192				
18.50	41,687				
20.20	43,435				
21.35	43,656				

In anticipation of this eventuality, MCD Productions provided a Welfare Tent outside each entrance gate (Gate A and Gate B). These tents were utilised by security/steward personnel and members of An Garda Síochána to provide a safe location for young unaccompanied persons and intoxicated individuals who required medical assistance. On the 7th July, there was a strict policy that persons under the age of seventeen (17) whether accompanied or not, would not be allowed entry to the concert venue. Young persons under the age of seventeen (17) were brought to a Welfare Tent and remained there until collected by a parent or guardian. In addition, MCD Productions employed spotters both inside and outside the venue to identify underage patrons who were attempting to gain entry or purchase alcohol once inside the venue. An Garda Síochána assisted security/stewards in the performance of this activity. It is clear that MCD Productions policy in this context was not strictly adhered to. This is evidenced at the early stage in the concert when the gates opened at 15.00 Hours, immediately issues on the checking of patron's age were raised by security/steward personnel who were unclear on the procedure (see section 7.7 of this report and recommendation 8.2).

7.4 Breakdown of reported incidents

The following table provides a breakdown of reported incidents at each concert. There is a notable increase in the number of Section 15 of the Misuse of Drugs Acts (Sale and Supply) on the 7th July. This may be attributable to the crowd demographic and is a reflection of the increased Garda presence to combat drug related offences at the event through the additional deployment of personnel on drug unit duties. This is illustrated in the increase of Section 23 drug searches on the 7th July which represent fifty six (56) percent of all drug searches for the duration of the three concerts.

Table Four: Breakdown of reported Incident Type	05th July	07 th July	08th July	Total
Assault Causing Harm	1	18 (9 x Stabbings)	Nil	19
Assault Minor	Nil	5	1	6
Robbery from the Person	Nil	10	1	11
Theft from the Person	1	11	10	22
Drugs – Section 23 Searches	22	39	9	70
Drugs- Section 3 Simple Possession	15	17	6	38
Drugs - Section 15 Sale and Supply	2	11	Nil	13
Public Order	8	18	8	34
Criminal Damage	Nil	2	Nil	2
Total	49	131	35	215

7.5 Prisoner Detention Strategy

On the 5th and 8th of July prisoners arrested by An Garda Síochána were transferred to Blanchardstown, Finglas and Lucan Garda stations. Two prison vans were employed for the transport of prisoners from the concert venue. Due to the anticipated higher volume of arrests at the Swedish House Mafia concert on the 7th July, An Garda Síochána employed additional resources of one (1) Sergeant and three (3) Gardaí at the Bridewell Garda station to operate the Prison Section attached to the station. The table below provides a breakdown of the prisoner numbers for each concert.

Ta	ble Five: Breakdown	of the prisoner	numbers for	each concert	
Concert	Blanchardstown Station	Finglas Station	Lucan Station	Bridewell Station	Total
5 th July	4	5	1	N/A	10
7 th July	3	2	Nil	29	34
8 th July	1	8	Nil	N/A	9

7.6 Incidents requiring Medical Treatment

On the 7th July at the routine end of concert debrief (23.45 Hours), the medical staff employed by MCD Productions informed An Garda Síochána that they had treated a total of two hundred and twenty (220) individuals. The more serious injuries were categorised as follows: one (1)

decased, seven (7) stab injuries, five (5) drug/alcohol related injuries, and two (2) fractures. Two (2) of the seven (7) stab injuries were transferred to James Connolly Memorial Hospital in Blanchardstown. On the 8th July (16.35 Hours) at a debrief with An Garda Síochána and the HSE, the medical staff informed An Garda Síochána that the revised total of the number of patrons treated at the previous nights concert was three hundred and forty (340).

Earlier on the 8th July An Garda Síochána met with the HSE (Mr Brendan Lawlor and Mr Michael O Toole HSE Emergency Management, Ms Anne Marie Hoey Area Manager HSE North and Ms Stephanie Monahan Duty Officer) regarding the previous night's concert. The HSE representatives informed An Garda Síochána that too many patients were transferred to James Connolly Memorial Hospital and there had been communication difficulties with Ambulance Control. In total sixteen (16) patients were transferred to James Connolly Memorial Hospital and eight (8) to the Mater Hospital.

