June 9, 2014 The Honorable Tom Vilsack Secretary U.S. Department of Agriculture Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for your response to my inquiry letter dated April 17, 2014, concerning the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). After examining the materials that you provided, I’m concerned about the viability of the project and the apparent lack of analysis and planning performed prior to the project’s initiation. I’m most troubled by the following issues: • The USDA confirmed that soybean production in Afghanistan has not met expectations and that there are doubts concerning the long-term sustainability of a soybean processing factory built as part of the project. • The project’s implementer, the American Soybean Association, did not conduct feasibility or value-chain studies prior to initiation of the project in 2010. • Scientific research conducted for the UK Department for International Development between 2005 and 2008 concluded that soybeans were inappropriate for conditions and farming practices in northern Afghanistan, where the program was implemented. • Despite the lack of prior planning and analysis, and despite evidence that may have put the success of the program in doubt, USDA provided $34.4 million in commodities, transportation, and administrative funds to ASA for SARAI. I understand that Afghanistan’s operating environment poses daunting challenges for reconstruction and development programs, and that any project in the country is bound to meet its fair share of difficulties. However, what is troubling about this particular project is that it appears that many of these problems could reasonably have been foreseen and, therefore, possibly avoided. Moving forward, I recommend that you take the following actions prior to any further investment of U.S. government funding in SARAI: • Implement a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the project’s future sustainability, including a review of existing research on the economic viability of growing soybeans in Afghanistan. If a viable business case cannot be supported, withhold further investment. • Develop an in-depth plan to address the deficiencies and challenges already identified. Additionally, I recommend that USDA thoroughly review the process by which the Food for Progress program evaluates project proposals and makes its final selections. June 9, 2014 The Honorable Tom Vilsack Secretary U.S. Department of Agriculture Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for your response to my inquiry letter dated April 17, 2014, concerning the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). After examining the materials that you provided, I’m concerned about the viability of the project and the apparent lack of analysis and planning performed prior to the project’s initiation. I’m most troubled by the following issues: • The USDA confirmed that soybean production in Afghanistan has not met expectations and that there are doubts concerning the long-term sustainability of a soybean processing factory built as part of the project. • The project’s implementer, the American Soybean Association, did not conduct feasibility or value-chain studies prior to initiation of the project in 2010. • Scientific research conducted for the UK Department for International Development between 2005 and 2008 concluded that soybeans were inappropriate for conditions and farming practices in northern Afghanistan, where the program was implemented. • Despite the lack of prior planning and analysis, and despite evidence that may have put the success of the program in doubt, USDA provided $34.4 million in commodities, transportation, and administrative funds to ASA for SARAI. I understand that Afghanistan’s operating environment poses daunting challenges for reconstruction and development programs, and that any project in the country is bound to meet its fair share of difficulties. However, what is troubling about this particular project is that it appears that many of these problems could reasonably have been foreseen and, therefore, possibly avoided. Moving forward, I recommend that you take the following actions prior to any further investment of U.S. government funding in SARAI: • Implement a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the project’s future sustainability, including a review of existing research on the economic viability of growing soybeans in Afghanistan. If a viable business case cannot be supported, withhold further investment. • Develop an in-depth plan to address the deficiencies and challenges already identified. Additionally, I recommend that USDA thoroughly review the process by which the Food for Progress program evaluates project proposals and makes its final selections. June 9, 2014 The Honorable Tom Vilsack Secretary U.S. Department of Agriculture Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for your response to my inquiry letter dated April 17, 2014, concerning the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). After examining the materials that you provided, I’m concerned about the viability of the project and the apparent lack of analysis and planning performed prior to the project’s initiation. I’m most troubled by the following issues: • The USDA confirmed that soybean production in Afghanistan has not met expectations and that there are doubts concerning the long-term sustainability of a soybean processing factory built as part of the project. • The project’s implementer, the American Soybean Association, did not conduct feasibility or value-chain studies prior to initiation of the project in 2010. • Scientific research conducted for the UK Department for International Development between 2005 and 2008 concluded that soybeans were inappropriate for conditions and farming practices in northern Afghanistan, where the program was implemented. • Despite the lack of prior planning and analysis, and despite evidence that may have put the success of the program in doubt, USDA provided $34.4 million in commodities, transportation, and administrative funds to ASA for SARAI. I understand that Afghanistan’s operating environment poses daunting challenges for reconstruction and development programs, and that any project in the country is bound to meet its fair share of difficulties. However, what is troubling about this particular project is that it appears that many of these problems could reasonably have been foreseen and, therefore, possibly avoided. Moving forward, I recommend that you take the following actions prior to any further investment of U.S. government funding in SARAI: • Implement a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the project’s future sustainability, including a review of existing research on the economic viability of growing soybeans in Afghanistan. If a viable business case cannot be supported, withhold further investment. • Develop an in-depth plan to address the deficiencies and challenges already identified. Additionally, I recommend that USDA thoroughly review the process by which the Food for Progress program evaluates project proposals and makes its final selections. June 9, 2014 The Honorable Tom Vilsack Secretary U.S. Department of Agriculture Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for your response to my inquiry letter dated April 17, 2014, concerning the Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). After examining the materials that you provided, I’m concerned about the viability of the project and the apparent lack of analysis and planning performed prior to the project’s initiation. I’m most troubled by the following issues: • The USDA confirmed that soybean production in Afghanistan has not met expectations and that there are doubts concerning the long-term sustainability of a soybean processing factory built as part of the project. • The project’s implementer, the American Soybean Association, did not conduct feasibility or value-chain studies prior to initiation of the project in 2010. • Scientific research conducted for the UK Department for International Development between 2005 and 2008 concluded that soybeans were inappropriate for conditions and farming practices in northern Afghanistan, where the program was implemented. • Despite the lack of prior planning and analysis, and despite evidence that may have put the success of the program in doubt, USDA provided $34.4 million in commodities, transportation, and administrative funds to ASA for SARAI. I understand that Afghanistan’s operating environment poses daunting challenges for reconstruction and development programs, and that any project in the country is bound to meet its fair share of difficulties. However, what is troubling about this particular project is that it appears that many of these problems could reasonably have been foreseen and, therefore, possibly avoided. Moving forward, I recommend that you take the following actions prior to any further investment of U.S. government funding in SARAI: • Implement a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the project’s future sustainability, including a review of existing research on the economic viability of growing soybeans in Afghanistan. If a viable business case cannot be supported, withhold further investment. • Develop an in-depth plan to address the deficiencies and challenges already identified. Additionally, I recommend that USDA thoroughly review the process by which the Food for Progress program evaluates project proposals and makes its final selections. I thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Special Projects, Mr. Jack Mitchell, at or at . Sincerely, John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Attachments: I: USDA Response to SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter II: Third-Party Evaluation of SARAI III: SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Soybean Program SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 2 I thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Special Projects, Mr. Jack Mitchell, at or at . Sincerely, John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Attachments: I: USDA Response to SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter II: Third-Party Evaluation of SARAI III: SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Soybean Program SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 2 I thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Special Projects, Mr. Jack Mitchell, at or at . Sincerely, John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Attachments: I: USDA Response to SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter II: Third-Party Evaluation of SARAI III: SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Soybean Program SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 2 I thank you for your cooperation in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact my Director of Special Projects, Mr. Jack Mitchell, at or at . Sincerely, John F. Sopko Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Attachments: I: USDA Response to SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter II: Third-Party Evaluation of SARAI III: SIGAR-14-51-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Soybean Program SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 2 ATTACHMENT I: USDA RESPONSE TO SIGAR-14-51-SP INQUIRY LETTER SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 3 ATTACHMENT I: USDA RESPONSE TO SIGAR-14-51-SP INQUIRY LETTER SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 3 ATTACHMENT I: USDA RESPONSE TO SIGAR-14-51-SP INQUIRY LETTER SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 3 ATTACHMENT I: USDA RESPONSE TO SIGAR-14-51-SP INQUIRY LETTER SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 3 Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) Description of Project and Justi?cation In July 2009, the American Soybean Association (AS A) submitted a proposal to USDA that requested funding under the Food for Progress program. The following paragraphs were provided by ASA within its proposal. ?The American Soybean Association?s WISHH program (ASAJWISHH), in collaboration with Shelter for Life (SFL) and Nutrition and Education International (NEI), propose a multi-prong agricultural development program that will contribute to the trilateral U.S.- Pakistan-Afghanistan efforts of improving food security, water management and watershed rehabilitation, and agricultural trade corridors. Proposed activities also support needs most recently stated following the June 2009 G8 Foreign Ministers Meetings, including promoting sustainable agricultural development, watershed rehabilitation, promoting the role of women, improved infrastructure and more ef?cient market access, capacity building, and credit availability. proposes a three year program reaching over 400,000 people with nine activities supporting four objectives. The four objectives include, i) increase the production capacity of targeted farmers through renovated irrigation systems, access to micro credit, and technical support and training, ii) increase farmer access to markets through road rehabilitation, increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities, and iv) improve the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users Description of the Need for the Proposed Program Afghanistan is a country with grim development indicators. The under-five mortality rate is the second worst in the world, only behind Sierra Leone. Maternal mortality is also among the worst in the world. In 2007, life expectancy was a mere 44 years. State of the World?s Children 2009 reports that 54 percent of children under ?ve suffer from moderate or severe stunting, and that 33 percent of children under ?ve are moderately or severely underweight.1 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) states that, . .almost half of the Afghan population is unable to purchase a basic food basket to provide 2,100 calories consumption per day.?12 In addition to insufficient caloric intake, micronutrient deficiencies are widespread (especially for iodine and iron) as is inadequate diet diversity. Findings from the 2007 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) indicate that 42 percent of the population survives on about per month, or 1 UNICEF, The State of the World ?5 Children 2009, pg. 122 2 Governm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 28 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 4 Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) Description of Project and Justi?cation In July 2009, the American Soybean Association (AS A) submitted a proposal to USDA that requested funding under the Food for Progress program. The following paragraphs were provided by ASA within its proposal. ?The American Soybean Association?s WISHH program (ASAJWISHH), in collaboration with Shelter for Life (SFL) and Nutrition and Education International (NEI), propose a multi-prong agricultural development program that will contribute to the trilateral U.S.- Pakistan-Afghanistan efforts of improving food security, water management and watershed rehabilitation, and agricultural trade corridors. Proposed activities also support needs most recently stated following the June 2009 G8 Foreign Ministers Meetings, including promoting sustainable agricultural development, watershed rehabilitation, promoting the role of women, improved infrastructure and more ef?cient market access, capacity building, and credit availability. proposes a three year program reaching over 400,000 people with nine activities supporting four objectives. The four objectives include, i) increase the production capacity of targeted farmers through renovated irrigation systems, access to micro credit, and technical support and training, ii) increase farmer access to markets through road rehabilitation, increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities, and iv) improve the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users Description of the Need for the Proposed Program Afghanistan is a country with grim development indicators. The under-five mortality rate is the second worst in the world, only behind Sierra Leone. Maternal mortality is also among the worst in the world. In 2007, life expectancy was a mere 44 years. State of the World?s Children 2009 reports that 54 percent of children under ?ve suffer from moderate or severe stunting, and that 33 percent of children under ?ve are moderately or severely underweight.1 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) states that, . .almost half of the Afghan population is unable to purchase a basic food basket to provide 2,100 calories consumption per day.?12 In addition to insufficient caloric intake, micronutrient deficiencies are widespread (especially for iodine and iron) as is inadequate diet diversity. Findings from the 2007 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) indicate that 42 percent of the population survives on about per month, or 1 UNICEF, The State of the World ?5 Children 2009, pg. 122 2 Governm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 28 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 4 Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) Description of Project and Justi?cation In July 2009, the American Soybean Association (AS A) submitted a proposal to USDA that requested funding under the Food for Progress program. The following paragraphs were provided by ASA within its proposal. ?The American Soybean Association?s WISHH program (ASAJWISHH), in collaboration with Shelter for Life (SFL) and Nutrition and Education International (NEI), propose a multi-prong agricultural development program that will contribute to the trilateral U.S.- Pakistan-Afghanistan efforts of improving food security, water management and watershed rehabilitation, and agricultural trade corridors. Proposed activities also support needs most recently stated following the June 2009 G8 Foreign Ministers Meetings, including promoting sustainable agricultural development, watershed rehabilitation, promoting the role of women, improved infrastructure and more ef?cient market access, capacity building, and credit availability. proposes a three year program reaching over 400,000 people with nine activities supporting four objectives. The four objectives include, i) increase the production capacity of targeted farmers through renovated irrigation systems, access to micro credit, and technical support and training, ii) increase farmer access to markets through road rehabilitation, increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities, and iv) improve the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users Description of the Need for the Proposed Program Afghanistan is a country with grim development indicators. The under-five mortality rate is the second worst in the world, only behind Sierra Leone. Maternal mortality is also among the worst in the world. In 2007, life expectancy was a mere 44 years. State of the World?s Children 2009 reports that 54 percent of children under ?ve suffer from moderate or severe stunting, and that 33 percent of children under ?ve are moderately or severely underweight.1 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) states that, . .almost half of the Afghan population is unable to purchase a basic food basket to provide 2,100 calories consumption per day.?12 In addition to insufficient caloric intake, micronutrient deficiencies are widespread (especially for iodine and iron) as is inadequate diet diversity. Findings from the 2007 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) indicate that 42 percent of the population survives on about per month, or 1 UNICEF, The State of the World ?5 Children 2009, pg. 122 2 Governm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 28 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 4 Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI) Description of Project and Justi?cation In July 2009, the American Soybean Association (AS A) submitted a proposal to USDA that requested funding under the Food for Progress program. The following paragraphs were provided by ASA within its proposal. ?The American Soybean Association?s WISHH program (ASAJWISHH), in collaboration with Shelter for Life (SFL) and Nutrition and Education International (NEI), propose a multi-prong agricultural development program that will contribute to the trilateral U.S.- Pakistan-Afghanistan efforts of improving food security, water management and watershed rehabilitation, and agricultural trade corridors. Proposed activities also support needs most recently stated following the June 2009 G8 Foreign Ministers Meetings, including promoting sustainable agricultural development, watershed rehabilitation, promoting the role of women, improved infrastructure and more ef?cient market access, capacity building, and credit availability. proposes a three year program reaching over 400,000 people with nine activities supporting four objectives. The four objectives include, i) increase the production capacity of targeted farmers through renovated irrigation systems, access to micro credit, and technical support and training, ii) increase farmer access to markets through road rehabilitation, increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities, and iv) improve the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users Description of the Need for the Proposed Program Afghanistan is a country with grim development indicators. The under-five mortality rate is the second worst in the world, only behind Sierra Leone. Maternal mortality is also among the worst in the world. In 2007, life expectancy was a mere 44 years. State of the World?s Children 2009 reports that 54 percent of children under ?ve suffer from moderate or severe stunting, and that 33 percent of children under ?ve are moderately or severely underweight.1 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) states that, . .almost half of the Afghan population is unable to purchase a basic food basket to provide 2,100 calories consumption per day.?12 In addition to insufficient caloric intake, micronutrient deficiencies are widespread (especially for iodine and iron) as is inadequate diet diversity. Findings from the 2007 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) indicate that 42 percent of the population survives on about per month, or 1 UNICEF, The State of the World ?5 Children 2009, pg. 122 2 Governm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 28 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 4 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 2 less than 50 cents per day. 3 UNICEF notes that when various key indicators in health, education, and water and sanitation are compared across all rovinces, ?Baghlan ranks 32f1d overall; the worst province in the country.? Takhar ranks 24 overall. On average, each member of a rural family consumes 3.4 kilograms of ?our each week. Adding soy flour to wheat flour could greatly contribute to improving nutrition. Agriculture is of paramount importance to Afghanistan, representing 50 percent of the country?s GDP and supporting 85 percent of its people. Securing water for agricultural and personal use is a challenge, however. According to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ?Prior to 1979 some 3.3 million hectares were cultivated under various irrigation methods, compared to the 1.8 million hectares now being irrigated.?4 In addition, ?water constraints inhibit cultivation of up to one third of irrigated land.?5 The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development notes that an average of only 19 percent of households in Baghlan have access to safe drinking water, while in Takhar this number increases to 29 percent of households. Farmers also have challenges in securing credit for necessary implements. Poor roads are a real challenge in Afghanistan. In Baghlan, about 40 percent of roads are accessible year round, while 32 percent of roads are accessible only during some seasons. In Takhar, 43 percent of roads can handle car traffic year round, while about 30 percent of roads are accessible to car tra?ic only part of the year. In both areas, however, nearly a quarter of the province has no roads at all.6 Due to decades of con?ict, much of Afghanistan?s agro-processing industry was destroyed, draining physical assets and human know-how. The country currently imports over 90 percent of the vegetable oil that it consumes each year, mainly from Pakistan, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, and other neighboring countries. Providing support to oilseed stakeholders will contribute to job creation and improved food security.? Overview of Grant Agreement In FY 2010, USDA signed a Food for Progress agreement with the American Soybean Association that would support the Soybeans in Agriculture Renewal of Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI). USDA modified the agreement in 2010 and twice in 2012 to approve adjustments in the commodity sales process, the donation of commodities, and activity descriptions and targets. USDA provided a total of $34.4 million of commodities, associated transportation, and administrative funds through this agreement. The following information is included in the grant agreement and describes the objectives of the project, progress measures, and specific activities. USDA is currently considering a 3 Ibid, pg. 27 4 Govemm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 84 5 . Ibid, pg. 88 6 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Development Plans for Baghlan and Takhar, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 5 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 2 less than 50 cents per day. 3 UNICEF notes that when various key indicators in health, education, and water and sanitation are compared across all rovinces, ?Baghlan ranks 32f1d overall; the worst province in the country.? Takhar ranks 24 overall. On average, each member of a rural family consumes 3.4 kilograms of ?our each week. Adding soy flour to wheat flour could greatly contribute to improving nutrition. Agriculture is of paramount importance to Afghanistan, representing 50 percent of the country?s GDP and supporting 85 percent of its people. Securing water for agricultural and personal use is a challenge, however. According to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ?Prior to 1979 some 3.3 million hectares were cultivated under various irrigation methods, compared to the 1.8 million hectares now being irrigated.?4 In addition, ?water constraints inhibit cultivation of up to one third of irrigated land.?5 The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development notes that an average of only 19 percent of households in Baghlan have access to safe drinking water, while in Takhar this number increases to 29 percent of households. Farmers also have challenges in securing credit for necessary implements. Poor roads are a real challenge in Afghanistan. In Baghlan, about 40 percent of roads are accessible year round, while 32 percent of roads are accessible only during some seasons. In Takhar, 43 percent of roads can handle car traffic year round, while about 30 percent of roads are accessible to car tra?ic only part of the year. In both areas, however, nearly a quarter of the province has no roads at all.6 Due to decades of con?ict, much of Afghanistan?s agro-processing industry was destroyed, draining physical assets and human know-how. The country currently imports over 90 percent of the vegetable oil that it consumes each year, mainly from Pakistan, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, and other neighboring countries. Providing support to oilseed stakeholders will contribute to job creation and improved food security.? Overview of Grant Agreement In FY 2010, USDA signed a Food for Progress agreement with the American Soybean Association that would support the Soybeans in Agriculture Renewal of Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI). USDA modified the agreement in 2010 and twice in 2012 to approve adjustments in the commodity sales process, the donation of commodities, and activity descriptions and targets. USDA provided a total of $34.4 million of commodities, associated transportation, and administrative funds through this agreement. The following information is included in the grant agreement and describes the objectives of the project, progress measures, and specific activities. USDA is currently considering a 3 Ibid, pg. 27 4 Govemm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 84 5 . Ibid, pg. 88 6 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Development Plans for Baghlan and Takhar, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 5 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 2 less than 50 cents per day. 3 UNICEF notes that when various key indicators in health, education, and water and sanitation are compared across all rovinces, ?Baghlan ranks 32f1d overall; the worst province in the country.? Takhar ranks 24 overall. On average, each member of a rural family consumes 3.4 kilograms of ?our each week. Adding soy flour to wheat flour could greatly contribute to improving nutrition. Agriculture is of paramount importance to Afghanistan, representing 50 percent of the country?s GDP and supporting 85 percent of its people. Securing water for agricultural and personal use is a challenge, however. According to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ?Prior to 1979 some 3.3 million hectares were cultivated under various irrigation methods, compared to the 1.8 million hectares now being irrigated.?4 In addition, ?water constraints inhibit cultivation of up to one third of irrigated land.?5 The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development notes that an average of only 19 percent of households in Baghlan have access to safe drinking water, while in Takhar this number increases to 29 percent of households. Farmers also have challenges in securing credit for necessary implements. Poor roads are a real challenge in Afghanistan. In Baghlan, about 40 percent of roads are accessible year round, while 32 percent of roads are accessible only during some seasons. In Takhar, 43 percent of roads can handle car traffic year round, while about 30 percent of roads are accessible to car tra?ic only part of the year. In both areas, however, nearly a quarter of the province has no roads at all.6 Due to decades of con?ict, much of Afghanistan?s agro-processing industry was destroyed, draining physical assets and human know-how. The country currently imports over 90 percent of the vegetable oil that it consumes each year, mainly from Pakistan, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, and other neighboring countries. Providing support to oilseed stakeholders will contribute to job creation and improved food security.? Overview of Grant Agreement In FY 2010, USDA signed a Food for Progress agreement with the American Soybean Association that would support the Soybeans in Agriculture Renewal of Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI). USDA modified the agreement in 2010 and twice in 2012 to approve adjustments in the commodity sales process, the donation of commodities, and activity descriptions and targets. USDA provided a total of $34.4 million of commodities, associated transportation, and administrative funds through this agreement. The following information is included in the grant agreement and describes the objectives of the project, progress measures, and specific activities. USDA is currently considering a 3 Ibid, pg. 27 4 Govemm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 84 5 . Ibid, pg. 88 6 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Development Plans for Baghlan and Takhar, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 5 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 2 less than 50 cents per day. 3 UNICEF notes that when various key indicators in health, education, and water and sanitation are compared across all rovinces, ?Baghlan ranks 32f1d overall; the worst province in the country.? Takhar ranks 24 overall. On average, each member of a rural family consumes 3.4 kilograms of ?our each week. Adding soy flour to wheat flour could greatly contribute to improving nutrition. Agriculture is of paramount importance to Afghanistan, representing 50 percent of the country?s GDP and supporting 85 percent of its people. Securing water for agricultural and personal use is a challenge, however. According to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, ?Prior to 1979 some 3.3 million hectares were cultivated under various irrigation methods, compared to the 1.8 million hectares now being irrigated.?4 In addition, ?water constraints inhibit cultivation of up to one third of irrigated land.?5 The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development notes that an average of only 19 percent of households in Baghlan have access to safe drinking water, while in Takhar this number increases to 29 percent of households. Farmers also have challenges in securing credit for necessary implements. Poor roads are a real challenge in Afghanistan. In Baghlan, about 40 percent of roads are accessible year round, while 32 percent of roads are accessible only during some seasons. In Takhar, 43 percent of roads can handle car traffic year round, while about 30 percent of roads are accessible to car tra?ic only part of the year. In both areas, however, nearly a quarter of the province has no roads at all.6 Due to decades of con?ict, much of Afghanistan?s agro-processing industry was destroyed, draining physical assets and human know-how. The country currently imports over 90 percent of the vegetable oil that it consumes each year, mainly from Pakistan, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, and other neighboring countries. Providing support to oilseed stakeholders will contribute to job creation and improved food security.? Overview of Grant Agreement In FY 2010, USDA signed a Food for Progress agreement with the American Soybean Association that would support the Soybeans in Agriculture Renewal of Afghanistan Initiative (SARAI). USDA modified the agreement in 2010 and twice in 2012 to approve adjustments in the commodity sales process, the donation of commodities, and activity descriptions and targets. USDA provided a total of $34.4 million of commodities, associated transportation, and administrative funds through this agreement. The following information is included in the grant agreement and describes the objectives of the project, progress measures, and specific activities. USDA is currently considering a 3 Ibid, pg. 27 4 Govemm ent of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, pg. 84 5 . Ibid, pg. 88 6 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Provincial Development Plans for Baghlan and Takhar, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 5 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 3 request to modify the grant agreement in order to address the challenges facing the project and to enhance the prospects for longer term sustainability. If approved, the descriptions of objectives, progress measures, and activities may change. Activity Objectives Monetization ASA Will monetize 13?750 MT Of Soybean Oil: and, OVef 3 Period of approximately three years, use the proceeds from such sale to implement the following activities in Afghanistan: 0 Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways to allow for greater water ?ows to reach targeted ?elds and to connect agricultural producing communities to provincial, regional, and national markets. 0 Provide Micro?credit to support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs and facilitate income generating trade that will complement food production and marketing. 0 Provide Technical Support and Training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop. 0 Provide Marketing Assistance to develop, package and market various foods produced by a newly-established protein processing facility. 0 Establish an Oilseed Association to bring together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. 0 Establish a Protein Processing Facility to process soybeans into flour. 0 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy. 0 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries to increase nutritional knowledge and ability to utilize soy in cooked foods, including naan bread. 0 Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys to determine the nutritional impact on those individuals who are participating under a direct feeding activity. 0 Conduct Feeding Trials to determine the most ef?cient feed for poultry. Direct Di_stribution of Soy Flour SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 6 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 3 request to modify the grant agreement in order to address the challenges facing the project and to enhance the prospects for longer term sustainability. If approved, the descriptions of objectives, progress measures, and activities may change. Activity Objectives Monetization ASA Will monetize 13?750 MT Of Soybean Oil: and, OVef 3 Period of approximately three years, use the proceeds from such sale to implement the following activities in Afghanistan: 0 Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways to allow for greater water ?ows to reach targeted ?elds and to connect agricultural producing communities to provincial, regional, and national markets. 0 Provide Micro?credit to support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs and facilitate income generating trade that will complement food production and marketing. 0 Provide Technical Support and Training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop. 0 Provide Marketing Assistance to develop, package and market various foods produced by a newly-established protein processing facility. 0 Establish an Oilseed Association to bring together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. 0 Establish a Protein Processing Facility to process soybeans into flour. 0 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy. 0 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries to increase nutritional knowledge and ability to utilize soy in cooked foods, including naan bread. 0 Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys to determine the nutritional impact on those individuals who are participating under a direct feeding activity. 0 Conduct Feeding Trials to determine the most ef?cient feed for poultry. Direct Di_stribution of Soy Flour SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 6 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 3 request to modify the grant agreement in order to address the challenges facing the project and to enhance the prospects for longer term sustainability. If approved, the descriptions of objectives, progress measures, and activities may change. Activity Objectives Monetization ASA Will monetize 13?750 MT Of Soybean Oil: and, OVef 3 Period of approximately three years, use the proceeds from such sale to implement the following activities in Afghanistan: 0 Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways to allow for greater water ?ows to reach targeted ?elds and to connect agricultural producing communities to provincial, regional, and national markets. 0 Provide Micro?credit to support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs and facilitate income generating trade that will complement food production and marketing. 0 Provide Technical Support and Training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop. 0 Provide Marketing Assistance to develop, package and market various foods produced by a newly-established protein processing facility. 0 Establish an Oilseed Association to bring together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. 0 Establish a Protein Processing Facility to process soybeans into flour. 0 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy. 0 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries to increase nutritional knowledge and ability to utilize soy in cooked foods, including naan bread. 0 Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys to determine the nutritional impact on those individuals who are participating under a direct feeding activity. 0 Conduct Feeding Trials to determine the most ef?cient feed for poultry. Direct Di_stribution of Soy Flour SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 6 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 3 request to modify the grant agreement in order to address the challenges facing the project and to enhance the prospects for longer term sustainability. If approved, the descriptions of objectives, progress measures, and activities may change. Activity Objectives Monetization ASA Will monetize 13?750 MT Of Soybean Oil: and, OVef 3 Period of approximately three years, use the proceeds from such sale to implement the following activities in Afghanistan: 0 Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways to allow for greater water ?ows to reach targeted ?elds and to connect agricultural producing communities to provincial, regional, and national markets. 0 Provide Micro?credit to support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs and facilitate income generating trade that will complement food production and marketing. 0 Provide Technical Support and Training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop. 0 Provide Marketing Assistance to develop, package and market various foods produced by a newly-established protein processing facility. 0 Establish an Oilseed Association to bring together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. 0 Establish a Protein Processing Facility to process soybeans into flour. 0 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy. 0 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries to increase nutritional knowledge and ability to utilize soy in cooked foods, including naan bread. 0 Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys to determine the nutritional impact on those individuals who are participating under a direct feeding activity. 0 Conduct Feeding Trials to determine the most ef?cient feed for poultry. Direct Di_stribution of Soy Flour SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 6 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 4 During the first year of activities under the agreement, AS A, through its subrecipient, distributed 80 metric tons (MT) of defatted soy flour to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families during the winter months. Each family received 4 kg of soy flour per month for a period of four months (120 days per year). This ration provided on average 22 grams of soy ?our per person per day. Barter of Soybeans and Direct Distribution of Soy Flour ASA will process 2,000 MT of soybeans annually over three years (6,000 MT total) through a newly established, self-contained protein processing facility that it will purchase with monetization proceeds under this agreement. ASA will arrange for Sustainable Appropriate Local Technologies International (SALT) to manage and monitor the facility. The 2,000 MT of soybeans that will be processed annually through this facility will yield approximately 950 MT of low fat soy flour annually. From this amount, ASA will barter 450 MT of soy flour each year with processors to cover processing costs. ASA will dispose of the remaining 1,500 MT of soy ?our (500 MT of soy ?our annually) as follows: ASA will distribute a total of 250 MT of soy ?our (160 MT will be used for two winter rations and 90 MT will be used in cooking seminars) over a period of three years. ASA will provide the remaining 1,250 MT of soy ?our to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) as a donation, or to another identi?ed non- governmental organization(s) (NGO) through a subgrant, or both, for distribution to vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. ASA will provide a ration of soy ?our to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families for a period of four months (120 days per year) during two additional winters. A woman will be eligible to receive rations for one, two, or three winters, provided that she is vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating during each winter in which she receives a ration. ASA will also distribute soy flour to 10,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women at ASA-sponsored cooking seminars. The distribution will consist of the soy flour that is used during the actual cooking seminars as well as soy flour that will be given to each vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating woman at the conclusion of each seminar for home use. The cooking seminars are part of an ASA effort, funded through monetization proceeds, to instruct vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women on the proper utilization of soy ?our in the home production of naan (local style bread), as well as the various ways that soybeans can be prepared and consumed.? ?Table I MONETIZATION Activity Objectives Type and Number Progress Measures of Bene?ciaries Renovate or Construct -Direct: 15,000 Outputs: Irrigation Systems and farmers and ?Mobilize or establish one agricultural Rehabilitate Farm?to? unemployed laborers extension and water management committee Market Roadways in at least six communities SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 7 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 4 During the first year of activities under the agreement, AS A, through its subrecipient, distributed 80 metric tons (MT) of defatted soy flour to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families during the winter months. Each family received 4 kg of soy flour per month for a period of four months (120 days per year). This ration provided on average 22 grams of soy ?our per person per day. Barter of Soybeans and Direct Distribution of Soy Flour ASA will process 2,000 MT of soybeans annually over three years (6,000 MT total) through a newly established, self-contained protein processing facility that it will purchase with monetization proceeds under this agreement. ASA will arrange for Sustainable Appropriate Local Technologies International (SALT) to manage and monitor the facility. The 2,000 MT of soybeans that will be processed annually through this facility will yield approximately 950 MT of low fat soy flour annually. From this amount, ASA will barter 450 MT of soy flour each year with processors to cover processing costs. ASA will dispose of the remaining 1,500 MT of soy ?our (500 MT of soy ?our annually) as follows: ASA will distribute a total of 250 MT of soy ?our (160 MT will be used for two winter rations and 90 MT will be used in cooking seminars) over a period of three years. ASA will provide the remaining 1,250 MT of soy ?our to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) as a donation, or to another identi?ed non- governmental organization(s) (NGO) through a subgrant, or both, for distribution to vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. ASA will provide a ration of soy ?our to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families for a period of four months (120 days per year) during two additional winters. A woman will be eligible to receive rations for one, two, or three winters, provided that she is vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating during each winter in which she receives a ration. ASA will also distribute soy flour to 10,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women at ASA-sponsored cooking seminars. The distribution will consist of the soy flour that is used during the actual cooking seminars as well as soy flour that will be given to each vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating woman at the conclusion of each seminar for home use. The cooking seminars are part of an ASA effort, funded through monetization proceeds, to instruct vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women on the proper utilization of soy ?our in the home production of naan (local style bread), as well as the various ways that soybeans can be prepared and consumed.? ?Table I MONETIZATION Activity Objectives Type and Number Progress Measures of Bene?ciaries Renovate or Construct -Direct: 15,000 Outputs: Irrigation Systems and farmers and ?Mobilize or establish one agricultural Rehabilitate Farm?to? unemployed laborers extension and water management committee Market Roadways in at least six communities SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 7 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 4 During the first year of activities under the agreement, AS A, through its subrecipient, distributed 80 metric tons (MT) of defatted soy flour to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families during the winter months. Each family received 4 kg of soy flour per month for a period of four months (120 days per year). This ration provided on average 22 grams of soy ?our per person per day. Barter of Soybeans and Direct Distribution of Soy Flour ASA will process 2,000 MT of soybeans annually over three years (6,000 MT total) through a newly established, self-contained protein processing facility that it will purchase with monetization proceeds under this agreement. ASA will arrange for Sustainable Appropriate Local Technologies International (SALT) to manage and monitor the facility. The 2,000 MT of soybeans that will be processed annually through this facility will yield approximately 950 MT of low fat soy flour annually. From this amount, ASA will barter 450 MT of soy flour each year with processors to cover processing costs. ASA will dispose of the remaining 1,500 MT of soy ?our (500 MT of soy ?our annually) as follows: ASA will distribute a total of 250 MT of soy ?our (160 MT will be used for two winter rations and 90 MT will be used in cooking seminars) over a period of three years. ASA will provide the remaining 1,250 MT of soy ?our to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) as a donation, or to another identi?ed non- governmental organization(s) (NGO) through a subgrant, or both, for distribution to vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. ASA will provide a ration of soy ?our to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families for a period of four months (120 days per year) during two additional winters. A woman will be eligible to receive rations for one, two, or three winters, provided that she is vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating during each winter in which she receives a ration. ASA will also distribute soy flour to 10,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women at ASA-sponsored cooking seminars. The distribution will consist of the soy flour that is used during the actual cooking seminars as well as soy flour that will be given to each vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating woman at the conclusion of each seminar for home use. The cooking seminars are part of an ASA effort, funded through monetization proceeds, to instruct vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women on the proper utilization of soy ?our in the home production of naan (local style bread), as well as the various ways that soybeans can be prepared and consumed.? ?Table I MONETIZATION Activity Objectives Type and Number Progress Measures of Bene?ciaries Renovate or Construct -Direct: 15,000 Outputs: Irrigation Systems and farmers and ?Mobilize or establish one agricultural Rehabilitate Farm?to? unemployed laborers extension and water management committee Market Roadways in at least six communities SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 7 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 4 During the first year of activities under the agreement, AS A, through its subrecipient, distributed 80 metric tons (MT) of defatted soy flour to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families during the winter months. Each family received 4 kg of soy flour per month for a period of four months (120 days per year). This ration provided on average 22 grams of soy ?our per person per day. Barter of Soybeans and Direct Distribution of Soy Flour ASA will process 2,000 MT of soybeans annually over three years (6,000 MT total) through a newly established, self-contained protein processing facility that it will purchase with monetization proceeds under this agreement. ASA will arrange for Sustainable Appropriate Local Technologies International (SALT) to manage and monitor the facility. The 2,000 MT of soybeans that will be processed annually through this facility will yield approximately 950 MT of low fat soy flour annually. From this amount, ASA will barter 450 MT of soy flour each year with processors to cover processing costs. ASA will dispose of the remaining 1,500 MT of soy ?our (500 MT of soy ?our annually) as follows: ASA will distribute a total of 250 MT of soy ?our (160 MT will be used for two winter rations and 90 MT will be used in cooking seminars) over a period of three years. ASA will provide the remaining 1,250 MT of soy ?our to the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) as a donation, or to another identi?ed non- governmental organization(s) (NGO) through a subgrant, or both, for distribution to vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. ASA will provide a ration of soy ?our to 5,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women and their families for a period of four months (120 days per year) during two additional winters. A woman will be eligible to receive rations for one, two, or three winters, provided that she is vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating during each winter in which she receives a ration. ASA will also distribute soy flour to 10,000 vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women at ASA-sponsored cooking seminars. The distribution will consist of the soy flour that is used during the actual cooking seminars as well as soy flour that will be given to each vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating woman at the conclusion of each seminar for home use. The cooking seminars are part of an ASA effort, funded through monetization proceeds, to instruct vulnerable, pregnant, or lactating women on the proper utilization of soy ?our in the home production of naan (local style bread), as well as the various ways that soybeans can be prepared and consumed.? ?Table I MONETIZATION Activity Objectives Type and Number Progress Measures of Bene?ciaries Renovate or Construct -Direct: 15,000 Outputs: Irrigation Systems and farmers and ?Mobilize or establish one agricultural Rehabilitate Farm?to? unemployed laborers extension and water management committee Market Roadways in at least six communities SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 7 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 5 -Indirect: 75,000 farming family members and unemployed laborers -Rebuild and rehabilitate six irrigation systems -Improve 35km of tertiary access to market roads -Employ 320 unskilled laborers, each for a period of eleven months -Inject $866,000 in local markets through provision of cash-for-work employment Outcomes -Improve the productivity of the land by at least 100% -Provide irrigation water for 6 communities -Increase the purchasing power of 320 families by 400% -Enhance agricultural trade by 50% -Increase farmers? income by 50% by the end of the second harvest -Increase farmers? income by an additional 5% beyond the third harvest Provide Micro?credit -Direct: 800 farmers and artisans - Indirect: 4,000 family members of farmers and artisans Outputs: -Provide 800 loans, at an average of $400?loan, for agriculture-related activities that increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock Outcomes -Increase income of the participants by an additional 25% by the second harvest -Increase income of the participants by an additional 5%-10% beyond the second harvest Provide Technical Support and Training -Direct: 9,000 farmers -Indirect: 45,000 family members of farmers Outputs -Develop a curriculum for trainers and trainees -Train 30 core trainers and 3,000 farmers per year -Establish and institute a system for measuring yields in ?ve percent of farms monitored -Establish approximately 90 demonstration plots Outcomes -Increase quantities of soy grown from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acres -Increase yields by 30 percent SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 8 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 5 -Indirect: 75,000 farming family members and unemployed laborers -Rebuild and rehabilitate six irrigation systems -Improve 35km of tertiary access to market roads -Employ 320 unskilled laborers, each for a period of eleven months -Inject $866,000 in local markets through provision of cash-for-work employment Outcomes -Improve the productivity of the land by at least 100% -Provide irrigation water for 6 communities -Increase the purchasing power of 320 families by 400% -Enhance agricultural trade by 50% -Increase farmers? income by 50% by the end of the second harvest -Increase farmers? income by an additional 5% beyond the third harvest Provide Micro?credit -Direct: 800 farmers and artisans - Indirect: 4,000 family members of farmers and artisans Outputs: -Provide 800 loans, at an average of $400?loan, for agriculture-related activities that increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock Outcomes -Increase income of the participants by an additional 25% by the second harvest -Increase income of the participants by an additional 5%-10% beyond the second harvest Provide Technical Support and Training -Direct: 9,000 farmers -Indirect: 45,000 family members of farmers Outputs -Develop a curriculum for trainers and trainees -Train 30 core trainers and 3,000 farmers per year -Establish and institute a system for measuring yields in ?ve percent of farms monitored -Establish approximately 90 demonstration plots Outcomes -Increase quantities of soy grown from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acres -Increase yields by 30 percent SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 8 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 5 -Indirect: 75,000 farming family members and unemployed laborers -Rebuild and rehabilitate six irrigation systems -Improve 35km of tertiary access to market roads -Employ 320 unskilled laborers, each for a period of eleven months -Inject $866,000 in local markets through provision of cash-for-work employment Outcomes -Improve the productivity of the land by at least 100% -Provide irrigation water for 6 communities -Increase the purchasing power of 320 families by 400% -Enhance agricultural trade by 50% -Increase farmers? income by 50% by the end of the second harvest -Increase farmers? income by an additional 5% beyond the third harvest Provide Micro?credit -Direct: 800 farmers and artisans - Indirect: 4,000 family members of farmers and artisans Outputs: -Provide 800 loans, at an average of $400?loan, for agriculture-related activities that increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock Outcomes -Increase income of the participants by an additional 25% by the second harvest -Increase income of the participants by an additional 5%-10% beyond the second harvest Provide Technical Support and Training -Direct: 9,000 farmers -Indirect: 45,000 family members of farmers Outputs -Develop a curriculum for trainers and trainees -Train 30 core trainers and 3,000 farmers per year -Establish and institute a system for measuring yields in ?ve percent of farms monitored -Establish approximately 90 demonstration plots Outcomes -Increase quantities of soy grown from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acres -Increase yields by 30 percent SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 8 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 5 -Indirect: 75,000 farming family members and unemployed laborers -Rebuild and rehabilitate six irrigation systems -Improve 35km of tertiary access to market roads -Employ 320 unskilled laborers, each for a period of eleven months -Inject $866,000 in local markets through provision of cash-for-work employment Outcomes -Improve the productivity of the land by at least 100% -Provide irrigation water for 6 communities -Increase the purchasing power of 320 families by 400% -Enhance agricultural trade by 50% -Increase farmers? income by 50% by the end of the second harvest -Increase farmers? income by an additional 5% beyond the third harvest Provide Micro?credit -Direct: 800 farmers and artisans - Indirect: 4,000 family members of farmers and artisans Outputs: -Provide 800 loans, at an average of $400?loan, for agriculture-related activities that increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock Outcomes -Increase income of the participants by an additional 25% by the second harvest -Increase income of the participants by an additional 5%-10% beyond the second harvest Provide Technical Support and Training -Direct: 9,000 farmers -Indirect: 45,000 family members of farmers Outputs -Develop a curriculum for trainers and trainees -Train 30 core trainers and 3,000 farmers per year -Establish and institute a system for measuring yields in ?ve percent of farms monitored -Establish approximately 90 demonstration plots Outcomes -Increase quantities of soy grown from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acres -Increase yields by 30 percent SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 8 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 6 Provide Marketing Direct 250 Staff or Outputs: Assistance employfes Ofmrgete?i -Conduct 22 technical assistance visits companies . . -Conduct 6 semlnars indirect: 500 Staff -Provide technical assistance to established members or employees protein processing facility of targeted companies Outcomes -Increased knowledge of soy -Increased demand for soy products -10 companies will utilize soy in their commercially available products Establish an Oilseed Direct 250 PTOducema Outputs Association processors: ?1101653le ?Establish and register one national oilseed -Indirect: 5,000 farmers assomatlon Outcomes ?Association established and registered, with strategic plan and membership structure in place -Association offering services of value to members -Association able to recover costs for services Establish a Protein - Direct 23 employees Outputs: Processing Facility and L000 Contra? -Procure, transport, commission, and staff a farmers -Indirect: 5,115 family members of employees and contract farmers protein processing facility -Institute standard operating procedures and production schedule -Develop and process products for commercial sale Outcomes: -Protein processing facility is sustainable and pro?table -At least three products are developed and are being sold commercially Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign -Direct: 150,000 consumers Outputs: -Complete a consumer awareness campaign Outcomes: -Increased consumer awareness about the bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries -Direct: 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -lndirect: 50,000 families of pregnant, lactating or vulnerable Outputs: -Organize cooking seminars for 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women -Support start-up of 20 women-owned community bakeries Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 9 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 6 Provide Marketing Direct 250 Staff or Outputs: Assistance employfes Ofmrgete?i -Conduct 22 technical assistance visits companies . . -Conduct 6 semlnars indirect: 500 Staff -Provide technical assistance to established members or employees protein processing facility of targeted companies Outcomes -Increased knowledge of soy -Increased demand for soy products -10 companies will utilize soy in their commercially available products Establish an Oilseed Direct 250 PTOducema Outputs Association processors: ?1101653le ?Establish and register one national oilseed -Indirect: 5,000 farmers assomatlon Outcomes ?Association established and registered, with strategic plan and membership structure in place -Association offering services of value to members -Association able to recover costs for services Establish a Protein - Direct 23 employees Outputs: Processing Facility and L000 Contra? -Procure, transport, commission, and staff a farmers -Indirect: 5,115 family members of employees and contract farmers protein processing facility -Institute standard operating procedures and production schedule -Develop and process products for commercial sale Outcomes: -Protein processing facility is sustainable and pro?table -At least three products are developed and are being sold commercially Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign -Direct: 150,000 consumers Outputs: -Complete a consumer awareness campaign Outcomes: -Increased consumer awareness about the bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries -Direct: 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -lndirect: 50,000 families of pregnant, lactating or vulnerable Outputs: -Organize cooking seminars for 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women -Support start-up of 20 women-owned community bakeries Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 9 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 6 Provide Marketing Direct 250 Staff or Outputs: Assistance employfes Ofmrgete?i -Conduct 22 technical assistance visits companies . . -Conduct 6 semlnars indirect: 500 Staff -Provide technical assistance to established members or employees protein processing facility of targeted companies Outcomes -Increased knowledge of soy -Increased demand for soy products -10 companies will utilize soy in their commercially available products Establish an Oilseed Direct 250 PTOducema Outputs Association processors: ?1101653le ?Establish and register one national oilseed -Indirect: 5,000 farmers assomatlon Outcomes ?Association established and registered, with strategic plan and membership structure in place -Association offering services of value to members -Association able to recover costs for services Establish a Protein - Direct 23 employees Outputs: Processing Facility and L000 Contra? -Procure, transport, commission, and staff a farmers -Indirect: 5,115 family members of employees and contract farmers protein processing facility -Institute standard operating procedures and production schedule -Develop and process products for commercial sale Outcomes: -Protein processing facility is sustainable and pro?table -At least three products are developed and are being sold commercially Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign -Direct: 150,000 consumers Outputs: -Complete a consumer awareness campaign Outcomes: -Increased consumer awareness about the bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries -Direct: 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -lndirect: 50,000 families of pregnant, lactating or vulnerable Outputs: -Organize cooking seminars for 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women -Support start-up of 20 women-owned community bakeries Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 9 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 6 Provide Marketing Direct 250 Staff or Outputs: Assistance employfes Ofmrgete?i -Conduct 22 technical assistance visits companies . . -Conduct 6 semlnars indirect: 500 Staff -Provide technical assistance to established members or employees protein processing facility of targeted companies Outcomes -Increased knowledge of soy -Increased demand for soy products -10 companies will utilize soy in their commercially available products Establish an Oilseed Direct 250 PTOducema Outputs Association processors: ?1101653le ?Establish and register one national oilseed -Indirect: 5,000 farmers assomatlon Outcomes ?Association established and registered, with strategic plan and membership structure in place -Association offering services of value to members -Association able to recover costs for services Establish a Protein - Direct 23 employees Outputs: Processing Facility and L000 Contra? -Procure, transport, commission, and staff a farmers -Indirect: 5,115 family members of employees and contract farmers protein processing facility -Institute standard operating procedures and production schedule -Develop and process products for commercial sale Outcomes: -Protein processing facility is sustainable and pro?table -At least three products are developed and are being sold commercially Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign -Direct: 150,000 consumers Outputs: -Complete a consumer awareness campaign Outcomes: -Increased consumer awareness about the bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries -Direct: 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -lndirect: 50,000 families of pregnant, lactating or vulnerable Outputs: -Organize cooking seminars for 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women -Support start-up of 20 women-owned community bakeries Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 9 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 7 women -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -20 women-owned bakeries operating commercially Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys -Direct: 300 pregnant or lactating women and their families Outputs: -Build one set of surveys and protocols with training materials for nutritional impact measurement and food distribution acceptance and uses -Conduct training for two teams of 10 data collectors -Conduct baseline and follow-up data collection annually on approximately 300 selected bene?ciaries -Provide outcome reports annually Outcomes: -Maintenance or improvement in nutritional impact indicators for targeted bene?ciaries -Improved utilization by targeted bene?ciaries of the foods distributed -Impr0ved knowledge by targeted bene?ciaries of the nutritional value of foods distributed Conduct Feeding Direct 5 targeth Outputs: Trials farmers -At least six poultry feeding trials completed -Ind1rect: 10,000 farmers Outcomes: -Best poultry feed formulation determined and information disseminated -Increased used of soybean meal in feeds DIRECT DISTRIBUTION Distribute Soy Flour -Direct: At least 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -Indirect: At least 50,000 family members of pregnant or lactating women Outputs: -Distribute 8.5kg of soy ?our to 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women following their participation in cooking seminars -Distribute 4 kg of soy ?our for winter family ration to 5,000 pregnant, lactating, or vulnerable women during three winters Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 10 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 7 women -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -20 women-owned bakeries operating commercially Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys -Direct: 300 pregnant or lactating women and their families Outputs: -Build one set of surveys and protocols with training materials for nutritional impact measurement and food distribution acceptance and uses -Conduct training for two teams of 10 data collectors -Conduct baseline and follow-up data collection annually on approximately 300 selected bene?ciaries -Provide outcome reports annually Outcomes: -Maintenance or improvement in nutritional impact indicators for targeted bene?ciaries -Improved utilization by targeted bene?ciaries of the foods distributed -Impr0ved knowledge by targeted bene?ciaries of the nutritional value of foods distributed Conduct Feeding Direct 5 targeth Outputs: Trials farmers -At least six poultry feeding trials completed -Ind1rect: 10,000 farmers Outcomes: -Best poultry feed formulation determined and information disseminated -Increased used of soybean meal in feeds DIRECT DISTRIBUTION Distribute Soy Flour -Direct: At least 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -Indirect: At least 50,000 family members of pregnant or lactating women Outputs: -Distribute 8.5kg of soy ?our to 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women following their participation in cooking seminars -Distribute 4 kg of soy ?our for winter family ration to 5,000 pregnant, lactating, or vulnerable women during three winters Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 10 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 7 women -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -20 women-owned bakeries operating commercially Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys -Direct: 300 pregnant or lactating women and their families Outputs: -Build one set of surveys and protocols with training materials for nutritional impact measurement and food distribution acceptance and uses -Conduct training for two teams of 10 data collectors -Conduct baseline and follow-up data collection annually on approximately 300 selected bene?ciaries -Provide outcome reports annually Outcomes: -Maintenance or improvement in nutritional impact indicators for targeted bene?ciaries -Improved utilization by targeted bene?ciaries of the foods distributed -Impr0ved knowledge by targeted bene?ciaries of the nutritional value of foods distributed Conduct Feeding Direct 5 targeth Outputs: Trials farmers -At least six poultry feeding trials completed -Ind1rect: 10,000 farmers Outcomes: -Best poultry feed formulation determined and information disseminated -Increased used of soybean meal in feeds DIRECT DISTRIBUTION Distribute Soy Flour -Direct: At least 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -Indirect: At least 50,000 family members of pregnant or lactating women Outputs: -Distribute 8.5kg of soy ?our to 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women following their participation in cooking seminars -Distribute 4 kg of soy ?our for winter family ration to 5,000 pregnant, lactating, or vulnerable women during three winters Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 10 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 7 women -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -20 women-owned bakeries operating commercially Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys -Direct: 300 pregnant or lactating women and their families Outputs: -Build one set of surveys and protocols with training materials for nutritional impact measurement and food distribution acceptance and uses -Conduct training for two teams of 10 data collectors -Conduct baseline and follow-up data collection annually on approximately 300 selected bene?ciaries -Provide outcome reports annually Outcomes: -Maintenance or improvement in nutritional impact indicators for targeted bene?ciaries -Improved utilization by targeted bene?ciaries of the foods distributed -Impr0ved knowledge by targeted bene?ciaries of the nutritional value of foods distributed Conduct Feeding Direct 5 targeth Outputs: Trials farmers -At least six poultry feeding trials completed -Ind1rect: 10,000 farmers Outcomes: -Best poultry feed formulation determined and information disseminated -Increased used of soybean meal in feeds DIRECT DISTRIBUTION Distribute Soy Flour -Direct: At least 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women* -Indirect: At least 50,000 family members of pregnant or lactating women Outputs: -Distribute 8.5kg of soy ?our to 10,000 pregnant, lactating or vulnerable women following their participation in cooking seminars -Distribute 4 kg of soy ?our for winter family ration to 5,000 pregnant, lactating, or vulnerable women during three winters Outcomes: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 10 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 8 -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -Nutritional status of targeted families is maintained or improved BARTER Barter 6,000 Metric Direct 62267 Outputs: Tons of Soybeans Vumemble beneflmanes -500 MT locally processed soy flour for distribution on an annual basis -450 MT of low fat soy ?our used as payment annually for processing services able to be sold commercially by protein processing facility to help cover its operational costs Outcomes: -Improved quality of distributed food basket -Increased availability of high quality protein source -Funds from sale by protein processing facility of 450 MT of soy flour per year received in barter help cover operational costs of protein processing facility Total Bene?ciaries Direct! 248,396 Indirect: 194,615 Note: Although 5,000 women will receive winter rations each year, the composition of this group of women will change as the women?s eligibility status changes. In the second and third years, some new bene?ciaries will replace others who are no longer eligible. All of the women who receive winter rations (up to 10,000) will also participate in the cooking seminars and receive soy flour as a result of this participation.? Anticipated Use of Sale Proceeds Subject to Part II, Item Paragraph B, ASA will use proceeds as set forth in the following table and in Attachment C: Table IV Activities Dollar Amount of Proceeds Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and $3 735 901 Rehabilitate Farm-to-Market Roadways Provide Micro-credit $934,000 Provide Technical Support and Training $1,740,885 Provide Marketing Assistance $450,000 Establish an Oilseed Association $480,000 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 11 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 8 -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -Nutritional status of targeted families is maintained or improved BARTER Barter 6,000 Metric Direct 62267 Outputs: Tons of Soybeans Vumemble beneflmanes -500 MT locally processed soy flour for distribution on an annual basis -450 MT of low fat soy ?our used as payment annually for processing services able to be sold commercially by protein processing facility to help cover its operational costs Outcomes: -Improved quality of distributed food basket -Increased availability of high quality protein source -Funds from sale by protein processing facility of 450 MT of soy flour per year received in barter help cover operational costs of protein processing facility Total Bene?ciaries Direct! 248,396 Indirect: 194,615 Note: Although 5,000 women will receive winter rations each year, the composition of this group of women will change as the women?s eligibility status changes. In the second and third years, some new bene?ciaries will replace others who are no longer eligible. All of the women who receive winter rations (up to 10,000) will also participate in the cooking seminars and receive soy flour as a result of this participation.? Anticipated Use of Sale Proceeds Subject to Part II, Item Paragraph B, ASA will use proceeds as set forth in the following table and in Attachment C: Table IV Activities Dollar Amount of Proceeds Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and $3 735 901 Rehabilitate Farm-to-Market Roadways Provide Micro-credit $934,000 Provide Technical Support and Training $1,740,885 Provide Marketing Assistance $450,000 Establish an Oilseed Association $480,000 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 11 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 8 -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -Nutritional status of targeted families is maintained or improved BARTER Barter 6,000 Metric Direct 62267 Outputs: Tons of Soybeans Vumemble beneflmanes -500 MT locally processed soy flour for distribution on an annual basis -450 MT of low fat soy ?our used as payment annually for processing services able to be sold commercially by protein processing facility to help cover its operational costs Outcomes: -Improved quality of distributed food basket -Increased availability of high quality protein source -Funds from sale by protein processing facility of 450 MT of soy flour per year received in barter help cover operational costs of protein processing facility Total Bene?ciaries Direct! 248,396 Indirect: 194,615 Note: Although 5,000 women will receive winter rations each year, the composition of this group of women will change as the women?s eligibility status changes. In the second and third years, some new bene?ciaries will replace others who are no longer eligible. All of the women who receive winter rations (up to 10,000) will also participate in the cooking seminars and receive soy flour as a result of this participation.? Anticipated Use of Sale Proceeds Subject to Part II, Item Paragraph B, ASA will use proceeds as set forth in the following table and in Attachment C: Table IV Activities Dollar Amount of Proceeds Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and $3 735 901 Rehabilitate Farm-to-Market Roadways Provide Micro-credit $934,000 Provide Technical Support and Training $1,740,885 Provide Marketing Assistance $450,000 Establish an Oilseed Association $480,000 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 11 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 8 -Increased knowledge of general nutrition -Increased knowledge of the nutritional bene?ts of soy -Increased soy consumption -Nutritional status of targeted families is maintained or improved BARTER Barter 6,000 Metric Direct 62267 Outputs: Tons of Soybeans Vumemble beneflmanes -500 MT locally processed soy flour for distribution on an annual basis -450 MT of low fat soy ?our used as payment annually for processing services able to be sold commercially by protein processing facility to help cover its operational costs Outcomes: -Improved quality of distributed food basket -Increased availability of high quality protein source -Funds from sale by protein processing facility of 450 MT of soy flour per year received in barter help cover operational costs of protein processing facility Total Bene?ciaries Direct! 248,396 Indirect: 194,615 Note: Although 5,000 women will receive winter rations each year, the composition of this group of women will change as the women?s eligibility status changes. In the second and third years, some new bene?ciaries will replace others who are no longer eligible. All of the women who receive winter rations (up to 10,000) will also participate in the cooking seminars and receive soy flour as a result of this participation.? Anticipated Use of Sale Proceeds Subject to Part II, Item Paragraph B, ASA will use proceeds as set forth in the following table and in Attachment C: Table IV Activities Dollar Amount of Proceeds Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and $3 735 901 Rehabilitate Farm-to-Market Roadways Provide Micro-credit $934,000 Provide Technical Support and Training $1,740,885 Provide Marketing Assistance $450,000 Establish an Oilseed Association $480,000 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 11 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 9 Establish a Protein Processing Facility $2,316,456 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign $250,000 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support $1,032,000 Bakeries Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys $140,000 Conduct Feeding Trials $160,746 Total Proceeds for Activities $11,239,988 If actual proceeds differ from the anticipated amount or ASA uses less than the total amount that is speci?ed in Attachment under ?Grand Total Costs? approved for monetization proceeds, ASA will apply the difference to increase or reduce the amount of proceeds allocated to one or more of the activities listed in the table above and make necessary adjustments to any indirect costs associated with such activity(ies), or ASA will return the unused funds to Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will renovate or construct six irrigation systems that have been identi?ed as part of the Provincial government and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan?s (UNAMA) priority list of projects. This may include the following three types of irrigation systems: i) ?ood irrigation systems with concrete ditches typically used for rice and grain ?elds, ii) spray irrigation systems with water- carrying pipes that are typically used on land fed by rain, where legumes are generally the crop grown, and drip irrigation also with water-carrying pipes. ASA will make maximum use of manual labor in carrying out this activity, and all unskilled labor will be hired from the bene?ciary communities. To the degree possible, materials will be purchased locally. Where local purchases may create a negative market impact, materials will be imported. ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will rehabilitate approximately 35 km. of roads that will connect agricultural-producing communities to provincial, regional and national markets. Targeted roads will be graded and graveled with 5m width and an average of 200m thickness. Rehabilitated roads will have a slope on both sides to drain rain water to redirect water off the roads. Ditches will be dug alongside the road and, where roads intersect water streams, concrete overpasses will be constructed. Provide Micro?credit ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide small scale loans to 800 families. The loans will primarily support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs, the development of local craftsmen (tinsmiths and blacksmiths) to support the agricultural economy, and the development of post-harvest activities to increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock. This could include drying, storing, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 12 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 9 Establish a Protein Processing Facility $2,316,456 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign $250,000 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support $1,032,000 Bakeries Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys $140,000 Conduct Feeding Trials $160,746 Total Proceeds for Activities $11,239,988 If actual proceeds differ from the anticipated amount or ASA uses less than the total amount that is speci?ed in Attachment under ?Grand Total Costs? approved for monetization proceeds, ASA will apply the difference to increase or reduce the amount of proceeds allocated to one or more of the activities listed in the table above and make necessary adjustments to any indirect costs associated with such activity(ies), or ASA will return the unused funds to Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will renovate or construct six irrigation systems that have been identi?ed as part of the Provincial government and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan?s (UNAMA) priority list of projects. This may include the following three types of irrigation systems: i) ?ood irrigation systems with concrete ditches typically used for rice and grain ?elds, ii) spray irrigation systems with water- carrying pipes that are typically used on land fed by rain, where legumes are generally the crop grown, and drip irrigation also with water-carrying pipes. ASA will make maximum use of manual labor in carrying out this activity, and all unskilled labor will be hired from the bene?ciary communities. To the degree possible, materials will be purchased locally. Where local purchases may create a negative market impact, materials will be imported. ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will rehabilitate approximately 35 km. of roads that will connect agricultural-producing communities to provincial, regional and national markets. Targeted roads will be graded and graveled with 5m width and an average of 200m thickness. Rehabilitated roads will have a slope on both sides to drain rain water to redirect water off the roads. Ditches will be dug alongside the road and, where roads intersect water streams, concrete overpasses will be constructed. Provide Micro?credit ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide small scale loans to 800 families. The loans will primarily support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs, the development of local craftsmen (tinsmiths and blacksmiths) to support the agricultural economy, and the development of post-harvest activities to increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock. This could include drying, storing, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 12 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 9 Establish a Protein Processing Facility $2,316,456 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign $250,000 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support $1,032,000 Bakeries Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys $140,000 Conduct Feeding Trials $160,746 Total Proceeds for Activities $11,239,988 If actual proceeds differ from the anticipated amount or ASA uses less than the total amount that is speci?ed in Attachment under ?Grand Total Costs? approved for monetization proceeds, ASA will apply the difference to increase or reduce the amount of proceeds allocated to one or more of the activities listed in the table above and make necessary adjustments to any indirect costs associated with such activity(ies), or ASA will return the unused funds to Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will renovate or construct six irrigation systems that have been identi?ed as part of the Provincial government and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan?s (UNAMA) priority list of projects. This may include the following three types of irrigation systems: i) ?ood irrigation systems with concrete ditches typically used for rice and grain ?elds, ii) spray irrigation systems with water- carrying pipes that are typically used on land fed by rain, where legumes are generally the crop grown, and drip irrigation also with water-carrying pipes. ASA will make maximum use of manual labor in carrying out this activity, and all unskilled labor will be hired from the bene?ciary communities. To the degree possible, materials will be purchased locally. Where local purchases may create a negative market impact, materials will be imported. ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will rehabilitate approximately 35 km. of roads that will connect agricultural-producing communities to provincial, regional and national markets. Targeted roads will be graded and graveled with 5m width and an average of 200m thickness. Rehabilitated roads will have a slope on both sides to drain rain water to redirect water off the roads. Ditches will be dug alongside the road and, where roads intersect water streams, concrete overpasses will be constructed. Provide Micro?credit ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide small scale loans to 800 families. The loans will primarily support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs, the development of local craftsmen (tinsmiths and blacksmiths) to support the agricultural economy, and the development of post-harvest activities to increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock. This could include drying, storing, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 12 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 9 Establish a Protein Processing Facility $2,316,456 Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign $250,000 Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support $1,032,000 Bakeries Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys $140,000 Conduct Feeding Trials $160,746 Total Proceeds for Activities $11,239,988 If actual proceeds differ from the anticipated amount or ASA uses less than the total amount that is speci?ed in Attachment under ?Grand Total Costs? approved for monetization proceeds, ASA will apply the difference to increase or reduce the amount of proceeds allocated to one or more of the activities listed in the table above and make necessary adjustments to any indirect costs associated with such activity(ies), or ASA will return the unused funds to Renovate or Construct Irrigation Systems and Rehabilitate Farm?to?Market Roadways ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will renovate or construct six irrigation systems that have been identi?ed as part of the Provincial government and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan?s (UNAMA) priority list of projects. This may include the following three types of irrigation systems: i) ?ood irrigation systems with concrete ditches typically used for rice and grain ?elds, ii) spray irrigation systems with water- carrying pipes that are typically used on land fed by rain, where legumes are generally the crop grown, and drip irrigation also with water-carrying pipes. ASA will make maximum use of manual labor in carrying out this activity, and all unskilled labor will be hired from the bene?ciary communities. To the degree possible, materials will be purchased locally. Where local purchases may create a negative market impact, materials will be imported. ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will rehabilitate approximately 35 km. of roads that will connect agricultural-producing communities to provincial, regional and national markets. Targeted roads will be graded and graveled with 5m width and an average of 200m thickness. Rehabilitated roads will have a slope on both sides to drain rain water to redirect water off the roads. Ditches will be dug alongside the road and, where roads intersect water streams, concrete overpasses will be constructed. Provide Micro?credit ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide small scale loans to 800 families. The loans will primarily support the extension of credit for the purchase of agricultural inputs, the development of local craftsmen (tinsmiths and blacksmiths) to support the agricultural economy, and the development of post-harvest activities to increase the return on locally produced crops and livestock. This could include drying, storing, SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 12 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 10 processing and transportation facilities. The number of loans that will be available for craftsmen will not exceed 50 loans out of a total of approximately 800 loans. For loan-repayment and performance accountability, the borrowers will be divided into solidarity groups. The actual size of each loan will vary based on the client?s capacity, but the average size per loan is estimated to be about $400. Borrowers that build strong credit and demonstrate success may receive additional loans. Provide Technical Support and Training ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will use a cascading train-the-trainers model to provide agricultural training, with a focus on soybean production, to farmers, extension workers, and academics. ASA will draw upon expertise from multiple sources to develop the curriculum for this training, with topics that will include seed selection, soil quality, moisture needs, fertilization, planting and cultivating, harvesting, cleaning, storage, etc. ASA will offer an initial course with additional technical follow-up provided at various time intervals. Each participant will receive a certi?cate upon completion of the training. In addition to providing hands-on training in Afghanistan, ASA will fund the attendance of a few selected individuals at training courses in the United States that are held on an annual basis, generally for a period of one to two weeks. Provide Marketing Assistance ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide technical assistance to processing facilities, millers, bakers, and feed producers that are interested in utilizing soy- based ingredients in their products. Depending on the identified needs of each business, ASA will provide technical assistance in the basic processing of soy oil, extruded or expelled soy flour, or soy protein; new product development; packaging and storage (options to extend shelf life and minimize loss during transport); and marketing (increasing awareness of the economic and nutritional benefits of soy). Technical seminars will also be arranged to provide group training to targeted zirandas (local small bakeries). Establish an Oilseed Association ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will establish an oilseed association, bringing together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. Specific activities will include establishing an executive committee, providing training on association development to the executive committee, facilitating a strategic planning process to create a membership drive, hosting conferences or technical seminars, recommending policies to the Government of Afghanistan, conducting promotions, developing a communications strategy, and creating an association website. Establish a Protein Processing Facility SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 13 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 10 processing and transportation facilities. The number of loans that will be available for craftsmen will not exceed 50 loans out of a total of approximately 800 loans. For loan-repayment and performance accountability, the borrowers will be divided into solidarity groups. The actual size of each loan will vary based on the client?s capacity, but the average size per loan is estimated to be about $400. Borrowers that build strong credit and demonstrate success may receive additional loans. Provide Technical Support and Training ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will use a cascading train-the-trainers model to provide agricultural training, with a focus on soybean production, to farmers, extension workers, and academics. ASA will draw upon expertise from multiple sources to develop the curriculum for this training, with topics that will include seed selection, soil quality, moisture needs, fertilization, planting and cultivating, harvesting, cleaning, storage, etc. ASA will offer an initial course with additional technical follow-up provided at various time intervals. Each participant will receive a certi?cate upon completion of the training. In addition to providing hands-on training in Afghanistan, ASA will fund the attendance of a few selected individuals at training courses in the United States that are held on an annual basis, generally for a period of one to two weeks. Provide Marketing Assistance ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide technical assistance to processing facilities, millers, bakers, and feed producers that are interested in utilizing soy- based ingredients in their products. Depending on the identified needs of each business, ASA will provide technical assistance in the basic processing of soy oil, extruded or expelled soy flour, or soy protein; new product development; packaging and storage (options to extend shelf life and minimize loss during transport); and marketing (increasing awareness of the economic and nutritional benefits of soy). Technical seminars will also be arranged to provide group training to targeted zirandas (local small bakeries). Establish an Oilseed Association ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will establish an oilseed association, bringing together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. Specific activities will include establishing an executive committee, providing training on association development to the executive committee, facilitating a strategic planning process to create a membership drive, hosting conferences or technical seminars, recommending policies to the Government of Afghanistan, conducting promotions, developing a communications strategy, and creating an association website. Establish a Protein Processing Facility SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 13 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 10 processing and transportation facilities. The number of loans that will be available for craftsmen will not exceed 50 loans out of a total of approximately 800 loans. For loan-repayment and performance accountability, the borrowers will be divided into solidarity groups. The actual size of each loan will vary based on the client?s capacity, but the average size per loan is estimated to be about $400. Borrowers that build strong credit and demonstrate success may receive additional loans. Provide Technical Support and Training ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will use a cascading train-the-trainers model to provide agricultural training, with a focus on soybean production, to farmers, extension workers, and academics. ASA will draw upon expertise from multiple sources to develop the curriculum for this training, with topics that will include seed selection, soil quality, moisture needs, fertilization, planting and cultivating, harvesting, cleaning, storage, etc. ASA will offer an initial course with additional technical follow-up provided at various time intervals. Each participant will receive a certi?cate upon completion of the training. In addition to providing hands-on training in Afghanistan, ASA will fund the attendance of a few selected individuals at training courses in the United States that are held on an annual basis, generally for a period of one to two weeks. Provide Marketing Assistance ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide technical assistance to processing facilities, millers, bakers, and feed producers that are interested in utilizing soy- based ingredients in their products. Depending on the identified needs of each business, ASA will provide technical assistance in the basic processing of soy oil, extruded or expelled soy flour, or soy protein; new product development; packaging and storage (options to extend shelf life and minimize loss during transport); and marketing (increasing awareness of the economic and nutritional benefits of soy). Technical seminars will also be arranged to provide group training to targeted zirandas (local small bakeries). Establish an Oilseed Association ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will establish an oilseed association, bringing together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. Specific activities will include establishing an executive committee, providing training on association development to the executive committee, facilitating a strategic planning process to create a membership drive, hosting conferences or technical seminars, recommending policies to the Government of Afghanistan, conducting promotions, developing a communications strategy, and creating an association website. Establish a Protein Processing Facility SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 13 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 10 processing and transportation facilities. The number of loans that will be available for craftsmen will not exceed 50 loans out of a total of approximately 800 loans. For loan-repayment and performance accountability, the borrowers will be divided into solidarity groups. The actual size of each loan will vary based on the client?s capacity, but the average size per loan is estimated to be about $400. Borrowers that build strong credit and demonstrate success may receive additional loans. Provide Technical Support and Training ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will use a cascading train-the-trainers model to provide agricultural training, with a focus on soybean production, to farmers, extension workers, and academics. ASA will draw upon expertise from multiple sources to develop the curriculum for this training, with topics that will include seed selection, soil quality, moisture needs, fertilization, planting and cultivating, harvesting, cleaning, storage, etc. ASA will offer an initial course with additional technical follow-up provided at various time intervals. Each participant will receive a certi?cate upon completion of the training. In addition to providing hands-on training in Afghanistan, ASA will fund the attendance of a few selected individuals at training courses in the United States that are held on an annual basis, generally for a period of one to two weeks. Provide Marketing Assistance ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will provide technical assistance to processing facilities, millers, bakers, and feed producers that are interested in utilizing soy- based ingredients in their products. Depending on the identified needs of each business, ASA will provide technical assistance in the basic processing of soy oil, extruded or expelled soy flour, or soy protein; new product development; packaging and storage (options to extend shelf life and minimize loss during transport); and marketing (increasing awareness of the economic and nutritional benefits of soy). Technical seminars will also be arranged to provide group training to targeted zirandas (local small bakeries). Establish an Oilseed Association ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will establish an oilseed association, bringing together multiple stakeholders, including government representatives, producers, processors, wholesalers, traders, and academics. Specific activities will include establishing an executive committee, providing training on association development to the executive committee, facilitating a strategic planning process to create a membership drive, hosting conferences or technical seminars, recommending policies to the Government of Afghanistan, conducting promotions, developing a communications strategy, and creating an association website. Establish a Protein Processing Facility SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 13 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 11 ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will commission, procure, and transport a self-contained, protein processing facility. ASA will purchase the facility from SALT, a 501(c)(3) organization that is headquartered in Grinnell, Iowa, and registered in Afghanistan. core services include processing facility design, fabrication, and set- up', contract farming; food and feed processing; training of processing facility personnel; and soy production. In addition to fabricating processing facilities, SALT establishes and supports sustainable agribusinesses in lesser developed countries, specializing in agribusinesses that utilize soy and other locally grown products for human food and animal feed. ASA will arrange for SALT to manage and monitor the protein processing facility. This facility will process soybeans bartered under this grant over three years, yielding low fat soy ?our for a direct distribution activity under this grant. The protein processing facility, operating at full capacity, will employ a miller, business manager, and at least 20 unskilled laborers. Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign ASA will conduct a broad nutrition education and consumer awareness campaign, focusing on the importance of nutrition, basic nutritional concepts, and the nutritional bene?ts of soy consumption, including as a feed ingredient. Various methods will be used to reach consumers, including radio spots and skits. ASA will also support competitions that raise awareness about nutrition, which may include sports teams, recipe competitions, school competitions, etc. As part of this intervention, ASA will also develop basic ?yers and participate in agricultural fairs. Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will complement the direct feeding activity under this grant by providing basic training on the utilization of soy flour in the home production of naan (a local style bread). ASA will also conduct seminars on basic nutrition, including informational seminars about nutrition for pregnant and lactating woman, breastfeeding, complementary feeding for children aged 6-24 months, nutrition in the lifecycle, and diet diversity. To increase sustainability, ASA will also support the start- up of 20 women-owned bakeries for the production of soy-forti?ed naan. ASA will select the women through an application process, with bakeries going into communities that are receiving direct distributions of soy flour. These bakeries will also receive some of the bartered soy flour to be included in a specially baked naan for women and children. Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys ASA will conduct baseline and follow-up surveys to determine the nutritional impact for a geographically representative sample of at least 300 beneficiaries who are participating in one of the direct distributions of soy flour during the winter months. In implementing the surveys, ASA will draft the survey questionnaire and measurement protocol, assist with training data collectors, assist with data collection, analyze the data, and provide a final report. The same tools will be used for both the baseline and follow-up survey, allowing SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 14 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 11 ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will commission, procure, and transport a self-contained, protein processing facility. ASA will purchase the facility from SALT, a 501(c)(3) organization that is headquartered in Grinnell, Iowa, and registered in Afghanistan. core services include processing facility design, fabrication, and set- up', contract farming; food and feed processing; training of processing facility personnel; and soy production. In addition to fabricating processing facilities, SALT establishes and supports sustainable agribusinesses in lesser developed countries, specializing in agribusinesses that utilize soy and other locally grown products for human food and animal feed. ASA will arrange for SALT to manage and monitor the protein processing facility. This facility will process soybeans bartered under this grant over three years, yielding low fat soy ?our for a direct distribution activity under this grant. The protein processing facility, operating at full capacity, will employ a miller, business manager, and at least 20 unskilled laborers. Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign ASA will conduct a broad nutrition education and consumer awareness campaign, focusing on the importance of nutrition, basic nutritional concepts, and the nutritional bene?ts of soy consumption, including as a feed ingredient. Various methods will be used to reach consumers, including radio spots and skits. ASA will also support competitions that raise awareness about nutrition, which may include sports teams, recipe competitions, school competitions, etc. As part of this intervention, ASA will also develop basic ?yers and participate in agricultural fairs. Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will complement the direct feeding activity under this grant by providing basic training on the utilization of soy flour in the home production of naan (a local style bread). ASA will also conduct seminars on basic nutrition, including informational seminars about nutrition for pregnant and lactating woman, breastfeeding, complementary feeding for children aged 6-24 months, nutrition in the lifecycle, and diet diversity. To increase sustainability, ASA will also support the start- up of 20 women-owned bakeries for the production of soy-forti?ed naan. ASA will select the women through an application process, with bakeries going into communities that are receiving direct distributions of soy flour. These bakeries will also receive some of the bartered soy flour to be included in a specially baked naan for women and children. Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys ASA will conduct baseline and follow-up surveys to determine the nutritional impact for a geographically representative sample of at least 300 beneficiaries who are participating in one of the direct distributions of soy flour during the winter months. In implementing the surveys, ASA will draft the survey questionnaire and measurement protocol, assist with training data collectors, assist with data collection, analyze the data, and provide a final report. The same tools will be used for both the baseline and follow-up survey, allowing SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 14 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 11 ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will commission, procure, and transport a self-contained, protein processing facility. ASA will purchase the facility from SALT, a 501(c)(3) organization that is headquartered in Grinnell, Iowa, and registered in Afghanistan. core services include processing facility design, fabrication, and set- up', contract farming; food and feed processing; training of processing facility personnel; and soy production. In addition to fabricating processing facilities, SALT establishes and supports sustainable agribusinesses in lesser developed countries, specializing in agribusinesses that utilize soy and other locally grown products for human food and animal feed. ASA will arrange for SALT to manage and monitor the protein processing facility. This facility will process soybeans bartered under this grant over three years, yielding low fat soy ?our for a direct distribution activity under this grant. The protein processing facility, operating at full capacity, will employ a miller, business manager, and at least 20 unskilled laborers. Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign ASA will conduct a broad nutrition education and consumer awareness campaign, focusing on the importance of nutrition, basic nutritional concepts, and the nutritional bene?ts of soy consumption, including as a feed ingredient. Various methods will be used to reach consumers, including radio spots and skits. ASA will also support competitions that raise awareness about nutrition, which may include sports teams, recipe competitions, school competitions, etc. As part of this intervention, ASA will also develop basic ?yers and participate in agricultural fairs. Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will complement the direct feeding activity under this grant by providing basic training on the utilization of soy flour in the home production of naan (a local style bread). ASA will also conduct seminars on basic nutrition, including informational seminars about nutrition for pregnant and lactating woman, breastfeeding, complementary feeding for children aged 6-24 months, nutrition in the lifecycle, and diet diversity. To increase sustainability, ASA will also support the start- up of 20 women-owned bakeries for the production of soy-forti?ed naan. ASA will select the women through an application process, with bakeries going into communities that are receiving direct distributions of soy flour. These bakeries will also receive some of the bartered soy flour to be included in a specially baked naan for women and children. Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys ASA will conduct baseline and follow-up surveys to determine the nutritional impact for a geographically representative sample of at least 300 beneficiaries who are participating in one of the direct distributions of soy flour during the winter months. In implementing the surveys, ASA will draft the survey questionnaire and measurement protocol, assist with training data collectors, assist with data collection, analyze the data, and provide a final report. The same tools will be used for both the baseline and follow-up survey, allowing SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 14 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 11 ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will commission, procure, and transport a self-contained, protein processing facility. ASA will purchase the facility from SALT, a 501(c)(3) organization that is headquartered in Grinnell, Iowa, and registered in Afghanistan. core services include processing facility design, fabrication, and set- up', contract farming; food and feed processing; training of processing facility personnel; and soy production. In addition to fabricating processing facilities, SALT establishes and supports sustainable agribusinesses in lesser developed countries, specializing in agribusinesses that utilize soy and other locally grown products for human food and animal feed. ASA will arrange for SALT to manage and monitor the protein processing facility. This facility will process soybeans bartered under this grant over three years, yielding low fat soy ?our for a direct distribution activity under this grant. The protein processing facility, operating at full capacity, will employ a miller, business manager, and at least 20 unskilled laborers. Conduct a Consumer Awareness Campaign ASA will conduct a broad nutrition education and consumer awareness campaign, focusing on the importance of nutrition, basic nutritional concepts, and the nutritional bene?ts of soy consumption, including as a feed ingredient. Various methods will be used to reach consumers, including radio spots and skits. ASA will also support competitions that raise awareness about nutrition, which may include sports teams, recipe competitions, school competitions, etc. As part of this intervention, ASA will also develop basic ?yers and participate in agricultural fairs. Conduct Cooking Seminars and Support Bakeries ASA, directly and through its subrecipient(s), will complement the direct feeding activity under this grant by providing basic training on the utilization of soy flour in the home production of naan (a local style bread). ASA will also conduct seminars on basic nutrition, including informational seminars about nutrition for pregnant and lactating woman, breastfeeding, complementary feeding for children aged 6-24 months, nutrition in the lifecycle, and diet diversity. To increase sustainability, ASA will also support the start- up of 20 women-owned bakeries for the production of soy-forti?ed naan. ASA will select the women through an application process, with bakeries going into communities that are receiving direct distributions of soy flour. These bakeries will also receive some of the bartered soy flour to be included in a specially baked naan for women and children. Conduct Nutrition Impact Surveys ASA will conduct baseline and follow-up surveys to determine the nutritional impact for a geographically representative sample of at least 300 beneficiaries who are participating in one of the direct distributions of soy flour during the winter months. In implementing the surveys, ASA will draft the survey questionnaire and measurement protocol, assist with training data collectors, assist with data collection, analyze the data, and provide a final report. The same tools will be used for both the baseline and follow-up survey, allowing SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 14 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 12 for comparisons. Basic data that will be collected will include demographic data, objective measures (such as height, weight, mid-upper arm circumference, and presence of edema), and subjective and other indicators of nutritional and health status (such as of respiratory disease and diarrhea, dietary information, and how the distributed foods are accepted and used in the household). Conduct Feeding Trials ASA will conduct at least six feeding trials that demonstrate the bene?t of soy in poultry feed. Various formulations will be tried using soybean meal from the processing facility and locally available ingredients. ASA will disseminate the feeding trial results through various means, including through events hosted by the Oilseed Association and through Consumer Awareness Campaign activity. Current Status of Project USDA is reviewing a request from ASA to modify the grant agreement. The purpose of the modi?cation is to set the implementation plan for the fourth and ?nal year of the project. The modi?cation would include changes needed to ensure increased production from committed farmers, suf?cient staf?ng support strategies, and renewed emphasis on marketing and market development of soy in Afghanistan. USDA and ASA have committed substantial resources in negotiating the modi?cation to ensure that the views and recommended adjustments of headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA were included. The negotiations were also extended due to delays in submitting vital documents, updating budgets, and submission of the third-party mid-term evaluation. ASA has complied with the grant agreement in implementing activities and meeting output-based indicators. ASA has reported favorable results in the number of farmers trained, irrigation and roadway construction, and microcredit loans, The ?nal outcomes associated with the project are uncertain. USDA believes that the project was successful in improving irrigation and roads, increasing credit availability, and promoting market opportunities for soybean products, especially animal feeds. These positive results may improve prospects for production of other agricultural products in addition to soybeans. To date, positive outcomes for soybean production and the long-term operation of the soy processing plant have not occurred. The modi?cation that USDA and ASA are negotiating is intended to focus on these areas. Identi?ed Challenges The project has faced numerous challenges including delays in implementation, changes in key staf?ng, and uncertain outcomes especially in production and the sustainability of the processing plant. Below are more speci?cs on the challenges: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 15 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 12 for comparisons. Basic data that will be collected will include demographic data, objective measures (such as height, weight, mid-upper arm circumference, and presence of edema), and subjective and other indicators of nutritional and health status (such as of respiratory disease and diarrhea, dietary information, and how the distributed foods are accepted and used in the household). Conduct Feeding Trials ASA will conduct at least six feeding trials that demonstrate the bene?t of soy in poultry feed. Various formulations will be tried using soybean meal from the processing facility and locally available ingredients. ASA will disseminate the feeding trial results through various means, including through events hosted by the Oilseed Association and through Consumer Awareness Campaign activity. Current Status of Project USDA is reviewing a request from ASA to modify the grant agreement. The purpose of the modi?cation is to set the implementation plan for the fourth and ?nal year of the project. The modi?cation would include changes needed to ensure increased production from committed farmers, suf?cient staf?ng support strategies, and renewed emphasis on marketing and market development of soy in Afghanistan. USDA and ASA have committed substantial resources in negotiating the modi?cation to ensure that the views and recommended adjustments of headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA were included. The negotiations were also extended due to delays in submitting vital documents, updating budgets, and submission of the third-party mid-term evaluation. ASA has complied with the grant agreement in implementing activities and meeting output-based indicators. ASA has reported favorable results in the number of farmers trained, irrigation and roadway construction, and microcredit loans, The ?nal outcomes associated with the project are uncertain. USDA believes that the project was successful in improving irrigation and roads, increasing credit availability, and promoting market opportunities for soybean products, especially animal feeds. These positive results may improve prospects for production of other agricultural products in addition to soybeans. To date, positive outcomes for soybean production and the long-term operation of the soy processing plant have not occurred. The modi?cation that USDA and ASA are negotiating is intended to focus on these areas. Identi?ed Challenges The project has faced numerous challenges including delays in implementation, changes in key staf?ng, and uncertain outcomes especially in production and the sustainability of the processing plant. Below are more speci?cs on the challenges: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 15 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 12 for comparisons. Basic data that will be collected will include demographic data, objective measures (such as height, weight, mid-upper arm circumference, and presence of edema), and subjective and other indicators of nutritional and health status (such as of respiratory disease and diarrhea, dietary information, and how the distributed foods are accepted and used in the household). Conduct Feeding Trials ASA will conduct at least six feeding trials that demonstrate the bene?t of soy in poultry feed. Various formulations will be tried using soybean meal from the processing facility and locally available ingredients. ASA will disseminate the feeding trial results through various means, including through events hosted by the Oilseed Association and through Consumer Awareness Campaign activity. Current Status of Project USDA is reviewing a request from ASA to modify the grant agreement. The purpose of the modi?cation is to set the implementation plan for the fourth and ?nal year of the project. The modi?cation would include changes needed to ensure increased production from committed farmers, suf?cient staf?ng support strategies, and renewed emphasis on marketing and market development of soy in Afghanistan. USDA and ASA have committed substantial resources in negotiating the modi?cation to ensure that the views and recommended adjustments of headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA were included. The negotiations were also extended due to delays in submitting vital documents, updating budgets, and submission of the third-party mid-term evaluation. ASA has complied with the grant agreement in implementing activities and meeting output-based indicators. ASA has reported favorable results in the number of farmers trained, irrigation and roadway construction, and microcredit loans, The ?nal outcomes associated with the project are uncertain. USDA believes that the project was successful in improving irrigation and roads, increasing credit availability, and promoting market opportunities for soybean products, especially animal feeds. These positive results may improve prospects for production of other agricultural products in addition to soybeans. To date, positive outcomes for soybean production and the long-term operation of the soy processing plant have not occurred. The modi?cation that USDA and ASA are negotiating is intended to focus on these areas. Identi?ed Challenges The project has faced numerous challenges including delays in implementation, changes in key staf?ng, and uncertain outcomes especially in production and the sustainability of the processing plant. Below are more speci?cs on the challenges: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 15 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 12 for comparisons. Basic data that will be collected will include demographic data, objective measures (such as height, weight, mid-upper arm circumference, and presence of edema), and subjective and other indicators of nutritional and health status (such as of respiratory disease and diarrhea, dietary information, and how the distributed foods are accepted and used in the household). Conduct Feeding Trials ASA will conduct at least six feeding trials that demonstrate the bene?t of soy in poultry feed. Various formulations will be tried using soybean meal from the processing facility and locally available ingredients. ASA will disseminate the feeding trial results through various means, including through events hosted by the Oilseed Association and through Consumer Awareness Campaign activity. Current Status of Project USDA is reviewing a request from ASA to modify the grant agreement. The purpose of the modi?cation is to set the implementation plan for the fourth and ?nal year of the project. The modi?cation would include changes needed to ensure increased production from committed farmers, suf?cient staf?ng support strategies, and renewed emphasis on marketing and market development of soy in Afghanistan. USDA and ASA have committed substantial resources in negotiating the modi?cation to ensure that the views and recommended adjustments of headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA were included. The negotiations were also extended due to delays in submitting vital documents, updating budgets, and submission of the third-party mid-term evaluation. ASA has complied with the grant agreement in implementing activities and meeting output-based indicators. ASA has reported favorable results in the number of farmers trained, irrigation and roadway construction, and microcredit loans, The ?nal outcomes associated with the project are uncertain. USDA believes that the project was successful in improving irrigation and roads, increasing credit availability, and promoting market opportunities for soybean products, especially animal feeds. These positive results may improve prospects for production of other agricultural products in addition to soybeans. To date, positive outcomes for soybean production and the long-term operation of the soy processing plant have not occurred. The modi?cation that USDA and ASA are negotiating is intended to focus on these areas. Identi?ed Challenges The project has faced numerous challenges including delays in implementation, changes in key staf?ng, and uncertain outcomes especially in production and the sustainability of the processing plant. Below are more speci?cs on the challenges: SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 15 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 13 Production 0 Activities that provided items such as training, seeds, and credit have not resulted in sizeable increases in production. 0 Insecurity in the regions where activities occurred has affected production results. 0 Farmers remain reluctant to switch to soybean production despite the efforts by the Government of Afghanistan, Nutrition and Education and International, and ASA. Several entities are continuing to conduct experiments with seed varieties in regions to increase the yield and pro?tability of soybean production. 0 The low level of production increases risks for the sustainability of the processing plant and may lead to reliance on imported products to remain viable. Management 0 ASA and its subrecipients had dif?culties with staf?ng in Afghanistan. Turnover was high, and some employees did not have sufficient experience. 0 Philosophical differences between ASA and Nutrition and Education International (another group investing in the soy value chain) prevented the coordination of resources and had a negative impact on the investments in soybeans. 0 Coordination and communication with the Government of Afghanistan was weak. 0 While individual activities were bene?cial, the overall project design had gaps that may have been avoided if analyses on feasibility and the value chain were completed at the beginning of the project. Planfar Mitigation of Challenges Headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA have discussed the challenges facing the program and have negotiated a modi?cation to the agreement. The modi?cation incorporates lessons learned from the implementation of the program and the mid-term evaluation. The modi?cation redirects resources to focus on production, improved management, and increasing the likelihood of the sustainability of the processing plant. A key objective is to engage with larger scale farmers in the Balkh region that use irrigated land to increase production of soybeans. The mid-term evaluation notes that a sustainable, local-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan is not achievable by the end of 20 14. The independent evaluator provides key recommendations that an extension through the end of 2014 could provide a proof-of- concept demonstration in Balkh. If 2014 production ?gures from large farms are suf?ciently high (yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a pro?table soy industry is possible. Within the modi?cation request, ASA expects production to reach 1,200 MT of soybeans, with 90 percent of that being sold to the factory. Further, ASA will shift resources to meet the minimum number of trainings, involve the district-level agents of MAIL, and will work with cooperatives in the Balkh province. While the projected level of locally produced soybeans will fall well below the break-even point of the factory (2,000 MT), the private SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 16 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 13 Production 0 Activities that provided items such as training, seeds, and credit have not resulted in sizeable increases in production. 0 Insecurity in the regions where activities occurred has affected production results. 0 Farmers remain reluctant to switch to soybean production despite the efforts by the Government of Afghanistan, Nutrition and Education and International, and ASA. Several entities are continuing to conduct experiments with seed varieties in regions to increase the yield and pro?tability of soybean production. 0 The low level of production increases risks for the sustainability of the processing plant and may lead to reliance on imported products to remain viable. Management 0 ASA and its subrecipients had dif?culties with staf?ng in Afghanistan. Turnover was high, and some employees did not have sufficient experience. 0 Philosophical differences between ASA and Nutrition and Education International (another group investing in the soy value chain) prevented the coordination of resources and had a negative impact on the investments in soybeans. 0 Coordination and communication with the Government of Afghanistan was weak. 0 While individual activities were bene?cial, the overall project design had gaps that may have been avoided if analyses on feasibility and the value chain were completed at the beginning of the project. Planfar Mitigation of Challenges Headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA have discussed the challenges facing the program and have negotiated a modi?cation to the agreement. The modi?cation incorporates lessons learned from the implementation of the program and the mid-term evaluation. The modi?cation redirects resources to focus on production, improved management, and increasing the likelihood of the sustainability of the processing plant. A key objective is to engage with larger scale farmers in the Balkh region that use irrigated land to increase production of soybeans. The mid-term evaluation notes that a sustainable, local-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan is not achievable by the end of 20 14. The independent evaluator provides key recommendations that an extension through the end of 2014 could provide a proof-of- concept demonstration in Balkh. If 2014 production ?gures from large farms are suf?ciently high (yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a pro?table soy industry is possible. Within the modi?cation request, ASA expects production to reach 1,200 MT of soybeans, with 90 percent of that being sold to the factory. Further, ASA will shift resources to meet the minimum number of trainings, involve the district-level agents of MAIL, and will work with cooperatives in the Balkh province. While the projected level of locally produced soybeans will fall well below the break-even point of the factory (2,000 MT), the private SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 16 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 13 Production 0 Activities that provided items such as training, seeds, and credit have not resulted in sizeable increases in production. 0 Insecurity in the regions where activities occurred has affected production results. 0 Farmers remain reluctant to switch to soybean production despite the efforts by the Government of Afghanistan, Nutrition and Education and International, and ASA. Several entities are continuing to conduct experiments with seed varieties in regions to increase the yield and pro?tability of soybean production. 0 The low level of production increases risks for the sustainability of the processing plant and may lead to reliance on imported products to remain viable. Management 0 ASA and its subrecipients had dif?culties with staf?ng in Afghanistan. Turnover was high, and some employees did not have sufficient experience. 0 Philosophical differences between ASA and Nutrition and Education International (another group investing in the soy value chain) prevented the coordination of resources and had a negative impact on the investments in soybeans. 0 Coordination and communication with the Government of Afghanistan was weak. 0 While individual activities were bene?cial, the overall project design had gaps that may have been avoided if analyses on feasibility and the value chain were completed at the beginning of the project. Planfar Mitigation of Challenges Headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA have discussed the challenges facing the program and have negotiated a modi?cation to the agreement. The modi?cation incorporates lessons learned from the implementation of the program and the mid-term evaluation. The modi?cation redirects resources to focus on production, improved management, and increasing the likelihood of the sustainability of the processing plant. A key objective is to engage with larger scale farmers in the Balkh region that use irrigated land to increase production of soybeans. The mid-term evaluation notes that a sustainable, local-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan is not achievable by the end of 20 14. The independent evaluator provides key recommendations that an extension through the end of 2014 could provide a proof-of- concept demonstration in Balkh. If 2014 production ?gures from large farms are suf?ciently high (yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a pro?table soy industry is possible. Within the modi?cation request, ASA expects production to reach 1,200 MT of soybeans, with 90 percent of that being sold to the factory. Further, ASA will shift resources to meet the minimum number of trainings, involve the district-level agents of MAIL, and will work with cooperatives in the Balkh province. While the projected level of locally produced soybeans will fall well below the break-even point of the factory (2,000 MT), the private SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 16 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 13 Production 0 Activities that provided items such as training, seeds, and credit have not resulted in sizeable increases in production. 0 Insecurity in the regions where activities occurred has affected production results. 0 Farmers remain reluctant to switch to soybean production despite the efforts by the Government of Afghanistan, Nutrition and Education and International, and ASA. Several entities are continuing to conduct experiments with seed varieties in regions to increase the yield and pro?tability of soybean production. 0 The low level of production increases risks for the sustainability of the processing plant and may lead to reliance on imported products to remain viable. Management 0 ASA and its subrecipients had dif?culties with staf?ng in Afghanistan. Turnover was high, and some employees did not have sufficient experience. 0 Philosophical differences between ASA and Nutrition and Education International (another group investing in the soy value chain) prevented the coordination of resources and had a negative impact on the investments in soybeans. 0 Coordination and communication with the Government of Afghanistan was weak. 0 While individual activities were bene?cial, the overall project design had gaps that may have been avoided if analyses on feasibility and the value chain were completed at the beginning of the project. Planfar Mitigation of Challenges Headquarter and ?eld representatives of ASA and USDA have discussed the challenges facing the program and have negotiated a modi?cation to the agreement. The modi?cation incorporates lessons learned from the implementation of the program and the mid-term evaluation. The modi?cation redirects resources to focus on production, improved management, and increasing the likelihood of the sustainability of the processing plant. A key objective is to engage with larger scale farmers in the Balkh region that use irrigated land to increase production of soybeans. The mid-term evaluation notes that a sustainable, local-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan is not achievable by the end of 20 14. The independent evaluator provides key recommendations that an extension through the end of 2014 could provide a proof-of- concept demonstration in Balkh. If 2014 production ?gures from large farms are suf?ciently high (yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a pro?table soy industry is possible. Within the modi?cation request, ASA expects production to reach 1,200 MT of soybeans, with 90 percent of that being sold to the factory. Further, ASA will shift resources to meet the minimum number of trainings, involve the district-level agents of MAIL, and will work with cooperatives in the Balkh province. While the projected level of locally produced soybeans will fall well below the break-even point of the factory (2,000 MT), the private SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 16 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 14 investors in the plant have added processing equipment to produce re?ned oil. The increased investment by the owners indicates optimism for the longer-term viability of the plant. USDA is monitoring the activities closely and has increased the frequency of performance and ?nancial reports from a semiannual basis to a quarterly basis. ATTACHMENTS: Financial Report Midterm Evaluation Report Agreement and Amendments SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 17 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 14 investors in the plant have added processing equipment to produce re?ned oil. The increased investment by the owners indicates optimism for the longer-term viability of the plant. USDA is monitoring the activities closely and has increased the frequency of performance and ?nancial reports from a semiannual basis to a quarterly basis. ATTACHMENTS: Financial Report Midterm Evaluation Report Agreement and Amendments SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 17 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 14 investors in the plant have added processing equipment to produce re?ned oil. The increased investment by the owners indicates optimism for the longer-term viability of the plant. USDA is monitoring the activities closely and has increased the frequency of performance and ?nancial reports from a semiannual basis to a quarterly basis. ATTACHMENTS: Financial Report Midterm Evaluation Report Agreement and Amendments SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 17 RESPONSE TO SIGAR Page 14 investors in the plant have added processing equipment to produce re?ned oil. The increased investment by the owners indicates optimism for the longer-term viability of the plant. USDA is monitoring the activities closely and has increased the frequency of performance and ?nancial reports from a semiannual basis to a quarterly basis. ATTACHMENTS: Financial Report Midterm Evaluation Report Agreement and Amendments SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 17 ATTACHMENT II: THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION OF SARAI SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 18 ATTACHMENT II: THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION OF SARAI SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 18 ATTACHMENT II: THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION OF SARAI SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 18 ATTACHMENT II: THIRD-PARTY EVALUATION OF SARAI SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 18 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 Acronyms ACE ASIMWISH ASF ASM EU CBCM CBI DIN PAS JDA Jerib NEI OCGAA PARSA SALT SARAI EFL MT FAS VEGA AgriCUItural Credit Enhancement American Soybean AssociationIW'orld Initiative for Soy in Human Health Afghan Soy Factory Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Dewelopment Capacity Building and Change Management Program CBI Global, CooperatiVE Business International Directorate of Agriculture, IrrigationI and USDAIFAS Foreign Agriculture Service Joint Development Associates (14942 acres Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock Nutrition and Education International Dil Crop Growers Association of Afghanista Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan SALT International Soybeans for Agriculture Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative Shelter for Life Metric Ton, 2200 lbs. US De pa rtment of Agriculture} Foreign Agriculture Service Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance Encompass LLC 1 page i SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 19 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 Acronyms ACE ASIMWISH ASF ASM EU CBCM CBI DIN PAS JDA Jerib NEI OCGAA PARSA SALT SARAI EFL MT FAS VEGA AgriCUItural Credit Enhancement American Soybean AssociationIW'orld Initiative for Soy in Human Health Afghan Soy Factory Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Dewelopment Capacity Building and Change Management Program CBI Global, CooperatiVE Business International Directorate of Agriculture, IrrigationI and USDAIFAS Foreign Agriculture Service Joint Development Associates (14942 acres Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock Nutrition and Education International Dil Crop Growers Association of Afghanista Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan SALT International Soybeans for Agriculture Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative Shelter for Life Metric Ton, 2200 lbs. US De pa rtment of Agriculture} Foreign Agriculture Service Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance Encompass LLC 1 page i SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 19 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 Acronyms ACE ASIMWISH ASF ASM EU CBCM CBI DIN PAS JDA Jerib NEI OCGAA PARSA SALT SARAI EFL MT FAS VEGA AgriCUItural Credit Enhancement American Soybean AssociationIW'orld Initiative for Soy in Human Health Afghan Soy Factory Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Dewelopment Capacity Building and Change Management Program CBI Global, CooperatiVE Business International Directorate of Agriculture, IrrigationI and USDAIFAS Foreign Agriculture Service Joint Development Associates (14942 acres Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock Nutrition and Education International Dil Crop Growers Association of Afghanista Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan SALT International Soybeans for Agriculture Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative Shelter for Life Metric Ton, 2200 lbs. US De pa rtment of Agriculture} Foreign Agriculture Service Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance Encompass LLC 1 page i SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 19 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 Acronyms ACE ASIMWISH ASF ASM EU CBCM CBI DIN PAS JDA Jerib NEI OCGAA PARSA SALT SARAI EFL MT FAS VEGA AgriCUItural Credit Enhancement American Soybean AssociationIW'orld Initiative for Soy in Human Health Afghan Soy Factory Afghanistan Small and Medium Enterprise Dewelopment Capacity Building and Change Management Program CBI Global, CooperatiVE Business International Directorate of Agriculture, IrrigationI and USDAIFAS Foreign Agriculture Service Joint Development Associates (14942 acres Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock Nutrition and Education International Dil Crop Growers Association of Afghanista Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan SALT International Soybeans for Agriculture Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative Shelter for Life Metric Ton, 2200 lbs. US De pa rtment of Agriculture} Foreign Agriculture Service Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance Encompass LLC 1 page i SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 19 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02113514 Evaluation Team Members Allison Brown Team Leader Jonathan Jones Senior Evaluation Specialist Khaista Yousafzai Senior Agriculture Adviser Encompass LLB page ii SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 20 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02113514 Evaluation Team Members Allison Brown Team Leader Jonathan Jones Senior Evaluation Specialist Khaista Yousafzai Senior Agriculture Adviser Encompass LLB page ii SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 20 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02113514 Evaluation Team Members Allison Brown Team Leader Jonathan Jones Senior Evaluation Specialist Khaista Yousafzai Senior Agriculture Adviser Encompass LLB page ii SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 20 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02113514 Evaluation Team Members Allison Brown Team Leader Jonathan Jones Senior Evaluation Specialist Khaista Yousafzai Senior Agriculture Adviser Encompass LLB page ii SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 20 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 Tobie of Contents EVALUATION TEAM II ExEcunvE 1 BACKGROUND AND CONTENT FOR THE 1.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ..8 2 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ..12 2.1 QUESTIONs ..12 2,2 2.3 EHCLUSIONSAND LIMITATIONS "13 3-1 THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT WORK IN AFGHANISTAN 3.2 PRODUUION 3.3 OTHER IMPLEMENTATION TASKS __22 3.4 MARKETING PRODUCTS 3-5 3.6 DESIGN .31 3.7 FULFILLMENT OF IN THE AGREEMENT 4 CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-1 CONCLUSIONS 4.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS "39 APPENDIX 1. STATEMENT OF APPENDLK 2. EVALUATION WORK PLAN APPENDIX 3. EVALUATION QUESTIONSIOATA COLLECTION APPENDDI II. DETAILED 5. SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT APPENDIX E. OUTPUT AND OUTCOME CRITERIA TO MEASURE PROGRESS TOWARDS PROJECT 61 APPENDIX T. TABLE PROVIDED BY ASA 5U MMARIZING PROJECT List ofExhibits Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions Exhibit 3: Plantingand replan?ng data* Exhibit 4: Pro?tability of alternatives to so; after wheat! Exhibit 5: Findings from 2003 IDA RALF project report that the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report} Exhibit 5: Comparison between soybean and mung Exhibit Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers Exhibit 8: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that have been damaged as soil has eroded Exhibit 9: Soy Value Chain Showing Project Suooesses and Challenges .37 Exhibit 10: Interviews completed with USA based stakeholders Exhibit 11: Interviews completed with Kabul based Exhibit 12: Interviews completed with Takhar based Exhibit 13: Interviews completed with Kuncluz-based stakeholders .55 Exhibit 14: Interviews completed with Mater-based EnCompass LLC: page SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 21 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 Tobie of Contents EVALUATION TEAM II ExEcunvE 1 BACKGROUND AND CONTENT FOR THE 1.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ..8 2 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ..12 2.1 QUESTIONs ..12 2,2 2.3 EHCLUSIONSAND LIMITATIONS "13 3-1 THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT WORK IN AFGHANISTAN 3.2 PRODUUION 3.3 OTHER IMPLEMENTATION TASKS __22 3.4 MARKETING PRODUCTS 3-5 3.6 DESIGN .31 3.7 FULFILLMENT OF IN THE AGREEMENT 4 CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-1 CONCLUSIONS 4.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS "39 APPENDIX 1. STATEMENT OF APPENDLK 2. EVALUATION WORK PLAN APPENDIX 3. EVALUATION QUESTIONSIOATA COLLECTION APPENDDI II. DETAILED 5. SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT APPENDIX E. OUTPUT AND OUTCOME CRITERIA TO MEASURE PROGRESS TOWARDS PROJECT 61 APPENDIX T. TABLE PROVIDED BY ASA 5U MMARIZING PROJECT List ofExhibits Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions Exhibit 3: Plantingand replan?ng data* Exhibit 4: Pro?tability of alternatives to so; after wheat! Exhibit 5: Findings from 2003 IDA RALF project report that the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report} Exhibit 5: Comparison between soybean and mung Exhibit Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers Exhibit 8: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that have been damaged as soil has eroded Exhibit 9: Soy Value Chain Showing Project Suooesses and Challenges .37 Exhibit 10: Interviews completed with USA based stakeholders Exhibit 11: Interviews completed with Kabul based Exhibit 12: Interviews completed with Takhar based Exhibit 13: Interviews completed with Kuncluz-based stakeholders .55 Exhibit 14: Interviews completed with Mater-based EnCompass LLC: page SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 21 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 Tobie of Contents EVALUATION TEAM II ExEcunvE 1 BACKGROUND AND CONTENT FOR THE 1.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ..8 2 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ..12 2.1 QUESTIONs ..12 2,2 2.3 EHCLUSIONSAND LIMITATIONS "13 3-1 THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT WORK IN AFGHANISTAN 3.2 PRODUUION 3.3 OTHER IMPLEMENTATION TASKS __22 3.4 MARKETING PRODUCTS 3-5 3.6 DESIGN .31 3.7 FULFILLMENT OF IN THE AGREEMENT 4 CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-1 CONCLUSIONS 4.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS "39 APPENDIX 1. STATEMENT OF APPENDLK 2. EVALUATION WORK PLAN APPENDIX 3. EVALUATION QUESTIONSIOATA COLLECTION APPENDDI II. DETAILED 5. SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT APPENDIX E. OUTPUT AND OUTCOME CRITERIA TO MEASURE PROGRESS TOWARDS PROJECT 61 APPENDIX T. TABLE PROVIDED BY ASA 5U MMARIZING PROJECT List ofExhibits Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions Exhibit 3: Plantingand replan?ng data* Exhibit 4: Pro?tability of alternatives to so; after wheat! Exhibit 5: Findings from 2003 IDA RALF project report that the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report} Exhibit 5: Comparison between soybean and mung Exhibit Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers Exhibit 8: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that have been damaged as soil has eroded Exhibit 9: Soy Value Chain Showing Project Suooesses and Challenges .37 Exhibit 10: Interviews completed with USA based stakeholders Exhibit 11: Interviews completed with Kabul based Exhibit 12: Interviews completed with Takhar based Exhibit 13: Interviews completed with Kuncluz-based stakeholders .55 Exhibit 14: Interviews completed with Mater-based EnCompass LLC: page SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 21 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 Tobie of Contents EVALUATION TEAM II ExEcunvE 1 BACKGROUND AND CONTENT FOR THE 1.