7.7 Synopsis of the Event Log for the 7th July

A synopsis of the main events that occurred at the concert on the 7th July is as follows:

- 14.00 Hours An Garda Síochána and the Event Controller performed a site inspection. There was a steady stream of concert pedestrian traffic on all approaches to the venue from 14.00 Hours
- Prior to the entrance gates opening members of An Garda Síochána visited the bars in the immediate vicinity of the concert venue (Half Way House, Hole in the Wall and Commiskeys). There were large crowds assembled in their car-parks drinking alcohol. Large queues had formed prior to the gates opening at 15.00 Hours
- 15.03 Hours- Event Security can confirm where they should be checking for ID.
- 15.05 Hours- to go to Gate A in relation to age checking
- 15.12 Hours- Age Check issue at Gate A
- Two Public Order units and one prison van were deployed to the Half-Way House bar
- 15.32 Hours One Public Order unit was deployed to Gate A
- 15.36 Hours The initial call for medical services was to the Papal Cross where there were two unresponsive males
- 16.09 Hours The coach car parks were near full capacity
- 16.20 Hours Welfare tent in arena has no furniture or water supplies
- 16.25 Hours Garda personnel observe patrons getting through ditch near Gate A

		CONFIDENTIAL
	16.37 Hours -	Security personnel reported pushing at barriers at Gate A
	16.51 Hours -	There was continued pushing at the barriers at Gate A and additional
		security personnel were requested to assist
	16.59 Hours -	Call for additional security at Gate A
п	17.21 Hours -	Continued pushing at Gate A. Additional security personnel deployed
п	17.21 Hours-	To the right of Gate A patrons attempting to enter concert through breaks
		in perimeter fence
	17.27 Hours-	Call for additional security personnel at the scanners as patrons were
		pushing in at both Gate A and B
	17.31 Hours -	The Safety Officer requested an update on the ground conditions at Gate A
	17.37 Hours -	There was a breach of the perimeter fence by the ATM. Security personnel
		were deployed to secure the fencing
п	17.38 Hours -	There was a breach of the perimeter fence by Bar 3. Security personnel
		were deployed to secure the fencing
	17.40 Hours -	There was a breach of the perimeter fence by Bar 2. 'People pouring in'
	18.00 Hours -	Damaged caused to the perimeter fence. Gardaí make one arrest
	18.00 Hours -	Garda personnel dispatched to the Phoenix Monument where the perimeter
		fence was damaged and individuals attempting to get into the concert
	18.08 Hours -	Additional security requested at Gate A
	18.16 Hours -	A large number of persons (60) attempted to breach the perimeter fence at
		Ashtown Castle. 'Not able to hold them at the moment' Security
		personnel were deployed to secure the fencing
	18.25 Hours -	Breach in the perimeter fence at rear of Bar 3
	18.30 Hours -	Two prisoners arrested at Deerfields, one prisoner detained at Gate A
	18.45 Hours -	Prisoner arrested at Mountjoy Cross
п	18.45 Hours -	Public Order Incident and Bar One, Two prisoners arrested
п	18.55 Hours -	Twelve people breach the fence at rear of Bar 3
	19.06 Hours -	Medical services requested for unconscious male in the forested area
п	19.12 Hours -	Ambulance departs for JCM Hospital
	19.13 Hours -	Garda personnel deployed to assist security at Gate A. One prisoner
		arrested
	19.32 Hours -	Prisoner arrested at Gate B
п	19.40 Hours -	There were issues with invalid tickets and patrons jumping fences at Gate
		A. Garda personnel deployed to assist