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ..8 2 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ..12 2.1 QUESTIONs ..12 2,2 2.3 EHCLUSIONSAND LIMITATIONS "13 3-1 THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT WORK IN AFGHANISTAN 3.2 PRODUUION 3.3 OTHER IMPLEMENTATION TASKS __22 3.4 MARKETING PRODUCTS 3-5 3.6 DESIGN .31 3.7 FULFILLMENT OF IN THE AGREEMENT 4 CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-1 CONCLUSIONS 4.2 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS "39 APPENDIX 1. STATEMENT OF APPENDLK 2. EVALUATION WORK PLAN APPENDIX 3. EVALUATION QUESTIONSIOATA COLLECTION APPENDDI II. DETAILED 5. SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT APPENDIX E. OUTPUT AND OUTCOME CRITERIA TO MEASURE PROGRESS TOWARDS PROJECT 61 APPENDIX T. TABLE PROVIDED BY ASA 5U MMARIZING PROJECT List ofExhibits Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions Exhibit 3: Plantingand replan?ng data* Exhibit 4: Pro?tability of alternatives to so; after wheat! Exhibit 5: Findings from 2003 IDA RALF project report that the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report} Exhibit 5: Comparison between soybean and mung Exhibit Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers Exhibit 8: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that have been damaged as soil has eroded Exhibit 9: Soy Value Chain Showing Project Suooesses and Challenges .37 Exhibit 10: Interviews completed with USA based stakeholders Exhibit 11: Interviews completed with Kabul based Exhibit 12: Interviews completed with Takhar based Exhibit 13: Interviews completed with Kuncluz-based stakeholders .55 Exhibit 14: Interviews completed with Mater-based EnCompass LLC: page SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 21 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Executive Summary In September 2010, the American Soybean AssociationMorld Initiative for Soy in Human Health received funding from the United States Department ongriculture Foreign Agriculture Service FAS) for a three-year project funded by the provision of commodities through the Food for Progress program. The Sovbeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative project Was funded through monetiza tion of donated refined soybean oil. in addition, donated defatted soy flour and soybeans for direct distribution and barter. EARN seelts to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion ofa soy value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented in cooperation with a partnership of international and local organizations and includes the following activities: a Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation a Microcredit roads?production, entrepreneurship, and general use I Soybean production technical support and training I Marketing assistance I Esta blishment of an oilseed association - Eta blishment of a protein processing facility 0 Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soyr 0 Cooking seminars a nd sup port to bakeries I Nutrition im pact surveys Livestock feeding trials a Direct distribution of soy ?our Under the Master Agreement between ASMWISHH and ASNWISHH is required to undertake mid-term and final project evaluations. ASAMISHH Was unable to commission this evaluation at the midpoint of the project. Technically the project ended September 30 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. Another evaluation is proposed for late 2014 on the assumption that USDAIFAS will approve a proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. This evaluation seeks to provide a useful snapshot of project progress towards reaching objectives and outcomes and to estimate whether the project will reach its goals in the time remaining. The design and methodologv were developed following consultation with and approval bv and USDAIFAS. Due to time and budgetlimits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMISHH and did not included all project activities mentioned in the original Statement ofWorlr, and some project activities were given lower priority. This mid?term evaluation does not include an audit, which USDMFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the abilityI to reach some sources of information. A team of three evaluators undertook ?eidwork, one in the U.S. and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the U.S. focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project historyr working relationships among partners, and activities. The ?eld team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over days [26 October-11 November] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Ka bul, visiting project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and EnCompass LLC 1 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 22 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Executive Summary In September 2010, the American Soybean AssociationMorld Initiative for Soy in Human Health received funding from the United States Department ongriculture Foreign Agriculture Service FAS) for a three-year project funded by the provision of commodities through the Food for Progress program. The Sovbeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative project Was funded through monetiza tion of donated refined soybean oil. in addition, donated defatted soy flour and soybeans for direct distribution and barter. EARN seelts to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion ofa soy value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented in cooperation with a partnership of international and local organizations and includes the following activities: a Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation a Microcredit roads?production, entrepreneurship, and general use I Soybean production technical support and training I Marketing assistance I Esta blishment of an oilseed association - Eta blishment of a protein processing facility 0 Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soyr 0 Cooking seminars a nd sup port to bakeries I Nutrition im pact surveys Livestock feeding trials a Direct distribution of soy ?our Under the Master Agreement between ASMWISHH and ASNWISHH is required to undertake mid-term and final project evaluations. ASAMISHH Was unable to commission this evaluation at the midpoint of the project. Technically the project ended September 30 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. Another evaluation is proposed for late 2014 on the assumption that USDAIFAS will approve a proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. This evaluation seeks to provide a useful snapshot of project progress towards reaching objectives and outcomes and to estimate whether the project will reach its goals in the time remaining. The design and methodologv were developed following consultation with and approval bv and USDAIFAS. Due to time and budgetlimits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMISHH and did not included all project activities mentioned in the original Statement ofWorlr, and some project activities were given lower priority. This mid?term evaluation does not include an audit, which USDMFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the abilityI to reach some sources of information. A team of three evaluators undertook ?eidwork, one in the U.S. and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the U.S. focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project historyr working relationships among partners, and activities. The ?eld team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over days [26 October-11 November] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Ka bul, visiting project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and EnCompass LLC 1 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 22 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Executive Summary In September 2010, the American Soybean AssociationMorld Initiative for Soy in Human Health received funding from the United States Department ongriculture Foreign Agriculture Service FAS) for a three-year project funded by the provision of commodities through the Food for Progress program. The Sovbeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative project Was funded through monetiza tion of donated refined soybean oil. in addition, donated defatted soy flour and soybeans for direct distribution and barter. EARN seelts to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion ofa soy value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented in cooperation with a partnership of international and local organizations and includes the following activities: a Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation a Microcredit roads?production, entrepreneurship, and general use I Soybean production technical support and training I Marketing assistance I Esta blishment of an oilseed association - Eta blishment of a protein processing facility 0 Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soyr 0 Cooking seminars a nd sup port to bakeries I Nutrition im pact surveys Livestock feeding trials a Direct distribution of soy ?our Under the Master Agreement between ASMWISHH and ASNWISHH is required to undertake mid-term and final project evaluations. ASAMISHH Was unable to commission this evaluation at the midpoint of the project. Technically the project ended September 30 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. Another evaluation is proposed for late 2014 on the assumption that USDAIFAS will approve a proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. This evaluation seeks to provide a useful snapshot of project progress towards reaching objectives and outcomes and to estimate whether the project will reach its goals in the time remaining. The design and methodologv were developed following consultation with and approval bv and USDAIFAS. Due to time and budgetlimits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMISHH and did not included all project activities mentioned in the original Statement ofWorlr, and some project activities were given lower priority. This mid?term evaluation does not include an audit, which USDMFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the abilityI to reach some sources of information. A team of three evaluators undertook ?eidwork, one in the U.S. and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the U.S. focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project historyr working relationships among partners, and activities. The ?eld team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over days [26 October-11 November] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Ka bul, visiting project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and EnCompass LLC 1 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 22 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Executive Summary In September 2010, the American Soybean AssociationMorld Initiative for Soy in Human Health received funding from the United States Department ongriculture Foreign Agriculture Service FAS) for a three-year project funded by the provision of commodities through the Food for Progress program. The Sovbeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative project Was funded through monetiza tion of donated refined soybean oil. in addition, donated defatted soy flour and soybeans for direct distribution and barter. EARN seelts to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion ofa soy value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented in cooperation with a partnership of international and local organizations and includes the following activities: a Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation a Microcredit roads?production, entrepreneurship, and general use I Soybean production technical support and training I Marketing assistance I Esta blishment of an oilseed association - Eta blishment of a protein processing facility 0 Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soyr 0 Cooking seminars a nd sup port to bakeries I Nutrition im pact surveys Livestock feeding trials a Direct distribution of soy ?our Under the Master Agreement between ASMWISHH and ASNWISHH is required to undertake mid-term and final project evaluations. ASAMISHH Was unable to commission this evaluation at the midpoint of the project. Technically the project ended September 30 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. Another evaluation is proposed for late 2014 on the assumption that USDAIFAS will approve a proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. This evaluation seeks to provide a useful snapshot of project progress towards reaching objectives and outcomes and to estimate whether the project will reach its goals in the time remaining. The design and methodologv were developed following consultation with and approval bv and USDAIFAS. Due to time and budgetlimits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMISHH and did not included all project activities mentioned in the original Statement ofWorlr, and some project activities were given lower priority. This mid?term evaluation does not include an audit, which USDMFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the abilityI to reach some sources of information. A team of three evaluators undertook ?eidwork, one in the U.S. and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the U.S. focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project historyr working relationships among partners, and activities. The ?eld team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over days [26 October-11 November] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Ka bul, visiting project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and EnCompass LLC 1 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 22 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [120514 markets, and interviewing management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non?government agencies. The ?eld team looked most closely at implementation issues a nd measures of success. Report Review and Feedback: The evaluation team provided with a draft evaluation report for review. Feedback on factual inconsistencies was addressed in the final report. Differences in perspectiVes that were not reconcilable are noted in footnotes throughout the report. FINDINGS it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number of signi?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the fluid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Production 1. Soy production has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical finding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. The project's hilch data substantiates that farmers have not adopted soybeans. According to information supplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harvest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs 4,5?0?5,000 MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw materials. Historical data show that farmers who have pa rticipated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept the input packages are reported to eat the seed and Use the fertilizor for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high production costs and low yields. 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive labor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating. 4. Without the prospect of adequate soy production, many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the close of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the profitability of the Afghan Soy Factory. 5, The production and processing activities of the vaIUe chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disIUption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could have been avaided by codocating prodUction and processing. In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Takhar and Mazar that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory?s prices for Takhar products because tlansport costs a re less. EnCompass LLC 2 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 23 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [120514 markets, and interviewing management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non?government agencies. The ?eld team looked most closely at implementation issues a nd measures of success. Report Review and Feedback: The evaluation team provided with a draft evaluation report for review. Feedback on factual inconsistencies was addressed in the final report. Differences in perspectiVes that were not reconcilable are noted in footnotes throughout the report. FINDINGS it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number of signi?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the fluid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Production 1. Soy production has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical finding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. The project's hilch data substantiates that farmers have not adopted soybeans. According to information supplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harvest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs 4,5?0?5,000 MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw materials. Historical data show that farmers who have pa rticipated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept the input packages are reported to eat the seed and Use the fertilizor for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high production costs and low yields. 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive labor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating. 4. Without the prospect of adequate soy production, many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the close of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the profitability of the Afghan Soy Factory. 5, The production and processing activities of the vaIUe chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disIUption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could have been avaided by codocating prodUction and processing. In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Takhar and Mazar that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory?s prices for Takhar products because tlansport costs a re less. EnCompass LLC 2 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 23 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [120514 markets, and interviewing management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non?government agencies. The ?eld team looked most closely at implementation issues a nd measures of success. Report Review and Feedback: The evaluation team provided with a draft evaluation report for review. Feedback on factual inconsistencies was addressed in the final report. Differences in perspectiVes that were not reconcilable are noted in footnotes throughout the report. FINDINGS it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number of signi?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the fluid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Production 1. Soy production has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical finding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. The project's hilch data substantiates that farmers have not adopted soybeans. According to information supplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harvest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs 4,5?0?5,000 MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw materials. Historical data show that farmers who have pa rticipated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept the input packages are reported to eat the seed and Use the fertilizor for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high production costs and low yields. 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive labor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating. 4. Without the prospect of adequate soy production, many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the close of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the profitability of the Afghan Soy Factory. 5, The production and processing activities of the vaIUe chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disIUption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could have been avaided by codocating prodUction and processing. In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Takhar and Mazar that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory?s prices for Takhar products because tlansport costs a re less. EnCompass LLC 2 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 23 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [120514 markets, and interviewing management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non?government agencies. The ?eld team looked most closely at implementation issues a nd measures of success. Report Review and Feedback: The evaluation team provided with a draft evaluation report for review. Feedback on factual inconsistencies was addressed in the final report. Differences in perspectiVes that were not reconcilable are noted in footnotes throughout the report. FINDINGS it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number of signi?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the fluid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Production 1. Soy production has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical finding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. The project's hilch data substantiates that farmers have not adopted soybeans. According to information supplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harvest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs 4,5?0?5,000 MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw materials. Historical data show that farmers who have pa rticipated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept the input packages are reported to eat the seed and Use the fertilizor for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high production costs and low yields. 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive labor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating. 4. Without the prospect of adequate soy production, many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the close of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the profitability of the Afghan Soy Factory. 5, The production and processing activities of the vaIUe chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disIUption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could have been avaided by codocating prodUction and processing. In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Takhar and Mazar that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory?s prices for Takhar products because tlansport costs a re less. EnCompass LLC 2 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 23 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Other Implementation Tasks 5. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful components of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers [4 of 6 farmers interviewed] Is that they considered the microcredlt cemponent to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside ofsoy production, such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy production. 5. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which was able to overcome numerous obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally produced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 33?3?430 MT per month MT per year] for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy flour, it would need 420 MT per month (5,000 MT per year). According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 1614 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack of in-country prodUction, there is widespread speculation that inputs for processing will be imported or that the factory will be broken up and equipment will be sold after project completion. 9. Despite heinga tasli required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy flour without an existing market supply did not further the goal ofa sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA management resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-Up, the initial oil auction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the first planting season tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition surveyI showed that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution. Marketing soy products It]. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders including the Afghan government that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is sUpported by national import figures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed Would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy?wheat flour blends make it adva ntageom to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy flour to their product. EnCompass LLC 3 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 24 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Other Implementation Tasks 5. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful components of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers [4 of 6 farmers interviewed] Is that they considered the microcredlt cemponent to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside ofsoy production, such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy production. 5. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which was able to overcome numerous obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally produced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 33?3?430 MT per month MT per year] for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy flour, it would need 420 MT per month (5,000 MT per year). According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 1614 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack of in-country prodUction, there is widespread speculation that inputs for processing will be imported or that the factory will be broken up and equipment will be sold after project completion. 9. Despite heinga tasli required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy flour without an existing market supply did not further the goal ofa sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA management resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-Up, the initial oil auction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the first planting season tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition surveyI showed that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution. Marketing soy products It]. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders including the Afghan government that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is sUpported by national import figures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed Would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy?wheat flour blends make it adva ntageom to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy flour to their product. EnCompass LLC 3 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 24 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Other Implementation Tasks 5. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful components of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers [4 of 6 farmers interviewed] Is that they considered the microcredlt cemponent to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside ofsoy production, such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy production. 5. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which was able to overcome numerous obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally produced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 33?3?430 MT per month MT per year] for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy flour, it would need 420 MT per month (5,000 MT per year). According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 1614 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack of in-country prodUction, there is widespread speculation that inputs for processing will be imported or that the factory will be broken up and equipment will be sold after project completion. 9. Despite heinga tasli required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy flour without an existing market supply did not further the goal ofa sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA management resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-Up, the initial oil auction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the first planting season tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition surveyI showed that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution. Marketing soy products It]. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders including the Afghan government that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is sUpported by national import figures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed Would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy?wheat flour blends make it adva ntageom to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy flour to their product. EnCompass LLC 3 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 24 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Other Implementation Tasks 5. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful components of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers [4 of 6 farmers interviewed] Is that they considered the microcredlt cemponent to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside ofsoy production, such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy production. 5. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which was able to overcome numerous obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally produced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 33?3?430 MT per month MT per year] for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy flour, it would need 420 MT per month (5,000 MT per year). According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 1614 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack of in-country prodUction, there is widespread speculation that inputs for processing will be imported or that the factory will be broken up and equipment will be sold after project completion. 9. Despite heinga tasli required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy flour without an existing market supply did not further the goal ofa sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA management resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-Up, the initial oil auction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the first planting season tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition surveyI showed that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution. Marketing soy products It]. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders including the Afghan government that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is sUpported by national import figures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed Would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy?wheat flour blends make it adva ntageom to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy flour to their product. EnCompass LLC 3 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 24 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 11. The pilot activity of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan with womenaowned community ba heries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the batteries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be replica ted and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. Management 12. has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors In three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in-country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have tie-en chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. In general, the number and technical background ofthe field staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Ta loqan seemed to have been focused on infrastructure [road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was likely due to the education background of staff and the organization's h1storica focus on construotion. Soybean the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seem to have received inadequate attention. 13. This evaluation team did not assess the capacity of Nutrition and Education International to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the ?rst few months of irnplementation (immediatelyr before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the possibilities of success for soy introduction. 14. Interview and obsewation data indicate that SA RAI project goals? particularly related to the soy value chain?have been undermined by SFt's inadequate management of farmer training, agriculture extension, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project's challenges. 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The tEEhnical midpoint of the project Was April 2012. 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread [commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not]: needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available. 17. Based on observation and Interviews with SARAI staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self-identi?cation of some partners with the SAHAI project is minimal. Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as part of the project design process. Independent Em: ompass LLC 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 25 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 11. The pilot activity of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan with womenaowned community ba heries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the batteries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be replica ted and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. Management 12. has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors In three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in-country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have tie-en chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. In general, the number and technical background ofthe field staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Ta loqan seemed to have been focused on infrastructure [road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was likely due to the education background of staff and the organization's h1storica focus on construotion. Soybean the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seem to have received inadequate attention. 13. This evaluation team did not assess the capacity of Nutrition and Education International to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the ?rst few months of irnplementation (immediatelyr before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the possibilities of success for soy introduction. 14. Interview and obsewation data indicate that SA RAI project goals? particularly related to the soy value chain?have been undermined by SFt's inadequate management of farmer training, agriculture extension, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project's challenges. 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The tEEhnical midpoint of the project Was April 2012. 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread [commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not]: needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available. 17. Based on observation and Interviews with SARAI staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self-identi?cation of some partners with the SAHAI project is minimal. Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as part of the project design process. Independent Em: ompass LLC 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 25 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 11. The pilot activity of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan with womenaowned community ba heries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the batteries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be replica ted and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. Management 12. has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors In three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in-country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have tie-en chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. In general, the number and technical background ofthe field staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Ta loqan seemed to have been focused on infrastructure [road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was likely due to the education background of staff and the organization's h1storica focus on construotion. Soybean the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seem to have received inadequate attention. 13. This evaluation team did not assess the capacity of Nutrition and Education International to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the ?rst few months of irnplementation (immediatelyr before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the possibilities of success for soy introduction. 14. Interview and obsewation data indicate that SA RAI project goals? particularly related to the soy value chain?have been undermined by SFt's inadequate management of farmer training, agriculture extension, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project's challenges. 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The tEEhnical midpoint of the project Was April 2012. 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread [commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not]: needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available. 17. Based on observation and Interviews with SARAI staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self-identi?cation of some partners with the SAHAI project is minimal. Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as part of the project design process. Independent Em: ompass LLC 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 25 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 11. The pilot activity of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan with womenaowned community ba heries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the batteries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be replica ted and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. Management 12. has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors In three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in-country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have tie-en chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. In general, the number and technical background ofthe field staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Ta loqan seemed to have been focused on infrastructure [road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was likely due to the education background of staff and the organization's h1storica focus on construotion. Soybean the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seem to have received inadequate attention. 13. This evaluation team did not assess the capacity of Nutrition and Education International to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the ?rst few months of irnplementation (immediatelyr before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the possibilities of success for soy introduction. 14. Interview and obsewation data indicate that SA RAI project goals? particularly related to the soy value chain?have been undermined by SFt's inadequate management of farmer training, agriculture extension, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project's challenges. 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The tEEhnical midpoint of the project Was April 2012. 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread [commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not]: needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available. 17. Based on observation and Interviews with SARAI staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self-identi?cation of some partners with the SAHAI project is minimal. Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as part of the project design process. Independent Em: ompass LLC 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 25 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the difficulty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan. There are doubts among those knowledgeabte about agriculture in Afghanistan about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of the project?s structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. logfia me and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of logframe. Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogram theory, a comprehensive project approach Was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. 19. Some SARAI partners feel that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review of design documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sustainability means. One key gap in terms of project su-jtainability has been a lack of focur. on sourcing viable seed inputs. 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of prodUctjon. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that SFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was tunable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group indicates that it is planting soybean for seed produotion but We do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed be offered, CONCLUSIONS Conclusions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does design oiign with the probiems and goofs outir'ned in the Master Agreement? a While the project has had some stand?alone suscesses, overall the design does not align with the probiems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The project Was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant flame. The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NEI as a partner crippled im plementation. To what Extent have interventions been e?ectiveiy impiemenred? EARN has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver rnonetiaed donated soy products with the exception of the ?rst year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these Enc ompass LLC 5 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 26 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the difficulty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan. There are doubts among those knowledgeabte about agriculture in Afghanistan about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of the project?s structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. logfia me and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of logframe. Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogram theory, a comprehensive project approach Was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. 19. Some SARAI partners feel that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review of design documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sustainability means. One key gap in terms of project su-jtainability has been a lack of focur. on sourcing viable seed inputs. 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of prodUctjon. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that SFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was tunable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group indicates that it is planting soybean for seed produotion but We do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed be offered, CONCLUSIONS Conclusions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does design oiign with the probiems and goofs outir'ned in the Master Agreement? a While the project has had some stand?alone suscesses, overall the design does not align with the probiems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The project Was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant flame. The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NEI as a partner crippled im plementation. To what Extent have interventions been e?ectiveiy impiemenred? EARN has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver rnonetiaed donated soy products with the exception of the ?rst year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these Enc ompass LLC 5 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 26 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the difficulty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan. There are doubts among those knowledgeabte about agriculture in Afghanistan about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of the project?s structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. logfia me and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of logframe. Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogram theory, a comprehensive project approach Was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. 19. Some SARAI partners feel that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review of design documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sustainability means. One key gap in terms of project su-jtainability has been a lack of focur. on sourcing viable seed inputs. 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of prodUctjon. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that SFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was tunable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group indicates that it is planting soybean for seed produotion but We do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed be offered, CONCLUSIONS Conclusions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does design oiign with the probiems and goofs outir'ned in the Master Agreement? a While the project has had some stand?alone suscesses, overall the design does not align with the probiems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The project Was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant flame. The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NEI as a partner crippled im plementation. To what Extent have interventions been e?ectiveiy impiemenred? EARN has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver rnonetiaed donated soy products with the exception of the ?rst year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these Enc ompass LLC 5 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 26 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the difficulty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan. There are doubts among those knowledgeabte about agriculture in Afghanistan about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of the project?s structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. logfia me and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of logframe. Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogram theory, a comprehensive project approach Was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. 19. Some SARAI partners feel that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review of design documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sustainability means. One key gap in terms of project su-jtainability has been a lack of focur. on sourcing viable seed inputs. 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of prodUctjon. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that SFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was tunable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group indicates that it is planting soybean for seed produotion but We do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed be offered, CONCLUSIONS Conclusions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does design oiign with the probiems and goofs outir'ned in the Master Agreement? a While the project has had some stand?alone suscesses, overall the design does not align with the probiems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The project Was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant flame. The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NEI as a partner crippled im plementation. To what Extent have interventions been e?ectiveiy impiemenred? EARN has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver rnonetiaed donated soy products with the exception of the ?rst year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these Enc ompass LLC 5 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 26 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 activities haire not been effectiVely integrated into the soyr value chain. seam has not introduced pro?table soy production. SARAI has not deployed staff effectively. SARAI has not developed an effective system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions been re?ective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected imports The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, local-prodUction-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension. the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve is goal. - The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especially young businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thUs perhaps undermining lacal produotion. If demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What can he expected to he the fang?term of the ASWISHH intervention? 0 It is difficult to estimate the long?term impacts of some of the stand-alone project successes. However; given the inability to develop soy production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we conclude that it is unlikely that the intervention will result in a sUstainable soy value chain. What one the lessons ieornedfrom EARN that might help he more successful in simr'ior interventions in the future? a A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SAHAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and logframe. Establish a system to Use monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifec'ycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and key partners are all working together to support the Intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs Whot in?uences from other actors in the soy v?oiue chorn ho ve enobied or constrained program rippiementotr'on and results? a The volatile security situation resulted in a fluid and unpredictable project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 27 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 activities haire not been effectiVely integrated into the soyr value chain. seam has not introduced pro?table soy production. SARAI has not deployed staff effectively. SARAI has not developed an effective system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions been re?ective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected imports The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, local-prodUction-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension. the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve is goal. - The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especially young businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thUs perhaps undermining lacal produotion. If demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What can he expected to he the fang?term of the ASWISHH intervention? 0 It is difficult to estimate the long?term impacts of some of the stand-alone project successes. However; given the inability to develop soy production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we conclude that it is unlikely that the intervention will result in a sUstainable soy value chain. What one the lessons ieornedfrom EARN that might help he more successful in simr'ior interventions in the future? a A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SAHAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and logframe. Establish a system to Use monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifec'ycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and key partners are all working together to support the Intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs Whot in?uences from other actors in the soy v?oiue chorn ho ve enobied or constrained program rippiementotr'on and results? a The volatile security situation resulted in a fluid and unpredictable project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 27 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 activities haire not been effectiVely integrated into the soyr value chain. seam has not introduced pro?table soy production. SARAI has not deployed staff effectively. SARAI has not developed an effective system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions been re?ective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected imports The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, local-prodUction-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension. the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve is goal. - The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especially young businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thUs perhaps undermining lacal produotion. If demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What can he expected to he the fang?term of the ASWISHH intervention? 0 It is difficult to estimate the long?term impacts of some of the stand-alone project successes. However; given the inability to develop soy production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we conclude that it is unlikely that the intervention will result in a sUstainable soy value chain. What one the lessons ieornedfrom EARN that might help he more successful in simr'ior interventions in the future? a A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SAHAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and logframe. Establish a system to Use monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifec'ycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and key partners are all working together to support the Intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs Whot in?uences from other actors in the soy v?oiue chorn ho ve enobied or constrained program rippiementotr'on and results? a The volatile security situation resulted in a fluid and unpredictable project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 27 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 activities haire not been effectiVely integrated into the soyr value chain. seam has not introduced pro?table soy production. SARAI has not deployed staff effectively. SARAI has not developed an effective system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions been re?ective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected imports The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, local-prodUction-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension. the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve is goal. - The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especially young businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thUs perhaps undermining lacal produotion. If demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What can he expected to he the fang?term of the ASWISHH intervention? 0 It is difficult to estimate the long?term impacts of some of the stand-alone project successes. However; given the inability to develop soy production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we conclude that it is unlikely that the intervention will result in a sUstainable soy value chain. What one the lessons ieornedfrom EARN that might help he more successful in simr'ior interventions in the future? a A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SAHAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and logframe. Establish a system to Use monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifec'ycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and key partners are all working together to support the Intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs Whot in?uences from other actors in the soy v?oiue chorn ho ve enobied or constrained program rippiementotr'on and results? a The volatile security situation resulted in a fluid and unpredictable project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 27 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report KEY REC OMMENDATIONS 2 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?conoept demonstration in Baikh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among SARM's previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and trainingr and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gures from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops], an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, logirarne, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. should be given SAHAI resources in Tal-Ihai and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be fulfilled using SFL permanent staffj with SARAI budget support as needed. SFL's SA RAI staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof of concept demonstration. When developing its staf?ng plan for 2?14, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support tea m, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Ballth, the project of?ce should be moved to Mazar and SARAI partner agencies should share office space. The project should devolop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant government of?ces. Given the volatility In staf?ng of the agronomist position to date, the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staffing could perhaps be managed on a cooperative or loan basis, although a more SUStainable option would be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy ?our beyond availability, the women's bakery pilot project should be expanded, particularly in lviazari within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture production in Afghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASAIWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situation-releva nt knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 7 I Page 28 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report KEY REC OMMENDATIONS 2 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?conoept demonstration in Baikh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among SARM's previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and trainingr and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gures from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops], an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, logirarne, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. should be given SAHAI resources in Tal-Ihai and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be fulfilled using SFL permanent staffj with SARAI budget support as needed. SFL's SA RAI staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof of concept demonstration. When developing its staf?ng plan for 2?14, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support tea m, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Ballth, the project of?ce should be moved to Mazar and SARAI partner agencies should share office space. The project should devolop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant government of?ces. Given the volatility In staf?ng of the agronomist position to date, the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staffing could perhaps be managed on a cooperative or loan basis, although a more SUStainable option would be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy ?our beyond availability, the women's bakery pilot project should be expanded, particularly in lviazari within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture production in Afghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASAIWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situation-releva nt knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 7 I Page 28 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report KEY REC OMMENDATIONS 2 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?conoept demonstration in Baikh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among SARM's previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and trainingr and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gures from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops], an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, logirarne, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. should be given SAHAI resources in Tal-Ihai and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be fulfilled using SFL permanent staffj with SARAI budget support as needed. SFL's SA RAI staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof of concept demonstration. When developing its staf?ng plan for 2?14, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support tea m, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Ballth, the project of?ce should be moved to Mazar and SARAI partner agencies should share office space. The project should devolop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant government of?ces. Given the volatility In staf?ng of the agronomist position to date, the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staffing could perhaps be managed on a cooperative or loan basis, although a more SUStainable option would be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy ?our beyond availability, the women's bakery pilot project should be expanded, particularly in lviazari within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture production in Afghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASAIWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situation-releva nt knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 7 I Page 28 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report KEY REC OMMENDATIONS 2 4 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?conoept demonstration in Baikh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among SARM's previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and trainingr and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gures from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops], an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, logirarne, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. should be given SAHAI resources in Tal-Ihai and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be fulfilled using SFL permanent staffj with SARAI budget support as needed. SFL's SA RAI staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof of concept demonstration. When developing its staf?ng plan for 2?14, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support tea m, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Ballth, the project of?ce should be moved to Mazar and SARAI partner agencies should share office space. The project should devolop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant government of?ces. Given the volatility In staf?ng of the agronomist position to date, the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staffing could perhaps be managed on a cooperative or loan basis, although a more SUStainable option would be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy ?our beyond availability, the women's bakery pilot project should be expanded, particularly in lviazari within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture production in Afghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASAIWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situation-releva nt knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 7 I Page 28 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 1 Background and Context for the Evaluation In September 2010, the American Soybean Association/World Initiative for Sol,r in Human Health received funding from the United States Depa rtrnent of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Service for a th ree?vea project, Soybeans forAgricuituro! Renewoi' in Afghanis tan initiative (SARAH. The project Is funded through the USDAIFAS Feed the Future program. SARAI seeks to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion of a sonr value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented with the support of international and local pa rtners. As part of the Master Agreement between and USDAXFAS, is required to undertake mid?term and ?nal project evaluations. ASAIWISHH was unable to commission this evaluation at the technical midpoint of the project in early 2012 for implementation May?June, around planting time.1 Instead, ASAIWISHH conducted the mid?term evaluation near the end of the third and ?nal year of the project. Technically the project ended September 30, 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. EnCompass LLC was contracted in November 2013 to conduct an evaluation of project progress to date, and offer recommendations to improve the projectshould it be extended for a fourth yea r. A finai evaluation is proposed at the end of the project on the assumption that will approve the proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. The ASAMISHH Staten1ent of Work {Appendix 1) and the mid?term evaluation work plan and evaluation questions matrix [Appendix 2 and 3) that Were approVEd by USDAIFAS provide a detailed ovarview of the mid?term evaluation effort goals and methodologies. 1.1 Project Overview SARAI is funded through the monetization of donated re?ned soybean oil. in addition, USDAXFAS donated defatted soy flour and whole soybeans for direct distribution and barter. The estimated value of SARAI is 523 mi11ion1, which includes both commodity costs and transportation costs from the United States. goal is to create a sustainable oilseed value chain. To accomplish this, is focused on the following activities: 0 Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation II Microcredit loans?production, entrepreneurship, and general use 1 During the course of the evaluation, ASA noted the strusgje they had to procure evaluation servicos. ASA provided the following context: The solicitation went through 2 reviews by USDA in the late summer/ early fall of 2D 12. The first release of the solicitation resulted in no one bidding. A second release resulted in no bidder, though one group expressed interest. ASA worked to contract with them. but the group ran into challenges in getting appropriate consultants in the time needed. That groLIp referred ASA to EnCompass. In summary, according to ASA, it tool: months to locate a group prepared to conduct interviews in Afghanistan on a short turnaround. The budget also went from $40,000 to 350,000 to $115,D0i1. These factors also contributed to a delayed mid~term. The solicitation went out to about 1200 people the ?rst round, and to the same group the second round. plus an additional 35?40 ?rms. 2 Figure given to the evaluation team via email communication with ASA, and includes money used for transportation of commodities from the U5. to Afghanistan. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 29 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 1 Background and Context for the Evaluation In September 2010, the American Soybean Association/World Initiative for Sol,r in Human Health received funding from the United States Depa rtrnent of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Service for a th ree?vea project, Soybeans forAgricuituro! Renewoi' in Afghanis tan initiative (SARAH. The project Is funded through the USDAIFAS Feed the Future program. SARAI seeks to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion of a sonr value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented with the support of international and local pa rtners. As part of the Master Agreement between and USDAXFAS, is required to undertake mid?term and ?nal project evaluations. ASAIWISHH was unable to commission this evaluation at the technical midpoint of the project in early 2012 for implementation May?June, around planting time.1 Instead, ASAIWISHH conducted the mid?term evaluation near the end of the third and ?nal year of the project. Technically the project ended September 30, 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. EnCompass LLC was contracted in November 2013 to conduct an evaluation of project progress to date, and offer recommendations to improve the projectshould it be extended for a fourth yea r. A finai evaluation is proposed at the end of the project on the assumption that will approve the proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. The ASAMISHH Staten1ent of Work {Appendix 1) and the mid?term evaluation work plan and evaluation questions matrix [Appendix 2 and 3) that Were approVEd by USDAIFAS provide a detailed ovarview of the mid?term evaluation effort goals and methodologies. 1.1 Project Overview SARAI is funded through the monetization of donated re?ned soybean oil. in addition, USDAXFAS donated defatted soy flour and whole soybeans for direct distribution and barter. The estimated value of SARAI is 523 mi11ion1, which includes both commodity costs and transportation costs from the United States. goal is to create a sustainable oilseed value chain. To accomplish this, is focused on the following activities: 0 Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation II Microcredit loans?production, entrepreneurship, and general use 1 During the course of the evaluation, ASA noted the strusgje they had to procure evaluation servicos. ASA provided the following context: The solicitation went through 2 reviews by USDA in the late summer/ early fall of 2D 12. The first release of the solicitation resulted in no one bidding. A second release resulted in no bidder, though one group expressed interest. ASA worked to contract with them. but the group ran into challenges in getting appropriate consultants in the time needed. That groLIp referred ASA to EnCompass. In summary, according to ASA, it tool: months to locate a group prepared to conduct interviews in Afghanistan on a short turnaround. The budget also went from $40,000 to 350,000 to $115,D0i1. These factors also contributed to a delayed mid~term. The solicitation went out to about 1200 people the ?rst round, and to the same group the second round. plus an additional 35?40 ?rms. 2 Figure given to the evaluation team via email communication with ASA, and includes money used for transportation of commodities from the U5. to Afghanistan. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 29 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 1 Background and Context for the Evaluation In September 2010, the American Soybean Association/World Initiative for Sol,r in Human Health received funding from the United States Depa rtrnent of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Service for a th ree?vea project, Soybeans forAgricuituro! Renewoi' in Afghanis tan initiative (SARAH. The project Is funded through the USDAIFAS Feed the Future program. SARAI seeks to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion of a sonr value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented with the support of international and local pa rtners. As part of the Master Agreement between and USDAXFAS, is required to undertake mid?term and ?nal project evaluations. ASAIWISHH was unable to commission this evaluation at the technical midpoint of the project in early 2012 for implementation May?June, around planting time.1 Instead, ASAIWISHH conducted the mid?term evaluation near the end of the third and ?nal year of the project. Technically the project ended September 30, 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. EnCompass LLC was contracted in November 2013 to conduct an evaluation of project progress to date, and offer recommendations to improve the projectshould it be extended for a fourth yea r. A finai evaluation is proposed at the end of the project on the assumption that will approve the proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. The ASAMISHH Staten1ent of Work {Appendix 1) and the mid?term evaluation work plan and evaluation questions matrix [Appendix 2 and 3) that Were approVEd by USDAIFAS provide a detailed ovarview of the mid?term evaluation effort goals and methodologies. 1.1 Project Overview SARAI is funded through the monetization of donated re?ned soybean oil. in addition, USDAXFAS donated defatted soy flour and whole soybeans for direct distribution and barter. The estimated value of SARAI is 523 mi11ion1, which includes both commodity costs and transportation costs from the United States. goal is to create a sustainable oilseed value chain. To accomplish this, is focused on the following activities: 0 Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation II Microcredit loans?production, entrepreneurship, and general use 1 During the course of the evaluation, ASA noted the strusgje they had to procure evaluation servicos. ASA provided the following context: The solicitation went through 2 reviews by USDA in the late summer/ early fall of 2D 12. The first release of the solicitation resulted in no one bidding. A second release resulted in no bidder, though one group expressed interest. ASA worked to contract with them. but the group ran into challenges in getting appropriate consultants in the time needed. That groLIp referred ASA to EnCompass. In summary, according to ASA, it tool: months to locate a group prepared to conduct interviews in Afghanistan on a short turnaround. The budget also went from $40,000 to 350,000 to $115,D0i1. These factors also contributed to a delayed mid~term. The solicitation went out to about 1200 people the ?rst round, and to the same group the second round. plus an additional 35?40 ?rms. 2 Figure given to the evaluation team via email communication with ASA, and includes money used for transportation of commodities from the U5. to Afghanistan. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 29 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 1 Background and Context for the Evaluation In September 2010, the American Soybean Association/World Initiative for Sol,r in Human Health received funding from the United States Depa rtrnent of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Service for a th ree?vea project, Soybeans forAgricuituro! Renewoi' in Afghanis tan initiative (SARAH. The project Is funded through the USDAIFAS Feed the Future program. SARAI seeks to address immediate humanitarian needs and to establish livelihood opportunities through the promotion of a sonr value chain in Afghanistan. The project is being implemented with the support of international and local pa rtners. As part of the Master Agreement between and USDAXFAS, is required to undertake mid?term and ?nal project evaluations. ASAIWISHH was unable to commission this evaluation at the technical midpoint of the project in early 2012 for implementation May?June, around planting time.1 Instead, ASAIWISHH conducted the mid?term evaluation near the end of the third and ?nal year of the project. Technically the project ended September 30, 2013, but it has been extended to December 2013. EnCompass LLC was contracted in November 2013 to conduct an evaluation of project progress to date, and offer recommendations to improve the projectshould it be extended for a fourth yea r. A finai evaluation is proposed at the end of the project on the assumption that will approve the proposed no-cost extension through the end of 2014. The ASAMISHH Staten1ent of Work {Appendix 1) and the mid?term evaluation work plan and evaluation questions matrix [Appendix 2 and 3) that Were approVEd by USDAIFAS provide a detailed ovarview of the mid?term evaluation effort goals and methodologies. 1.1 Project Overview SARAI is funded through the monetization of donated re?ned soybean oil. in addition, USDAXFAS donated defatted soy flour and whole soybeans for direct distribution and barter. The estimated value of SARAI is 523 mi11ion1, which includes both commodity costs and transportation costs from the United States. goal is to create a sustainable oilseed value chain. To accomplish this, is focused on the following activities: 0 Road and irrigation systems rehabilitation II Microcredit loans?production, entrepreneurship, and general use 1 During the course of the evaluation, ASA noted the strusgje they had to procure evaluation servicos. ASA provided the following context: The solicitation went through 2 reviews by USDA in the late summer/ early fall of 2D 12. The first release of the solicitation resulted in no one bidding. A second release resulted in no bidder, though one group expressed interest. ASA worked to contract with them. but the group ran into challenges in getting appropriate consultants in the time needed. That groLIp referred ASA to EnCompass. In summary, according to ASA, it tool: months to locate a group prepared to conduct interviews in Afghanistan on a short turnaround. The budget also went from $40,000 to 350,000 to $115,D0i1. These factors also contributed to a delayed mid~term. The solicitation went out to about 1200 people the ?rst round, and to the same group the second round. plus an additional 35?40 ?rms. 2 Figure given to the evaluation team via email communication with ASA, and includes money used for transportation of commodities from the U5. to Afghanistan. EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 29 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 I Soybean production technical support and training Marketing assislence Establishment of an oilseed association - Establishment of a protein processing facility Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy a Cooking seminars and support to bakeriES II Nutrition impact surveys Iv Livestock feeding trials 0 Direct distribution of soy flour The tasks are divided among the partners as follows: I ASAIWISHH Www.wi5hh.orgi is a humanitarian initiative of the American Soybean Association, an important trade association of the U5. soy industry. ASA, acting through WISHH, undertook project oversight and management. WISHH, acting through commercial agents CooperatiVE Business International [CBlj and ALI Logistics, imported and stored donated soy products and managed the commodity auction to ?nance the project. In addition, WISHH was responsible for soybean promotion, developing an oilseeds association, nutrition impact surveys, livestock feredlng trials, and for providing cooking seminars and support to bakeries. Shelter For Life org] undertook road and irrigation improvements, agriculture training, agriculture extension and microcredit. .- SALT International undertook the construction and management of the Afghan Soybean Factory (ASP) and the training of factory managers and staff. 0 I?ilaseeb Group the local partner in the SARAI project. Naseeb Group provided the land, building, staff, and a portion of the operating capital for the Afghan Soy Factory. ASAIWISHH proposes to convey the factory equipment to Naseeb Group at the end of project. i Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan paramoer undertook the distribution ofsoy flour to pregnant and lactating women. PARSA also piloted a soy-wheat ?our-baking project with 20 woman-owned bakeries. In 2013, PARSA also a55isted SFL and Naseeb Group to collect the soy ha NEst in Talthar. Nu?'ition and Education International was an original project partner along with SFL NEI withdrew from the project several months after the signing of the Master Agreement. This issue is discussed further in the project history below. Other participants and contractors in the project have included: a Cetena Group is an advertising ?rm contracted to conduct the soy promotion activity. 0 The Cutting Edge: conducted the nutrition study after the soy??our distribution, (led by a dietician}. Oil Crop Growers Association of Afghanistan (Di:ij is the Oil Crop EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 30 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 I Soybean production technical support and training Marketing assislence Establishment of an oilseed association - Establishment of a protein processing facility Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy a Cooking seminars and support to bakeriES II Nutrition impact surveys Iv Livestock feeding trials 0 Direct distribution of soy flour The tasks are divided among the partners as follows: I ASAIWISHH Www.wi5hh.orgi is a humanitarian initiative of the American Soybean Association, an important trade association of the U5. soy industry. ASA, acting through WISHH, undertook project oversight and management. WISHH, acting through commercial agents CooperatiVE Business International [CBlj and ALI Logistics, imported and stored donated soy products and managed the commodity auction to ?nance the project. In addition, WISHH was responsible for soybean promotion, developing an oilseeds association, nutrition impact surveys, livestock feredlng trials, and for providing cooking seminars and support to bakeries. Shelter For Life org] undertook road and irrigation improvements, agriculture training, agriculture extension and microcredit. .- SALT International undertook the construction and management of the Afghan Soybean Factory (ASP) and the training of factory managers and staff. 0 I?ilaseeb Group the local partner in the SARAI project. Naseeb Group provided the land, building, staff, and a portion of the operating capital for the Afghan Soy Factory. ASAIWISHH proposes to convey the factory equipment to Naseeb Group at the end of project. i Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan paramoer undertook the distribution ofsoy flour to pregnant and lactating women. PARSA also piloted a soy-wheat ?our-baking project with 20 woman-owned bakeries. In 2013, PARSA also a55isted SFL and Naseeb Group to collect the soy ha NEst in Talthar. Nu?'ition and Education International was an original project partner along with SFL NEI withdrew from the project several months after the signing of the Master Agreement. This issue is discussed further in the project history below. Other participants and contractors in the project have included: a Cetena Group is an advertising ?rm contracted to conduct the soy promotion activity. 0 The Cutting Edge: conducted the nutrition study after the soy??our distribution, (led by a dietician}. Oil Crop Growers Association of Afghanistan (Di:ij is the Oil Crop EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 30 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 I Soybean production technical support and training Marketing assislence Establishment of an oilseed association - Establishment of a protein processing facility Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy a Cooking seminars and support to bakeriES II Nutrition impact surveys Iv Livestock feeding trials 0 Direct distribution of soy flour The tasks are divided among the partners as follows: I ASAIWISHH Www.wi5hh.orgi is a humanitarian initiative of the American Soybean Association, an important trade association of the U5. soy industry. ASA, acting through WISHH, undertook project oversight and management. WISHH, acting through commercial agents CooperatiVE Business International [CBlj and ALI Logistics, imported and stored donated soy products and managed the commodity auction to ?nance the project. In addition, WISHH was responsible for soybean promotion, developing an oilseeds association, nutrition impact surveys, livestock feredlng trials, and for providing cooking seminars and support to bakeries. Shelter For Life org] undertook road and irrigation improvements, agriculture training, agriculture extension and microcredit. .- SALT International undertook the construction and management of the Afghan Soybean Factory (ASP) and the training of factory managers and staff. 0 I?ilaseeb Group the local partner in the SARAI project. Naseeb Group provided the land, building, staff, and a portion of the operating capital for the Afghan Soy Factory. ASAIWISHH proposes to convey the factory equipment to Naseeb Group at the end of project. i Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan paramoer undertook the distribution ofsoy flour to pregnant and lactating women. PARSA also piloted a soy-wheat ?our-baking project with 20 woman-owned bakeries. In 2013, PARSA also a55isted SFL and Naseeb Group to collect the soy ha NEst in Talthar. Nu?'ition and Education International was an original project partner along with SFL NEI withdrew from the project several months after the signing of the Master Agreement. This issue is discussed further in the project history below. Other participants and contractors in the project have included: a Cetena Group is an advertising ?rm contracted to conduct the soy promotion activity. 0 The Cutting Edge: conducted the nutrition study after the soy??our distribution, (led by a dietician}. Oil Crop Growers Association of Afghanistan (Di:ij is the Oil Crop EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 30 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 I Soybean production technical support and training Marketing assislence Establishment of an oilseed association - Establishment of a protein processing facility Consumer awareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy a Cooking seminars and support to bakeriES II Nutrition impact surveys Iv Livestock feeding trials 0 Direct distribution of soy flour The tasks are divided among the partners as follows: I ASAIWISHH Www.wi5hh.orgi is a humanitarian initiative of the American Soybean Association, an important trade association of the U5. soy industry. ASA, acting through WISHH, undertook project oversight and management. WISHH, acting through commercial agents CooperatiVE Business International [CBlj and ALI Logistics, imported and stored donated soy products and managed the commodity auction to ?nance the project. In addition, WISHH was responsible for soybean promotion, developing an oilseeds association, nutrition impact surveys, livestock feredlng trials, and for providing cooking seminars and support to bakeries. Shelter For Life org] undertook road and irrigation improvements, agriculture training, agriculture extension and microcredit. .