Security could not deal with situation at Gate A

19.44 Hours -

- 19.57 Hours People jumping the fence behind Bar 2
- 20.03 Hours Prisoner detained for transport at Gate B
- 20.15 Hours Garda personnel assist security personnel with a public order incident behind Bar Two
- 20.43 Hours Garda personnel assist security personnel with a public order incident at
 Gate A. One prisoner arrested
- 21.15 Hours Three reports of serious stabbings to An Garda Síochána
- 21.41 Hours A large group of individuals were hanging around outside Gate A
- 21.55 Hours Prisoner arrested for stabbing incidents
- 22.07 Hours Report of a public order incident on Chesterfield Avenue
- 22.33 Hours Three further reports of stabbing made to Garda personnel at the Medical
 Tent
- 22.44 Hours Report of an assault at Cummiskey's bar. One prisoner arrested
- 22.48 Hours The concert ends

This synopsis represents an overview of the level of activity during the concert on the 7th July. Members of An Garda Síochána dealt with multiple incidents throughout the day. While these incidents were in line with An Garda Síochána's pre-event Risk Assessment of the concert demographic, the concert on the 7th July would have been the first occasion where this type of event was in an urban setting. This raised public awareness of the event and contributed to the volume of non-patrons who engaged in anti-social behaviour in the vicinity of the concert. However, their actions do not represent the majority of patrons who attend the concert with the intention of merely enjoying the event. Consequently, An Garda Síochána had to employ an intelligence-led policing approach. It took cognisance of the entire crowd demographic where there was a balanced policing approach that applied an appropriate tolerance level to incidents on an individual basis. This approach was factored into An Garda Síochána's briefings to Garda personnel deployed at the concerts and incorporated into the Policing Plan for each concert.

7.8 Security/stewarding related incidents on the 7th July

During the course of the three concerts a significant volume of alcohol was seized from patrons and individuals entering the Phoenix Park, concert venue and congregating in the Phoenix Park. MCD Productions provided large bins to facilitate the storage of the seized alcohol. These bins were disposed of by a waste contractor in the employment of MCD Productions. Due to the high volume of seizures on the 7th July, these bins were empted on a more frequent basis.

Security/steward personnel did not report the seizure of any knifes or offensive weapons at the Swedish House Mafia Concert. Members of An Garda Síochána on patrol in the vicinity of the concert made one arrest of a male for the possession of an offensive weapon where he was in possession of a hammer. The male was charged with possession of an offensive weapon and released on bail. On the 8th July at the Snow Patrol concert, security/steward personnel notified members of An Garda Síochána that they suspected a male to be in possession of a knife. Members of An Garda Síochána searched a male and female and found the male had hidden a knife in the female's bag. The male admitted hiding the knife in the female's bag and was arrested and charged with the possession of an offensive weapon and released on bail.

A review of the incident logs for the Swedish House Mafia Concert on the 7th July (see section 7.7 of this report) indicates that there were periods where the security/steward personnel encountered large volumes of patrons at the entrance gates seeking admittance to the concert. This resulted in incidents of pushing at the barriers and pressure being placed upon security/steward personnel. The logs indicate that the security/steward personnel were unable to contain these incidents. Therefore, it can be deduced that during these periods, the priority of crowd safety and control impacted upon the extent of searches performed by security/steward personnel (e.g. 16.37 Hours, 16.51 Hours, 17.21 Hours, 17.27 Hours, 19.40 Hours and 19.44 Hours).

In addition to the incidents at the entrance gates, there were numerous breaches in the perimeter fence (e.g. 17.21 Hours, 17.37 Hours, 17.38 Hours, 17.40 Hours, 18.16 Hours, 18.25 Hours, 18.55 Hours and 19.57 Hours). In some of these incidents large groups breached the perimeter fence and this is reflected in the comments of the MCD Productions' event log (e.g. 17.40 Hours 'People pouring in' and 18.16 Hours 'Not able to hold them at the moment').

The incidents at the entrance gate search areas coupled with the volume of breaches in the perimeter fencing indicate that MCD Productions did not have appropriate security measures in place for the Swedish House Mafia concert and the associated crowd demographic. This is evidenced by the logs in respect of the deployment of security/steward personnel at the entrance gate search areas and the quality and installation of the perimeter fence.

8 Review - Lessons Learned

An Garda Síochána conducted a review of the policing arrangements for the three concerts held in the Phoenix Park. This review was carried out under the following headings:

- Location Specific Factors outside the concert venue
- Issues for consideration by the concert promoters
- Issues for consideration by An Garda Síochána
- Issues for consideration by other statutory agencies

8.1 Location specific factors outside the concert venue

The Navan Road

An Garda Síochána identified that the Half Way House Bar was a potential source of public order incidents due to its proximity to the Ashtown train station (which was used by patrons to travel to the concert) and the use of it as a drop-off point by private coach contractors transporting patrons to the concert. This resulted in a number of individuals/patrons congregating at various locations along the Navan Road and in particular at the Half Way House Bar. They were consuming alcohol and urinating in public. On the 5th July, An Garda Síochána identified a contributory factor to this behaviour was that the Half Way House Bar was selling alcohol from a marquee in the cark park. This was in contravention of their liquor licence. An Garda Síochána requested the immediate cessation of this practice and the management of the Half Way House Bar co-operated fully and voluntarily closed the bar for a period of time to allow the crowd disperse. This intervention alleviated the public order related issues along the Navan Road. On the 7th July a mixture of patrons and individuals without tickets congregated in the car park of the Half Way House Bar. There were no breaches of the bar's liquor licence, as some of the individuals had purchased the alcohol at off-licence premises in the immediate vicinity of the Navan Road. An Garda Síochána deployed public order units and a prison van to the Half Way House Bar and those found consuming alcohol in public areas were directed to leave the area under the Criminal Justice Public Order Act 1994. In response to residents concerns An Garda Siochána increased the policing presence through mobile and beat patrols.

Chesterfield Avenue

Chesterfield Avenue is the main route through the Phoenix Park and was used by patrons to access both existing amenities (e.g. Zoological Gardens, Farmleigh, and Sports Grounds etc.) and the concert. An Garda Síochána had deployed a number of mobile and beat patrols to monitor activity along the avenue. A number of patrons and individuals without tickets congregated at various locations along the avenue in close proximity to the concert venue. On the 7th July, An Garda Síochána redeployed additional resources to police the avenue with a particular focus on the approach to Gate A which faced directly onto the avenue. Divisional Traffic Units were also deployed to prevent Taxis from dropping off and collecting fares along the avenue as this was identified as a potential risk to the concert patrons. These Taxis were directed to the designated Taxi points at the Papal Cross.

Park Gate Street

On the 5th July, two (2) sergeants and eight (8) Gardaí were deployed to Park Gate Street Concert patrons were searched at the Park Gate Street entrance to the Phoenix Park. This resulted in large crowds congregating outside this gate in the vicinity of the Courts of Criminal Justice building consuming alcohol prior to it being detected and confiscated upon entry to the Phoenix Park. In addition, the close proximity of a mobile Fast-food outlet contributed to the congregation of individuals on Park Gate Street. The licence for this Fast-food outlet was issued by Dublin City Council despite objections by An Garda Síochána.

An Garda Síochána's revised risk assessment of this situation on Park Gate Street resulted in the search cordon being moved to within the Phoenix Park. Patrons were encouraged to enter the park were they were searched at the entrance gates to the concert venue. This action resulted in the supervised movement of the crowd from Park Gate Street into the Phoenix Park which resulted in a filtered migration towards the concert venue. This revised approach was also implemented on the 7th and 8th of July.

8.2 Issues for consideration by the concert promoters

Selection of concert venue

The concert on the 7th July was the first large scale outdoor 'electric music' concert held in the Phoenix Park. The Phoenix Park is an urban location in close proximity to a wide

population demographic. In the recent past similar concerts were held at the Oxygen Festival which is located in a rural location. Thereby reducing the number of non-concert patrons congregating in the vicinity of the concert and the probability of potential public order incidents. An Garda Síochána recommends that concert promoters give greater consideration to the selection of concert venue for this type of music, its appropriateness for the anticipated crowd demographic, the potential to attract non-patrons to the vicinity of the concert and the impact of inclement weather on the venue's ground conditions.