- SALT International undertook the construction and management of the Afghan Soybean Factory (ASP) and the training of factory managers and staff. 0 I?ilaseeb Group the local partner in the SARAI project. Naseeb Group provided the land, building, staff, and a portion of the operating capital for the Afghan Soy Factory. ASAIWISHH proposes to convey the factory equipment to Naseeb Group at the end of project. i Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for Afghanistan paramoer undertook the distribution ofsoy flour to pregnant and lactating women. PARSA also piloted a soy-wheat ?our-baking project with 20 woman-owned bakeries. In 2013, PARSA also a55isted SFL and Naseeb Group to collect the soy ha NEst in Talthar. Nu?'ition and Education International was an original project partner along with SFL NEI withdrew from the project several months after the signing of the Master Agreement. This issue is discussed further in the project history below. Other participants and contractors in the project have included: a Cetena Group is an advertising ?rm contracted to conduct the soy promotion activity. 0 The Cutting Edge: conducted the nutrition study after the soy??our distribution, (led by a dietician}. Oil Crop Growers Association of Afghanistan (Di:ij is the Oil Crop EnCompass LLC SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 30 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Fina! Report 030514 Growers Association of Afghanistan. The project sopports the assodation's promoting soy as one of many oilseed crops. I Coopera?Ve Business lntemational?Global is the agent who managed the monetization of the donated soybeans. 0 AU Logistics handled the storage of donated soybeans in Afghanistan. Project History: ASA leadership had conversations with NEI about growing soybeans in Afghanistan, leading to an interest in a project focused on a soybean production using the WISHH mechanism that has been funded by USDA since 2000. According to ASA staff, SFL approached ASA to partner on the project with ASA being the prime. This partnership seemed bene?cial as SFL already had existing U56 funded activities in Afghanistan. ASA, following discussions with USDA, decided to pursue the opportunity and on the entire soy value chain. To fund the projeot, ASA signed a sub?partner agreement with CBI in April 2010 to oversee the monetization of refined soy oil sourced from USDA Food for Progress Program. The Master Agreement was signed with USDA in September 2010 with a project end date of September so, 2013. Monetization: Delays in transshipping the donated supplies at the Pakistan border in late 2011 caused setbacks for project monetize tion, resulting in some soybean oil being off-loaded and sold in Dubai at a lower price than expected. Auctions occurred on the following dates: December 23, 2010, October 1, 2011r August 26, 2012, and November 13, 2012. According to interviews with {El and ASA, the monetization process resulted in higher funds than expected for the project Production: Per the original project design, NEI was to handle production, and SFL was tasked with the infrastructure aspect of the project {irrigation and road rehabilitation}. However, NEI withdrew from the project due to disagreements about the scope of the agreement and project implementation policies. Was to have ayerseen the soy production, cooking seminars, and direct distribution components for the project. After NEl's departure. ASA was without a partner for production approximately two months prior to the first planting season. The agriculture duties (agriculture extension and microcreditj were taken up by SFL ASA amended the suh~partner agreement with SFL in March 2011 to incorporate soy production into SFL's existing tasks under the project. One implication of this arrangement was that soybean production would occur in Takha r, clue in part to prior experience doing development work in the province. The ?rst planting occurred in June 2011 and the first harvest October 2011. Afghan Soy Factory; ASA signed a sub?pa rtner agreement with SALT on November 15, 2010, to oversee construction and operation of the soy factory. The original intention was for the soy factory to be Ioca ted in an industrial park in Kabul, however a land dispute with farmers and along with violent protests, compelled SALT to look for a new location. A USE staff member suggested that the factory be located in Mata r. The factory was completed in June 2011. The Naseeb lGroup provided the land and building for the factory. Cooking Seminars and Distribution: As noted above, NEI was originally intended to handle distribution and cooking seminars. Once NEI withdrew from the project, PARSA was brought into the partnership to manage soy-?our distribution and cooking seminars. In July 2011, ASA signed a subrpartner agreement with PARSA to: a} provide home cooking seminars and soy flour to pregnantflactating and vulnerable EnCompass LLC 1D I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 31 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Fina! Report 030514 Growers Association of Afghanistan. The project sopports the assodation's promoting soy as one of many oilseed crops. I Coopera?Ve Business lntemational?Global is the agent who managed the monetization of the donated soybeans. 0 AU Logistics handled the storage of donated soybeans in Afghanistan. Project History: ASA leadership had conversations with NEI about growing soybeans in Afghanistan, leading to an interest in a project focused on a soybean production using the WISHH mechanism that has been funded by USDA since 2000. According to ASA staff, SFL approached ASA to partner on the project with ASA being the prime. This partnership seemed bene?cial as SFL already had existing U56 funded activities in Afghanistan. ASA, following discussions with USDA, decided to pursue the opportunity and on the entire soy value chain. To fund the projeot, ASA signed a sub?partner agreement with CBI in April 2010 to oversee the monetization of refined soy oil sourced from USDA Food for Progress Program. The Master Agreement was signed with USDA in September 2010 with a project end date of September so, 2013. Monetization: Delays in transshipping the donated supplies at the Pakistan border in late 2011 caused setbacks for project monetize tion, resulting in some soybean oil being off-loaded and sold in Dubai at a lower price than expected. Auctions occurred on the following dates: December 23, 2010, October 1, 2011r August 26, 2012, and November 13, 2012. According to interviews with {El and ASA, the monetization process resulted in higher funds than expected for the project Production: Per the original project design, NEI was to handle production, and SFL was tasked with the infrastructure aspect of the project {irrigation and road rehabilitation}. However, NEI withdrew from the project due to disagreements about the scope of the agreement and project implementation policies. Was to have ayerseen the soy production, cooking seminars, and direct distribution components for the project. After NEl's departure. ASA was without a partner for production approximately two months prior to the first planting season. The agriculture duties (agriculture extension and microcreditj were taken up by SFL ASA amended the suh~partner agreement with SFL in March 2011 to incorporate soy production into SFL's existing tasks under the project. One implication of this arrangement was that soybean production would occur in Takha r, clue in part to prior experience doing development work in the province. The ?rst planting occurred in June 2011 and the first harvest October 2011. Afghan Soy Factory; ASA signed a sub?pa rtner agreement with SALT on November 15, 2010, to oversee construction and operation of the soy factory. The original intention was for the soy factory to be Ioca ted in an industrial park in Kabul, however a land dispute with farmers and along with violent protests, compelled SALT to look for a new location. A USE staff member suggested that the factory be located in Mata r. The factory was completed in June 2011. The Naseeb lGroup provided the land and building for the factory. Cooking Seminars and Distribution: As noted above, NEI was originally intended to handle distribution and cooking seminars. Once NEI withdrew from the project, PARSA was brought into the partnership to manage soy-?our distribution and cooking seminars. In July 2011, ASA signed a subrpartner agreement with PARSA to: a} provide home cooking seminars and soy flour to pregnantflactating and vulnerable EnCompass LLC 1D I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 31 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Fina! Report 030514 Growers Association of Afghanistan. The project sopports the assodation's promoting soy as one of many oilseed crops. I Coopera?Ve Business lntemational?Global is the agent who managed the monetization of the donated soybeans. 0 AU Logistics handled the storage of donated soybeans in Afghanistan. Project History: ASA leadership had conversations with NEI about growing soybeans in Afghanistan, leading to an interest in a project focused on a soybean production using the WISHH mechanism that has been funded by USDA since 2000. According to ASA staff, SFL approached ASA to partner on the project with ASA being the prime. This partnership seemed bene?cial as SFL already had existing U56 funded activities in Afghanistan. ASA, following discussions with USDA, decided to pursue the opportunity and on the entire soy value chain. To fund the projeot, ASA signed a sub?partner agreement with CBI in April 2010 to oversee the monetization of refined soy oil sourced from USDA Food for Progress Program. The Master Agreement was signed with USDA in September 2010 with a project end date of September so, 2013. Monetization: Delays in transshipping the donated supplies at the Pakistan border in late 2011 caused setbacks for project monetize tion, resulting in some soybean oil being off-loaded and sold in Dubai at a lower price than expected. Auctions occurred on the following dates: December 23, 2010, October 1, 2011r August 26, 2012, and November 13, 2012. According to interviews with {El and ASA, the monetization process resulted in higher funds than expected for the project Production: Per the original project design, NEI was to handle production, and SFL was tasked with the infrastructure aspect of the project {irrigation and road rehabilitation}. However, NEI withdrew from the project due to disagreements about the scope of the agreement and project implementation policies. Was to have ayerseen the soy production, cooking seminars, and direct distribution components for the project. After NEl's departure. ASA was without a partner for production approximately two months prior to the first planting season. The agriculture duties (agriculture extension and microcreditj were taken up by SFL ASA amended the suh~partner agreement with SFL in March 2011 to incorporate soy production into SFL's existing tasks under the project. One implication of this arrangement was that soybean production would occur in Takha r, clue in part to prior experience doing development work in the province. The ?rst planting occurred in June 2011 and the first harvest October 2011. Afghan Soy Factory; ASA signed a sub?pa rtner agreement with SALT on November 15, 2010, to oversee construction and operation of the soy factory. The original intention was for the soy factory to be Ioca ted in an industrial park in Kabul, however a land dispute with farmers and along with violent protests, compelled SALT to look for a new location. A USE staff member suggested that the factory be located in Mata r. The factory was completed in June 2011. The Naseeb lGroup provided the land and building for the factory. Cooking Seminars and Distribution: As noted above, NEI was originally intended to handle distribution and cooking seminars. Once NEI withdrew from the project, PARSA was brought into the partnership to manage soy-?our distribution and cooking seminars. In July 2011, ASA signed a subrpartner agreement with PARSA to: a} provide home cooking seminars and soy flour to pregnantflactating and vulnerable EnCompass LLC 1D I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 31 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Fina! Report 030514 Growers Association of Afghanistan. The project sopports the assodation's promoting soy as one of many oilseed crops. I Coopera?Ve Business lntemational?Global is the agent who managed the monetization of the donated soybeans. 0 AU Logistics handled the storage of donated soybeans in Afghanistan. Project History: ASA leadership had conversations with NEI about growing soybeans in Afghanistan, leading to an interest in a project focused on a soybean production using the WISHH mechanism that has been funded by USDA since 2000. According to ASA staff, SFL approached ASA to partner on the project with ASA being the prime. This partnership seemed bene?cial as SFL already had existing U56 funded activities in Afghanistan. ASA, following discussions with USDA, decided to pursue the opportunity and on the entire soy value chain. To fund the projeot, ASA signed a sub?partner agreement with CBI in April 2010 to oversee the monetization of refined soy oil sourced from USDA Food for Progress Program. The Master Agreement was signed with USDA in September 2010 with a project end date of September so, 2013. Monetization: Delays in transshipping the donated supplies at the Pakistan border in late 2011 caused setbacks for project monetize tion, resulting in some soybean oil being off-loaded and sold in Dubai at a lower price than expected. Auctions occurred on the following dates: December 23, 2010, October 1, 2011r August 26, 2012, and November 13, 2012. According to interviews with {El and ASA, the monetization process resulted in higher funds than expected for the project Production: Per the original project design, NEI was to handle production, and SFL was tasked with the infrastructure aspect of the project {irrigation and road rehabilitation}. However, NEI withdrew from the project due to disagreements about the scope of the agreement and project implementation policies. Was to have ayerseen the soy production, cooking seminars, and direct distribution components for the project. After NEl's departure. ASA was without a partner for production approximately two months prior to the first planting season. The agriculture duties (agriculture extension and microcreditj were taken up by SFL ASA amended the suh~partner agreement with SFL in March 2011 to incorporate soy production into SFL's existing tasks under the project. One implication of this arrangement was that soybean production would occur in Takha r, clue in part to prior experience doing development work in the province. The ?rst planting occurred in June 2011 and the first harvest October 2011. Afghan Soy Factory; ASA signed a sub?pa rtner agreement with SALT on November 15, 2010, to oversee construction and operation of the soy factory. The original intention was for the soy factory to be Ioca ted in an industrial park in Kabul, however a land dispute with farmers and along with violent protests, compelled SALT to look for a new location. A USE staff member suggested that the factory be located in Mata r. The factory was completed in June 2011. The Naseeb lGroup provided the land and building for the factory. Cooking Seminars and Distribution: As noted above, NEI was originally intended to handle distribution and cooking seminars. Once NEI withdrew from the project, PARSA was brought into the partnership to manage soy-?our distribution and cooking seminars. In July 2011, ASA signed a subrpartner agreement with PARSA to: a} provide home cooking seminars and soy flour to pregnantflactating and vulnerable EnCompass LLC 1D I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 31 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305114 Women; b} provide a winter ration to pregnant and lactating Women per annum over three yearsnutrition survey. Staffing: The first ASA in-eountry team leader was hired December 4 2010, and departed on November 15 2012. A new team leader, who alternated his time between the USA and Afghanistan, took over on February 1? 2013, and left his post on October 35 2013. A consulta nt, with the position title Team Leader, arrived in late October 2013 during data collection for this evaluation. The previOUS Deputy Director, an Afghan national, has been appointed as the ASA CountryI Director. A5. of this writing, ASA is currently negotiating an amendment with USDA for a no-cost extension of the project of one year, to December 2014. No extension past that date is being considered. A time-line for the project is presented in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Afghanistan of?te opened 'Sub partner agreement with SALTsigned ran?rotted ?'nrn p, project SFL subpanner agree men'r amended to include oreduction knighan Soy Factory complete Suhnal'tnar bub partner Mama m-dterm Project end date agree-man: N11 EBI aireement asseggme m; {one year extensor signed PAHSA signed under negotiation: 2010 2013 Master Agreement First planting Second planting Third planting signed with USDA Second untn; Direclnr 1.1 parts External i'lrxt Country evaluation Director deoarts EnCompass 11 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 32 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305114 Women; b} provide a winter ration to pregnant and lactating Women per annum over three yearsnutrition survey. Staffing: The first ASA in-eountry team leader was hired December 4 2010, and departed on November 15 2012. A new team leader, who alternated his time between the USA and Afghanistan, took over on February 1? 2013, and left his post on October 35 2013. A consulta nt, with the position title Team Leader, arrived in late October 2013 during data collection for this evaluation. The previOUS Deputy Director, an Afghan national, has been appointed as the ASA CountryI Director. A5. of this writing, ASA is currently negotiating an amendment with USDA for a no-cost extension of the project of one year, to December 2014. No extension past that date is being considered. A time-line for the project is presented in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Afghanistan of?te opened 'Sub partner agreement with SALTsigned ran?rotted ?'nrn p, project SFL subpanner agree men'r amended to include oreduction knighan Soy Factory complete Suhnal'tnar bub partner Mama m-dterm Project end date agree-man: N11 EBI aireement asseggme m; {one year extensor signed PAHSA signed under negotiation: 2010 2013 Master Agreement First planting Second planting Third planting signed with USDA Second untn; Direclnr 1.1 parts External i'lrxt Country evaluation Director deoarts EnCompass 11 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 32 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305114 Women; b} provide a winter ration to pregnant and lactating Women per annum over three yearsnutrition survey. Staffing: The first ASA in-eountry team leader was hired December 4 2010, and departed on November 15 2012. A new team leader, who alternated his time between the USA and Afghanistan, took over on February 1? 2013, and left his post on October 35 2013. A consulta nt, with the position title Team Leader, arrived in late October 2013 during data collection for this evaluation. The previOUS Deputy Director, an Afghan national, has been appointed as the ASA CountryI Director. A5. of this writing, ASA is currently negotiating an amendment with USDA for a no-cost extension of the project of one year, to December 2014. No extension past that date is being considered. A time-line for the project is presented in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Afghanistan of?te opened 'Sub partner agreement with SALTsigned ran?rotted ?'nrn p, project SFL subpanner agree men'r amended to include oreduction knighan Soy Factory complete Suhnal'tnar bub partner Mama m-dterm Project end date agree-man: N11 EBI aireement asseggme m; {one year extensor signed PAHSA signed under negotiation: 2010 2013 Master Agreement First planting Second planting Third planting signed with USDA Second untn; Direclnr 1.1 parts External i'lrxt Country evaluation Director deoarts EnCompass 11 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 32 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305114 Women; b} provide a winter ration to pregnant and lactating Women per annum over three yearsnutrition survey. Staffing: The first ASA in-eountry team leader was hired December 4 2010, and departed on November 15 2012. A new team leader, who alternated his time between the USA and Afghanistan, took over on February 1? 2013, and left his post on October 35 2013. A consulta nt, with the position title Team Leader, arrived in late October 2013 during data collection for this evaluation. The previOUS Deputy Director, an Afghan national, has been appointed as the ASA CountryI Director. A5. of this writing, ASA is currently negotiating an amendment with USDA for a no-cost extension of the project of one year, to December 2014. No extension past that date is being considered. A time-line for the project is presented in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1: Project Timeline with Key Events Highlighted Afghanistan of?te opened 'Sub partner agreement with SALTsigned ran?rotted ?'nrn p, project SFL subpanner agree men'r amended to include oreduction knighan Soy Factory complete Suhnal'tnar bub partner Mama m-dterm Project end date agree-man: N11 EBI aireement asseggme m; {one year extensor signed PAHSA signed under negotiation: 2010 2013 Master Agreement First planting Second planting Third planting signed with USDA Second untn; Direclnr 1.1 parts External i'lrxt Country evaluation Director deoarts EnCompass 11 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 32 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 2 Evaluation Design and Methodology The evaluation design and methodology were developed following consultation with and approval by ASAMBHH and USDNFAS. Due to time and budget limits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMEHH and USHIDIFAS, did not include all project activities mentioned in the original Statement of Work, and some proiect activities were given lower priority. This mid-term evaluation does not Include an auditF which USDAIFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the ability to reach some key sources of information. 2.1 Evaluation Questions The questions that frame the evaluation are outlined in Exhibit 2 below. Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions The me Evaluation Questions Project designf?pprooch 1. To what extent does SAHAI design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? Project implementation 2. To what extent have SARAI interventions been effectiver implemented? a. To what extent do and partners have the right staffing patterns, management structures. and communication strategies in place? b. To what extent are ASNWISHH and partners conduoting monitoring and evaluationr in line with contract require me nts, and in context of overall SUCCESSBS of meeting the objectives of creating, a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? c. What lessons have been learned that might improve project implementation in the future, with a primary focus on creating a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? Contribution 3. To what extent have the project interventions been effective in meeting stated objectives and contributng to expected impacts? ofproduction Ill. What can be expected to be the long?term results ofthe ASMWISHH and iocoi processing ejjforts intervention? a. What does look like for key stakeholders? b. To what extent do perceptions of sustainabilltv align benveen key stakeholders? USDMFAS. Headquarters, ?eld. partners, beneficiaries] c. What are the pathways to sustainability? . What has been learned thus far to capitalize on opportunities for improving sustains Ioilitv? 5. What are the lessons learned from SARAI that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in simiiar interventions in the future? System and context of the 6. What influences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or EARN project constrained program implementationfresults? a. What is in?uencing bene?ciary, {with a focus on crop rotation} decisions on the ground? A full evaluation questions matrix [which includes sub-questions, illustrative measures of success, and data collection strategy] is available in Appendix 3. EnCompass LLC 12 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 33 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 2 Evaluation Design and Methodology The evaluation design and methodology were developed following consultation with and approval by ASAMBHH and USDNFAS. Due to time and budget limits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMEHH and USHIDIFAS, did not include all project activities mentioned in the original Statement of Work, and some proiect activities were given lower priority. This mid-term evaluation does not Include an auditF which USDAIFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the ability to reach some key sources of information. 2.1 Evaluation Questions The questions that frame the evaluation are outlined in Exhibit 2 below. Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions The me Evaluation Questions Project designf?pprooch 1. To what extent does SAHAI design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? Project implementation 2. To what extent have SARAI interventions been effectiver implemented? a. To what extent do and partners have the right staffing patterns, management structures. and communication strategies in place? b. To what extent are ASNWISHH and partners conduoting monitoring and evaluationr in line with contract require me nts, and in context of overall SUCCESSBS of meeting the objectives of creating, a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? c. What lessons have been learned that might improve project implementation in the future, with a primary focus on creating a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? Contribution 3. To what extent have the project interventions been effective in meeting stated objectives and contributng to expected impacts? ofproduction Ill. What can be expected to be the long?term results ofthe ASMWISHH and iocoi processing ejjforts intervention? a. What does look like for key stakeholders? b. To what extent do perceptions of sustainabilltv align benveen key stakeholders? USDMFAS. Headquarters, ?eld. partners, beneficiaries] c. What are the pathways to sustainability? . What has been learned thus far to capitalize on opportunities for improving sustains Ioilitv? 5. What are the lessons learned from SARAI that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in simiiar interventions in the future? System and context of the 6. What influences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or EARN project constrained program implementationfresults? a. What is in?uencing bene?ciary, {with a focus on crop rotation} decisions on the ground? A full evaluation questions matrix [which includes sub-questions, illustrative measures of success, and data collection strategy] is available in Appendix 3. EnCompass LLC 12 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 33 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 2 Evaluation Design and Methodology The evaluation design and methodology were developed following consultation with and approval by ASAMBHH and USDNFAS. Due to time and budget limits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMEHH and USHIDIFAS, did not include all project activities mentioned in the original Statement of Work, and some proiect activities were given lower priority. This mid-term evaluation does not Include an auditF which USDAIFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the ability to reach some key sources of information. 2.1 Evaluation Questions The questions that frame the evaluation are outlined in Exhibit 2 below. Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions The me Evaluation Questions Project designf?pprooch 1. To what extent does SAHAI design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? Project implementation 2. To what extent have SARAI interventions been effectiver implemented? a. To what extent do and partners have the right staffing patterns, management structures. and communication strategies in place? b. To what extent are ASNWISHH and partners conduoting monitoring and evaluationr in line with contract require me nts, and in context of overall SUCCESSBS of meeting the objectives of creating, a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? c. What lessons have been learned that might improve project implementation in the future, with a primary focus on creating a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? Contribution 3. To what extent have the project interventions been effective in meeting stated objectives and contributng to expected impacts? ofproduction Ill. What can be expected to be the long?term results ofthe ASMWISHH and iocoi processing ejjforts intervention? a. What does look like for key stakeholders? b. To what extent do perceptions of sustainabilltv align benveen key stakeholders? USDMFAS. Headquarters, ?eld. partners, beneficiaries] c. What are the pathways to sustainability? . What has been learned thus far to capitalize on opportunities for improving sustains Ioilitv? 5. What are the lessons learned from SARAI that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in simiiar interventions in the future? System and context of the 6. What influences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or EARN project constrained program implementationfresults? a. What is in?uencing bene?ciary, {with a focus on crop rotation} decisions on the ground? A full evaluation questions matrix [which includes sub-questions, illustrative measures of success, and data collection strategy] is available in Appendix 3. EnCompass LLC 12 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 33 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 2 Evaluation Design and Methodology The evaluation design and methodology were developed following consultation with and approval by ASAMBHH and USDNFAS. Due to time and budget limits, the evaluation design, as agreed with ASAMEHH and USHIDIFAS, did not include all project activities mentioned in the original Statement of Work, and some proiect activities were given lower priority. This mid-term evaluation does not Include an auditF which USDAIFAS intends to do in 2014. Time and resource constraints also limited the ability to reach some key sources of information. 2.1 Evaluation Questions The questions that frame the evaluation are outlined in Exhibit 2 below. Exhibit 2: Evaluation Questions The me Evaluation Questions Project designf?pprooch 1. To what extent does SAHAI design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? Project implementation 2. To what extent have SARAI interventions been effectiver implemented? a. To what extent do and partners have the right staffing patterns, management structures. and communication strategies in place? b. To what extent are ASNWISHH and partners conduoting monitoring and evaluationr in line with contract require me nts, and in context of overall SUCCESSBS of meeting the objectives of creating, a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? c. What lessons have been learned that might improve project implementation in the future, with a primary focus on creating a sustainable Afghanistan soybean value chain? Contribution 3. To what extent have the project interventions been effective in meeting stated objectives and contributng to expected impacts? ofproduction Ill. What can be expected to be the long?term results ofthe ASMWISHH and iocoi processing ejjforts intervention? a. What does look like for key stakeholders? b. To what extent do perceptions of sustainabilltv align benveen key stakeholders? USDMFAS. Headquarters, ?eld. partners, beneficiaries] c. What are the pathways to sustainability? . What has been learned thus far to capitalize on opportunities for improving sustains Ioilitv? 5. What are the lessons learned from SARAI that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in simiiar interventions in the future? System and context of the 6. What influences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or EARN project constrained program implementationfresults? a. What is in?uencing bene?ciary, {with a focus on crop rotation} decisions on the ground? A full evaluation questions matrix [which includes sub-questions, illustrative measures of success, and data collection strategy] is available in Appendix 3. EnCompass LLC 12 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 33 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 2.2 Methodology This section summarizes the methodological approach undertaken to respond to the evaluation questions A fuller description of the methodology can be found in Appendix 4. The evaluation team collected primary qualitative data using a variety of methods: document review, semirstructured interviews, site visits, and Data collection tools were developed prior to Appendix 5 contains a sample data collection protocol used in this evaluation. A team of three evaluators undertook fieldwork, one in the United States, and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the United States focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project history, working relationships among partners, and monitoring and evaluation [M?iEi issues. The field team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over 1? days [October 26 to November 11, 2013] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Kabul. The team visited project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and markets, and interviewed management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non-government agencies. The field team looked most closely at implementation issues and measures of success. Interviews: The evaluation team conducted individual and group interviewa in various formal and informal settings including over the telephone, village discussions, market visits, and breakfast and dinner meetings. A full list of data collection participants is available in Appendix 4. were undertaken in villages in Balkh and Kunduz provinces, factories in Mazar and Kunduz cities, Warehouse 2 soy storage facility in Ma zar city, a poultry farm, and markets in variousiocatlonsl Document Review: The evaluation team worked with ASAIWISHH and partners to obtain and review the most appropriate set of documents from all relevant sources. Decurnents that were reviewed are listed in Appendix 4. An explanation of how the qualitative data is presented in this report can also be found in Appendix ii. 2.3 Exclusions and Limitations The Scope of Work [Appendix 1] and the Evaluation Design approved by ASAMISHH and USDAIFAS (Appendix 2 and 3} detail the key activities of this evaluation. A key aspect of the participatory evaluation design process was to prioritize the evaluation areas of focus. Because of this process, the following areas were deemed lower priority, and hence not focused on in the evaluation: II Review of monetize tion procedures was excluded entirely a Road construction and irrigation work was downgraded in importance 0 Financial review was excluded entirely i Commodity storage was downgraded in importance The evaluation team attempted, but was unable to schedule interviews with the followmg stakeholders: The ?rst ASAIWISHH Country Director I Previous SARAI agronomists who had worked for SFL 0 Former Senior Analyst, Of?ce of Capacity Building and Development, USDAIFAS (involved in the EnCompass LLC 13 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 34 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 2.2 Methodology This section summarizes the methodological approach undertaken to respond to the evaluation questions A fuller description of the methodology can be found in Appendix 4. The evaluation team collected primary qualitative data using a variety of methods: document review, semirstructured interviews, site visits, and Data collection tools were developed prior to Appendix 5 contains a sample data collection protocol used in this evaluation. A team of three evaluators undertook fieldwork, one in the United States, and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the United States focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project history, working relationships among partners, and monitoring and evaluation [M?iEi issues. The field team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over 1? days [October 26 to November 11, 2013] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Kabul. The team visited project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and markets, and interviewed management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non-government agencies. The field team looked most closely at implementation issues and measures of success. Interviews: The evaluation team conducted individual and group interviewa in various formal and informal settings including over the telephone, village discussions, market visits, and breakfast and dinner meetings. A full list of data collection participants is available in Appendix 4. were undertaken in villages in Balkh and Kunduz provinces, factories in Mazar and Kunduz cities, Warehouse 2 soy storage facility in Ma zar city, a poultry farm, and markets in variousiocatlonsl Document Review: The evaluation team worked with ASAIWISHH and partners to obtain and review the most appropriate set of documents from all relevant sources. Decurnents that were reviewed are listed in Appendix 4. An explanation of how the qualitative data is presented in this report can also be found in Appendix ii. 2.3 Exclusions and Limitations The Scope of Work [Appendix 1] and the Evaluation Design approved by ASAMISHH and USDAIFAS (Appendix 2 and 3} detail the key activities of this evaluation. A key aspect of the participatory evaluation design process was to prioritize the evaluation areas of focus. Because of this process, the following areas were deemed lower priority, and hence not focused on in the evaluation: II Review of monetize tion procedures was excluded entirely a Road construction and irrigation work was downgraded in importance 0 Financial review was excluded entirely i Commodity storage was downgraded in importance The evaluation team attempted, but was unable to schedule interviews with the followmg stakeholders: The ?rst ASAIWISHH Country Director I Previous SARAI agronomists who had worked for SFL 0 Former Senior Analyst, Of?ce of Capacity Building and Development, USDAIFAS (involved in the EnCompass LLC 13 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 34 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 2.2 Methodology This section summarizes the methodological approach undertaken to respond to the evaluation questions A fuller description of the methodology can be found in Appendix 4. The evaluation team collected primary qualitative data using a variety of methods: document review, semirstructured interviews, site visits, and Data collection tools were developed prior to Appendix 5 contains a sample data collection protocol used in this evaluation. A team of three evaluators undertook fieldwork, one in the United States, and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the United States focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project history, working relationships among partners, and monitoring and evaluation [M?iEi issues. The field team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over 1? days [October 26 to November 11, 2013] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Kabul. The team visited project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and markets, and interviewed management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non-government agencies. The field team looked most closely at implementation issues and measures of success. Interviews: The evaluation team conducted individual and group interviewa in various formal and informal settings including over the telephone, village discussions, market visits, and breakfast and dinner meetings. A full list of data collection participants is available in Appendix 4. were undertaken in villages in Balkh and Kunduz provinces, factories in Mazar and Kunduz cities, Warehouse 2 soy storage facility in Ma zar city, a poultry farm, and markets in variousiocatlonsl Document Review: The evaluation team worked with ASAIWISHH and partners to obtain and review the most appropriate set of documents from all relevant sources. Decurnents that were reviewed are listed in Appendix 4. An explanation of how the qualitative data is presented in this report can also be found in Appendix ii. 2.3 Exclusions and Limitations The Scope of Work [Appendix 1] and the Evaluation Design approved by ASAMISHH and USDAIFAS (Appendix 2 and 3} detail the key activities of this evaluation. A key aspect of the participatory evaluation design process was to prioritize the evaluation areas of focus. Because of this process, the following areas were deemed lower priority, and hence not focused on in the evaluation: II Review of monetize tion procedures was excluded entirely a Road construction and irrigation work was downgraded in importance 0 Financial review was excluded entirely i Commodity storage was downgraded in importance The evaluation team attempted, but was unable to schedule interviews with the followmg stakeholders: The ?rst ASAIWISHH Country Director I Previous SARAI agronomists who had worked for SFL 0 Former Senior Analyst, Of?ce of Capacity Building and Development, USDAIFAS (involved in the EnCompass LLC 13 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 34 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 2.2 Methodology This section summarizes the methodological approach undertaken to respond to the evaluation questions A fuller description of the methodology can be found in Appendix 4. The evaluation team collected primary qualitative data using a variety of methods: document review, semirstructured interviews, site visits, and Data collection tools were developed prior to Appendix 5 contains a sample data collection protocol used in this evaluation. A team of three evaluators undertook fieldwork, one in the United States, and two in Afghanistan. Data collection in the United States focused on in-person and telephone interviews with key actors, and review of background documents to understand project history, working relationships among partners, and monitoring and evaluation [M?iEi issues. The field team conducted data collection in Afghanistan over 1? days [October 26 to November 11, 2013] in Takhar, Kunduz, Mazar, and Kabul. The team visited project sites, production sites, reconstruction sites, and markets, and interviewed management and staff of the partner agencies and others, government of?cers, farmers, and staff of non-government agencies. The field team looked most closely at implementation issues and measures of success. Interviews: The evaluation team conducted individual and group interviewa in various formal and informal settings including over the telephone, village discussions, market visits, and breakfast and dinner meetings. A full list of data collection participants is available in Appendix 4. were undertaken in villages in Balkh and Kunduz provinces, factories in Mazar and Kunduz cities, Warehouse 2 soy storage facility in Ma zar city, a poultry farm, and markets in variousiocatlonsl Document Review: The evaluation team worked with ASAIWISHH and partners to obtain and review the most appropriate set of documents from all relevant sources. Decurnents that were reviewed are listed in Appendix 4. An explanation of how the qualitative data is presented in this report can also be found in Appendix ii. 2.3 Exclusions and Limitations The Scope of Work [Appendix 1] and the Evaluation Design approved by ASAMISHH and USDAIFAS (Appendix 2 and 3} detail the key activities of this evaluation. A key aspect of the participatory evaluation design process was to prioritize the evaluation areas of focus. Because of this process, the following areas were deemed lower priority, and hence not focused on in the evaluation: II Review of monetize tion procedures was excluded entirely a Road construction and irrigation work was downgraded in importance 0 Financial review was excluded entirely i Commodity storage was downgraded in importance The evaluation team attempted, but was unable to schedule interviews with the followmg stakeholders: The ?rst ASAIWISHH Country Director I Previous SARAI agronomists who had worked for SFL 0 Former Senior Analyst, Of?ce of Capacity Building and Development, USDAIFAS (involved in the EnCompass LLC 13 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 34 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project at inception] Time, security, and resource constraints precluded the following visits that could have been useful for the evaluation: In all regions: Interview:. with large numbers of farmer participants and with non-participant controls were not possible because of the small budget allotted to fieldwork. In Mazar: I Som'zadd Co: An example of a commercial oil press I Doiryform: Dairy farms are not ordering soy meal but chicken farms are. Feed trials were conducted at dairy farms. Feed trials were conducted at poultry fa and a poultry farm was Ivisited during data collection In Kabul Cetana: Contracted to do ma rketing and messaging for soyI food and soy feed. I ACE project: USAID supported oilseed investments ASMED supported oilseed investments. Also did say assessment EnComp ass LLC 14 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 35 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project at inception] Time, security, and resource constraints precluded the following visits that could have been useful for the evaluation: In all regions: Interview:. with large numbers of farmer participants and with non-participant controls were not possible because of the small budget allotted to fieldwork. In Mazar: I Som'zadd Co: An example of a commercial oil press I Doiryform: Dairy farms are not ordering soy meal but chicken farms are. Feed trials were conducted at dairy farms. Feed trials were conducted at poultry fa and a poultry farm was Ivisited during data collection In Kabul Cetana: Contracted to do ma rketing and messaging for soyI food and soy feed. I ACE project: USAID supported oilseed investments ASMED supported oilseed investments. Also did say assessment EnComp ass LLC 14 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 35 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project at inception] Time, security, and resource constraints precluded the following visits that could have been useful for the evaluation: In all regions: Interview:. with large numbers of farmer participants and with non-participant controls were not possible because of the small budget allotted to fieldwork. In Mazar: I Som'zadd Co: An example of a commercial oil press I Doiryform: Dairy farms are not ordering soy meal but chicken farms are. Feed trials were conducted at dairy farms. Feed trials were conducted at poultry fa and a poultry farm was Ivisited during data collection In Kabul Cetana: Contracted to do ma rketing and messaging for soyI food and soy feed. I ACE project: USAID supported oilseed investments ASMED supported oilseed investments. Also did say assessment EnComp ass LLC 14 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 35 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project at inception] Time, security, and resource constraints precluded the following visits that could have been useful for the evaluation: In all regions: Interview:. with large numbers of farmer participants and with non-participant controls were not possible because of the small budget allotted to fieldwork. In Mazar: I Som'zadd Co: An example of a commercial oil press I Doiryform: Dairy farms are not ordering soy meal but chicken farms are. Feed trials were conducted at dairy farms. Feed trials were conducted at poultry fa and a poultry farm was Ivisited during data collection In Kabul Cetana: Contracted to do ma rketing and messaging for soyI food and soy feed. I ACE project: USAID supported oilseed investments ASMED supported oilseed investments. Also did say assessment EnComp ass LLC 14 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 35 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3 FINDINGS 3.1 The Challenges of Development Work in Afghanistan it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number ofsigni?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the ?uid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Some of the challenges the project faced were: a Security challenges that often prevented SFL from entering into production areas I Constant security threats that resulted in an ongoing high pressu refstress work environment; SFL staff faced three abduction threats, and wore at times met with gun-wielding farmers when they went to check on whether farmers utilized input bundles I Security issues at the indestrial park in Kabul where the factory was to be originally construoted resulted in the need to find a new location Gender disparities meant that it was dif?cult for Women to attend training and pick Up input bundles - Government resistance to the introduction of soy seeds with a quicker maturity 3.2 Production 1. Soy produotion has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical ?nding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. 3 The project?s MELE data substantiates that farmers 3" in response to this ?nding. ASA noted the following: It takes at least 5?7 years to successfully introduce a new crop. This is especially true with illiterate, small, subsistence farmers that have been targeted in Afghanistan. in the absence of knowledge of soybean production by the EARN farmers, they and the SFL agronomists [who also did have experience with soybean production} resorted to planting the soybean crop in the same manner as they planted cotton on the raised ridges. Targeted farmers knew this method and it was successful for cotton why not soybea ns? SARAI has had only two full production seasons. 2012 and 2013. IOnly approximately 900 farmers were able to plant in 2011 because of the seed situation as outlined further below. Moreover, early snows came the. last week in September in 2011 causing substantial crop loss. The Stine 3300 is a 120-130 day crop and the season in Takhar isjust too- shortI and especially if winter weather comes early. This was a bad experience for first time farmers with a brand new crop that was being introduced. This situation contributed to the fact that more of the 2011 farmers did not plant in 2012 they had Just seen their neighbors lose their crop to early snows; why would they plant the same crop in 2012? There is no crop insurance in Afghanistan to mitigate crop rislr. so when farmers lose the income from a crop; it is a very serious situation. This planting method resulted in a low plant population density Iwhich in turn leads to fewer pods, feWer beans and low yields. Low yields contir'ILre to be a problem becaute of issues with plant population density and this is one of the issues to be acid raged in the 2014 planting season. In 2014 ASA's aim is to develop a means of mechanical planting that would increase plant populations. which is critical to acceptable yields SARAI agronomists have been working in the field to identify and promote the most effective methods for soybean cultivation but this takes time lots of time. In 2013 ASA had ?eld trials that used raised beds, broad cast planting. and row planting. The results of these plots are still being determined so that in 2014 the most effective planting method can be used. in addition. even though field trials may demonstrate higher yields for a planting method. there is no guarantee in the field that the farmers will adopt this method. Adoption of new farming practices comes when farmers can see the success in the fields for themselves. EnCompass LLC 15 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 36 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3 FINDINGS 3.1 The Challenges of Development Work in Afghanistan it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number ofsigni?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the ?uid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Some of the challenges the project faced were: a Security challenges that often prevented SFL from entering into production areas I Constant security threats that resulted in an ongoing high pressu refstress work environment; SFL staff faced three abduction threats, and wore at times met with gun-wielding farmers when they went to check on whether farmers utilized input bundles I Security issues at the indestrial park in Kabul where the factory was to be originally construoted resulted in the need to find a new location Gender disparities meant that it was dif?cult for Women to attend training and pick Up input bundles - Government resistance to the introduction of soy seeds with a quicker maturity 3.2 Production 1. Soy produotion has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical ?nding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. 3 The project?s MELE data substantiates that farmers 3" in response to this ?nding. ASA noted the following: It takes at least 5?7 years to successfully introduce a new crop. This is especially true with illiterate, small, subsistence farmers that have been targeted in Afghanistan. in the absence of knowledge of soybean production by the EARN farmers, they and the SFL agronomists [who also did have experience with soybean production} resorted to planting the soybean crop in the same manner as they planted cotton on the raised ridges. Targeted farmers knew this method and it was successful for cotton why not soybea ns? SARAI has had only two full production seasons. 2012 and 2013. IOnly approximately 900 farmers were able to plant in 2011 because of the seed situation as outlined further below. Moreover, early snows came the. last week in September in 2011 causing substantial crop loss. The Stine 3300 is a 120-130 day crop and the season in Takhar isjust too- shortI and especially if winter weather comes early. This was a bad experience for first time farmers with a brand new crop that was being introduced. This situation contributed to the fact that more of the 2011 farmers did not plant in 2012 they had Just seen their neighbors lose their crop to early snows; why would they plant the same crop in 2012? There is no crop insurance in Afghanistan to mitigate crop rislr. so when farmers lose the income from a crop; it is a very serious situation. This planting method resulted in a low plant population density Iwhich in turn leads to fewer pods, feWer beans and low yields. Low yields contir'ILre to be a problem becaute of issues with plant population density and this is one of the issues to be acid raged in the 2014 planting season. In 2014 ASA's aim is to develop a means of mechanical planting that would increase plant populations. which is critical to acceptable yields SARAI agronomists have been working in the field to identify and promote the most effective methods for soybean cultivation but this takes time lots of time. In 2013 ASA had ?eld trials that used raised beds, broad cast planting. and row planting. The results of these plots are still being determined so that in 2014 the most effective planting method can be used. in addition. even though field trials may demonstrate higher yields for a planting method. there is no guarantee in the field that the farmers will adopt this method. Adoption of new farming practices comes when farmers can see the success in the fields for themselves. EnCompass LLC 15 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 36 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3 FINDINGS 3.1 The Challenges of Development Work in Afghanistan it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number ofsigni?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the ?uid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Some of the challenges the project faced were: a Security challenges that often prevented SFL from entering into production areas I Constant security threats that resulted in an ongoing high pressu refstress work environment; SFL staff faced three abduction threats, and wore at times met with gun-wielding farmers when they went to check on whether farmers utilized input bundles I Security issues at the indestrial park in Kabul where the factory was to be originally construoted resulted in the need to find a new location Gender disparities meant that it was dif?cult for Women to attend training and pick Up input bundles - Government resistance to the introduction of soy seeds with a quicker maturity 3.2 Production 1. Soy produotion has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical ?nding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. 3 The project?s MELE data substantiates that farmers 3" in response to this ?nding. ASA noted the following: It takes at least 5?7 years to successfully introduce a new crop. This is especially true with illiterate, small, subsistence farmers that have been targeted in Afghanistan. in the absence of knowledge of soybean production by the EARN farmers, they and the SFL agronomists [who also did have experience with soybean production} resorted to planting the soybean crop in the same manner as they planted cotton on the raised ridges. Targeted farmers knew this method and it was successful for cotton why not soybea ns? SARAI has had only two full production seasons. 2012 and 2013. IOnly approximately 900 farmers were able to plant in 2011 because of the seed situation as outlined further below. Moreover, early snows came the. last week in September in 2011 causing substantial crop loss. The Stine 3300 is a 120-130 day crop and the season in Takhar isjust too- shortI and especially if winter weather comes early. This was a bad experience for first time farmers with a brand new crop that was being introduced. This situation contributed to the fact that more of the 2011 farmers did not plant in 2012 they had Just seen their neighbors lose their crop to early snows; why would they plant the same crop in 2012? There is no crop insurance in Afghanistan to mitigate crop rislr. so when farmers lose the income from a crop; it is a very serious situation. This planting method resulted in a low plant population density Iwhich in turn leads to fewer pods, feWer beans and low yields. Low yields contir'ILre to be a problem becaute of issues with plant population density and this is one of the issues to be acid raged in the 2014 planting season. In 2014 ASA's aim is to develop a means of mechanical planting that would increase plant populations. which is critical to acceptable yields SARAI agronomists have been working in the field to identify and promote the most effective methods for soybean cultivation but this takes time lots of time. In 2013 ASA had ?eld trials that used raised beds, broad cast planting. and row planting. The results of these plots are still being determined so that in 2014 the most effective planting method can be used. in addition. even though field trials may demonstrate higher yields for a planting method. there is no guarantee in the field that the farmers will adopt this method. Adoption of new farming practices comes when farmers can see the success in the fields for themselves. EnCompass LLC 15 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 36 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3 FINDINGS 3.1 The Challenges of Development Work in Afghanistan it is important to note at the outset that the evaluation data revealed a number ofsigni?cant challenges the project faced in undertaking development work in a conflict zone. The challenges noted contributed to the need for the project to adapt and react to the ?uid situation on the ground and directly affected project results. Some of the challenges the project faced were: a Security challenges that often prevented SFL from entering into production areas I Constant security threats that resulted in an ongoing high pressu refstress work environment; SFL staff faced three abduction threats, and wore at times met with gun-wielding farmers when they went to check on whether farmers utilized input bundles I Security issues at the indestrial park in Kabul where the factory was to be originally construoted resulted in the need to find a new location Gender disparities meant that it was dif?cult for Women to attend training and pick Up input bundles - Government resistance to the introduction of soy seeds with a quicker maturity 3.2 Production 1. Soy produotion has been signi?cantly short of SARAI project goals. This is a critical ?nding that impacts all other elements of the value chain. 3 The project?s MELE data substantiates that farmers 3" in response to this ?nding. ASA noted the following: It takes at least 5?7 years to successfully introduce a new crop. This is especially true with illiterate, small, subsistence farmers that have been targeted in Afghanistan. in the absence of knowledge of soybean production by the EARN farmers, they and the SFL agronomists [who also did have experience with soybean production} resorted to planting the soybean crop in the same manner as they planted cotton on the raised ridges. Targeted farmers knew this method and it was successful for cotton why not soybea ns? SARAI has had only two full production seasons. 2012 and 2013. IOnly approximately 900 farmers were able to plant in 2011 because of the seed situation as outlined further below. Moreover, early snows came the. last week in September in 2011 causing substantial crop loss. The Stine 3300 is a 120-130 day crop and the season in Takhar isjust too- shortI and especially if winter weather comes early. This was a bad experience for first time farmers with a brand new crop that was being introduced. This situation contributed to the fact that more of the 2011 farmers did not plant in 2012 they had Just seen their neighbors lose their crop to early snows; why would they plant the same crop in 2012? There is no crop insurance in Afghanistan to mitigate crop rislr. so when farmers lose the income from a crop; it is a very serious situation. This planting method resulted in a low plant population density Iwhich in turn leads to fewer pods, feWer beans and low yields. Low yields contir'ILre to be a problem becaute of issues with plant population density and this is one of the issues to be acid raged in the 2014 planting season. In 2014 ASA's aim is to develop a means of mechanical planting that would increase plant populations. which is critical to acceptable yields SARAI agronomists have been working in the field to identify and promote the most effective methods for soybean cultivation but this takes time lots of time. In 2013 ASA had ?eld trials that used raised beds, broad cast planting. and row planting. The results of these plots are still being determined so that in 2014 the most effective planting method can be used. in addition. even though field trials may demonstrate higher yields for a planting method. there is no guarantee in the field that the farmers will adopt this method. Adoption of new farming practices comes when farmers can see the success in the fields for themselves. EnCompass LLC 15 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 36 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305'14 have not adopted soybeans. According to information sopplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harVest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw rnaterials.?1 Historical data show that farmers who have participated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept me input packages are reported to eat the seed and use the ferti i2er for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high cost of production and low yields. Since the inception of the project, SFL has provided training to 13,000 farmers and input packages to 10,324 farmers to grow soy. However, fewer than 100 replanted in 2013 in the absonce of direrzt production credit or the promise of future irrigation im proVementh it is important to be transparent about how this estimate Was derived. According to interviews and data provided by SFL, TD farmers requested seed inputs in the second year of replanting, and of those, 20 returned the inputs. Thus the estimate is based on farmers who have interacted with SFL for inputs in the second yea r. it is possible that farmers have replanted without the project's knowledge. During with SFL, it was also noted that some farmers might not be reporting replanting numbers due to the mistaken notion that they are obligated to sell to the soybean factory, whereas they might want to keep the harvest to themselves for animal feed. The evaluation team did not have the resources to quantify these claims. Exhibita provides summary intervention and production data for the project. In Talthar, farmers who do plant soy hava experienced average yields ranging from 35.4kg?erib (Dashti Gala, 2011} to 130.5l-cgfjerib [Dashti Qala, 2013f: Unfortunately, a ny change in crop prod uction methods (planting. cultivation, weedfinsect control, irrigation, etc.} from what farmers have previously used and trust takesa full year to investigate - a crop takes almosta year from distribution of inpuo to harvest, It also takes time for farmers to ado pt new planting methods and new cultivation techniques. These farmers have income only from their crops and if they fail. their families could starve so one can see why is rmers are cautioua about adopting new crops and new farming practices - they barre a lot at stake. Problems with Weeding and insect control were also totally new to these farmers and agronomists and solving those problEms will also take time. i The ?gure of was given to the evaluatlon team in an email communication on November 19, 2013. by Dayna Curry, the Mghanistan Country Director from SALT internatlonal, and was derived from averages of past production records at the factory. [Permission was given to the evaluation team to cite the country director directly} 5 Data provided to the evaluation team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 According to data provided to the eyalua tion team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 EnCompass LLC 16 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 37 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305'14 have not adopted soybeans. According to information sopplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harVest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw rnaterials.?1 Historical data show that farmers who have participated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept me input packages are reported to eat the seed and use the ferti i2er for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high cost of production and low yields. Since the inception of the project, SFL has provided training to 13,000 farmers and input packages to 10,324 farmers to grow soy. However, fewer than 100 replanted in 2013 in the absonce of direrzt production credit or the promise of future irrigation im proVementh it is important to be transparent about how this estimate Was derived. According to interviews and data provided by SFL, TD farmers requested seed inputs in the second year of replanting, and of those, 20 returned the inputs. Thus the estimate is based on farmers who have interacted with SFL for inputs in the second yea r. it is possible that farmers have replanted without the project's knowledge. During with SFL, it was also noted that some farmers might not be reporting replanting numbers due to the mistaken notion that they are obligated to sell to the soybean factory, whereas they might want to keep the harvest to themselves for animal feed. The evaluation team did not have the resources to quantify these claims. Exhibita provides summary intervention and production data for the project. In Talthar, farmers who do plant soy hava experienced average yields ranging from 35.4kg?erib (Dashti Gala, 2011} to 130.5l-cgfjerib [Dashti Qala, 2013f: Unfortunately, a ny change in crop prod uction methods (planting. cultivation, weedfinsect control, irrigation, etc.} from what farmers have previously used and trust takesa full year to investigate - a crop takes almosta year from distribution of inpuo to harvest, It also takes time for farmers to ado pt new planting methods and new cultivation techniques. These farmers have income only from their crops and if they fail. their families could starve so one can see why is rmers are cautioua about adopting new crops and new farming practices - they barre a lot at stake. Problems with Weeding and insect control were also totally new to these farmers and agronomists and solving those problEms will also take time. i The ?gure of was given to the evaluatlon team in an email communication on November 19, 2013. by Dayna Curry, the Mghanistan Country Director from SALT internatlonal, and was derived from averages of past production records at the factory. [Permission was given to the evaluation team to cite the country director directly} 5 Data provided to the evaluation team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 According to data provided to the eyalua tion team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 EnCompass LLC 16 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 37 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305'14 have not adopted soybeans. According to information sopplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harVest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw rnaterials.?1 Historical data show that farmers who have participated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept me input packages are reported to eat the seed and use the ferti i2er for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high cost of production and low yields. Since the inception of the project, SFL has provided training to 13,000 farmers and input packages to 10,324 farmers to grow soy. However, fewer than 100 replanted in 2013 in the absonce of direrzt production credit or the promise of future irrigation im proVementh it is important to be transparent about how this estimate Was derived. According to interviews and data provided by SFL, TD farmers requested seed inputs in the second year of replanting, and of those, 20 returned the inputs. Thus the estimate is based on farmers who have interacted with SFL for inputs in the second yea r. it is possible that farmers have replanted without the project's knowledge. During with SFL, it was also noted that some farmers might not be reporting replanting numbers due to the mistaken notion that they are obligated to sell to the soybean factory, whereas they might want to keep the harvest to themselves for animal feed. The evaluation team did not have the resources to quantify these claims. Exhibita provides summary intervention and production data for the project. In Talthar, farmers who do plant soy hava experienced average yields ranging from 35.4kg?erib (Dashti Gala, 2011} to 130.5l-cgfjerib [Dashti Qala, 2013f: Unfortunately, a ny change in crop prod uction methods (planting. cultivation, weedfinsect control, irrigation, etc.} from what farmers have previously used and trust takesa full year to investigate - a crop takes almosta year from distribution of inpuo to harvest, It also takes time for farmers to ado pt new planting methods and new cultivation techniques. These farmers have income only from their crops and if they fail. their families could starve so one can see why is rmers are cautioua about adopting new crops and new farming practices - they barre a lot at stake. Problems with Weeding and insect control were also totally new to these farmers and agronomists and solving those problEms will also take time. i The ?gure of was given to the evaluatlon team in an email communication on November 19, 2013. by Dayna Curry, the Mghanistan Country Director from SALT internatlonal, and was derived from averages of past production records at the factory. [Permission was given to the evaluation team to cite the country director directly} 5 Data provided to the evaluation team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 According to data provided to the eyalua tion team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 EnCompass LLC 16 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 37 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0305'14 have not adopted soybeans. According to information sopplied to the evaluation team by Shelter for Life on November 21, 2013, project farmers have provided 161.4 metric tons of soybeans during the 2013 harVest to the Afghan Soy Factory (ASP). The factory needs MT to operate at full capacity using locally sourced raw rnaterials.?1 Historical data show that farmers who have participated in SARAI soy production training have not planted soy in the absence of input packages. Some farmers who accept me input packages are reported to eat the seed and use the ferti i2er for other crops. Farmers who do plant soy have experienced poor results in terms of high cost of production and low yields. Since the inception of the project, SFL has provided training to 13,000 farmers and input packages to 10,324 farmers to grow soy. However, fewer than 100 replanted in 2013 in the absonce of direrzt production credit or the promise of future irrigation im proVementh it is important to be transparent about how this estimate Was derived. According to interviews and data provided by SFL, TD farmers requested seed inputs in the second year of replanting, and of those, 20 returned the inputs. Thus the estimate is based on farmers who have interacted with SFL for inputs in the second yea r. it is possible that farmers have replanted without the project's knowledge. During with SFL, it was also noted that some farmers might not be reporting replanting numbers due to the mistaken notion that they are obligated to sell to the soybean factory, whereas they might want to keep the harvest to themselves for animal feed. The evaluation team did not have the resources to quantify these claims. Exhibita provides summary intervention and production data for the project. In Talthar, farmers who do plant soy hava experienced average yields ranging from 35.4kg?erib (Dashti Gala, 2011} to 130.5l-cgfjerib [Dashti Qala, 2013f: Unfortunately, a ny change in crop prod uction methods (planting. cultivation, weedfinsect control, irrigation, etc.} from what farmers have previously used and trust takesa full year to investigate - a crop takes almosta year from distribution of inpuo to harvest, It also takes time for farmers to ado pt new planting methods and new cultivation techniques. These farmers have income only from their crops and if they fail. their families could starve so one can see why is rmers are cautioua about adopting new crops and new farming practices - they barre a lot at stake. Problems with Weeding and insect control were also totally new to these farmers and agronomists and solving those problEms will also take time. i The ?gure of was given to the evaluatlon team in an email communication on November 19, 2013. by Dayna Curry, the Mghanistan Country Director from SALT internatlonal, and was derived from averages of past production records at the factory. [Permission was given to the evaluation team to cite the country director directly} 5 Data provided to the evaluation team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 According to data provided to the eyalua tion team by SFL in an email communication dated December 12, 2013 EnCompass LLC 16 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 37 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 02105114 Exhibit 3: Planting and replanting data? Takhar Dashti Gala 201 1 1.012 891 124 oashti Gala 2012 2,385 2,020 226 oashti Gala 2013 302 791 Nutmilahle Baharak 2013 1,074 992 NotaUailahle Yange Gala 2013 1,164 1,100 Not available Kunduz Imam Shaib 2012 1,416 985 124 imam Shaib 201.3 1,180 1,090 NDfaWIiahlE Ali Ahead 2013 1,035 847' Not available Shula gra 2013 130 10? ?01 De bath" 2013 36 35 32 "or available Dawalatabad 2013 4? 4? 3? Not available Nahre Shah 2013 60 50 41 Nnta?ilable Data provided by Shelter for Life in an email communication with the evaluatlon team According to and SH, one of the key challenges the project has had in terms of yieids is securing the right type of seed for soy cultivation in northern Afghanistan. Initially, SARAI imported 120? 130 day Stine 3300 seeds, as this was the type of seed that was approved by the Afghanistan government. An early snow in October 2011 resulted in substantial crop loss. In 2012, the Stine 3300 Were no longer available on the market and the government subsequently alloWed a variety with a shorter maturity period [90?110 day variety}. These varieties were evaluated in ?eld trials and results will be made available in the future and will be taken into consideration for 2014 seed purchases. The evaluation team notes that prior independent research had established typical crop cycles; and the data showed that 120?130 clay varieties would not fa re virell.T SFL's selection of target villages could not be evaluated because written documents, criteria, or technical feasibility studies Were not made available. The ?eld team was tofd by SFL staff and public sector officers that selection was done through coordination and consultation with Community Development Councils and District Development Authorities A technical report written by JDA in 2008, recommends planting soybeans in April?May for harvest in August? September. HGWever, the winter wheat that is normally planted in the project area is. not harvested till May or June. delaying the planting time for soy. {Mark Henning, 100. International, increased Productivity and Profitability Wheat Based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, July 30, 2003, page 11.} EnCompass LLCI 17 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 38 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 02105114 Exhibit 3: Planting and replanting data? Takhar Dashti Gala 201 1 1.012 891 124 oashti Gala 2012 2,385 2,020 226 oashti Gala 2013 302 791 Nutmilahle Baharak 2013 1,074 992 NotaUailahle Yange Gala 2013 1,164 1,100 Not available Kunduz Imam Shaib 2012 1,416 985 124 imam Shaib 201.3 1,180 1,090 NDfaWIiahlE Ali Ahead 2013 1,035 847' Not available Shula gra 2013 130 10? ?01 De bath" 2013 36 35 32 "or available Dawalatabad 2013 4? 4? 3? Not available Nahre Shah 2013 60 50 41 Nnta?ilable Data provided by Shelter for Life in an email communication with the evaluatlon team According to and SH, one of the key challenges the project has had in terms of yieids is securing the right type of seed for soy cultivation in northern Afghanistan. Initially, SARAI imported 120? 130 day Stine 3300 seeds, as this was the type of seed that was approved by the Afghanistan government. An early snow in October 2011 resulted in substantial crop loss. In 2012, the Stine 3300 Were no longer available on the market and the government subsequently alloWed a variety with a shorter maturity period [90?110 day variety}. These varieties were evaluated in ?eld trials and results will be made available in the future and will be taken into consideration for 2014 seed purchases. The evaluation team notes that prior independent research had established typical crop cycles; and the data showed that 120?130 clay varieties would not fa re virell.T SFL's selection of target villages could not be evaluated because written documents, criteria, or technical feasibility studies Were not made available. The ?eld team was tofd by SFL staff and public sector officers that selection was done through coordination and consultation with Community Development Councils and District Development Authorities A technical report written by JDA in 2008, recommends planting soybeans in April?May for harvest in August? September. HGWever, the winter wheat that is normally planted in the project area is. not harvested till May or June. delaying the planting time for soy. {Mark Henning, 100. International, increased Productivity and Profitability Wheat Based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, July 30, 2003, page 11.