In addition, An Garda Síochána recommends that concert promoters tendering for contracts to promote concerts in OPW locations are required to stipulate the artists/type of music e.g. 'electric music' that they intend to have perform at each concert date. In this instance the artists were not confirmed until the 7th March 2012.

Security/stewarding

There was uncertainty on the behalf of security/steward personnel in respect of their responsibility with regard to the removal of intoxicated patrons from the concert venue. For future concerts in the Phoenix Park, An Garda Siochána will require security/steward personnel to receive specific instruction on their responsibility with regard to the removal of intoxicated patrons from the concert venue. Security/steward personnel are given specific instruction in respect of intoxicated patrons attempting to enter the site and similar instructions are necessary in respect of those patrons who become intoxicated while on site.

In relation to the checking of patron's identity to ascertain their age, it is apparent that security/steward personnel were unclear on MCD Productions policy in this area and it was not strictly adhered to. An Garda Síochána will require security/steward personnel to receive specific instruction on their responsibility with regard to validation of patron's ages prior to entry to a concert venue.

In addition, the incidents at the entrance gate search areas coupled with the volume of breaches in the perimeter fencing indicate that MCD Productions did not have adequate security measures in place for the Swedish House Mafia concert and the associated crowd demographic. This is evidenced by the logs in respect of the deployment of security/steward personnel at the entrance gate search areas and the quality and installation of the perimeter fence (see sections 7.7 and 7.8 of this report). An Garda

Síochána recommends that concert promoters review their policy and procedures regarding the searching of patrons attending concerts in relation to the potential crowd demographic and arrival rates. In addition, An Garda Síochána recommends that concert promoters review of the quality and installation of perimeter fencing utilised at outdoor concerts in the Phoenix Park as in this instance the perimeter fence was breached on numerous occasions.

Provision of a Welfare Tent

MCD Productions provided a Welfare Tent for the concert on the 7th July. The Welfare Tent is used by Medical Staff employed by the concert promoter to monitor the condition of patrons who are brought to the tent under the influence of intoxicants (drugs/alcohol). The absence of a Welfare Tent at the other two concerts increased the calls to the medical staff within the venue and requests for ambulance services to transfer intoxicated individuals to hospital for medical assistance. An Garda Síochána recommend that a Welfare Tent is provided at all concerts regardless of attendance size.

The Event Control Centre

The size of the Event Control Centre provided by MCD Productions was not fit for purpose. An Garda Síochána requested additional accommodation in the centre. The Event Controller gave an undertaking this would be facilitated but it failed to materialise. The CCTV for the venue was controlled by a contactor on behalf of the Event Controller. Consequently, An Garda Síochána had limited access to its functionality. This resulted in it not being possible for a member of An Garda Síochána to be employed to monitor the CCTV footage on a continuous basis for items of Garda interest that may be relevant to the policing of the event. An Garda Síochána had to request the contactor to monitor areas in response to reports of incidents instead of An Garda Síochána being able to proactively monitor the crowds using CCTV. An Garda Síochána will require priority access to the CCTV system in the Event Control Centre for future events in the Phoenix Park.

Temporary Concert Signage

MCD Productions used wooden staked temporary signage in the Phoenix Park to inform patrons of the venue layout. Individuals were able to remove the staked signs from the ground and the wooden stakes had the potential to become offensive weapons. An Garda Síochána recommend that this signage is no longer used by concert organisers in the Phoenix Park.

Security of Outdoor Lighting

MCD Productions provided outdoor lighting in the vicinity of the concert to assist patrons egress from the concert venue. The design of the tower lighting systems required the key to be left in the 'on-position' to operate the lights. Some of these lighting systems were left unattended. Consequently unknown individuals removed the keys from these lighting systems thereby making them redundant. An Garda Síochána recommends that appropriate security be provided by concert promoters to their lighting systems which will eliminate this issue.

8.3 Issues for consideration by An Garda Síochána

Culture of alcohol consumption

The culture of alcohol consumption in Ireland is currently being examined by a Government Working Group. An Garda Síochána's experience from previous large scale outdoor events indicates that concert patrons in the 17 – 25 age group prefer to purchase alcohol at off-licence premises prior to attending a concert than consuming alcohol within the venue. This may be attributable to the Irish culture on the consumption of alcohol and the cost of alcohol within a concert venue. Due to this preference, the result will be individuals consuming alcohol in the vicinity of concert venues, as upon entry to these venues the alcohol will be seized by security/steward personnel and members of An Garda Síochána. This in turn is a contributory factor in the volume of anti-social behaviour in the vicinity of concert venues.

Concert Venue

In hindsight, the Phoenix Park is not a suitable venue for large scale outdoor 'electric music' concerts. Its close proximity to a wide population demographic contributed to the events that occurred on the 7th July. Where similar concerts are held in rural locations, with limited access it reduces the number of non-concert patrons congregating in the vicinity of the concert and the probability of potential public order incidents. There were no indicators during the pre-event planning process of the unsuitability of the Phoenix Park for this type of concert. This location differed from Oxygen Festival in that patrons had a separate camp site from the concert area where they could congregate in a controlled environment under the supervision of security/steward personnel and members of An Garda Síochána.

The transportation of prisoners from within the concert venue

The adverse weather made the ground conditions unsuitable for the large vehicular access required by the prison vans. The event management team had laid a circular track around the perimeter of the concert venue which they travelled with light vehicular buggies. The larger Garda prison vehicles were unable to utilise this access track resulting in prisoners being walked from within the concert venue to the nearest entrance gate. For future outdoor concerts, An Garda Síochána will insist on the provision by concert promoters for the vehicular transport of prisoners from concert sites where there are poor ground conditions due to inclement weather.

Liaison with the DMR North Central Garda Division

Park Gate Street is the boundary marker between the DMR West and DMR North Central Garda Divisions. The majority of patrons exiting the concert utilised Park Gate Street. The DMR West Policing Plan for the concerts identified this eventuality and resources were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the Phoenix Park. However, on the 5th of July the concert ran over time and when the patrons went to Huston Train Station to use the LUAS to travel from the concert it had ceased operation for the night. This resulted in large numbers of individuals seeking to hire taxis and walking along the Quays to the city centre. These circumstances resulted in large numbers of patrons being unexpectedly within the DMR North Central Garda Division for a period of time, but no public order incidents arose.

Public Order Unit and Reserve Units

The proactive deployment of two public order units for the duration of the concert on the 7th July was very effective. They responded to public order incidents and performed the role of a reserve unit responding to public order incidents of a minor nature and as a snatch squad to arrest prisoners within the concert venue. It is now clear that had An Garda Síochána been fully briefed on the likely conduct of the patrons associated with the Swedish House Mafia concert a separate public order unit would have been employed within the concert venue to perform the role of a snatch squad if required and separate reserve units to respond to incidents of a minor nature. In addition the use of the public order units to conduct a sweep of the Phoenix Park after the concert to remove individuals was an effective public order tactic.

Prisoner Management at the Bridewell Garda Station

The concert on the 7th July was the first time the Prison Section at the Bridewell Garda Station was used for the processing of prisoners arrested at concerts in the Phoenix Park. This system was very effective and will be incorporated into future policing plans for events of a similar nature in the Phoenix Park.

Grid Location System

A Grid Location System was utilised by MCD Productions to identify incident locations within the concert venue. However, the absence of a physical marking system on the site to cross reference with the Grid location system distinctly disadvantaged members of An Garda Síochána on the ground. This contributed to a delay in members of An Garda Síochána arriving at the location of some incidents. This matter was identified at the first concert on the 5th July. Consequently, An Garda Síochána brought forward the briefing time for the remaining concerts to afford Garda personnel additional time in advance of the gate opening times to orientate themselves with the venue. Concert promoters should provide a physical marking system on the site to enable cross reference with the Grid system.