} EnCompass LLCI 17 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 38 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 02105114 Exhibit 3: Planting and replanting data? Takhar Dashti Gala 201 1 1.012 891 124 oashti Gala 2012 2,385 2,020 226 oashti Gala 2013 302 791 Nutmilahle Baharak 2013 1,074 992 NotaUailahle Yange Gala 2013 1,164 1,100 Not available Kunduz Imam Shaib 2012 1,416 985 124 imam Shaib 201.3 1,180 1,090 NDfaWIiahlE Ali Ahead 2013 1,035 847' Not available Shula gra 2013 130 10? ?01 De bath" 2013 36 35 32 "or available Dawalatabad 2013 4? 4? 3? Not available Nahre Shah 2013 60 50 41 Nnta?ilable Data provided by Shelter for Life in an email communication with the evaluatlon team According to and SH, one of the key challenges the project has had in terms of yieids is securing the right type of seed for soy cultivation in northern Afghanistan. Initially, SARAI imported 120? 130 day Stine 3300 seeds, as this was the type of seed that was approved by the Afghanistan government. An early snow in October 2011 resulted in substantial crop loss. In 2012, the Stine 3300 Were no longer available on the market and the government subsequently alloWed a variety with a shorter maturity period [90?110 day variety}. These varieties were evaluated in ?eld trials and results will be made available in the future and will be taken into consideration for 2014 seed purchases. The evaluation team notes that prior independent research had established typical crop cycles; and the data showed that 120?130 clay varieties would not fa re virell.T SFL's selection of target villages could not be evaluated because written documents, criteria, or technical feasibility studies Were not made available. The ?eld team was tofd by SFL staff and public sector officers that selection was done through coordination and consultation with Community Development Councils and District Development Authorities A technical report written by JDA in 2008, recommends planting soybeans in April?May for harvest in August? September. HGWever, the winter wheat that is normally planted in the project area is. not harvested till May or June. delaying the planting time for soy. {Mark Henning, 100. International, increased Productivity and Profitability Wheat Based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, July 30, 2003, page 11.} EnCompass LLCI 17 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 38 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 02105114 Exhibit 3: Planting and replanting data? Takhar Dashti Gala 201 1 1.012 891 124 oashti Gala 2012 2,385 2,020 226 oashti Gala 2013 302 791 Nutmilahle Baharak 2013 1,074 992 NotaUailahle Yange Gala 2013 1,164 1,100 Not available Kunduz Imam Shaib 2012 1,416 985 124 imam Shaib 201.3 1,180 1,090 NDfaWIiahlE Ali Ahead 2013 1,035 847' Not available Shula gra 2013 130 10? ?01 De bath" 2013 36 35 32 "or available Dawalatabad 2013 4? 4? 3? Not available Nahre Shah 2013 60 50 41 Nnta?ilable Data provided by Shelter for Life in an email communication with the evaluatlon team According to and SH, one of the key challenges the project has had in terms of yieids is securing the right type of seed for soy cultivation in northern Afghanistan. Initially, SARAI imported 120? 130 day Stine 3300 seeds, as this was the type of seed that was approved by the Afghanistan government. An early snow in October 2011 resulted in substantial crop loss. In 2012, the Stine 3300 Were no longer available on the market and the government subsequently alloWed a variety with a shorter maturity period [90?110 day variety}. These varieties were evaluated in ?eld trials and results will be made available in the future and will be taken into consideration for 2014 seed purchases. The evaluation team notes that prior independent research had established typical crop cycles; and the data showed that 120?130 clay varieties would not fa re virell.T SFL's selection of target villages could not be evaluated because written documents, criteria, or technical feasibility studies Were not made available. The ?eld team was tofd by SFL staff and public sector officers that selection was done through coordination and consultation with Community Development Councils and District Development Authorities A technical report written by JDA in 2008, recommends planting soybeans in April?May for harvest in August? September. HGWever, the winter wheat that is normally planted in the project area is. not harvested till May or June. delaying the planting time for soy. {Mark Henning, 100. International, increased Productivity and Profitability Wheat Based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, July 30, 2003, page 11.} EnCompass LLCI 17 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 38 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report DZFDEHII 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally?produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. One of the challenges that the project faces in terms of production is that soy does not seem to be pro?table relatiye to other crops commonly produced in the region at this time. Production data supplied to the evaluation team by SARAI staff indicates that soy is not more pro?table than alternative crops at contract prices that warrant local purchase over imported supplies {Exhibit All farmers interviewed for this evaluation reported that their income with soy was less than with other crops and when asked why they grow soy, many indicated that they expected future bene?ts of infrastructure and credit from the project as a kind of recompense. Exhibit d: Pro?tability of alternatives to my after whit-at? Tomatoes 35500 Rice 32200 Melon 28100 Watermelon 28100 15250 Sesame 147'00 11563 11393 Cotton 10200 Cauliflower 996? Carrot 7500 an 7333 3333 Corn Okra 1500 'This is a summary of data provided to the evaluation team by Shelher for tile vla emaii communication November 26, 1013} Soybeans at hig herylelcl broadast seeded with lower labor requirement "Soybeans at his her yield with no insecticide in raised beds :Suybeans with no fertilizer, no insecticides in raised beds with faitllizer package BAP and potassium sulfate in raised beds 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive Tabor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating.8 a The DFlD-funded RALF project undertook extensive research on soybeans in Afghanistan in the mid -2000s_ testing about 20 varieties. They also conducted extensive farmer training activities. The HALF reports are collected on the web site and many of them reference the soybean work. The most sallent summary is here: The participating organizations in RALF were {alphabetical order]: Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan, AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center, Baghlan University, Balkh Savings 8! Credit Union, Catholic ReliefServices, CAZS Natural Resources, University of Wales, Bangor Centre lnternacionai de Majaramiento de Mai: Trigo {International Maize and Wheat EnCompass 13 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 39 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report DZFDEHII 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally?produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. One of the challenges that the project faces in terms of production is that soy does not seem to be pro?table relatiye to other crops commonly produced in the region at this time. Production data supplied to the evaluation team by SARAI staff indicates that soy is not more pro?table than alternative crops at contract prices that warrant local purchase over imported supplies {Exhibit All farmers interviewed for this evaluation reported that their income with soy was less than with other crops and when asked why they grow soy, many indicated that they expected future bene?ts of infrastructure and credit from the project as a kind of recompense. Exhibit d: Pro?tability of alternatives to my after whit-at? Tomatoes 35500 Rice 32200 Melon 28100 Watermelon 28100 15250 Sesame 147'00 11563 11393 Cotton 10200 Cauliflower 996? Carrot 7500 an 7333 3333 Corn Okra 1500 'This is a summary of data provided to the evaluation team by Shelher for tile vla emaii communication November 26, 1013} Soybeans at hig herylelcl broadast seeded with lower labor requirement "Soybeans at his her yield with no insecticide in raised beds :Suybeans with no fertilizer, no insecticides in raised beds with faitllizer package BAP and potassium sulfate in raised beds 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive Tabor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating.8 a The DFlD-funded RALF project undertook extensive research on soybeans in Afghanistan in the mid -2000s_ testing about 20 varieties. They also conducted extensive farmer training activities. The HALF reports are collected on the web site and many of them reference the soybean work. The most sallent summary is here: The participating organizations in RALF were {alphabetical order]: Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan, AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center, Baghlan University, Balkh Savings 8! Credit Union, Catholic ReliefServices, CAZS Natural Resources, University of Wales, Bangor Centre lnternacionai de Majaramiento de Mai: Trigo {International Maize and Wheat EnCompass 13 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 39 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report DZFDEHII 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally?produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. One of the challenges that the project faces in terms of production is that soy does not seem to be pro?table relatiye to other crops commonly produced in the region at this time. Production data supplied to the evaluation team by SARAI staff indicates that soy is not more pro?table than alternative crops at contract prices that warrant local purchase over imported supplies {Exhibit All farmers interviewed for this evaluation reported that their income with soy was less than with other crops and when asked why they grow soy, many indicated that they expected future bene?ts of infrastructure and credit from the project as a kind of recompense. Exhibit d: Pro?tability of alternatives to my after whit-at? Tomatoes 35500 Rice 32200 Melon 28100 Watermelon 28100 15250 Sesame 147'00 11563 11393 Cotton 10200 Cauliflower 996? Carrot 7500 an 7333 3333 Corn Okra 1500 'This is a summary of data provided to the evaluation team by Shelher for tile vla emaii communication November 26, 1013} Soybeans at hig herylelcl broadast seeded with lower labor requirement "Soybeans at his her yield with no insecticide in raised beds :Suybeans with no fertilizer, no insecticides in raised beds with faitllizer package BAP and potassium sulfate in raised beds 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive Tabor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating.8 a The DFlD-funded RALF project undertook extensive research on soybeans in Afghanistan in the mid -2000s_ testing about 20 varieties. They also conducted extensive farmer training activities. The HALF reports are collected on the web site and many of them reference the soybean work. The most sallent summary is here: The participating organizations in RALF were {alphabetical order]: Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan, AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center, Baghlan University, Balkh Savings 8! Credit Union, Catholic ReliefServices, CAZS Natural Resources, University of Wales, Bangor Centre lnternacionai de Majaramiento de Mai: Trigo {International Maize and Wheat EnCompass 13 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 39 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report DZFDEHII 2. Production data from SARAI and other reliable sources do not demonstrate that locally?produced soy can be more pro?table than alternative crops, or that soy can be locally sourced at contract prices that are cheaper than importation. One of the challenges that the project faces in terms of production is that soy does not seem to be pro?table relatiye to other crops commonly produced in the region at this time. Production data supplied to the evaluation team by SARAI staff indicates that soy is not more pro?table than alternative crops at contract prices that warrant local purchase over imported supplies {Exhibit All farmers interviewed for this evaluation reported that their income with soy was less than with other crops and when asked why they grow soy, many indicated that they expected future bene?ts of infrastructure and credit from the project as a kind of recompense. Exhibit d: Pro?tability of alternatives to my after whit-at? Tomatoes 35500 Rice 32200 Melon 28100 Watermelon 28100 15250 Sesame 147'00 11563 11393 Cotton 10200 Cauliflower 996? Carrot 7500 an 7333 3333 Corn Okra 1500 'This is a summary of data provided to the evaluation team by Shelher for tile vla emaii communication November 26, 1013} Soybeans at hig herylelcl broadast seeded with lower labor requirement "Soybeans at his her yield with no insecticide in raised beds :Suybeans with no fertilizer, no insecticides in raised beds with faitllizer package BAP and potassium sulfate in raised beds 3. Independent scientific research and analysis by other agencies indicate farmers are unlikely to accept soy into their cropping system for many reasons, including excessive Tabor requirements over other crops, the inability of soy to produce a good yield in the soil, and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan where the project is operating.8 a The DFlD-funded RALF project undertook extensive research on soybeans in Afghanistan in the mid -2000s_ testing about 20 varieties. They also conducted extensive farmer training activities. The HALF reports are collected on the web site and many of them reference the soybean work. The most sallent summary is here: The participating organizations in RALF were {alphabetical order]: Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan, AVRDC - The World Vegetable Center, Baghlan University, Balkh Savings 8! Credit Union, Catholic ReliefServices, CAZS Natural Resources, University of Wales, Bangor Centre lnternacionai de Majaramiento de Mai: Trigo {International Maize and Wheat EnCompass 13 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 39 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 030514 I in 2008, Joint Development Associates produced a report for the RALF project on crop research that the organization condueted to address constraints within the wheat?based cropping system of northern Afghanistan. As elaborated in Exhibit 5, the ?ndings of the soy trials led the researchers to conclude that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan,? Exhibit 5: Findings from 2008 JDA RALF project report that illustrate the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report)? Our project initially had hopes that soybeans would have promise. However, after much research and evaluation We concl ud ed that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan. There are sevaral reasons for this: I The crop production cycle and available water means that soybeans do not ?t pro?tably into the Afghan farming system. Soybeans can be planted April?May. and then are harvested in August?September. They can also be planted as a setond crop after wheat in June, and then harvested in about September-October, although yields can be lower.-. If a farmer has water then he will grow vegetables and fruit, some irrigated winter wheat and some forages. To plant soybeans in April means that lard will have to be Set aside the previous October, which means it is not pla nted to winter wheat or planted to an early spring vegetable crop such as cucumbers or tomatoes. it also means that land will not be available fora 2"d crop sUch as maize. or the midsummer planted vegetables such as cabbage and cauli?ower. Famers think in terms of what they can earn per unit areaflime. Soybeans do not fa re well in this thinking. I Planting and harvest labor intensive. Without machinery, land for soybeans must be prepared with shovels as they are planted in ridge-furrow system, and planting and harvesting done by hand. JDA did try some mechanized planting and got reasonable stands, but yields were still low. I Low yields. The average yields for 2005?2006 replicated trials conducted by JDA in Balkh were 1. 2?1.5 nit/ha. which is low compared to yields in other countries. I input issues. A lcey benefit of soybeans is that as legumes they can fix their own nitrogen, thus adding nitrogen fertilizer is generally not needed. A bacterial seed inoculant is needed for soybeans to ?x nitrogen. This inooJIant is expensive and cannot be made in Afghanistan as the raw materials do not exist. This means farmers would have to buy nitrogen fertilizer, which increases the cost of production. I Market. IDA had initially hoped to sell soybeans to a poultry farm in Uzbekistan that had trouble getting an adequate supply of soybeans. But because of low yields this was not possible. In Afghanistan if there is demand for soybeans, than it is probany best to import them from countries that can produce them more efficiently and cheaply. Improvement Center}, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Cornell University, Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, Afghanistan, Herat University, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, international Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics, International Development Enterprises, Joint Development Associates International, Afghanistan, Macaulay Research Consultancy Services Ltd, Mercy Corps, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Afghanistan. Nangarhar University, Natural Resources Institute, Novib, ProFound, Relief international, Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul, Afghanistan, United Nations Development Fund for Women, University of Balkh. University of Kabul, Washington State University, World Council of Credit Unions. 9 Mark Henning, JDA International, {July, 30, zone}, Increased Productivity and Profitability of Wheat-based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Opium Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, pg. 12 This text is taken from JDA International report referenced in footnote EnCompass LLC 19 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 40 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 030514 I in 2008, Joint Development Associates produced a report for the RALF project on crop research that the organization condueted to address constraints within the wheat?based cropping system of northern Afghanistan. As elaborated in Exhibit 5, the ?ndings of the soy trials led the researchers to conclude that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan,? Exhibit 5: Findings from 2008 JDA RALF project report that illustrate the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report)? Our project initially had hopes that soybeans would have promise. However, after much research and evaluation We concl ud ed that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan. There are sevaral reasons for this: I The crop production cycle and available water means that soybeans do not ?t pro?tably into the Afghan farming system. Soybeans can be planted April?May. and then are harvested in August?September. They can also be planted as a setond crop after wheat in June, and then harvested in about September-October, although yields can be lower.-. If a farmer has water then he will grow vegetables and fruit, some irrigated winter wheat and some forages. To plant soybeans in April means that lard will have to be Set aside the previous October, which means it is not pla nted to winter wheat or planted to an early spring vegetable crop such as cucumbers or tomatoes. it also means that land will not be available fora 2"d crop sUch as maize. or the midsummer planted vegetables such as cabbage and cauli?ower. Famers think in terms of what they can earn per unit areaflime. Soybeans do not fa re well in this thinking. I Planting and harvest labor intensive. Without machinery, land for soybeans must be prepared with shovels as they are planted in ridge-furrow system, and planting and harvesting done by hand. JDA did try some mechanized planting and got reasonable stands, but yields were still low. I Low yields. The average yields for 2005?2006 replicated trials conducted by JDA in Balkh were 1. 2?1.5 nit/ha. which is low compared to yields in other countries. I input issues. A lcey benefit of soybeans is that as legumes they can fix their own nitrogen, thus adding nitrogen fertilizer is generally not needed. A bacterial seed inoculant is needed for soybeans to ?x nitrogen. This inooJIant is expensive and cannot be made in Afghanistan as the raw materials do not exist. This means farmers would have to buy nitrogen fertilizer, which increases the cost of production. I Market. IDA had initially hoped to sell soybeans to a poultry farm in Uzbekistan that had trouble getting an adequate supply of soybeans. But because of low yields this was not possible. In Afghanistan if there is demand for soybeans, than it is probany best to import them from countries that can produce them more efficiently and cheaply. Improvement Center}, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Cornell University, Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, Afghanistan, Herat University, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, international Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics, International Development Enterprises, Joint Development Associates International, Afghanistan, Macaulay Research Consultancy Services Ltd, Mercy Corps, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Afghanistan. Nangarhar University, Natural Resources Institute, Novib, ProFound, Relief international, Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul, Afghanistan, United Nations Development Fund for Women, University of Balkh. University of Kabul, Washington State University, World Council of Credit Unions. 9 Mark Henning, JDA International, {July, 30, zone}, Increased Productivity and Profitability of Wheat-based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Opium Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, pg. 12 This text is taken from JDA International report referenced in footnote EnCompass LLC 19 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 40 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 030514 I in 2008, Joint Development Associates produced a report for the RALF project on crop research that the organization condueted to address constraints within the wheat?based cropping system of northern Afghanistan. As elaborated in Exhibit 5, the ?ndings of the soy trials led the researchers to conclude that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan,? Exhibit 5: Findings from 2008 JDA RALF project report that illustrate the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report)? Our project initially had hopes that soybeans would have promise. However, after much research and evaluation We concl ud ed that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan. There are sevaral reasons for this: I The crop production cycle and available water means that soybeans do not ?t pro?tably into the Afghan farming system. Soybeans can be planted April?May. and then are harvested in August?September. They can also be planted as a setond crop after wheat in June, and then harvested in about September-October, although yields can be lower.-. If a farmer has water then he will grow vegetables and fruit, some irrigated winter wheat and some forages. To plant soybeans in April means that lard will have to be Set aside the previous October, which means it is not pla nted to winter wheat or planted to an early spring vegetable crop such as cucumbers or tomatoes. it also means that land will not be available fora 2"d crop sUch as maize. or the midsummer planted vegetables such as cabbage and cauli?ower. Famers think in terms of what they can earn per unit areaflime. Soybeans do not fa re well in this thinking. I Planting and harvest labor intensive. Without machinery, land for soybeans must be prepared with shovels as they are planted in ridge-furrow system, and planting and harvesting done by hand. JDA did try some mechanized planting and got reasonable stands, but yields were still low. I Low yields. The average yields for 2005?2006 replicated trials conducted by JDA in Balkh were 1. 2?1.5 nit/ha. which is low compared to yields in other countries. I input issues. A lcey benefit of soybeans is that as legumes they can fix their own nitrogen, thus adding nitrogen fertilizer is generally not needed. A bacterial seed inoculant is needed for soybeans to ?x nitrogen. This inooJIant is expensive and cannot be made in Afghanistan as the raw materials do not exist. This means farmers would have to buy nitrogen fertilizer, which increases the cost of production. I Market. IDA had initially hoped to sell soybeans to a poultry farm in Uzbekistan that had trouble getting an adequate supply of soybeans. But because of low yields this was not possible. In Afghanistan if there is demand for soybeans, than it is probany best to import them from countries that can produce them more efficiently and cheaply. Improvement Center}, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Cornell University, Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, Afghanistan, Herat University, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, international Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics, International Development Enterprises, Joint Development Associates International, Afghanistan, Macaulay Research Consultancy Services Ltd, Mercy Corps, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Afghanistan. Nangarhar University, Natural Resources Institute, Novib, ProFound, Relief international, Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul, Afghanistan, United Nations Development Fund for Women, University of Balkh. University of Kabul, Washington State University, World Council of Credit Unions. 9 Mark Henning, JDA International, {July, 30, zone}, Increased Productivity and Profitability of Wheat-based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Opium Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, pg. 12 This text is taken from JDA International report referenced in footnote EnCompass LLC 19 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 40 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 030514 I in 2008, Joint Development Associates produced a report for the RALF project on crop research that the organization condueted to address constraints within the wheat?based cropping system of northern Afghanistan. As elaborated in Exhibit 5, the ?ndings of the soy trials led the researchers to conclude that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan,? Exhibit 5: Findings from 2008 JDA RALF project report that illustrate the challenges of soybean production in Afghanistan {quoted verbatim from the report)? Our project initially had hopes that soybeans would have promise. However, after much research and evaluation We concl ud ed that soybeans are not an appropriate crop for most of Afghanistan. There are sevaral reasons for this: I The crop production cycle and available water means that soybeans do not ?t pro?tably into the Afghan farming system. Soybeans can be planted April?May. and then are harvested in August?September. They can also be planted as a setond crop after wheat in June, and then harvested in about September-October, although yields can be lower.-. If a farmer has water then he will grow vegetables and fruit, some irrigated winter wheat and some forages. To plant soybeans in April means that lard will have to be Set aside the previous October, which means it is not pla nted to winter wheat or planted to an early spring vegetable crop such as cucumbers or tomatoes. it also means that land will not be available fora 2"d crop sUch as maize. or the midsummer planted vegetables such as cabbage and cauli?ower. Famers think in terms of what they can earn per unit areaflime. Soybeans do not fa re well in this thinking. I Planting and harvest labor intensive. Without machinery, land for soybeans must be prepared with shovels as they are planted in ridge-furrow system, and planting and harvesting done by hand. JDA did try some mechanized planting and got reasonable stands, but yields were still low. I Low yields. The average yields for 2005?2006 replicated trials conducted by JDA in Balkh were 1. 2?1.5 nit/ha. which is low compared to yields in other countries. I input issues. A lcey benefit of soybeans is that as legumes they can fix their own nitrogen, thus adding nitrogen fertilizer is generally not needed. A bacterial seed inoculant is needed for soybeans to ?x nitrogen. This inooJIant is expensive and cannot be made in Afghanistan as the raw materials do not exist. This means farmers would have to buy nitrogen fertilizer, which increases the cost of production. I Market. IDA had initially hoped to sell soybeans to a poultry farm in Uzbekistan that had trouble getting an adequate supply of soybeans. But because of low yields this was not possible. In Afghanistan if there is demand for soybeans, than it is probany best to import them from countries that can produce them more efficiently and cheaply. Improvement Center}, Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, Cornell University, Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, Afghanistan, Herat University, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, international Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas, International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics, International Development Enterprises, Joint Development Associates International, Afghanistan, Macaulay Research Consultancy Services Ltd, Mercy Corps, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Afghanistan. Nangarhar University, Natural Resources Institute, Novib, ProFound, Relief international, Tribal Liaison Office, Kabul, Afghanistan, United Nations Development Fund for Women, University of Balkh. University of Kabul, Washington State University, World Council of Credit Unions. 9 Mark Henning, JDA International, {July, 30, zone}, Increased Productivity and Profitability of Wheat-based Cropping Systems to Reduce Reliance on Opium Poppy in Northern Afghanistan, pg. 12 This text is taken from JDA International report referenced in footnote EnCompass LLC 19 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 40 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 I Cast of production too high. With the amount of time and labor required, soybeans are nota pro?table crop for Afghan farmers. In other parts of the world farmers. make money from soybeans on a large scale [in terms of land area) where they have precision machinery, necessary inputs. and a ready market. Afghan fanners typically have small plots of irrigated land. and there is no machinery and no market. The lessons learned from this project?s experience with soybeans are valuable in that it can strongly advise against any further encodragement of farm-crs growing soybeans in Afghanistan. JDA has been asked by other agenciesI which have been approached by people wanting to promote soybean production. about soybean production and ma has been able to advise against it, thus the waste of development funding. Based on individual interviews and focus group discussions with SARAI pa rticipantsI almost all reported that soybean is not competitive with other crops. Farmers see soy as a dif?cult and unrewarding crop and this view is largely shared by local and expatriate agronomists. Agronomists and farmers question whether soy can be induced to grow well in a two crop farming system in Afghanistan that does not contain opium poppy because of the unsuita bility of afghan weather. This problem does not arise with mung, which has a ready market, or with highdvalue vegetables that would be planted in the same season as soy. To illustrate the challenges of producing soy, a polnt?by? point comparison between soy and mung is outlined below (Exhibit Exhibit?: Comparison between soybean and mung12 Parameters to Colnpa re Soybean Mung bean Planting method Needs raised beds and Simple broadcasting seeding in prepared furrms and planting seeds land without need for raised beds and one by one furrows Weeding 2 or 3 times No weeding Water requirement Up to 6 times depending on 1-2 times irrigation maximum Ii'lrrigatiorlu the nature of the soil Straw No straw for animal Provides straw for animals Access to inputs Not available in market (seeds Available in market and rhizobium inoculant} Market No stable market. Must Good market depend on ASF or 1? At issue is planting soy after wheat or rice which is a month later than optimal. To maintain a two crop calendar, soy must ?t into a narrow crop window. The window is he rrowied further when the autumn wheat planting and subsequent spring harvest are delayed. 12 In response to this table, ASA noted the following: These are not the most relevant point as mung bean is not an oilseed and the project is in part responding to the bene?ts that would arise from the promotion ofan oilseed {speci?cally soy) value chain?specifically the potential for local edible oil processing to which Afghanistan is completely reliant upon imports. Furthermore. it ignores the point about the project being in large part a crisp introduction projEct which means that demand for a crop will have to be promoted and may not be immediately supported independently by the market. By the logic presented here, no new crop would be introduced ever as there would be no initial demand for it, which ignores the point that demand can be created. The evaluation team responds by pointing out the difficulties in convincing farmers to switch to a lovuI profit crop and the shortfalls in SARAI project outreach strategies showing farmers how to raise soy pro?tably. EnCompass LLC 20 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 41 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 I Cast of production too high. With the amount of time and labor required, soybeans are nota pro?table crop for Afghan farmers. In other parts of the world farmers. make money from soybeans on a large scale [in terms of land area) where they have precision machinery, necessary inputs. and a ready market. Afghan fanners typically have small plots of irrigated land. and there is no machinery and no market. The lessons learned from this project?s experience with soybeans are valuable in that it can strongly advise against any further encodragement of farm-crs growing soybeans in Afghanistan. JDA has been asked by other agenciesI which have been approached by people wanting to promote soybean production. about soybean production and ma has been able to advise against it, thus the waste of development funding. Based on individual interviews and focus group discussions with SARAI pa rticipantsI almost all reported that soybean is not competitive with other crops. Farmers see soy as a dif?cult and unrewarding crop and this view is largely shared by local and expatriate agronomists. Agronomists and farmers question whether soy can be induced to grow well in a two crop farming system in Afghanistan that does not contain opium poppy because of the unsuita bility of afghan weather. This problem does not arise with mung, which has a ready market, or with highdvalue vegetables that would be planted in the same season as soy. To illustrate the challenges of producing soy, a polnt?by? point comparison between soy and mung is outlined below (Exhibit Exhibit?: Comparison between soybean and mung12 Parameters to Colnpa re Soybean Mung bean Planting method Needs raised beds and Simple broadcasting seeding in prepared furrms and planting seeds land without need for raised beds and one by one furrows Weeding 2 or 3 times No weeding Water requirement Up to 6 times depending on 1-2 times irrigation maximum Ii'lrrigatiorlu the nature of the soil Straw No straw for animal Provides straw for animals Access to inputs Not available in market (seeds Available in market and rhizobium inoculant} Market No stable market. Must Good market depend on ASF or 1? At issue is planting soy after wheat or rice which is a month later than optimal. To maintain a two crop calendar, soy must ?t into a narrow crop window. The window is he rrowied further when the autumn wheat planting and subsequent spring harvest are delayed. 12 In response to this table, ASA noted the following: These are not the most relevant point as mung bean is not an oilseed and the project is in part responding to the bene?ts that would arise from the promotion ofan oilseed {speci?cally soy) value chain?specifically the potential for local edible oil processing to which Afghanistan is completely reliant upon imports. Furthermore. it ignores the point about the project being in large part a crisp introduction projEct which means that demand for a crop will have to be promoted and may not be immediately supported independently by the market. By the logic presented here, no new crop would be introduced ever as there would be no initial demand for it, which ignores the point that demand can be created. The evaluation team responds by pointing out the difficulties in convincing farmers to switch to a lovuI profit crop and the shortfalls in SARAI project outreach strategies showing farmers how to raise soy pro?tably. EnCompass LLC 20 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 41 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 I Cast of production too high. With the amount of time and labor required, soybeans are nota pro?table crop for Afghan farmers. In other parts of the world farmers. make money from soybeans on a large scale [in terms of land area) where they have precision machinery, necessary inputs. and a ready market. Afghan fanners typically have small plots of irrigated land. and there is no machinery and no market. The lessons learned from this project?s experience with soybeans are valuable in that it can strongly advise against any further encodragement of farm-crs growing soybeans in Afghanistan. JDA has been asked by other agenciesI which have been approached by people wanting to promote soybean production. about soybean production and ma has been able to advise against it, thus the waste of development funding. Based on individual interviews and focus group discussions with SARAI pa rticipantsI almost all reported that soybean is not competitive with other crops. Farmers see soy as a dif?cult and unrewarding crop and this view is largely shared by local and expatriate agronomists. Agronomists and farmers question whether soy can be induced to grow well in a two crop farming system in Afghanistan that does not contain opium poppy because of the unsuita bility of afghan weather. This problem does not arise with mung, which has a ready market, or with highdvalue vegetables that would be planted in the same season as soy. To illustrate the challenges of producing soy, a polnt?by? point comparison between soy and mung is outlined below (Exhibit Exhibit?: Comparison between soybean and mung12 Parameters to Colnpa re Soybean Mung bean Planting method Needs raised beds and Simple broadcasting seeding in prepared furrms and planting seeds land without need for raised beds and one by one furrows Weeding 2 or 3 times No weeding Water requirement Up to 6 times depending on 1-2 times irrigation maximum Ii'lrrigatiorlu the nature of the soil Straw No straw for animal Provides straw for animals Access to inputs Not available in market (seeds Available in market and rhizobium inoculant} Market No stable market. Must Good market depend on ASF or 1? At issue is planting soy after wheat or rice which is a month later than optimal. To maintain a two crop calendar, soy must ?t into a narrow crop window. The window is he rrowied further when the autumn wheat planting and subsequent spring harvest are delayed. 12 In response to this table, ASA noted the following: These are not the most relevant point as mung bean is not an oilseed and the project is in part responding to the bene?ts that would arise from the promotion ofan oilseed {speci?cally soy) value chain?specifically the potential for local edible oil processing to which Afghanistan is completely reliant upon imports. Furthermore. it ignores the point about the project being in large part a crisp introduction projEct which means that demand for a crop will have to be promoted and may not be immediately supported independently by the market. By the logic presented here, no new crop would be introduced ever as there would be no initial demand for it, which ignores the point that demand can be created. The evaluation team responds by pointing out the difficulties in convincing farmers to switch to a lovuI profit crop and the shortfalls in SARAI project outreach strategies showing farmers how to raise soy pro?tably. EnCompass LLC 20 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 41 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 1 I Cast of production too high. With the amount of time and labor required, soybeans are nota pro?table crop for Afghan farmers. In other parts of the world farmers. make money from soybeans on a large scale [in terms of land area) where they have precision machinery, necessary inputs. and a ready market. Afghan fanners typically have small plots of irrigated land. and there is no machinery and no market. The lessons learned from this project?s experience with soybeans are valuable in that it can strongly advise against any further encodragement of farm-crs growing soybeans in Afghanistan. JDA has been asked by other agenciesI which have been approached by people wanting to promote soybean production. about soybean production and ma has been able to advise against it, thus the waste of development funding. Based on individual interviews and focus group discussions with SARAI pa rticipantsI almost all reported that soybean is not competitive with other crops. Farmers see soy as a dif?cult and unrewarding crop and this view is largely shared by local and expatriate agronomists. Agronomists and farmers question whether soy can be induced to grow well in a two crop farming system in Afghanistan that does not contain opium poppy because of the unsuita bility of afghan weather. This problem does not arise with mung, which has a ready market, or with highdvalue vegetables that would be planted in the same season as soy. To illustrate the challenges of producing soy, a polnt?by? point comparison between soy and mung is outlined below (Exhibit Exhibit?: Comparison between soybean and mung12 Parameters to Colnpa re Soybean Mung bean Planting method Needs raised beds and Simple broadcasting seeding in prepared furrms and planting seeds land without need for raised beds and one by one furrows Weeding 2 or 3 times No weeding Water requirement Up to 6 times depending on 1-2 times irrigation maximum Ii'lrrigatiorlu the nature of the soil Straw No straw for animal Provides straw for animals Access to inputs Not available in market (seeds Available in market and rhizobium inoculant} Market No stable market. Must Good market depend on ASF or 1? At issue is planting soy after wheat or rice which is a month later than optimal. To maintain a two crop calendar, soy must ?t into a narrow crop window. The window is he rrowied further when the autumn wheat planting and subsequent spring harvest are delayed. 12 In response to this table, ASA noted the following: These are not the most relevant point as mung bean is not an oilseed and the project is in part responding to the bene?ts that would arise from the promotion ofan oilseed {speci?cally soy) value chain?specifically the potential for local edible oil processing to which Afghanistan is completely reliant upon imports. Furthermore. it ignores the point about the project being in large part a crisp introduction projEct which means that demand for a crop will have to be promoted and may not be immediately supported independently by the market. By the logic presented here, no new crop would be introduced ever as there would be no initial demand for it, which ignores the point that demand can be created. The evaluation team responds by pointing out the difficulties in convincing farmers to switch to a lovuI profit crop and the shortfalls in SARAI project outreach strategies showing farmers how to raise soy pro?tably. EnCompass LLC 20 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 41 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020314 Yield Lower than rice or mung High corn pare to soybean Market price 2013 Bill-i kg 320 kg. ire geta ble prices are even higher Reliability If planted too late will not Can be planted late with minimal risir ma lie a good crop 4. Without the prospect ofadequate soy production. many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the ciose of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the pro?tability of the Afghan Soy Factory. Although Naseeh Groura {the factory owners] expresses commitment to the project and willingness to support intensive production in Balkh in 2014, the company can be expected to ma kc its business decisions based on a cost-bene?t analysis of the situation. if it is determined that soy prodUction is not feasible in the next few years, interview respondents noted that there is a risk that Naseeb Group will sell the factory equipment. Naseeb Group did not invest in harvest collection in Takhar and Kunduz in 2013 because production is low and transport costs are high. SARAI, working through PARSA and SFL, are handling the collection instead. 5. The prodUction and processing activities of the value chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disruption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could hatre been atroided by co?locating prodUCtion and processing.? In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Talihar and Ma zar. that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory prices for Talihar products because transport costs are less. SARAI and NH {the production partner] decided to sever their relationship approximately two months before the start of the ?rst soy planting. The evaluation team was unable to determine the reasons for this separation as stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation had different perspectives on the issue. However, consensus was that the loss of the production partner came at an inopportune time. As a result, ASA selected SFL as the new production partner was already contracted to undertake the irrigation and road activities]. interview respondents cited several reasons for the decision to concentrate production in Talchar, including SFL's prior experience in the region {albeit not in agriculture production), the fact that the irrigation and road work was to take place in Ta khar, and the perception among some SFL staff that soil quality in Taithar is more conducive to soy production. Talihar is nearly 100 miles from Mazar city, where the factory is currently located, and double that distance [in time} from the original factory site in Kabul. Ii: is important to note that the decision to relocate the ASF to Mazar was due to ongoing security challenges with the original factory site in Kabul. The distance between production location and the ASF has led to challenges, including a struggle to foster a relationship between the factory owner and farmers, and higher transport costs. ?3 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: The facility was not included in the original proposal. We did have to make changes over time as various challenges came forward, Production nearby existing SFL areas had bene?ts, and Ballrh province was eventually added to the production component. However. the evaluation team would like to note that the facility was in fact included in the Master Agreement. EnCompass LLC 21 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 42 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020314 Yield Lower than rice or mung High corn pare to soybean Market price 2013 Bill-i kg 320 kg. ire geta ble prices are even higher Reliability If planted too late will not Can be planted late with minimal risir ma lie a good crop 4. Without the prospect ofadequate soy production. many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the ciose of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the pro?tability of the Afghan Soy Factory. Although Naseeh Groura {the factory owners] expresses commitment to the project and willingness to support intensive production in Balkh in 2014, the company can be expected to ma kc its business decisions based on a cost-bene?t analysis of the situation. if it is determined that soy prodUction is not feasible in the next few years, interview respondents noted that there is a risk that Naseeb Group will sell the factory equipment. Naseeb Group did not invest in harvest collection in Takhar and Kunduz in 2013 because production is low and transport costs are high. SARAI, working through PARSA and SFL, are handling the collection instead. 5. The prodUction and processing activities of the value chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disruption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could hatre been atroided by co?locating prodUCtion and processing.? In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Talihar and Ma zar. that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory prices for Talihar products because transport costs are less. SARAI and NH {the production partner] decided to sever their relationship approximately two months before the start of the ?rst soy planting. The evaluation team was unable to determine the reasons for this separation as stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation had different perspectives on the issue. However, consensus was that the loss of the production partner came at an inopportune time. As a result, ASA selected SFL as the new production partner was already contracted to undertake the irrigation and road activities]. interview respondents cited several reasons for the decision to concentrate production in Talchar, including SFL's prior experience in the region {albeit not in agriculture production), the fact that the irrigation and road work was to take place in Ta khar, and the perception among some SFL staff that soil quality in Taithar is more conducive to soy production. Talihar is nearly 100 miles from Mazar city, where the factory is currently located, and double that distance [in time} from the original factory site in Kabul. Ii: is important to note that the decision to relocate the ASF to Mazar was due to ongoing security challenges with the original factory site in Kabul. The distance between production location and the ASF has led to challenges, including a struggle to foster a relationship between the factory owner and farmers, and higher transport costs. ?3 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: The facility was not included in the original proposal. We did have to make changes over time as various challenges came forward, Production nearby existing SFL areas had bene?ts, and Ballrh province was eventually added to the production component. However. the evaluation team would like to note that the facility was in fact included in the Master Agreement. EnCompass LLC 21 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 42 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020314 Yield Lower than rice or mung High corn pare to soybean Market price 2013 Bill-i kg 320 kg. ire geta ble prices are even higher Reliability If planted too late will not Can be planted late with minimal risir ma lie a good crop 4. Without the prospect ofadequate soy production. many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the ciose of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the pro?tability of the Afghan Soy Factory. Although Naseeh Groura {the factory owners] expresses commitment to the project and willingness to support intensive production in Balkh in 2014, the company can be expected to ma kc its business decisions based on a cost-bene?t analysis of the situation. if it is determined that soy prodUction is not feasible in the next few years, interview respondents noted that there is a risk that Naseeb Group will sell the factory equipment. Naseeb Group did not invest in harvest collection in Takhar and Kunduz in 2013 because production is low and transport costs are high. SARAI, working through PARSA and SFL, are handling the collection instead. 5. The prodUction and processing activities of the value chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disruption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could hatre been atroided by co?locating prodUCtion and processing.? In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Talihar and Ma zar. that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory prices for Talihar products because transport costs are less. SARAI and NH {the production partner] decided to sever their relationship approximately two months before the start of the ?rst soy planting. The evaluation team was unable to determine the reasons for this separation as stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation had different perspectives on the issue. However, consensus was that the loss of the production partner came at an inopportune time. As a result, ASA selected SFL as the new production partner was already contracted to undertake the irrigation and road activities]. interview respondents cited several reasons for the decision to concentrate production in Talchar, including SFL's prior experience in the region {albeit not in agriculture production), the fact that the irrigation and road work was to take place in Ta khar, and the perception among some SFL staff that soil quality in Taithar is more conducive to soy production. Talihar is nearly 100 miles from Mazar city, where the factory is currently located, and double that distance [in time} from the original factory site in Kabul. Ii: is important to note that the decision to relocate the ASF to Mazar was due to ongoing security challenges with the original factory site in Kabul. The distance between production location and the ASF has led to challenges, including a struggle to foster a relationship between the factory owner and farmers, and higher transport costs. ?3 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: The facility was not included in the original proposal. We did have to make changes over time as various challenges came forward, Production nearby existing SFL areas had bene?ts, and Ballrh province was eventually added to the production component. However. the evaluation team would like to note that the facility was in fact included in the Master Agreement. EnCompass LLC 21 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 42 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020314 Yield Lower than rice or mung High corn pare to soybean Market price 2013 Bill-i kg 320 kg. ire geta ble prices are even higher Reliability If planted too late will not Can be planted late with minimal risir ma lie a good crop 4. Without the prospect ofadequate soy production. many stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation worry that there are a lack of incentives for the local project partner to maintain the Afghan Soy Factory or to promote soy production after the ciose of the project. In the absence of adequate yields and a stable market price, no data exist upon which to calculate the pro?tability of the Afghan Soy Factory. Although Naseeh Groura {the factory owners] expresses commitment to the project and willingness to support intensive production in Balkh in 2014, the company can be expected to ma kc its business decisions based on a cost-bene?t analysis of the situation. if it is determined that soy prodUction is not feasible in the next few years, interview respondents noted that there is a risk that Naseeb Group will sell the factory equipment. Naseeb Group did not invest in harvest collection in Takhar and Kunduz in 2013 because production is low and transport costs are high. SARAI, working through PARSA and SFL, are handling the collection instead. 5. The prodUction and processing activities of the value chain occurred in different provinces in a region of increasing insecurity. This location disruption added management and logistical burdens to the project that could hatre been atroided by co?locating prodUCtion and processing.? In addition, a second soy?processing factory has opened in Kunduz, betWeen Talihar and Ma zar. that will likely undercut Afghan Soy Factory prices for Talihar products because transport costs are less. SARAI and NH {the production partner] decided to sever their relationship approximately two months before the start of the ?rst soy planting. The evaluation team was unable to determine the reasons for this separation as stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation had different perspectives on the issue. However, consensus was that the loss of the production partner came at an inopportune time. As a result, ASA selected SFL as the new production partner was already contracted to undertake the irrigation and road activities]. interview respondents cited several reasons for the decision to concentrate production in Talchar, including SFL's prior experience in the region {albeit not in agriculture production), the fact that the irrigation and road work was to take place in Ta khar, and the perception among some SFL staff that soil quality in Taithar is more conducive to soy production. Talihar is nearly 100 miles from Mazar city, where the factory is currently located, and double that distance [in time} from the original factory site in Kabul. Ii: is important to note that the decision to relocate the ASF to Mazar was due to ongoing security challenges with the original factory site in Kabul. The distance between production location and the ASF has led to challenges, including a struggle to foster a relationship between the factory owner and farmers, and higher transport costs. ?3 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: The facility was not included in the original proposal. We did have to make changes over time as various challenges came forward, Production nearby existing SFL areas had bene?ts, and Ballrh province was eventually added to the production component. However. the evaluation team would like to note that the facility was in fact included in the Master Agreement. EnCompass LLC 21 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 42 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3.3 Other Implementation Tasks 6. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful com ponents of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. Irriggtion rehabilitation Per the Master Agreement, the project was to construct or renovate five irrigation systems. Project reporting indicates that ASKS pa rtneri Shelter for ljfeF has exceeded project goals by constructing or renovating 23 irrigation systems. The evaluation team was not able to independently verify these stated project outputs due to time and security constraints. However, interviews with SFL revealed that the project exceeded its irrigation targets because some of the work involved gate rehabilitation (which is cheaper than rehabilitating a reservoir]. in addition, SFL noted that communities provided volunteer laborr thereby reducing the cost of the work. SFt?s October 2013 achievement report notes a signi?cant increase in produetion of other crops due in part to the rehabilitated irrigation systems. A section of the report is reproduced here (the evaluation team Was unable to corroborate the findings noted in the report}: According to a random survey of 5 SI irrigation beneficiaries, 513 stated that they had increased the amount of irrigated iand that couid be cultivated for a second growing season as resoit of the project, and all stated that irrigation efficiency on their land had improved. A totai of250 of the beneficiaries in terviEWEd reported that they were growing crops for the first time in a seoond season as a result of the improved irrigation systems. The others mostly were only growing crops such as aifoifa and ciover prior to the improvement in irrigation systems. After improvement of the irrigation tems, a larger number offarm ers started to grow rice, mungbeans and soybeans. As part of the above mentioned random sample survay 200% increase in tomato and other second season crops was reported. (SFL SARAI Achievement Report, October 2013) The field team visited two water intake irrigation rehabilitation projects in different villages in Bahark District of Taithar. Other visits were not possible for security reasons and the distance from Taloqan city. These intakes have been used by the farmers for a long time, and maintained by the farmers using traditional methods. Exhibit 2? details some results of the rehabilitation effort as reported by farmers. Exhibit'i: Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers I Before the reconstruction. the intake needed repair an average of 3?10 times each year. The new system requires less labor. I The old style maintenance was highly labor Intensive, requiring hundreds of people to work for one ortwo weeks. The new is easier to maintain. - PrevioLIsly, diaputes arose with semi-nannies battens-z there was no mazhanism to regulate the water flow. Ifwater was needed,. the farmers diverted all the water, disrupting the water flowing The new structures are better managed and these disputes no longer oocur. EnCompass LLC 22 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 43 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3.3 Other Implementation Tasks 6. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful com ponents of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. Irriggtion rehabilitation Per the Master Agreement, the project was to construct or renovate five irrigation systems. Project reporting indicates that ASKS pa rtneri Shelter for ljfeF has exceeded project goals by constructing or renovating 23 irrigation systems. The evaluation team was not able to independently verify these stated project outputs due to time and security constraints. However, interviews with SFL revealed that the project exceeded its irrigation targets because some of the work involved gate rehabilitation (which is cheaper than rehabilitating a reservoir]. in addition, SFL noted that communities provided volunteer laborr thereby reducing the cost of the work. SFt?s October 2013 achievement report notes a signi?cant increase in produetion of other crops due in part to the rehabilitated irrigation systems. A section of the report is reproduced here (the evaluation team Was unable to corroborate the findings noted in the report}: According to a random survey of 5 SI irrigation beneficiaries, 513 stated that they had increased the amount of irrigated iand that couid be cultivated for a second growing season as resoit of the project, and all stated that irrigation efficiency on their land had improved. A totai of250 of the beneficiaries in terviEWEd reported that they were growing crops for the first time in a seoond season as a result of the improved irrigation systems. The others mostly were only growing crops such as aifoifa and ciover prior to the improvement in irrigation systems. After improvement of the irrigation tems, a larger number offarm ers started to grow rice, mungbeans and soybeans. As part of the above mentioned random sample survay 200% increase in tomato and other second season crops was reported. (SFL SARAI Achievement Report, October 2013) The field team visited two water intake irrigation rehabilitation projects in different villages in Bahark District of Taithar. Other visits were not possible for security reasons and the distance from Taloqan city. These intakes have been used by the farmers for a long time, and maintained by the farmers using traditional methods. Exhibit 2? details some results of the rehabilitation effort as reported by farmers. Exhibit'i: Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers I Before the reconstruction. the intake needed repair an average of 3?10 times each year. The new system requires less labor. I The old style maintenance was highly labor Intensive, requiring hundreds of people to work for one ortwo weeks. The new is easier to maintain. - PrevioLIsly, diaputes arose with semi-nannies battens-z there was no mazhanism to regulate the water flow. Ifwater was needed,. the farmers diverted all the water, disrupting the water flowing The new structures are better managed and these disputes no longer oocur. EnCompass LLC 22 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 43 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3.3 Other Implementation Tasks 6. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful com ponents of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. Irriggtion rehabilitation Per the Master Agreement, the project was to construct or renovate five irrigation systems. Project reporting indicates that ASKS pa rtneri Shelter for ljfeF has exceeded project goals by constructing or renovating 23 irrigation systems. The evaluation team was not able to independently verify these stated project outputs due to time and security constraints. However, interviews with SFL revealed that the project exceeded its irrigation targets because some of the work involved gate rehabilitation (which is cheaper than rehabilitating a reservoir]. in addition, SFL noted that communities provided volunteer laborr thereby reducing the cost of the work. SFt?s October 2013 achievement report notes a signi?cant increase in produetion of other crops due in part to the rehabilitated irrigation systems. A section of the report is reproduced here (the evaluation team Was unable to corroborate the findings noted in the report}: According to a random survey of 5 SI irrigation beneficiaries, 513 stated that they had increased the amount of irrigated iand that couid be cultivated for a second growing season as resoit of the project, and all stated that irrigation efficiency on their land had improved. A totai of250 of the beneficiaries in terviEWEd reported that they were growing crops for the first time in a seoond season as a result of the improved irrigation systems. The others mostly were only growing crops such as aifoifa and ciover prior to the improvement in irrigation systems. After improvement of the irrigation tems, a larger number offarm ers started to grow rice, mungbeans and soybeans. As part of the above mentioned random sample survay 200% increase in tomato and other second season crops was reported. (SFL SARAI Achievement Report, October 2013) The field team visited two water intake irrigation rehabilitation projects in different villages in Bahark District of Taithar. Other visits were not possible for security reasons and the distance from Taloqan city. These intakes have been used by the farmers for a long time, and maintained by the farmers using traditional methods. Exhibit 2? details some results of the rehabilitation effort as reported by farmers. Exhibit'i: Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers I Before the reconstruction. the intake needed repair an average of 3?10 times each year. The new system requires less labor. I The old style maintenance was highly labor Intensive, requiring hundreds of people to work for one ortwo weeks. The new is easier to maintain. - PrevioLIsly, diaputes arose with semi-nannies battens-z there was no mazhanism to regulate the water flow. Ifwater was needed,. the farmers diverted all the water, disrupting the water flowing The new structures are better managed and these disputes no longer oocur. EnCompass LLC 22 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 43 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 3.3 Other Implementation Tasks 6. Road and irrigation system rehabilitation has been useful to beneficiaries and have been successful com ponents of the project when viewed as standalone interventions. However, this work has not contributed to advancing the soy value chain, in part because of the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. Irriggtion rehabilitation Per the Master Agreement, the project was to construct or renovate five irrigation systems. Project reporting indicates that ASKS pa rtneri Shelter for ljfeF has exceeded project goals by constructing or renovating 23 irrigation systems. The evaluation team was not able to independently verify these stated project outputs due to time and security constraints. However, interviews with SFL revealed that the project exceeded its irrigation targets because some of the work involved gate rehabilitation (which is cheaper than rehabilitating a reservoir]. in addition, SFL noted that communities provided volunteer laborr thereby reducing the cost of the work. SFt?s October 2013 achievement report notes a signi?cant increase in produetion of other crops due in part to the rehabilitated irrigation systems. A section of the report is reproduced here (the evaluation team Was unable to corroborate the findings noted in the report}: According to a random survey of 5 SI irrigation beneficiaries, 513 stated that they had increased the amount of irrigated iand that couid be cultivated for a second growing season as resoit of the project, and all stated that irrigation efficiency on their land had improved. A totai of250 of the beneficiaries in terviEWEd reported that they were growing crops for the first time in a seoond season as a result of the improved irrigation systems. The others mostly were only growing crops such as aifoifa and ciover prior to the improvement in irrigation systems. After improvement of the irrigation tems, a larger number offarm ers started to grow rice, mungbeans and soybeans. As part of the above mentioned random sample survay 200% increase in tomato and other second season crops was reported. (SFL SARAI Achievement Report, October 2013) The field team visited two water intake irrigation rehabilitation projects in different villages in Bahark District of Taithar. Other visits were not possible for security reasons and the distance from Taloqan city. These intakes have been used by the farmers for a long time, and maintained by the farmers using traditional methods. Exhibit 2? details some results of the rehabilitation effort as reported by farmers. Exhibit'i: Results of irrigation rehabilitation as reported by farmers I Before the reconstruction. the intake needed repair an average of 3?10 times each year. The new system requires less labor. I The old style maintenance was highly labor Intensive, requiring hundreds of people to work for one ortwo weeks. The new is easier to maintain. - PrevioLIsly, diaputes arose with semi-nannies battens-z there was no mazhanism to regulate the water flow. Ifwater was needed,. the farmers diverted all the water, disrupting the water flowing The new structures are better managed and these disputes no longer oocur. EnCompass LLC 22 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 43 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 I Previouely farmers Were cutting trees and dropping them In the main canal to divert Water to secondary canals. This is now no longer needed so there has been a positive environmental effect. Gates, checks and turnout structures function correctly but tlrere aresome complications resulting from SFL's rehabilitation efforts. In one example, the diversion point where water Is pushed into one of the secondary canals is ?lled with loose soil without compaction or the planting of trees to provide a firm structure to the banks of the main canal?. Subsequently the bank has been eroded by water, and erosion is progressing to the nearestfoothill. Backfilling of the constructed and rehabilitated intake walls has not been clone correctlyand thsaraas behind the intake walls have filled with water, which threatens the durability of the construction- Site visits to two irrigation rehabilitation sites revealed poorly chosen channels, collapsing banks, and soil erosion (Exhibit B). This was due- in part to soil not having been properly oorn pacted behind the canal banks, and a lack of replanting of the protective vegetation that was uprooted during construction of irrigation and road structures. it is not possible to assess the contribution of the rehabilitated irrigation systems to soy production However, these interventions have not contributed significantly to the soybean value chain given the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. In addition, the plan to scale dotvn prodUction in Ta khar and ramp up in Balkh puts in question the long?term value of these projects in terms of the soybean value chain. Roads Per the Master Agreement, SFL I.ivas to rehabilitate 35 Exhibit 3: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that km of roads. Proiect reporting indicates that SFL has have been damaged as. soil has eroded exceeded targets by rehabilitating km of roads. The goal of the road construction was to allow transport to larger processing centers [including Mazar) as wall as improve access sites to local markets. Second category gravel roads are common in rural areas of Afghanistan to connect villages with the main district road, which is typically asphalted. interviews revealed that decisions on the development priorities were consistent to the local development plans. The provincial government of?cials endorse the effort becauee in theory it is a bottom?up approach, in assessing quality, engineers generally examine thickness of gravel and compaction. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation expressed satisfaction with the thickness of gravel on rehabilitated roads. The constrUEtion engineer of the public sector Directorate of Rural Rehabilitation also exprESsed his satisfaction on the road quality. achievement report from October 2013 outlined some of the bene?ts of the road construotion (the evaluation team was unable to corroborate the ?ndings presented below}: EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 44 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 I Previouely farmers Were cutting trees and dropping them In the main canal to divert Water to secondary canals. This is now no longer needed so there has been a positive environmental effect. Gates, checks and turnout structures function correctly but tlrere aresome complications resulting from SFL's rehabilitation efforts. In one example, the diversion point where water Is pushed into one of the secondary canals is ?lled with loose soil without compaction or the planting of trees to provide a firm structure to the banks of the main canal?. Subsequently the bank has been eroded by water, and erosion is progressing to the nearestfoothill. Backfilling of the constructed and rehabilitated intake walls has not been clone correctlyand thsaraas behind the intake walls have filled with water, which threatens the durability of the construction- Site visits to two irrigation rehabilitation sites revealed poorly chosen channels, collapsing banks, and soil erosion (Exhibit B). This was due- in part to soil not having been properly oorn pacted behind the canal banks, and a lack of replanting of the protective vegetation that was uprooted during construction of irrigation and road structures. it is not possible to assess the contribution of the rehabilitated irrigation systems to soy production However, these interventions have not contributed significantly to the soybean value chain given the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. In addition, the plan to scale dotvn prodUction in Ta khar and ramp up in Balkh puts in question the long?term value of these projects in terms of the soybean value chain. Roads Per the Master Agreement, SFL I.ivas to rehabilitate 35 Exhibit 3: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that km of roads. Proiect reporting indicates that SFL has have been damaged as. soil has eroded exceeded targets by rehabilitating km of roads. The goal of the road construction was to allow transport to larger processing centers [including Mazar) as wall as improve access sites to local markets. Second category gravel roads are common in rural areas of Afghanistan to connect villages with the main district road, which is typically asphalted. interviews revealed that decisions on the development priorities were consistent to the local development plans. The provincial government of?cials endorse the effort becauee in theory it is a bottom?up approach, in assessing quality, engineers generally examine thickness of gravel and compaction. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation expressed satisfaction with the thickness of gravel on rehabilitated roads. The constrUEtion engineer of the public sector Directorate of Rural Rehabilitation also exprESsed his satisfaction on the road quality. achievement report from October 2013 outlined some of the bene?ts of the road construotion (the evaluation team was unable to corroborate the ?ndings presented below}: EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 44 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 I Previouely farmers Were cutting trees and dropping them In the main canal to divert Water to secondary canals. This is now no longer needed so there has been a positive environmental effect. Gates, checks and turnout structures function correctly but tlrere aresome complications resulting from SFL's rehabilitation efforts. In one example, the diversion point where water Is pushed into one of the secondary canals is ?lled with loose soil without compaction or the planting of trees to provide a firm structure to the banks of the main canal?. Subsequently the bank has been eroded by water, and erosion is progressing to the nearestfoothill. Backfilling of the constructed and rehabilitated intake walls has not been clone correctlyand thsaraas behind the intake walls have filled with water, which threatens the durability of the construction- Site visits to two irrigation rehabilitation sites revealed poorly chosen channels, collapsing banks, and soil erosion (Exhibit B). This was due- in part to soil not having been properly oorn pacted behind the canal banks, and a lack of replanting of the protective vegetation that was uprooted during construction of irrigation and road structures. it is not possible to assess the contribution of the rehabilitated irrigation systems to soy production However, these interventions have not contributed significantly to the soybean value chain given the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. In addition, the plan to scale dotvn prodUction in Ta khar and ramp up in Balkh puts in question the long?term value of these projects in terms of the soybean value chain. Roads Per the Master Agreement, SFL I.ivas to rehabilitate 35 Exhibit 3: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that km of roads. Proiect reporting indicates that SFL has have been damaged as. soil has eroded exceeded targets by rehabilitating km of roads. The goal of the road construction was to allow transport to larger processing centers [including Mazar) as wall as improve access sites to local markets. Second category gravel roads are common in rural areas of Afghanistan to connect villages with the main district road, which is typically asphalted. interviews revealed that decisions on the development priorities were consistent to the local development plans. The provincial government of?cials endorse the effort becauee in theory it is a bottom?up approach, in assessing quality, engineers generally examine thickness of gravel and compaction. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation expressed satisfaction with the thickness of gravel on rehabilitated roads. The constrUEtion engineer of the public sector Directorate of Rural Rehabilitation also exprESsed his satisfaction on the road quality. achievement report from October 2013 outlined some of the bene?ts of the road construotion (the evaluation team was unable to corroborate the ?ndings presented below}: EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 44 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 I Previouely farmers Were cutting trees and dropping them In the main canal to divert Water to secondary canals. This is now no longer needed so there has been a positive environmental effect. Gates, checks and turnout structures function correctly but tlrere aresome complications resulting from SFL's rehabilitation efforts. In one example, the diversion point where water Is pushed into one of the secondary canals is ?lled with loose soil without compaction or the planting of trees to provide a firm structure to the banks of the main canal?. Subsequently the bank has been eroded by water, and erosion is progressing to the nearestfoothill. Backfilling of the constructed and rehabilitated intake walls has not been clone correctlyand thsaraas behind the intake walls have filled with water, which threatens the durability of the construction- Site visits to two irrigation rehabilitation sites revealed poorly chosen channels, collapsing banks, and soil erosion (Exhibit B). This was due- in part to soil not having been properly oorn pacted behind the canal banks, and a lack of replanting of the protective vegetation that was uprooted during construction of irrigation and road structures. it is not possible to assess the contribution of the rehabilitated irrigation systems to soy production However, these interventions have not contributed significantly to the soybean value chain given the distance between the production sites and the Afghan Soy Factory. In addition, the plan to scale dotvn prodUction in Ta khar and ramp up in Balkh puts in question the long?term value of these projects in terms of the soybean value chain. Roads Per the Master Agreement, SFL I.ivas to rehabilitate 35 Exhibit 3: Rehabilitated irrigation systems that km of roads. Proiect reporting indicates that SFL has have been damaged as. soil has eroded exceeded targets by rehabilitating km of roads. The goal of the road construction was to allow transport to larger processing centers [including Mazar) as wall as improve access sites to local markets. Second category gravel roads are common in rural areas of Afghanistan to connect villages with the main district road, which is typically asphalted. interviews revealed that decisions on the development priorities were consistent to the local development plans. The provincial government of?cials endorse the effort becauee in theory it is a bottom?up approach, in assessing quality, engineers generally examine thickness of gravel and compaction. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation expressed satisfaction with the thickness of gravel on rehabilitated roads. The constrUEtion engineer of the public sector Directorate of Rural Rehabilitation also exprESsed his satisfaction on the road quality. achievement report from October 2013 outlined some of the bene?ts of the road construotion (the evaluation team was unable to corroborate the ?ndings presented below}: EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 44 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I mom The Food projec? belie connected more than ?0 dgfferent communities to the regionoi, provincioi, and nationoi market and impacted more than 70,000 direct main outcome of this activity was to enhance ogricuiturol trade by or ieost 5036. According to random beneficiary survey of 323 road beneficiaries the time to market has decreased by more than hoif. Achievement Report, October. 2013} During interviews conducted with passersby along the reconstrUCte-d roadways, stakeholders responded positively regarding the road. For erra mple, one traveler noted the appropriate thickness of gravel and spoke of how helpful the rehabilitated road has been. The road has been especially helpful during harsh Weather conditions where it is otherwise difficult to transport agricultural produce or medical patients to the market or clinic. The field team met many merchants in the Takhar provincial grain market. They mentioned that, in general, road rehabiilta tion projects are Useful by improving ease of tra nsportation of prodUcts to market. The total length road rehabilitated through this project was only a short distance and the merchants felt that they could not comment on the small pa rt of a road that was rehabilitated. While the irrigation and road rehabilitation work can be considered as individual achieve-menrsr some stakeholders feel that this work has not contributed to a sustainable soy value chain because the factory is located in another province. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers (4 of 6 farmers interviewed} is that they considered the micro-credit component to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside of soy production. such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the. Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy prodUction. According to SFL reporting, 363 original loans were provided to direct bene?ciaries, and 374 paid back loans were redistributed to 37?! borrowers as of August 2013, of which 1,152 loans were for farm inputs. In email communications with the evaluation team however, approximately ?0 loan bene?ciaries requested seed inputs to replant in 2013I and 20 of those returned the inputs instead of planting them. The main purpose of the microcredit activity should have been to assure that soy farmers have access to inputs. Microcredit loans and other ?nancial implements are commonly Used for this purpose. SFL seems to have a set of protocols for distribution of inputs and for the provision of microcredit that were not linked to increasing soy production. We found that some participating farmers considered the n?licrocredit facility as compensation for their financial losses on soybean. Some farmers used the ns for different entrepreneurial activities. Fair selection of the microcreclit participants was dif?cult to analyze in die short time allDWEd because there is no clear written criteria for bene?ciary selection. Overall, the approach appeared acceptable berzause the partners are working with local community development councils as their main entry point. Some basic rules were in place for microcredit, collateral as these loans were disbursed to groups of 10?15 members and each member had the responsibility to make them available to his group members as and when needed. It was difficult to link the loans with the stated purpose and there were few links to soy production. Additional measures would be to ensure transparency on bene?ciary selection. EnCompass LLC 24 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 45 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I mom The Food projec? belie connected more than ?0 dgfferent communities to the regionoi, provincioi, and nationoi market and impacted more than 70,000 direct main outcome of this activity was to enhance ogricuiturol trade by or ieost 5036. According to random beneficiary survey of 323 road beneficiaries the time to market has decreased by more than hoif. Achievement Report, October. 2013} During interviews conducted with passersby along the reconstrUCte-d roadways, stakeholders responded positively regarding the road. For erra mple, one traveler noted the appropriate thickness of gravel and spoke of how helpful the rehabilitated road has been. The road has been especially helpful during harsh Weather conditions where it is otherwise difficult to transport agricultural produce or medical patients to the market or clinic. The field team met many merchants in the Takhar provincial grain market. They mentioned that, in general, road rehabiilta tion projects are Useful by improving ease of tra nsportation of prodUcts to market. The total length road rehabilitated through this project was only a short distance and the merchants felt that they could not comment on the small pa rt of a road that was rehabilitated. While the irrigation and road rehabilitation work can be considered as individual achieve-menrsr some stakeholders feel that this work has not contributed to a sustainable soy value chain because the factory is located in another province. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers (4 of 6 farmers interviewed} is that they considered the micro-credit component to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside of soy production. such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the. Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy prodUction. According to SFL reporting, 363 original loans were provided to direct bene?ciaries, and 374 paid back loans were redistributed to 37?! borrowers as of August 2013, of which 1,152 loans were for farm inputs. In email communications with the evaluation team however, approximately ?0 loan bene?ciaries requested seed inputs to replant in 2013I and 20 of those returned the inputs instead of planting them. The main purpose of the microcredit activity should have been to assure that soy farmers have access to inputs. Microcredit loans and other ?nancial implements are commonly Used for this purpose. SFL seems to have a set of protocols for distribution of inputs and for the provision of microcredit that were not linked to increasing soy production. We found that some participating farmers considered the n?licrocredit facility as compensation for their financial losses on soybean. Some farmers used the ns for different entrepreneurial activities. Fair selection of the microcreclit participants was dif?cult to analyze in die short time allDWEd because there is no clear written criteria for bene?ciary selection. Overall, the approach appeared acceptable berzause the partners are working with local community development councils as their main entry point. Some basic rules were in place for microcredit, collateral as these loans were disbursed to groups of 10?15 members and each member had the responsibility to make them available to his group members as and when needed. It was difficult to link the loans with the stated purpose and there were few links to soy production. Additional measures would be to ensure transparency on bene?ciary selection. EnCompass LLC 24 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 45 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I mom The Food projec? belie connected more than ?0 dgfferent communities to the regionoi, provincioi, and nationoi market and impacted more than 70,000 direct main outcome of this activity was to enhance ogricuiturol trade by or ieost 5036. According to random beneficiary survey of 323 road beneficiaries the time to market has decreased by more than hoif. Achievement Report, October. 2013} During interviews conducted with passersby along the reconstrUCte-d roadways, stakeholders responded positively regarding the road. For erra mple, one traveler noted the appropriate thickness of gravel and spoke of how helpful the rehabilitated road has been. The road has been especially helpful during harsh Weather conditions where it is otherwise difficult to transport agricultural produce or medical patients to the market or clinic. The field team met many merchants in the Takhar provincial grain market. They mentioned that, in general, road rehabiilta tion projects are Useful by improving ease of tra nsportation of prodUcts to market. The total length road rehabilitated through this project was only a short distance and the merchants felt that they could not comment on the small pa rt of a road that was rehabilitated. While the irrigation and road rehabilitation work can be considered as individual achieve-menrsr some stakeholders feel that this work has not contributed to a sustainable soy value chain because the factory is located in another province. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers (4 of 6 farmers interviewed} is that they considered the micro-credit component to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside of soy production. such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the. Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy prodUction. According to SFL reporting, 363 original loans were provided to direct bene?ciaries, and 374 paid back loans were redistributed to 37?! borrowers as of August 2013, of which 1,152 loans were for farm inputs. In email communications with the evaluation team however, approximately ?0 loan bene?ciaries requested seed inputs to replant in 2013I and 20 of those returned the inputs instead of planting them. The main purpose of the microcredit activity should have been to assure that soy farmers have access to inputs. Microcredit loans and other ?nancial implements are commonly Used for this purpose. SFL seems to have a set of protocols for distribution of inputs and for the provision of microcredit that were not linked to increasing soy production. We found that some participating farmers considered the n?licrocredit facility as compensation for their financial losses on soybean. Some farmers used the ns for different entrepreneurial activities. Fair selection of the microcreclit participants was dif?cult to analyze in die short time allDWEd because there is no clear written criteria for bene?ciary selection. Overall, the approach appeared acceptable berzause the partners are working with local community development councils as their main entry point. Some basic rules were in place for microcredit, collateral as these loans were disbursed to groups of 10?15 members and each member had the responsibility to make them available to his group members as and when needed. It was difficult to link the loans with the stated purpose and there were few links to soy production. Additional measures would be to ensure transparency on bene?ciary selection. EnCompass LLC 24 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 45 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I mom The Food projec? belie connected more than ?0 dgfferent communities to the regionoi, provincioi, and nationoi market and impacted more than 70,000 direct main outcome of this activity was to enhance ogricuiturol trade by or ieost 5036. According to random beneficiary survey of 323 road beneficiaries the time to market has decreased by more than hoif. Achievement Report, October. 2013} During interviews conducted with passersby along the reconstrUCte-d roadways, stakeholders responded positively regarding the road. For erra mple, one traveler noted the appropriate thickness of gravel and spoke of how helpful the rehabilitated road has been. The road has been especially helpful during harsh Weather conditions where it is otherwise difficult to transport agricultural produce or medical patients to the market or clinic. The field team met many merchants in the Takhar provincial grain market. They mentioned that, in general, road rehabiilta tion projects are Useful by improving ease of tra nsportation of prodUcts to market. The total length road rehabilitated through this project was only a short distance and the merchants felt that they could not comment on the small pa rt of a road that was rehabilitated. While the irrigation and road rehabilitation work can be considered as individual achieve-menrsr some stakeholders feel that this work has not contributed to a sustainable soy value chain because the factory is located in another province. The microcredit activity did not further the soy value chain. A response given by our admittedly small sample of farmers (4 of 6 farmers interviewed} is that they considered the micro-credit component to be compensation for their ?nancial losses related to soybean production. Farmers commonly used the loans for activities outside of soy production. such as investing in sheep. It is important to note that, per the. Master Agreement, the microcredit component did not need to be exclusively tied to soy prodUction. According to SFL reporting, 363 original loans were provided to direct bene?ciaries, and 374 paid back loans were redistributed to 37?! borrowers as of August 2013, of which 1,152 loans were for farm inputs. In email communications with the evaluation team however, approximately ?0 loan bene?ciaries requested seed inputs to replant in 2013I and 20 of those returned the inputs instead of planting them. The main purpose of the microcredit activity should have been to assure that soy farmers have access to inputs. Microcredit loans and other ?nancial implements are commonly Used for this purpose. SFL seems to have a set of protocols for distribution of inputs and for the provision of microcredit that were not linked to increasing soy production. We found that some participating farmers considered the n?licrocredit facility as compensation for their financial losses on soybean. Some farmers used the ns for different entrepreneurial activities. Fair selection of the microcreclit participants was dif?cult to analyze in die short time allDWEd because there is no clear written criteria for bene?ciary selection. Overall, the approach appeared acceptable berzause the partners are working with local community development councils as their main entry point. Some basic rules were in place for microcredit, collateral as these loans were disbursed to groups of 10?15 members and each member had the responsibility to make them available to his group members as and when needed. It was difficult to link the loans with the stated purpose and there were few links to soy production. Additional measures would be to ensure transparency on bene?ciary selection. EnCompass LLC 24 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 45 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02143514 Soybean produetion is mainly a male activity as they prepare the land, plant, and irrigate while the women take part in weeding, harvesting, cleaning, and less arduousjobs. The field team did not have an Opportunity to talk with women farmers for cultural reasons, but project documentation and interviewa with SFL staff indicate that 35% of the microfinance bene?ciaries were female.?1 According to the beneficiaries, the interest rate and payback times were appropriate. The interest rate Was 10 percent, which seems lower than is commonly charged in Afghanistan and elsewhere.? The loan of 20,000 AFN was released in two installments, with 10,000 AFN in the ?rst installment and a second installment of 10,000 AFN after six months. The SFL micro?nance manager told the ?eld team that nearly 100 percent of the ns are repaid, but that there is a problem with on?tirne payments. 8. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which Was able to overcome obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally prodL1ced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 330?430 MT per month (4500 MT per year) for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?oor, it would need 420 MT per month {5,000 MT per year]. According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 161.4 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack ofin-country produotion, there is widespread speculation that inputs for pr0cessing will be imported or that the factory will be brolten Up and equipment will be sold after project completion The factory seems to be doing well although its commissioning was a bit late. indeed, the factory was cited as a key success story by WISHH staff: from piece of land with nothing on it to having ilie facility insrolied and having the building put in place to house it i really has coma iong way since beginning of program. staff) The factory is still using USDA-supplied soybean. however. in order to function at full capacity the ASF needs 330?340 MT per month or 4,000 MT per year for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?our, it Would need 420 MT per month or 5,000 MT per year to function at full capacity. 1" If average production was 500 kg per jerib 14-15,000 jerib? would be needed to keep the factory running at full capacity year round. Indicative numbers can be chosen for ?nanctal calculations, but there is no way to estimate or predict a stable price for locally produced soy. This means that cost benefit analysis is not useful and that decision makers are working blind. A future stable price of Afghan soy cannot be estimated, making forward A female evaluator was in?country for the do to collection. However due to security constraints, she Was unable to travel to Takhar for interviews. I For example, the Rural Microcredlt 8: Livestock Support Program AIL funded by lFi??iD is charging interest rates from 12% to 20% depending on the type of the product. '5 Numbers supplied by SALT staff in an email November 19, 2013. i Assuming that the average is 500 kg?erib, provision must be made for farmers producing less than average. EnCompass LLC 25l SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 46 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02143514 Soybean produetion is mainly a male activity as they prepare the land, plant, and irrigate while the women take part in weeding, harvesting, cleaning, and less arduousjobs. The field team did not have an Opportunity to talk with women farmers for cultural reasons, but project documentation and interviewa with SFL staff indicate that 35% of the microfinance bene?ciaries were female.?1 According to the beneficiaries, the interest rate and payback times were appropriate. The interest rate Was 10 percent, which seems lower than is commonly charged in Afghanistan and elsewhere.? The loan of 20,000 AFN was released in two installments, with 10,000 AFN in the ?rst installment and a second installment of 10,000 AFN after six months. The SFL micro?nance manager told the ?eld team that nearly 100 percent of the ns are repaid, but that there is a problem with on?tirne payments. 8. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which Was able to overcome obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally prodL1ced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 330?430 MT per month (4500 MT per year) for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?oor, it would need 420 MT per month {5,000 MT per year]. According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 161.4 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack ofin-country produotion, there is widespread speculation that inputs for pr0cessing will be imported or that the factory will be brolten Up and equipment will be sold after project completion The factory seems to be doing well although its commissioning was a bit late. indeed, the factory was cited as a key success story by WISHH staff: from piece of land with nothing on it to having ilie facility insrolied and having the building put in place to house it i really has coma iong way since beginning of program. staff) The factory is still using USDA-supplied soybean. however. in order to function at full capacity the ASF needs 330?340 MT per month or 4,000 MT per year for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?our, it Would need 420 MT per month or 5,000 MT per year to function at full capacity. 1" If average production was 500 kg per jerib 14-15,000 jerib? would be needed to keep the factory running at full capacity year round. Indicative numbers can be chosen for ?nanctal calculations, but there is no way to estimate or predict a stable price for locally produced soy. This means that cost benefit analysis is not useful and that decision makers are working blind. A future stable price of Afghan soy cannot be estimated, making forward A female evaluator was in?country for the do to collection. However due to security constraints, she Was unable to travel to Takhar for interviews. I For example, the Rural Microcredlt 8: Livestock Support Program AIL funded by lFi??iD is charging interest rates from 12% to 20% depending on the type of the product. '5 Numbers supplied by SALT staff in an email November 19, 2013. i Assuming that the average is 500 kg?erib, provision must be made for farmers producing less than average. EnCompass LLC 25l SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 46 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02143514 Soybean produetion is mainly a male activity as they prepare the land, plant, and irrigate while the women take part in weeding, harvesting, cleaning, and less arduousjobs. The field team did not have an Opportunity to talk with women farmers for cultural reasons, but project documentation and interviewa with SFL staff indicate that 35% of the microfinance bene?ciaries were female.?1 According to the beneficiaries, the interest rate and payback times were appropriate. The interest rate Was 10 percent, which seems lower than is commonly charged in Afghanistan and elsewhere.? The loan of 20,000 AFN was released in two installments, with 10,000 AFN in the ?rst installment and a second installment of 10,000 AFN after six months. The SFL micro?nance manager told the ?eld team that nearly 100 percent of the ns are repaid, but that there is a problem with on?tirne payments. 8. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which Was able to overcome obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally prodL1ced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 330?430 MT per month (4500 MT per year) for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?oor, it would need 420 MT per month {5,000 MT per year]. According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 161.4 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack ofin-country produotion, there is widespread speculation that inputs for pr0cessing will be imported or that the factory will be brolten Up and equipment will be sold after project completion The factory seems to be doing well although its commissioning was a bit late. indeed, the factory was cited as a key success story by WISHH staff: from piece of land with nothing on it to having ilie facility insrolied and having the building put in place to house it i really has coma iong way since beginning of program. staff) The factory is still using USDA-supplied soybean. however. in order to function at full capacity the ASF needs 330?340 MT per month or 4,000 MT per year for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?our, it Would need 420 MT per month or 5,000 MT per year to function at full capacity. 1" If average production was 500 kg per jerib 14-15,000 jerib? would be needed to keep the factory running at full capacity year round. Indicative numbers can be chosen for ?nanctal calculations, but there is no way to estimate or predict a stable price for locally produced soy. This means that cost benefit analysis is not useful and that decision makers are working blind. A future stable price of Afghan soy cannot be estimated, making forward A female evaluator was in?country for the do to collection. However due to security constraints, she Was unable to travel to Takhar for interviews. I For example, the Rural Microcredlt 8: Livestock Support Program AIL funded by lFi??iD is charging interest rates from 12% to 20% depending on the type of the product. '5 Numbers supplied by SALT staff in an email November 19, 2013. i Assuming that the average is 500 kg?erib, provision must be made for farmers producing less than average. EnCompass LLC 25l SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 46 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02143514 Soybean produetion is mainly a male activity as they prepare the land, plant, and irrigate while the women take part in weeding, harvesting, cleaning, and less arduousjobs. The field team did not have an Opportunity to talk with women farmers for cultural reasons, but project documentation and interviewa with SFL staff indicate that 35% of the microfinance bene?ciaries were female.?1 According to the beneficiaries, the interest rate and payback times were appropriate. The interest rate Was 10 percent, which seems lower than is commonly charged in Afghanistan and elsewhere.? The loan of 20,000 AFN was released in two installments, with 10,000 AFN in the ?rst installment and a second installment of 10,000 AFN after six months. The SFL micro?nance manager told the ?eld team that nearly 100 percent of the ns are repaid, but that there is a problem with on?tirne payments. 8. The Afghan Soy Factory is operational, operational, largely due to the knowledge and experience of Sustainable Alternative Local Technologies which Was able to overcome obstacles to get the factory running with minimal delays. However, the lack of locally prodL1ced soybeans puts the sustainability of the factory in question. To function at full capacity, the factory needs 330?430 MT per month (4500 MT per year) for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?oor, it would need 420 MT per month {5,000 MT per year]. According to information supplied by SFL dated November 21, 2013, project farmers provided 161.4 MT of soybeans to the factory in 2013. The current intention is to turn the factory over to the Afghan business partners at the end of project implementation. Given a lack ofin-country produotion, there is widespread speculation that inputs for pr0cessing will be imported or that the factory will be brolten Up and equipment will be sold after project completion The factory seems to be doing well although its commissioning was a bit late. indeed, the factory was cited as a key success story by WISHH staff: from piece of land with nothing on it to having ilie facility insrolied and having the building put in place to house it i really has coma iong way since beginning of program. staff) The factory is still using USDA-supplied soybean. however. in order to function at full capacity the ASF needs 330?340 MT per month or 4,000 MT per year for soy meal. If the factory were producing soy ?our, it Would need 420 MT per month or 5,000 MT per year to function at full capacity. 1" If average production was 500 kg per jerib 14-15,000 jerib? would be needed to keep the factory running at full capacity year round. Indicative numbers can be chosen for ?nanctal calculations, but there is no way to estimate or predict a stable price for locally produced soy. This means that cost benefit analysis is not useful and that decision makers are working blind. A future stable price of Afghan soy cannot be estimated, making forward A female evaluator was in?country for the do to collection. However due to security constraints, she Was unable to travel to Takhar for interviews. I For example, the Rural Microcredlt 8: Livestock Support Program AIL funded by lFi??iD is charging interest rates from 12% to 20% depending on the type of the product. '5 Numbers supplied by SALT staff in an email November 19, 2013. i Assuming that the average is 500 kg?erib, provision must be made for farmers producing less than average. EnCompass LLC 25l SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 46 Midterm Evaiuation: Final Report 020514 planning, especially prodLIction contracts, more risli?yI at all levels of the value chain. Many stakeholders, including government officials and farmers, explained how important it is to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. Afghanistan imports thousands of tonnes of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed vvould save foreign enchange. The project competes with other soy buyers including NEI and private companies such as Rana Group, There are uncon?rmed reports that the 2013 purchase offer is over U53 TDD per ton while ASF is paying lust over USS 500. In an interview for the evaluation, Rana Group management claims to be matching the MEI price in all markets. As He na is collecting seed for sale, they can afford to pay more than processors. There are also unconfirmed reports that NEI is not paying its farmers as promised due to cash flow problems. If two, this undermines the credibility of the ASF when seeking to negotiate future predection contracts. 9. Despite being a task required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy ?our without an existing market supply did not further the goal of a sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA managEment resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-up, the initial oil anction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the ?rst planting season, tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition survey shovved that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution"; PARSA was responsible for the soy ?our distribution and the cooking seminarsand, per the Master Agreement and partner sub agreement, and indeed, monitoring data shows that 79.760 MT of soy ?our was distributed. PARSA and ASA were responsible for conducting a nutrition Impact survey, the goal being to determine via handgrip strength analysis, whether, after four months of soy flour in the diet of participating women, there was any in?uence on health. The survey was conducted by a dietician, and it was reported to the evaluation team that bene?ciaries saw positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report noted that it was not possible to directly attribute the change in health status to the soy distribution. Some interview respondents also noted the methodological limitations, given that there are a multitude of health factors to consider beyond soy consumption and, that the proiect did not have control over who ate the soy or how much was eaten. Meals are often shared and, there are reports offamilies selling their ration or giving it to animals. 18 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: As per the proposal, the soy flour distribution was specifically targeted during the winter months when other foods may be less available. The winter ration Was not linked to marketing activities. 19 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: Every evaluation on nutritional impact of food aid distribution would by its vary nature have to have an assumption on actual consumption of food aid unless it Was in a thera peutic setting where consumption can be monitored. EnCompass LLC 28 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 47 Midterm Evaiuation: Final Report 020514 planning, especially prodLIction contracts, more risli?yI at all levels of the value chain. Many stakeholders, including government officials and farmers, explained how important it is to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. Afghanistan imports thousands of tonnes of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed vvould save foreign enchange. The project competes with other soy buyers including NEI and private companies such as Rana Group, There are uncon?rmed reports that the 2013 purchase offer is over U53 TDD per ton while ASF is paying lust over USS 500. In an interview for the evaluation, Rana Group management claims to be matching the MEI price in all markets. As He na is collecting seed for sale, they can afford to pay more than processors. There are also unconfirmed reports that NEI is not paying its farmers as promised due to cash flow problems. If two, this undermines the credibility of the ASF when seeking to negotiate future predection contracts. 9. Despite being a task required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy ?our without an existing market supply did not further the goal of a sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA managEment resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-up, the initial oil anction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the ?rst planting season, tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition survey shovved that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution"; PARSA was responsible for the soy ?our distribution and the cooking seminarsand, per the Master Agreement and partner sub agreement, and indeed, monitoring data shows that 79.760 MT of soy ?our was distributed. PARSA and ASA were responsible for conducting a nutrition Impact survey, the goal being to determine via handgrip strength analysis, whether, after four months of soy flour in the diet of participating women, there was any in?uence on health. The survey was conducted by a dietician, and it was reported to the evaluation team that bene?ciaries saw positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report noted that it was not possible to directly attribute the change in health status to the soy distribution. Some interview respondents also noted the methodological limitations, given that there are a multitude of health factors to consider beyond soy consumption and, that the proiect did not have control over who ate the soy or how much was eaten. Meals are often shared and, there are reports offamilies selling their ration or giving it to animals. 18 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: As per the proposal, the soy flour distribution was specifically targeted during the winter months when other foods may be less available. The winter ration Was not linked to marketing activities. 19 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: Every evaluation on nutritional impact of food aid distribution would by its vary nature have to have an assumption on actual consumption of food aid unless it Was in a thera peutic setting where consumption can be monitored. EnCompass LLC 28 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 47 Midterm Evaiuation: Final Report 020514 planning, especially prodLIction contracts, more risli?yI at all levels of the value chain. Many stakeholders, including government officials and farmers, explained how important it is to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. Afghanistan imports thousands of tonnes of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed vvould save foreign enchange. The project competes with other soy buyers including NEI and private companies such as Rana Group, There are uncon?rmed reports that the 2013 purchase offer is over U53 TDD per ton while ASF is paying lust over USS 500. In an interview for the evaluation, Rana Group management claims to be matching the MEI price in all markets. As He na is collecting seed for sale, they can afford to pay more than processors. There are also unconfirmed reports that NEI is not paying its farmers as promised due to cash flow problems. If two, this undermines the credibility of the ASF when seeking to negotiate future predection contracts. 9. Despite being a task required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy ?our without an existing market supply did not further the goal of a sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA managEment resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-up, the initial oil anction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the ?rst planting season, tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition survey shovved that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution"; PARSA was responsible for the soy ?our distribution and the cooking seminarsand, per the Master Agreement and partner sub agreement, and indeed, monitoring data shows that 79.760 MT of soy ?our was distributed. PARSA and ASA were responsible for conducting a nutrition Impact survey, the goal being to determine via handgrip strength analysis, whether, after four months of soy flour in the diet of participating women, there was any in?uence on health. The survey was conducted by a dietician, and it was reported to the evaluation team that bene?ciaries saw positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report noted that it was not possible to directly attribute the change in health status to the soy distribution. Some interview respondents also noted the methodological limitations, given that there are a multitude of health factors to consider beyond soy consumption and, that the proiect did not have control over who ate the soy or how much was eaten. Meals are often shared and, there are reports offamilies selling their ration or giving it to animals. 18 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: As per the proposal, the soy flour distribution was specifically targeted during the winter months when other foods may be less available. The winter ration Was not linked to marketing activities. 19 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: Every evaluation on nutritional impact of food aid distribution would by its vary nature have to have an assumption on actual consumption of food aid unless it Was in a thera peutic setting where consumption can be monitored. EnCompass LLC 28 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 47 Midterm Evaiuation: Final Report 020514 planning, especially prodLIction contracts, more risli?yI at all levels of the value chain. Many stakeholders, including government officials and farmers, explained how important it is to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. Afghanistan imports thousands of tonnes of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed vvould save foreign enchange. The project competes with other soy buyers including NEI and private companies such as Rana Group, There are uncon?rmed reports that the 2013 purchase offer is over U53 TDD per ton while ASF is paying lust over USS 500. In an interview for the evaluation, Rana Group management claims to be matching the MEI price in all markets. As He na is collecting seed for sale, they can afford to pay more than processors. There are also unconfirmed reports that NEI is not paying its farmers as promised due to cash flow problems. If two, this undermines the credibility of the ASF when seeking to negotiate future predection contracts. 9. Despite being a task required by the Master Agreement, distributing soy ?our without an existing market supply did not further the goal of a sustainable soybean value chain. The distribution diverted ASA managEment resources from other time-sensitive activities, including project set-up, the initial oil anction, renegotiating subcontracts, and sourcing and importing seed for the ?rst planting season, tasks that were pressing for attention. A nutrition survey shovved that bene?ciaries had positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report acknowledged the methodological challenges in attributing health outcomes with the soy distribution"; PARSA was responsible for the soy ?our distribution and the cooking seminarsand, per the Master Agreement and partner sub agreement, and indeed, monitoring data shows that 79.760 MT of soy ?our was distributed. PARSA and ASA were responsible for conducting a nutrition Impact survey, the goal being to determine via handgrip strength analysis, whether, after four months of soy flour in the diet of participating women, there was any in?uence on health. The survey was conducted by a dietician, and it was reported to the evaluation team that bene?ciaries saw positive health outcomes in terms of nutrition maintenance, although the report noted that it was not possible to directly attribute the change in health status to the soy distribution. Some interview respondents also noted the methodological limitations, given that there are a multitude of health factors to consider beyond soy consumption and, that the proiect did not have control over who ate the soy or how much was eaten. Meals are often shared and, there are reports offamilies selling their ration or giving it to animals. 18 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: As per the proposal, the soy flour distribution was specifically targeted during the winter months when other foods may be less available. The winter ration Was not linked to marketing activities. 19 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: Every evaluation on nutritional impact of food aid distribution would by its vary nature have to have an assumption on actual consumption of food aid unless it Was in a thera peutic setting where consumption can be monitored. EnCompass LLC 28 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 47 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report UZlOSl'lii 3.4 Marketing Soy Products :10. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is supported by national import ?gures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy-wheat flour blends make it advantageous to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy ?our to their product.m Respondents repeatedly quoted high ?gures for and yearly importation of animal feeds and feed additives. These numbers seldom matched each other. but were nonetheless very high. Without exception, respondents felt that this represented a high expense, huge loss of foreign exchange, and a vulnerability to the country. Malnourishment is a Well-known and pervasive critical problem in Mghanistan, particularly of women and children. Health issues related to poor nutrition are common. The addition of soy flour to diets Would be an inexpensive way to acid protein to diets. 11. The pilot activity of and Rehabilitation Servicras for Afghanistan (PARSA) with Women? owned community bakeries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the bakeries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be rEplicated and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. The PAHSA pilot activity in women's bakeries is a small activity within SARAI but it is one of its success stories. A cultural tradition found across Afghanistan is the community bakery. These are often owned by women or husband and wife teams. These bakeries have two functions. First, the women bake bread that is kneaded and raised at home by Women, collecting a commission of cash or bread dough. Second, the women bake bread for sale either at the bakery or the husband takes the bread to the market to sell. PARSA has introduced it] women bakers in Mazar and 1B in Kabul to soy~wheat bread formulations with good success. The soy-wheat breads stale more slowly than wheat breads and can be promoted as being more nutritious. Women bakers interviewed by the evaluation team report that they are happy with the innovation. The cost and availability of soy flour has proved to be problematic, however. Une bakery owner in lta bul reported that she no longer used soy flour after the initial SARAI grant Was used up. It is interesting to note that PARSA's systEm of providing initial production inputs to these bakers on a grant and microcredit basis is not seen by SARAI management or partners as a microcredit activity. 3.5 Management 12. SARAI has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors in In response to this finding, ASA noted that Afghanista also imports over 90% of its edible oil. EnCompass LLC 27 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 48 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report UZlOSl'lii 3.4 Marketing Soy Products :10. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is supported by national import ?gures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy-wheat flour blends make it advantageous to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy ?our to their product.m Respondents repeatedly quoted high ?gures for and yearly importation of animal feeds and feed additives. These numbers seldom matched each other. but were nonetheless very high. Without exception, respondents felt that this represented a high expense, huge loss of foreign exchange, and a vulnerability to the country. Malnourishment is a Well-known and pervasive critical problem in Mghanistan, particularly of women and children. Health issues related to poor nutrition are common. The addition of soy flour to diets Would be an inexpensive way to acid protein to diets. 11. The pilot activity of and Rehabilitation Servicras for Afghanistan (PARSA) with Women? owned community bakeries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the bakeries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be rEplicated and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. The PAHSA pilot activity in women's bakeries is a small activity within SARAI but it is one of its success stories. A cultural tradition found across Afghanistan is the community bakery. These are often owned by women or husband and wife teams. These bakeries have two functions. First, the women bake bread that is kneaded and raised at home by Women, collecting a commission of cash or bread dough. Second, the women bake bread for sale either at the bakery or the husband takes the bread to the market to sell. PARSA has introduced it] women bakers in Mazar and 1B in Kabul to soy~wheat bread formulations with good success. The soy-wheat breads stale more slowly than wheat breads and can be promoted as being more nutritious. Women bakers interviewed by the evaluation team report that they are happy with the innovation. The cost and availability of soy flour has proved to be problematic, however. Une bakery owner in lta bul reported that she no longer used soy flour after the initial SARAI grant Was used up. It is interesting to note that PARSA's systEm of providing initial production inputs to these bakers on a grant and microcredit basis is not seen by SARAI management or partners as a microcredit activity. 3.5 Management 12. SARAI has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors in In response to this finding, ASA noted that Afghanista also imports over 90% of its edible oil. EnCompass LLC 27 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 48 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report UZlOSl'lii 3.4 Marketing Soy Products :10. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is supported by national import ?gures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy-wheat flour blends make it advantageous to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy ?our to their product.m Respondents repeatedly quoted high ?gures for and yearly importation of animal feeds and feed additives. These numbers seldom matched each other. but were nonetheless very high. Without exception, respondents felt that this represented a high expense, huge loss of foreign exchange, and a vulnerability to the country. Malnourishment is a Well-known and pervasive critical problem in Mghanistan, particularly of women and children. Health issues related to poor nutrition are common. The addition of soy flour to diets Would be an inexpensive way to acid protein to diets. 11. The pilot activity of and Rehabilitation Servicras for Afghanistan (PARSA) with Women? owned community bakeries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the bakeries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be rEplicated and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. The PAHSA pilot activity in women's bakeries is a small activity within SARAI but it is one of its success stories. A cultural tradition found across Afghanistan is the community bakery. These are often owned by women or husband and wife teams. These bakeries have two functions. First, the women bake bread that is kneaded and raised at home by Women, collecting a commission of cash or bread dough. Second, the women bake bread for sale either at the bakery or the husband takes the bread to the market to sell. PARSA has introduced it] women bakers in Mazar and 1B in Kabul to soy~wheat bread formulations with good success. The soy-wheat breads stale more slowly than wheat breads and can be promoted as being more nutritious. Women bakers interviewed by the evaluation team report that they are happy with the innovation. The cost and availability of soy flour has proved to be problematic, however. Une bakery owner in lta bul reported that she no longer used soy flour after the initial SARAI grant Was used up. It is interesting to note that PARSA's systEm of providing initial production inputs to these bakers on a grant and microcredit basis is not seen by SARAI management or partners as a microcredit activity. 3.5 Management 12. SARAI has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors in In response to this finding, ASA noted that Afghanista also imports over 90% of its edible oil. EnCompass LLC 27 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 48 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report UZlOSl'lii 3.4 Marketing Soy Products :10. Based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, it appears that developing a market for soy meal and soy ?our seems to present no important challenges. There is widespread belief among stakeholders that it is important to develop an indigenous soy industry for animal feed. This is supported by national import ?gures. Afghanistan imports thousands of tons of poultry feed alone and the availability of locally produced ingredients and mixed feed would save foreign exchange. The technical advantages of soy-wheat flour blends make it advantageous to bakers and consumers, thus supporting favorable market conditions. Bread bakers, pasta manufacturers, and confectioners expressed willingness to add soy ?our to their product.m Respondents repeatedly quoted high ?gures for and yearly importation of animal feeds and feed additives. These numbers seldom matched each other. but were nonetheless very high. Without exception, respondents felt that this represented a high expense, huge loss of foreign exchange, and a vulnerability to the country. Malnourishment is a Well-known and pervasive critical problem in Mghanistan, particularly of women and children. Health issues related to poor nutrition are common. The addition of soy flour to diets Would be an inexpensive way to acid protein to diets. 11. The pilot activity of and Rehabilitation Servicras for Afghanistan (PARSA) with Women? owned community bakeries has not provided suf?cient data to show empirical success. However, the bakeries do appear to be thriving and well accepted by the entrepreneurs. Based on observation and discussions with stakeholders, these bakeries seem to be a promising activity that could easily be rEplicated and that can be scaled at a pace paralleling the availability of soy flour. The PAHSA pilot activity in women's bakeries is a small activity within SARAI but it is one of its success stories. A cultural tradition found across Afghanistan is the community bakery. These are often owned by women or husband and wife teams. These bakeries have two functions. First, the women bake bread that is kneaded and raised at home by Women, collecting a commission of cash or bread dough. Second, the women bake bread for sale either at the bakery or the husband takes the bread to the market to sell. PARSA has introduced it] women bakers in Mazar and 1B in Kabul to soy~wheat bread formulations with good success. The soy-wheat breads stale more slowly than wheat breads and can be promoted as being more nutritious. Women bakers interviewed by the evaluation team report that they are happy with the innovation. The cost and availability of soy flour has proved to be problematic, however. Une bakery owner in lta bul reported that she no longer used soy flour after the initial SARAI grant Was used up. It is interesting to note that PARSA's systEm of providing initial production inputs to these bakers on a grant and microcredit basis is not seen by SARAI management or partners as a microcredit activity. 3.5 Management 12. SARAI has struggled with staf?ng capacity in-country. The project has had three country directors in In response to this finding, ASA noted that Afghanista also imports over 90% of its edible oil. EnCompass LLC 27 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 48 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in?country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have been chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. in general, the number and technical background of the ?eld staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Talooan seemed to bare been focused on infrastructure (road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was liker due to the education background of staff and the organization's historical focus on construction. Soybean production, the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seam to have received inadeouate attention. Many stakeholders noted the rapid staff turnover and lack of experience of some EARN staff: Thefirst country director did not have ogricuituroi experience. The tricky part in production is the the first country director had no experience with farmers, subsistence, or voide chains. The second country director didn't have ogricuituroi experience either. stakeholder) What needed was a production manager and a permanent ieaci ogmnornist, and in the first turn years, there were four expat agronomists. it was a revolving door and it Was extra-raer cii?ficuit to through. You need continuity in the fiel'd with farmers. sta keholder] 15. This evaluation team did not assess NEl's capacity to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the first few months of implementation, {immediately before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the of success for soy introduction. During interviews, NEI and ASA each noted that they parted company within months of signing the Master Agreement because they could not agree on the terms of engagement. Outside stakeholders question the reasons for the split, but the results of the split are clear. NEI Is not the most experienced development agency in Afghanistan and it is Iikely that they would have had trouble reaching a high production capacity in three years. By comparison, NEI has more experience with soy research and soy extension than SFL and, as such, might have been on the ground more quickly for the 2011 growing season. 14. Interview and observation data indicate that project goals, particularly related to the soy value chain, have been undermined by SFL's inadequate management of farmer training, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project?s challenges. lf farmers are to grow soy pro?tably, they must be adequately supported by an agriculture extension system. The government does not include soy in its extension outreach program, although some projects are supplementing the government of the provincial agriculture offices to support soy. Training ofagriculture extension of?cers is crucial to establishing soy. As noted above, SF provided training to 13,000 farmers. However, in some respects, the SFL extension program was not adequately Conceived or delivered. This evaluation did not examine the details ofthe SARAI agriculture extension EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 49 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in?country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have been chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. in general, the number and technical background of the ?eld staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Talooan seemed to bare been focused on infrastructure (road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was liker due to the education background of staff and the organization's historical focus on construction. Soybean production, the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seam to have received inadeouate attention. Many stakeholders noted the rapid staff turnover and lack of experience of some EARN staff: Thefirst country director did not have ogricuituroi experience. The tricky part in production is the the first country director had no experience with farmers, subsistence, or voide chains. The second country director didn't have ogricuituroi experience either. stakeholder) What needed was a production manager and a permanent ieaci ogmnornist, and in the first turn years, there were four expat agronomists. it was a revolving door and it Was extra-raer cii?ficuit to through. You need continuity in the fiel'd with farmers. sta keholder] 15. This evaluation team did not assess NEl's capacity to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the first few months of implementation, {immediately before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the of success for soy introduction. During interviews, NEI and ASA each noted that they parted company within months of signing the Master Agreement because they could not agree on the terms of engagement. Outside stakeholders question the reasons for the split, but the results of the split are clear. NEI Is not the most experienced development agency in Afghanistan and it is Iikely that they would have had trouble reaching a high production capacity in three years. By comparison, NEI has more experience with soy research and soy extension than SFL and, as such, might have been on the ground more quickly for the 2011 growing season. 14. Interview and observation data indicate that project goals, particularly related to the soy value chain, have been undermined by SFL's inadequate management of farmer training, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project?s challenges. lf farmers are to grow soy pro?tably, they must be adequately supported by an agriculture extension system. The government does not include soy in its extension outreach program, although some projects are supplementing the government of the provincial agriculture offices to support soy. Training ofagriculture extension of?cers is crucial to establishing soy. As noted above, SF provided training to 13,000 farmers. However, in some respects, the SFL extension program was not adequately Conceived or delivered. This evaluation did not examine the details ofthe SARAI agriculture extension EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 49 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in?country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have been chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. in general, the number and technical background of the ?eld staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Talooan seemed to bare been focused on infrastructure (road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was liker due to the education background of staff and the organization's historical focus on construction. Soybean production, the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seam to have received inadeouate attention. Many stakeholders noted the rapid staff turnover and lack of experience of some EARN staff: Thefirst country director did not have ogricuituroi experience. The tricky part in production is the the first country director had no experience with farmers, subsistence, or voide chains. The second country director didn't have ogricuituroi experience either. stakeholder) What needed was a production manager and a permanent ieaci ogmnornist, and in the first turn years, there were four expat agronomists. it was a revolving door and it Was extra-raer cii?ficuit to through. You need continuity in the fiel'd with farmers. sta keholder] 15. This evaluation team did not assess NEl's capacity to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the first few months of implementation, {immediately before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the of success for soy introduction. During interviews, NEI and ASA each noted that they parted company within months of signing the Master Agreement because they could not agree on the terms of engagement. Outside stakeholders question the reasons for the split, but the results of the split are clear. NEI Is not the most experienced development agency in Afghanistan and it is Iikely that they would have had trouble reaching a high production capacity in three years. By comparison, NEI has more experience with soy research and soy extension than SFL and, as such, might have been on the ground more quickly for the 2011 growing season. 14. Interview and observation data indicate that project goals, particularly related to the soy value chain, have been undermined by SFL's inadequate management of farmer training, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project?s challenges. lf farmers are to grow soy pro?tably, they must be adequately supported by an agriculture extension system. The government does not include soy in its extension outreach program, although some projects are supplementing the government of the provincial agriculture offices to support soy. Training ofagriculture extension of?cers is crucial to establishing soy. As noted above, SF provided training to 13,000 farmers. However, in some respects, the SFL extension program was not adequately Conceived or delivered. This evaluation did not examine the details ofthe SARAI agriculture extension EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 49 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 three years and SFL has had five expatriate agronomists in the same period. There is a sense among stakeholders that leadership in?country did not have the requisite experience in agriculture or rural development to oversee the project. Short?term technical assistance has not been well managed and the consultants deployed, many of whom have been chosen from within ASA and affiliates, have been of uneven quality. Within SFL, the staf?ng gaps seem to have undermined implementation. in general, the number and technical background of the ?eld staff was appropriate at the level of technical and support staff, but SFL leadership in Talooan seemed to bare been focused on infrastructure (road and irrigation construction] rather than on agriculture. This was liker due to the education background of staff and the organization's historical focus on construction. Soybean production, the most important SARAI component, and its attendant microfinance for production, seam to have received inadeouate attention. Many stakeholders noted the rapid staff turnover and lack of experience of some EARN staff: Thefirst country director did not have ogricuituroi experience. The tricky part in production is the the first country director had no experience with farmers, subsistence, or voide chains. The second country director didn't have ogricuituroi experience either. stakeholder) What needed was a production manager and a permanent ieaci ogmnornist, and in the first turn years, there were four expat agronomists. it was a revolving door and it Was extra-raer cii?ficuit to through. You need continuity in the fiel'd with farmers. sta keholder] 15. This evaluation team did not assess NEl's capacity to produce soy, but the loss of NEI as the production partner in the first few months of implementation, {immediately before the first planting season] has had a negative impact on the of success for soy introduction. During interviews, NEI and ASA each noted that they parted company within months of signing the Master Agreement because they could not agree on the terms of engagement. Outside stakeholders question the reasons for the split, but the results of the split are clear. NEI Is not the most experienced development agency in Afghanistan and it is Iikely that they would have had trouble reaching a high production capacity in three years. By comparison, NEI has more experience with soy research and soy extension than SFL and, as such, might have been on the ground more quickly for the 2011 growing season. 14. Interview and observation data indicate that project goals, particularly related to the soy value chain, have been undermined by SFL's inadequate management of farmer training, microcredit, and road and irrigation rehabilitation. SFL's lack of appropriate skills and unwillingness to modify its own agenda and operating processes during SARAI implementation has contributed to the project?s challenges. lf farmers are to grow soy pro?tably, they must be adequately supported by an agriculture extension system. The government does not include soy in its extension outreach program, although some projects are supplementing the government of the provincial agriculture offices to support soy. Training ofagriculture extension of?cers is crucial to establishing soy. As noted above, SF provided training to 13,000 farmers. However, in some respects, the SFL extension program was not adequately Conceived or delivered. This evaluation did not examine the details ofthe SARAI agriculture extension EnCompass LLC 23 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 49 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 staffing pla n, the training regimen for staff, or the details of the extension visitation schedules. However, the poor farmer performance is indicative that extension activities might not have been adequate. SFL did not incorporate accepted extension methodologies in its training program. The soy production training materials were prepared by US. experts familiar with the problems faced by non-mechanized farmers and are considered to be well done, although certain weaknesses have been identified. In particular, the introduction section does not adequately describe the bene?ts of soy prodUCtion so that farmers are enooura god to grow it. The harvest and postharvest sections are thought to be weak as well. According to partner interviews, supplemental farmer training was needed in Takhar even in year 3 on when to harvest and how todo it. The farmers continue to harvest soy while it is green (immature) beca Use that is how they harvest mung. The factory continues to accept immature beans but the quality of the resulting product is louver. Rather than provide farmers with an in?depth course of training suited to their needs, SFL scheduled one*day exposure training that culminated with the presentation of a study booklet which presented acknowledged dif?culties for illiterate farmers. ASA however noted to the evaluation team that study materials Were produced which consisted primarily of photographs that were designed especially for farmers who may not be able to read. In addition, some training courses were not conveniently timed to be accessible to the farmers. Farmers also noted that the demonstration plots took too long to visit, as they are not close to their homes, and hence would have taken valuable time away from their other production efforts. SFL follow? on visits and extension monitoring activities were inadequate in number and in technical content. The farmers complained that they did not learn hovvI to grow soybean and they lost interest. SFL took a short-term outlook to the production training activity and did not make the distinction between an input such as a training session and an output such as changed farmer behavior. SFLand others contend that they have ful?lled their task by training farmers to grow soy, and that farmer retention is not within the project scope of work. The target was 9,006! direct farmer beneficiaries and the indirect benefician target was 45,000 farmers'fomi'ly members. gooi' was to provide soybean production management and training to 9,000fanners over a three-year period. exceeded this deiiverabie by providing training for 13,024 farmers in the three years, with 9,040farmers planting soybeans in the three years. final project reporting, October 2013} i think EFL concentrated on training the They had no time or people left to go back to the not much to bring outsmarformers hock. sta keholderl 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The technical midpoint of the projeat was April 2012. There is a question as to whether SARAI is using its internal MELE system to provide direction to project implementation [discussed below). Some of the challenges noted in this report were appearing in the ?rst growing season and were apparent by mid-2012. An evaluation at that time would have provided EnCompass LLC 29 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 50 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 staffing pla n, the training regimen for staff, or the details of the extension visitation schedules. However, the poor farmer performance is indicative that extension activities might not have been adequate. SFL did not incorporate accepted extension methodologies in its training program. The soy production training materials were prepared by US. experts familiar with the problems faced by non-mechanized farmers and are considered to be well done, although certain weaknesses have been identified. In particular, the introduction section does not adequately describe the bene?ts of soy prodUCtion so that farmers are enooura god to grow it. The harvest and postharvest sections are thought to be weak as well. According to partner interviews, supplemental farmer training was needed in Takhar even in year 3 on when to harvest and how todo it. The farmers continue to harvest soy while it is green (immature) beca Use that is how they harvest mung. The factory continues to accept immature beans but the quality of the resulting product is louver. Rather than provide farmers with an in?depth course of training suited to their needs, SFL scheduled one*day exposure training that culminated with the presentation of a study booklet which presented acknowledged dif?culties for illiterate farmers. ASA however noted to the evaluation team that study materials Were produced which consisted primarily of photographs that were designed especially for farmers who may not be able to read. In addition, some training courses were not conveniently timed to be accessible to the farmers. Farmers also noted that the demonstration plots took too long to visit, as they are not close to their homes, and hence would have taken valuable time away from their other production efforts. SFL follow? on visits and extension monitoring activities were inadequate in number and in technical content. The farmers complained that they did not learn hovvI to grow soybean and they lost interest. SFL took a short-term outlook to the production training activity and did not make the distinction between an input such as a training session and an output such as changed farmer behavior. SFLand others contend that they have ful?lled their task by training farmers to grow soy, and that farmer retention is not within the project scope of work. The target was 9,006! direct farmer beneficiaries and the indirect benefician target was 45,000 farmers'fomi'ly members. gooi' was to provide soybean production management and training to 9,000fanners over a three-year period. exceeded this deiiverabie by providing training for 13,024 farmers in the three years, with 9,040farmers planting soybeans in the three years. final project reporting, October 2013} i think EFL concentrated on training the They had no time or people left to go back to the not much to bring outsmarformers hock. sta keholderl 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The technical midpoint of the projeat was April 2012. There is a question as to whether SARAI is using its internal MELE system to provide direction to project implementation [discussed below). Some of the challenges noted in this report were appearing in the ?rst growing season and were apparent by mid-2012. An evaluation at that time would have provided EnCompass LLC 29 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 50 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 staffing pla n, the training regimen for staff, or the details of the extension visitation schedules. However, the poor farmer performance is indicative that extension activities might not have been adequate. SFL did not incorporate accepted extension methodologies in its training program. The soy production training materials were prepared by US. experts familiar with the problems faced by non-mechanized farmers and are considered to be well done, although certain weaknesses have been identified. In particular, the introduction section does not adequately describe the bene?ts of soy prodUCtion so that farmers are enooura god to grow it. The harvest and postharvest sections are thought to be weak as well. According to partner interviews, supplemental farmer training was needed in Takhar even in year 3 on when to harvest and how todo it. The farmers continue to harvest soy while it is green (immature) beca Use that is how they harvest mung. The factory continues to accept immature beans but the quality of the resulting product is louver. Rather than provide farmers with an in?depth course of training suited to their needs, SFL scheduled one*day exposure training that culminated with the presentation of a study booklet which presented acknowledged dif?culties for illiterate farmers. ASA however noted to the evaluation team that study materials Were produced which consisted primarily of photographs that were designed especially for farmers who may not be able to read. In addition, some training courses were not conveniently timed to be accessible to the farmers. Farmers also noted that the demonstration plots took too long to visit, as they are not close to their homes, and hence would have taken valuable time away from their other production efforts. SFL follow? on visits and extension monitoring activities were inadequate in number and in technical content. The farmers complained that they did not learn hovvI to grow soybean and they lost interest. SFL took a short-term outlook to the production training activity and did not make the distinction between an input such as a training session and an output such as changed farmer behavior. SFLand others contend that they have ful?lled their task by training farmers to grow soy, and that farmer retention is not within the project scope of work. The target was 9,006! direct farmer beneficiaries and the indirect benefician target was 45,000 farmers'fomi'ly members. gooi' was to provide soybean production management and training to 9,000fanners over a three-year period. exceeded this deiiverabie by providing training for 13,024 farmers in the three years, with 9,040farmers planting soybeans in the three years. final project reporting, October 2013} i think EFL concentrated on training the They had no time or people left to go back to the not much to bring outsmarformers hock. sta keholderl 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The technical midpoint of the projeat was April 2012. There is a question as to whether SARAI is using its internal MELE system to provide direction to project implementation [discussed below). Some of the challenges noted in this report were appearing in the ?rst growing season and were apparent by mid-2012. An evaluation at that time would have provided EnCompass LLC 29 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 50 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 staffing pla n, the training regimen for staff, or the details of the extension visitation schedules. However, the poor farmer performance is indicative that extension activities might not have been adequate. SFL did not incorporate accepted extension methodologies in its training program. The soy production training materials were prepared by US. experts familiar with the problems faced by non-mechanized farmers and are considered to be well done, although certain weaknesses have been identified. In particular, the introduction section does not adequately describe the bene?ts of soy prodUCtion so that farmers are enooura god to grow it. The harvest and postharvest sections are thought to be weak as well. According to partner interviews, supplemental farmer training was needed in Takhar even in year 3 on when to harvest and how todo it. The farmers continue to harvest soy while it is green (immature) beca Use that is how they harvest mung. The factory continues to accept immature beans but the quality of the resulting product is louver. Rather than provide farmers with an in?depth course of training suited to their needs, SFL scheduled one*day exposure training that culminated with the presentation of a study booklet which presented acknowledged dif?culties for illiterate farmers. ASA however noted to the evaluation team that study materials Were produced which consisted primarily of photographs that were designed especially for farmers who may not be able to read. In addition, some training courses were not conveniently timed to be accessible to the farmers. Farmers also noted that the demonstration plots took too long to visit, as they are not close to their homes, and hence would have taken valuable time away from their other production efforts. SFL follow? on visits and extension monitoring activities were inadequate in number and in technical content. The farmers complained that they did not learn hovvI to grow soybean and they lost interest. SFL took a short-term outlook to the production training activity and did not make the distinction between an input such as a training session and an output such as changed farmer behavior. SFLand others contend that they have ful?lled their task by training farmers to grow soy, and that farmer retention is not within the project scope of work. The target was 9,006! direct farmer beneficiaries and the indirect benefician target was 45,000 farmers'fomi'ly members. gooi' was to provide soybean production management and training to 9,000fanners over a three-year period. exceeded this deiiverabie by providing training for 13,024 farmers in the three years, with 9,040farmers planting soybeans in the three years. final project reporting, October 2013} i think EFL concentrated on training the They had no time or people left to go back to the not