8.4 Issues for consideration by other statutory agencies

The HSE/Ambulance Control and Dublin Fire Brigade were part of the pre-event planning process and attended the Table Top Exercise for the concerts. No representatives from the HSE/Ambulance Control or Dublin Fire Brigade were present in the Event Control Centre for any of the three concerts. An Garda Síochána recommend that representatives from these agencies are present in the Event Control Centre for future events of the nature of these concerts to enable efficient communications among the statutory agencies and an immediate response should it be necessary to declare an emergency and hand over control to the relevant statutory agency.

9 Appendix

- Appendix A: The MCD Productions' Event Management Plan
- Appendix B: The MCD Productions' Event Control Manual
- Appendix C: An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia)
- Appendix D: Section 21 Order for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia)
- Appendix E: Public Event Licence issued by Dublin City Council
- Appendix F: An Garda Síochána's Risk Assessment for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia)
- Appendix G: E-mail (7th March) to the Event Controller outlining Garda concerns

Appendix C

An Garda Síochána's Policing Plan for the 7th July (Swedish House Mafia)



Swedish House Mafia & Snoop Dogg Concert



Policing Plan

Phoenix Park 7th July 2012

An Garda Síochána Baile Bhlainséir Baile Átha Cliath 15

Tel/Teileafon: (01) 666 7000 Fax/Facs: (01) 666 7041

Our ref: Your Ref:



Garda Station Blanchardstown Dublin 15

Web site: www.garda.ie E-mail:

Date 7th July 2012.

Chief Superintendent Coburn
D/Superintendent O 'Sullivan
Superintendent Quirke
D/Inspector McEneaney
Inspectors Kelly, Burke. Mostyn, Murphy & Smyth

Re: Swedish House Mafia & Snoop Dogg Concert – Saturday 7^{th} July 2012 at Phoenix Park. Major Event 1D: 32533

Holding Party Public Parade at	08.00hrs.
Main Party Public Duty Parade at	13.00hrs.
Non Public Party Parade	13:30hrs
Doors Opening at	15.00hrs.
Original Rude Boys	15:15hrs
Calvin Harris	16:15hrs
Snoop Dogg	17:45hrs
Tinie Tempah	19:15hrs
Swedish House Mafia	20:45 hrs
Event Finish at	22:50hrs.
Expected Attendance	45,000
•	

Pre Event Management.

The event category for this event is:

Event Category	В
Event Risk	2

Category B Events have an expected attendance of between 45,000. The Risk Matrix of 2 is rated as Medium.

This rating is decided with the Event Organiser and based on the following reasons:

- There are no stands or seating areas.
- This is a full capacity event.
- The event finishes after dark.
- Large non familiarity with temporary venue and surrounding environs.
- Alcohol sales on site during event.
- No serious incidents of note at similar events with same times and venue.
- MCD anticipated attendance is likely to be around 45,000.

Security of Grounds.

Outside Duty

Prior to this event, all members on foot and mobile patrol will be directed to pay attention to the concert site and the environs with a view to ensuring that anything of a suspicious nature is attended to promptly.

The members will pay particular attention to ensuring that the site and its environs are not subjected to unlawful entry, criminal damage etc.

The members will also prevent any temporary food outlet or other commercial outlet from entering and parking on streets inside the Phoenix Park. A direction under Section 21 Public Order Act may be invoked where any person will not comply with a request.