much to bring outsmarformers hock. sta keholderl 15. The mid-term evaluation was delayed, which resulted in a lost an opportunity for learning. The technical midpoint of the projeat was April 2012. There is a question as to whether SARAI is using its internal MELE system to provide direction to project implementation [discussed below). Some of the challenges noted in this report were appearing in the ?rst growing season and were apparent by mid-2012. An evaluation at that time would have provided EnCompass LLC 29 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 50 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Useful insight into the implementation problems and perhaps might heme made USeful recommendations for improvement.21 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread {commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not} needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available.?1 Commercial bread bakeries are regulated and there are constraints on the ways that soy?wheat bread may legally be sold. The project team, working perhaps through the oilseed and bakery associations, might have focused on the need to amend these regulations to allow the sale of more expensive soy? wheat breads, and begun appropriate lobbying efforts. In as much as consumers and bakers find the soy?wheat breads more convenient because they stale more slowly, these amendments might have been proposed as a labeling change onlyI and passed with minimal effort. Based on observation and interviews with staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between BARN and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self? identi?cation of some partners with the SARAI project is minimal. Rather than use a triangular consortium-style management approach with an Afghan-based Team Leader as the management head, Used a horizontal approach with each partner operating independently of the others. it Country Director Was expected to oversee the project while also carrying out assigned tasks. Communication betwaen partners has been an issue. Each partner had its own of?ce and was managed from ASNWISHH offices in Saint Louis with minimal contact between partners. ASAIWISHH proved unable to maintain a unifying theme across project components and partners have gone their Way. indeed, partners noted a lack of communication early on in the project. Only recently have partners come together for regular meetings: We found out that our partners were not talking to each other. They were all and there was no connection. staff member} Ail partners Were crying outfor rrionsl internal coordination and that stymied the project from achieving foil pa tentioi. There were tremendous opportunities for cross fertilization ?ieorning 2? Please see footnote 1 for content provided by ASA on this point. '1 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: We are In the process ofconducting a baking study to determine the optimum amount of low fat soy flour that can be incorporated into Afghan naan while Maintaining tonal acceptability to local Afghan peeple. There. would have been no way or reason for going to the GOA for amendments on the regulations on naan in Afghanistan UNTIL we know for sure what the peroentage of our soy flour that can be put into the naan and the naan remain totally acceptable to Afghan nationals. Then: is stili time to do this if deemed necessary but it appears that the more important uestion for commercial bakeries is 'wili the addition of soy flour increase dough Volumesfioaves per batch?. [The literature raports that it does for nonfat soy flour but this must be determined in the field to: low fat soy ilour.i We are hoping the higher yield in loaves per batch of dough will offset the cost of soy flour. Dnce we have corn pieted the study - approximately January 30, 2614, these questions will be ansWered and can be dealt with, In response the evaluation team notes that it was SAHAI staff who on multiple occasions blamed the poor rise on the incorrect recipes provided by SARAI consultants. EnCompass LLC 30 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 51 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Useful insight into the implementation problems and perhaps might heme made USeful recommendations for improvement.21 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread {commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not} needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available.?1 Commercial bread bakeries are regulated and there are constraints on the ways that soy?wheat bread may legally be sold. The project team, working perhaps through the oilseed and bakery associations, might have focused on the need to amend these regulations to allow the sale of more expensive soy? wheat breads, and begun appropriate lobbying efforts. In as much as consumers and bakers find the soy?wheat breads more convenient because they stale more slowly, these amendments might have been proposed as a labeling change onlyI and passed with minimal effort. Based on observation and interviews with staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between BARN and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self? identi?cation of some partners with the SARAI project is minimal. Rather than use a triangular consortium-style management approach with an Afghan-based Team Leader as the management head, Used a horizontal approach with each partner operating independently of the others. it Country Director Was expected to oversee the project while also carrying out assigned tasks. Communication betwaen partners has been an issue. Each partner had its own of?ce and was managed from ASNWISHH offices in Saint Louis with minimal contact between partners. ASAIWISHH proved unable to maintain a unifying theme across project components and partners have gone their Way. indeed, partners noted a lack of communication early on in the project. Only recently have partners come together for regular meetings: We found out that our partners were not talking to each other. They were all and there was no connection. staff member} Ail partners Were crying outfor rrionsl internal coordination and that stymied the project from achieving foil pa tentioi. There were tremendous opportunities for cross fertilization ?ieorning 2? Please see footnote 1 for content provided by ASA on this point. '1 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: We are In the process ofconducting a baking study to determine the optimum amount of low fat soy flour that can be incorporated into Afghan naan while Maintaining tonal acceptability to local Afghan peeple. There. would have been no way or reason for going to the GOA for amendments on the regulations on naan in Afghanistan UNTIL we know for sure what the peroentage of our soy flour that can be put into the naan and the naan remain totally acceptable to Afghan nationals. Then: is stili time to do this if deemed necessary but it appears that the more important uestion for commercial bakeries is 'wili the addition of soy flour increase dough Volumesfioaves per batch?. [The literature raports that it does for nonfat soy flour but this must be determined in the field to: low fat soy ilour.i We are hoping the higher yield in loaves per batch of dough will offset the cost of soy flour. Dnce we have corn pieted the study - approximately January 30, 2614, these questions will be ansWered and can be dealt with, In response the evaluation team notes that it was SAHAI staff who on multiple occasions blamed the poor rise on the incorrect recipes provided by SARAI consultants. EnCompass LLC 30 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 51 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Useful insight into the implementation problems and perhaps might heme made USeful recommendations for improvement.21 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread {commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not} needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available.?1 Commercial bread bakeries are regulated and there are constraints on the ways that soy?wheat bread may legally be sold. The project team, working perhaps through the oilseed and bakery associations, might have focused on the need to amend these regulations to allow the sale of more expensive soy? wheat breads, and begun appropriate lobbying efforts. In as much as consumers and bakers find the soy?wheat breads more convenient because they stale more slowly, these amendments might have been proposed as a labeling change onlyI and passed with minimal effort. Based on observation and interviews with staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between BARN and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self? identi?cation of some partners with the SARAI project is minimal. Rather than use a triangular consortium-style management approach with an Afghan-based Team Leader as the management head, Used a horizontal approach with each partner operating independently of the others. it Country Director Was expected to oversee the project while also carrying out assigned tasks. Communication betwaen partners has been an issue. Each partner had its own of?ce and was managed from ASNWISHH offices in Saint Louis with minimal contact between partners. ASAIWISHH proved unable to maintain a unifying theme across project components and partners have gone their Way. indeed, partners noted a lack of communication early on in the project. Only recently have partners come together for regular meetings: We found out that our partners were not talking to each other. They were all and there was no connection. staff member} Ail partners Were crying outfor rrionsl internal coordination and that stymied the project from achieving foil pa tentioi. There were tremendous opportunities for cross fertilization ?ieorning 2? Please see footnote 1 for content provided by ASA on this point. '1 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: We are In the process ofconducting a baking study to determine the optimum amount of low fat soy flour that can be incorporated into Afghan naan while Maintaining tonal acceptability to local Afghan peeple. There. would have been no way or reason for going to the GOA for amendments on the regulations on naan in Afghanistan UNTIL we know for sure what the peroentage of our soy flour that can be put into the naan and the naan remain totally acceptable to Afghan nationals. Then: is stili time to do this if deemed necessary but it appears that the more important uestion for commercial bakeries is 'wili the addition of soy flour increase dough Volumesfioaves per batch?. [The literature raports that it does for nonfat soy flour but this must be determined in the field to: low fat soy ilour.i We are hoping the higher yield in loaves per batch of dough will offset the cost of soy flour. Dnce we have corn pieted the study - approximately January 30, 2614, these questions will be ansWered and can be dealt with, In response the evaluation team notes that it was SAHAI staff who on multiple occasions blamed the poor rise on the incorrect recipes provided by SARAI consultants. EnCompass LLC 30 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 51 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Useful insight into the implementation problems and perhaps might heme made USeful recommendations for improvement.21 16. The project has not taken steps to support amendments of regulations on commercially produced bread {commercial bakeries are licensed and regulated, community bakeries are not} needed to exploit the commercial bread market when soy ?our becomes available.?1 Commercial bread bakeries are regulated and there are constraints on the ways that soy?wheat bread may legally be sold. The project team, working perhaps through the oilseed and bakery associations, might have focused on the need to amend these regulations to allow the sale of more expensive soy? wheat breads, and begun appropriate lobbying efforts. In as much as consumers and bakers find the soy?wheat breads more convenient because they stale more slowly, these amendments might have been proposed as a labeling change onlyI and passed with minimal effort. Based on observation and interviews with staff and government staff, communication among SARAI partners and between BARN and the Afghan government has been poorly managed. Self? identi?cation of some partners with the SARAI project is minimal. Rather than use a triangular consortium-style management approach with an Afghan-based Team Leader as the management head, Used a horizontal approach with each partner operating independently of the others. it Country Director Was expected to oversee the project while also carrying out assigned tasks. Communication betwaen partners has been an issue. Each partner had its own of?ce and was managed from ASNWISHH offices in Saint Louis with minimal contact between partners. ASAIWISHH proved unable to maintain a unifying theme across project components and partners have gone their Way. indeed, partners noted a lack of communication early on in the project. Only recently have partners come together for regular meetings: We found out that our partners were not talking to each other. They were all and there was no connection. staff member} Ail partners Were crying outfor rrionsl internal coordination and that stymied the project from achieving foil pa tentioi. There were tremendous opportunities for cross fertilization ?ieorning 2? Please see footnote 1 for content provided by ASA on this point. '1 In response to this finding, ASA noted the following: We are In the process ofconducting a baking study to determine the optimum amount of low fat soy flour that can be incorporated into Afghan naan while Maintaining tonal acceptability to local Afghan peeple. There. would have been no way or reason for going to the GOA for amendments on the regulations on naan in Afghanistan UNTIL we know for sure what the peroentage of our soy flour that can be put into the naan and the naan remain totally acceptable to Afghan nationals. Then: is stili time to do this if deemed necessary but it appears that the more important uestion for commercial bakeries is 'wili the addition of soy flour increase dough Volumesfioaves per batch?. [The literature raports that it does for nonfat soy flour but this must be determined in the field to: low fat soy ilour.i We are hoping the higher yield in loaves per batch of dough will offset the cost of soy flour. Dnce we have corn pieted the study - approximately January 30, 2614, these questions will be ansWered and can be dealt with, In response the evaluation team notes that it was SAHAI staff who on multiple occasions blamed the poor rise on the incorrect recipes provided by SARAI consultants. EnCompass LLC 30 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 51 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report U2ii35l14 I from experiences and there Was curiosity with the partners. partner] One key implication of this lack of communication structure is that partners struggled to see the linkages betvveen the work tasks and the goals of the project: Everyone had enough work to do on their own. But what the lack of communication ied to Was a iacir ofappreciation of understanding of the link betWeen the soyfactoiy and the farmers. A disciplined, regalarform of communication was needed. What was generated was frantic last minute demands for information. staff member) Fieldwork revealed a number of examples that illustrate communication breakdowns during the project: Example 1. NEl's issues with ASA stems from their perception, expressed to the evaluation team, that ASA changed the parameters of the project after signing and that, early in the impIEmentation, the changes had distorted the project to the point that NEl's Boa rd required that the orga nization withdraw. Example 2. Sevaral times in the course of the fieldwork, when the evaluation team asked a question of staff from one partner about the work of another, the answer was, don't know what they do." This was true when WE asked about Work and the work being done with factory soy flour in Mazar city. Example 3. does not harm a micrOcreclit program," a staff member told the evaluation team. has the microcredit program." This ?we?they" dichotomy among the project partners is common. Partners regularly answar. don't know, [another partner] does that" to seemingly simple procedural questions. Example 4. The field team was present during a meeting between senior project staff and H.E. DM Technical Affairs. The Kabul team was trying to get a signature on a document that amended the MOU signed between MAIL and ASAIWISHH replacing NEI with SFL for project implementation 2.5 years after the change had taken place, which means in effect that the project had been acting illegally. Moreover, project staff were asking the DM to sign without getting priorapproval. Example 5. Of?cers from MAIL and the DAILs mentioned several times that they had not received reports from SARAI about project activities. This is in contradiction to national policy. An important indication of the communication challenges in the project is the differing perspectives stakeholders have with respect to the notion of project sustainability {discussed further below]. In addition, many observers outside the project express an opinion that an underlying objective of SARAI is to create a demand for imported soybeans and soy ?our for the betterment of LLS. farmers. This might indicate that has struggled with external project communication. 3.6 Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as pa rt of the project dasign Independent scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that say is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry EnCompass LLC 31 Page 52 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report U2ii35l14 I from experiences and there Was curiosity with the partners. partner] One key implication of this lack of communication structure is that partners struggled to see the linkages betvveen the work tasks and the goals of the project: Everyone had enough work to do on their own. But what the lack of communication ied to Was a iacir ofappreciation of understanding of the link betWeen the soyfactoiy and the farmers. A disciplined, regalarform of communication was needed. What was generated was frantic last minute demands for information. staff member) Fieldwork revealed a number of examples that illustrate communication breakdowns during the project: Example 1. NEl's issues with ASA stems from their perception, expressed to the evaluation team, that ASA changed the parameters of the project after signing and that, early in the impIEmentation, the changes had distorted the project to the point that NEl's Boa rd required that the orga nization withdraw. Example 2. Sevaral times in the course of the fieldwork, when the evaluation team asked a question of staff from one partner about the work of another, the answer was, don't know what they do." This was true when WE asked about Work and the work being done with factory soy flour in Mazar city. Example 3. does not harm a micrOcreclit program," a staff member told the evaluation team. has the microcredit program." This ?we?they" dichotomy among the project partners is common. Partners regularly answar. don't know, [another partner] does that" to seemingly simple procedural questions. Example 4. The field team was present during a meeting between senior project staff and H.E. DM Technical Affairs. The Kabul team was trying to get a signature on a document that amended the MOU signed between MAIL and ASAIWISHH replacing NEI with SFL for project implementation 2.5 years after the change had taken place, which means in effect that the project had been acting illegally. Moreover, project staff were asking the DM to sign without getting priorapproval. Example 5. Of?cers from MAIL and the DAILs mentioned several times that they had not received reports from SARAI about project activities. This is in contradiction to national policy. An important indication of the communication challenges in the project is the differing perspectives stakeholders have with respect to the notion of project sustainability {discussed further below]. In addition, many observers outside the project express an opinion that an underlying objective of SARAI is to create a demand for imported soybeans and soy ?our for the betterment of LLS. farmers. This might indicate that has struggled with external project communication. 3.6 Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as pa rt of the project dasign Independent scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that say is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry EnCompass LLC 31 Page 52 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report U2ii35l14 I from experiences and there Was curiosity with the partners. partner] One key implication of this lack of communication structure is that partners struggled to see the linkages betvveen the work tasks and the goals of the project: Everyone had enough work to do on their own. But what the lack of communication ied to Was a iacir ofappreciation of understanding of the link betWeen the soyfactoiy and the farmers. A disciplined, regalarform of communication was needed. What was generated was frantic last minute demands for information. staff member) Fieldwork revealed a number of examples that illustrate communication breakdowns during the project: Example 1. NEl's issues with ASA stems from their perception, expressed to the evaluation team, that ASA changed the parameters of the project after signing and that, early in the impIEmentation, the changes had distorted the project to the point that NEl's Boa rd required that the orga nization withdraw. Example 2. Sevaral times in the course of the fieldwork, when the evaluation team asked a question of staff from one partner about the work of another, the answer was, don't know what they do." This was true when WE asked about Work and the work being done with factory soy flour in Mazar city. Example 3. does not harm a micrOcreclit program," a staff member told the evaluation team. has the microcredit program." This ?we?they" dichotomy among the project partners is common. Partners regularly answar. don't know, [another partner] does that" to seemingly simple procedural questions. Example 4. The field team was present during a meeting between senior project staff and H.E. DM Technical Affairs. The Kabul team was trying to get a signature on a document that amended the MOU signed between MAIL and ASAIWISHH replacing NEI with SFL for project implementation 2.5 years after the change had taken place, which means in effect that the project had been acting illegally. Moreover, project staff were asking the DM to sign without getting priorapproval. Example 5. Of?cers from MAIL and the DAILs mentioned several times that they had not received reports from SARAI about project activities. This is in contradiction to national policy. An important indication of the communication challenges in the project is the differing perspectives stakeholders have with respect to the notion of project sustainability {discussed further below]. In addition, many observers outside the project express an opinion that an underlying objective of SARAI is to create a demand for imported soybeans and soy ?our for the betterment of LLS. farmers. This might indicate that has struggled with external project communication. 3.6 Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as pa rt of the project dasign Independent scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that say is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry EnCompass LLC 31 Page 52 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report U2ii35l14 I from experiences and there Was curiosity with the partners. partner] One key implication of this lack of communication structure is that partners struggled to see the linkages betvveen the work tasks and the goals of the project: Everyone had enough work to do on their own. But what the lack of communication ied to Was a iacir ofappreciation of understanding of the link betWeen the soyfactoiy and the farmers. A disciplined, regalarform of communication was needed. What was generated was frantic last minute demands for information. staff member) Fieldwork revealed a number of examples that illustrate communication breakdowns during the project: Example 1. NEl's issues with ASA stems from their perception, expressed to the evaluation team, that ASA changed the parameters of the project after signing and that, early in the impIEmentation, the changes had distorted the project to the point that NEl's Boa rd required that the orga nization withdraw. Example 2. Sevaral times in the course of the fieldwork, when the evaluation team asked a question of staff from one partner about the work of another, the answer was, don't know what they do." This was true when WE asked about Work and the work being done with factory soy flour in Mazar city. Example 3. does not harm a micrOcreclit program," a staff member told the evaluation team. has the microcredit program." This ?we?they" dichotomy among the project partners is common. Partners regularly answar. don't know, [another partner] does that" to seemingly simple procedural questions. Example 4. The field team was present during a meeting between senior project staff and H.E. DM Technical Affairs. The Kabul team was trying to get a signature on a document that amended the MOU signed between MAIL and ASAIWISHH replacing NEI with SFL for project implementation 2.5 years after the change had taken place, which means in effect that the project had been acting illegally. Moreover, project staff were asking the DM to sign without getting priorapproval. Example 5. Of?cers from MAIL and the DAILs mentioned several times that they had not received reports from SARAI about project activities. This is in contradiction to national policy. An important indication of the communication challenges in the project is the differing perspectives stakeholders have with respect to the notion of project sustainability {discussed further below]. In addition, many observers outside the project express an opinion that an underlying objective of SARAI is to create a demand for imported soybeans and soy ?our for the betterment of LLS. farmers. This might indicate that has struggled with external project communication. 3.6 Project Design 18. Interviews revealed that ASA and team members did not conduct operational feasibility, gross margin analysis, or value chain studies as pa rt of the project dasign Independent scienti?c research and analysis by other agencies show that say is unlikely to be accepted by farmers for SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry EnCompass LLC 31 Page 52 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030314 many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the dif?culty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan.23 There are doubts among those knowledgeable about agriculture in Afghanistan, about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of project structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. i5. logframe and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of Iogfra me.? Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogiam theory, a comprehensive project approach was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer term outcomes. SARAI is intended to be a value chain intervention, With the various pieces of the rote-mention intricately linked from farmer production to market. However, a review of the Master Agreement and subsequent documentation reveals that a value chain assessment was not undertaken during project design or implementation. The sustainability of soy in the Afghan farming system seems not to have been questioned. Achieving high yields while maintaining a pro?table two crop farming system that does not include opium will remain dif?cult in the northern tier provinces because of the peculiarities of Afghan weather, and the requirement to maintain a pro?table crop per year farming calendar. Lack ofa Comprehensive Program Theory: A comprehensiVe project approach was not developed to Show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. Without a program theory, it is difficult to develop a meaningful monitoring and evaluation plan, and indeed the project has not developed a comprehensive plan to capture relevant information along the value chain that could in turn have fed Into project decision making.? Data Collection: In some respects, extensive data has been collected during project monitoring. For example, the level of monitoring conducted by SFI. is commendable, and the evaluation team found that the reporting of field activities has generally been high quality. The organization has MSLE tools, including structured questionnaires and templates for tracking data. During interviews, Sf staff noted that almost all reports have been submitted on time. The reports Were Well ?led and labelled. In some respects, the presentation of the data was dif?cult to follow. For example, to examine data with respect to drop out rates of farmers, it is necessary to review several spreadsheets and then aggregate the data. Inmnsistent data was sometimes presented to the evaluation team. Per the sub partner agreement, PARSA was required to complete pre? and post? knowledge tests on cooking seminar participants. During interviews, PARSA indicated that such testing was indeed conducted, although the evaluation team was unable to independently verify the statement Staff 23 See footnote 3 for agencies involved in such studies. 2? in response to this finding ASA noted the following; The Master Agreement is the USDA template. which cannot be changed. Some changes may be made annually by USDA Office of Legal Counsel. However, once language has been defined. It is applied across all agreements signed in a given year. The same applied to the proposal format is stated earlier in our comments. 5 ASA has recently developed Key Performance lnditors to aggregate performance across multiple projects. EnCompass LLC 32 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 53 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030314 many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the dif?culty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan.23 There are doubts among those knowledgeable about agriculture in Afghanistan, about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of project structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. i5. logframe and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of Iogfra me.? Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogiam theory, a comprehensive project approach was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer term outcomes. SARAI is intended to be a value chain intervention, With the various pieces of the rote-mention intricately linked from farmer production to market. However, a review of the Master Agreement and subsequent documentation reveals that a value chain assessment was not undertaken during project design or implementation. The sustainability of soy in the Afghan farming system seems not to have been questioned. Achieving high yields while maintaining a pro?table two crop farming system that does not include opium will remain dif?cult in the northern tier provinces because of the peculiarities of Afghan weather, and the requirement to maintain a pro?table crop per year farming calendar. Lack ofa Comprehensive Program Theory: A comprehensiVe project approach was not developed to Show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. Without a program theory, it is difficult to develop a meaningful monitoring and evaluation plan, and indeed the project has not developed a comprehensive plan to capture relevant information along the value chain that could in turn have fed Into project decision making.? Data Collection: In some respects, extensive data has been collected during project monitoring. For example, the level of monitoring conducted by SFI. is commendable, and the evaluation team found that the reporting of field activities has generally been high quality. The organization has MSLE tools, including structured questionnaires and templates for tracking data. During interviews, Sf staff noted that almost all reports have been submitted on time. The reports Were Well ?led and labelled. In some respects, the presentation of the data was dif?cult to follow. For example, to examine data with respect to drop out rates of farmers, it is necessary to review several spreadsheets and then aggregate the data. Inmnsistent data was sometimes presented to the evaluation team. Per the sub partner agreement, PARSA was required to complete pre? and post? knowledge tests on cooking seminar participants. During interviews, PARSA indicated that such testing was indeed conducted, although the evaluation team was unable to independently verify the statement Staff 23 See footnote 3 for agencies involved in such studies. 2? in response to this finding ASA noted the following; The Master Agreement is the USDA template. which cannot be changed. Some changes may be made annually by USDA Office of Legal Counsel. However, once language has been defined. It is applied across all agreements signed in a given year. The same applied to the proposal format is stated earlier in our comments. 5 ASA has recently developed Key Performance lnditors to aggregate performance across multiple projects. EnCompass LLC 32 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 53 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030314 many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the dif?culty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan.23 There are doubts among those knowledgeable about agriculture in Afghanistan, about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of project structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. i5. logframe and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of Iogfra me.? Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogiam theory, a comprehensive project approach was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer term outcomes. SARAI is intended to be a value chain intervention, With the various pieces of the rote-mention intricately linked from farmer production to market. However, a review of the Master Agreement and subsequent documentation reveals that a value chain assessment was not undertaken during project design or implementation. The sustainability of soy in the Afghan farming system seems not to have been questioned. Achieving high yields while maintaining a pro?table two crop farming system that does not include opium will remain dif?cult in the northern tier provinces because of the peculiarities of Afghan weather, and the requirement to maintain a pro?table crop per year farming calendar. Lack ofa Comprehensive Program Theory: A comprehensiVe project approach was not developed to Show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. Without a program theory, it is difficult to develop a meaningful monitoring and evaluation plan, and indeed the project has not developed a comprehensive plan to capture relevant information along the value chain that could in turn have fed Into project decision making.? Data Collection: In some respects, extensive data has been collected during project monitoring. For example, the level of monitoring conducted by SFI. is commendable, and the evaluation team found that the reporting of field activities has generally been high quality. The organization has MSLE tools, including structured questionnaires and templates for tracking data. During interviews, Sf staff noted that almost all reports have been submitted on time. The reports Were Well ?led and labelled. In some respects, the presentation of the data was dif?cult to follow. For example, to examine data with respect to drop out rates of farmers, it is necessary to review several spreadsheets and then aggregate the data. Inmnsistent data was sometimes presented to the evaluation team. Per the sub partner agreement, PARSA was required to complete pre? and post? knowledge tests on cooking seminar participants. During interviews, PARSA indicated that such testing was indeed conducted, although the evaluation team was unable to independently verify the statement Staff 23 See footnote 3 for agencies involved in such studies. 2? in response to this finding ASA noted the following; The Master Agreement is the USDA template. which cannot be changed. Some changes may be made annually by USDA Office of Legal Counsel. However, once language has been defined. It is applied across all agreements signed in a given year. The same applied to the proposal format is stated earlier in our comments. 5 ASA has recently developed Key Performance lnditors to aggregate performance across multiple projects. EnCompass LLC 32 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 53 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030314 many reasons including excessive labor requirements over other crops and the dif?culty of realizing good yields in the soil and weather conditions prevalent in northern Afghanistan.23 There are doubts among those knowledgeable about agriculture in Afghanistan, about whether sustainable soy production will be possible in Afghanistan, regardless of project structure or implementation methodology, because growing conditions are not deemed suitable. i5. logframe and program theory was not generated during project design, although portions of the Master Agreement function as a kind of Iogfra me.? Without a value chain analysis, feasibility study or logframefprogiam theory, a comprehensive project approach was not developed to show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer term outcomes. SARAI is intended to be a value chain intervention, With the various pieces of the rote-mention intricately linked from farmer production to market. However, a review of the Master Agreement and subsequent documentation reveals that a value chain assessment was not undertaken during project design or implementation. The sustainability of soy in the Afghan farming system seems not to have been questioned. Achieving high yields while maintaining a pro?table two crop farming system that does not include opium will remain dif?cult in the northern tier provinces because of the peculiarities of Afghan weather, and the requirement to maintain a pro?table crop per year farming calendar. Lack ofa Comprehensive Program Theory: A comprehensiVe project approach was not developed to Show the theory and logic behind the various interventions, how they are interdependent, and how they, together, contribute to intermediate results and longer?term outcomes. Without a program theory, it is difficult to develop a meaningful monitoring and evaluation plan, and indeed the project has not developed a comprehensive plan to capture relevant information along the value chain that could in turn have fed Into project decision making.? Data Collection: In some respects, extensive data has been collected during project monitoring. For example, the level of monitoring conducted by SFI. is commendable, and the evaluation team found that the reporting of field activities has generally been high quality. The organization has MSLE tools, including structured questionnaires and templates for tracking data. During interviews, Sf staff noted that almost all reports have been submitted on time. The reports Were Well ?led and labelled. In some respects, the presentation of the data was dif?cult to follow. For example, to examine data with respect to drop out rates of farmers, it is necessary to review several spreadsheets and then aggregate the data. Inmnsistent data was sometimes presented to the evaluation team. Per the sub partner agreement, PARSA was required to complete pre? and post? knowledge tests on cooking seminar participants. During interviews, PARSA indicated that such testing was indeed conducted, although the evaluation team was unable to independently verify the statement Staff 23 See footnote 3 for agencies involved in such studies. 2? in response to this finding ASA noted the following; The Master Agreement is the USDA template. which cannot be changed. Some changes may be made annually by USDA Office of Legal Counsel. However, once language has been defined. It is applied across all agreements signed in a given year. The same applied to the proposal format is stated earlier in our comments. 5 ASA has recently developed Key Performance lnditors to aggregate performance across multiple projects. EnCompass LLC 32 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 53 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 I expressed reservations about the accuracy of this type of monitoring [name most of the Women who participated in the cooking seminars were illiterate, making a written test infeasible, although a follow up discussion with ASA revealed that, while PARSA was asked to do pre and post testing, they were not required to do it in writing. Use of MELE Data: While there is a consensus that the project did not property develop outcome level indicators to track results, most stakeholders feel that, in many resperzts, the project has collected robust MSLE data at the output level. However, most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation also felt that MELE data was generally not used to inform project decision making. Perhaps the most pressing issue identified from activities Was the challenges related to farmer retention. MELE reporting indicated that farmers were unhappy with soybean prices and Were not replanting soybeans. HoWever, there is a concern among stakeholders that this data was not usad to make key project decisions. [The use of MEIE data] has not been great. Some data was coilectedjust to be collected. in some cases it was aseo'for reporting, so was a confirmation of where we are supposed to be. But in other cases, such as the farmer retention iss ae, EFL has a whole spreadsheet and they show which farmers sold yields for how much. So the information was there, butit wasn't in a Way to change something in the following year. stakeholder] The evaluation team was unable to assess de?nitively why MSLE data was not used fully. However, interviewees noted that sustainability was not a focus of the project design, and that the project has been in ?crisis managementr mode, with limited resources put towards strategic planning. As one stakeholder noted: We had gaps that we did not anticipate. By the time they were identified, we didn't address them as amblin as We should have. Things don?t stop moving just because you have identi?ed a gap. So we needed to keep things moving. sta keholderl 19. Some SARAI partners feet that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review ofdesign documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sastainability means. lDne key gap in terms of project sustainability has been a lack of focus on sourcing viable seed inputs. ASAMISHH staff feel the project work plan and partner activities are aligned with the Master Agreement, but others feel that, as the EARN partners have not addressed sustainability, the project has gone off track. Some felt that sustainability sh ould be assessed by looking at individual project components, and not defining sustainability in terms of the project value chain. For example, some stakeholders feel that the sustainability of the factory need not be predicated on 100 percent locally grown soybean production, and that the factory aspect of the project should be seen as successful even it it requires inputs from out of country: if the factory can't rely 10035 on iocally produeed so ybeans, if [locoi prodacrionj' can't fiil cope-cit}; we don't look at it as a negative. EnCompass LLC 33 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 54 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 I expressed reservations about the accuracy of this type of monitoring [name most of the Women who participated in the cooking seminars were illiterate, making a written test infeasible, although a follow up discussion with ASA revealed that, while PARSA was asked to do pre and post testing, they were not required to do it in writing. Use of MELE Data: While there is a consensus that the project did not property develop outcome level indicators to track results, most stakeholders feel that, in many resperzts, the project has collected robust MSLE data at the output level. However, most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation also felt that MELE data was generally not used to inform project decision making. Perhaps the most pressing issue identified from activities Was the challenges related to farmer retention. MELE reporting indicated that farmers were unhappy with soybean prices and Were not replanting soybeans. HoWever, there is a concern among stakeholders that this data was not usad to make key project decisions. [The use of MEIE data] has not been great. Some data was coilectedjust to be collected. in some cases it was aseo'for reporting, so was a confirmation of where we are supposed to be. But in other cases, such as the farmer retention iss ae, EFL has a whole spreadsheet and they show which farmers sold yields for how much. So the information was there, butit wasn't in a Way to change something in the following year. stakeholder] The evaluation team was unable to assess de?nitively why MSLE data was not used fully. However, interviewees noted that sustainability was not a focus of the project design, and that the project has been in ?crisis managementr mode, with limited resources put towards strategic planning. As one stakeholder noted: We had gaps that we did not anticipate. By the time they were identified, we didn't address them as amblin as We should have. Things don?t stop moving just because you have identi?ed a gap. So we needed to keep things moving. sta keholderl 19. Some SARAI partners feet that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review ofdesign documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sastainability means. lDne key gap in terms of project sustainability has been a lack of focus on sourcing viable seed inputs. ASAMISHH staff feel the project work plan and partner activities are aligned with the Master Agreement, but others feel that, as the EARN partners have not addressed sustainability, the project has gone off track. Some felt that sustainability sh ould be assessed by looking at individual project components, and not defining sustainability in terms of the project value chain. For example, some stakeholders feel that the sustainability of the factory need not be predicated on 100 percent locally grown soybean production, and that the factory aspect of the project should be seen as successful even it it requires inputs from out of country: if the factory can't rely 10035 on iocally produeed so ybeans, if [locoi prodacrionj' can't fiil cope-cit}; we don't look at it as a negative. EnCompass LLC 33 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 54 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 I expressed reservations about the accuracy of this type of monitoring [name most of the Women who participated in the cooking seminars were illiterate, making a written test infeasible, although a follow up discussion with ASA revealed that, while PARSA was asked to do pre and post testing, they were not required to do it in writing. Use of MELE Data: While there is a consensus that the project did not property develop outcome level indicators to track results, most stakeholders feel that, in many resperzts, the project has collected robust MSLE data at the output level. However, most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation also felt that MELE data was generally not used to inform project decision making. Perhaps the most pressing issue identified from activities Was the challenges related to farmer retention. MELE reporting indicated that farmers were unhappy with soybean prices and Were not replanting soybeans. HoWever, there is a concern among stakeholders that this data was not usad to make key project decisions. [The use of MEIE data] has not been great. Some data was coilectedjust to be collected. in some cases it was aseo'for reporting, so was a confirmation of where we are supposed to be. But in other cases, such as the farmer retention iss ae, EFL has a whole spreadsheet and they show which farmers sold yields for how much. So the information was there, butit wasn't in a Way to change something in the following year. stakeholder] The evaluation team was unable to assess de?nitively why MSLE data was not used fully. However, interviewees noted that sustainability was not a focus of the project design, and that the project has been in ?crisis managementr mode, with limited resources put towards strategic planning. As one stakeholder noted: We had gaps that we did not anticipate. By the time they were identified, we didn't address them as amblin as We should have. Things don?t stop moving just because you have identi?ed a gap. So we needed to keep things moving. sta keholderl 19. Some SARAI partners feet that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review ofdesign documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sastainability means. lDne key gap in terms of project sustainability has been a lack of focus on sourcing viable seed inputs. ASAMISHH staff feel the project work plan and partner activities are aligned with the Master Agreement, but others feel that, as the EARN partners have not addressed sustainability, the project has gone off track. Some felt that sustainability sh ould be assessed by looking at individual project components, and not defining sustainability in terms of the project value chain. For example, some stakeholders feel that the sustainability of the factory need not be predicated on 100 percent locally grown soybean production, and that the factory aspect of the project should be seen as successful even it it requires inputs from out of country: if the factory can't rely 10035 on iocally produeed so ybeans, if [locoi prodacrionj' can't fiil cope-cit}; we don't look at it as a negative. EnCompass LLC 33 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 54 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 030514 I expressed reservations about the accuracy of this type of monitoring [name most of the Women who participated in the cooking seminars were illiterate, making a written test infeasible, although a follow up discussion with ASA revealed that, while PARSA was asked to do pre and post testing, they were not required to do it in writing. Use of MELE Data: While there is a consensus that the project did not property develop outcome level indicators to track results, most stakeholders feel that, in many resperzts, the project has collected robust MSLE data at the output level. However, most stakeholders interviewed for this evaluation also felt that MELE data was generally not used to inform project decision making. Perhaps the most pressing issue identified from activities Was the challenges related to farmer retention. MELE reporting indicated that farmers were unhappy with soybean prices and Were not replanting soybeans. HoWever, there is a concern among stakeholders that this data was not usad to make key project decisions. [The use of MEIE data] has not been great. Some data was coilectedjust to be collected. in some cases it was aseo'for reporting, so was a confirmation of where we are supposed to be. But in other cases, such as the farmer retention iss ae, EFL has a whole spreadsheet and they show which farmers sold yields for how much. So the information was there, butit wasn't in a Way to change something in the following year. stakeholder] The evaluation team was unable to assess de?nitively why MSLE data was not used fully. However, interviewees noted that sustainability was not a focus of the project design, and that the project has been in ?crisis managementr mode, with limited resources put towards strategic planning. As one stakeholder noted: We had gaps that we did not anticipate. By the time they were identified, we didn't address them as amblin as We should have. Things don?t stop moving just because you have identi?ed a gap. So we needed to keep things moving. sta keholderl 19. Some SARAI partners feet that sustainability was not integrated into the original project design and that the discussion of sustainability has just arisen. However, a review ofdesign documentation and other records shows that sustainability was indeed a key aspect of the initiative. It is important to note that because the project has not internalized program theory, stakeholders have quite different interpretations as to what project sastainability means. lDne key gap in terms of project sustainability has been a lack of focus on sourcing viable seed inputs. ASAMISHH staff feel the project work plan and partner activities are aligned with the Master Agreement, but others feel that, as the EARN partners have not addressed sustainability, the project has gone off track. Some felt that sustainability sh ould be assessed by looking at individual project components, and not defining sustainability in terms of the project value chain. For example, some stakeholders feel that the sustainability of the factory need not be predicated on 100 percent locally grown soybean production, and that the factory aspect of the project should be seen as successful even it it requires inputs from out of country: if the factory can't rely 10035 on iocally produeed so ybeans, if [locoi prodacrionj' can't fiil cope-cit}; we don't look at it as a negative. EnCompass LLC 33 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 54 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mom Others however, see sustainability in terms of the entire value chain. wouid have been to create a viahie ongoing production basefor this piant, and then deveiop the marke tfar the products. Many ASA staff and partners suggested that stistalnability- Was not properly defined at the outset of the - '26 project. is something that has to be discussed and decided before a project gets off the gro and, but to shh?t the goaipost on more than hoi?voy through the project you are going to getjair results at best bec'twse it wasn't huiit into the the beginning. The issue is that farmers are not produeing in the second year, but the Master Agreement caii's for training farmers. so EFL deiivered what was in the Master Agreemant. But now USDA is moving the goaipost and wants sustainabie production. The MasterAgreemenr was ciear. But the chaiienge was that it was driven more by data than resuits. The requirement was to train 9,0EKJfonners. There was nothing on retention. So we irnocired out the requrrement, but was that appropriate measurement for project? And We got scoided by USDA about not focusing on But We toid them - you approved this. A review of the original Master Agreement shows that indeed, sustainability is one of the goals of the initiative. The agreement contains a list of output and outcome criteria to measure progress towards project objectivas on pages 15-19 [Appendix The evaiuation team reviewed the list of criteria and found them to be explicit, if overly ambitious. However, these criteria were not operationalized into the project Work plan or incorporated into an effective MELE system. ASA incorporated suatainability language in its public documentation. The project design was strategic in the fact that it not oniy sought to addr?s immediate humanitarian needs arising from the con?ict. but sought the reestobiishment of iiveiihood opportunities through the promotion of the soy voiue chain in Afghanistan. brochure, January 2013} 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was unable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says indicates it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed will be offered.? 26 In response to this finding, ASA note-d: Sustainability was unde?ned-we are facing competing visions of sustainability that has caused the goalpost to move during the oourse of implementation. :7 In response to these findings, ASA noted the following: This was not the case. There Were no locally available seedsin 2012 - What was Intended by this was that the funds for procuring soybean seeds for 2012 and 2013 were In the SH. budget. It was always known that the seeds would have to be imported all 3. years. In fact, we made arrangements withthe Benton EnCompass LLC 34] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 55 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mom Others however, see sustainability in terms of the entire value chain. wouid have been to create a viahie ongoing production basefor this piant, and then deveiop the marke tfar the products. Many ASA staff and partners suggested that stistalnability- Was not properly defined at the outset of the - '26 project. is something that has to be discussed and decided before a project gets off the gro and, but to shh?t the goaipost on more than hoi?voy through the project you are going to getjair results at best bec'twse it wasn't huiit into the the beginning. The issue is that farmers are not produeing in the second year, but the Master Agreement caii's for training farmers. so EFL deiivered what was in the Master Agreemant. But now USDA is moving the goaipost and wants sustainabie production. The MasterAgreemenr was ciear. But the chaiienge was that it was driven more by data than resuits. The requirement was to train 9,0EKJfonners. There was nothing on retention. So we irnocired out the requrrement, but was that appropriate measurement for project? And We got scoided by USDA about not focusing on But We toid them - you approved this. A review of the original Master Agreement shows that indeed, sustainability is one of the goals of the initiative. The agreement contains a list of output and outcome criteria to measure progress towards project objectivas on pages 15-19 [Appendix The evaiuation team reviewed the list of criteria and found them to be explicit, if overly ambitious. However, these criteria were not operationalized into the project Work plan or incorporated into an effective MELE system. ASA incorporated suatainability language in its public documentation. The project design was strategic in the fact that it not oniy sought to addr?s immediate humanitarian needs arising from the con?ict. but sought the reestobiishment of iiveiihood opportunities through the promotion of the soy voiue chain in Afghanistan. brochure, January 2013} 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was unable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says indicates it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed will be offered.? 26 In response to this finding, ASA note-d: Sustainability was unde?ned-we are facing competing visions of sustainability that has caused the goalpost to move during the oourse of implementation. :7 In response to these findings, ASA noted the following: This was not the case. There Were no locally available seedsin 2012 - What was Intended by this was that the funds for procuring soybean seeds for 2012 and 2013 were In the SH. budget. It was always known that the seeds would have to be imported all 3. years. In fact, we made arrangements withthe Benton EnCompass LLC 34] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 55 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mom Others however, see sustainability in terms of the entire value chain. wouid have been to create a viahie ongoing production basefor this piant, and then deveiop the marke tfar the products. Many ASA staff and partners suggested that stistalnability- Was not properly defined at the outset of the - '26 project. is something that has to be discussed and decided before a project gets off the gro and, but to shh?t the goaipost on more than hoi?voy through the project you are going to getjair results at best bec'twse it wasn't huiit into the the beginning. The issue is that farmers are not produeing in the second year, but the Master Agreement caii's for training farmers. so EFL deiivered what was in the Master Agreemant. But now USDA is moving the goaipost and wants sustainabie production. The MasterAgreemenr was ciear. But the chaiienge was that it was driven more by data than resuits. The requirement was to train 9,0EKJfonners. There was nothing on retention. So we irnocired out the requrrement, but was that appropriate measurement for project? And We got scoided by USDA about not focusing on But We toid them - you approved this. A review of the original Master Agreement shows that indeed, sustainability is one of the goals of the initiative. The agreement contains a list of output and outcome criteria to measure progress towards project objectivas on pages 15-19 [Appendix The evaiuation team reviewed the list of criteria and found them to be explicit, if overly ambitious. However, these criteria were not operationalized into the project Work plan or incorporated into an effective MELE system. ASA incorporated suatainability language in its public documentation. The project design was strategic in the fact that it not oniy sought to addr?s immediate humanitarian needs arising from the con?ict. but sought the reestobiishment of iiveiihood opportunities through the promotion of the soy voiue chain in Afghanistan. brochure, January 2013} 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was unable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says indicates it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed will be offered.? 26 In response to this finding, ASA note-d: Sustainability was unde?ned-we are facing competing visions of sustainability that has caused the goalpost to move during the oourse of implementation. :7 In response to these findings, ASA noted the following: This was not the case. There Were no locally available seedsin 2012 - What was Intended by this was that the funds for procuring soybean seeds for 2012 and 2013 were In the SH. budget. It was always known that the seeds would have to be imported all 3. years. In fact, we made arrangements withthe Benton EnCompass LLC 34] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 55 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mom Others however, see sustainability in terms of the entire value chain. wouid have been to create a viahie ongoing production basefor this piant, and then deveiop the marke tfar the products. Many ASA staff and partners suggested that stistalnability- Was not properly defined at the outset of the - '26 project. is something that has to be discussed and decided before a project gets off the gro and, but to shh?t the goaipost on more than hoi?voy through the project you are going to getjair results at best bec'twse it wasn't huiit into the the beginning. The issue is that farmers are not produeing in the second year, but the Master Agreement caii's for training farmers. so EFL deiivered what was in the Master Agreemant. But now USDA is moving the goaipost and wants sustainabie production. The MasterAgreemenr was ciear. But the chaiienge was that it was driven more by data than resuits. The requirement was to train 9,0EKJfonners. There was nothing on retention. So we irnocired out the requrrement, but was that appropriate measurement for project? And We got scoided by USDA about not focusing on But We toid them - you approved this. A review of the original Master Agreement shows that indeed, sustainability is one of the goals of the initiative. The agreement contains a list of output and outcome criteria to measure progress towards project objectivas on pages 15-19 [Appendix The evaiuation team reviewed the list of criteria and found them to be explicit, if overly ambitious. However, these criteria were not operationalized into the project Work plan or incorporated into an effective MELE system. ASA incorporated suatainability language in its public documentation. The project design was strategic in the fact that it not oniy sought to addr?s immediate humanitarian needs arising from the con?ict. but sought the reestobiishment of iiveiihood opportunities through the promotion of the soy voiue chain in Afghanistan. brochure, January 2013} 20. According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and SFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the first production year. The evaluation team was unable to document efforts by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says indicates it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success or the price at which the seed will be offered.? 26 In response to this finding, ASA note-d: Sustainability was unde?ned-we are facing competing visions of sustainability that has caused the goalpost to move during the oourse of implementation. :7 In response to these findings, ASA noted the following: This was not the case. There Were no locally available seedsin 2012 - What was Intended by this was that the funds for procuring soybean seeds for 2012 and 2013 were In the SH. budget. It was always known that the seeds would have to be imported all 3. years. In fact, we made arrangements withthe Benton EnCompass LLC 34] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 55 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Many stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation felt that the inputs strategy was ill conceived in terms of providing free inputs in the first yea r, and then not providing meaningful incentives in the socond, especially when year one yields were low and not profitable for the farmers. One of the things the project did was give farmers free inpu? in year one and there was a year Mr: option to borrow money to purchase inputs. Maybe that mil have to change in the future. if farmers had other incentives, they might come in. stakeholder] [The project] gave away the input bundles, and i don't believe this is the n'ght way. in my model, the processor buys the inputs and sells to the farmer on third payment terms and pays when the].ll sell to the processor. But the current way when you give-farmers stuff they don't always appreciate or value it. (EARN stakeholder] According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and EFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the ?rst production year: it is presumed that locally grown soybean seed will be available to SR and the farmers. it is the responsibility ofSFi. to determine this local availability ofsoybeon seed as soon as possible so that alternate arrangements can he made in case local seed does not materialize. Agreement, March 12, 2011] The evaluation team was unable to uncover any evidence of an attempt by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says that it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success. Nodules do not form readily under Afghan conditions so the nitrogenr?xing attributes of soy [and other pulses too, it must be said] are not realized. Rhizobia do not overwinter in the poor soils and must be introduced each yea r. Inoculants are not produced in Afghanistan and so must aiso be imported and distributed each year. Ful?llment of Goals as Outlined in the Master Agreement The sections above discuss project implementation and results in the context of developing a soybean value chain. Some project activities have achieved positive results when viewed as standalone interventions. These project successes have been noted throughout the body of the report. Additionally. ASA has provided a table that summarizes what they interpret to be project successes. This table is presented in Appendix The information provided in this table has not been corroborated by the evaluation team. 3 years? worth of seeds. In 2011 ASA purchased the seeds and shipped same on the DOD flights for S??larmers because Dr. Kwon of NEI would not turn over the seeds which he had purchased and on behalf of ASA. That is why there were only approximately 90D farmers in 2011. In 2012 and 2013 SFL Issuedthe purchase orders and paid directly for the Stine and Albert Lea seeds. There was never any plan [or SFL to "buy local seeds they did not exist". EnCompass LLC 35 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 56 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Many stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation felt that the inputs strategy was ill conceived in terms of providing free inputs in the first yea r, and then not providing meaningful incentives in the socond, especially when year one yields were low and not profitable for the farmers. One of the things the project did was give farmers free inpu? in year one and there was a year Mr: option to borrow money to purchase inputs. Maybe that mil have to change in the future. if farmers had other incentives, they might come in. stakeholder] [The project] gave away the input bundles, and i don't believe this is the n'ght way. in my model, the processor buys the inputs and sells to the farmer on third payment terms and pays when the].ll sell to the processor. But the current way when you give-farmers stuff they don't always appreciate or value it. (EARN stakeholder] According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and EFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the ?rst production year: it is presumed that locally grown soybean seed will be available to SR and the farmers. it is the responsibility ofSFi. to determine this local availability ofsoybeon seed as soon as possible so that alternate arrangements can he made in case local seed does not materialize. Agreement, March 12, 2011] The evaluation team was unable to uncover any evidence of an attempt by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says that it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success. Nodules do not form readily under Afghan conditions so the nitrogenr?xing attributes of soy [and other pulses too, it must be said] are not realized. Rhizobia do not overwinter in the poor soils and must be introduced each yea r. Inoculants are not produced in Afghanistan and so must aiso be imported and distributed each year. Ful?llment of Goals as Outlined in the Master Agreement The sections above discuss project implementation and results in the context of developing a soybean value chain. Some project activities have achieved positive results when viewed as standalone interventions. These project successes have been noted throughout the body of the report. Additionally. ASA has provided a table that summarizes what they interpret to be project successes. This table is presented in Appendix The information provided in this table has not been corroborated by the evaluation team. 3 years? worth of seeds. In 2011 ASA purchased the seeds and shipped same on the DOD flights for S??larmers because Dr. Kwon of NEI would not turn over the seeds which he had purchased and on behalf of ASA. That is why there were only approximately 90D farmers in 2011. In 2012 and 2013 SFL Issuedthe purchase orders and paid directly for the Stine and Albert Lea seeds. There was never any plan [or SFL to "buy local seeds they did not exist". EnCompass LLC 35 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 56 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Many stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation felt that the inputs strategy was ill conceived in terms of providing free inputs in the first yea r, and then not providing meaningful incentives in the socond, especially when year one yields were low and not profitable for the farmers. One of the things the project did was give farmers free inpu? in year one and there was a year Mr: option to borrow money to purchase inputs. Maybe that mil have to change in the future. if farmers had other incentives, they might come in. stakeholder] [The project] gave away the input bundles, and i don't believe this is the n'ght way. in my model, the processor buys the inputs and sells to the farmer on third payment terms and pays when the].ll sell to the processor. But the current way when you give-farmers stuff they don't always appreciate or value it. (EARN stakeholder] According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and EFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the ?rst production year: it is presumed that locally grown soybean seed will be available to SR and the farmers. it is the responsibility ofSFi. to determine this local availability ofsoybeon seed as soon as possible so that alternate arrangements can he made in case local seed does not materialize. Agreement, March 12, 2011] The evaluation team was unable to uncover any evidence of an attempt by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says that it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success. Nodules do not form readily under Afghan conditions so the nitrogenr?xing attributes of soy [and other pulses too, it must be said] are not realized. Rhizobia do not overwinter in the poor soils and must be introduced each yea r. Inoculants are not produced in Afghanistan and so must aiso be imported and distributed each year. Ful?llment of Goals as Outlined in the Master Agreement The sections above discuss project implementation and results in the context of developing a soybean value chain. Some project activities have achieved positive results when viewed as standalone interventions. These project successes have been noted throughout the body of the report. Additionally. ASA has provided a table that summarizes what they interpret to be project successes. This table is presented in Appendix The information provided in this table has not been corroborated by the evaluation team. 3 years? worth of seeds. In 2011 ASA purchased the seeds and shipped same on the DOD flights for S??larmers because Dr. Kwon of NEI would not turn over the seeds which he had purchased and on behalf of ASA. That is why there were only approximately 90D farmers in 2011. In 2012 and 2013 SFL Issuedthe purchase orders and paid directly for the Stine and Albert Lea seeds. There was never any plan [or SFL to "buy local seeds they did not exist". EnCompass LLC 35 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 56 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Many stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation felt that the inputs strategy was ill conceived in terms of providing free inputs in the first yea r, and then not providing meaningful incentives in the socond, especially when year one yields were low and not profitable for the farmers. One of the things the project did was give farmers free inpu? in year one and there was a year Mr: option to borrow money to purchase inputs. Maybe that mil have to change in the future. if farmers had other incentives, they might come in. stakeholder] [The project] gave away the input bundles, and i don't believe this is the n'ght way. in my model, the processor buys the inputs and sells to the farmer on third payment terms and pays when the].ll sell to the processor. But the current way when you give-farmers stuff they don't always appreciate or value it. (EARN stakeholder] According to project documents, farmers were to be provided with inputs, including soybean seed and inoculum, during their ?rst year of production. The partner agreement between ASA and EFL [dated March 12, 2011] indicates that EFL was responsible for sourcing locally available soybean seeds for inputs after the ?rst production year: it is presumed that locally grown soybean seed will be available to SR and the farmers. it is the responsibility ofSFi. to determine this local availability ofsoybeon seed as soon as possible so that alternate arrangements can he made in case local seed does not materialize. Agreement, March 12, 2011] The evaluation team was unable to uncover any evidence of an attempt by the project to source locally available soy seed. Rana Group says that it is planting soybean for seed production but we do not have an indication of the amount they are aiming for or their success. Nodules do not form readily under Afghan conditions so the nitrogenr?xing attributes of soy [and other pulses too, it must be said] are not realized. Rhizobia do not overwinter in the poor soils and must be introduced each yea r. Inoculants are not produced in Afghanistan and so must aiso be imported and distributed each year. Ful?llment of Goals as Outlined in the Master Agreement The sections above discuss project implementation and results in the context of developing a soybean value chain. Some project activities have achieved positive results when viewed as standalone interventions. These project successes have been noted throughout the body of the report. Additionally. ASA has provided a table that summarizes what they interpret to be project successes. This table is presented in Appendix The information provided in this table has not been corroborated by the evaluation team. 3 years? worth of seeds. In 2011 ASA purchased the seeds and shipped same on the DOD flights for S??larmers because Dr. Kwon of NEI would not turn over the seeds which he had purchased and on behalf of ASA. That is why there were only approximately 90D farmers in 2011. In 2012 and 2013 SFL Issuedthe purchase orders and paid directly for the Stine and Albert Lea seeds. There was never any plan [or SFL to "buy local seeds they did not exist". EnCompass LLC 35 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 56 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [121'051?14 I It is important to note that, even with the activity level 5U:ces5&s noted throughout this report, and presented by ASA in Appendix If many of the higher level outcomes and goals as outlined in the Master Agreement have not been ful?lled. For example, the following outcomes and goals have not been achieved during the project lifecycle: Increase soy yields by 30% It Train 3,000 farmers per year {the assumption being that the one-day SFL erosure meetings are not the same thing as ensuring thata farmer is properly trained and acting on the training) 0 Protein processing facility is sustainable and profitable 0 Increase soy production from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acms I Increase demand for soy products with 1D commercial companies using soy,r flour in their product; ExhibitQ illustrates the lien,? ?ndings of this report, showing project successes and challenges with respect to the soy value chain. EnCompass LLC 35 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 57 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [121'051?14 I It is important to note that, even with the activity level 5U:ces5&s noted throughout this report, and presented by ASA in Appendix If many of the higher level outcomes and goals as outlined in the Master Agreement have not been ful?lled. For example, the following outcomes and goals have not been achieved during the project lifecycle: Increase soy yields by 30% It Train 3,000 farmers per year {the assumption being that the one-day SFL erosure meetings are not the same thing as ensuring thata farmer is properly trained and acting on the training) 0 Protein processing facility is sustainable and profitable 0 Increase soy production from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acms I Increase demand for soy products with 1D commercial companies using soy,r flour in their product; ExhibitQ illustrates the lien,? ?ndings of this report, showing project successes and challenges with respect to the soy value chain. EnCompass LLC 35 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 57 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [121'051?14 I It is important to note that, even with the activity level 5U:ces5&s noted throughout this report, and presented by ASA in Appendix If many of the higher level outcomes and goals as outlined in the Master Agreement have not been ful?lled. For example, the following outcomes and goals have not been achieved during the project lifecycle: Increase soy yields by 30% It Train 3,000 farmers per year {the assumption being that the one-day SFL erosure meetings are not the same thing as ensuring thata farmer is properly trained and acting on the training) 0 Protein processing facility is sustainable and profitable 0 Increase soy production from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acms I Increase demand for soy products with 1D commercial companies using soy,r flour in their product; ExhibitQ illustrates the lien,? ?ndings of this report, showing project successes and challenges with respect to the soy value chain. EnCompass LLC 35 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 57 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [121'051?14 I It is important to note that, even with the activity level 5U:ces5&s noted throughout this report, and presented by ASA in Appendix If many of the higher level outcomes and goals as outlined in the Master Agreement have not been ful?lled. For example, the following outcomes and goals have not been achieved during the project lifecycle: Increase soy yields by 30% It Train 3,000 farmers per year {the assumption being that the one-day SFL erosure meetings are not the same thing as ensuring thata farmer is properly trained and acting on the training) 0 Protein processing facility is sustainable and profitable 0 Increase soy production from approximately 500 acres to 4,500 acms I Increase demand for soy products with 1D commercial companies using soy,r flour in their product; ExhibitQ illustrates the lien,? ?ndings of this report, showing project successes and challenges with respect to the soy value chain. EnCompass LLC 35 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 57 myrr? Esm? mmuo: 369.3 932.5 m. (mEm ma?a 13.62 wan mcmEEmEm m3. gain. 33:23: m3. 