Personnel Employed Holding Party Public Duty:

The following personnel will parade at Ratra House at 08.00hrs in connection with the above concert:

	Holding Party Parade 08.0	Ohrs
Inspector	Sergeant	Gardai
0	1	6

All holding party members are included in main party numbers

Personnel Employed Public Duty:

The following personnel will parade at Ratra House at 13.00hrs in connection with the event:

Public Parade 13.00hrs						
Superintendent	Inspector	Sgt	Gardai	R/Gardai		
	3	7	43	4		

Specialist Unit					
Traffic	Radio Techs	Public Order Unit			
1 - 12	2	1 & 2 & 14			

Total Manpower Employed Public Duty							
C/Supt	D/Supt	Supt	Insp	Sgt	Garda	R/Gda	All Ranks
1	1	1	5	22	125	7	162

	Operational Support 13:	30hrs
Mounted Unit	Dog Unit	Air Support
4	2	Yes

Personnel Employed Non Public Duty:

The following personnel will parade at Ratra House at 1.30hrs in connection with the event:

	C/Supt	Supt	Insp	Sergeant	Gardai	R/Gda	Total
Uniform	1	1	2	8	47	3	62
DDU				1	4		5
Drugs				2	7		9
Total	1	1	2	11	58	3	76

Detective Superintendent Walter O'Sullivan will ensure that all working Detective Gardai under his control are aware that this event is taking place. The members will pay attention to the event and be alert for anything of a suspicious nature coming to notice.

Detective Inspector Mc Eneaney will deploy:

One armed member at the Concert Cash Office.

The member detailed for the above duty will commence duty at 12.00hrs. The members will be responsible for the safety and security of cash within the cash office at the concert site. The member will be under the control of one Detective Sergeant.

Detective Superintendent O'Sullivan will also ensure that the District Task Force are aware that this event is taking place. The members will pay attention to the event and be alert for anything of a suspicious nature coming to notice.

Ticket Collection / Sales Outlets outside Concert Site:

There is one point for ticket collection and sales of a small number of remaining tickets for this event.

It is located as follows:

1. Gate A - Chesterfield Avenue

Arrest and Detention of Persons

The general policy will be that arrests are to be avoided and only resorted to when all other options have failed. Arrests will be necessary where any of the following incidents occur:

- Serious Breach of the Peace
- · Assaults on Gardai
- Any definite criminal Act, e.g. Criminal Damage, Theft etc.
- Throwing of missiles at Artists, official's etc.
- Breaches of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994.
- Only with the authorisation of a Supervisor.

Relevant Powers

Hereunder is a summary of the powers, which may be used:

Section 21 Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 - confers powers to control access. Superintendent Blanchardstown has invoked his powers under Section 21 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 in relation to road closures.

Section 22. Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 - confers powers to search for alcohol containers or any other thing, which could cause injury, or to refuse access.

Section 24 Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 – Powers of Arrest under Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994

Parking Arrangements

There is one supervised car park available in the vicinity of the concert site.

1. Phoenix Park School - 30 Special Needs/Disabled parking.

Artistes Coaches

Event Coaches will approach the site under Garda Escort via Ashtown Gate.

Concert Site Search

The concert site will be searched by security in the presence of a Garda. Members of the Garda Síochaná will then maintain a presence at the concert site until the completion of the event. This will be maintained by uniformed members. Special attention will be paid to the bar area.

The primary duty for the members will be to ensure that the site, stage area, equipment etc are not interfered with during the above tour of duty. Members will ensure that no access is gained to the ground unless authorised. Ensure no part of the site is interfered with defaced or used for advertising, or political purposes.

Bomb Alert Message:

The following message will be transmitted to via Garda Communications Room to Gardai in the event of a bomb call to the Stadium.



Gardai and Stewards will commence a search of the relevant area and a Supervisor will communicate the result back to the Communications Room

Emergency Plan.

The D.M.R. Emergency Plan will be available at KD Base, if required.

All Supervisors will ensure that they are familiar with the Emergency Evacuation Detail. They will ensure that all members listed in the Detail are informed of their duties in the event of an Emergency Evacuation.

Emergency Assembly Areas

In the event of an emergency, members may be required to go to an Assembly Point to be instructed as to their duties in the site. The Communications Room will give this order and the Assembly Point will be determined by the location of the emergency.

The Outside Garda Assembly Points are as follows:

1. Phoenix Monument.

Inspector John Burke - will take charge of Gardai assembled at this point.

2. Mountjoy Cross.

Inspector Frank Mostyn - will take charge of Gardai assembled at this point.

3. District Resources:

Inspector Colm Murphy