333.3 1. gamma mcm?m?u Guacaua . .1 . . 2.. $53333 . 3am: .m 33.39. 3 3. 3.3 I . n.ij m. . .5er5 x, 3.3_mazz . .. . .u .. . Ecsam Canaan _am?wza .. . 9m. . fl . m3..n_mm..m Egan?E. mcnur Bum?x .. +33 .m?o3.25.3 .. mcun: .m . I-.. 9.53 .22 m3 .3. mg? a. mama . .Egan: Eo?m?m amymzem . 3.5: Damn .. mng??rma . .. n3 um naeanmn 3 .I 12.533". 55 .. a. . v. .Eaans w. niac?gs, 53mm? agmr? 2 Erie .3959?. . . . 395m 35%: . mmzmu__._m.m 2 ?ag um $013.8. 83:32 2.333 0659.5 m?uz?g 3.3.3.323. 8.35.9 $3.53. man 0.5.2.5 33. man man 2033.3 . 33.5% 53.3 30.3. $33.3 .. 9.28:3 _uro Page 58 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry myrr? Esm? mmuo: 369.3 932.5 m. (mEm ma?a 13.62 wan mcmEEmEm m3. gain. 33:23: m3. 333.3 1. gamma mcm?m?u Guacaua . .1 . . 2.. $53333 . 3am: .m 33.39. 3 3. 3.3 I . n.ij m. . .5er5 x, 3.3_mazz . .. . .u .. . Ecsam Canaan _am?wza .. . 9m. . fl . m3..n_mm..m Egan?E. mcnur Bum?x .. +33 .m?o3.25.3 .. mcun: .m . I-.. 9.53 .22 m3 .3. mg? a. mama . .Egan: Eo?m?m amymzem . 3.5: Damn .. mng??rma . .. n3 um naeanmn 3 .I 12.533". 55 .. a. . v. .Eaans w. niac?gs, 53mm? agmr? 2 Erie .3959?. . . . 395m 35%: . mmzmu__._m.m 2 ?ag um $013.8. 83:32 2.333 0659.5 m?uz?g 3.3.3.323. 8.35.9 $3.53. man 0.5.2.5 33. man man 2033.3 . 33.5% 53.3 30.3. $33.3 .. 9.28:3 _uro Page 58 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry myrr? Esm? mmuo: 369.3 932.5 m. (mEm ma?a 13.62 wan mcmEEmEm m3. gain. 33:23: m3. 333.3 1. gamma mcm?m?u Guacaua . .1 . . 2.. $53333 . 3am: .m 33.39. 3 3. 3.3 I . n.ij m. . .5er5 x, 3.3_mazz . .. . .u .. . Ecsam Canaan _am?wza .. . 9m. . fl . m3..n_mm..m Egan?E. mcnur Bum?x .. +33 .m?o3.25.3 .. mcun: .m . I-.. 9.53 .22 m3 .3. mg? a. mama . .Egan: Eo?m?m amymzem . 3.5: Damn .. mng??rma . .. n3 um naeanmn 3 .I 12.533". 55 .. a. . v. .Eaans w. niac?gs, 53mm? agmr? 2 Erie .3959?. . . . 395m 35%: . mmzmu__._m.m 2 ?ag um $013.8. 83:32 2.333 0659.5 m?uz?g 3.3.3.323. 8.35.9 $3.53. man 0.5.2.5 33. man man 2033.3 . 33.5% 53.3 30.3. $33.3 .. 9.28:3 _uro Page 58 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry myrr? Esm? mmuo: 369.3 932.5 m. (mEm ma?a 13.62 wan mcmEEmEm m3. gain. 33:23: m3. 333.3 1. gamma mcm?m?u Guacaua . .1 . . 2.. $53333 . 3am: .m 33.39. 3 3. 3.3 I . n.ij m. . .5er5 x, 3.3_mazz . .. . .u .. . Ecsam Canaan _am?wza .. . 9m. . fl . m3..n_mm..m Egan?E. mcnur Bum?x .. +33 .m?o3.25.3 .. mcun: .m . I-.. 9.53 .22 m3 .3. mg? a. mama . .Egan: Eo?m?m amymzem . 3.5: Damn .. mng??rma . .. n3 um naeanmn 3 .I 12.533". 55 .. a. . v. .Eaans w. niac?gs, 53mm? agmr? 2 Erie .3959?. . . . 395m 35%: . mmzmu__._m.m 2 ?ag um $013.8. 83:32 2.333 0659.5 m?uz?g 3.3.3.323. 8.35.9 $3.53. man 0.5.2.5 33. man man 2033.3 . 33.5% 53.3 30.3. $33.3 .. 9.28:3 _uro Page 58 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Conclusions Condosions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does EARN design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? 1: While the project has had some stand-alone successes, overall the design does not align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The protect was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NH as a partner crippled implementation. To what extent hove EARN interventions been effectively implemented? SARAI has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver monetized donated sol.I products with the exception of the first year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these activities have not been effectively integrated into the soy value chain. I SARAI has not introduoed profitable sov production. - SARAI has not deployed staff effectiVelv 1' SARAI has not developed an effective hilng system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions neon effective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected impacts .3 a The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, looal-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension, the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve its goal. a The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especiallyI voung businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thus perhaps undermining local production. if demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What con he expected to be the long?term results of the intervention? 1! It is difficult to estimate the Iong?te rm impacts of some of the stand?a lone project sUccesses. However, given the inability to develop soyr production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we condude that it is unlikely that the ASAJWISHH intervention will result in a sustainable soy value chain. What are the lessons leornedfrom 5A that might help be more successful in similar EnCompass LLC 33 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 59 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Conclusions Condosions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does EARN design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? 1: While the project has had some stand-alone successes, overall the design does not align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The protect was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NH as a partner crippled implementation. To what extent hove EARN interventions been effectively implemented? SARAI has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver monetized donated sol.I products with the exception of the first year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these activities have not been effectively integrated into the soy value chain. I SARAI has not introduoed profitable sov production. - SARAI has not deployed staff effectiVelv 1' SARAI has not developed an effective hilng system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions neon effective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected impacts .3 a The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, looal-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension, the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve its goal. a The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especiallyI voung businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thus perhaps undermining local production. if demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What con he expected to be the long?term results of the intervention? 1! It is difficult to estimate the Iong?te rm impacts of some of the stand?a lone project sUccesses. However, given the inability to develop soyr production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we condude that it is unlikely that the ASAJWISHH intervention will result in a sustainable soy value chain. What are the lessons leornedfrom 5A that might help be more successful in similar EnCompass LLC 33 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 59 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Conclusions Condosions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does EARN design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? 1: While the project has had some stand-alone successes, overall the design does not align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The protect was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NH as a partner crippled implementation. To what extent hove EARN interventions been effectively implemented? SARAI has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver monetized donated sol.I products with the exception of the first year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these activities have not been effectively integrated into the soy value chain. I SARAI has not introduoed profitable sov production. - SARAI has not deployed staff effectiVelv 1' SARAI has not developed an effective hilng system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions neon effective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected impacts .3 a The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, looal-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension, the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve its goal. a The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especiallyI voung businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thus perhaps undermining local production. if demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What con he expected to be the long?term results of the intervention? 1! It is difficult to estimate the Iong?te rm impacts of some of the stand?a lone project sUccesses. However, given the inability to develop soyr production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we condude that it is unlikely that the ASAJWISHH intervention will result in a sustainable soy value chain. What are the lessons leornedfrom 5A that might help be more successful in similar EnCompass LLC 33 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 59 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report I 030514 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Conclusions Condosions are presented to correspond with the evaluation questions. To what extent does EARN design align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master Agreement? 1: While the project has had some stand-alone successes, overall the design does not align with the problems and goals outlined in the Master hgreement with respect to the creation of a sustainable value chain for soybeans. The protect was hampered by not being based on a program theory and therefore the overall design has signi?cant The partnership arrangements did not support a coordinated effort among the partners. The timing of the loss of NH as a partner crippled implementation. To what extent hove EARN interventions been effectively implemented? SARAI has completed and is operating the soy processing factory. SARAI has effectiver monetized donated sol.I products with the exception of the first year when outside issues interfered. SARAI has undertaken irrigation, road rehabilitation, and microcredit activities. However, these activities have not been effectively integrated into the soy value chain. I SARAI has not introduoed profitable sov production. - SARAI has not deployed staff effectiVelv 1' SARAI has not developed an effective hilng system to monitor and control project implementation. To what extent have the project interventions neon effective in meeting stated objectives and contributing to expected impacts .3 a The production challenges besetting EARN are such that the initiative will not be able to achieve its goal of developing a sustainable, looal-production-based soy value chain in Afghanistan within the time allotted. Even with a no-cost extension, the value chain is too complex and underdeveloped to allow the project to achieve its goal. a The project runs the risk of promoting demand for soy products in the absence of supply. Excessive demand can swamp businesses, especiallyI voung businesses. The local partners will begin to run the factory based on imported materials, thus perhaps undermining local production. if demand is not met, consumers will lose interest and substitute other products. What con he expected to be the long?term results of the intervention? 1! It is difficult to estimate the Iong?te rm impacts of some of the stand?a lone project sUccesses. However, given the inability to develop soyr production, and independent research that indicates that soy is unlikely to be accepted by farmers into their cropping system, we condude that it is unlikely that the ASAJWISHH intervention will result in a sustainable soy value chain. What are the lessons leornedfrom 5A that might help be more successful in similar EnCompass LLC 33 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 59 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mam intewentions in the future? 0 A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SARAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and Iogframe. Establish a system to u5e monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifecycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and liey partners are all Working together to sopport the intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs What in?uences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or constrained program implementation and results? a The volatile secur ity situa tion resulted in a ?uid a nd unpredicta ble project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. 4.2 Key Recommendations The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?concept demonstration in Balkh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and training, and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gUres from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. 2. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, Iogframe, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive MSLE plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. 3. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. 5FL should be given SARAI resources in Takhar and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be ful?lled using SFL permanent staff, with SARAI budget support as needed. EARN staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof ofconcept demonstration. 4. When deVeloping its staffing plan for Z?l-?il, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support team, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. 5. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Balkh, the project office should be moved to Mazar and SAHAI partner agencies should share of?ce space. The EnCompass LLC 39 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 60 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mam intewentions in the future? 0 A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SARAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and Iogframe. Establish a system to u5e monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifecycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and liey partners are all Working together to sopport the intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs What in?uences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or constrained program implementation and results? a The volatile secur ity situa tion resulted in a ?uid a nd unpredicta ble project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. 4.2 Key Recommendations The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?concept demonstration in Balkh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and training, and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gUres from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. 2. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, Iogframe, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive MSLE plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. 3. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. 5FL should be given SARAI resources in Takhar and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be ful?lled using SFL permanent staff, with SARAI budget support as needed. EARN staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof ofconcept demonstration. 4. When deVeloping its staffing plan for Z?l-?il, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support team, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. 5. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Balkh, the project office should be moved to Mazar and SAHAI partner agencies should share of?ce space. The EnCompass LLC 39 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 60 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mam intewentions in the future? 0 A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SARAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and Iogframe. Establish a system to u5e monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifecycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and liey partners are all Working together to sopport the intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs What in?uences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or constrained program implementation and results? a The volatile secur ity situa tion resulted in a ?uid a nd unpredicta ble project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. 4.2 Key Recommendations The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?concept demonstration in Balkh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and training, and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gUres from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. 2. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, Iogframe, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive MSLE plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. 3. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. 5FL should be given SARAI resources in Takhar and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be ful?lled using SFL permanent staff, with SARAI budget support as needed. EARN staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof ofconcept demonstration. 4. When deVeloping its staffing plan for Z?l-?il, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support team, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. 5. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Balkh, the project office should be moved to Mazar and SAHAI partner agencies should share of?ce space. The EnCompass LLC 39 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 60 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report mam intewentions in the future? 0 A number of lessons have emerged as a result of the SARAI initiative that might help ASNWISHH be more successful in similar interventions in the future: Conduct a feasibility study prior to project design Develop a program theory and logfrarne to show the theory and logic behind an intervention Develop a comprehensive and meaningful monitoring and evaluation system that is informed by a program theory and Iogframe. Establish a system to u5e monitoring data to inform decisions throughout the project lifecycle Put a communication strategy in place to ensure project staff and liey partners are all Working together to sopport the intervention Ensure that the skills of project staff and partners align with project needs What in?uences from other actors in the soy value chain have enabled or constrained program implementation and results? a The volatile secur ity situa tion resulted in a ?uid a nd unpredicta ble project environment, which has compounded implementation dif?culties. 4.2 Key Recommendations The proposed one year, no-cost extension should be approved on the condition that remaining project resources are directed to providing a proof-of?concept demonstration in Balkh. This demonstration should be on large mechanized farms and on small farms among previously recruited and trained cohort of farmers. This demonstration should include signi?cant investment in staff, outreach, and training, and publicity from the local partner. If 2014 production ?gUres from small and large farms are suf?ciently high [yield and pro?t relative to competing crops), an argument could perhaps be made that a profitable soy industry is possible. 2. The project should undertake team-building exercises with project partners to develop a program theory, Iogframe, a 2014 work plan, and a comprehensive MSLE plan to reconstruct project history and to monitor the fourth year of the project. 3. Despite the concentration of efforts in Balkh, some obligations in other locations may remain. 5FL should be given SARAI resources in Takhar and Kunduz suf?cient only to fulfill contractual obligations already in place, and these obligations should be ful?lled using SFL permanent staff, with SARAI budget support as needed. EARN staff and activities should be moved to Balkh entirely to participate in the proof ofconcept demonstration. 4. When deVeloping its staffing plan for Z?l-?il, should consider eliminating the positions of Country Director and Production Director, especially if SFL continues to be the agronomic lead. An in-country Team Leader, with an appropriate in-country support team, should be suf?cient to handle the remaining project activities and closeout. 5. To facilitate communication within the project and to support the intensive effort in Balkh, the project office should be moved to Mazar and SAHAI partner agencies should share of?ce space. The EnCompass LLC 39 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 60 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project should detrelop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant got'ernment offices. 5. Given the volatility in staf?ng of the agronomist position to date. the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staf?ng could perhaps be managed on a or loan basis, although a more sustainable option muld be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. i. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy flour beyond availability, the wcrmen's bakery pilot project should be eitpanded, particularly in Mazar, within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. 3. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture prodUCtion in hfghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASMWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situa tion-relevant knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 40 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 61 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project should detrelop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant got'ernment offices. 5. Given the volatility in staf?ng of the agronomist position to date. the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staf?ng could perhaps be managed on a or loan basis, although a more sustainable option muld be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. i. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy flour beyond availability, the wcrmen's bakery pilot project should be eitpanded, particularly in Mazar, within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. 3. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture prodUCtion in hfghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASMWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situa tion-relevant knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 40 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 61 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project should detrelop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant got'ernment offices. 5. Given the volatility in staf?ng of the agronomist position to date. the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staf?ng could perhaps be managed on a or loan basis, although a more sustainable option muld be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. i. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy flour beyond availability, the wcrmen's bakery pilot project should be eitpanded, particularly in Mazar, within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. 3. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture prodUCtion in hfghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASMWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situa tion-relevant knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 40 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 61 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report project should detrelop a robust internal communication system to ensure regular communication among key partners throughout the rest of the project. The project should initiate regular and frequent interaction with relevant got'ernment offices. 5. Given the volatility in staf?ng of the agronomist position to date. the project should consider employing Afghan nationals with soy experience to handle outreach. This staf?ng could perhaps be managed on a or loan basis, although a more sustainable option muld be for the local partner to recruit and hire their permanent agronomists at this time. i. For publicity purposes and to facilitate nutrition education while not increasing the demand for soy flour beyond availability, the wcrmen's bakery pilot project should be eitpanded, particularly in Mazar, within the project and support offered to other agencies for expansion ofthe activity. 3. To gain a wider perspective on agriculture prodUCtion in hfghanistan, future short?term technical assistance should be recruited from outside ASMWISHH and its af?liates in order to provide situa tion-relevant knowledge and skills. EnCompass LLC 40 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 61 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Appendix 1. Statement of Work REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST The American Soybean Association is requesting proposals from organizations and.? or individuals to conduct a mid-term evaluation of a Food for Progress activity in Afghanistan. l. BACKGROUND The American Soybean Association received funding from USDNFAS Food for Progress to implement a three year agricultural deVelopment project in Mghanistan. The Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative agreement was signed on September 30, 2010, with as the prime. The initial 3?5 months focused mainly on getting up and mnning and getting commodities monetized so that funds were available to begin program implementation. As part of the project, ASAMISHH entered into sub-recipient agreements with three organizations, Shelter for Life, SALT, and PARSA. also has a monetization agent, CHI. The project Was written with the intent of creating a Sostainable oilseed value chain by implementing interventions that support four objectives, including: Objective I: Increase the production capacity of targeted farmers Objective ll: Increase farmer access to markets Objective Ill: Increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities Objective IV: prove the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users SARAI has about ten interventions along the soy value chain, most of which are inter-connected in some we y. These activities include: 0 Re habillisite 35 kilometers of farm-to?market roadways - Renovate! construct ?ve irrigation systems I Provide micro-credit loans to I300 farming families Provide training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop to 9,000 farmers Establish a protein processing facility Provide technical assistance to develop, packager and market various foods produoed by the newly established protein protessing facility, as well as millers and bakeries. Establish an oilseed association Complete a nutrition educationf consumer avvareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy I Provide nutrition information and cooking seminars to 10,000 pregnant} lactating and vulnerable women identi?ed in collaboration with the Ministry of Women's Affai rs Distribute a winter ration of soy ?our to 5,000 pregnant! lactating women As part of the Master Agreement betWee-n ASAMISHH and US DAIFAS, ASMWISHH is required to undertake both an external mid?term evaluation and a final evaluation. The overall aim RFP is to identify and contract with a ?rm or individual to conduct the mid? term evaluation. ll. METHODOLOGY EnComp ass LLC 41 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 62 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Appendix 1. Statement of Work REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST The American Soybean Association is requesting proposals from organizations and.? or individuals to conduct a mid-term evaluation of a Food for Progress activity in Afghanistan. l. BACKGROUND The American Soybean Association received funding from USDNFAS Food for Progress to implement a three year agricultural deVelopment project in Mghanistan. The Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative agreement was signed on September 30, 2010, with as the prime. The initial 3?5 months focused mainly on getting up and mnning and getting commodities monetized so that funds were available to begin program implementation. As part of the project, ASAMISHH entered into sub-recipient agreements with three organizations, Shelter for Life, SALT, and PARSA. also has a monetization agent, CHI. The project Was written with the intent of creating a Sostainable oilseed value chain by implementing interventions that support four objectives, including: Objective I: Increase the production capacity of targeted farmers Objective ll: Increase farmer access to markets Objective Ill: Increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities Objective IV: prove the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users SARAI has about ten interventions along the soy value chain, most of which are inter-connected in some we y. These activities include: 0 Re habillisite 35 kilometers of farm-to?market roadways - Renovate! construct ?ve irrigation systems I Provide micro-credit loans to I300 farming families Provide training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop to 9,000 farmers Establish a protein processing facility Provide technical assistance to develop, packager and market various foods produoed by the newly established protein protessing facility, as well as millers and bakeries. Establish an oilseed association Complete a nutrition educationf consumer avvareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy I Provide nutrition information and cooking seminars to 10,000 pregnant} lactating and vulnerable women identi?ed in collaboration with the Ministry of Women's Affai rs Distribute a winter ration of soy ?our to 5,000 pregnant! lactating women As part of the Master Agreement betWee-n ASAMISHH and US DAIFAS, ASMWISHH is required to undertake both an external mid?term evaluation and a final evaluation. The overall aim RFP is to identify and contract with a ?rm or individual to conduct the mid? term evaluation. ll. METHODOLOGY EnComp ass LLC 41 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 62 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Appendix 1. Statement of Work REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST The American Soybean Association is requesting proposals from organizations and.? or individuals to conduct a mid-term evaluation of a Food for Progress activity in Afghanistan. l. BACKGROUND The American Soybean Association received funding from USDNFAS Food for Progress to implement a three year agricultural deVelopment project in Mghanistan. The Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative agreement was signed on September 30, 2010, with as the prime. The initial 3?5 months focused mainly on getting up and mnning and getting commodities monetized so that funds were available to begin program implementation. As part of the project, ASAMISHH entered into sub-recipient agreements with three organizations, Shelter for Life, SALT, and PARSA. also has a monetization agent, CHI. The project Was written with the intent of creating a Sostainable oilseed value chain by implementing interventions that support four objectives, including: Objective I: Increase the production capacity of targeted farmers Objective ll: Increase farmer access to markets Objective Ill: Increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities Objective IV: prove the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users SARAI has about ten interventions along the soy value chain, most of which are inter-connected in some we y. These activities include: 0 Re habillisite 35 kilometers of farm-to?market roadways - Renovate! construct ?ve irrigation systems I Provide micro-credit loans to I300 farming families Provide training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop to 9,000 farmers Establish a protein processing facility Provide technical assistance to develop, packager and market various foods produoed by the newly established protein protessing facility, as well as millers and bakeries. Establish an oilseed association Complete a nutrition educationf consumer avvareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy I Provide nutrition information and cooking seminars to 10,000 pregnant} lactating and vulnerable women identi?ed in collaboration with the Ministry of Women's Affai rs Distribute a winter ration of soy ?our to 5,000 pregnant! lactating women As part of the Master Agreement betWee-n ASAMISHH and US DAIFAS, ASMWISHH is required to undertake both an external mid?term evaluation and a final evaluation. The overall aim RFP is to identify and contract with a ?rm or individual to conduct the mid? term evaluation. ll. METHODOLOGY EnComp ass LLC 41 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 62 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report Appendix 1. Statement of Work REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST The American Soybean Association is requesting proposals from organizations and.? or individuals to conduct a mid-term evaluation of a Food for Progress activity in Afghanistan. l. BACKGROUND The American Soybean Association received funding from USDNFAS Food for Progress to implement a three year agricultural deVelopment project in Mghanistan. The Soybeans for Agricultural Renewal in Afghanistan Initiative agreement was signed on September 30, 2010, with as the prime. The initial 3?5 months focused mainly on getting up and mnning and getting commodities monetized so that funds were available to begin program implementation. As part of the project, ASAMISHH entered into sub-recipient agreements with three organizations, Shelter for Life, SALT, and PARSA. also has a monetization agent, CHI. The project Was written with the intent of creating a Sostainable oilseed value chain by implementing interventions that support four objectives, including: Objective I: Increase the production capacity of targeted farmers Objective ll: Increase farmer access to markets Objective Ill: Increase capacity to process and sell locally produced crops, contributing to the creation of sustainable business opportunities Objective IV: prove the nutritional knowledge and status of targeted community leaders, health sector workers, food processors, vulnerable individuals, and end users SARAI has about ten interventions along the soy value chain, most of which are inter-connected in some we y. These activities include: 0 Re habillisite 35 kilometers of farm-to?market roadways - Renovate! construct ?ve irrigation systems I Provide micro-credit loans to I300 farming families Provide training in the production of soybeans as a rotation crop to 9,000 farmers Establish a protein processing facility Provide technical assistance to develop, packager and market various foods produoed by the newly established protein protessing facility, as well as millers and bakeries. Establish an oilseed association Complete a nutrition educationf consumer avvareness campaign to increase knowledge of general nutrition and the health bene?ts of soy I Provide nutrition information and cooking seminars to 10,000 pregnant} lactating and vulnerable women identi?ed in collaboration with the Ministry of Women's Affai rs Distribute a winter ration of soy ?our to 5,000 pregnant! lactating women As part of the Master Agreement betWee-n ASAMISHH and US DAIFAS, ASMWISHH is required to undertake both an external mid?term evaluation and a final evaluation. The overall aim RFP is to identify and contract with a ?rm or individual to conduct the mid? term evaluation. ll. METHODOLOGY EnComp ass LLC 41 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 62 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 The mid-term evaluation will be condulzted in several phases: Phase 1: This phase will focus on data review and mid?term evaluation design. Documents to be reviewed include the Master Agreement, semi-annual donor reports, ad-hoc reports, success stories, reports from sub?recipients, monetizan'on reports, and technical consultant reports. During this time, the technician mayI also interview several stakeholders, including US. based WISH H, donor, and HAXWISHH sub-recipient staff. During pha5e the technician will also ?nalize their design plan for the mid-term evaluation. Phase Phase two will take place in Afghanistan [mainly in Kabul, Talchar, and Balkhi. The technician will mE'et with multiple stakeholders that are introlved in, coordinate with, and/or bene?t from the SARAI project. During this phase, information will be gathered through one-on-one meetings, tacos groups, site visits, andfor a review ofdocuments available at the field level. Meetings and areas of investigation include: 0 Meet with all sub-recipient partners- Shelter for Life, SALT, PARSA, cm; I Meet with collaborating partners? Oil Crops Growers Association of Afghanistan, the Naseeb Group, Naanwahee Associations in [Water and Kabul; a Meet with government representatives? USDAIFAS, Ministry of Agriculture, industry and Labor, Ministry of Women's Miairs; a Review monetization procedures Includes process for audions, bids, tenders, final price received, ways in which challenges Were addressed; Review consistency of activi ties, outputs, and outcomes compared to the description in the Master Agreement; II Review in-country of?ce ?nancial records and receipts; i Review available ?nancial reports and con?rm accuracy of expenditures against activities in the ?eld; 0 Review implementation to date of all activities against planned implementation timetable; a Review and verify that ASNWEHH is on track to achieve the ta rgets outlined in the Master Agreement; I Verify the number of people that have received distributions, and revievv procedures for identi?cation of bene?ciaries, distribution, and signatories at pick-up; - Review training modules used in various activities, and note logical flow, appropriateness, and how information was presented; a Meet with bene?ciaries of commodity distributions and training for several activities (including cooking seminars, soybean production, and training for micro?credit recipients}; II For micro-credit component, review average size loan and use of loan, loan terms, and appropriateness; 0 For agricultural production, review issues related to measuring improved crop yield, farmer contracts, contract pricing, and sustainability for farmers securing inputs in the future; 0 Review all aspects of commodity storage, including warehousing, stacking, use of bin cards, cleanliness, ventilation, signs of infestation, warehouse security, handling of damaged commodity, losses; I Visit the main market to collect market data;r intelligence, including commodities available, prices, origin of commodities, supply! quantity, quality of commodities for sale; II Review any monitoring documents. compiled at the ?eld level; I Assess the capacity and appropriateness of sh l'l'ing of ASMWISHH and local partners, including EnCompass LLC 42 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 63 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 The mid-term evaluation will be condulzted in several phases: Phase 1: This phase will focus on data review and mid?term evaluation design. Documents to be reviewed include the Master Agreement, semi-annual donor reports, ad-hoc reports, success stories, reports from sub?recipients, monetizan'on reports, and technical consultant reports. During this time, the technician mayI also interview several stakeholders, including US. based WISH H, donor, and HAXWISHH sub-recipient staff. During pha5e the technician will also ?nalize their design plan for the mid-term evaluation. Phase Phase two will take place in Afghanistan [mainly in Kabul, Talchar, and Balkhi. The technician will mE'et with multiple stakeholders that are introlved in, coordinate with, and/or bene?t from the SARAI project. During this phase, information will be gathered through one-on-one meetings, tacos groups, site visits, andfor a review ofdocuments available at the field level. Meetings and areas of investigation include: 0 Meet with all sub-recipient partners- Shelter for Life, SALT, PARSA, cm; I Meet with collaborating partners? Oil Crops Growers Association of Afghanistan, the Naseeb Group, Naanwahee Associations in [Water and Kabul; a Meet with government representatives? USDAIFAS, Ministry of Agriculture, industry and Labor, Ministry of Women's Miairs; a Review monetization procedures Includes process for audions, bids, tenders, final price received, ways in which challenges Were addressed; Review consistency of activi ties, outputs, and outcomes compared to the description in the Master Agreement; II Review in-country of?ce ?nancial records and receipts; i Review available ?nancial reports and con?rm accuracy of expenditures against activities in the ?eld; 0 Review implementation to date of all activities against planned implementation timetable; a Review and verify that ASNWEHH is on track to achieve the ta rgets outlined in the Master Agreement; I Verify the number of people that have received distributions, and revievv procedures for identi?cation of bene?ciaries, distribution, and signatories at pick-up; - Review training modules used in various activities, and note logical flow, appropriateness, and how information was presented; a Meet with bene?ciaries of commodity distributions and training for several activities (including cooking seminars, soybean production, and training for micro?credit recipients}; II For micro-credit component, review average size loan and use of loan, loan terms, and appropriateness; 0 For agricultural production, review issues related to measuring improved crop yield, farmer contracts, contract pricing, and sustainability for farmers securing inputs in the future; 0 Review all aspects of commodity storage, including warehousing, stacking, use of bin cards, cleanliness, ventilation, signs of infestation, warehouse security, handling of damaged commodity, losses; I Visit the main market to collect market data;r intelligence, including commodities available, prices, origin of commodities, supply! quantity, quality of commodities for sale; II Review any monitoring documents. compiled at the ?eld level; I Assess the capacity and appropriateness of sh l'l'ing of ASMWISHH and local partners, including EnCompass LLC 42 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 63 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 The mid-term evaluation will be condulzted in several phases: Phase 1: This phase will focus on data review and mid?term evaluation design. Documents to be reviewed include the Master Agreement, semi-annual donor reports, ad-hoc reports, success stories, reports from sub?recipients, monetizan'on reports, and technical consultant reports. During this time, the technician mayI also interview several stakeholders, including US. based WISH H, donor, and HAXWISHH sub-recipient staff. During pha5e the technician will also ?nalize their design plan for the mid-term evaluation. Phase Phase two will take place in Afghanistan [mainly in Kabul, Talchar, and Balkhi. The technician will mE'et with multiple stakeholders that are introlved in, coordinate with, and/or bene?t from the SARAI project. During this phase, information will be gathered through one-on-one meetings, tacos groups, site visits, andfor a review ofdocuments available at the field level. Meetings and areas of investigation include: 0 Meet with all sub-recipient partners- Shelter for Life, SALT, PARSA, cm; I Meet with collaborating partners? Oil Crops Growers Association of Afghanistan, the Naseeb Group, Naanwahee Associations in [Water and Kabul; a Meet with government representatives? USDAIFAS, Ministry of Agriculture, industry and Labor, Ministry of Women's Miairs; a Review monetization procedures Includes process for audions, bids, tenders, final price received, ways in which challenges Were addressed; Review consistency of activi ties, outputs, and outcomes compared to the description in the Master Agreement; II Review in-country of?ce ?nancial records and receipts; i Review available ?nancial reports and con?rm accuracy of expenditures against activities in the ?eld; 0 Review implementation to date of all activities against planned implementation timetable; a Review and verify that ASNWEHH is on track to achieve the ta rgets outlined in the Master Agreement; I Verify the number of people that have received distributions, and revievv procedures for identi?cation of bene?ciaries, distribution, and signatories at pick-up; - Review training modules used in various activities, and note logical flow, appropriateness, and how information was presented; a Meet with bene?ciaries of commodity distributions and training for several activities (including cooking seminars, soybean production, and training for micro?credit recipients}; II For micro-credit component, review average size loan and use of loan, loan terms, and appropriateness; 0 For agricultural production, review issues related to measuring improved crop yield, farmer contracts, contract pricing, and sustainability for farmers securing inputs in the future; 0 Review all aspects of commodity storage, including warehousing, stacking, use of bin cards, cleanliness, ventilation, signs of infestation, warehouse security, handling of damaged commodity, losses; I Visit the main market to collect market data;r intelligence, including commodities available, prices, origin of commodities, supply! quantity, quality of commodities for sale; II Review any monitoring documents. compiled at the ?eld level; I Assess the capacity and appropriateness of sh l'l'ing of ASMWISHH and local partners, including EnCompass LLC 42 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 63 Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 0210514 The mid-term evaluation will be condulzted in several phases: Phase 1: This phase will focus on data review and mid?term evaluation design. Documents to be reviewed include the Master Agreement, semi-annual donor reports, ad-hoc reports, success stories, reports from sub?recipients, monetizan'on reports, and technical consultant reports. During this time, the technician mayI also interview several stakeholders, including US. based WISH H, donor, and HAXWISHH sub-recipient staff. During pha5e the technician will also ?nalize their design plan for the mid-term evaluation. Phase Phase two will take place in Afghanistan [mainly in Kabul, Talchar, and Balkhi. The technician will mE'et with multiple stakeholders that are introlved in, coordinate with, and/or bene?t from the SARAI project. During this phase, information will be gathered through one-on-one meetings, tacos groups, site visits, andfor a review ofdocuments available at the field level. Meetings and areas of investigation include: 0 Meet with all sub-recipient partners- Shelter for Life, SALT, PARSA, cm; I Meet with collaborating partners? Oil Crops Growers Association of Afghanistan, the Naseeb Group, Naanwahee Associations in [Water and Kabul; a Meet with government representatives? USDAIFAS, Ministry of Agriculture, industry and Labor, Ministry of Women's Miairs; a Review monetization procedures Includes process for audions, bids, tenders, final price received, ways in which challenges Were addressed; Review consistency of activi ties, outputs, and outcomes compared to the description in the Master Agreement; II Review in-country of?ce ?nancial records and receipts; i Review available ?nancial reports and con?rm accuracy of expenditures against activities in the ?eld; 0 Review implementation to date of all activities against planned implementation timetable; a Review and verify that ASNWEHH is on track to achieve the ta rgets outlined in the Master Agreement; I Verify the number of people that have received distributions, and revievv procedures for identi?cation of bene?ciaries, distribution, and signatories at pick-up; - Review training modules used in various activities, and note logical flow, appropriateness, and how information was presented; a Meet with bene?ciaries of commodity distributions and training for several activities (including cooking seminars, soybean production, and training for micro?credit recipients}; II For micro-credit component, review average size loan and use of loan, loan terms, and appropriateness; 0 For agricultural production, review issues related to measuring improved crop yield, farmer contracts, contract pricing, and sustainability for farmers securing inputs in the future; 0 Review all aspects of commodity storage, including warehousing, stacking, use of bin cards, cleanliness, ventilation, signs of infestation, warehouse security, handling of damaged commodity, losses; I Visit the main market to collect market data;r intelligence, including commodities available, prices, origin of commodities, supply! quantity, quality of commodities for sale; II Review any monitoring documents. compiled at the ?eld level; I Assess the capacity and appropriateness of sh l'l'ing of ASMWISHH and local partners, including EnCompass LLC 42 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 63 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02:05:14 documentation on hand; 0 Overall appropriateness of project concept and approach; I Appropriateness of selected road rehabilitation and irrigation sites and methodologies employed in that process: I Review overall monitoring and evaluation plans and tools and assess their utility for monitoring project implementation, achievements, and outcomes and make recommendations for the ?nal evaluation. During this phase, interview tools and/or questionnaires should be shared with ASMWISHH prior to use. Phase 3: This phase will consist of collating all available documentation and not? from travel to Afghanistan into a coherent report. This phase will take place in the United States, and during this time the technician may continue to reach out to individuals in the United States and in Afghanistan for any additional data needed, andfor to confirm} clarify.l any observations or findings. Ill. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a detailed picture of the existing progress of the project against stated objectives and outcomes. This is to be achieved by addressing several key questions, including: Are the interventions effective in meeting stated objectivles and outcomes? Are the interventions meant to be sustainable going to be sustainable? If not, what are proposed changes to increase the likelihood of sustainability? Are the interventions relevant given the proposed problems? The deliverable is a midterm report that documents all findings, and should include the following com ponents'. Title page Ta ble of Contents Acronvms l. Executive summaiv ll. Background Purpose of mid-term evaluation W. Methodologv- include overview of design, as Well as and limitations of methodology Key Findings detailed by activitv, in addition to monetization, commodity management, and financial conclusions. This section should also include demonstrated impact {or evidence of potential for long- term impact) in the project activities Ul. Best practices} lessons learned EnCompass LLC 43 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 64 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02:05:14 documentation on hand; 0 Overall appropriateness of project concept and approach; I Appropriateness of selected road rehabilitation and irrigation sites and methodologies employed in that process: I Review overall monitoring and evaluation plans and tools and assess their utility for monitoring project implementation, achievements, and outcomes and make recommendations for the ?nal evaluation. During this phase, interview tools and/or questionnaires should be shared with ASMWISHH prior to use. Phase 3: This phase will consist of collating all available documentation and not? from travel to Afghanistan into a coherent report. This phase will take place in the United States, and during this time the technician may continue to reach out to individuals in the United States and in Afghanistan for any additional data needed, andfor to confirm} clarify.l any observations or findings. Ill. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a detailed picture of the existing progress of the project against stated objectives and outcomes. This is to be achieved by addressing several key questions, including: Are the interventions effective in meeting stated objectivles and outcomes? Are the interventions meant to be sustainable going to be sustainable? If not, what are proposed changes to increase the likelihood of sustainability? Are the interventions relevant given the proposed problems? The deliverable is a midterm report that documents all findings, and should include the following com ponents'. Title page Ta ble of Contents Acronvms l. Executive summaiv ll. Background Purpose of mid-term evaluation W. Methodologv- include overview of design, as Well as and limitations of methodology Key Findings detailed by activitv, in addition to monetization, commodity management, and financial conclusions. This section should also include demonstrated impact {or evidence of potential for long- term impact) in the project activities Ul. Best practices} lessons learned EnCompass LLC 43 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 64 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02:05:14 documentation on hand; 0 Overall appropriateness of project concept and approach; I Appropriateness of selected road rehabilitation and irrigation sites and methodologies employed in that process: I Review overall monitoring and evaluation plans and tools and assess their utility for monitoring project implementation, achievements, and outcomes and make recommendations for the ?nal evaluation. During this phase, interview tools and/or questionnaires should be shared with ASMWISHH prior to use. Phase 3: This phase will consist of collating all available documentation and not? from travel to Afghanistan into a coherent report. This phase will take place in the United States, and during this time the technician may continue to reach out to individuals in the United States and in Afghanistan for any additional data needed, andfor to confirm} clarify.l any observations or findings. Ill. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a detailed picture of the existing progress of the project against stated objectives and outcomes. This is to be achieved by addressing several key questions, including: Are the interventions effective in meeting stated objectivles and outcomes? Are the interventions meant to be sustainable going to be sustainable? If not, what are proposed changes to increase the likelihood of sustainability? Are the interventions relevant given the proposed problems? The deliverable is a midterm report that documents all findings, and should include the following com ponents'. Title page Ta ble of Contents Acronvms l. Executive summaiv ll. Background Purpose of mid-term evaluation W. Methodologv- include overview of design, as Well as and limitations of methodology Key Findings detailed by activitv, in addition to monetization, commodity management, and financial conclusions. This section should also include demonstrated impact {or evidence of potential for long- term impact) in the project activities Ul. Best practices} lessons learned EnCompass LLC 43 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 64 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 02:05:14 documentation on hand; 0 Overall appropriateness of project concept and approach; I Appropriateness of selected road rehabilitation and irrigation sites and methodologies employed in that process: I Review overall monitoring and evaluation plans and tools and assess their utility for monitoring project implementation, achievements, and outcomes and make recommendations for the ?nal evaluation. During this phase, interview tools and/or questionnaires should be shared with ASMWISHH prior to use. Phase 3: This phase will consist of collating all available documentation and not? from travel to Afghanistan into a coherent report. This phase will take place in the United States, and during this time the technician may continue to reach out to individuals in the United States and in Afghanistan for any additional data needed, andfor to confirm} clarify.l any observations or findings. Ill. PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a detailed picture of the existing progress of the project against stated objectives and outcomes. This is to be achieved by addressing several key questions, including: Are the interventions effective in meeting stated objectivles and outcomes? Are the interventions meant to be sustainable going to be sustainable? If not, what are proposed changes to increase the likelihood of sustainability? Are the interventions relevant given the proposed problems? The deliverable is a midterm report that documents all findings, and should include the following com ponents'. Title page Ta ble of Contents Acronvms l. Executive summaiv ll. Background Purpose of mid-term evaluation W. Methodologv- include overview of design, as Well as and limitations of methodology Key Findings detailed by activitv, in addition to monetization, commodity management, and financial conclusions. This section should also include demonstrated impact {or evidence of potential for long- term impact) in the project activities Ul. Best practices} lessons learned EnCompass LLC 43 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 64 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Recommendations This section should include recommendations for speci?c improvements from mid?term to project closure, and evidence of sustainability or potential pathways to sustainability in the various project components Annexes? To include technicia n?s 50W, suwey instrumentfs, liey informant questions, itinerary detailing documents reviEWed and people met W. ASAIWISHH EVALUATION MANAGEMENT I?v'l?iE within ASNWISHH is overseen by a small division. This division i5 responsible for overseeing the drafting and release ofthis RFP. soliciting responses, helping select the final candidate, drafting the ?nal contract, and keeping the progress of this solicitation on track. This also includes providing support as necessary, providing haedback on evaluation drafts, serving as a liaison as necessary, and giving approval for the final ?nished evaluation report. The MBLE division works closely with other divisions that will be heavily involved in the mid?term evaluation. The operations division oversees all aspects of project implementa tion, including contracting and compliance. This division includes the Director of Operations, Program Manager for Asia, and the Program Officer for Asia. The evaluatorfs will meet with all three of these division staff as part of this evaluation. also has an of?ce in Afghanistan that is staffed with a Country Director, Deputy Country Director, etc. The evaluator?fs will meet with any staff as necessary in Afghanistan to effectively complete the evaluation. Both the operations division and Afghanian country office will provide inputs for selecting a ?nal candidate to conduct the evaluation, provide feedback on proposed questionnaires, and provide com ments on dra ft evaluation reports. V. SCHEDULE June 13- Release of solicitation July 3- Expressions of interest due Week ofJuly 3 - Proposals reviewed. Only semi-?nalists will be coniacted for interview. Week of July 15- Contract negotiated and completed July 22- August 5- Review of available data (Master agreement, donor reports, EARN brochure piece, sub?recipient reports to ASAIWISHH, nutrition survey reports, auction reports, etc.) August 12?16? Final review ofavailable data and brief with USDNFAS Washington DCand Washington DC August 17-Sept 7- It is envisioned that approximately 2 a weeks of time will he spent in Afghanistan, depending on the program design. Week of September B-Telephone de?briefof trip ?ndings with USDMFAS Washington DC and ASAIWISHH Washington DC September 20- draft of mid-term evaluation report September 30? Final mid-term evaluation report submitted VI. EXPRESSION OF INTEREST SUBMISSION Expressions of interest should not exceed 5 pages, and must include the following to be considered: 1. Short overview of evaluator/ com pa ny EnCompass LLC 44 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 65 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Recommendations This section should include recommendations for speci?c improvements from mid?term to project closure, and evidence of sustainability or potential pathways to sustainability in the various project components Annexes? To include technicia n?s 50W, suwey instrumentfs, liey informant questions, itinerary detailing documents reviEWed and people met W. ASAIWISHH EVALUATION MANAGEMENT I?v'l?iE within ASNWISHH is overseen by a small division. This division i5 responsible for overseeing the drafting and release ofthis RFP. soliciting responses, helping select the final candidate, drafting the ?nal contract, and keeping the progress of this solicitation on track. This also includes providing support as necessary, providing haedback on evaluation drafts, serving as a liaison as necessary, and giving approval for the final ?nished evaluation report. The MBLE division works closely with other divisions that will be heavily involved in the mid?term evaluation. The operations division oversees all aspects of project implementa tion, including contracting and compliance. This division includes the Director of Operations, Program Manager for Asia, and the Program Officer for Asia. The evaluatorfs will meet with all three of these division staff as part of this evaluation. also has an of?ce in Afghanistan that is staffed with a Country Director, Deputy Country Director, etc. The evaluator?fs will meet with any staff as necessary in Afghanistan to effectively complete the evaluation. Both the operations division and Afghanian country office will provide inputs for selecting a ?nal candidate to conduct the evaluation, provide feedback on proposed questionnaires, and provide com ments on dra ft evaluation reports. V. SCHEDULE June 13- Release of solicitation July 3- Expressions of interest due Week ofJuly 3 - Proposals reviewed. Only semi-?nalists will be coniacted for interview. Week of July 15- Contract negotiated and completed July 22- August 5- Review of available data (Master agreement, donor reports, EARN brochure piece, sub?recipient reports to ASAIWISHH, nutrition survey reports, auction reports, etc.) August 12?16? Final review ofavailable data and brief with USDNFAS Washington DCand Washington DC August 17-Sept 7- It is envisioned that approximately 2 a weeks of time will he spent in Afghanistan, depending on the program design. Week of September B-Telephone de?briefof trip ?ndings with USDMFAS Washington DC and ASAIWISHH Washington DC September 20- draft of mid-term evaluation report September 30? Final mid-term evaluation report submitted VI. EXPRESSION OF INTEREST SUBMISSION Expressions of interest should not exceed 5 pages, and must include the following to be considered: 1. Short overview of evaluator/ com pa ny EnCompass LLC 44 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 65 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Recommendations This section should include recommendations for speci?c improvements from mid?term to project closure, and evidence of sustainability or potential pathways to sustainability in the various project components Annexes? To include technicia n?s 50W, suwey instrumentfs, liey informant questions, itinerary detailing documents reviEWed and people met W. ASAIWISHH EVALUATION MANAGEMENT I?v'l?iE within ASNWISHH is overseen by a small division. This division i5 responsible for overseeing the drafting and release ofthis RFP. soliciting responses, helping select the final candidate, drafting the ?nal contract, and keeping the progress of this solicitation on track. This also includes providing support as necessary, providing haedback on evaluation drafts, serving as a liaison as necessary, and giving approval for the final ?nished evaluation report. The MBLE division works closely with other divisions that will be heavily involved in the mid?term evaluation. The operations division oversees all aspects of project implementa tion, including contracting and compliance. This division includes the Director of Operations, Program Manager for Asia, and the Program Officer for Asia. The evaluatorfs will meet with all three of these division staff as part of this evaluation. also has an of?ce in Afghanistan that is staffed with a Country Director, Deputy Country Director, etc. The evaluator?fs will meet with any staff as necessary in Afghanistan to effectively complete the evaluation. Both the operations division and Afghanian country office will provide inputs for selecting a ?nal candidate to conduct the evaluation, provide feedback on proposed questionnaires, and provide com ments on dra ft evaluation reports. V. SCHEDULE June 13- Release of solicitation July 3- Expressions of interest due Week ofJuly 3 - Proposals reviewed. Only semi-?nalists will be coniacted for interview. Week of July 15- Contract negotiated and completed July 22- August 5- Review of available data (Master agreement, donor reports, EARN brochure piece, sub?recipient reports to ASAIWISHH, nutrition survey reports, auction reports, etc.) August 12?16? Final review ofavailable data and brief with USDNFAS Washington DCand Washington DC August 17-Sept 7- It is envisioned that approximately 2 a weeks of time will he spent in Afghanistan, depending on the program design. Week of September B-Telephone de?briefof trip ?ndings with USDMFAS Washington DC and ASAIWISHH Washington DC September 20- draft of mid-term evaluation report September 30? Final mid-term evaluation report submitted VI. EXPRESSION OF INTEREST SUBMISSION Expressions of interest should not exceed 5 pages, and must include the following to be considered: 1. Short overview of evaluator/ com pa ny EnCompass LLC 44 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 65 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report 020514 Recommendations This section should include recommendations for speci?c improvements from mid?term to project closure, and evidence of sustainability or potential pathways to sustainability in the various project components Annexes? To include technicia n?s 50W, suwey instrumentfs, liey informant questions, itinerary detailing documents reviEWed and people met W. ASAIWISHH EVALUATION MANAGEMENT I?v'l?iE within ASNWISHH is overseen by a small division. This division i5 responsible for overseeing the drafting and release ofthis RFP. soliciting responses, helping select the final candidate, drafting the ?nal contract, and keeping the progress of this solicitation on track. This also includes providing support as necessary, providing haedback on evaluation drafts, serving as a liaison as necessary, and giving approval for the final ?nished evaluation report. The MBLE division works closely with other divisions that will be heavily involved in the mid?term evaluation. The operations division oversees all aspects of project implementa tion, including contracting and compliance. This division includes the Director of Operations, Program Manager for Asia, and the Program Officer for Asia. The evaluatorfs will meet with all three of these division staff as part of this evaluation. also has an of?ce in Afghanistan that is staffed with a Country Director, Deputy Country Director, etc. The evaluator?fs will meet with any staff as necessary in Afghanistan to effectively complete the evaluation. Both the operations division and Afghanian country office will provide inputs for selecting a ?nal candidate to conduct the evaluation, provide feedback on proposed questionnaires, and provide com ments on dra ft evaluation reports. V. SCHEDULE June 13- Release of solicitation July 3- Expressions of interest due Week ofJuly 3 - Proposals reviewed. Only semi-?nalists will be coniacted for interview. Week of July 15- Contract negotiated and completed July 22- August 5- Review of available data (Master agreement, donor reports, EARN brochure piece, sub?recipient reports to ASAIWISHH, nutrition survey reports, auction reports, etc.) August 12?16? Final review ofavailable data and brief with USDNFAS Washington DCand Washington DC August 17-Sept 7- It is envisioned that approximately 2 a weeks of time will he spent in Afghanistan, depending on the program design. Week of September B-Telephone de?briefof trip ?ndings with USDMFAS Washington DC and ASAIWISHH Washington DC September 20- draft of mid-term evaluation report September 30? Final mid-term evaluation report submitted VI. EXPRESSION OF INTEREST SUBMISSION Expressions of interest should not exceed 5 pages, and must include the following to be considered: 1. Short overview of evaluator/ com pa ny EnCompass LLC 44 I SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 65 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 2. Approach to the review pr0ce55 3. Organizational chart of team completing the work Proposed Scope of Work 5. Description of similar projects completed,l past performance (he prepared to share samples of previously completed evaluations) 5. Fee schedule and proposed fee to accomplish the work 7. Experience in Afghanistan is a must, and should be briefly detailed in the submission Eualuatorfs should have at least 10 years of experience in the ?eld of development evaluation, in addition to experience in international development. Semi-finalists will be contacted for interviews. The proposed submission should not exceed $50,000 Expressions of interest should be submitted electronically by close of business on July 3 to apoock@soy.org. and EnCompass LLC 45] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 66 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 2. Approach to the review pr0ce55 3. Organizational chart of team completing the work Proposed Scope of Work 5. Description of similar projects completed,l past performance (he prepared to share samples of previously completed evaluations) 5. Fee schedule and proposed fee to accomplish the work 7. Experience in Afghanistan is a must, and should be briefly detailed in the submission Eualuatorfs should have at least 10 years of experience in the ?eld of development evaluation, in addition to experience in international development. Semi-finalists will be contacted for interviews. The proposed submission should not exceed $50,000 Expressions of interest should be submitted electronically by close of business on July 3 to apoock@soy.org. and EnCompass LLC 45] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 66 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 2. Approach to the review pr0ce55 3. Organizational chart of team completing the work Proposed Scope of Work 5. Description of similar projects completed,l past performance (he prepared to share samples of previously completed evaluations) 5. Fee schedule and proposed fee to accomplish the work 7. Experience in Afghanistan is a must, and should be briefly detailed in the submission Eualuatorfs should have at least 10 years of experience in the ?eld of development evaluation, in addition to experience in international development. Semi-finalists will be contacted for interviews. The proposed submission should not exceed $50,000 Expressions of interest should be submitted electronically by close of business on July 3 to apoock@soy.org. and EnCompass LLC 45] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 66 SARAI Midterm Evaluation: Final Report [130514 2. Approach to the review pr0ce55 3. Organizational chart of team completing the work Proposed Scope of Work 5. Description of similar projects completed,l past performance (he prepared to share samples of previously completed evaluations) 5. Fee schedule and proposed fee to accomplish the work 7. Experience in Afghanistan is a must, and should be briefly detailed in the submission Eualuatorfs should have at least 10 years of experience in the ?eld of development evaluation, in addition to experience in international development. Semi-finalists will be contacted for interviews. The proposed submission should not exceed $50,000 Expressions of interest should be submitted electronically by close of business on July 3 to apoock@soy.org. and EnCompass LLC 45] SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry Page 66 bug?3.? N. wink .5553. 3.3m; mane: 3.59.3 Ea} Em: urwmm Hunt anal?u Fm} aim manna Emu min ?an?man 332122.?: Emanqzm man 3258 :3 3 On". 3133 .3 Emma-? Eimi mam?Em 23m: mom? Dug 3.52.0: 333$ 332% $335 man 1333 31m 3 03 mepm um?nmu?m m: Emma?? um?m mug?inns: QO?mm.? Um?m: man. .3 nor! gnaw: Eu} On? DE: man 3235: 833mg 0: man ?Era? 31 DE. Hm m?uqaii man mauqosm Em: 3:me Dmm?z Dug no=mnmna non?m amm?sma non?m DB. in; Dagmar?n may. mcmEuma: can?: On 3. Bus 8:230: non?m nqmumz?mn Ha ma?a? 832.53 a: Emumqm man 233: an 02. mN m??woii man ?5395 32m 3:35 $3.335. 10:2, 305% 33333.. mmsm? wan 333m On? 5 3313. union Suez? mannmum nancams? Gm?: 3592 ?.323, 26:3? 333. #03 EU- Eton?. m:n_ nmnranm. 3:253 Etna Cm magma mam??main? 33am Fan nuancn? On". musmm Ann 31:23 Fm. Emma hm? mono: .31 53235 Egan? .mnm. but. ?54263.3 ?Hm man acute: mocquamz? nOandDz mnzma :55 a oval 4341 2:3: mare: qul x.me 03. mm. manna?Una? Eh hm Page 67 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry bug?3.? N. wink .5553. 3.3m; mane: 3.59.3 Ea} Em: urwmm Hunt anal?u Fm} aim manna Emu min ?an?man 332122.?: Emanqzm man 3258 :3 3 On". 3133 .3 Emma-? Eimi mam?Em 23m: mom? Dug 3.52.0: 333$ 332% $335 man 1333 31m 3 03 mepm um?nmu?m m: Emma?? um?m mug?inns: QO?mm.? Um?m: man. .3 nor! gnaw: Eu} On? DE: man 3235: 833mg 0: man ?Era? 31 DE. Hm m?uqaii man mauqosm Em: 3:me Dmm?z Dug no=mnmna non?m amm?sma non?m DB. in; Dagmar?n may. mcmEuma: can?: On 3. Bus 8:230: non?m nqmumz?mn Ha ma?a? 832.53 a: Emumqm man 233: an 02. mN m??woii man ?5395 32m 3:35 $3.335. 10:2, 305% 33333.. mmsm? wan 333m On? 5 3313. union Suez? mannmum nancams? Gm?: 3592 ?.323, 26:3? 333. #03 EU- Eton?. m:n_ nmnranm. 3:253 Etna Cm magma mam??main? 33am Fan nuancn? On". musmm Ann 31:23 Fm. Emma hm? mono: .31 53235 Egan? .mnm. but. ?54263.3 ?Hm man acute: mocquamz? nOandDz mnzma :55 a oval 4341 2:3: mare: qul x.me 03. mm. manna?Una? Eh hm Page 67 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry bug?3.? N. wink .5553. 3.3m; mane: 3.59.3 Ea} Em: urwmm Hunt anal?u Fm} aim manna Emu min ?an?man 332122.?: Emanqzm man 3258 :3 3 On". 3133 .3 Emma-? Eimi mam?Em 23m: mom? Dug 3.52.0: 333$ 332% $335 man 1333 31m 3 03 mepm um?nmu?m m: Emma?? um?m mug?inns: QO?mm.? Um?m: man. .3 nor! gnaw: Eu} On? DE: man 3235: 833mg 0: man ?Era? 31 DE. Hm m?uqaii man mauqosm Em: 3:me Dmm?z Dug no=mnmna non?m amm?sma non?m DB. in; Dagmar?n may. mcmEuma: can?: On 3. Bus 8:230: non?m nqmumz?mn Ha ma?a? 832.53 a: Emumqm man 233: an 02. mN m??woii man ?5395 32m 3:35 $3.335. 10:2, 305% 33333.. mmsm? wan 333m On? 5 3313. union Suez? mannmum nancams? Gm?: 3592 ?.323, 26:3? 333. #03 EU- Eton?. m:n_ nmnranm. 3:253 Etna Cm magma mam??main? 33am Fan nuancn? On". musmm Ann 31:23 Fm. Emma hm? mono: .31 53235 Egan? .mnm. but. ?54263.3 ?Hm man acute: mocquamz? nOandDz mnzma :55 a oval 4341 2:3: mare: qul x.me 03. mm. manna?Una? Eh hm Page 67 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry bug?3.? N. wink .5553. 3.3m; mane: 3.59.3 Ea} Em: urwmm Hunt anal?u Fm} aim manna Emu min ?an?man 332122.?: Emanqzm man 3258 :3 3 On". 3133 .3 Emma-? Eimi mam?Em 23m: mom? Dug 3.52.0: 333$ 332% $335 man 1333 31m 3 03 mepm um?nmu?m m: Emma?? um?m mug?inns: QO?mm.? Um?m: man. .3 nor! gnaw: Eu} On? DE: man 3235: 833mg 0: man ?Era? 31 DE. Hm m?uqaii man mauqosm Em: 3:me Dmm?z Dug no=mnmna non?m amm?sma non?m DB. in; Dagmar?n may. mcmEuma: can?: On 3. Bus 8:230: non?m nqmumz?mn Ha ma?a? 832.53 a: Emumqm man 233: an 02. mN m??woii man ?5395 32m 3:35 $3.335. 10:2, 305% 33333.. mmsm? wan 333m On? 5 3313. union Suez? mannmum nancams? Gm?: 3592 ?.323, 26:3? 333. #03 EU- Eton?. m:n_ nmnranm. 3:253 Etna Cm magma mam??main? 33am Fan nuancn? On". musmm Ann 31:23 Fm. Emma hm? mono: .31 53235 Egan? .mnm. but. ?54263.3 ?Hm man acute: mocquamz? nOandDz mnzma :55 a oval 4341 2:3: mare: qul x.me 03. mm. manna?Una? Eh hm Page 67 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry what; .5533. ma?a: 359.2 trump. .me min 33 no.9. dam?En 3.11 ?u aim a. {0:33. .2 5.3.2 9.2.0: 333 .3 Guzman? 53255.?. On?. mem a $522.. .3 .93. .P .2 95 33.23% .25 macaw. 25. on. 3-3 51:95 5333 . mun?53113633 man. To {ocmm?? man 93m #31 ES. Ema?82.. mancamz?. mimic} 2.3532; 29. He. x. {0:3me 2:1 Smash 5.55 .P 3.5.: 3 01.11 lanai.? in $53 ES. ?czus? amalmm ?Emu?m Ea hm} uw?dnmum?m .: Elma?? almanac?Q m" .9333 ma?a: 5 0.1.3 ?.2.qu Dug nonmam m2. m5?.sz noaucn? Hi ?rum 9mm.? Eq?zm Snazm Dam an?.qu mcra?m?s Eva: taimm 333ng a: a3: 3.5? NH ragga lawn Etc: Own bzu A. mmtoaim 3.31.. 33332312.? mam _um Ham?um?m .: 1m azi?m mmum?: Umn aim 51.3203 5:33.20 w. can 5 manoiumum Eh Page 68 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry what; .5533. ma?a: 359.2 trump. .me min 33 no.9. dam?En 3.11 ?u aim a. {0:33. .2 5.3.2 9.2.0: 333 .3 Guzman? 53255.?. On?. mem a $522.. .3 .93. .P .2 95 33.23% .25 macaw. 25. on. 3-3 51:95 5333 . mun?53113633 man. To {ocmm?? man 93m #31 ES. Ema?82.. mancamz?. mimic} 2.3532; 29. He. x. {0:3me 2:1 Smash 5.55 .P 3.5.: 3 01.11 lanai.? in $53 ES. ?czus? amalmm ?Emu?m Ea hm} uw?dnmum?m .: Elma?? almanac?Q m" .9333 ma?a: 5 0.1.3 ?.2.qu Dug nonmam m2. m5?.sz noaucn? Hi ?rum 9mm.? Eq?zm Snazm Dam an?.qu mcra?m?s Eva: taimm 333ng a: a3: 3.5? NH ragga lawn Etc: Own bzu A. mmtoaim 3.31.. 33332312.? mam _um Ham?um?m .: 1m azi?m mmum?: Umn aim 51.3203 5:33.20 w. can 5 manoiumum Eh Page 68 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry what; .5533. ma?a: 359.2 trump. .me min 33 no.9. dam?En 3.11 ?u aim a. {0:33. .2 5.3.2 9.2.0: 333 .3 Guzman? 53255.?. On?. mem a $522.. .3 .93. .P .2 95 33.23% .25 macaw. 25. on. 3-3 51:95 5333 . mun?53113633 man. To {ocmm?? man 93m #31 ES. Ema?82.. mancamz?. mimic} 2.3532; 29. He. x. {0:3me 2:1 Smash 5.55 .P 3.5.: 3 01.11 lanai.? in $53 ES. ?czus? amalmm ?Emu?m Ea hm} uw?dnmum?m .: Elma?? almanac?Q m" .9333 ma?a: 5 0.1.3 ?.2.qu Dug nonmam m2. m5?.sz noaucn? Hi ?rum 9mm.? Eq?zm Snazm Dam an?.qu mcra?m?s Eva: taimm 333ng a: a3: 3.5? NH ragga lawn Etc: Own bzu A. mmtoaim 3.31.. 33332312.? mam _um Ham?um?m .: 1m azi?m mmum?: Umn aim 51.3203 5:33.20 w. can 5 manoiumum Eh Page 68 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry what; .5533. ma?a: 359.2 trump. .me min 33 no.9. dam?En 3.11 ?u aim a. {0:33. .2 5.3.2 9.2.0: 333 .3 Guzman? 53255.?. On?. mem a $522.. .3 .93. .P .2 95 33.23% .25 macaw. 25. on. 3-3 51:95 5333 . mun?53113633 man. To {ocmm?? man 93m #31 ES. Ema?82.. mancamz?. mimic} 2.3532; 29. He. x. {0:3me 2:1 Smash 5.55 .P 3.5.: 3 01.11 lanai.? in $53 ES. ?czus? amalmm ?Emu?m Ea hm} uw?dnmum?m .: Elma?? almanac?Q m" .9333 ma?a: 5 0.1.3 ?.2.qu Dug nonmam m2. m5?.sz noaucn? Hi ?rum 9mm.? Eq?zm Snazm Dam an?.qu mcra?m?s Eva: taimm 333ng a: a3: 3.5? NH ragga lawn Etc: Own bzu A. mmtoaim 3.31.. 33332312.? mam _um Ham?um?m .: 1m azi?m mmum?: Umn aim 51.3203 5:33.20 w. can 5 manoiumum Eh Page 68 SIGAR-14-69-SP Inquiry Letter: USDA Response to Soybean Inquiry what; .5353. 3.3m; mate: batman-Ex m. m5_cm=o: Dcm?azmama 00.523: gmix manna-??n. ma?a. 3 915.5 555% Kawasaki?533305 bmamamz? 3mm? 5.33? 5.33 10mm Em mhmE Emmi: MEN: Em. Eon?m3? mam 3 9m 3 Sin: Em?.an bm?mm?mnn SEWER mini 3 Sin: 33mg unzsimm 3:02 _ommnm__< :63 uaEmE mum mom: mgnmams? mmc?? twommnn guacamz? man gamma Snowman mmnosmicnw =Em?mz